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 ABBATIS THEODORI.  
 GENERE GRECI ARTE.  
 PHILOSOPHI. CV. IOH. VIRO.  
 ERVDITISSIMO. ROMANE  
 ECCLESIE. ARCHIDIACO  
 NO. GENERE. SCOTHO.



SCRIPTORES LATINI HIBERNIAE  
 VOLUME VII

IOHANNIS  
 SCOTTI ERIVGENAE  
*PERIPHYSEON*  
 (*De Diuisione Naturae*)

LIBER PRIMVS

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## FOREWORD AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

THE present work has grown out of an inquiry into Ireland's claim to have been the 'Island of Saints and Scholars', a proud title which, at the time when I began to examine it, now over thirty years ago, seemed to have declined into a cliché for satirists. My inquiry early revealed that over the figures of the past to whom Ireland owes that title, he whom we now know as Johannes Scottus Eriugena so predominates in interest, in importance, and in the sheer bulk of his extant writings, as alone to suffice for a lifetime of study. The interest lies in the fascinating spectacle of this elusive and controversial Irishman gliding in and out of the shadows of official disapproval; distinguished enough as a young man to be invited by prelates to defend the Faith against heresy; throwing himself with such abandon into the task that his attack upon damnable doctrine leant so far the other way as to be itself condemned; recovering from this setback sufficiently to be commissioned by his King with the solemn task of translating into Latin the works ascribed to the Patron Saint of France; falling as a consequence so completely under the spell of the Platonizing theology of the Greeks that he and all his works were declared anathema; vanishing thereafter into an oblivion fitfully illumined by the lurid glow reflected by the subsequent heresies that were fathered upon him; and finally, after being rescued from that by the publication of the first edition of his masterpiece at the end of the seventeenth century, placed upon the Index within four years of the publication; where he remained.

Of the importance and magnitude of his work no more need be said here than that by translating the Ps.-Dionysius he laid the foundations of Western Mysticism, and that his *Periphyseon*, running to more than half a million words, is the most impressive piece of philosophical writing between the ages of St. Augustine and St. Thomas. This alone may be considered sufficient justification for a new edition of it, the fourth. Of the first three, the third and best is to be found only in the pages of Migne's *Patrologia Latina*. It was published over a century ago and, like its predecessors, is mainly based on a manuscript of as late as the twelfth century. The present edition offers a text based wholly in the case of the first three books, and partially in the case of Books IV and V, on manuscripts contemporary with the author, two of which show signs of having actually passed through his hands.

In preparing it I have incurred debts of gratitude towards many, some so heavy that it embarrasses me not to see their names on the title-page. Mr. Alexander Dru, in a spirit of pure altruism (for his interests lie in a different philosophical field), took vigorous action to make it possible for me to be provided with books under the difficult conditions of military service during the war. Professor Hilary Armstrong was generous of his time in looking through the first draft of the translation, a herculean labour. Professor Bernhard Bischoff of Munich read through the text of Book I and offered suggestions of which, coming from the leading authority in the field, the value is inestimable. Dr. R. W. Hunt, Bodley's Keeper of Western MSS., showed immediate interest in the project as soon as he got wind of it, and has continued to offer valuable assistance (and here I gratefully acknowledge too the kindness and courtesy of his staff, and the gracious hospitality of the Bodleian Library itself). The Revd. Professor A. Gwynn, S.J., former President of the Royal Irish Academy, has been the presiding genius of this work, and to a very great extent its inspirer.

I have to thank too Professor J. J. O'Meara for his sympathy and interest, and important criticisms which have improved the text and translation of Book I; and many others who have helped me with advice and information, of whom I particularly recall Professor Daniel Binchy of the Dublin Institute for Advanced Studies and Dr. L. Minio-Paluello, Reader in Medieval Philosophy at the University of Oxford, both of whom have shown continuing interest in the progress of this work. Nor, in recalling the names of individuals, would I be so churlish as to pass over those of institutions. The Bodleian Library I have already mentioned; but my gratitude is due also to the London Library which allows me to borrow its books for long periods and carry them off to distant corners of the globe; to the British Council for its openly expressed sympathy towards, and interest in, the private studies of its officers; to the Dublin Institute for Advanced Studies for sponsoring this work.

I have left my greatest debt to the last. From the moment when I began seriously to tackle the problem of editing the text of the *Periphyseon* I have been remarkably favoured by the constant advice and most detailed criticism of Professor L. Bieler of University College, Dublin. Neither the modest reference on the title-page nor any words that I can find adequately express the meticulous care with which he has gone through the text line by line, purging it of the errors with which it abounded; no debt that I can pay would ever recompense the hours of precious time that he must have devoted to a task demanding a knowledge which he shares with few and a patience which, I am sure, he shares with none. I do not find it too

much to say that this work is as much his as mine. In so far as it is mine, one of the greatest rewards it has earned me has been the experience of the charity of scholars.

Athens

*The Feast of St. Mary Magdalene*

1964

*Postscriptum.* The interval that has elapsed between the time when the foregoing was written and the date of publication provides me with an opportunity of repairing omissions in the acknowledgements I have made. I should have mentioned, among others who may have slipped my memory, Professor C. W. Dugmore of King's College, London, who, by publishing my Eriugena bibliographies in the *Journal of Ecclesiastical History* (vols. x, 2 (1960) and xv, i (1965)), has made it possible for me to simplify the references to Eriugena's other works which appear in the footnotes of this edition of the *Periphyseon*; Dom P. Meyvaert, O.S.B., of Quarr Abbey for drawing my attention to his important discovery of what appears to be a hitherto unknown work of Eriugena, his version of the *Quaestiones ad Thalassium* of St. Maximus Confessor, extracts of which occur in the *Periphyseon* disguised as *Scholia Maximi*; M. Édouard Jeuneau of Paris, another worker in the same field, for his interest and for many illuminating conversations; and the encouragement I have received from Mlle M.-T. d'Alverny of the Bibliothèque Nationale.

It is through the good offices of the last that I have been able to include in this volume a frontispiece which contains, in effect, an imaginary portrait of the author. It is a reproduction of f. 3<sup>r</sup> of MS. Paris Bibl. nat. lat. 6734, s. xii, the earliest extant manuscript of the *Clavis physicae* of Honorius Augustodunensis, a work based upon the *Periphyseon* and retaining its dialogue form. The interlocutors are called M and D as in some of the later manuscripts of the *Periphyseon*. Evidently the artist identified the former with 'the Abbot Theodore' and the latter with Johannes.

The scroll held by Theodore is inscribed with the verse,

Dogmatis is lumen pendit per mentis acumen;

and that held by Johannes,

Inuolucrum rerum petit is fieri sibi clarum.

Mlle d'Alverny, who has reproduced and described the drawing in 'Le cosmos symbolique du xii<sup>e</sup> siècle', *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge*, xx, 1953, notes the interesting fact that William of St. Thierry records the use of the rare (but classical) word 'inuolucrum' as one of Eriugena's affectations, though it

nowhere appears in his extant writings. I owe Mlle d'Alverny a further debt of gratitude, incurred too late to note its substance in the proper place, for drawing my attention to what appears to be another twelfth-century manuscript of the whole or part of Book I of the *Periphyseon*. It is in the Library at Admont, and is described anonymously in the catalogue as 'Dialogus de s. Trinitate'. It consists of 62 folios.

At the same time the Revd. N. Haring, S.A.C., informed Professor Bieler that MS. Harley 3851 in the British Museum contains an epitome of the work. One gathering at the beginning and an unknown number of gatherings at the end are missing. What is left now constitute the first 40 folios of the Harley MS., and were found by Fr. Haring to epitomize i. 39–iii. 13 of the *Periphyseon*. The text is provided with lemmata which do not, at a rapid glance, appear to correspond either with those of the Reims or with those of the Bamberg MSS.

Kensington,  
Epiphany, 1966

## INTRODUCTION TO BOOKS I–III

### I. THE AUTHOR

LITTLE is known of the life of the author of the *Periphyseon*, and no fresh biographical information has come to light since the publication of Dom Maëul Cappuyns's exhaustive study in 1933.<sup>1</sup> Only a few words are necessary here to establish a background. That his name was John we know from contemporary manuscripts;<sup>2</sup> and to this was usually added the cognomen<sup>3</sup> which indicated his origin, Scottus,<sup>4</sup> or occasionally Scottigena.<sup>5</sup> But the name which distinguishes him from all the other Johns and all the other Scots, Eriugena, was devised by himself on the occasion of his translation of the Ps.-Dionysius, probably after the analogy of the Virgilian *Graingena*, which occurs in one of his poems.<sup>6</sup> He was not regularly referred to by this name until the seventeenth century, when, in the form 'Erigena'<sup>7</sup> and added as a third name to 'Johannes Scottus', it

<sup>1</sup> See list of sources in section 6 (iii) below.

<sup>2</sup> Vat. Reg. lat. 251 and 1587, f. 63<sup>r</sup>; Laon 444; St. Paul in Carinthia, 25. 2. 31; Berne 363 and 258; Dresden Misc. A, 145B; Avranches 235; St. Gall, Stiftsbibl. 274 (see below, pp. 14–15).

<sup>3</sup> 'Scottus' was not then thought of as a surname, but as a generic epithet = *genere Scottus* (Cappuyns, p. 3).

<sup>4</sup> This spelling is more ancient and more correct than *Scotus*. It predominates in MSS. until the end of the tenth century or later: e.g. Laon 444, f. 294<sup>v</sup>; Vat. Reg. lat. 240 and 1709, f. 16<sup>v</sup>; Paris, Bibl. nat. lat. 12949, ff. 12<sup>r</sup>, 23 *bis*, 42<sup>r</sup>; Wolfenbüttel Gud. lat. F. 70; Cambridge Corp. Christ. 223; St. Gall Stiftsbibl. 274; Berlin Phillippis 1817; Leiden Voss. lat. 88, f. 22<sup>v</sup>. See also *Gesta episcoporum Antiodorensium*, PL cxxxviii. 253c = MGH SS xiii (G. Waitz), p. 399.

<sup>5</sup> Hincmar, *De praedestinatione*, xxi, PL cxxv. 296c; Anastasius the Librarian, *Epist. ad Carol.*, PL cxxii. 1027; Gautbertus the Grammarian; MS. Brit. Mus. Add. 11035. For the form see Sedulius Scottus, MGH, *Poet. lat.* iii. 1, pp. 197 and 201.

<sup>6</sup> PL cxxii. 1236A. This is more likely than that it was composed directly from the Gaelic *Ériu*. *Graingena* is also found in Columbanus, *Ad Fídelium*, 119. Cf. also ΓΡΑΜΜΑΤΑ ΓΡΑΙΥΓΕΝΩΝ in a poem by an anonymous Irishman, Traube, MGH, *Poet. lat.* iii. 686, where the Y suggests that this Greek word is a 'calque' on the Latin (information supplied by Professor Bieler).

<sup>7</sup> 'Eriugena' is the spelling in the oldest and best MSS. of the Dionysian versions: Berne 19, s. ix; Berlin Phill. 1668, s. ix; Cologne Dombibliothek 30, s. xi; Florence Gadd. Pl. 89, sup. 15, s. xi; Cambridge, Trin. Coll. B. 2. 31, s. xii; Cambridge, Corp. Christ. D 9, s. xiii. 'Erigena' is found in the twelfth-century catalogue of Cluny (M. Manitius, 'Geschichtliches aus mittelalterlichen Bibliothekskatalogen', *Neues Archiv*, xxxii (1907), 678–9) and the thirteenth-century MS. Lilienfeld 128 (C. Schimek, 'Verzeichnis der Handschriften des Stiftes Lilienfeld', *Xenia Bernardina*, ii. 1 (Vienna, 1891), p. 521). Gale may have adopted this form from Peter Alixius, who has inscribed it on the fly-leaf of Paris, Bibl. nat. lat. 12964 (see below, p. 13). 'Herigene' occurs in a Saint-Pons-de-Tomières catalogue of 1276 (Manitius, loc. cit.), cf. Hincmar, PL cxxv. 296. 'Ierugena', the form favoured by Floss (PL cxxii, p. xix) and Henry Bett, *Johannes Scotus Erigena* (Cambridge, 1925), p. 2, is found in a secondary group of MSS.; cf. Sheldon-Williams, 'A Bibliography

appears in Archbishop Ussher's *Sylloge*<sup>1</sup> and in Thomas Gale's edition of the present work. To attach the name Eriugena to works other than the Dionysian translations is not strictly correct, and Floss removed it from his edition in the *Patrologia Latina*. Nevertheless, it is both well known (in the form 'Erigena') and distinctive, and is therefore used here.<sup>2</sup>

Eriugena, then, was called by others, and was proud to call himself, an Irishman; and nobody since his first editor has seriously doubted that he was. He was born in Ireland in the first quarter of the ninth century,<sup>3</sup> but, for one reason or another,<sup>4</sup> left his country some time before 847, the year in which Prudentius became Bishop of Troyes,<sup>5</sup> since the latter, writing to Eriugena about the *De praedestinatione*,<sup>6</sup> refers to the period of their former friendship before his consecration. Another of Eriugena's friends at that time was Wulfad, who became successively Abbot of Montiérendon in 856, Abbot of Soissons in 858, and eventually Archbishop of Bourges; it is to him that, in one of the manuscripts, the *Periphyseon* is dedicated.<sup>7</sup>

Eriugena was then at the Royal Court, where he was known as of the Works of Johannes Scottus Eriugena', *Journal of Ecclesiastical History*, x (1959) (hereafter referred to as 'Bibl. '), 217.

<sup>1</sup> J. Ussher, *Veterum epistolarum Hibernicarum sylloge* (Dublin, 1632), p. 57.

<sup>2</sup> E is sometimes called Chrysostomos, as by Honorius Augustodunensis, *de lum. ecll. siue de script. ecll.* iii. 12, PL clxxii. 222C, and in two manuscripts of his *Clavis Physicae*, for which see note to frontispiece; Anselm of Laon (below, p. 9); and in the twelfth-century catalogue of Michelsberg near Bamberg (below, *ibid.*).

<sup>3</sup> H. von Schubert, *Geschichte der christlichen Kirche im Frühmittelalter* (Tübingen, 1921), p. 463; A. Rivet, *Histoire littéraire de France*, v (1866), p. 416; Cappuyns, p. 9; between 800 and 815 according to Th. Christlieb, *Leben und Lehre des Johannes Scotus Erigena* (Gotha, 1860), p. 21; J. Huber, *Johannes Scotus Erigena* (Munich, 1861), p. 42; F. Vernet, 'Érigène', *Dict. théol. cat.* v (Paris, 1913), p. 402; Bett, p. 3; in 828 according to Schlüter in his edition of the *Periphyseon*, p. 111.

<sup>4</sup> William of Malmesbury's *concrepantibus undique bellorum fragoribus* (*Gest. reg.* ii. 122) has been interpreted as the cause instead of the attendant circumstances of his emigration, and as referring to the Danish raids on Ireland instead of the disturbances in the Frankish kingdom; and this, combined with the statement in the seventeenth-century *Life of St. Buo* (J. Colgan, *Acta Sanctorum Hiberniae* (Louvain, 1645), p. 256) that the Church in Ireland, even while suffering under this blight, continued to flourish sufficiently to send forth missionaries, including 'Beatus Ioannes Erigena', to other countries, has led to the belief that E was fleeing from the Danes; cf. F. E. Warren, *The Antiphony of Bangor*, i (London, 1893), p. xiii. While this is possible, there is no reason to search for a cause for E's arrival in France beyond the *consuetudo peregrinandi* which Walafrid Strabo recognizes as the Irishman's second nature (*Vita Sancti Galli*, ii. 46, MGH, *Script. rer. merou.* iv. 336, 5 sq. = PL cxiv. 1029C).

<sup>5</sup> M. Manitius, *Geschichte der lateinischen Literatur des Mittelalters*, i (Munich, 1911), p. 324; A. Gardner, *Studies in John the Scot (Erigena): a Philosopher of the Dark Ages* (London, 1900), p. 12; Bett, p. 3.

<sup>6</sup> Prudentius, *De praedestinatione*, i, PL cxv. 1012D.

<sup>7</sup> PL cxxii. 1022A 13. Henceforward the volume no. of PL will, as a rule, be omitted for references to E's work. Wulfad's name is found in only one MS., Paris Bibl. nat. lat. 12965.

*scholasticus et eruditus*.<sup>1</sup> The former epithet has been taken to mean that he was a teacher in the Palace School,<sup>2</sup> but without more evidence it would be bold to assert that the word has here its technical meaning.<sup>3</sup> However, he was certainly a teacher later when he moved to Laon, where he counted among his pupils Wicbald, Bishop of Auxerre 879-87, and Helias, Bishop of Angoulême between 861/2 and 875. If a teacher, he was, one would have presumed, a cleric,<sup>4</sup> but, although he must have received an ecclesiastical education,<sup>5</sup> he does not appear to have taken orders. Prudentius states that he was *nullis ecclesiasticis gradibus insignitus*,<sup>6</sup> and usually describes him simply as *quidam uir*.

At Laon he and his fellow countryman Martin became the principals of what almost amounted to a university. They were renowned Grecians, and the study of Greek had a place in the curriculum. Eriugena's move to Laon could not have occurred before 851/2, for he was still at the Palace when, in that year, he was invited by Hincmar, Archbishop of Rheims, and Pardulus, Bishop of Laon, to refute the predestinarian errors of Godescalc.<sup>7</sup> In response he wrote for them<sup>8</sup> his first important work, the *De praedestinatione*. But Eriugena was far too reckless and independent a writer to enter the field of contemporary theological controversy,<sup>9</sup> and went so far in the opposite direction to Godescalc that his book was attacked by, among others, the very patrons who had commissioned it,<sup>10</sup> and finally condemned at the Councils of Valence, January 855, and of Langres, May 859. Perhaps his withdrawal to Laon was connected with these events; but he was not in disgrace, or did not remain so for long. Shortly before 860 he was asked by Charles the Bald to make a new translation of the writings attributed to Dionysius the Areopagite, of which a copy<sup>11</sup> had been presented to Charles's father, Louis the Debonair, by the Emperor Michael the Stammerer in 827. The codex had been deposited in the abbey of St. Denis,<sup>12</sup> and a translation had already been made under the direction of the abbot, Hilduin. But it

<sup>1</sup> Florus Diaconus (?), *Adu. Iohannis Scotti erroneas definitiones*, PL cxix. 103A; cf. PL cxxii. 355A.

<sup>2</sup> R. L. Poole, 'Scotus', *DNB* xvii. 1054; Kenney, *Sources*, p. 571.

<sup>3</sup> Cappuyns, p. 64, n. 1.

<sup>4</sup> Kenney, *loc. cit.*

<sup>5</sup> Manitius, *op. cit.* i. 324; Vernet, *art. cit.*, p. 402.

<sup>6</sup> Prudentius, *op. cit.* iii, PL cxv. 1043A.

<sup>7</sup> Ebo of Grenoble (?), *Liber de iii epistolis*, xxxix, PL cxxi. 1052A; É. Gilson, *La Philosophie au moyen âge*, 2nd ed. (Paris, 1947), p. 201.

<sup>8</sup> The *De praed.* is dedicated to the two bishops; see PL 355A.

<sup>9</sup> Cappuyns, p. 111.

<sup>10</sup> PL cxv. 1009; cxix. 101; cxxi. 985, 1052; cxxii. 355; cxxv. 51, 225, 296, 313; H. Schrörs, *Hinkmar Erzbischof von Rheims* (Freiburg i. Br., 1884), pp. 117, 122, 137, n. 30, 173; L. Traube, 'Iohannis Scotti Carmina', MGH, *Poet. lat.* iii. 520, n. 1.

<sup>11</sup> MS. Paris, Bibl. nat. gr. 437.

<sup>12</sup> S. Denis of France was identified with the Areopagite.

was unsatisfactory in many ways,<sup>1</sup> and was never widely used. Eriugena approached the task of making a new one with some diffidence,<sup>2</sup> but nevertheless completed it within the years 860–2,<sup>3</sup> and almost immediately afterwards<sup>4</sup> undertook, also at the King's request, the translation of another Greek text that had somehow found its way to France, the *First Ambigua* of St. Maximus the Confessor. He set about this task with greater confidence, and did not require the incentive of a royal behest to make at least three more translations from the Greek: another work of Maximus, the *Quaestiones ad Thalassium*;<sup>5</sup> the *De hominis officio* of St. Gregory of Nyssa<sup>5a</sup>; and the *Ancoratus* of Epiphanius.

He emerged from these labours with his faculties deepened, his learning broadened, and his opinions reorientated. Before he undertook the work of translating the Ps.-Dionysius, he had been not much more than a 'grammarian', confining his speculations, mostly logical and dialectical, to commentaries on the works of others, and his culture had been almost exclusively Latin;<sup>6</sup> as it is still found to be even in Book I of the *Periphyseon*, except for the closing chapters. But he learnt from the Greeks to look at things in a way which was new to him and to the Latin West. The Platonic tradition which had flowed more purely and more richly through the teaching of the Eastern than of the Western Fathers<sup>7</sup> liberated him from the confines of logic and dialectic and opened up wider fields of speculation. The 'grammarian' had put forth wings and developed into a philosopher.

Little more is known of Eriugena. Besides the writings already mentioned, there survive a number of poems of no literary merit, produced at different times during the course of his life, towards the end of which, according to William of Malmesbury,<sup>8</sup> he came to England and taught at Malmesbury. William was a conscientious historian and there seems no reason for disbelieving him in this,<sup>9</sup>

<sup>1</sup> P. G. Théry, 'Scot Érigène traducteur de Denys', *Bulletin du Cange*, vi (Paris, 1931), p. 189. Théry edited Hilduin's version in *Études dionysiennes*, ii (Paris, 1937).

<sup>2</sup> Cf. PL 1031C, 1032B.

<sup>3</sup> Sheldon-Williams, 'Bibl.', p. 203.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 204.

<sup>5</sup> Dom Paul Meyvaert, 'The exegetical treatises of Peter the Deacon and Eriugena's rendering of the Ad Thalassium of Maximus the Confessor', *Sacris Erudiri* xiv (1963), pp. 130–48.

<sup>5a</sup> Published by Dom M. Cappeluyns, 'Le "De imagine" de Grégoire de Nysse traduit par Jean Scot Érigène', *Rech. théol. anc. et méd.*, xxxii (1965), pp. 205–262.

<sup>6</sup> P. Jacquin, 'Le Néoplatonisme de Jean Scot', *Revue des Sciences philosophiques et théologiques*, i (1907), pp. 674–85; J. Dräseke, 'Zum Neoplatonismus Eriegenas', *Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte*, xxxiii B (Gotha, 1912), pp. 73–84; id., 'Sur la question des sources d'Anselme', *Revue de Philosophie*, xv (July–Dec. 1909), p. 645.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. PL 1031C, 1196C.

<sup>8</sup> Will. Malmesb., *Gesta regum*, ii. 122, 189 sq. Hardy = *Epistola ad Petrum*, ed. W. Stubbs, Preface to Hardy's ed. of the *Gest. reg.* i (London, 1887), p. cxliii.

<sup>9</sup> R. L. Poole, *Illustrations of the History of Medieval Thought and Learning*, 2nd ed. (1920) rev. (New York, n.d.), p. 285.

whatever we may think of his account of Eriugena's end, according to which his pupils stabbed him to death with their styles (*grafis*);<sup>1</sup> to which a pleasing, but wholly apocryphal, sequel is still related in Dublin: when asked why they had done it they replied, 'Because he forced us to think'.

## 2. THE BOOK

The philosophical works of Eriugena have been compared by Dom Cappeluyns to a triptych, of which the side panels are the Commentaries on St. John's Gospel and the *Celestial Hierarchy* of the Ps.-Dionysius, and the centre-piece the dialogue which he called *Periphyseon* but which is usually known as the *De diuisione naturae*. This is a work which developed gradually into something very different from what seems to have been its original conception. Four stages are discernible in this development:

(i) An essay in dialectic, perhaps abandoned before completion, in which the genus Nature, by which is meant all that is and all that is not, is divided into four species: that which creates but is not created; that which is created and creates; that which is created but does not create; and that which neither is created nor creates. No manuscript of this primitive version survives, but evidence of it may be seen in Book I of the final version. Apparently only Latin sources were used, chiefly St. Augustine, Boethius, Martianus Capella, and Ps.-Augustine, *De categoriis decem*.<sup>2</sup>

(ii) The next stage is found in the earliest extant manuscript, Rheims 875 (R), which was evidently copied from an earlier one.<sup>3</sup> Here we have in substance the great work that has come down to us, running to five books<sup>4</sup> and, from the end of Book I onwards, relying heavily on Greek sources. Although the quadripartite division of Nature is retained as a framework for the discourse, its importance is secondary to the Platonic theme of the descent of the soul and its return to God, which Eriugena had learnt from St. Gregory of Nyssa, the Ps.-Dionysius, and St. Maximus. The text bears the superscription *Περὶ φύσεως μερισμοῦ*, but the manuscript is not known by this name in the catalogues, nor is it used in the description of the manuscript which was written on the fly-leaf in the fifteenth century.<sup>5</sup> This superscription seems to be the relic of a quickly

<sup>1</sup> On this story see L. Bieler, 'Vindicta scholarium', *Serta philologica Aemipontana* (Innsbruck, 1961), pp. 383–5.

<sup>2</sup> i.e. the 'Themistian Paraphrase' edited by L. Minio-Paluello, *Aristoteles latinus*, i, 1–5 *Categoriae uel Praedicamenta* (Bruges–Paris, 1961), pp. 129–75.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. notes on text 65, 99, 107, 173.

<sup>4</sup> The MS. is now incomplete, ending in the middle of Bk. IV, but it is clear both from references in the marginalia and from the evidence of MSS. deriving from it that it originally contained a fifth book.

<sup>5</sup> See below, p. 11.

abandoned scheme to divide the work into chapters. The title of one of these survives at f. 13<sup>v</sup>, written in majuscule and occupying a whole line of the text: DE NATURA CREANTE ET NON CREATA. It bears the number II, but there is now no trace of a number I, for which the only place would be before the only other title, ΠΕΡΙ ΦΥΣΕΩΣ ΜΕΡΙΣΜΟΥ. The first page of the manuscript has been much exposed to wear and tear, and it would be quite possible for a figure I to have been obliterated. If this be the case, the Greek title designates not the whole book, but only the first chapter, to which in fact it is more appropriate, for this chapter expounds the method of the division of nature and acts as a general introduction to the four divisions, the first of which is dealt with in Chapter II. On this hypothesis R bears no title;<sup>1</sup> nevertheless it will be referred to, by anticipation, as *Periphyseon A*.

(iii) The next development emerges on the margins of R in the form of enlargements which were incorporated into the text in a manuscript of which the part containing Books I–III survives as Bamberg Ph. 2/1 (B). This recension is referred to as *Periphyseon B*.

(iv) Finally, marginalia similar to those of R, and in the same hand as most of them, were added to B, thus constituting a fourth recension. The same hand supplied this manuscript with a set of lemmata and the title *Περὶ φύσεως*, which here appears for the first time. Two of the lemmata correspond to the two titles which were found in R, the second in the same position as in R, the first, in the Latin form *De diuisione naturae*, shifted down a few lines so as not to include the general definition of Nature with which the dialogue opens. The enlargements of B are in turn included in the text of a group of Paris manuscripts mostly originating from Laon (P) which also preserve the lemmata and the title *Περὶ φύσεως*. This final recension is referred to as *Periphyseon C*. (There are also a number of interpolations in the P-text, none of which is demonstrably authentic, and some of which are plainly unacceptable.)

This final recension still preserves the basic structure of the quadripartite division, as can be seen by the following synopsis:

(i) *Introduction: On the Division of Nature* (Chapter I in R). Definition of the genus Nature. Classification into four species (Bk. I. 1–10 = 441A–451C).

(ii) *First Species: That which is not created but creates*, i.e. God as Efficient Cause (Chapter II in R) (Bk. I. 11–78 = 451C–524B). Includes a digression on the first eight Categories (22–61 = 469A–504A).

(iii) *Second Species: That which is created and creates* (Bks. II. 1–III. 4 = 523D–634A). After a brief recapitulation (1–2 = 523D–

<sup>1</sup> On the title see below, pp. 9–10.

528C) the second species is shown to be the Primordial Causes = the Platonic Forms.

(iv) *Third Species: That which is created but does not create*, i.e. the material universe (Bks. III. 5–IV. 26 = 634A–860B).

(v) *Fourth Species: That which is not created and does not create*, i.e. God as Final Cause (Bks. IV. 27–V. 40 = 860B–1022C).

But this scheme is subordinate and not always relevant to the speculations which clothe it. For instance, the last section deals not so much with God as End as with the return of created nature thereto.

It is not easy to assign dates to a work that has evolved in this way. The first draft could belong to Eriugena's early period before he became acquainted with the Greek Fathers, but *Periphyseon A* must have been written after the first version<sup>1</sup> of his translation of the Ps.-Dionysius and after those of Maximus and Gregory, from all of which it quotes extensively: that is to say, not much, if at all, before 864, the latest possible date for the Maximus translation. On the other hand, the terms in which he refers, at the end of the book, to Wulfad, *frater in Christo, in studiis cooperator*<sup>2</sup> (if this was part of the original text, for the only evidence for it is in P, since the Bamberg MS. Ph. 2/2, which is probably a copy of the missing part of B, has a different form of dedication which does not mention Wulfad, and R does not extend as far as this), would not have been appropriate after Wulfad's elevation to the archbishopric of Bourges in the autumn of 866. The only certain *terminus ad quem*, however, is Eriugena's *Expositiones in Caelestem Ierarchiam*, which refers to the *Periphyseon* by name.

All the manuscripts so far mentioned are of the ninth century, and could have been copied in the author's lifetime. Half a century ago Traube made the interesting suggestion<sup>4</sup> that the hand in which most of the enlargements to R and all of those in B are written is Eriugena's autograph. This has been disputed<sup>5</sup> on the following grounds:

(i) The enlargements contain errors which Eriugena would not have perpetrated.

(ii) Some of the R-enlargements are not in this hand, and some are

<sup>1</sup> Sheldon-Williams, 'Bibl.', p. 206.

<sup>2</sup> PL 1022A 13–14. See p. 2, n. 7.

<sup>3</sup> At ii. 6, PL 168A 1; iv. 4, MS. Douai 202, f. 37<sup>v</sup> ap. H. Dondaine, 'Les "Expositiones super Ierarchiam caelestem" de Jean Scot Érigène', *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge*, xviii (1950–1, Paris, 1951), p. 263; xi. 2, PL 230B 7–8.

<sup>4</sup> L. Traube, 'Paläographische Forschungen, V.: Autographa des Johannes Scottus, aus dem Nachlass herausgegeben von E. K. Rand', *Abhandl. der Kgl. Bay. Akad. der Wiss., Philos.-philol. Cl. XXVI. 1*, Munich, 1912.

<sup>5</sup> E. K. Rand, 'Supposed Autographa of John the Scot', *University of California Publications in Classical Philology*, v (1920), pp. 135–41.



in hands in which parts of the text are written, and sometimes an enlargement, like the text itself, is the work of more than one hand: it may begin in the 'Eriugena' hand (*C*) and continue in the hand of the text (*sR*),<sup>1</sup> and on one occasion<sup>2</sup> *sR* interchanges twice with *C* in the same enlargement.

Three possible explanations were suggested for these phenomena:

- (i) The text of *R* was submitted to a team of revisers under the chairmanship of the writer of the *C* hand.
- (ii) The enlargements were copied from amplifications already made by Eriugena on the exemplar from which *R* was copied.
- (iii) They were added to the manuscript under Eriugena's direction, but not in his own hand.

The second explanation no more accounts for the changes of hand than does Traube's, and in any case is not tenable unless we are to suppose that the scribes of *R* copied so mechanically that they placed in the margin of the copy whatever they found in the margin of the exemplar, even when the marginalia were obviously intended to be part of the text. Moreover, even where the hand is not *C* it is seldom the same as that of the text it accompanies. The first solution is not incompatible with Eriugena's having written some, at least, of the enlargements, which is all that Traube claimed; and the third, like the second, admits that they were not added without his authority. As to the arguments against Traube's theory, the first may be dismissed at once, since the greatest scholars make careless mistakes when they scribble notes in the margins of books, and the errors in the enlargements are of this type. The second assumes that Eriugena invariably wrote in the same hand, but this need not have been the case.

On the other hand, Traube's theory is strengthened by the fact that the *C* hand is found again not only in *B*, but also in another Eriugena manuscript of the ninth century, Laon 81, where enlargements similar to those of *RB* are added to the fragments of Eriugena's Commentary on St. John's Gospel, and in a Leiden manuscript of Martianus Capella,<sup>3</sup> on whom Eriugena wrote a commentary,<sup>4</sup> and of whom he made extensive use in Book I of the *Periphyseon*, where most of the enlargements in *R* occur.<sup>5</sup>

Whosoever the hand that wrote these enlargements, there can be little doubt but that the matter is Eriugena's even when the hand is not *C*. Although they do not as a rule affect the argument, being for the most part qualifications of statements made in the text, or

<sup>1</sup> e.g. pp. 132, 2-12; 152, 13-30.

<sup>2</sup> Fol. 285<sup>v</sup>.

<sup>3</sup> Recently identified by Professor Bischoff.

<sup>4</sup> Sheldon-Williams, 'Bibl.', pp. 200-2.

<sup>5</sup> A list of the enlargements to Bk. I is given in the Appendix, pp. 247-69.

elaborations, or illustrations to point the meaning, all bear the stamp of authority. To say that Eriugena is not the author would amount to saying that he is no more than part author of the *Periphyseon*.

Since the lemmata and the title in *B* are also written in the *C* hand, it is reasonable to suppose that these too were added to this manuscript on Eriugena's authority, and that therefore *Περὶ φύσεως* is the title which the author himself chose for his work. Other evidence points to the same conclusion: it is the name by which Eriugena refers to the work elsewhere,<sup>1</sup> and by which it was known to friends, contemporaries, and later authorities up to the time of its condemnation in the thirteenth century, after which no more is heard of it until modern times. In a ninth-century manuscript of Eriugena's translation of the *Ambigua* there is a catalogue of books belonging to his friend Wulfad, which includes, among other writings of Eriugena, the entry 'Libri perifision I. I.'<sup>2</sup> Similar entries occur in the ninth-century catalogue of St. Gildas<sup>3</sup> and the twelfth-century catalogue of Michelsberg near Bamberg,<sup>4</sup> while a catalogue of S. Bertin<sup>5</sup> has 'Erifeson Ioannis Scoti'. Honorius Augustodunensis informs us that *Ioannes Scotus uel Chrysostomos scripsit eleganti stylo librum Perifiseon, id est de natura omnium rerum*,<sup>6</sup> and the glossator of Porphyry who seems to call himself *Icpa*<sup>7</sup> recommends: *Lege periphyseon*.<sup>8</sup> Anselm of Laon speaks of *liber qui intitatur perifision quem Crisostomus dicitur fecisse*.<sup>9</sup> In the thirteenth century Cardinal Henry of Ostia found that the heresies of Amalric of Bena were based on a book of Johannes Scottus called *Periphyseon, id est de natura*,<sup>10</sup> although in the act of condemnation it seems to have been called *perifisis*, i.e. *Περὶ φύσεως*:<sup>11</sup> *Nuper . . . est quidam liber perifisis titulatus inuentus, totus scatens uermibus heretice prauitatis*.<sup>12</sup>

But since the name *Periphyseon* (to avoid the inconvenience of Greek characters) appears for the first time in *B*, other copies of *R*, and other manuscripts not influenced by *B*, will not carry it. They will either be anonymous and sometimes subsequently provided (like

<sup>1</sup> See p. 7.

<sup>2</sup> MS. Paris, Mazarine 561, f. 219.

<sup>3</sup> Th. Gottlieb, *Ueber mittelalterliche Bibliotheken* (Leipzig, 1890), p. 144.

<sup>4</sup> C. Becker, *Catalogi bibliothecarum antiqui* (Bonn, 1885), nos. 80, 102-3.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, no. 77, 212.

<sup>6</sup> Honor. August., *De lumin. eccl.* iii. 12, PL clxxii. 222C.

<sup>7</sup> Perhaps Hucbald or Wicbald of Saint-Amand, a fellow student of Remigius and Heiric; see Cappuyns, p. 72.

<sup>8</sup> *Glossae in Porphyrium* 130, ed. C. Baeumker and B. S. von Waltershausen (Münster, 1924), p. 34 (*Beitr. zur Gesch. der Philosophie des MA*, xxiv. 1).

<sup>9</sup> Anselm of Laon, *Sententie diuine pagine*, ed. F. Bliemetzrieder (Münster, 1919), p. 22 (*Beitr. zur Gesch. der Philosophie des MA*, xviii. 2-3).

<sup>10</sup> J. Huber, *Joh. Scot. Erig.*, pp. 435-6; Gieseler, *Ecclesiastical History*, iii. 299; Bett, p. 176.

<sup>11</sup> Cf. Nicolas of Cues, *Opera* (Basel, 1565), pp. 70-73.

<sup>12</sup> Honorius III, letter of 23 Jan. 1225 confirming the condemnation, *Epistola ad archiepiscopos et episcopos*, PL cxxii. 439-40.

R itself)<sup>1</sup> with more or less appropriate titles by the librarians, e.g. *Liber physiologiae Iohannis Scottigenae*,<sup>2</sup> *De decem categoriis in Deum*,<sup>3</sup> *Dialogus Iohannis Scoti de hiis que sunt et que non sunt, de distinctionibus, diuisionibus et differentiis et ceteris ratiocinationibus*,<sup>4</sup> etc.; or they will take their name from the first chapter heading, *Περὶ φύσεως μερισμοῦ*. A twelfth-century manuscript bearing this title (or something approximating to it) found its way to England, probably either to Hereford or to Malmesbury,<sup>5</sup> where it, or a copy of it, was seen by William of Malmesbury and was one of the sources of his knowledge of Eriugena and his work. William wrote a preface to it in the form of a letter to a certain Peter,<sup>6</sup> and with this letter prefixed to it the manuscript came, in the seventeenth century, into the possession of Thomas Gale, the first editor of the text. The two documents subsequently became separated: the *Epistola ad Petrum* is in the British Museum,<sup>7</sup> the *Periphyseon* at Trinity College, Cambridge.<sup>8</sup> In this manuscript, as in the letter prefixed to it, the work is referred to both as *Περὶ φύσεων* and *Περὶ φύσεως μερισμοῦ* (with other variants in both Greek and Latin), but it begins with the words *Incipit Liber primus peri fiseon [sic] merismou .i. de diuisione naturae*, and consequently Gale adopted for his edition the title *De diuisione naturae*. The editors who followed him did the same, and so it came about that a title which probably was never intended for the whole work, and which is so used only in manuscripts of late date, has usurped the place of that which is found in manuscripts of the highest authority, and by which the work was known to all, including its author, from the ninth to the thirteenth century.

### 3. THE MANUSCRIPTS

R *Rheims* 875, formerly I. 679,<sup>9</sup> s. ix,<sup>10</sup> parchment, 357 ff. + a quarter-leaf inserted after f. 265, in 45 gatherings originally numbered at the bottom of the verso of the last folio of each in Greek characters

<sup>1</sup> See below, p. 11.

<sup>2</sup> MS. Brit. Mus. Addit. 11035, f. 9<sup>r</sup>.

<sup>3</sup> Hugh of St. Victor, *Eruditionis didascalicon*, iii, PL clxxvi. 765.

<sup>4</sup> Cluny catalogue *ap.* L. Delisle, *Le Cabinet des manuscrits de la Bibl. nat.* ii (Paris, 1874), p. 476, no. 455.

<sup>5</sup> See below, p. 20.

<sup>6</sup> *Epistola ad Petrum*, printed by Gale among the *Testimonia* to his edition of the *Periphyseon*, by Stubbs in his preface to Hardy's edition of the *Gesta regum* (London, 1887), pp. cxliii–cxlvi, and by Poole, *op. cit.*, pp. 276–9.

<sup>7</sup> MS. Royal App. 85, no. 6. The letter is written on the inner sides of two folios of the same size in the same hand with the same number of lines to the column as the Cambridge MS. (see next note) of the *Periphyseon*.

<sup>8</sup> MS. Cambridge, Trin. Coll. O. 5. 20.

<sup>9</sup> H. Loriquet, *Catalogue générale des mss. des bibliothèques publiques de France*, xxxix: Reims, ii. 1 (Paris, 1904), pp. 191–2.

<sup>10</sup> So Cappuyens; s. x, according to Loriquet.

contemporary with the text. These Greek letters are still visible at the ends of gatherings 13, 14, 16, 28–44. Subsequently they were replaced by roman numerals, sometimes preceded by Q (i.e. Quaternio). The gatherings are normally of 8 folios, and the first four (ff. 1–32) are composed of smaller folios than the rest. The folios are numbered 1–358, with no. 184 omitted. The codex is bound in very worn white calf covering wooden boards. On ff. 1–32 there are 17 long lines to the page, 18 on the rest; they are written in three or four different hands. The 27th gathering has been lost, and is now replaced by ff. 212–17 written in a twelfth-century hand: 212<sup>r</sup>–217<sup>r</sup> (where the text occupies only two-thirds of the page) contain PL 686B 9–696A 7 *Absentia namque . . . praedicto sensui*; 217<sup>v</sup> contains 685A 2–686A 3 *A. Nec ego . . . mihi uidetur*, which is an enlargement to the text of f. 211<sup>v</sup>, where it is indicated by a *signe de renvoi*. It must have originally been written on the margin of the first page of the missing gathering.

Many enlargements are written in the margins, either in the hand C attributed to Eriugena,<sup>1</sup> described by Professor Bieler as 'a pointed Irish minuscule of a very characteristic ductus' or by sC, a scribe or scribes writing from the enlarger's dictation. Lemmata have been added in the same hand which wrote the text replacing the missing gathering (*Rm*). These are older than the Roman numerals which renumber the gatherings.

Ff. 1–80 = Bk. I; 81–150 = Bk. II; 151–263<sup>r</sup> = Bk. III; 263<sup>v</sup>–358<sup>v</sup> = Bk. IV as far as 855D 5 *rationabilibus animi motibus in his*, after which several gatherings have been lost. On the recto of the fly-leaf is a memorandum dated 16 May 1412 and signed by Gilles Aspremont stating that the text has a title in Greek characters and is a treatise on the Categories by a great theologian;<sup>2</sup> on the verso in a bold eighteenth-century hand: *Tractatus Philosophicus de Anima*, and below, in a smaller hand: *et de primo capite geneseos in modo dialogi*. At the foot of f. 33<sup>r</sup> (the first of the larger pages) is written in a ninth-century hand:<sup>3</sup> *Stephanus dedit Sanctae Mariae Remensi*. On f. 108<sup>v</sup> a mark (☒) is set in the margin against the words *Paterna siquidem substantia* (568B 1). This mark, which has a significance for the later manuscript tradition,<sup>4</sup> was probably made by a copyist to indicate the point he had reached in his transcription. In the catalogue of 1456 R is entered as *Liber antique scripturae procedens per modum dialogi*,<sup>5</sup> and in the eighteenth-century catalogue it is described as on the fly-leaf: *Tractatus philosophicus de anima*.

<sup>1</sup> See above, pp. 7–9.

<sup>2</sup> Loriquet, *loc. cit.*

<sup>3</sup> Cappuyens, p. 193, n. 2.

<sup>4</sup> See below, pp. 16, 18, 24–25.

<sup>5</sup> Loriquet thought that no. 185 of the same catalogue, *Philosophi Scoti*, now lost, might have contained the rest of the text, but the *incipit* and *explicit* given by him (*ad formam . . . ponere in hoc*) do not fit this theory.

B *Bamberg Ph. 2/I*, formerly H. J. IV 5,<sup>1</sup> s. ix, parchment, 269 × 220 mm., 238 ff. in 23 gatherings each of 8 folios except for the sixth which has only 6 (ff. 113–18). Two loose folios, 135–6, are added to the 17th gathering to complete Book II. From the 18th gathering, with which Book III begins, the gatherings, as in the case of R, were originally numbered in Greek characters starting from A, of which those at the ends of gatherings 18–21, 24, and 25 are still visible. Later the gatherings of the whole codex were numbered in roman numerals throughout, except the last, since the last folio, 238, is blank.

There are 23 long lines to the page. Three hands are discernible in the composition:

(i) *B*, in which the text is written, is an accomplished Caroline minuscule which shows signs of early training in the Insular script revealed in the general ductus, especially at the ends of lines, and more clearly in a tendency to 'let off' end-strokes, which results in a bold up-turned tapering flourish (cross-beam of *t*; abbreviation mark; tongue of *e*; tail of the continental *-ur* abbreviation). In a number of instances the bend of *l* is remarkably round and even shows a tendency to bulge out to the left.<sup>2</sup>

(ii) *C*, in which, as in R, the marginalia are written, as also the lemmata, the title, and some of the corrections.<sup>3</sup>

(iii) *cB*, a somewhat larger continental hand, using a darker ink, which has contributed a number of minor corrections, mainly of spelling and scribal blunders, and has frequently changed the original punctuation mark · to a semi-colon by the addition of

<sup>1</sup> A. Schmitt, 'Zwei noch unbenützte Handschriften des Joannes Scotus Erigena', *Programm des K. Neuen Gymnasiums in Bamberg für das Schuljahr 1899–1900*, Bamberg, 1900; F. Leitschuh, *Katalog der Handschriften der Königl. Bibliothek zu Bamberg*, i. 2 (Bamberg, 1899), pp. 395–6.

<sup>2</sup> I am indebted to Professor Bieler for these observations on the calligraphy.

<sup>3</sup> Other corrections are in a hand which shows more pronounced insular tendencies than that of the text: e.g. f. 9<sup>v</sup>16 *deindeq*: the inserted *q* is an Irish pointed letter; 10<sup>r</sup>4 *sequuntur*: *q*, *ex c*, is an Irish pointed letter; 12<sup>r</sup>19 *sint*: the added *t* is an Irish letter; 12<sup>v</sup>21 *.i. h̄s modi* is in Irish script. The Irish abbreviation *h̄s* does not appear in the text. 14<sup>v</sup>9 *d* is an Irish pointed letter with characteristic Irish accent over the monosyllable; 18<sup>v</sup>6 Irish *d*; 19<sup>v</sup>14 *tamen* in Irish script; 25<sup>v</sup>14 *per se* in Irish script. The following are doubtful cases: 11<sup>r</sup>10 interlinear *.i. relationem* may be in hand *C*, but is not typical; 13<sup>r</sup> marg. *de oppositis* is certainly not *C*, ductus and ink being different: it is similar to *sentientium* at 9<sup>v</sup>10, and may therefore be the rare case of a lemma in the hand of the scribe, but *sentientium* is not the correction of a copyist's error; 17<sup>r</sup> left marg. *de ycia* is probably not *C*, being different from the *C* entry in the right margin; 23<sup>r</sup>15 *d* superscript cannot be surely classified. Difficulty in identifying some of these corrections and additions is due to the similarity of ductus of the Carolingian hand of the text and the Irish hands of the correctors. Professor Bischoff has observed that this similarity extends to practically all MSS. with the alleged *autographa* of Eriugena and seems to be characteristic of the whole Laon circle, a fact which could be explained on the hypothesis that this is the script of a northern French school with Insular 'symptoms' (Professor Bieler to I. P. S.-W., 11 Feb. 1957).

a hooked comma. Chrēsima and marks signifying *Nota* appear in the margins.

The text consists of Books I–III with R's enlargements incorporated: f. 1 *Incipit liber primus* ΠΕΡΙΦΥΧΩΝ; f. 66 *Incipit secundus* ΠΕΡΙΦΥΧΩΝ *in quo multa de reditu disputantur*; f. 137 *Incipit tertius* ΠΕΡΙΦΥΧΩΝ.

Kenney<sup>1</sup> thought that both these manuscripts, of which one seems to have been copied from the other, belonged to Hincmar, Archbishop of Rheims, but according to Professor Bischoff neither was written at Rheims. In the late twelfth century B was the property of the monastery of Michelsberg near Bamberg.<sup>2</sup> Together with Ph. 2/2, a later manuscript containing Books IV–V, it is entered in Jaeck's Katalog, I no. 80, as *Aristotelis Physicae libri I–V*.<sup>3</sup>

P *Paris, Bibl. nat. lat. 12964*, formerly Saint-Germain 309 [548], s. ix,<sup>4</sup> parchment, 224 ff. paginated by Peter Alixius<sup>5</sup> 1–447. There are 37 long lines to the page, written in a continental ninth-century hand. The text consists of Books I–V, but ends on p. 447 with the words *seruiens diabolo dissipauit* = 1008B 4. B's enlargements are incorporated into the text (with some additional matter), and B's lemmata are reproduced in rubricated majuscule, which is also used for the letters indicating the interlocutors: p. 1 *Incipit primus* ΠΕΡΙΦΥΧΩΝ; p. 65 *Incipit secundus* ΠΕΡΙΦΥΧΩΝ *in quo multa de reditu disputantur*; p. 139, line 8 *Incipit tertius* ΠΕΡΙΦΥΧΩΝ.

On the fly-leaf Alixius has written: *hic continentur Iohannis Scotti Erigenae ΠΕΡΙ ΦΥΧΩΝ Libri omnes exceptis 22 paginis quae alio in libro reperiuntur*,<sup>6</sup> and where in the text he has encountered what he considers dangerous doctrine he has written *Cave* in the margin. At the top of p. 1 four inscriptions have been made at different times: (i) *S. Petri Corbeiensis* (16th cent.); (ii) *Iste liber est de conuentu Corbeiae. Sed monachi habent unum memoriale pro isto libro 'periphision' sed non totum quod memoriale uel comburatur uel reddatur monachis beati Vincentii in Lauduno. Melius enim esset ut credo quod comburere-tur propter haereses dampnatos quae sunt in eo* (13th or 14th cent.); (iii) *Johannes Scottus Erigena*; (iv) *sancti Germani a Pratis* (Alixius).

The present edition of Books I–III is based upon the foregoing three manuscripts. The others, some of which will be used for the later books, are added for completeness.

*Paris, Bibl. nat. lat. 12965*, formerly S. Germain 830 [549], s. ix,<sup>4</sup> parchment, 207 ff., of which the last has only 5 lines. The text consists

<sup>1</sup> *Sources*, p. 583.

<sup>2</sup> Which was also the owner of Avranches 230; see below, p. 26.

<sup>3</sup> Leitschuh, *loc. cit.* For Ph. 2/2 see below, p. 15.

<sup>4</sup> So Cappuyns.

<sup>5</sup> See below, p. 26.

<sup>6</sup> i.e. Paris, Bibl. nat. lat. 12965, q.v.

of Books IV–V. On a sheet of paper attached to the front Alixius has written: *Liber quartus et quintus Iohannis Scotti Eriugena*, and at f. 197<sup>r</sup> (= 1008B 4): *hic finit alterum exemplar*, i.e. P. From this point he continues the pagination from the last page of P, numbering ff. 198–207 of this manuscript 448–67.

The provenance of the two Paris manuscripts is the same: both came from Saint-Vincent-de-Laon,<sup>1</sup> and both bear the stamp of the Abbey of Corbie, though they were not there when the twelfth-century catalogue was compiled.<sup>2</sup> Both were first identified by Mabillon.<sup>3</sup>

*Valenciennes 169*, s. ix, of which the provenance is Saint-Amand.<sup>4</sup> Ff. 1–3<sup>r</sup> and 78–83 contain, with eighteen omissions varying in length from a few lines to a column of Migne, the end of Book I and the beginning of Book II (500D 1–531C 5 *Mutabilibus rerum . . . creatoris condita est*), at the end of which is added the gloss which in the manuscripts refers to AOPACIAN, 534C 10. At 3<sup>r</sup> the text is interrupted at the words *superessentialiter superata* [sic] (p. 190, 27) by the insertion of St. Augustine's *Enchiridion*, written in the same hand without a break, but introduced by the title in majuscule *Reconciliatio poenitentis ad mortem*; it continues until 78<sup>r</sup>, where the *Periphyseon* is resumed at the words *Ratio in hoc uniuersaliter* (p. 190, 29).

Here and there the text has been shortened by the omission of connecting particles and by compression. Most of Alumnus' contributions to the dialogue and the letters indicating change of speaker have been omitted, and there are no lemmata, although the exemplar must have been furnished with these since the lemma ΑΠΟΦΑΤΙΚΗ at p. 192, 2 of this edition is included in the text, where it makes no sense. This exemplar was probably P, most of whose readings are reproduced, e.g. *his* (190, 11), *appositione* (192, 12), *amabilem* (218, 35), *caruis*, *progređitur* (gl. ad 220, 6, which is included in the text), and, in Book II, *in genera* (PL 526A 5), AOPOCIA, *quaeque* (gl. ad PL 534C 10). The manuscript contributes nothing to the establishment of the text.

*St. Gall, Stiftsbibliothek 274*, s. ix, parchment, 33 small folios paginated 1–66. On p. 4, after three blank pages, there is a fragment from Book I: *Aristoteles acutissimus . . . pati* (p. 84, 17–26) under the title *Verba Iohannis Scotti*, with the Greek names of the Categories

<sup>1</sup> Becker, *op. cit.*, no. 79; L.-V. Delisle, 'Recherches sur l'ancienne bibliothèque de Corbie', *Mém. de l'Acad. des Inscriptions et Belles Lettres*, xxiv. 1 (1861), p. 298.

B. Hauréau, *Histoire de la philosophie scolastique*, i (Paris, 1872), p. 175.

<sup>2</sup> Becker, *loc. cit.*

<sup>3</sup> AA. SS. OSB., saec. iv. 2, *praef.*, no. 135 = vi (Venice, 1735), pp. xlv–xlvi.

<sup>4</sup> G. Mathon, 'Un florilège érigénien à l'abbaye de Saint-Amand', *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale*, xx (1953), pp. 302–11.

rubricated. It is followed on pp. 4–5 by the *Versus Alcuini ad Karolum regem Francorum*.<sup>1</sup> The two passages form an introduction to *Cathegoriae Aristotelis ab Augustino translatae ad filium*,<sup>2</sup> pp. 5–66. The manuscript is mentioned in the catalogue of 1461.<sup>3</sup> It is the earliest written evidence for Eriugena's authorship of the *Periphyseon*.<sup>4</sup>

Milan, *Ambros. B. 71 sup.*, s. ix, f. 35<sup>r</sup>. Contains the same extract as the preceding, but without the ascription to Eriugena.<sup>5</sup>

Paris, *Bibl. nat. lat. 12255*, formerly Saint-Germain 280 [166], s. ix *ex.*, parchment, 255 ff., of which 192–255 contain part of the *Periphyseon: negatio uero superioris . . . inter terminos humanae naturae* (444B 1–576A 6). The first folio, the gathering containing 518B 4–542B 12 (*faci]endi . . . indiscretam*), and the folio containing 559A 11–560B 12 (*suum genuit filium . . . cursu perficiunt*) are missing.

*Bamberg Ph. 2/2*, formerly H. J. IV 6,<sup>6</sup> s. ix–x, parchment, 207 ff., 22 long lines to the page, written in various hands, contains Books IV–V. This is evidently a copy of the companion volume of B, with which it has always been closely associated. The enlargements of R are incorporated into the text, together with other material which presumably represents the enlargements to B. Lemmata in the margin are in the hand of the text. F. 1: *Incipit quartus ΠΕΡΙΦΥΣΕΩΝ*; f. 91<sup>r</sup>, line 19: *Incipit quintus ΠΕΡΙΦΥΣΕΩΝ*; f. 207<sup>v</sup> in tall elaborate majuscule: *Explicit liber quintus*.

There are occasional marginal glosses. On the recto of the fly-leaf towards the top a modern hand has written: *Aristotelis Physicae Liber IV et V* (cf. B), and at the foot of the page: *Ad Bibliothecam Reverendissimi Capituli Bambergensis*. Another hand has written on the same page: 's. x. 1–203', and has altered the numbering of f. 207 to 203.

Paris, *Bibl. nat. lat. 12960*, formerly Saint-Germain 1110, s. ix–x, parchment, 125 large quarto ff., of which the contents of ff. 25–38, written in double columns, are as follows: ff. 25–30: part of the Commentary on Martianus Capella (*De dialectica* and *De rhetorica*), which

<sup>1</sup> Published by Dümmler (but not from this MS.) in MGH, *Poet. lat. med. aeu.* i (1881), p. 295; and also by Minio-Paluello, *op. cit.*, p. lxxxvii.

<sup>2</sup> See p. 5 *supra*.

<sup>3</sup> G. Scherrer, *Verzeichmis*, p. 104; F. Weidmann, *Geschichte der Bibliothek von St. Gallen* (1841), p. 406.

<sup>4</sup> The fragment was published by M. Esposito, who had not at that time identified it, in *Proc. RIA* xxviii C (1910), p. 74. See id., *Hermathena*, xv (1909), p. 362; B. Gütersbock, *Zeitschrift für vergleichende Sprachforschung*, n.f. xiii. 103.

<sup>5</sup> L. Minio-Paluello, *Aristoteles Latinus*, i. 1–5 (Bruges–Paris, 1961), p. lxxix, n. 4.

<sup>6</sup> Leitschuh, *Katal. Hss. Bamb.*, pp. 395–6.

has recently been attributed to Martin the Irishman;<sup>1</sup> f. 30<sup>vb</sup>: a few glosses from Eriugena's Commentary on Martianus Capella;<sup>2</sup> ff. 31-38: the beginning of the *Periphyseon* as far as *accidentium immutabilis est* (p. 114, 12-13).

The contents of the rest of the manuscript, written in long lines, are as follows: ff. 1-24 Boet., *Comm. in Περὶ ἐρμηνείας* i and part of ii; 39-46 Remigius, Commentary on Martianus Capella, incomplete; 47-115 Eriugena's Commentary on Martianus Capella;<sup>3</sup> 116-25 a fragment of a grammatical treatise of Priscian.

The manuscript comes from Corbie, of which the press-mark occurs on f. 1,<sup>4</sup> with the words *Liber Sancti Petri Corbeie*. A later hand states that it is the property of Saint-Germain, *olim N iii O*; and a still later hand (? 1638) adds: *Ex libris S. Petri Corbeiensis*. The manuscript was first noticed by Hauréau.<sup>5</sup>

Paris, *Bibl. nat. lat.* 1764,<sup>6</sup> s. ix-x,<sup>7</sup> parchment, 340×265 mm., 1+145 unnumbered folios, of which 99-145 contain Book I and Book II as far as 568B 2, expl. *substantiam filiatam genuit et procedentem substantiam*, under the title *De diuisione naturae, de Melchisedec*. The first part of this title translates the Greek 'title' of R, and both parts are found among the lemmata of B, pp. 2, 4 and 101, 14 of this edition.

Initials are in colour, rubrics in majuscule. On the verso of f. 145 a thirteenth-century hand records that it was a gift from Foulques de Royère and Guillaume his brother to the abbey of S. Martin de Limoges. Thence it passed successively to the College of Clermont; to Nicolas le Fèvre and J. A. Thou (who seem to have owned it jointly, for Le Fèvre provides a table of contents on f. 1 to which Thou appends his signature); to the Colbertine Library;<sup>8</sup> and finally to the Bibliothèque Nationale.<sup>9</sup>

Since the text ends at the point where the copyist's mark is made at R,<sup>10</sup> the exemplar of Paris 1764 may have been the uncompleted copy of R which that mark seems to suggest. The Paris codex is not the uncompleted copy itself, since that seems to have been at

<sup>1</sup> J.-G. Præaux, 'Le Commentaire de Martin de Laon sur l'œuvre de Martianus Capella', *Latomus*, xii (1953), pp. 437-59.

<sup>2</sup> 115, 9-119, 27 Lutz.

<sup>3</sup> S.-W., 'Bibl.', pp. 200-2.

<sup>4</sup> O. Dobias-Rozhdestvenskaya, *Codices Corbeienses Leninopolitani* (Leningrad, 1934), p. 34.

<sup>5</sup> 'Le Commentaire de Jean Scot Érigène sur Martianus Capella', *Notices et extraits de la Bibliothèque impériale* . . . xx. 2 (Paris, 1865), pp. 1-39; id., *Notices et extraits de quelques mss. latins*, ii (Paris, 1891), pp. 139-40.

<sup>6</sup> Ph. Lauer, *Catalogue générale des mss. latins de la Bibliothèque nationale*, ii (1940), p. 161.

<sup>7</sup> So Cappuyns; s. ix according to Lauer.

<sup>8</sup> Colbert 1031.

<sup>9</sup> Regius 3750<sup>4</sup>.

<sup>10</sup> See above, p. 11

Mont-Saint-Michel near Avranches until the eighteenth century.<sup>1</sup> MS. Dublin Trin. Coll. 197 no. 7 is a copy of this Paris MS.

*Brit. Mus. Add.* 11035,<sup>2</sup> s. x-xi, parchment, is a small folio bound in lambskin over boards, containing 120 ff. written in the widely distributed and plentifully preserved handwriting of the Eucharius-Kloster of Trier. Ff. 9-85 contain Book I of the *Periphyseon* under the title *Liber physiologiae Iohannis Scottigenae*. The interlocutors of the dialogue are designated by the letters Δ and Ψ (which may represent either N or M).<sup>3</sup> The margins are closely annotated in a small neat hand, identified by Raymond Klibansky<sup>4</sup> as that of Nicolas of Cues.

Ff. 104-20 contain a summary of the text in verse.

DEPRESSVS usquequaque	Omnis pondere noxae
Heu gratiae perennis	Factus prorsus inanis
Verbo nec absque quoque	Dictus nomine quippe
Oblatus et perenni	Rerum cunctipotenti
Sanctos et ad patronos	Hac in parte τὸ πᾶν ἄλλο
Coenobialis aulae	Torpens incola ualde
Eucharie fauente	Tandem ualerioque
Expergefactus egre	Gliscens seu studiose
Patraram hunc libellum	Indagem sapientum
Qui phisicam iohannis	Promit philosophantis
Species qua constat esse	Clarae philosophiae
ΘΕΟΛΟΓΙΑ PLANE	Quam declarat habunde
Summae phisi superna	Maiestatis in ipsa
Quae causa principalis	Est necnon ὑπὸ αὐτῷ
Degentis esse in se	Ex se non secus esse
Discretionem quadra	Pandit quod uia dupla
HEC PHISIOLOGIA	Dat rerum ΘΕΟΡΕΜΑ
Cum quicquid est ὑπὸ αὐτῷ	Phisic claudat ὈΝΩΜΑ . . .
<i>Expl.</i> Cum finis omnis esse	Constet perspicua spe
Eius nec esse finis	Regni possit inani

<sup>1</sup> See below, p. 18.

<sup>2</sup> W. Turner, 'Irish teachers in the Carolingian Revival of Letters', *Catholic University Bulletin*, xiii (1908), p. 566, n. 4; P. Lehmann, *Mitteilungen aus Handschriften*, ii 5 (*Sitzungsberichte der Bay. Akad. der Wiss., Philos.-philol. u. hist. Kl.*, 1930, no. 2); B. Bischoff, *Byzant. Zeitschr.* xlv (1951), p. 34. Turner also mentions MS. Harl. 2506, but I can find no Eriugena matter in it.

<sup>3</sup> In previous editions the two speakers of the dialogue have been designated *Magister* and *Discipulus* (M and D Gale; *Mag.* and *Disc.* Floss). In the three ninth-century manuscripts used for this edition of Bks. I-III they appear as N and A, interpreted as *Nutritor* and *Alumnus* (Leitschuh, op. cit., pp. 395-6; Traube, *Vorlesungen und Abhandlungen*, herausgegeben von F. Boll, ii (Munich, 1911), p. 99 sq.; Cappuyns, pp. 196-7). We shall see that the evidence of later MSS. is conflicting. A discussion of the question will be postponed to the Introduction to Bks. IV-V, for which some of these later MSS. will be used. See p. 222, n. 3 *infra*.

<sup>4</sup> Note pasted to fly-leaf, dated 29 Jan. 1935.

On the inside of the cover an eighteenth-century hand has written: 'hic codex constans 110 foliis continet 1° Excerptum e Somnio Scipionis 2° Iohannis Scottigenae physiologiam 3° Varia excerpta lactantii & metrica contra uarias haereses. Hic codex scriptus fuit saec 10 a quodam besario in abbatia S. Eucharii (S. Matthiae) ut constat ex folio 93 recto. Scriptum ibi oblatus fuerat ad SS. Patronos Coenobiales aula Eucharis [sic] fauente, ubi egre patrarat hunc libellum.' Below, in an earlier hand: *somnium scipionis | Physiologi Jo Scottigene | ex Prudentii collecta*. Below, in a still earlier hand in faded red ink: *Physiologia Jo Scottigene | Prudentii*. On the recto of f. 1 a twelfth-century hand has written: *Libellus Sancti Eucharii primi Treuirorum archiepiscopi. Si quis eum abstulerit anathema sit. Amen. Liber iohannis scottigenae et prudenti* (the last two words added later).

The printed catalogue does not mention a Treverine provenance, and gives no earlier information than that it was 'purchased of Rodd July 1837 from Bentham's sale'.

*Avranches 230*, formerly 1976,<sup>1</sup> s. xii,<sup>2</sup> folio, double columns, 38 lines to the column. Contains, from f. 2 onwards, the text of *Periphyseon B* (i.e. including R's enlargements, but not those of B), commencing at 568A 15 *Paterna siquidem substantia*. The rest of Book II occupies the first two gatherings, ff. 2-17. F. 18: *Incipit liber iii* (s.l.) *perysfision Iohannis Scotti*. The first folio is a separate sheet, on the verso of which the scribe has written: 'In hoc uolumine continetur ultima pars perifision iohannis scoti (ex stoti) scilicet iii et semis. In alio uolumine continetur prima pars eiusdem libri scilicet primus et ii semis. Fecit enim idem iohannes v libros de naturae diuisione obscurissimos et caute legendos.'

Since the text begins from the copyist's mark in R,<sup>3</sup> it is probable that the 'other volume' was the work of the scribe who made that mark, and was in existence in the ninth century, when MS. Paris, Bibl. nat. lat. 1764 was copied from it. It is not the Paris MS. itself, since as late as the eighteenth century the library of Mont-Saint-Michel near Avranches possessed a copy of the *Periphyseon* in two volumes labelled T5, T6.<sup>4</sup> T6 is almost certainly the surviving manuscript, for although the label no longer survives, it is bound up with another codex (Stephen Langton) labelled T3. T5 would then have been the 'other volume'.

In this edition of Books I-III this manuscript is used to reconstruct the text of *Periphyseon B* as it is found in manuscript R enlarged where the lacuna in R occurs in Book III.

<sup>1</sup> F. Ravaisson, *Rapports au Ministre* (Paris, 1841), p. 197; Floss, PL cxxii, pp. xii-xiii; Schmitt, *art. cit.*

<sup>2</sup> So Cappuyns; s. xiii according to Ravaisson.

<sup>3</sup> See above, p. 11.

<sup>4</sup> C. Oudin, *Commentarium de scriptoribus ecclesiae antiquis* (Leipzig, 1722), p. 234.

*Cambridge, Trin. Coll. O. 5. 20*, formerly 21: 6027, 6028,<sup>1</sup> s. xii, two volumes, vellum, 14½ × 9¾ in., of 128 and 88 ff., written at the same time and place but in different hands. The second volume (i.e. 6028) is St. Luke's Gospel. The first volume (i.e. 6027) is in double columns, 54 lines to the column, with capital initials in green and red and rubrics usually in small majuscule. This volume contains the text of *Periphyseon B*:<sup>2</sup> f. 1<sup>r</sup>: *Incipit Liber primus peri fiseon merismou .i. de diuisione naturae*; f. 19<sup>v</sup>: *Explicit liber i peri phision. Incipit liber ii*; f. 40<sup>r</sup>: *Explicit liber secundus. Incipit liber tertius ΠΗΡΙΦΙΣΗΟC*; f. 66<sup>v</sup>: *Explicit liber iii. Incipit quartus*; f. 92<sup>v</sup>: *Explicit liber quartus ΠΗΡΥΦΙΣΗΩC (ex ΠΗΡΥΦΙΣΗΩΝ). Incipit quintus*; f. 128: *Explicit liber ΠΕΡΥΦΥCΕΟΝ ΜΕΡΙCΜΟΥ hoc est de nature diuisione. R: C·RD: :S M: SCR: PS: T.* But the words ΜΕΡΙCΜΟΥ . . . *diuisione* have been added by Thomas Gale<sup>3</sup> to bring the colophon into conformity with the title of Book I. There is throughout the manuscript a general uncertainty as to whether the title of the work should be *περὶ φύσεων* or *περὶ φύσεων μερισμοῦ*, with a tendency (cf., for example, the explicits of Books IV and V) to correct from the former to the latter.

There are four guards and a sheet of paper of a smaller size at the beginning of the volume, and one guard at the end. The first guard and the one at the end, which are contemporary with the binding, are blank. The others and the smaller sheet of paper are covered with notes suggesting sources for the study of Eriugena, and speculations about his place of origin, the Heruli tribe being regarded as most likely. They are not Gale's work sheet for his edition, but written by a later scholar (or scholars: they do not appear to be all in the same hand) some time after the manuscript had been deposited at Trinity College. They are inconsequent, repetitive, and of little interest. At the top of f. 1 Gale has written: *Iste liber componitur per Johannem Scotum Heruligenam sicut epistola praecedens declarat*. The reference is to William of Malmesbury's *Epistola ad Petrum*, as will be shown later.

The letters denoting the interlocutors, like the title, are inconsistent.<sup>4</sup> At first they are N and A (approximating to Δ), as in R; at f. 9<sup>ra</sup> (478c 11) N is replaced by >C, which is presumably intended for M;<sup>5</sup> at f. 29<sup>r</sup> there is a change of hand, and the new scribe begins

<sup>1</sup> M. R. James, *The Western MSS. of the Library of Trinity College, Cambridge*, iii (Cambridge, 1902), pp. 321-3.

<sup>2</sup> See above, p. 6.

<sup>3</sup> See below, p. 26.

<sup>4</sup> See p. 17, n. 3.

<sup>5</sup> On f. 1<sup>r</sup> of the MS. of the *Epistola ad Petrum* (Brit. Mus. Roy. App. 85 no. 6: see p. 20, n. 6), otherwise blank, the same scribe has written out the characters of the Greek alphabet, each with its name above it. >C corresponds to *mu*, but N (*nu*) is omitted altogether.

by using M and D, but soon changes, at f. 30<sup>v</sup>, to ϳϳ and Δ). Finally, MAGISTER is written in full at the beginning of Book V, a unique case. Fol. 29 begins with the same words as Avranches 230, *Paterna siquidem substantia*, and Avranches 230 exhibits the same change from M and D to ϳϳ and Δ. There is thus a double link between these two manuscripts of *Periphyseon B*: a new hand takes over in the Cambridge manuscript at the very point where the Avranches manuscript begins; and the new hand treats the names of the interlocutors in the same way as Avranches.<sup>1</sup>

The codex was bequeathed to Trinity College by Thomas Gale, who describes it in the catalogue of his library as: 'Iohannis Scoti Heruligenae libri quinque de naturarum diuisione. codex uetus. habetur de auctore et opere Malmesburiensis epistola praefixa.'<sup>2</sup> It was in William's *Epistola* that Gale found the curious form *Heruligena*, which he associates with Hereford. This manuscript may be the ancient one which Antony à Wood saw in the Hereford Library,<sup>3</sup> and which Archbishop Ussher, in a letter to Patrick Young dated 27 August 1639,<sup>4</sup> wished to have collated with his own transcription of the Codex Thuaneus.<sup>5</sup> If so, this is what Gale did; for the first state of his edition was based on his own codex collated with the 'Codex Thuaneus', by which he almost certainly meant the transcription of it which is now MS. Dublin, Trin. Coll. 197 no. 7. But William of Malmesbury's association with the Cambridge manuscript suggests that its original provenance was Malmesbury, a monastery much frequented by the Irish, and the place where Eriugena himself is reputed to have ended his days.

Indeed, it is not impossible that the beginning of the manuscript was written by William himself. Ff. 1-28 are in the same hand as the *Epistola ad Petrum*, which was originally prefixed to this manuscript,<sup>6</sup> and which, in the index to Hamilton's edition of the *Gesta pontificum*, 531b, is said to be in William's autograph. Even if this view cannot be maintained,<sup>7</sup> it is evident that the scribe of this manuscript of the *Periphyseon* came strongly under the influence of the *Epistola*. The form of the title *περὶ φύσεων* (pl.) *μερισμοῦ* is peculiar to William, and occurs three times in his works: *Gesta regum*, ii. 122; *Gesta pontificum*, v. 240 (*perifision merimnoi*); and in the *Epistola ad Petrum*,

<sup>1</sup> 'Mont-Saint-Michel is a place from which a MS. could very easily be brought over to England in the 12th century' (Professor Bieler).

<sup>2</sup> E. Bernard, *Catalogi librorum manuscritorum Angliae et Hiberniae*, ii (Oxford, 1697), no. 6027. 193 (p. 189).

<sup>3</sup> Thomas Tanner, *Bibliotheca Britanno-Hibernica* . . . (London, 1748), p. 263.

<sup>4</sup> Johannes Kempe, *Patricius Iunius (Patrick Young), Bibliothekar der Könige Jacob I. und Carl I. von England: Mitteilungen aus seinem Briefwechsel herausgegeben* (Leipzig, 1898), p. 94.

<sup>5</sup> i.e. of Paris, Bibl. nat. lat. 1764.

<sup>6</sup> See p. 19, n. 5.

<sup>7</sup> It is summarily rejected by Poole, *op. cit.*, p. 267, n. 6.

from which it is reasonable to suppose it was adopted as the title of the work of which that *Epistola* was the preface. Also, the *Epistola*, like the Cambridge manuscript, gives the inaccurate Latin equivalent *de naturae* (sing.) *diuisione*. Still more significant is the third peculiarity which the *Epistola* shares with the manuscript, of using the alternative title *Periphyseon* as well. The three references for *περὶ φύσεων μερισμοῦ* given above are in fact an identical passage copied almost word for word from one work to another; that is to say, in the *Epistola* William is at this point quoting from either the *Gesta regum* or *Gesta pontificum*. In doing so he took no note of the fact that in the *Epistola* he had already named Eriugena's work *περὶ φύσεων*. It is in the *Epistola* therefore that the two titles are brought together for the first time; and it is from the *Epistola* that the same peculiarity was introduced into the Cambridge manuscript, which we can almost speak of as William's 'edition' of the *Periphyseon*.

This manuscript, through Gale's edition, forms the basis of all editions of the *Periphyseon* that have so far appeared, and is still valuable evidence for those parts of the recension *Periphyseon B* where R is defective. Like Avranches it is put to this use in the present edition of Books I-III.

Berne 469, s. xii, contains the same text as the 'aliud uolumen' to Avranches, i.e. *Periphyseon B* as far as 568B 1 *substantiam filiatam genuit*, and must derive from that lost manuscript.

Cologne, *Stadtarchiv W 4° 225*, s. xii,<sup>1</sup> contains Book I only: Inc. *Sepe mihi cogitanti* . . . Expl. *sat enim est in eo completum* (sic). Colophon: *Iohannes cardinalis Romanus Scauro. Et intitulum Periphision.*

Oxford, *Bodl. Auct. F. III 15*,<sup>2</sup> s. xii in., parchment, 10 $\frac{5}{8}$  × 7 $\frac{5}{8}$  in., 68 ff., contains four distinct items in different Irish hands: (i) ff. 1-20: Chalcidius' translation of the *Timaeus* with his preface; (ii) ff. 21-30: a treatise on the Computus; (iii) ff. 31-53: extracts from Books I-IV of the *Periphyseon*; (iv) ff. 54-68: part of Book V of the *Periphyseon*. The codex is glossed and annotated in Latin and Irish throughout. The Irish glosses have been edited by Whitley Stokes<sup>3</sup> and, more accurately, by the Revd. Professor F. Shaw, S.J.,<sup>4</sup> who

<sup>1</sup> W. Seul, *Die Gottserkenntnis bei Johannes Skotus unter Berücksichtigung ihrer neuplatonischen und augustiniischen Elemente* (Bonn, 1932), p. 45.

<sup>2</sup> F. Madan and others, *Summary Catalogue of Western MSS. in the Bodleian Library at Oxford*, ii. 2, no. 3511; E. A. Lowe, *Codices latini antiquiores*, ii (Oxford, 1935), no. 232; Sheldon-Williams, 'An Epitome of Irish Provenance of Eriugena's *De diuisione naturae*', *Proc. RIA* lviii C 1, Dublin, June 1956.

<sup>3</sup> *Zeitschrift für vergleich. Sprachf.* (Kuhn's Zeitsch.) xxix = N.F., ix (1888), p. 372.

<sup>4</sup> Appendix to Sheldon-Williams, *art. cit.*

notes that those of the *Periphyseon* differ from the rest in never dealing directly with the text, being scribal observations, prayers, and glosses on the marginal notes.

Item iii is made up of two gatherings, ff. 31-43 and 44-53. F. 31<sup>r</sup> is blank. A single folio of about the same size as the rest, folded double, covered on both sides with theological matter written in a late hand and having no bearing on the text, is pasted between ff. 31 and 34 and accounts for ff. 32-33. The text consists of six series of short excerpts from the *Periphyseon*, sometimes only two or three words, never extending beyond the length of a column of Migne. The excerpts within a series, and the series with one another, are clumsily linked together by a connecting phrase or word. Although no special punctuation mark indicates where one series ends and the next begins, each is discerned by its contents:

(a) ff. 31<sup>v</sup>-43<sup>v</sup>: excerpts from the first part of *Periphyseon B* covered by the 'aliud uolumen', i.e. as far as 568B 2 *filiatam genuit et procedentem*.

(b) ff. 43<sup>v</sup>-45<sup>v</sup>: further excerpts from the same.

(c) ff. 45<sup>v</sup>-46<sup>r</sup>: excerpts from Book III. 713-15.

(d) ff. 46<sup>r</sup>-49<sup>v</sup>: excerpts from Book IV. 743-75.

(e) ff. 49<sup>v</sup>-53<sup>r</sup>: excerpts from Book III. 633-72.

(f) f. 53: excerpts from Books I-II. 520-52.

Item iv consists of a single gathering, ff. 54-65, +3 separate sheets, ff. 66-68, attached to it by strips of parchment. The gathering is a palimpsest, the text being written transversely over a Latin liturgical manuscript in Irish majuscule of the eighth century.<sup>1</sup> The three separate sheets are attached to it in the wrong order; f. 68 should precede ff. 66, 67. The number of lines to the page varies slightly, 48 being the norm, written in a close, neat, Irish hand of the first half of the twelfth century.<sup>2</sup> The text, which also appears to be of *Periphyseon B*,<sup>3</sup> runs from 935A 4 *Porro si uniuersaliter* to 985B 6 *quae uera plus ratio deridet* (f. 67<sup>v</sup>). Since the extract begins with an exceptionally large and decorated capital, such as does not occur elsewhere in it, it is unlikely that any leaves have been lost before f. 54; but some seem to have been lost at the end, since f. 67<sup>v</sup> ends with an uncompleted sentence and with no punctuation mark.

The contents of items iii and iv together account for just under a quarter of *Periphyseon B*. Like the Avranches and Trinity manuscripts they are used in this edition of Books I-III only where R is

<sup>1</sup> Lowe, *op. cit.*, no. 232.

<sup>2</sup> Professor Bieler.

<sup>3</sup> As neither R nor B is available for this part of the text, this can only be conjectured; but the fragment shows closer affinity to the Cambridge MS., which is of *Periphyseon B*, than to the Paris and Bamberg MSS., which represent *Periphyseon C*. The speakers are designated *M* and *A* (? Δ); see p. 17, n. 3.

defective. The whole codex was at one time the property of Thomas Allen the mathematician (1542-1632), whose name appears at the top of f. 1. E. A. Lowe suggests Irish provenance, and this seems to be borne out by one of the marginalia to the *Periphyseon*.<sup>1</sup>

*Escorial P III 4*,<sup>2</sup> s. xii-xiii, parchment, 220 × 155 mm., 105 ff. in the binding of the Escorial Library. Ff. 44-80 contain Book I: f. 44<sup>r</sup>: *Incipit liber peryfysyon*; f. 80<sup>v</sup>: *Explicit peryfysyon*. Capitals are in red and green, colophon in red. The manuscript belonged at one time to the Library of the Conde-Duque de Olivares, subsequently to J. J. Chiffley.

A considerable portion of the *Periphyseon* is also preserved in the *Clauis physicae* of Honorius Augustodunensis (fl. 1133-50), of which the following twelfth-century manuscripts survive: Paris, Bibl. nat. lat. 6734; Lambach 102; Zwettl 298; Göttingen M 173. 33.

Apart from the cover of *Bamberg B IV 7*, provenance Michelsberg, on which there is a passage from Book I, probably copied from B, the thirteenth century is represented by only one manuscript: *Vienna, Nationalbibliothek 833*, of 55 ff. This is a manuscript of Boethius *adu. Nestorium*, to which are appended three passages, probably all from the *Periphyseon*, though I have succeeded in identifying only the first and the third:

(i) F. 54<sup>v</sup>3-9: Book V. 36, 971B 3-8 *Αδη<ς> . . . grauidas*.

(ii) Ff. 54<sup>v</sup>9-55<sup>r</sup>8: 'Ineffabilem et incomprehensibilem diuinae bonitatis inaccessibleemque claritatem omnibus intellectibus siue humanis siue angelicis incognitam. Superessentialis est enim et supernaturalis. Eo nomine significatam crediderim. Quae dum per se ipsam cogitatur neque est neque erat neque erit. In nullo enim intelligitur existentium quia superat omnia. Dum uero per condescensionem quandam ineffabilem in ea quae sunt mentis obtutibus inspicitur ipsa sola inuenitur in omnibus esse et est et erat et erit. Dum incomprehensibilis intelligitur per excellentiam nichilum non immerito uocitatur. At uero in suis theophaniis incipiens apparere ueluti ex nichilo in aliquid dicitur procedere. Et quae proprie super omnem essentiam existimatur proprie quoque in omni essentia cognoscitur. Ideoque omnis uisibilis et inuisibilis creatura theophania, id est diuina apparitio, potest appellari.' The passage appears to be not a direct citation, but a summary of Eriugena's doctrine of theophanies, cf. Book I. 479 sq.

(iii) F. 5539-15: 650B 1-13 *Deus nostra . . . superessentiale*.

<sup>1</sup> 'icúalge roscribus in duilind sea fortír gid etir ón 7 ní icill', which Professor Shaw tentatively translates: 'In Cúalge (?) I wrote this leaf . . . and not in Cill (?)'. If the queried words are place-names, they are the names of places in Ireland.

<sup>2</sup> G. Antolin, *Catálogo de los códices latinos de la Biblioteca del Escorial iii* (Madrid, 1913), p. 317.



With the condemnation of the *Periphyseon* at the Council of Paris in 1210<sup>1</sup> the production of manuscripts came to an end; but a considerable portion of the work, amounting to about one-fifteenth of the whole,<sup>2</sup> in the form of glosses, anonymous or attributed to St. Maximus, to the works of the Ps.-Dionys., continued to be read and studied until the Ps.-Dionys. was supplanted by Aristotle as the supreme authority for the wisdom of the ancients. Thus many doctors of the thirteenth century, including St. Albert<sup>3</sup> and St. Thomas,<sup>4</sup> who did not read the *Periphyseon*, came under its influence.

One, and perhaps two, seventeenth-century manuscripts exist, both in Dublin, an indication of the interest in Eriugena aroused in his own country by the researches of Archbishop Ussher. *Dublin, Trin. Coll. 240*, paper, folio, is said to contain<sup>5</sup> a fragment of the *Periphyseon* under the title: *Dialogus de Natura diuina et rebus theologicis*, inc.: *Nil mihi probabilius occurrit quam ut Patris imaginem . . .*, but I have not been able to trace this passage. *Dublin, Trin. Coll. 197 no. 7, c. 1637*,<sup>6</sup> *Joh. Scottus (Eriugena). De diuisione naturae, de Melchisedec*, is a transcript of MS. Paris, Bibl. nat. lat. 1764 (the Codex Thuaneus), q.v. Presumably it is the transcript to which Archbishop Ussher refers in his letter to Patrick Young,<sup>7</sup> and from which Gale obtained his knowledge of the Codex Thuaneus. This would explain the statement in the *Testimonia* to his edition, erroneous and inconsistent with what he says elsewhere,<sup>7</sup> that William of Malmesbury's *Epistola ad Petrum* is also contained in the Codex Thuaneus; for a note at the end of the Dublin MS., *omnia ex mss. in Bibl. Thuana*, would have been understood by him to include MS. 197 no. 6, which is a copy of the *Epistola*.

*Summary.* R, although evidently the copy of an earlier exemplar,<sup>8</sup> is the earliest extant manuscript of the *Periphyseon* and is the parent of all the others. Its descendants can be divided into two families: those which derive through B and carry the recension *Periphyseon C*; and those which do not derive through B and carry the recension *Periphyseon B*. In both families the work is usually divided into two parts: in *Periphyseon B* the division is made at 568B, where a copyist's mark in R probably indicates the point at which the copyist was interrupted, so that he or another scribe would know where to

<sup>1</sup> Honorius III, *Epist. ad archiep. et episc.*, PL cxxii. 439-40.

<sup>2</sup> H.-F. Dondaine, *Le Corpus dionysien de l'Université de Paris au XIII<sup>e</sup> siècle* (Rome, 1953), pp. 137-8.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 139.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 13.

<sup>5</sup> T. K. Abbott, *MSS. of Trinity College, Dublin* (1900), p. 34.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 27.

<sup>7</sup> See above, p. 20.


<sup>8</sup> See Notes on Translation 65, 99, 107, 173.

resume;<sup>1</sup> in *Periphyseon C* the division is at the end of Book III. In the following table the two parts are in each case named (a) and (b):

<i>Periphyseon B</i>	
(a)	(b)
s. ix: R as far as the mark ☒	R beyond the mark ☒ (incomplete)
Codex Thuaneus (Paris, Bibl. nat. lat. 1764)	—
s. xii: Cambridge, ff. 1-28 [aliud uolumen'] Berne 496 Oxford Epitome (a)	Cambridge, ff. 29-128 Avranches 230 — —
s. xvii: Dublin, Trin. Coll. 197 no. 7 <sup>2</sup>	

<sup>1</sup> See above, p. 11. The assumption is that the 'Uncompleted Copy' of R was never completed, either in the same volume or another volume—the latter would be most unlikely, for it would be very strange indeed to start a new volume in the middle of a sentence; and we shall see that all MSS. which reproduce the 'Supplementary Copy' in fact start from the beginning of the sentence in which the 'break' occurs. The 'Uncompleted Copy' or a copy of it (the *aliud uolumen*) probably came to Mont-Saint-Michel at some unknown date not later than the twelfth century, and was supplemented by a copy of the remainder, taken either directly from R or from an intermediate exemplar. Avranches 230 and the *aliud uolumen* are thus companion volumes rather than one copy in two volumes. But it is no longer possible to determine whether the *aliud uolumen* was or was not the 'Uncompleted Copy' made directly from R.

The sign in the margin of R indicating the 'break' extends over three lines thus:

f. 108 <sup>v</sup> 11		filiu uirtus. spiritus sancti operatio nostrae accomodet. Paterna
12		siquidem substantia quae de se substantiam filioliatis genuit et
13		procesionis substantiam ex se emisit non inmerito principalis dicitur substantia. non

(PL 568A 14-B 3).

It could, therefore, indicate a break anywhere within these three lines. But the evidence of the MSS. which reproduce the 'Uncompleted Copy' shows that it could not have occurred before *procesionis substantiam*, the concluding words of Paris 1764; and it is most likely that it occurred at this word, for the Paris scribe would hardly have omitted *ex se emisit* if he had found this in his exemplar, for by doing so he commits himself to the opinion that the Father 'begot' the *procesionis* (or *procedentem*, as he read in his exemplar) *substantiam*. It was probably to avoid this that the scribe of the Berne MS. stopped short at *genuit*. The Oxford Epitome, which, like Paris 1764, has *procedentem* for *procesionis*, breaks off at this word. According to Gale, the 'codex Thuni' [*sic*] does the same (p. 74 of his edition), but this is probably because in the transcript from which he obtained his information of Paris 1764 (the Codex Thuaneus) the final word appears as 'subianciam', and that he omitted 'substantiam' because he did not recognize it under this distorted form. The MSS. of the 'Supplementary Copy', on the other hand, all begin at *Paterna siquidem* as one would expect, for this is the beginning of the sentence. (This note is based on suggestions kindly supplied by Professor Bieler.) See also p. 27, no. 4.

<sup>2</sup> It should be mentioned, however, that of these MSS. of Recension B(a), the Codex Thuaneus (and therefore Dublin, Trin. Coll. 197 no. 7) and Oxford Epitome (a) show a text closer to BP than to R, a fact which I cannot reconcile with the evidence they show of the 'break', of which, of course, there is no sign in BP.

## Periphyseon C

	(a)	(b)
s. ix:	B	—
	P	P (incomplete)
	—	Paris, Bibl. nat. lat. 12965
	—	Bamberg Ph. 2/2

## 4. THE EDITIONS

(i) [Thomas Gale], *Ioannis Scoti Erigenae de Diuisione Naturae libri quinque, diu desiderati. Accedit Appendix ex Ambiguis S. Maximi Graece et Latine*. Oxonii, e Theatro Sheldoniano, Anno MDCLXXXI. The editor (1635/6–1702) was High Master of St. Paul's School and Regius Professor of Greek at Cambridge. The edition is of MS. Cambridge, Trin. Coll. O. 5. 20, which he owned at the time, with a list of variants from Paris, Bibl. nat. lat. 12964 and the last 22 pages of Paris, Bibl. nat. lat. 12965, supplied by his friend Peter Alixius. Gale also consulted MS. Dublin, Trin. Coll. 197 no. 7, but did not use it. This *editio princeps* was placed on the *Index Librorum Prohibitorum* by decree dated 5 September 1864.<sup>1</sup>

(ii) C. B. Schlüter, *Joannis Scoti Erigenae de diuisione naturae libri. Editio recognita et emendata. Accedunt tredecim auctoris hymni ad Carolum ex palimpsestis Angeli Maii*. Monasterii Guestphalorum 1838. Based on Gale's edition. Blindness overtook the editor before he could complete his task, which was entrusted to less skilled assistants. The text is inaccurate, lacks the corrections and additions Gale was able to make from the Paris manuscripts, and is practically valueless.

(iii) H. J. Floss, *Joannis Scoti Περὶ φύσεως μερισμοῦ, id est De Diuisione Naturae Libri quinque*, 1853 = PL cxxii. 439–1022. Based on Gale's edition with the material supplied by Alixius from the Paris manuscripts incorporated into the text, improved by further examination of these manuscripts, and collated with two others, Paris, Bibl. nat. lat. 12255 and 1764 (Codex Thuaneus). The editor knew of the existence of Avranches 230, but did not use it. It is not known by what chance he was led to reintroduce the Greek title as it appears at the beginning of R. He did not know this manuscript, nor Gale's Cambridge manuscript, the only other one in which it appears. However, he knew, through Gale, the *Epistola ad Petrum*,

<sup>1</sup> See the 1930 edition (Rome), p. 171. Earlier editions give the date as 3 April 1685: cf. F. H. Reusch, *Der Index der verbotenen Bücher. Ein Beitrag zur Kirchen- und Literaturgeschichte* i (Bonn, 1883), p. 15; J. Hilgers, *Der Index der verbotenen Bücher* (Freiburg i. Br., 1904), p. 432.

which makes it clear that the original title was Greek, and may have corrected the title he found there to make it accord with the Latin title used by Gale. In his *Monitum ad lectorem* Floss quotes from the letter of Honorius which gives the title as *Periphysis*,<sup>1</sup> and a passage from the *Gesta pontificum*<sup>2</sup> where it appears as *Peri physion*. Although he recognized the Paris manuscripts to be superior to that of Cambridge, his text remains basically that of Gale, but is nevertheless serviceable.

(iv) *The present edition* attempts to present the text with which the author finally came to be satisfied, and at the same time to exhibit the stages of its development. We have seen that the last three of these, wholly or in part, can be studied from extant manuscripts: *Periphyseon A* in R, *Periphyseon B* in RB, and *Periphyseon C* in BP. The indications are that contemporary alterations and additions to R and B, even if not in Eriugena's autograph, were carried out under his supervision: that is to say, B, which in its original state is essentially a copy of R enlarged, is a copy of which Eriugena approved; and where it differs from R, e.g. in adding a title and lemmata and a new set of enlargements, these additions were made by Eriugena or on his authority. This is not the case with P, where, indeed, some of the interpolations point to the contrary. Therefore B provides the best evidence not only for *Periphyseon B* but also for *Periphyseon C*. Therefore the present edition of Books I–III is based on the text of B (except where R is obviously preferable), with P's additions distinguished typographically as interpolations, each of which is assessed on its merits. R is collated in order to distinguish *Periphyseon B* from *Periphyseon A*; where it is defective, i.e. for 686B 9–697A 7, other manuscripts of *Periphyseon B* have been collated: those of Avranches and Cambridge, the Oxford Epitome, and the folios substituted in R itself by a twelfth-century hand which appears to be that of Rm.<sup>3</sup> But none of these, of course, provides evidence for *Periphyseon A*, since R's enlargements have in these been incorporated in the text.<sup>4</sup>

(Another family seems to be constituted by the three manuscripts which contain Book I only: Brit. Mus. Addit. 11035; Escorial; and Cologne Stadtarchiv W 4° 225; but I have not examined any of these closely. It would be to a member of this family that Hugh of St. Victor gives the title, *De decem categoriis in Deum* (see p. 10, n. 3)).

<sup>1</sup> See above, p. 9.

<sup>2</sup> PL cxxii. 441–2 = *Gest. pont.* v. 240.

<sup>3</sup> See above, p. 11.

<sup>4</sup> A stemma of Cambridge I–Berne–Paris 1764–Oxford (a) on the one hand and of Cambridge II–Avranches 230 on the other could be worked out only from a minute collation of their respective texts, which would probably yield no results proportionate to the labour involved (Professor Bieler).

With these exceptions, then, the text of Books I–III has been reconstituted from three manuscripts only, RBP, all written in the author's lifetime and two of them probably under his supervision. For Books IV–V a different treatment will be required, for B will no longer be available, and R only as far as the middle of Book IV, while P also lacks its final folios. As a consequence, this edition of the *Periphyseon* follows the division of most of the manuscripts of *Periphyseon C*, with Books I–III forming the first part, and Books IV–V forming the second. The present volume contains Book I, of which the contents are analysed in the next section.

5. ANALYSIS OF BOOK I

(If *Περὶ φύσεως μερισμοῦ* in R is taken as a chapter heading,<sup>1</sup> Book I consists of two chapters. Chapter I is preceded by a brief introduction, and Chapter II is followed by an Appendix on the categories.)

Introduction: Definition of *Φύσις*–*Natura* (441A 1–441B 4).


Chapter I: *Περὶ φύσεως μερισμοῦ* (441B 5–450B 2).

1. The four species of Nature (441B 5–10).
2. Classification of the species into pairs of opposites (441B 10–442A 12).
3. The need to discuss each species separately (442A 12–B 9).
4. Amplification of the Introduction, in which Nature was defined as comprising that which is and that which is not. This can be understood in five different ways (442B 10–446A 3):

- (i) That which is sensible or comprehensible is: that which is insensible or incomprehensible is not (443A 9–D 3).
- (ii) In a hierarchy, if the superior order is said to be, the lower is said not to be, and vice versa (443D 4–444C 12).
- (iii) The manifested effect is: the unmanifested cause is not (444C 13–445B 10).
- (iv) That which is is: that which becomes and passes away is not (445B 11–C 2).
- (v) Man in a state of grace is: man who has fallen from grace is not (445C 3–446A 3).

5. An objection to 4 (i): angels contemplate the primordial causes, and men may contemplate God in the Beatific Vision; therefore that which by this definition is not is yet comprehensible. Answer: these comprehend not the nature of what they contemplate, but theophanies of it (446A 3–451C 10). The section includes a digression on theophanies (449A 1–450B 2).

<sup>1</sup> See above, pp. 5–6.



Provisional diagram to illustrate the pedigree of the manuscripts and editions of Books I–III

Chapter II: *De natura creante et non creata* (451C 11–462D 8).

1. God is *ἀναρχος* and therefore *non-creatus*; and is the First Cause and therefore *creans* (451C 11–452A 7).

2. If God is said to be created, this is because He pervades all things and thus becomes manifest in all things, and so comes to being in them. If He did not they would have no being at all (452A 8–455A 6).

3. Therefore, although we cannot know God, we know three things about Him:

(i) that He exists, from the fact that His creatures exist;

(ii) that He is wise, from the fact that they are rationally ordered;

(iii) that He lives, from the fact that they are in constant motion.

These three things are substantial to Him, and therefore we know that He is a Trinity consisting of Being, Wisdom, and Life, i.e. Father, Son, and Holy Spirit (455A 6–D 3).

4. How the One God can be Three. His Unity does not exclude multiplicity, and therefore contains within itself the Unbegotten Substance, the Begotten Substance, the Proceeding Substance. The relation of the first to the second is the Father; that of the second to the first is the Son; that of the third to the first and second is the Holy Spirit (455D 3–457D 5).

5. There are two theologies: the Apophatic, which declares that nothing of God's creation can be predicated of Him literally; and the Cataphatic, which declares that all things can be predicated of Him metaphorically. The two are reconciled by adding to every predicate the prefix 'More-than-' (457D 6–462D 8).

Appendix (462D 8–524B 12).

(This appendix applies the principle of the two theologies to each of the ten Categories. It provides the opportunity for a little treatise on the Categories for which an appropriate title would be that which Hugh of St. Victor gave to the whole Book:<sup>1</sup> *On the Ten Categories in relation to God*. The new topic is really broached at 457D 6, where Alumnus breaks into the discussion on the Trinity with the irrelevant words: 'Nosse tamen aperte et breuiter per te uelim utrum omnes categoriae, cum sint numero decem, de summa diuinae bonitatis . . . essentia . . . possint praedicari.' Nutritor insists on dealing with the two theologies first, and then deals with Alumnus' question at 462D 8. Within this appendix there is a long digression which deals with the first eight Categories in greater detail. So as not to obscure the structure of the dialogue, this digression will be analysed separately at the end.)

<sup>1</sup> *Eruditionis didascalicon*, iii, PL clxxvi. 765 *De decem categoriis in Deum*; cf. Cappuyns, p. 71, n. 2.

1. Introduction (462D 8–464A 10).

2. The Ten Categories (464A 10–524B 11).

(i) *essentia* (464A 10–13).

(ii) *quantitas* (464A 13–B 15).

(iii) *qualitas* (464B 15–C 7).

(iv) *relatio* (464C 8–465C 6).

(v) *situs* (465C 7–466A 1).

(vi) *habitus* (466A 2–468B 12).

(vii and viii) *locus, tempus* (468B 13–469A 4).

(Here follows the digression on the first eight Categories, 469A 4–504A 4.)

(ix and x) *agere, pati* (504A 5–524B 11).

Conclusion of Book I (524B 11–12).

Treatise on the First Eight Categories (469A 4–504A 4).

1. Introduction: Alumnus remarks that the nature of the Categories and their application to God have been sufficiently covered (although in fact only eight Categories have so far been dealt with) (469A 4–9).

2. The reduction of the ten Categories to the two higher Categories of *status* and *motus*, and of these to the universal genus, τὸ πᾶν (469A 10–B 11).

3. Doubts about *habitus* and *relatio*. They have been allocated to *motus*, but seem to be in *status*. Answer: That which subsists in another subject is in motion; *habitus* and *relatio* subsist in another subject; therefore they are in motion (469B 12–470B 3).

4. But this argument would equally apply to *locus, quantitas*, and *situs*, which have been allocated to *status*. Answer: *locus, quantitas*, and *situs* are not in the subject, but rather each is a subject in which other things are. Therefore they are at rest (470B 5–D 3).

5. But *locus, quantitas*, and *situs* are accidents of *essentia*, and therefore cannot be self-sufficient subjects. Answer: there are two kinds of accidents, περιουχαί and συμβάματα. The former enclose the subject and are its limits, and therefore are at rest. *Locus, quantitas*, and *situs* are always this kind of accident, and therefore at rest (470D 3–472B 10).

6. In the course of this discussion the Categories have been shown to be so closely interrelated that Alumnus is compelled to ask for their properties to be clearly distinguished (472 B 11–C 3).

7. The properties of the Categories (472C 4–504A 4).

(i) *essentia* (472C 4–15).

(ii) *quantitas* (472C 15–D 9).

(iii) *qualitas* (472D 9–473B 1).

- (iv) *relatio* (473B 2-C 8).  
 (v) *situs* (473C 9-474A 5).  
 (vi) *habitus* (474A 6-B 5).  
 (vii and viii) *locus, tempus* (474B 6-504A 4).

With this long section on *locus* and *tempus* the interpolated treatise comes to an end, for the passage on *agere* and *pati* which follows is concerned with the question whether these two Categories may be predicated of God, and therefore belongs to the main body of the Appendix.

## 6. BIBLIOGRAPHY AND TESTIMONIA

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 Dom Maïeul Cappuyns, *Jean Scot Érigène, sa vie, son œuvre, sa pensée* (Paris and Louvain, 1933), pp. 183-216, 274-381.  
 Mario del Pra, *Scoto Eriugena*, 2nd ed. (Milan, 1951), pp. 106-239.  
 Carlo Mazzantini, 'Un testo di Giovanni Scoto Eriugena ("De diuisione naturae" i. 1, PL cxxii. 442A) di fronte ad una recente interpretazione del suo pensiero', *Atti della Accademia delle Scienze di Torino* xc. 2 (1955-6), pp. 329-55 (critique of the preceding).  
 I. P. Sheldon-Williams, 'An epitome of Irish provenance of Eriugena's De diuisione naturae', *Proc. RIA* 58 C 1 (1956), pp. 1-20.  
 — 'The Title of Eriugena's Periphyseon', *Studia Patristica* iii (*Texte und Untersuchungen* 78, Berlin, 1961), 297-302.  
 Most of the histories of philosophy which cover the period discuss the *Periphyseon*. See also Sheldon-Williams, *Bibliography*.

(iv) *Translations*

The *Periphyseon* has been translated into English by William Larminie, MS. Dublin, Nat. Lib. of Ireland 290, 291; and a part of it (iv. 7-9, PL cxxii 762-81) by R. McKeon, *Selections from the Medieval Philosophers* i (London, 1928), 106-41.

## 7. SIGLA

- R MS. Rheims 875.  
 B MS. Bamberg Ph. 2/1.  
 P MS. Paris, Bibl. Nat. lat. 12964.  
 C Eriugena's supposed autograph.  
 sC other scribes writing apparently from Eriugena's dictation.  
 sR, sB, sP supplementation, in the hands of the scribes of RBP, of words or passages omitted.  
 R\*, B\*, P\* uncorrected readings of RBP.  
 R<sup>c</sup>, B<sup>c</sup>, P<sup>c</sup> corrected readings of RBP.

<sup>1</sup> But the reference to the bibliography in Baldwin's *History of Philosophy* should be disregarded: the compiler has failed to distinguish between Eriugena and Duns Scotus!

### Introduction

- Rm the scribe of the twelfth-century lemmata added to R.  
\*(\*\*\*) one (two) letter(s) erased.  
<. . .> words or letters added to the text.  
[. . .] words or letters excluded from the text.  
[. . .] Eriugena's additions to the text of R, in hand C unless otherwise stated.  
<. . .> Eriugena's additions to the text of B, in hand C unless otherwise stated. (The lemmata, however, which are in hand C unless otherwise stated, are not distinguished typographically.)  
Small type additions to the text found in P only.  
Italics corrections in hand C to RB.

In view of the fact that MSS R B P represent three successive recensions of the text it has been decided to give a full 'positive' apparatus criticus, and to do so, for the sake of consistency, even where a manuscript variant is merely a scribal blunder.

In the *apparatus fontium* and in the Notes the titles of the Ps.-Dionysian treatises are abridged as follows: *CH* = *De caelesti hierarchia*; *EH* = *De ecclesiastica hierarchia*; *DN* = *De diuinis nominibus*; *MT* = *De mystica theologia*; *Ep.* = *Epistulae*.

The numbers and letters in the right-hand margin of the Latin text refer to columns and sections of PL cxxii; the numbers in the right-hand margin of the English text to the chapter numbers used by Gale and Floss.

## TEXT AND TRANSLATION

de prima  
diuisione  
omnium in  
ea quae sunt  
et quae non  
sunt

## PERIPHYSEON

### LIBER I

NVTRITOR. Saepe mihi cogitanti diligentiusque quantum uires sup- 441A  
petunt inquirenti rerum omnium quae uel animo percipi possunt uel  
intentionem eius superant primam summamque diuisionem esse in 5  
ea quae sunt et in ea quae non sunt horum omnium generale uoca-  
bulum occurrit quod graece ΦΥCIC, latine uero natura uocatur.  
An tibi aliter uidetur?

ALVMNVS. Immo consentio. Nam et ego dum ratiocinandi uiam  
ingredior haec ita fieri reperio. 10

N. Est igitur natura generale nomen, ut diximus, omnium quae  
sunt et quae non sunt?

A. Est quidem. Nihil enim in uniuerso cogitationibus nostris  
potest occurrere quod tali uocabulo ualeat carere.

N. Quoniam igitur inter nos conuenit de hoc uocabulo generale 15  
esse, uelim dicas diuisionis eius per differentias in species rationem; 441B  
aut, si tibi libet, prius conabor diuidere, tuum uero erit recte  
iudicare.

A. Ingredere quaesso. Impatiens enim sum de hac re ueram  
rationem a te audire uolens. 20

de diuisione  
naturae N. Videtur mihi diuisio naturae per quattuor differentias quattuor  
species recipere, quarum prima est in eam quae creat et non creatur,  
secunda in eam quae et creatur et creat, tertia in eam quae creatur et  
non creat, quarta quae nec creat nec creatur. Harum uero quattuor 442A  
binae sibi inuicem opponuntur. Nam tertia opponitur primae, quarta 25  
uero secundae; sed quarta inter impossibilia ponitur cuius esse est  
non posse esse. Rectane tibi talis diuisio uidetur an non?

A. Recta quidem. Sed uelim repetas ut praedictarum formarum  
oppositio clarius elucescat.

N. Vides, ni fallor, tertiae speciei primae oppositionem (prima 30  
nanque creat et non creatur, cui e contrario opponitur illa [quae  
creatur et non creat), secundae uero quartae, siquidem secunda et  
creatur et creat, cui uniuersaliter quarta contradicit] quae nec creat  
neque creatur.

1-2 ΠΕΡΙ ΦΥCΕΩC ΜΕΡΙCΜΟΥ R: INCIPIT LIBER PRIMVS ΠΕΡΙΦΥCΗΩΝ B:  
INCIPIT PRIMVS ΠΕΡΙΦΥCΕΩΝ P 1 lemma hic adscribit sC in marg. B: DE  
PRIMA DIUISIONE OMNIVM ID EST OMNIA QVAE SVNT ET QVAE NON SVNT lemma ad lin.  
3 P: prima diuisio omnium in ea quae sunt et quae non sunt Rm 3 NVTRITOR:  
N codd. 9 ALVMNVS: A codd. 17 si tibi RB: sic ubi P recte RB:  
diuisa P 19 quaesso RB: quesso P de hac re RB: de his P  
21 lemma BP: § quadrifaria nature diuisio .i. Rm mihi RBP<sup>c</sup>: om. P\*

## PERIPHYSEON (I)

### BOOK I

NUTRITOR (3). As I frequently ponder (4) and, so far as my  
talents allow, ever more carefully investigate the fact that the first and  
fundamental division of all things which either can be grasped by  
the mind or lie beyond its grasp is into those that are and those that  
are not (5), there comes to mind as a general term for them all what  
in Greek is called Φύσις and in Latin Natura. Or do you think  
otherwise? Concerning  
the first  
division of  
all things  
into those  
which are  
and those  
which are  
not (2)

ALUMNUS (3). No, I agree. For I too, when I enter upon the path  
of reasoning, find that this is so.

N. Nature, then, is the general name, as we said, for all things, for  
those that are and those that are not.

A. It is. For nothing at all can come into our thought that would  
not fall under this term.

N. Then since we agree to use this term for the genus, I should  
like you to suggest a method for its division by differentiations into  
species; or, if you wish, I shall first attempt a division, and your part  
will be to offer sound criticism.

A. Pray begin. For I am impatient to hear from you a true account  
of this matter.

N. It is my opinion that the division of Nature by means of four 1  
differences results in four species, (being divided) first into that which  
creates and is not created, secondly into that which is created and  
also creates, thirdly into that which is created and does not create,  
while the fourth neither creates nor is created. But within these four  
there are two pairs of opposites. For the third is the opposite of the  
first, the fourth of the second; but the fourth is classed among the  
impossibles (7), for it is of its essence that it cannot be. Does such  
a division seem right to you or not? 1  
On the  
division of  
Nature (6)

A. Right, certainly. But please go over it again so as to elucidate  
more fully the opposition(s) (8) within these four forms (9).

N. I am sure you see the opposition of the third species to the  
first—for the first creates and is not created; it therefore has as its  
contrary that [which is created and does not create—and of the second  
to the fourth, for the second both is created and creates; it therefore  
has as its contrary in all respects the fourth,] which neither creates  
nor is created.

25 bine erasum ante binae in R 26 esse est RB: differentia (om. est) P 31-  
33 quae creatur-contradicit omitta, altera manu ad calcem suppleta

A. Clare uideo. Sed multum me mouet quarta species quae a te addita est. Nam de aliis tribus nullo modo haesitare ausim, cum prima ut arbitror in causa omnium quae sunt et quae non sunt intelligatur; secunda uero in primordialibus causis; tertia in his quae in generatione temporibusque et locis cognoscuntur. Atque ideo de singulis disputari subtilius necessarium est, ut uideo.

442B

5

N. Recte aestimas. Sed quo ordine ratiocinationis uia tenenda sit, hoc est de qua specie naturae primo discutiendum, tuo arbitrio committo.

A. Ratum mihi uidetur ante alias de prima quicquid lux mentium largita fuerit dicere.

10

N. Ita fiat. Sed prius de summa ac principali omnium, ut diximus [diuisione] in ea quae sunt et quae non sunt breuiter dicendum existimo.

443A

A. Iure prouideque. Non enim ex alio primordio ratiocinationem inchoari oportere uideo, nec solum quia prima omnium differentia sed quia obscurior caeteris uidetur esse et est.

15

de quinque modis primae diuisionis omnium I

N. Ipsa itaque primordialis omnium discretiua differentia *quinque* suae interpretationis modos inquit.

Quorum primus uidetur esse ipse per quem ratio suadet omnia quae corporeo sensui uel intelligentiae perceptioni succumbunt uere ac rationabiliter dici esse, ea uero quae per excellentiam suae naturae non solum omnem sensum sed etiam omnem intellectum rationemque fugiunt iure uideri non esse—quae non nisi in solo deo materiaeque et in omnium rerum quae ab eo condita(e) sunt rationibus atque essentiis recte intelliguntur. Nec immerito; ipse nanque omnium essentia est qui solus uere est, ut ait Dionysius Ariopagita. 'Esse enim,' inquit, 'omnium est super esse diuinitas.' Gregorius etiam theologus multis rationibus nullam substantiam seu essentiam siue uisibilis siue inuisibilis creaturae intellectu uel ratione comprehendi posse confirmat quid sit. Nam sicut ipse deus in se ipso ultra omnem creaturam nullo intellectu comprehenditur ita etiam in secretissimis

443B

25

de eo quod nulla essentia uel substantia per se intelligi potest

26-27 Ps.-Dionys., CH iv. 1, PG iii. 177D 1-2. Cf. *infra ad p.* 204, 29-30, et 644B 27-29; cf. Max. Conf., I *Ambig.*, xiii, PG xci. 1225D; p. 40, 24-28 *infra*. Vide etiam Basil., *Adu. Eun.* i. 1, 6; 2, 4. 23, PG xxix. 521-4, 577-80, 648; eund., *Ad Amphiloichium ep.* ccxxxiv, PG xxxii. 869A-C

3 et quae non sunt B in ras., P: quae deus est R 6 est om. P 9 Ratum BP: Recte R 11 hic lemma quod lineae 17 adscripti (omissa uoce omnium) inserendum indicat C in R (principalis diuisio omnium que sunt et que non sunt quinquepartita, adscripto numero ii, Rm); eodem loco lemma totum litteris maiusculis adscriptum erat in marg. B, sed erasum est. Cf. *infra ad 17* fiat R<sup>c</sup>BP: fiet R\* 14 prouideque B<sup>c</sup>P: existimas R(B\*?) 15 oportere BP: oportere R nec B<sup>c</sup>P: non RB\* differentia B<sup>c</sup>P: differentia est RB\* 17 lemma B: de modis primae diuisionis omnium hoc est quod (lege quot) modis dicuntur et quae sunt et quae non sunt P: iii Nullam uisibilis uel inuisibilis creature substantiam intellectu humano comprehendi posse Rm. Cf. *infra ad 30* quinque R<sup>c</sup>B: certos P (de R\* non constat) 19 I in marg. BP esse om. P 20-21 uere

A. I see (that) clearly. But I am much perplexed by the fourth species which you have introduced (10). For about the other three I should not presume to raise any question at all, because, as I think, the first is understood to be the Cause of all things that are and that are not, Who is God; the second to be the primordial causes (11); and the third those things that become manifest through coming into being in times and places. For this reason a more detailed discussion which shall take each species individually is required, as I think.

N. You are right to think so. But in what order we should pursue our path of reasoning, that is to say, which of the species of Nature we should take first, I leave it to you to decide.

A. It seems to me beyond question that before the others we should say of the first species whatever the light of minds (12) has granted us to utter.

N. Let it be so. But first I think a few words should be said about the first and fundamental [division]—as we called it—of all things into the things that are and the things that are not.

2

A. It would be correct and wise to do so. For I see no other beginning from which reasoning ought to start, and this not only because this difference is the first of all, but because both in appearance and in fact it is more obscure than the others.

N. This basic difference, then, which separates all things requires for itself five modes of interpretation:

Of the five modes of the first division of all things

3

I. Of these modes the first seems to be that by means of which reason convinces us that all things which fall within the perception of bodily sense or (within the grasp of) intelligence are truly and reasonably said to be, but that those which because of the excellence of their nature elude not only all (13) sense but also all intellect and reason rightly seem not to be—which are correctly understood only of God and matter (14) and of the reasons and essences (15) of all the things that are created by Him. And rightly so: for as Dionysius the Areopagite says, He is the Essence of all things Who alone truly is. 'For', says he, 'the being of all things is the Divinity Who is above Being.' Gregory the Theologian too (16) proves by many arguments that no substance or essence (17) of any creature, whether visible or invisible, can be comprehended by the intellect or by reason as to what it is. For just as God as He is in Himself beyond every creature is comprehended by no intellect, so is He equally incomprehensible

That no essence or substance is intelligible in itself

ac RB: posse P 22 supra sensum superscripta est glossa ylem omnem et in marg. eadem manu (Rm?) grece ylem primam materiam romani dicunt pro(r)sus (in)formatam R 24 condita codd. 26 dyonysius RB: dionysius P 27 enim om. P supra Gregorius sed ad theologus pertinens superscripta est glossa dei disputator R 30 quid sit RP: om. B lemma BP (... intelli(gi) ... P): nulla essentia uel substantia per se potest intelligi quid sit Rm. Cf. ad 24 supra



creaturae ab eo factae et in eo existentis consideratus incomprehensibilis est. Quicquid autem in omni creatura uel sensu corporeo percipitur seu intellectu consideratur nihil aliud est nisi quoddam accidens 443C  
 in se incomprehensibili per se ut dictum est unicuique essentiae quae aut per 5  
 qualitatem aut quantitatem aut formam aut materiem aut differentiam  
 quandam aut locum aut tempus cognoscitur non quid est sed quia  
 est. Iste igitur modus primus ac summus est [diuisionis] eorum quae  
 dicuntur esse et non esse. Quia ille qui uidetur quodam modo esse, qui  
 in priuationibus et substantiarum et accidentium constituitur, nullo  
 modo recipiendus, ut arbitror. Nam quod paenitus non est nec esse 10  
 potest nec prae eminentia suae existentiae intellectum exsuperat, quo-  
 modo in rerum diuisionibus recipi ualeat non uideo [nisi forte quis  
 dixerit rerum quae sunt absentias et priuationes non omnino nihil esse 443D  
 sed earum quarum priuationes seu absentiae seu oppositiones sunt  
 mirabili quadam naturali uirtute contineri ut quodam modo sint.] 15

II Fiat igitur secundus modus essendi et non essendi qui in naturarum 444A  
 creaturarum ordinibus atque *differentiis* consideratur, qui ab excelsis-  
 sima et circa deum proxime constituta intellectuali uirtute inchoans  
 usque ad extremitatem rationa[li]s irrationali[que] creaturae descendit, hoc est, ut apertius dicamus, a sublimissimo angelo usque ad extre- 20  
 mam rationa[bilis] irrationali[que] animae partem—[nutritiuam  
 dico et auctiuam uitam quae pars generalis animae ultima est quon-  
 iam corpus nutrit et auget]—ubi mirabili intelligentiae modo unus-  
 quisque ordo, *cum ipso* deorsum uersus nouissimo [qui est corporum  
 et in quo omnis diuisio terminatur], potest dici esse et non esse. 25  
 Inferioris enim affirmatio superioris est negatio itemque inferioris  
 negatio superioris est affirmatio [eodemque modo superioris affir-  
 matio inferioris est negatio, negatio uero superioris erit affirmatio 444B  
 inferioris]. Affirmatio enim hominis (mortalis adhuc dico) negatio est  
 angeli, negatio uero hominis affirmatio est angeli [et uicissim]. 30  
 Si enim homo est animal rationale mortale risibile, profecto angelus neque  
 animal rationale est neque mortale neque risibile. Item si angelus est essen-  
 tialis motus intellectualis circa deum rerumque causas, profecto homo non  
 est essentialis motus intellectualis circa deum et rerum causas. Eademque

1 consideratus RB: uel consid(er)ata oysia *superscriptum* R: considerata OYCIA P  
 4 incomprehensibili RB: incomprehensibilis P quae B<sup>c</sup>P: Nam RB\* 8 di-  
 cuntur RB: dicunt P 8-10 Quia ille—arbitror RB: Quia uero modus ille qui  
 uidetur quodam modo introduci posse qui in priuationibus circa substantias  
 habitudinum ut circa oculos uisus et orbatus constituitur nullo modo recipiendus ut  
 arbitror P 10 *uerba* ut arbitror, *alterutrum altera manu, addita sunt in R*  
 16 II *in marg.* RBP 17 *differentiis in ras.* R 18 et R<sup>c</sup>BP: ex R\*  
 22 auctiuam RBP: actiuam P\* uitam om. P 22-23 quoniam RB: quae P  
 24 cum ipso *in ras.* R 28 uero *s.l.* B 29 glo(sa) Notandum quod non  
 de homine ante peccatum hoc dictum sit *marg.* B(C): *hinc uerba* mortalis—dico  
*suppleta ad lin. 29 in P* 29-30 negatio est angeli om. B *sed manu C in marg. suppleta*  
 § ordo i. creature dicitur esse et non esse. est quantum a se uel superiori cognoscitur,  
 non est quantum ab inferiori comprehendendi non sinitur Rm

when considered in the innermost depths (18) of the creature which  
 was made by Him and which exists in Him; while whatsoever in  
 every creature is either perceived by the bodily sense or contemplated  
 by the intellect is merely some accident to each creature's essence  
 which, as has been said, by itself (19) is incomprehensible, but which,  
 either by quality or by quantity or by form or by matter or by some  
 difference or by place or by time, is known not as to what it is but as  
 to that it is (20).

That, then, is the first and fundamental mode [of division] of those  
 things of which it is said that they are and those (of which it is said)  
 that they are not. For what somehow appears to be (a mode of divi-  
 sion) based upon privations of substances and accidents should  
 certainly not be admitted, in my opinion (21). For how can that  
 which absolutely is not, and cannot be, and which does not surpass  
 the intellect because of the pre-eminence of its existence, be included  
 in the division of things? [—unless perhaps someone should say that  
 the absences and privations of things that exist are themselves not  
 altogether nothing, but are implied by some strange natural virtue of  
 those things of which they are the privations and absences and  
 oppositions, so as to have some kind of existence.]

II. Let then the second mode of being and not being be that which is 4  
 seen in the orders and *differences* of created natures, which, beginning  
 from the intellectual power, which is the highest and is constituted  
 nearest to God, descends to the furthestmost (degree) of the rational [and  
 irrational] creature, or, to speak more plainly, from the most exalted  
 angel to the furthestmost element of the rational [and irrational] soul  
 [—I mean the nutritive and growth-giving life-principle, which is the  
 least part of the soul in the general acceptance of the term because it  
 nourishes the body and makes it grow]. Here, by a wonderful mode  
 of understanding, each order, *including the* last at the lower end  
 [which is that of bodies and in which the whole division comes to  
 an end], can be said to be and not to be. For an affirmation concerning  
 the lower (order) is a negation concerning the higher, and so too  
 a negation concerning the lower (order) is an affirmation concerning  
 the higher [and similarly an affirmation concerning the higher (order)  
 is a negation concerning the lower, while a negation concerning the  
 higher (order) will be an affirmation concerning the lower] (22).  
 Thus, the affirmation of 'man' (I mean, man while still in his mortal state)  
 is the negation of 'angel', while the negation of 'man' is the  
 affirmation of 'angel' [and vice versa]. For if man is a rational, mortal,  
 risible (23) animal, then an angel is certainly neither a rational animal nor  
 mortal nor risible: likewise, if an angel is an essential intellectual motion about  
 God and the causes of things, then man is certainly not an essential intellectual  
 motion about God and the causes of things (24). And the same rule is

regula in omnibus caelestibus essentiis usque dum ad supremam omnium perueniatur ordinem obseruari potest. Ipse uero [in] suprema [sursum] negatione terminatur; eius nanque negatio nullam creaturam superiorem se confirmat. Tres autem ordines sunt quos omotages uocant, quorum primus cherubin seraphin troni, secundus uirtutes potestates dominationes, tertius principatus archangeli angeli. Deorsum uero corporum nouissimus solummodo [superiorem se aut negat aut firmat, quia infra se nil habet quod uel auferat uel constituat], quia ab omnibus superioribus se praeceditur, nullum uero inferiorem se praecedit. Hac item ratione omnis ordo rationalis et intellectualis creaturae esse dicitur et non esse. Est enim quantum a superioribus uel a se ipso cognoscitur, non est autem quantum ab inferioribus se comprehendi non sinit.

III Tertius modus non incongrue inspicitur in his quibus huius mundi uisibilis plenitudo perficitur et in suis causis praecedentibus in secretissimis naturae sinibus. Quicquid enim ipsarum causarum in materia et forma in temporibus et locis per generationem cognoscitur quadam humana consuetudine dicitur esse, quicquid uero adhuc in ipsis naturae sinibus continetur neque in forma uel materia loco uel tempore caeterisque accidentibus apparet eadem praedicta consuetudine dicitur non esse. Huius modi exempla late patent et maxime in humana natura. Cum enim deus omnes homines in illo primo atque uno quem ad imaginem suam fecit simul constituerit, sed non simul in hunc mundum uisibilem produxit, certis uero temporibus locisque naturam quam simul considerat quadam ut ipse nouit serie ad uisibilem essentiam adducit, hi qui iam in mundo uisibiliter apparent et apparenter dicuntur esse, qui uero adhuc latent futuri tamen sunt dicuntur non esse. Inter primum et tertium hoc distat: primus generaliter in omnibus qui simul et semel in causis et effectibus facta sunt; secundus specialiter in his quae partem adhuc in causis suis latent, partim in effectibus patent, quibus proprie mundus iste contextitur. Ad hunc modum pertinet ratio illa quae uirtutem seminum considerat siue in animalibus

4-6 cf. Ps.-Dionys., CH vi. 2, PG iii. 200D 4-201A 13 16 secretissimis-sinibus: cf. p. 44, 22; 55B, 603C, 632C, 658B, 661B, 700A, C, 710AB, 711C, 714B, 731A, 822C; Annot. in Marc. 297, 3 Lutz

1-3 usque dum-terminatur R<sup>BP</sup>: usque dum ad supremam (i.e. essentiam) omnium perueniatur obseruari potest. ipsa uero suprema negatione terminatur R\* sed cum notio ordinis (cuius tamen uox ipsa nondum erat expressa) praeualeret mutatum est 2 ordinem BP: deest in R Exempla sunt haec: affirmatio hominis: animal rationale mortale homo est. Negatio angeli: animal rationale mortale angelus non est. Negatio hominis: animal rationale immortale non est homo. Affirmatio angeli: animal rationale immortale angelus est. Haec quattuor reflexim alia quattuor efficiunt erasa longiore eiusdem manus glossa primaria C in marg. B adscribit. Hinc uidentur fluxisse quae leguntur in P, p. 40, 31-34 7 superiorem in ras. B 8 nil RB: nihil P quia RB: qui P 14 III in marg. RB 17 materia et

found to apply in all the celestial essences until one reaches the highest order of all (25). This, however, terminates [in] the highest negation [upward]; for its negation confirms the existence of no higher creature. Now, there are three orders which they call 'of equal rank': the first of these are the Cherubim, Seraphim, and Thrones; the second, the Virtues, Powers, and Dominations; the third, the Principalities, Archangels, and Angels (26). Downwards, on the other hand, the last (order) merely [denies or confirms the one above it, because it has nothing below it which it might either take away or establish] since it is preceded by all the orders higher than itself but precedes none that is lower than itself.

It is also on these grounds that every order of rational or intellectual creature is said to be and not to be: it is in so far as it is known by the orders above it and (27) by itself; but it is not in so far as it does not permit itself to be comprehended by the orders that are below it.

III. The third mode can suitably be seen in those things of which the visible plenitude of this world is made up, and in their causes in the most secret folds of nature (28), which precede them. For whatsoever of these causes through generation is known as to matter and form, as to times and places, is by a certain human convention said to be, while whatsoever is still held in those folds of nature and is not manifest as to form or matter, place or time, and the other accidents, by the same convention referred to is said not to be (29). Clear examples of this mode are provided over a wide range (of experience), and especially in human nature. Thus, since God in that first and one man whom He made in His image established all men at the same time, yet did not bring them all at the same time into this visible world, but brings the nature which He considers all at one time into visible essence at certain times and places according to a certain sequence which He Himself knows: those who already are becoming, or have become visibly manifest in the world are said to be, while those who are as yet hidden, though destined to be, are said not to be (30). Between the first and third (mode) there is this difference: the first (is found) generically in all things which at the same time and once for all have been made in (their) causes and effects; the third specifically in those which partly are still hidden in their causes, partly are manifest in (their) effects, of which in particular the fabric of this world is woven. To this mode belongs the reasoning which considers the potentiality of seeds, whether

forma RB: materia formata P v in marg. R glossa Qui uiuit in eternum creauit omnia simul que iam processerunt in forma dicuntur esse que adhuc latent in nature sinibus dicuntur non esse Rm 19 forma uel materia RB: formata materia uel P 23 constituerit B<sup>CP</sup>: constituit RB\* 26 adducit R<sup>BP</sup>: induxit R\* 26-27 apparent et apparuerunt B<sup>CP</sup>: apparuerunt RB\* C in marg. B adscribit per filium patris 29 qui codd.: lege quae secundus P: lege tertius ut in aliis codicibus Parisiensibus 30 partem: lege partim

siue arboribus siue in herbis. Virtus enim seminum eo tempore quo in secretis naturae silet quia nondum apparet dicitur non esse; dum uero in nascentibus crescentibusque animalibus seu floribus fructibusue lignorum et herbarum apparuerit dicitur esse.

III Quartus modus est qui secundum philosophos non improbabili- 5  
 ea solummodo quae solo comprehenduntur intellectu dicit uere esse; quae uero per generationem materiae distentionibus seu detractio- 445C  
 nibus locorum quoque spatiis temporumque motibus uariantur col-  
 liguntur soluuntur uere dicuntur non esse, ut sunt omnia corpora  
 quae nasci et corrumpi possunt. 10

V Quintus modus est quem in sola humana natura ratio intuetur,  
 quae cum diuinae imaginis dignitatem in qua proprie substetit pec-  
 cando deseruit merito esse suum perdidit et ideo dicitur non esse;  
 dum uero unigeniti filii dei gratia restaurata ad pristinum suae sub-  
 stantiae statum in qua secundum imaginem dei condita est reducit, 15  
 incipit esse et in eo qui secundum imaginem dei conditus est inchoat  
 uiuere. Ad hunc modum uidetur pertinere quod Apostolus dicit:  
 Et uocat ea quae non sunt tanquam quae sunt, hoc est: Eos qui in  
 primo homine perditum sunt et ad quandam non subsistentiam cecide- 445D  
 runt deus pater per fidem [in filium suum] uocat ut sint sicut hi qui 20  
 iam in Christo renati sunt—quanquam et hoc ita intelligi possit et  
 de his quos cotidie deus ex secretis naturae sinibus in quibus aesti-  
 mantur non esse uocat ut appareant uisibiliter in forma et materia  
 caeterisque in quibus occulta apparere possunt.

Etsi quid praeter hos modos indagatio ratio inuenire potest, sed prae- 446A  
 sentialiter, ut arbitrator, de his satis dictum est, si tibi aliter non uidetur. 26

A. Satis plane, ni me paulisper turbaret quod a sancto Augustino  
 in Examerone suo dictum uidetur, hoc est, angelicam naturam ante  
 omnem creaturam dignitate non tempore conditam fuisse, ac per hoc et  
 aliorum praeter suimet primordiales causas, hoc est principalia exempla 30  
 quae Graeci ΠΡΟΤΟΤΥΠΑ nominant, prius in deo considerasse, deinde  
 in se ipsa, deinde ipsas creaturas in effectibus suis. Nam suimet causam  
 prius quam in speciem propriam procederet cognoscere non ualuit.

5 secundum philosophos: cf. Plato, *Tim.* 27 D, 28 A 8-9 cf. Plato, *Tim.*  
 48 sq. 18 Et uocat—quae sunt: Rom. iv. 17 (O.L. cfg; *Vulg.* DF et al.; vg)  
 28-30 Haec uerba in Augustini libris De genesi ad litteram, quas Eriugena Examerone  
 solet appellare, non inueni. Sed ad i. 17 op. cit. dicitur creaturam spirituales super omne  
 corpus non locorum gradibus sed naturae sublimitate praepositam et tali modo simul ac  
 corpus factam quali materiam simul ac rem, uidelicet non tempore sed origine; cf. i. 15.

1 pro siue altero seue habet P uirtus RB: uirtutis P 4 herbarum RB: er-  
 barum P dicitur BP: dicunt R\*: dicuntur R<sup>c</sup> 5 IIII in marg. RB glossa  
 que solo comprehenduntur intellectu esse, que corruptioni subiacent dicuntur non  
 esse Rm 11 V in marg. B glossa Qui diuinae imaginis (sic) dignitatem  
 peccando deserit dicitur non esse, qui gratiam dei conseruat dicitur esse Rm  
 12 substetit R<sup>c</sup> (posteriori in substitit mutatum), BP: subsistit R\* 14 dum BP:  
 cum R 16 et B<sup>c</sup>P: cum RB\* inchoat BP: incipit R 19 non subsisten-

in animals or in trees or in plants. For during the time when the potentiality of the seeds is latent in the recesses of nature, because it is not yet manifest it is said not to be; but when it has become manifest in the birth and growth of animals or of flowers or of the fruits of trees and plants it is said to be.

IV. The fourth mode is that which, not improbably according 6  
 to the philosophers, declares that only those things which are con-  
 templated by the intellect alone truly are, while those things which in  
 generation, through the expansions or contractions of matter, and the  
 intervals of places and motions of times are changed, brought to-  
 gether, or dissolved, are said not to be truly, as is the case with all  
 bodies which can come into being and pass away.

V. The fifth mode is that which reason observes only in human 7  
 nature, which, when through sin it renounced the honour of the  
 divine image in which it was properly substantiated, deservedly  
 lost its being and therefore is said not to be; but when, restored by  
 the grace of the only-begotten Son of God, it is brought back to the  
 former condition of its substance in which it was made after the image  
 of God, it begins to be, and in him who has been made in the image  
 of God begins to live. It is to this mode, it seems, that the Apostle's  
 saying refers: 'and He calls the things that are not as the things  
 that are'; that is to say, those who in the first man were lost and had  
 fallen into a kind of non-subsistence God the Father calls through  
 faith [in His Son] to be as those who are already reborn in Christ.  
 But this too may also be understood of those whom God daily  
 calls forth from the secret folds of nature (31), in which they are con-  
 sidered not to be, to become visibly manifest in form and matter and  
 in the other (conditions) in which hidden things are able to become  
 manifest.

Although keener reasoning can discover some modes besides these,  
 yet I think at the present (stage) enough has been said about these  
 things, unless you disagree.

A. Quite plainly so—except that I am rather perplexed by what St.  
 Augustine appears to have said in his *Hexameron*, namely that the  
 angelic nature was established before every other creature, not in  
 time but in status, and on this account it contemplated the primordial  
 causes, that is, those primary exemplars which the Greeks call  
 πρωτότυπα (32), even of others besides its own, first in God; then in  
 itself; then the creatures themselves in their effects. For it cannot have  
 known its own cause before it proceeded into its proper species (33).

tiam RB: insubsistentiam P 21 et (1) RB: ex P 25 quid RB: quit P inda-  
 gator R\*BP: indagator R<sup>c</sup> inuenire BP: inueniri R 26 si tibi RBP<sup>c</sup>: sibi P\*  
 27 ni B<sup>c</sup>P: nisi RB\* augustino RB: agustino P 28 in s.l. P 31 quae  
 RB: quam P 31-32 deinde in se ipsa, deinde ipsas creaturas R<sup>c</sup>BP: deinde in  
 se ipsis, deinde in ipsis creaturis R\*

N. Nec illud te mouere oportet, *sed* intentius ea quae dicta sunt  
considera. Si enim angelos principales rerum causas in deo constitui  
tutas cognouisse dixerimus Apostolo resistere uidebimur, qui super  
omne quod dicitur et intelligitur ipsum deum et causas omnium in  
eo, si non aliud sunt praeter quod ipse est, affirmat esse; ac per hoc  
necessarium est nos rectam mediamque uiam tenere ne uel Apostolo  
uideamur resistere uel sententiam summae ac sanctae auctoritatis  
magistri non obtinere. Vtrumque igitur uerum dixisse non dubi-  
tandum, immo firmiter tenendum. Causam igitur omnium rerum  
quae omnem intellectum exsuperat nulli creatae naturae secundum  
Apostolum cognitam fieri ratio sinit. Quis enim, inquit, intellectum  
domini cognouit? et alibi: Pax Christi quae exsuperat omnem intel-  
lectum. At si causa omnium ab omnibus quae ab ea creata sunt  
remota est, absque ulla dubitatione rationes omnium rerum quae  
aeternaliter atque incommutabiliter [in ea] sunt ab omnibus quorum  
rationes sunt paenitus remotae sunt. In angelicis uero intellectibus  
earum rationum theophanias quasdam esse, hoc est comprehensibiles  
intellectuali naturae quasdam [diuinas] apparitiones, non autem ipsas  
rationes, id est principalia exempla, quisquis dixerit non, ut arbitrator,  
a ueritate errabit. Quas theophanias [in] angelica creatura [secundum]  
sanctum Augustinum ante omnium generationem inferiorum se uisus  
non incongrue dixisse credimus. *Non ergo* nos moueat quod diximus  
quia angeli [et] primum in deo, deinde in se ipsis inferioris creaturae  
causas uident. Non enim essentia diuina deus solummodo dicitur  
sed etiam modus ille quo se quodam modo intellectuali et rationali  
creaturae prout [est] capacitas uniuscuiusque ostendit deus saepe  
a sancta scriptura uocatur. Qui modus a Grecis theophania, hoc est  
dei apparitio, solet appellari. Cuius exemplum: 'Vidi dominum  
sedentem,' et caetera huiusmodi, cum non ipsius essentiam sed ali-  
quod ab eo factum uiderit. Non est ergo mirum si trina quaequam  
cognitio in angelo intelligatur: una quidem superior quae de aeternis

de eo quod  
rationes  
omnium in  
deo non  
esse, per  
quasdam  
autem  
theophanias  
quantum  
compre-  
hendi ab  
intellectu  
sive  
angelico seu  
humano  
possunt  
dicuntur esse

3-5 interpretatur Iohannes locum Apostoli quem habes infra (11-12) 9-13 Causam-  
intellectum: cf. Ps.-Dionys., Ep. v, PG iii. 1073A 12-1076A 6 11-12 Rom. xi.  
34 (intellectum Aug. semel) 12-13 Pax-intellectum: Phil. iv. 7 (Christi OS t  
Ambr. cum Graeco A; intellectum Dg, Aug. semper) 16-20 cf. Ps.-Dionys.,  
CH iv. 3, PG iii. 180c 28-29 Is. vi. 1

1 lemma quomodo sibi non repugnant sententia pauli et augustini Rm 1-2 sed-  
considera R<sup>c</sup>BP: si intentius ea quae dicta sunt consideraueris R\* 2 post  
causas erasum est constitutas in R 3 dixerimus R<sup>c</sup>BP: dicamus R\* glossa  
causa rerum nulli creature cognita est tamen in angelicis intellectibus quedam  
theophania earum manet Rm 5 si non aliud sunt B<sup>c</sup>: quae non aliud  
sunt RB\*: siue aliud siue non aliud sint P: si non non aliud sunt fortasse  
intelligendum est 6 nos om. P 10 creatae naturae RB: creaturae naturae  
P 13 lemma BP (angelico ex angeli B) 15 incommutabiliter RBP<sup>c</sup>:

N. Not even that should worry you: *but* consider more closely  
what has been said. For if we say that the angels knew the primary  
causes of things as they are constituted in God we shall seem to go  
against the Apostle, who affirms that God Himself and the causes of  
all things in Him, if they are not other than what He Himself is, are  
above all that is said and understood; and therefore we must steer  
a straight and middle course, avoiding the appearance of either going  
against the Apostle or of not holding the opinion of a teacher of  
weighty and sacred authority. Therefore, that each has spoken the  
truth must not be doubted, nay rather, must strongly be maintained.  
So reason permits us to say that the cause of all things, which sur-  
passes all understanding, does not become known, according to the  
Apostle, to any created nature. 'For who', says he, 'has known the  
intellect of the Lord?' And in another place: 'the peace of Christ  
which surpasses all understanding.' But if the Cause of all things is  
inaccessible to all things that are created by it, then there can be no  
doubt but that the reasons (34) of all things, which exist [in it]  
eternally and without change, are completely inaccessible to all things  
of which they are the reasons. And yet anyone who might say that  
in the intellects of the angels there are certain theophanies (35) of  
those reasons, that is to say, certain [divine] manifestations which are  
comprehensible to the intellectual nature, but which are not the  
reasons, i.e. the primary exemplars, themselves, will not, I think,  
stray from the truth. And we believe that St. Augustine was not in-  
correct when he said that these theophanies were beheld in the  
angelic nature before the generation of all the natures that are below  
it. *So* let us *not* worry about having said that the angels behold the  
causes of the lower creature, and (that they do so) first in God, then  
in themselves. For it is not only the divine essence that is indicated  
by the word 'God', but also that mode by which God reveals Him-  
self in a certain way to the intellectual and rational creature, according  
to the capacity of each, is often called 'God' in Holy Scripture. This  
mode the Greeks are accustomed to call theophany, that is, self-  
manifestation of God. An example of it is: 'I saw the Lord sitting',  
and other similar expressions, since it is not His Essence that (the  
prophet) saw, but something created by Him.

Therefore it is not to be wondered at that the angel should be

inmutabiliter P\* 16 remotae RB<sup>c</sup>P: remota B\* 19 rationes R<sup>c</sup>BP: appariti-  
ones R\* post non erasum est longe in R 20-22 secundum-dixisse codd.: aut  
dixisse aut, ut ego ad p. 44, 27-33 spectans habeo, secundum excludendum 21 a  
ante sanctum erasum in R augustinum RB: agustinum P uisas correxit C prius  
in marg., ubi sas erasum est, deinde in textu in ras. R 22 non ergo R<sup>c</sup>BP: nec R\*  
23-24 primum-causas R<sup>c</sup>BP: primum in deo deinde in se ipsis deinde in inferiores  
creaturas causas ex primum in deo deinde in se ipsis deinde in inferiori creatura  
causas R\* 24 uident RB: uiderit P

That the  
reasons of  
all things in  
God are said  
not to be,  
but are said  
to be through  
certain  
theophanies,  
in so far as  
they can be  
compre-  
hended by  
the angelic or  
the human  
intellect

rerum rationibus iuxta praedictum modum primo in eo exprimitur, deinde quod ex superioribus excipit ueluti in mirabili atque ineffabili [quadam] memoria sibi ipsi committit quasi quaedam imago imaginis expressa. Ac per hoc si superiora se tali modo potest cognoscere, quis audeat dicere inferiorum quandam cognitionem in se non habere? Recte igitur dicuntur esse quae ratione atque intellectu comprehendi possunt, quae uero omnem rationem ac intellectum exsuperant recte similiter dicuntur non esse.

A. Quid ergo dicemus de illa futura felicitate quae promittitur sanctis, quam nil aliud putamus esse praeter ipsius diuinae essentiae puram contemplationem atque immediatam?—sicut ait sanctus euangelista Iohannes: ‘Scimus quia filii dei sumus et nondum apparuit ‘quid erimus. Cum autem apparuerit similes ei erimus, uidebimus enim ‘eum sicut est.’ Item apostolus Paulus: ‘Nunc uidemus per speculum ‘et in enigmate, tunc autem facie ad faciem.’ Item sanctus Augustinus in libris de Ciuitate Dei de futura contemplatione diuinae, ut arbitror, essentiae dicit: ‘Per corpora quae gestabimus in omni corpore quod- ‘cunque uidebimus quaquauersum oculos nostri corporis duxerimus ‘ipsum deum perspicua claritate contemplabimur.’ Nam si angelicae contemplationis purissimam uirtutem diuinae essentiae superat altitudo (praedictis enim rationibus confectum est diuinam essentiam nulli intellectuali creaturae comprehensibilem esse, quae maxime in angelis consistere dubium non est; nobis quoque nulla alia felicitas promittitur quam ad angelicam naturam aequalitas), quomodo humanae naturae felicitas diuinae essentiae altitudinem contemplari ualebit?

N. Acute ac uigilanter. Non enim sine causa in hoc moueris. Sed tibi sufficere existimarim quod prius generaliter de omni suasimus creatura.

A. Quid illud? Repetas peto.

N. Nonne uniuersaliter diffiniuimus diuinam essentiam nulli corporeo sensui nulli rationi nulli seu humano seu angelico intellectui per se ipsam comprehensibilem esse?

A. Recordor ac me sic sumpsisse negare non possum. Sed ut mihi uidetur aut illa praedicta conclusio paenitus soluetur et intellectuali creaturae diuinae essentiae per se ipsam contemplationem dabimus, aut si solui non potest, quoniam certissimis rationibus stabilita est,

3-4 imago imaginis: cf. Porph., *Vita Plot.* i. 8; David, *In Porph. isag. prooem.* 4, p. 91. 23-92, 1; Aeneas Gaz., *Ep.* xii, *Epistologr. Gr.*, 27 Hercher; Greg. Nyss., *De hom. opif.*, PG xlv. 164A (= 790A6 *infra*); 585D 1-3 et 598C6 *infra* 12-14 1 Ioh. iii. 2 14-15 1 Cor. xiii. 12 17-19 Aug. *De ciu. dei* xxii. 29 ex.

1 rationibus RB<sup>c</sup>: nationibus B\*P 9 glossa diuina contemplatio sanctis promittitur que est felicitas Rm 11 puram s.l. sR atque immediatam in marg. sR 16 in-Dei RB: in libro de ciuitate dei xxii P 17-18 quodcunque BP:

understood to possess, in a certain sense, a threefold knowledge: one, that is, from above, which, (coming) from the eternal reasons of things, is reproduced first in him after the mode just mentioned; then that which he receives from what is above him he commits to himself as it were in a wondrous and ineffable memory, some sort of image, as it were, reproducing an image (36); and hence, if he can by this mode have knowledge of what is above him, who would dare say that he has not in him some knowledge of what is below? With truth therefore is it said that those things that can be comprehended by the reason and by the intellect are, and with equal truth that those things which surpass all reason and intellect are not.

A. What then shall we say of that happiness to come which is promised to the saints, which we consider to be nothing else but the pure and unmediated contemplation of the Divine Essence itself?—as St. John the Evangelist says: ‘We know that we are the sons of God, and it has not yet appeared what we shall be. But when that shall have appeared we shall be like unto Him, for we shall see Him as He is.’ In the same way the Apostle Paul: ‘Now we see in a mirror and obscurely, but then face to face.’ Also St. Augustine in his books ‘On the City of God’ says, I think, of the contemplation that is to be of the Divine Essence: ‘Through the bodies that we shall put on, in every body we see wherever we turn the eyes of our body we shall contemplate with translucent clarity God Himself.’ For if the eminence of the Divine Essence surpasses the purest power of angelic contemplation—since it has been established by the foregoing arguments that the Divine Essence is comprehensible to no intellectual creature, which without doubt consists chiefly in the angels; and the happiness promised to us is no other than equality with the angelic nature (37)—how will the happiness of human nature be able to contemplate the eminence of the Divine Essence?

N. Shrewdly and observantly (spoken). For your difficulty here is not without cause. Nevertheless, I should have thought you were sufficiently answered by what we have already pointed out in general concerning every creature.

A. What was that? Please go over it again.

N. Did we not make the general assertion that the Divine Essence is in itself comprehensible to no bodily sense, to no reason, to no intellect, whether of man or of angel?

A. I remember, and I cannot deny that I accepted it. But, as it seems to me, that conclusion you refer to will be wholly invalidated by our allowing to the intellectual creature a contemplation of the Divine Essence in itself; or, if it cannot be invalidated since it has

quodcunque R 22 quae *codd.*: lege quam 24 ad s.l. P 28 suasimus RB: suassimus P 37 soluī R stabilita BP: stabilitata R

necessarium erit ut modum diuinae contemplationis quae sanctis in futuro promittitur et in qua semper angeli subsistunt ueris rationibus probabilibusque exemplis absoluas.

N. Quem modum quaeras ignoro praeter illum de quo paulo ante breuiter discussimus.

A. Quis ille sit uelim repetas, non enim ipsius recolo.

N. Recordarisne quid inter nos conuenerat dum de Examerone sancti patris Augustini quaedam dicebamus?

A. Recordor quidem, sed te iterum [de hoc] audire uolo.

N. Mouebat te, ut arbitrator, quomodo praedictus pater [dixerit] causas rerum creandarum quae aeternaliter in deo sunt et deus sunt angelos primum in deo considerasse, deinde in se ipsis, deinde ipsarum creaturarum proprias species differentiasque cognouisse, si nulli creaturae diuina essentia cum rationibus quae in ea sunt essentialiter nequeat comprehensibilis esse.

A. Totum teneo.

N. Recordarisne quid ad haec respondebamus?

A. Vtique recordor si me memoria non fallit; dicebas enim non ipsas causas rerum quae in diuina essentia subsistunt angelos uidisse sed quasdam apparitiones diuinas quas, ut ais, theophanias Graeci appellant, causarumque aeternarum quarum imagines sunt nomine appellatas. Addidisti etiam non solum ipsam diuinam essentiam incommutabiliter in se ipsa existentem deum uocari sed etiam ipsas theophanias quae ex ea et de ea in natura intellectuali exprimuntur dei nomine praedicari.

N. Bene tenes. Ita enim diximus.

A. Sed quid ad negotium praesens pertinet?

N. Non paruum, ut uideo. Eo enim modo et angelos deum semper uidere ut arbitrator, iustos quoque et in hac uita dum mentis excessum patiuntur et in futuro sicut angeli uisuros esse.

A. Non ergo ipsum deum per se ipsum uidebimus, quia neque angeli uident (hoc enim omni creaturae impossibile est. 'Solus' nanque, ut ait Apostolus, 'habet immortalitatem et lucem habitat inaccessibilem'), sed quasdam factas ab eo in nobis theophanias contemplabimur.

N. Non. Vnusquisque enim secundum suae sanctitatis atque sapientiae celsitudinem ab una eademque forma quam omnia appetunt, [dei uerbum dico,] formabitur. Ipsa nanque de se ipsa loquitur in

7-8 cf. p. 44, 28-30. 33-34 1 Tim. vi. 16

1 contemplationis RBP<sup>c</sup>: cotemplationis P\* 4 Quem modum RP: Quemadmodum B 8 augustini RB: agustini P 11 et in ras. B 14 diuina essentia RBP<sup>c</sup>: diuinae essentiae P\* 18 si me R<sup>c</sup>BP: sime R\* me om. P 21 causarumque R<sup>c</sup>BP: causarum quae R\* 25 praedicari R<sup>c</sup>BP: uocitari (?) R\* 27 quid RB: quia P 31 A s.l. R quia BP: qui R 33 immortali-

been confirmed by the surest arguments, you will have to show by sound reasons and probable examples the mode of divine contemplation that is promised to the saints in the time to come and in which the angels subsist at all times.

N. What mode it is you seek I know not, unless it be that which we have just now been briefly discussing.

A. What that is I should like you to tell me again, for I do not remember it (38).

N. Do you remember the agreement we reached when we were speaking about the Hexameron of the holy father Augustine?

A. I do remember, but I should like to hear you a second time [on this subject].

N. Your difficulty was, as I think, how this Father [said] that the angels contemplated the causes (39) of the things that were to be created, which are eternally in God and which are God, first in God, then in themselves, then the proper species and (specific) differences of the creatures themselves, if the Divine Essence, together with the reasons which are in it, cannot be comprehensible essentially.

A. I remember it all.

N. Do you remember our answer to these points?

A. Yes, I recall, if my memory does not deceive me, you were saying that it is not the causes of things themselves, which subsist in the Divine Essence, that the angels beheld but certain divine manifestations which, so you say, the Greeks call theophanies, and which take their names from the eternal causes of which they are the images. You further added that not only the Divine Essence itself which exists in itself without change was called God, but that also the theophanies which are reproduced out of it and by it in the intellectual nature are themselves given the name of God.

N. You remember clearly. For this is what we said.

A. But how does it concern the present task?

N. Not a little, in my opinion. For that is the mode in which I think the angels behold God all the time, and the righteous in this life when they experience ecstasy (40) and in the (world) to come (when they will) see (Him) as the angels do.

A. Then we shall not see God Himself in Himself (41), for not even the angels do so—since this is impossible for every creature. For 'He alone', as the Apostle says, 'possesses immortality and dwells in inaccessible light—(42)'; but we shall contemplate certain theophanies which are made in us by Him.

N. No. For from the one and the same Form which all things desire [I mean the Word of God (43)] each shall receive a form

tatem RB: immortalitatem P 36 N. Non in marg. R 38 nanque in ras. (? enim) R se om. P

euangelio: 'In domo patris mei mansiones multae sunt', se ipsam domum patris appellans, quae dum sit una eademque incommutabilisque permaneat multiplex tamen uidebitur his quibus in se habitare largietur. Nam unusquisque ut diximus unigeniti dei uerbi notitiam in se ipso possidebit quantum ei gratia donabitur. Quot enim numerus est electorum tot erit numerus mansionum; quanta fuerit sanctarum animarum multiplicatio tanta erit diuinarum theophaniarum possessio.

A. Verisimile uidetur.

N. Recte dicis uerisimile. Quis enim de talibus [firmiter] ita et non aliter esse dum uires humanae adhuc in hac fragili carne intentionis uideantur excedere?

de theophania A. Sed uelim quid de hac theophania conicere possis breuiter aperias, hoc est, quid sit, unde sit, ubi sit, utrum extra nos an intra nos formatur.

N. Altum quaeris, et nescio quid altius humanis inquisitionibus fieri possit. Dicam tamen quod super hac re in libris sanctorum patrum qui talia ausi sunt dicere potui inuenire.

[A. Dic quaeso.

N.] Quaeris itaque quid sit et unde et ubi?

[A. Etiam.

N.] Maximum [monachum diuinum philosophum] in expositione sermonum Gregorii theologi de hac theophania altissime atque subtilissime disputasse reperimus. Ait enim theophaniam effici non aliunde nisi ex deo, fieri uero ex condensatione diuini uerbi, hoc est humanam naturam a se conditam atque purgatam, et exaltatione sursum uersus humanae naturae ad praedictum uerbum per diuinum amorem. [Condensationem hic dico non eam quae iam facta est per incarnationem sed eam quae fit per theosin, id est per deificationem, creaturae.] Ex ipsa igitur sapientiae dei condensatione ad humanam naturam per gratiam et exaltatione eiusdem naturae ad ipsam sapientiam per dilectionem fit theophania. Cui sensui sanctus pater Augustinus astipulari uidetur exponens illud Apostoli: 'Qui factus est nobis iustitia et sapientia.' Ita enim exponit: 'Sapientia patris in

1 Ioh. xiv. 2 24-33 Haec Maximi esse negat Dräseke, Joh. Erig. u. s. Gewährsm., p. 55; Zeitschr. f. wissenschaft. Theol. xlvii (1904), p. 126 (Brilliantoff). Sed cf. Max. Conf., I Ambig., PG xci. 1084c, 1113B, 1385BC 34-35 1 Cor. i. 30

5-6 glossa Quot numerus est electorum tot erit numerus mansionum Rm  
 9 Verisimile RB: Virisimile P 10 post uerisimile erasum est uidetur in R  
 13 lemma BP: Quid si(t) theophania unde sit ubi sit Rm 15 formatur R<sup>c</sup>BP:  
 formantur R\* 19 quaeso BP: quaeso R(C) 23-24 altissime atque sub-  
 tilissime RB: altissimae atque sublimissimae P 24 reperimus B<sup>c</sup>P: repperimus RB\*  
 24 effici non RB: non effici P 25 glossa theophania ex deo fit Rm

according to the degree of his own sanctity and wisdom. For (the Form) itself says of itself in the Gospel: 'In my Father's house are many mansions,' calling itself the house of its Father because while it is one and the same (Form) and remains unchanging, it will be multiple to the sight of those to whom it shall be given to dwell in it. For each one, as we have said, shall possess in himself knowledge of the only begotten Word of God up to the measure that grace will bestow upon him. For as great as is the number of the elect, so great will be the number of the mansions; as much as shall be the multiplication of holy souls, so much will be the possession of divine theophanies.

A. It seems likely.

N. Well do you say 'likely.' For who on such matters [would say with assurance] that the case was thus and not otherwise when they would seem to exceed the strength of man's grasp while (he is) still in this fragile flesh?

A. But I should like you to expound to me briefly what you can guess about this theophany, that is, what it is, whence it is, where it is, whether it is formed without us or within.

N. It is a deep thing you ask, and I do not know what deeper thing there can be for human inquiry. However, I will say what I have been able to discover about this subject in the books of the holy fathers who have been bold enough to speak of such things.

[A. Please do.

N.] So you ask what it is, and whence, and where?

[A. Yes.

N.] We find that Maximus [the monk, a godly philosopher,] has treated of this theophany most profoundly and subtly in his commentary on the Homilies of Gregory the Theologian. For he says that theophany is effected from no other (cause) but God, but that it happens as a result of the condensation of the Divine Word, that is, of the only begotten Son Who is the Wisdom of the Father, downwards, as it were, upon human nature which was created and purified by Him, and of the exaltation upwards of human nature to the afore-said Word by divine love. [By condensation I mean here not that which has already taken place through the Incarnation but that which is brought about by theosis, that is to say, the deification (44), of the creature.] So from this condensation of the Wisdom of God upon human nature through grace, and the exaltation of the same nature to that same Wisdom through choice (45), theophany is brought about. With this interpretation the holy father Augustine seems to agree in his exposition of that passage from the Apostle, 'He Who is made unto us righteousness and wisdom'; for he expounds it as

29 Condensationem RB: Condensationem P 30 per (2) s.l. P 33 theophania RB<sup>c</sup>P: teophania B\*

'qua et per quam omnia facta sunt, quae non est creata sed creans, fit  
'in animabus nostris quadam ineffabili suae misericordiae condescen- 449c  
'sione ac sibi adiungit nostrum intellectum ut ineffabili quodam modo  
'quaedam quasi composita fiat sapientia ex ipso descendente ad nos et 5  
'in nobis habitante et ex nostra intelligentia ab eo per amorem ad se  
'assumpta et in se formata.' Similiter de iustitia caeterisque uirtutibus  
exponit non aliter fieri nisi ex diuinae sapientiae nostraeque intel-  
ligentiae quadam mirabili atque ineffabili conformatione. In quantum  
enim, ut ait Maximus, humanus intellectus ascendit per caritatem, 10  
in tantum diuina sapientia descendit per misericordiam, et haec  
est causa omnium uirtutum et substantia. Igitur omnis theophania,  
id est omnis uirtus, et in hac uita [in] qua adhuc incipit [in his] qui  
digni sunt formari et in futura uita perfectionem diuinae beatitudinis  
accepturi non extra se sed in se et ex deo et ex se ipsis efficitur. 449D

[A.] Ex deo itaque theophaniae in natura angelica atque humana  
illuminata purgata perfecta per gratiam fiunt ex descensione diuinae 16  
sapientiae et ascensione humanae angelicaeque intelligentiae.

[N. Sane. Nam] huic rationi conuenit quod idem Maximus [ait]  
quia quodcunque intellectus comprehendere potuerit id ipsum fit. 450A  
In quantum ergo animus uirtutem comprehendit, in tantum ipse 21  
uirtus fit. Horum autem exempla si quaeris ab eodem Maximo  
euidetissime posita sunt. 'Sicut enim aer a sole illuminatus nihil  
aliud uidetur esse nisi lux, non quia sui naturam perdat sed quia lux  
in eo praeualeat ut id ipsum luci esse aestimetur, sic humana natura 25  
deo adiuncta deus per omnia dicitur esse, non quod desinat esse  
natura sed quod diuinitatis participationem accipiat ut solus in ea  
deus esse uideatur. Item absente luce aer est obscurus, solis autem  
lumen per se subsistens nullo sensu corporeo comprehenditur; cum  
uero solare lumen aeri misceatur tunc incipit apparere ita ut in se 450B  
ipso sensibus sit incomprehensibilis, mixtum uero aeri sensibus possit 31  
comprehendi.' Ac per hoc intellige diuinam essentiam per se incom-  
prehensibilem esse, adiunctam uero intellectuali creaturae mirabili  
modo apparere ita ut ipsa, diuina dico essentia, sola in ea, creatura  
intellectuali uidelicet, appareat. Ipsius enim ineffabilis excellentia

p. 52, 35-p. 54, 6 Sapientia-formata: haec uerba apud Augustinum non inueni, 35  
sed cf. *De beata uita* xxxiv, PL xxxii. 975-6 9-11 In quantum-substantia:  
Max. Conf., *I Ambig.* vi. 3, PG xci. 1113B 12-14 20 quia-fit: Max. Conf.,  
*I Ambig.* xi, PG xci. 1220A 7-10; cf. Plotinus, *Enn.* vi. 7, 35, 2. 23-32 Sicut  
enim-comprehendi: cf. Max. Conf., *I Ambig.*, PG xci. 1073D, 1088A, 1137C, 1140C

2 nostris RBP<sup>c</sup>: uestris P\* 5 ab eo RB: a deo P 6 assumpta RBP<sup>c</sup>:  
adsumpta P\* 12 et in-qui R<sup>c</sup>BP: et in hac uita qua adhuc incipiunt qui R\*  
15 post itaque *erasum est* fiunt in R post theophaniae *erasum est* et in R angelica  
atque s.l. R 16 ex descensione RB: et descensionem P 19 quia om. P  
24 *luci codd.*: cf. Max. Conf., *I Ambig.*, PG xci. 1076A 2-3, 1088D 6-8 25 lemma  
Quod humana natura deo adiuncta deus per omnia dicitur esse Rm 30 in-  
comprehensibilis *codd.*: lege incomprehensibile

follows: 'The Father's Wisdom, in which and through which all  
things were made, which is not created but creating, comes into being  
in our souls by some ineffable condensation of compassion and  
attaches to itself our intellect so that in some ineffable manner a kind  
of composite wisdom, as it were, is formed out of its descending  
upon us and dwelling in us, and out of our understanding which  
through love is raised up by it to itself and is formed in it.' In the  
same way, concerning righteousness and the other virtues he teaches  
that they derive from no other source than a certain wondrous and  
ineffable conformation of the Divine Wisdom and our own under-  
standing. For, as Maximus says, as far as the human intellect ascends  
through charity (45), so far does the Divine Wisdom descend through  
compassion, and it is this that is the cause and the substance of all  
the virtues. Therefore every theophany, that is, every virtue, both  
in this life [in] which it is still only beginning to take shape [in those]  
who are worthy to be formed, and in the future life (in those who)  
shall receive the perfection of the divine beatitude, is effected not  
externally but internally out of God and out of themselves.

[A.] It is from God, then, that the theophanies happen through  
grace in the angelic nature and in human nature when it has been  
illuminated, purified, and perfected (46), as a consequence of the  
descent of the Divine Wisdom (47) and of the ascent of the human  
and angelic understanding (48).

[N. Clearly. For] consistent with this is [the statement] of the  
same Maximus that whatever the intellect shall have been able to  
comprehend, that it itself becomes. Therefore, to the extent that the  
mind comprehends virtue, to that extent it becomes virtue itself.

But if you require examples of these things, they are plainly set 10  
forth by the same Maximus (49): 'For just as air illuminated by the  
sun appears to be nothing else but light, not because it loses its own  
nature, but because the light prevails in it so that it is believed itself  
to be light (50), so human nature when it is united with God is said  
to be God through and through, not because it ceases to be (its own)  
nature but because it receives a share in Divinity so that only God  
appears to be in it. Also, when there is no light present the air is  
dark, while the light of the sun as it subsists by itself is comprehended  
by no bodily sense. But when the sunlight mingles with air, then it  
begins to appear: so that in itself it is incomprehensible to the senses,  
but when mixed with air it can be comprehended by the senses.'  
And from this you are to understand that the Divine Essence is  
incomprehensible in itself, but when it is joined to an intellectual  
creature it becomes after a wondrous fashion manifest: so that the  
former, I mean the Divine Essence, is seen alone in the latter, namely  
the intellectual creature. For the ineffable excellence of the former



omnem naturam sui participem superat ut nil aliud in omnibus  
 praeter ipsam intelligentibus occurrat dum per se ipsam, ut diximus,  
 nullo modo appareat.

A. Video admodum quid suadere uis. Sed utrum sancti patris  
 Augustini uerbis conuenire possint non satis clare perspicio. 5

N. Attentior igitur esto et ad eius uerba quae primo posuimus  
 redeamus. Sunt autem haec, ut aestimo, [in uicesimo secundo de 450c  
 urbe dei]: 'Per corpora quae gestabimus in omni corpore quodcun-  
 que uidebimus quaquauersum oculos nostri corporis duxerimus  
 ipsum deum perspicua claritate contemlabimur.' Vim uerborum 10  
 intuere. Non enim dixit: 'Per corpora quae gestabimus ipsum deum  
 'contemlabimur' (quia ipse per se uideri non possit); sed dixit:  
 'Per corpora quae gestabimus in omni corpore quodcunque  
 'uidebimus ipsum deum contemlabimur.' Per corpora ergo in  
 corporibus, non per se ipsum, uidebitur. Similiter per intellectum in 15  
 intellectibus, per rationem in rationibus, non per se ipsum, diuina  
 essentia apparebit. Tanta enim diuinae uirtutis excellentia in futura  
 uita omnibus qui contemplatione ipsius digni futuri sunt manifestabitur  
 ut nihil aliud praeter eam siue in corporibus siue in intellectibus eis 450d  
 eluceat. Erit enim deus omnia in omnibus, ac si aperte scriptura 20  
 diceret: Solus deus apparebit in omnibus. Hinc ait sanctus Iob: 'Et  
 'in carne mea uidebo deum', ac si dixisset: In hac carne mea quae  
 multis temptationibus affligitur tanta gloria futura sit ut, quemad- 451A  
 modum nihil in ea nunc apparet nisi mors et corruptio, ita in futura  
 uita nihil mihi in ea apparebit nisi solus deus, qui uere uita est et 25  
 immortalitas et incorruptio. At si de sui corporis felicitate talem  
 gloriam promisit, quid de sui animi dignitate existimandum est?—  
 praesertim cum, ut ait magnus Gregorius theologus, corpora sancto-  
 rum in rationem, ratio in intellectum, intellectus in deum, ac per hoc  
 tota illorum natura in ipsum deum mutabitur. Cuius rei pulcher- 30  
 rima paradigmata a praedicto Maximo in expositione Gregorii posita  
 sunt; quorum unum praemisimus cum de aere loquebamur. Alterum  
 uero nunc subiungemus, quod est in igne et ferro. Nam cum ferrum  
 conflatum in igne in liquorem soluitur nihil de natura eius remanere 451B  
 sensibus uidetur sed totum in igneam qualitatem uertitur, sola uero 35  
 ratione suam naturam quamuis liquefactam seruare cognoscitur.

8-10 Aug., *De ciu. dei* xxii. 29 = *supra*, p. 48, 17-19 20 1 Cor. xv. 28  
 21-22 Iob xix. 26 28-30 Greg. Naz., *Orat.* xxi, PG xxxv. 1084c 32-  
 36 cf. Max. Conf., *I Ambig.*, PG xci. 1076A, 1088c

1 nil RBP<sup>c</sup>: nihil P\* 5 possint *codd.*: lege possit 14 *decem lineae a C*  
*adscriptae sed postea erasae sunt in marg.* R 15 in *s.l.* P 19 *seue pro*  
*siue* (2) *habebat* P\* 27 promisit RBP\*: promissit P<sup>c</sup> 29 in *ante in-*  
*tellectum om.* P 32 praemisimus RB: premissimus P 36 suam RBP<sup>c</sup>: *s.a.* P\*

surpasses every nature which participates in it, so that in all things  
 nothing else but itself is presented to those that have understanding,  
 while in itself, as we have said, it is not manifest in any fashion.

A. I quite see what you wish me to understand, but as to whether  
 it can stand together with the words of the holy father Augustine  
 I am not sufficiently clear.

N. Be more attentive then, and let us return to those words of his  
 which we first cited. They are these, I think [in the twenty-second  
 (book) 'On the City of God']: 'Through the bodies that we shall  
 (have) put on, in every body we see wherever we turn the eyes  
 of our body, we shall contemplate with translucent clarity God  
 Himself.' Note the sense of the words. For he did not say, 'Through  
 the bodies we shall (have) put on we shall contemplate God Him-  
 self' (for in Himself He cannot be seen); but he said: 'Through  
 the bodies we shall (have) put on, in every body we see, we shall  
 contemplate God Himself.' Therefore it is through bodies in  
 bodies, not through Himself, that He shall be seen. Similarly, it is  
 through intellect in intellects, through reason in reasons (51), not  
 through itself, that the Divine Essence shall appear. For so strongly  
 shall the excellence of the Divine Power (52) be manifested in  
 the life to come to all those who shall be worthy of its contem-  
 plation that nothing but itself shall be apparent in either these  
 bodies or these intellects. For 'God shall be all in all'—as if the  
 Scripture said plainly: God alone shall be manifest in all things.  
 Hence the holy Job declares: 'Even in my flesh I shall see God',  
 which is as if he had said: In this flesh of mine, which is afflicted  
 with many trials, there shall come to be such glory that, in the same  
 way as nothing is now manifest in it but death and corruption, so in  
 the life to come nothing in it will be manifest to me but God alone,  
 Who in very truth is life and immortality and incorruptibility. But  
 if such was the glory to which he looked forward in respect of his  
 body's felicity, what are we to think will be his spirit's status?—  
 especially as, in the words of great Gregory the Theologian (53), 'the  
 bodies of the saints shall be changed into reason (54), their reason  
 into intellect, their intellect into God (55)'; and thus the whole of  
 their nature shall be changed into Very God. Many most excellent  
 examples of this have been adduced by the aforesaid Maximus in  
 his exposition of Gregory (56), one of which we have already men-  
 tioned in speaking of the air. But now we shall introduce a second,  
 which concerns iron and fire (57). For when iron is melted in fire  
 and reduced to a liquid, nothing of its nature appears to the senses  
 to remain, but all is changed into the quality of fire, and it is by the  
 reason alone that it is known to preserve its own nature, though  
 reduced to a liquid state. So, just as the air appears wholly as light,

Sicut ergo totus aer lux totumque ferrum liquefactum, ut diximus, igneum, immo etiam ignis, apparet, manentibus tamen eorum substantiis, ita sano intellectu accipiendum quia post finem huius mundi omnis natura siue corporea siue incorporea solus deus esse uidebitur, naturae integritate permanente, ut et deus, qui per se ipsum incomprehensibilis est, in creatura quodam modo comprehendatur, ipsa uero creatura ineffabili miraculo in deum uertatur. Sed sufficient ista, si tibi clare lucescunt.

A. Lucescunt sane, quantum talia nostris mentibus lucere sinuntur. De re enim ineffabili quis in hac uita luculenter potest fari ut nil amplius inquiringentium appetat desiderium?—praesertim cum nulla alia promittitur nobis gloria praeter eorum quae hic per fidem creduntur et ratione queruntur et quantum licet suadentur in futura uita per experimentum cognitionem.

N. Cautè ac rationabiliter existimas. Proinde ad ea quae proposita sunt, hoc est, ad diuisiones naturae, redeundum esse censeo.

A. Redeundum sane. Quoniam modus obseruandus est in his quae dicenda sunt ut ad finem quendam possint peruenire.

de natura  
 creante et  
 non creata

N. Praedictarum itaque naturae diuisionum prima differentia nobis uisa est in eam quae creat et non creatur. Nec immerito, quia talis naturae species de deo solo recte praedicatur, qui solus omnia creans ANAPXOC, hoc est sine principio, intelligitur esse, quia principalis causa omnium quae ex ipso et per ipsum facta sunt solus est, ac per hoc et omnium quae ex se sunt finis est; ipsum enim omnia appetunt. Est igitur principium et medium et finis: principium quidem, quia ex se sunt omnia quae essentiam participant; medium autem, quia in ipso et per ipsum subsistunt atque mouentur; finis uero, quia ad ipsum mouentur quietem motus sui suaeque perfectionis stabilitatem quaerentia.

A. Firmissime credo et quantum datur intelligo de diuina solummodo omnium causa recte hoc praedicari, quia sola omnia quae a se sunt creat et a nulla superiori ac se praecedente creatur. Ipsa enim est summa ac sola causa omnium quae ex se et in se subsistunt. Velim tamen [scire] quid de hac re sentias. Non enim me parum mouet dum saepissime in libris sanctorum patrum qui de diuina natura disputare conati sunt inuenio eam non solum omnia quae sunt creare sed etiam creari. Ea siquidem, ut aiunt, facit et fit, [et] creat et

4 uidebitur RBP<sup>c</sup>: uidetur P\*      8 si tibi RB: sibi P      lucescunt RB:  
 lucescant P      13 queruntur RB: quaeruntur P      14 cognitionem R<sup>c</sup>BP:  
 cognitio R\*      19 lemma quod hic adscribitur in marg. BP in textu maiusculis  
 ut titulum habet R      II in marg. R      N s.l. P      Praedictarum cum initiali  
 pergrandi in superiorem lineam, ubi nihil praeterea scriptum est, et in inferiorem exten-  
 dente B      diuisionem RBP<sup>c</sup>: diuisionem P\*      22 esse om. P      36 rasura  
 post conati sunt in R      36-37 lemma Quomodo dicatur deus facere et fieri creare  
 et creari Rm      36 rasura post sunt in R      37 siquidem R<sup>c</sup>BP: enim R\*

and iron when melted appears to take on wholly the quality of fire, as we have said, and in fact to be fire, although their substances persist: so the sound intellect must hold that after the end of this world every nature, whether corporeal or incorporeal, will seem to be only God, while preserving the integrity of its nature, so that even God, Who in Himself is incomprehensible, is after a certain mode comprehended in the creature, while the creature itself by an ineffable miracle is changed into God. But let these words suffice, if their meaning is clear to you.

A. It is certainly as clear as such things are permitted to be to our minds: for concerning what is ineffable who in this life can speak with such clarity as to leave nothing more for inquirers to wish for—especially as we are promised no other glory than knowledge by direct experience in the life to come of those things which here (on earth) are believed by faith, and inquired into (58) and, as far as may be, commended by reason?

N. Your opinion is cautious and sensible. And now, I think, we must return to the task we have set ourselves, namely to the division of Nature.

A. Certainly we must return to it: for in what is going to be said some sort of moderation must be observed if it is ever to come to a conclusion.

N. Well, then: of the aforesaid divisions of Nature the first difference, as has seemed to us, is that which creates and is not created. And rightly so: for such a species of Nature is correctly predicated only of God, Who, since He alone creates all things, is understood to be ἀρχος (60), that is, without beginning, because He alone is the principal Cause of all things which are made from Him and through Him, and therefore He is also the End of all things that are from Him, for it is He towards Whom all things strive. Therefore He is the Beginning, the Middle and the End (61): the Beginning, because from Him are all things that participate in essence; the Middle, because in Him and through Him they subsist and move; the End, because it is towards Him that they move in seeking rest from their movement and the stability of their perfection.

A. I most firmly believe and, as far as I may, understand that only of the Divine Cause of all things is this rightly predicated; for it alone creates all things that are from it, and is not itself created by any cause which is superior (to itself) or precedes it. For it is the supreme and unique Cause of all things which take their existence from it and exist in it. But I would like [to know] your opinion about this. For I am not a little perplexed when I so often find in the books of the Holy Fathers who have attempted to treat of the Divine Nature that not only does it create all things that are, but itself also is created.

II  
 Concerning  
 the nature  
 which  
 creates and  
 is not  
 created (59)

creatur. Si igitur ita est, quomodo nostra ratiocinatio steterit non facile inuenio. Dicimus enim eam solummodo creare, a nullo autem 452B creari.

N. Merito moueris. Nam et ego de hoc multum admiror et quomodo haec, quae uidentur esse contraria sibi inuicem, [sibi inuicem] 5 aduersari nequeant quomodoque uera ratio de hoc consulenda est optari[m per] te nosse [posse].

A. Ingredere precor: nam de talibus non meam sed tuam sententiam ratiocinandique uiam expecto.

de eo nomine quod est deus

N. Primum itaque, si uidetur, de ipso nomine quod in sancta 10 scriptura usitatissimum est, quod est deus, considerandum arbitror. Quamuis enim multis nominibus diuina natura denominetur, ut est bonitas essentia ueritas caeteraque huius modi, frequentissime tamen eo nomine diuina utitur scriptura.

A. Plane uidetur. 15

N. Huius [itaque] nominis etymologia a Graecis assumpta est: aut enim a uerbo quod est ΘΕΩΡΩ, hoc est uideo, diriuatur; aut ex 452C uerbo ΘΕΩ, hoc est curro; aut (quod probabilius est [quia unus] idem[que] intellectus inest) ab utroque diriuari recte accipitur. Nam cum a uerbo ΘΕΟΡΩ deducitur ΘΕΟC uidens interpretatur; ipse 20 enim omnia quae sunt in se ipso uidet [dum] nichil extra se ipsum aspiciat quia nihil extra se ipsum est: cum uero a uerbo ΘΕΩ ΘΕΟC deducitur currens recte intelligitur; ipse enim in omnia currit et nullo modo stat sed omnia currendo implet, sicut scriptum est: 'Velociter 25 'currit sermo eius.' [Attamen nullo modo mouetur. De deo siquidem] uerissime dicitur motus stabilis et status mobilis. Stat enim in se ipso incommutabiliter nunquam naturalem suam stabilitatem deserens, mouet autem se ipsum per omnia ut sint ea quae a se essentialiter 452D subsistunt. Motu enim ipsius omnia fiunt. Ac per hoc unus idemque intellectus est in duabus interpretationibus eiusdem nominis quod 30 est deus. Non enim aliud est deo currere per omnia quam uidere omnia, sed sicut uidendo ita et currendo fiunt omnia.

de motu et statu dei

A. De etymologia nominis satis ac probabiliter suasum est. Sed non satis uideo quo se moueat qui ubique est, sine quo nichil esse 453A

24-25 Ps. cxlvii. 15 = *infra*, p. 78, 8

1 post est deleta sunt ut illi aiunt in R  
 6 quomodoque R<sup>c</sup>B<sup>p</sup>: et quomodo R\*: quomodo quae B\* 5 sibi inuicem (2) desunt in R\*P  
 10 lemma BP: de hoc nomine quod est deus Rm 16 nominis RB<sup>c</sup>P: nomines B\* 7 posse om. R\*P  
 17 diriuatur B<sup>c</sup>P: deriuatur RB\* 18-19 aut-inest R<sup>c</sup>BP: aut \*\*\*\*\* quod  
 probabilius est idem intellectus \*\*\*\*\* R\* 19 diriuari B<sup>c</sup>P: deriuari RB\*  
 accipitur R<sup>c</sup>BP: dicitur (?) R\* 20 ΘΕΟΡΩ R<sup>c</sup>(C)B: ΘΕΩ (?) R\* ΘΕΩΡΩ P  
 ΘΕΟC RB: ΘΕΩC P 21 dum-aspiciat R<sup>c</sup>(C)BP: nichil enim extra se ipsum  
 aspiciat R\* 22 se quod deletum est in R restauratum in P ΘΕΩ ΘΕΟC RB:  
 ΘΕΩΘΕΩC P deducitur om. P 23 glossa deus omnia que sunt in se ipso

For, according to them, it makes and is made, [and] creates and is created. If, then, this is the case, I do not find it easy to see how our reasoning may stand. For we say that it creates only, but is not created by anything.

N. You have every reason for being perplexed. For I too am greatly puzzled by this, and I should like [to be able] to learn [by] your guidance how it can be that these (statements), which seem to contradict one another, are prevented from conflicting [with one another]; and how to approach this question according to right reason.

A. Please speak first yourself: for in such matters I look to you rather than to myself for an opinion, and for a lead in reasoning.

N. First, then, I think we must consider that name which is so commonly used in Holy Scripture, that is, (the Name of) God. For although there are many names by which the Divine Nature is called, such as Goodness, Essence, Truth, and others of this kind, yet that is the name which most frequently occurs in Scripture.

Concerning that name which is God

A. It is certainly seen to be so.

N. Of this name [then] an etymology has been taken over from the Greeks: for either it is derived from the verb θεωρᾶν, that is, 'I see'; or from the verb θέω, that is, 'I run (62)'; or—which is more likely [since] the meaning of both is [one and] the same—it is correctly held to be derived from both. For when it is derived from the verb θεωρᾶν, θεός (62) is interpreted to mean 'He Who sees', for He sees in Himself all things that are [while] He looks upon nothing that is outside Himself because outside Him there is nothing. But when θεός is derived from the verb θέω it is correctly interpreted 'He Who runs', for He runs throughout all things and never stays but by His running fills out all things, as it is written: 'His Word runneth swiftly (63).'

[And yet He is not moved at all. For of God] it is most truly said that He is motion at rest and rest in motion. For He is at rest unchangingly in Himself, never departing from the stability of His Nature; yet He sets Himself in motion through all things in order that those things which essentially subsist by Him may be. For by His motion all things are made (64). And thus there is one and the same meaning in the two interpretations of the same name, which is God. For in God to run through all things is not something other than to see all things, but as by His seeing so too by His running all things are made (65).

Concerning the motion and rest of God

A. What has been said of the etymology of the name is sufficient and convincing. But I do not satisfactorily see whither He may move

uidet quia nil extra ipsum est Rm 25 lemma BPRm 29-32 ac per hoc-fiunt omnia ad calc. add. sR 29 post unus erasum est e(t) in R 30-31 quod est deus desunt in R 33 lemma Quo se moueat qui ubique est extra quem nichil est Rm 34 moueat qui RB: mouet atqui P

potest et extra quem nihil extenditur. Est enim locus omnium atque circumscriptionis.

N. Deum moueri non extra se dixi, sed a se ipso in se ipso ad se ipsum. Non enim alium motum in eo oportet credi praeter suae uoluntatis appetitum quo uult omnia fieri, sicut status eius non quasi post motum *stet* sed eiusdem suae uoluntatis incommutabile propositum [intelligitur] quo omnia in incommutabili rationum suarum stabilitate permanere diffinit. Non enim in ipso proprie status aut motus dicitur. Haec enim duo opposita sibi inuicem esse uidentur. Opposita autem in eo cogitari uel intelligi uera ratio prohibet—praesertim cum status proprie finis motionis est, non autem deus moueri inchoat ut ad statum quendam perueniat. Haec igitur nomina sicut et multa similia *ex* creatura *per* quendam diuinam metaphoram ad creatorem referuntur. Non irrationabiliter, quoniam omnium quae in statu et motu sunt causa est. Ab eo enim incipiunt currere ut sint quoniam principium omnium est; et [per eum] ad eum naturali motu feruntur ut in eo incommutabiliter atque aeternaliter stent quoniam finis quietis omnium est. Nam ultra eum nil appetunt, in eo enim sui motus principium finemque inueniunt. Deus ergo currens dicitur non quia extra se currat, qui semper in se ipso immutabiliter stat, qui omnia implet, sed quia omnia currere facit ex non existentibus in existentia.

A. Redi ad propositum. Haec enim non irrationabiliter dicta esse uidentur.

N. Quale propositum quaeras admoneas me peto. Nam cum de incidentibus quaestionibus quaedam dicere conamur principalium quaestionum saepissime obliuiscimur.

quare creare et creari deus dicitur

A. Numquid hoc proposuimus, ut pro uiribus inuestigaremus quae ratione ab his qui de diuina natura disputant eadem creare et creari dicitur? Creare enim omnia nullus sane intelligentium ambigit; quomodo uero creari dicitur non transitorie praetereundum esse nobis uisum est.

N. Ita profecto. Sed ut arbitror ex his quae praedicta sunt ad hanc quaestionem soluendam non exiguus introitus reseratus est. Confectum est enim inter nos quod motus diuinae naturae nihil aliud intelligendum praeter diuinae uoluntatis propositum ad ea condenda quae facienda sunt. Fieri ergo dicitur in omnibus diuina natura, quae nihil aliud est nisi diuina uoluntas. Non enim aliud in ea est esse et

4 alium motum R<sup>c</sup>BP: alius motus R\* 5-6 sicut—sed R<sup>c</sup>BP: sicut stet status eius non quasi post motum sed R\* 7 in s.l. B 10 uera ratio in ras. B 13 per—metaphoram R<sup>c</sup>BP: quadam diuina metaphora R\* 16 est om. P 21 ex RB: et P 22 esse om. P 24 me om. P 27 lemma BPRm 28 eadem R<sup>c</sup>BP: ea natura R\* 30 esse om. P

Who is everywhere, without Whom nothing can be, and beyond Whom nothing extends. For He is the place and the circumference of all things.

N. I did not say that God moves beyond Himself, but from Himself in Himself towards Himself. For it ought not to be believed that there is any motion in Him except that of His Will, by which He wills all things to be made; just as His rest [is understood] not as though He comes to rest after motion but as the immoveable determination of His same Will, by which He limits all things so that they remain in the immutable stability of their reasons. For properly speaking there is in Him neither rest nor motion. For these two are seen to be opposites one of the other. But right reason forbids us to suppose or understand that there are opposites in Him—especially as rest is, properly speaking, the end of motion, whereas God does not begin to move in order that He may attain to some end. Therefore these names, like many similar ones also, are transferred from the creature by a kind of divine metaphor to the Creator. Not without reason; for of all things that are at rest or in motion He is the Cause. For from Him they begin to run in order that they may be, since He is the Principle of them all; and [through Him] they are carried towards Him by their natural motion so that in Him they may rest immutably and eternally since He is the End and Rest of them all. For beyond Him there is nothing that they strive for since in Him they find the beginning and end of their motion (66). God, therefore, is called 'He Who runs' not because He runs beyond Himself, Who is always immutably at rest in Himself, Who fills out all things; but because He makes all things run from a state of non-existence into one of existence (67).

A. Return to the subject. For these things seem to be not unreasonably spoken.

N. Please tell me which subject you mean. For in trying to say something about intervening questions we commonly forget the main one.

A. Was not this the task we set ourselves: to try our best to find out on what grounds those who treat of the Divine Nature say that the same (Nature) creates and is created? For that it creates all things no one of sound intellect is in doubt; but how it is said to be created is not, we thought, a question to be cursorily passed over.

Why God is said to create and to be created

N. Just so. But, as I think, in what has already been said considerable headway has been made towards the solution of this question. For we agreed that the motion of the Divine Nature is to be understood as nothing else but the purpose of the Divine Will to establish the things that are to be made. Therefore it is said that in all things the Divine Nature is being made, which is nothing else

uelle sed unum idemque est uelle et esse in condendis omnibus quae  
 facienda uisa sunt. Verbi gratia, si quis dixerit: Ad hoc diuinae uolun-  
 tatis motus adducitur ut sint ea quae sunt: creat igitur omnia quae de  
 nihilo adducit ut sint, ex non esse in esse; creatur autem quia nihil  
 essentialiter est praeter ipsam, est enim omnium essentia. Nam sicut  
 nullum bonum naturale est praeter ipsum sed omne quod dicitur  
 bonum esse ex participatione unius summi boni est bonum ita omne  
 quod dicitur existere non in se ipso existit sed participatione uere  
 existentis naturae existit. Non solum itaque, ut in his quae ante dicta  
 sunt consideratum est, diuina natura fieri dicitur dum in eis qui fide  
 et spe et caritate caeterisque uirtutibus reformantur dei uerbum  
 mirabili atque ineffabili modo innascitur—sicut ait Apostolus de  
 Christo loquens: ‘Qui factus est nobis sapientia a deo et iustificatio  
 ‘et sanctificatio et redemptio’—sed etiam quia in omnibus quae sunt  
 apparet quae per se ipsam inuisibilis est, non incongrue dicitur facta.  
 Nam et noster intellectus prius quam ueniat in cogitationem atque  
 memoriam non irrationabiliter dicitur <non> esse. Est enim per se  
 inuisibilis et nulli praeter deum nobisque ipsis cognitus est; dum uero  
 in cogitationes uenerit et ex quibusdam phantasiis formam accipit  
 non inmerito dicitur fieri. Fit enim in memoria, formas quasdam  
 accipiens [rerum seu uocum seu colorum <caeterorumque> sensi-  
 bilium qui] informis erat prius quam in memoriam ueniret, deinde  
 ueluti secundam formationem recipit dum quibusdam <formarum  
 siue> uocum signis (litteras dico quae sunt signa uocum et figuras quae  
 sunt signa formarum matheseos) seu aliis sensibilibus indicia forma-  
 tur per quae *sentientium* sensibus insinuari possit. Hac similitudine  
 quamuis a diuina natura remota sit suaderi tamen posse arbitror  
 quomodo ipsa, dum omnia creat et a nullo creari nesciat, in omnibus  
 quae ab ea sunt mirabili modo creatur, ut, quemadmodum mentis  
 intelligentia seu propositum seu consilium seu quoquo modo motus  
 ille noster intimus et primus dici possit dum in cogitationem, ut  
 diximus, uenerit quasdamque phantasiarum formas acceperit deinde-  
 que in signa uocum seu sensibilibus motuum indicia processerit non  
 incongrue dicitur fieri—fit enim in phantasiis formatus qui per se  
 omni sensibili caret forma—, ita diuina essentia, quae per se subsistens  
 omnem superat intellectum, in his quae a se et per se et in se [et ad se]  
 facta sunt recte dicitur creari, ut in eis siue intellectu, si solummodo

13-14 I Cor. i. 30

1 est ante uelle om. P    4 nihilo R<sup>c</sup>BP: nilo R\*    5 omnium essentia RBP<sup>c</sup>:  
 essentia omnium P\*    8 uere RB: uerae P    14 quia RB: qui P    15 rasura  
 post ipsam in P    17 non quod deest in codd. com. Gale    18 praeter deum  
 RB: nisi deo P    23 ueluti s.l. R    26 sentientium B<sup>c</sup>P: audientium RB\*  
 32 phantasiarum BP: fantasiarum R    33 post sensibilibus una littera erasa  
 est in R    37 dicitur codd.: lege dicatur

than the Divine Will. For in that Nature being is not different from  
 willing, but willing and being are one and the same in the establish-  
 ment of all things that are to be made (68). For example, one might  
 say: this is the end to which the motion of the Divine Will is directed:  
 that the things that are may be. Therefore it creates all things which it  
 leads forth out of nothing so that they may be, from not-being into  
 being; but it is (also) created because nothing except itself exists as  
 an essence since itself is the essence of all things (69). For as there is  
 nothing that is good by its nature (70), except (the divine nature) itself,  
 but everything which is said to be good is so (P: good) by participation  
 in the One Supreme Good, so everything which is said to exist exists  
 not in itself but by participation in the Nature which truly exists.  
 Not only, therefore, as was mentioned earlier in our discussion, is  
 the Divine Nature said to be made when in those who are reformed  
 by faith and hope and charity and the other virtues the Word of God  
 in a miraculous and ineffable manner is born—as the Apostle says,  
 speaking of Christ, ‘Who from God is made in us wisdom and  
 justification and sanctification and redemption (71)’; but also, be-  
 cause that which is invisible in itself becomes manifest in all things  
 that are, it is not inappropriately said to be made. For our intellect  
 also, before it enters upon thought and memory, is not unreasonably  
 said <not> to be (72). For in itself it is invisible and known only to  
 God and ourselves; but when it enters upon thoughts and takes shape  
 in certain fantasies (73) it is not inappropriately said to come into  
 being. For it does so in the memory when it receives certain forms  
 [of things and sounds and colours and <other> sensibles]—for it had  
 no form before it entered into the memory—; then it receives, as it  
 were, a second formation when it takes the form of certain signs of  
 <forms and> sounds—I mean the letters which are the signs of sounds, and  
 the figures which are the signs of mathematical forms—or other perceptible  
 indicators by which it can be communicated to the senses of *sentient*  
*beings* (74). By this analogy, far removed as it is from the Divine Nature,  
 I think it can be shown all the same how that Nature, although it creates  
 all things and cannot be created by anything, is in an admirable manner  
 created in all things which take their being from it; so that, as the  
 intelligence of the mind or its purpose or its intention or however  
 this first and innermost motion of ours may be called, having, as we  
 said, entered upon thought and received the forms of certain fantasies,  
 and having then proceeded into the symbols of sounds or the signs  
 of sensible motions, is not inappropriately said to become—for, being  
 in itself without any sensible form, it becomes formed in fantasies—,  
 so the Divine Essence which when it subsists by itself surpasses every  
 intellect is correctly said to be created in those things which are made  
 by itself and through itself and in itself [and for itself], so that in

intelligibilia sunt, siue sensu, si sensibilia sint, ab his qui eam recto 454<sup>D</sup>  
studio inquirunt cognoscatur.

A. De his sat est dictum ut censeo.

N. Sat plane [ni fallor.

A.] Sed adhuc necessarium edisseras quare diuina natura creatrix 5  
solummodo dicitur esse et non creata, si, ut praedictis rationibus  
suasum est, et creat et creatur. [Haec enim sibimet uidentur contra- 455A  
dicere.]

N. Caute uigilas. Nam et hoc inquisitione dignum esse uideo.

A. Dignum profecto. 10

N. Attende itaque in ea quae sequuntur mentis[que] contuitum  
huic breuiter responsioni accomoda.

A. Praecede. Intentus subsequar.

N. Diuinam naturam uniuersitatis conditricem esse non dubitas?

A. Perge ad caetera. Hinc enim haesitare nefas est. 15

N. Similiter a nullo creari fide atque intellectu percipis?

A. Nil eo firmius.

N. Non ergo ambigis dum ipsam creari audis non ab alia sed a se  
ipsa creari?

A. Non ambigo. 20

N. Quid igitur? nonne semper creans est siue se ipsam siue a se  
creatas essentias creauerit? Nam cum dicitur se ipsam creare nil  
aliud recte intelligitur nisi naturas rerum condere. Ipsius nanque 455B  
creatio, hoc est in aliquo manifestatio, omnium existentium profecto  
est substitutio. 25

A. Hactenus quae dicta sunt uidentur esse probabilia. Sed uelim  
audire quid de hac ineffabili atque incomprehensibili creatrice  
omnium causalique natura theologia edocet, [id est utrum sit quid  
sit uel qualis sit et quomodo diffinitur.]

N. Nonne ab ipsa quam nunc nominasti theologia, quae aut solum- 30  
modo aut maxime erga diuinam naturam uersatur, satis ac plane  
ueritatem intuentibus suasum est ex his quae ab ipsa creata sunt  
solummodo ipsam essentialiter subsistere, non autem quid sit ipsa  
essentia intelligi? Nam non solum, ut saepe diximus, humanae  
ratiocinationis conatus uerum etiam essentialium caelestium puris- 455C  
simos superat intellectus; ipsam tamen esse ex his quae sunt, et  
sapientem esse ex diuisionibus eorum in essentias in genera in species 36

3 A s.l. R ni fallor (quae nunc ad lin. 4 inueniuntur) et alia uerba a C in marg.  
adscripta postea erasa sunt in R 4 plane RB<sup>c</sup>P: plene B\* 9 uigilas RBP<sup>c</sup>:  
uigilias P\* 11 sequuntur R: secuntur B\*P: sequuntur B<sup>c</sup> 12 accomoda BP:  
accommoda R 16 atque s.l. R 21 est om P 22 glossa nota quid  
sit creari deum Rm 23 glossa Dominus creauit me ab initio ii. s (quae sigla  
fortasse locum biblicum indicant, Sirach xxiv. 14) Rm nanque B: namque RP  
24 glossa trinitas non potest cognosci quid sit uel qualis sit sed tantum scitur quod  
sit sapiat uiuat pater filius spiritus sanctus Rm 32 est om. P 36 superat  
RB<sup>c</sup>P: superat B\*

them either by the intellect, if they are only intelligible, or by the  
sense, if they are sensible, it comes to be known by those who  
investigate it in the right spirit.

A. Enough has been said about this, I think.

N. Quite enough [unless I am mistaken. 13

A.] But it is still necessary for you to explain why the Divine  
Nature is only called creative and not created, if, as the aforesaid  
reasons have shown, it both creates and is created. [For there seems  
to be a contradiction here.]

N. You are very attentive. For I see that this too merits investi-  
gation.

A. Certainly it merits it.

N. Listen then to what follows and apply the mind's eye to this  
brief answer of mine.

A. Go on. I will follow attentively.

N. That the Divine Nature is the Founder of the universe you do  
not doubt?

A. Proceed to what follows. For to hesitate over this would be  
impiety.

N. Similarly that it is created by nothing you perceive by faith and  
by intellect?

A. (I perceive) nothing more surely.

N. Then when you hear that it is created, you are not placed in  
doubt as to its being created not by another nature but by itself?

A. No.

N. Well, then: is it not in any case creating whether it creates  
itself or the essences that are created by it? For when it is said that  
it creates itself the true meaning is nothing else but that it is estab-  
lishing the natures of things. For the creation of itself, that is, the  
manifestation of itself in something, is surely that by which all things  
subsist?

A. What has been said up to now seems probable. But I should  
like to hear what theology teaches about this ineffable and incompre-  
hensible Nature which is the Creator and Cause of all things, [that is,  
whether it exists, what it is (75), of what sort it is, and how it is defined.]

N. Does not this very theology which you have just mentioned,  
which is concerned entirely or for the most part with the Divine  
Nature, hold—plainly enough for those who can see the truth—that  
from what has been created by itself one can deduce merely that this  
Nature subsists as an essence, but not what that essence is? For, as  
we have often said (76), it exceeds not only the endeavours of human  
reasoning, but even the most pure intellects of the celestial essences.  
But the theologians have correctly deduced from the things that are  
that it is, and from their divisions into essences, genera, species,

de una causa  
omnium ter  
subsistente

differentiasque numerosque, uiuereque eam ex motu omnium stabili et ex statu mobili recto mentis contuitu theologi scrutati sunt. Hac etiam ratione causam omnium ter subsistentem uerissime inuenerunt. Nam, ut diximus, ex essentia eorum quae sunt intelligitur esse, ex mirabili rerum ordine sapientem esse, ex motu uitam esse reper- tum est. Est igitur causa omnium creatrixque natura, et sapit, et uiuit. Ac per hoc per essentiam patrem, per sapientiam filium, per uitam spiritum sanctum intelligi inquisitores ueritatis tradi- derunt.

A. Haec mihi satis planeque suasa sunt eaque uerissima esse con- spicio. [Omnino siquidem quid uel qualis diffiniri non potest; nam quod intelligi omnino non sinitur, diffiniri omnino nequitur.] Velim tamen audire qua ratione theologi unitatem et trinitatem de causa omnium praedicare ausi sunt.

N. In hac ultima tua propositione non magnopere nobis laboran- dum—praesertim sancto Dionysio Ariopagita theologo nobis ueris- sime atque probatissime suadente diuinae unitatis atque trinitatis mysteria. Ait enim: 'Nulla uerborum seu nominum seu quacunque 'articulatae uocis significatione summa omnium atque causalis 'essentia potest significari.' Non enim est unitas neque trinitas talis qualis ab humano quamuis purissimo cogitari aut angelico intellectu etsi serenissimo considerari potest; sed ut de re ineffabili atque in- comprehensibili religiosi piorum animorum motus aliquid cogitare ac praedicare possent, maxime propter eos qui christianae religionis rationem a catholicis uiris exigunt, siue discendae ueritatis gratia si boni sint, siue temptandae et reprehendendae occasione si mali, haec religiosa fidei symbolica uerba a sanctis theologis et reperta et tradita sunt, ut corde credamus et ore confiteamur diuinam bonitatem in unius essentiae tribus substantiis esse constitutam. Et nec hoc sine spiritualis intelligentiae rationabilisque inuestigationis contuitu inuentum est. Vnam enim ineffabilem omnium causam unumque principium simplex atque indiuiduum uniuersaleque quantum diuino spiritu illuminati sunt contemplantes unitatem dixerunt, iterum ipsam unitatem non in singularitate quadam et sterilitate intuentes tres substantias unitatis intellexerunt, ingenitam scilicet genitamque

18-22 Nulla-potest: cf. Ps.-Dionys., DN xiii. 3, PG iii. 980c 1-981B 7  
28 ut-confiteamur: cf. Rom. x. 10

2 recto RB: rectae P 3 causam RB: causa P subsistentem RB: sub-  
stantem P 4 lemma BP (SVBSTANCE P) 10 eaque RB: ea quae P  
15 lemma Qua ratione unitatem trinitatem de causa omnium praedicare ausi  
sunt Rm 18 quacunque B: quacumque P: qualicunque R 19-20 sum-  
ma-significari RB: summam omnium atque causalem essentiam posse significari  
P 24 maxime R<sup>c</sup>BP: praesertim R\* 29 unius essentiae R<sup>c</sup>BP: uni es-  
sentia R\* in ante tribus add. R\* nec RB: ne P sine RB: absque P

differences and individuals that it is wise, and from the stable motion and moving rest of all things that it lives (77). In this way they also discovered the great truth that the Cause of all things is of a threefold substance. For, as we said, from the essence (78) of the things that are it is understood to be; from the marvellous order of things that it is wise; from their motion it is found to be life. Therefore the Cause and creative Nature of all things is, and is wise, and lives. And from this those who search out the truth have handed down that in its essence is understood the Father, in its wisdom the Son, in its life the Holy Ghost.

A. These things have been made sufficiently clear to me and I see that they are very true. [It is, of course, quite impossible to define what or of what kind it is, since what quite refuses to be understood is quite impossible to be defined.] But I should like to hear for what reason the theologians have dared to predicate of the Cause of all things unity and trinity.

N. Over this last question of yours we need not expend much labour—especially as the theologian St. Dionysius the Areopagite expounds for us with the utmost truth and by the surest arguments the mysteries of the Divine Unity and Trinity. For he says: 'There is no way of signifying by verb or noun or any other part of articu- lated speech how the supreme and causal Essence of all things can be signified.' For it is not unity or trinity of such a kind as can be conceived by any human intellect however pure, or by any angelic intellect however serene; but in order that the religious inclinations of pious minds may have something to think and something to say concerning that which is ineffable and incomprehensible, especially for the benefit of those who demand from catholics a rational account of the Christian religion, either, if they are well-disposed, because they wish to learn the truth, or, if they are ill-disposed, as an oppor- tunity for attacking and criticizing it, these religious expressions by which the Faith is symbolized have been both devised and handed down by the holy theologians so that we may believe in our hearts and confess with our lips that the Divine Goodness is constituted in Three Substances of One Essence (79). And even this (truth) was discovered only in the light of spiritual understanding and rational investigation: for in contemplating, as far as the enlightenment of the Spirit of God would take them, the one and ineffable Cause of all things and the one simple and indivisible Principle they affirmed the Unity; and then by observing that this Unity did not consist in any singularity or barrenness they gained an understanding of the Three Substances of the Unity, namely the Unbegotten and the Begotten

32 post simplex una littera erasa est in R uniuersaleque R<sup>c</sup>BP: uniuersalem-  
que R\*

Of the One  
Cause of all  
things triply  
subsisting

de habitu id est relatione trium diuinarum substantiarum patris uidelicet et filii et spiritus sancti

et procedentem. Habitum autem [id est relationem] substantiae ingenitae ad substantiam genitam patrem, habitum uero genitae ad substantiam ingenitam filium, habitum uero procedentis substantiae ad ingenitam genitamque substantiam spiritum sanctum nominauerunt. Sed quoniam in hac re fere omnis sanctorum expositorum sanctae scripturae uersatur intentio, satis, ut arbitrator, praesentialiter dictum est.

A. Satis plane. Verumtamen planius uelim audire de habitu trium diuinarum substantiarum. Poterit enim quis haec mystica sanctae trinitatis nomina, patrem uidelicet et filium et spiritum sanctum, non secundum habitudinem sed secundum naturam accipere. Pater enim substantiae patris nomen esse uidetur, similiter et filius nomen substantiae filii, spiritus quoque sancti nominatio non aliud praeter substantiam ipsius significare.

N. Fortassis et non id ipsum credere atque fateri non negauerimus, si sancti Gregorii theologi summa uenerabilisque auctoritas ueraque rationis approbatio talia credere non prohiberet. Nam cum ab Eynomianis uenenosissimis catholicae fidei aduersantibus interrogatus esset de hoc nomine quod est pater utrum naturae sit an operationis significatiuum, diuina gratia illuminatus mirabiliter respondit dicens neque naturae esse neque operationis sed solius ad filium habitudinis. Si enim responderet naturae esse nomen patrem, illi continuo sequerentur dicerentque similiter et filium nomen esse naturae; si autem hoc daretur, necessario sequeretur alterius naturae pater esse nomen, alterius filius. In una enim eademque natura duo nomina a se inuicem differentia fieri non possunt, ac per hoc conficerent patrem et filium ΕΤΕΡΟΥΣΙΑΣ, hoc est diuersae essentiae seu naturae, esse. Similiter de operatione responsum est: nam si daretur eis operationis nomen pater esse, confestim concluderent filium esse creaturam quando pater operationis, hoc est creationis, suae [nomen] esse conceditur.

A. Hoc responsum laudabile esse certissimum est, et ex ueritate inspiratum. Sed paulo luculentius considerare debemus. Nam, ut mihi uidetur, non continuo eum reprehendere possent etsi diceret patrem nomen naturae esse. Quid enim? nunquid duo nomina a se inuicem sono non sensu discrepantia in una eademque natura intelligi

17-31 Nam cum-conceditur: cf. Max. Conf., I Ambig. xxii, PG xci. 1265CI-D 4.

1 lemma B: de habitudine trium diuinarum substantiarum patris uidelicet et filii et spiritus sancti P: de habitudine diuinarum substantiarum patris filii spiritus sancti Rm id est relationem quae addidit C in R ad lemma adiungit P 5 omnis B<sup>c</sup>P: omnes RB\* 11 lemma utrum substantialiter uel relatiue uel naturaliter pater filius spiritus sanctus predicentur de deo Rm 13 spiritus quoque sancti RB: spiritus sancti quoque P 16 uenerabilisque R<sup>c</sup>BP: uenerabilis atque R\*

and the Proceeding. Now, they called the condition, [that is, the relation,] of the Unbegotten Substance to the Begotten Substance Father (80), the condition of the Begotten to the Unbegotten Substance Son, and the condition of the Proceeding Substance to the Unbegotten and to the Begotten Substance Holy Spirit. But since the attention of the holy commentators of Holy Scripture is almost entirely concentrated upon this subject, enough, I think, has been said for the present.

A. Quite enough: but I should like to hear a plainer account of the condition of the Three Divine Substances; for it would be possible for someone to take these mystical names of the Holy Trinity, namely, Father and Son and Holy Spirit, as referring not to Their condition but to Their nature; for 'father' seems to be the name of the substance of the Father, and similarly 'son' the name of the substance of the Son, and the denomination 'Holy Spirit' also seems to signify nothing other than His substance.

N. Perhaps we too should not deny that we believe and profess just this if the supreme and venerable authority of St. Gregory the Theologian (81) and the assent of sound reason did not prohibit us from believing such things. For when he was questioned by the Eunomians, those most virulent adversaries of the Catholic Faith, concerning this name of 'father', whether it signified a nature or an operation, enlightened by divine grace he made a wonderful reply, saying that it was (the name) neither of a nature nor of an operation, but only of the relation to the Son. For were he to reply that 'father' was the name of a nature, they would at once follow this up by saying that similarly 'son' also was the name of a nature; but if this were granted, it would necessarily follow that 'father' was the name of one nature and 'son' of another. For in one and the same nature there cannot be two names differing the one from the other; and from this they would make their point that Father and Son were ετερουσίας, that is, of diverse essence or nature. Of like (wisdom) was his answer concerning operation: for if it were granted them that 'father' was the name of an operation, they would promptly conclude that the Son was a creature since 'father' was admitted to be [the name] of His operation, that is, of His creation.

A. Most certainly this was a praiseworthy reply, and one inspired by truth. But we ought to look into it a little more closely. For, as it seems to me, they would not immediately be able to blame him even if he did say that 'father' was the name of a nature. Why should they? Is it impossible for two names, differing from one another in sound but not in sense, to be understood in one and the same nature, when

21 neque . . . neque R<sup>c</sup>BP: nec . . . nec R\*

33 luculentius: luculen in ras. B

34 possent etsi R<sup>c</sup>BP: posse \*tsi R\*

Concerning the condition, that is, the relation, of the Three Divine Substances namely of the Father, of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit



non ualent, cum et Abraam et Isaac, patrem uidelicet et filium, unam naturam significare uideamus? Non enim alterius naturae nomen est Abraam alterius Isaac, sed unius atque eiusdem.

N. Recte diceres si similiter in hoc tuo exemplo de Abraam et Isaac affirmare ualeres quod non aliud significat Abraam seu Isaac et aliud significat in eis pater et filius. Nam Abraam et nomen est [ipsius] Abraam et pater nomen est eidem Abraam, similiter et Isaac et nomen est Isaac et filius nomen est eidem Isaac. Sed non de eadem re Abraam et pater seu Isaac et filius praedicantur. Nam de substantia Abraam, id est de speciali eius persona, Abraam dicitur, de relatione uero eius ad suum filium Isaac patrem uocari nemo bene intelligentium dubitarit. Eodem modo de Isaac intelligendum. Hoc enim nomine Isaac propria indiuiduaque substantia ipsius significatur, habitus autem eius ad patrem suum per filium cognoscitur. Non enim potes *negare* talia nomina, id est patrem et filium, relatiua esse, non substantiua. Si ergo apud nos, hoc est in nostra natura, non substantialiter sed relatiue tales uoces praedicantur, quid de summa ac sancta dicturi sumus essentia in qua substantiarum inter se inuicem relationis, id est habitudinis, talia nomina, pater uidelicet et filius et spiritus sanctus, sancta scriptura constituit?

A. Iam uideo praedicti sancti theologi responsum omnino ueritate suffultum esse. Non enim potest, ut suasum est, siue in diuina siue in humana natura relationis nomen in substantia seu essentia recipi. Nosse tamen aperte ac breuiter per te uelim utrum omnes categoriae, cum sint numero decem, de summa diuinae bonitatis una essentia in tribus substantiis et de tribus substantiis in eadem una essentia [uere proprieque possunt praedicari].

N. De hoc negotio nescio quis breuiter atque aperte potest dicere. Aut enim de huius modi causa per omnia tacendum est et simplicitati orthodoxae fidei committendum, nam exsuperat omnem intellectum—sicut scriptum est: 'Qui solus habes immortalitatem et lucem habitas inaccessibilem'—aut si quis de ea disputare coeperit necessario multis modis multisque argumentationibus uerisimile suadebit, duabus principalibus theologiae partibus utens, affirmatiua quidem, quae a Graecis ΚΑΤΑΦΑΤΙΚΗ dicitur, et abnegatiua, quae ΑΠΟΦΑΤΙΚΗ uocatur.

31 1 Tim. vi. 16. Cf. supra, p. 50, 32-34

1 non om. B\* 12 dubitarit RB: dubitaret P 12-13 hoc-significatur R<sup>c</sup>BP: hoc enim nomen isaac propriam indiuiduamque substantiam ipsius significat R\*  
 15 rasura post esse in R 17 quid R<sup>c</sup>BP: quod R\* 19 id est RB: uel P  
 21 ueritate RB<sup>c</sup>P: ueritatem B\* 22 esse om. P 22-23 lemma xviii utrum omnes cathogorie de deo uere possint predicari Rm 24 categoriae BP: categoriae R 25 una essentia R<sup>c</sup>BP: essentialis R\* 26 substantiis . . . substantiis BP: subsistentiis . . . subsistentiis R de tribus bis R\* 29 huius R<sup>c</sup>BP: eius R\* 30 orthodoxae B: ortodoxae RP exsuperat RB:

we see that both Abraham and Isaac, that is, a father and a son, signify one nature? For it is not that Abraham is the name of one nature and Isaac of another, but both are of one and the same nature.

N. You would be correct in what you say if you could equally assert that, in this example of yours of Abraham and Isaac, what is meant by Abraham and Isaac is not different from what in their case is meant by father and son. For as well as Abraham being Abraham's [own] name, 'father' too is a name applying to the same Abraham. In like manner also, as well as Isaac being Isaac's name, 'son' too is a name applying to the same Isaac. But 'Abraham' and 'father', or 'Isaac' and 'son' are not predicated of the same thing. For it is to the substance of Abraham, that is, to the special person that he is, that 'Abraham' refers, whereas no one of sound understanding would doubt that when he is called 'father' the reference is to his relationship to his son Isaac. The same must be understood of 'Isaac'. For by this name 'Isaac' is meant his own individual substance, whereas what is made known by 'son' is his condition in respect of his father. For you cannot deny that such names, that is, father and son, denote relation and not substance. If, then, among us, that is, in (the case of) human nature, these names are predicated not substantivally but relatively, what are we to say in the case of the Supreme and Holy Essence in which Holy Scripture has established such names, namely, Father, Son and Holy Spirit, for the mutual relation, that is, condition, of the Substances (82)?

A. I now see the reply of the holy theologian to be completely supported by the truth. For, as has been shown, whether in the Divine Nature or the human, the name of a relation cannot be applied to a substance or essence. But I should like to hear from you, clearly and succinctly, whether all the categories—for they are ten in number—[can truly and properly be predicated] of the supreme One Essence in Three Substances of the Divine Goodness, and of the Three Substances in the same One Essence (83).

N. On this subject I know of no one who could speak succinctly and clearly. For in such a matter as this either one should keep wholly silent and resign oneself to the simplicity of the Orthodox Faith, for it surpasses every intellect, as it is written: 'Thou Who alone hast immortality and dwellest in inaccessible light (84)'; or, if one has begun to discuss it, one will have to show in many ways and by many arguments what is likely to be the truth, making use of the two branches of theology, the affirmative, which by the Greeks is called *καταφατική*, and the negative, which is named *ἀποφατική*. The one,

exuperat P 31 immortalitatem B: immortalitatem RP 32 ea RB<sup>c</sup>P: eo B\* coeperit RB<sup>c</sup>P: cepit B\* 35 dicitur om. P quae om. P uocatur om. P

de καταφατικῆ  
et ἀποφατικῆ

Vna quidem, id est ΑΠΟΦΑΤΙΚΗ, diuinam essentiam seu substantiam esse aliquid eorum quae sunt, id est quae dici aut intelligi possunt, *negat*; altera uero, ΚΑΤΑΦΑΤΙΚΗ, omnia quae sunt de ea praedicat et ideo affirmatiua dicitur—non ut confirmet aliquid esse eorum quae sunt, sed omnia quae ab ea sunt de ea posse praedicari suadeat. Rationabiliter enim per causatiua causalis potest significari: dicit enim esse ueritatem bonitatem essentiam lucem iustitiam solem stellam spiritum aquam leonem ursum uermem et cetera innumerabilia; et non solum ex his quae sunt secundum naturam eam edocet sed ex his quae contra naturam, quando eam inebriari stultitiam[que] esse [et] insanire dicit. Sed de his nunc non est nostri propositi disserere; satis enim de talibus a sancto Dionysio Ariopagita in Symbolica Theologia dictum est, ideoque ad id quod a te quaesitum est redeundum. Quaesieras enim utrum [omnes] categoriae de deo praedicandae sint [proprie] an quaedam ipsarum.

458B

5

10

458C

15

A. Redeundum sane. Sed prius considerandum, ut arbitror, cur praedicta nomina, essentiam dico bonitatem ueritatem iustitiam sapientiam caeteraque id genus quae uidentur non solum diuina sed etiam diuinissima esse et nil aliud praeter illam diuinam substantiam seu essentiam significare metaforica fieri, id est a creatura ad creatorem translata, praedictus sanctissimus pater atque theologus esse pronuntiarit. Non enim sine quadam mystica atque secreta ratione talia dixisse aestimandum *aestimo*.

20

N. Bene uigilas. Non enim hoc quoque inconsiderate transeundum esse uideo ac per hoc respondeas uelim utrum deo aliquod oppositum aut sibi cointellectum esse intelligas. Oppositum dico aut per priuationem aut per contrarietatem aut per relationem aut per absentiam; cointellectum uero, hoc est simul cum eo aeternaliter intellectum, non tamen ei coessentiale.

458D

26

A. Clare uideo quod uelis. Ac per hoc neque aliquod ei oppositum neque sibi cointellectum ΕΤΕΡΟΥΣΙΟΝ, hoc est quod sit alterius essentiae quam ipse est, dicere ausim. Nam opposita per relationem ita

30

459A

de oppositis

1 lemma: cf. Ps.-Dionys., MT iii, PG iii. 1032D-1033C 7 ueritatem: Ioh. xiv. 6. Cf. Ps.-Dionys., DN vii. 4, PG iii. 872C 9 bonitatem: Ps. cxviii. 1. Cf. DN iv. 1, 693B sq. essentiam: Exod. iii. 14. Cf. DN v. 1, 816B sq. lucem: Ioh. i. 5. Cf. DN iv. 5, 700C 9; CH ii. 3, 140C 9 iustitiam: Is. xlv. 8. Cf. DN viii. 7, 893D 3 sq. solem: Dan. vii. 5; Mal. iv. 2. Cf. DN i. 6, 596C 1; iv. 4, 700B 12; CH ii. 5, 144C 9 stellam: Apoc. xxii. 16. Cf. DN i. 6, 596C 3; CH ii. 5, 144C 10 8 spiritum: Ioh. iv. 24. Cf. DN i. 6, 596C 3; ii. 3, 640C 3 aquam: Ioh. iv. 15. Cf. DN i. 6, 596C 3; CH ii. 5, 144D 3 leonem: Hos. v. 14. Cf. CH 144D 8 ursum: Hos. xiii. 8. Cf. CH 144D 9 uermem: Ps. xxii. 7. Cf. CH 145A 2 12 cf. Ps.-Dionys., DN i. 8, PG iii. 597B 5-6; CH ii. 3, 140C sq.

1 lemma BP: quid sit apofatice et catafatice Rm id est om. P 1-3 diuinam-kataφατικῆ R<sup>c</sup>BP: diuinam essentiam seu substantiam *negat* (?) esse aliquid eorum quae sunt, id est quae dici aut intelligi possunt, altera uero, id est καταφατικῆ R\*

that is ἀποφατικῆ, denies that the Divine Essence or Substance is any one of the things that are, that is, of the things which can be discussed or understood; but the other, καταφατικῆ, predicates of it all the things that are, and for that reason is called affirmative—not that it affirms that it is any of the things that are, but (because) it teaches that all things which take their being from it can be predicated of it. For that which is the cause can reasonably be expressed in terms of the things that are caused (86). For it says that it is Truth, Goodness, Essence, Light, Justice, Sun, Star, Spirit, Water, Lion, Bear, Worm, and innumerable other things; and not only does it draw its lessons about it from those things which accord with nature, but from the things which are contrary to nature, since it describes it as being drunken [and] foolish [and] mad. But of these things it is not our present purpose to speak (87); for enough is said about such things by St. Dionysius the Areopagite in his 'Symbolic Theology', and therefore we may return to the question you have asked. For you had inquired whether [all] the Categories are [properly] to be predicated of God or (only) some of them.

Concerning  
καταφατικῆ  
and  
ἀποφατικῆ  
(85)

A. Yes, let us return to that. But first I think we must ponder why the names you have mentioned, I mean Essence, Goodness, Truth, Justice, Wisdom, and others of that sort, which seem to be not merely divine but the divinest, and to signify nothing else but that Divine Substance or Essence, are said by the aforementioned holy father and theologian to be metaphorical, that is, to have been transferred from the creature to the Creator. For *I think* it must be considered that he had some mystical and hidden reason for saying so.

N. You observe well. Here too is something which I see should not be passed over without consideration, and therefore I should like you to tell me whether you understand that anything opposed to God or conceived alongside of Him exists. By 'opposed' I mean either deprived of Him or contrary to Him or related to Him or absent from Him; while by 'conceived alongside of Him' I mean something that is understood to exist eternally with Him without being of the same essence with him.

A. I see clearly what you mean. And therefore I should not dare to say that there is either anything that is opposed to Him or anything understood in association with Him which is ἑτεροούσιον, that is, which is of another essence than what He is. For opposites by relation

4 affirmatiua BP: adfirmatiua R confirmet RB: firmet P 5 suadeat R<sup>c</sup>BP: suadet R\* 6 causalis RB: causale P post enim add. eam R\* 8 aquam BP: ὕquam R 11 non est RB: non esse P propositi B<sup>c</sup>P: prepositi RB\* 18 glossa ad id genus *pertinens*. i. huius mundi B 19 esse om. P nil RB: nihil P 21 esse om. P 23 aestimo B: estimo R<sup>c</sup>: est R\*: om. P 25 esse om. P post oppositum tres litterae erasae sunt in R 26 intelligas R<sup>c</sup>BP: intelliges R\* 32 lemma BPRm

sibi semper opposita sunt ut simul et inchoare incipiant et simul esse  
 desinant, siue eiusdem naturae sint ut simplum ad duplum, subses-  
 qualterum ad sesqualterum, aut diuersae naturae ut lux atque tene-  
 brae, aut secundum priuationem ut mors et uita, uox et silentium. 5  
 Haec enim *his* quae ortui succumbunt atque occasui recta ratione  
 attribuuntur. Nam ea quae a se ipsis discrepant aeterna esse non  
 possunt. Si enim aeterna essent a se inuicem non discrepant. Nam  
 aeternitas sui similis est ac tota per totum in se ipsa una simplex 459B  
 indiuiduaque subsistit. Est enim omnium unum principium unusque 10  
 finis in nullo a se ipso discrepans. Eadem ratione coaeternum deo  
 esse quod sibi coessentialia non sit nescio quis audeat affirmare. Nam  
 si hoc cogitari aut inueniri potest necessario sequitur non esse unum  
 omnium principium sed duo quaedam [seu plura] longe a se inuicem  
 differentia, quod uera ratio sine ulla haesitatione rennuere consuevit.  
 Nam ab uno omnia, a duobus autem [uel pluribus] nihil esse inchoat. 15

N. Recte disceptas, ut aestimo. Si igitur predicta diuina nomina  
 opposita e regione sibi alia nomina respiciunt, necessario etiam res  
 quae proprie eis significantur oppositas sibi contrarietates obtinere  
 intelliguntur, ac per hoc de deo, cui nil oppositum aut cum quo  
 coaeternaliter natura differens nil inspicitur, proprie praedicari non 459C  
 possunt. Predictorum etenim nominum aliorumque sibi similium 21  
 nullum uera ratio reperire potest cui non ex aduersa parte aut secum  
 in eodem genere differens *aliud ab ipso* discedens nomen non re-  
 peritur. Et quod in nominibus cognoscimus, necessarium ut in his  
 [rebus] quae ab eis significantur cognoscamus. Sed quoniam diuinae 25  
 significationes quae in sancta scriptura a creatura ad creatorem  
 translate de deo praedicantur (si tamen recte dicitur aliquid de eo  
 posse praedicari, quod alio loco considerandum est) innumerabiles  
 sunt et paruitate nostrae ratiocinationis nec inueniri nec insimul  
 colligi possunt, pauca tamen exempli gratia diuina uocabula ponenda 30  
 sunt. Essentia igitur dicitur [deus] sed proprie essentia non est. Esse 459D  
 enim opponitur non esse. ΥΠΕΡΟΥΣΙΟC igitur est, id est superes-  
 sentialis. Item bonitas dicitur sed proprie bonitas non est. Bonitati  
 enim malitia opponitur. ΥΠΕΡΑΓΑΘΟC igitur, id est plus quam  
 bonus et ΥΠΕΡΑΓΑΘΟΤΗΤΑ, id est plus quam bonitas. Deus dicitur 35

de eo quod  
 non proprie  
 de deo  
 praedicatur  
 quicquid  
 habet  
 oppositum

2 siue RB: dum P 3-6 aut diuersae-nam ea RB: aut per negationem  
 ut est non-est, aut per qualitates naturales, per absentiam ut lux atque tenebrae,  
 aut secundum priuationem ut mors et uita, aut per contrarium ut sanitas et imbe-  
 cillitas. haec autem his quae intellectui succumbunt atque sensui recta ratione at-  
 tribuuntur ac per hoc in deo non sunt. ea quippe P 5 his *in ras.* R 7 nam  
 om. P 9 enim RB: siquidem P 10 *rasura post ratione in R* 14 rennuere  
 R<sup>c</sup>BP: renuere R\* 15 nam RB: merito P 17 respiciunt: res- *in ras.* R  
 18 proprie RB<sup>c</sup>P: propriae B\* contrarietates: -es *in ras.* R 21 etenim RB:  
 enim P 22 reperire B<sup>c</sup>P: repperire RB\* 23-24 reperiatur BP: repperi-  
 atur R 24 nominibus R<sup>c</sup>BP: hominibus R\* 27 translate BP<sup>c</sup>: translatae RP\*  
 30 tamen: *an leg.* tantum 31 lemma BPRm 31-32 Esse-non esse RB: cui

are always so opposed to one another that they both begin to be at  
 the same time and cease to be at the same time, whether they are  
 of the same nature, like single to double or  $\frac{2}{3}$  to  $\frac{3}{2}$ , or of different  
 natures, like light and darkness, or in respect of privation, like death  
 and life, sound and silence. For these are correctly thought to belong  
 to the things which are subject to coming into being and passing  
 away. For those things which are in discord with one another cannot  
 be eternal. For if they were eternal they would not be in discord with  
 one another, since eternity is always like what it is and ever eternally  
 subsists in itself as a single and indivisible unity (88). For it is the  
 one beginning of all things, and their one end, in no way at discord  
 with itself. For the same reason I do not know of anyone who would  
 be so bold as to affirm that anything is co-eternal with God which is  
 not co-essential with Him. For if such a thing can be conceived or  
 discovered it necessarily follows that there is not one Principle of all  
 things, but two [or more], widely differing from each other—which  
 right reason invariably rejects without any hesitation: for from the  
 One all things take their being; from two [or more], nothing.

N. You judge correctly, as I think. If therefore the aforesaid  
 Divine Names are confronted by other names directly opposed to  
 them, the things which are properly signified by them must also of  
 necessity be understood to have contraries opposite to them; and  
 therefore they cannot properly be predicated of God, to Whom  
 nothing is opposed, and with Whom nothing is found to be co-eternal  
 which differs from Him by nature. For right reason cannot find  
 a single one of the names already mentioned or others like them to  
 which *another* name, disagreeing *with it*, being opposed or differing  
 from it within the same genus, is not found; and what we know to  
 be the case with the names we must necessarily know to be so with  
 the [things] which are signified by them. But since the expressions of  
 divine significance which are predicated of God in Holy Scripture  
 by transference from the creature to the Creator—if, indeed, it is  
 right to say that anything can be predicated of Him, which must be  
 considered in another place—are innumerable and cannot be found or  
 gathered together within the small compass of our reasoning, only  
 a few of the Divine Names can be set forth for the sake of example.  
 Thus, [God] is called Essence, but strictly speaking He is not  
 essence: for to being is opposed not-being. Therefore He is *ὑπερούσιος*,  
 that is, superessential. Again, He is called Goodness (89), but strictly  
 speaking He is not goodness: for to goodness wickedness is opposed.  
 Therefore (He is) *ὑπεράγαθος*, that is, more-than-good, and *ὑπεραγα-  
 θότης*, that is, more-than-goodness. He is called God, but He is not

14  
 That any-  
 thing which  
 has an  
 opposite  
 cannot be  
 properly  
 predicated  
 of God

opponitur nihil P 34 *post igitur add. est RB\** 35 ΥΠΕΡΑΓΑΘΟΤΗΤΑ *codd.:*  
*lege ὑπεραγαθότης*

sed non proprie deus est. Visioni enim caecitas opponitur et uidenti 460A  
 non uidens. Igitur ΥΠΕΡΘΕΟΣ, id est plus quam deus. ΘΕΟΣ enim  
 uidens interpretatur. Sed si ad aliam originem huius nominis recur-  
 ras, ita ut non a uerbo ΘΕΩ(ΡΩ), id est uideo, sed a uerbo ΘΕΩ, id  
 est curro, ΘΕΟΝ, id est deum, diriuari intelligas, *adest* tibi similiter 5  
 eadem ratio. Nam currenti non currens opponitur sicut tarditas  
 celeritati. Erit igitur ΥΠΕΡΘΕΟΣ, id est plus quam currens, sicut  
 scriptum est: 'Velociter currit sermo eius.' Nam hoc de deo uerbo,  
 quod ineffabiliter per omnia quae sunt ut sint currit, intelligimus.  
 Eodem modo de ueritate accipere debemus. Veritati etenim falsitas 10  
 opponitur, ac per hoc proprie ueritas non est. ΥΠΕΡΑΛΗΘΗΣ igitur  
 est et ΥΠΕΡΑΛΗΘΙΑ, id est plus quam uerus et ueritas. Eadem ratio  
 in omnibus diuinis nominibus obseruanda est. Non enim proprie 460B  
 dicitur aeternitas quoniam aeternitati temporalitas opponitur.  
 ΥΠΕΡΑΙΩΝΙΟΣ igitur est et ΥΠΕΡΑΙΩΝΙΑ, id est plus quam aeternus 15  
 et aeternitas. De sapientia quoque nulla alia occurrit ratio ideoque  
 proprie de deo praedicari non est arbitrandum, quoniam sapientiae  
 et sapienti insipientes [et insipientia] oppugnant. Proinde ΥΠΕΡΣΟΦΟΣ,  
 id est plus quam sapiens, et ΥΠΕΡΣΟΦΙΑ, id est plus quam sapientia,  
 recte uereque dicitur. Similiter plus quam uita est, siquidem uitae 20  
 mors opponitur. Eodem modo de luce intelligendum est. Nam luci  
 tenebrae obstant. Hactenus, ut arbitrator, [de his] sufficienter dictum  
 est.

A. Atqui fatendum [satis esse dictum]. Nam de talibus quaecumque  
 necessaria sunt proferri propter ea quae praesenti negotio disputanda 460C  
 sunt nunc nostrae disceptationis propositum non admittit. Redi 26  
 igitur, si placet, ad denariae quantitatis categoriarum considerationem.

N. Intentionis tuae acumen quae adhuc admodum peruigil uide-  
 batur admiror.

A. Vnde quaeso dicas? 30

N. Nonne diximus quod ineffabilis natura nullo uerbo nullo  
 nomine alioque sensibili sono nulla re significata proprie possit signifi-  
 cari? Et hoc dedisti. Non enim proprie sed translative dicitur essentia  
 ueritas sapientia caeteraque huius modi, sed superessentialis plus  
 quam ueritas plus quam sapientia dicitur. Sed Nonne et haec quasi 35

8 Velociter-eius: Ps. cxlvii. 15 = p. 60, 24-25 supra

1 uisioni RBP<sup>c</sup>: uisio P\* 2 post ΥΠΕΡΘΕΟΣ add. est RB\* id est om. P  
 ΘΕΟΣ enim RB: si ΘΕΟΣ P 3 nominis R<sup>c</sup>BP: hominis R\* 4 ΘΕΩ B:  
 Θ<sup>ε</sup>Ω R: Θ<sup>ε</sup>ΩΡΩ P id est om. P 5 ΘΕΟΝ RB: Θ<sup>ε</sup>ΩΝ P id est om. P adest  
 in ras. R 6 opponitur R<sup>c</sup>BP: opponetur R\* sicut R<sup>c</sup>BP: sicut R\*  
 7 celeritati R<sup>c</sup>BP: celeritatem R\* 11 ΥΠΕΡΑΛΗΘΗΣ RB: ΥΠΕΡΑΛΗΘΕΣ P  
 12 id est om. P uerus et s.l. RP 13 obseruanda R<sup>c</sup>BP: obseruan-  
 dam R\* 15 ΥΠΕΡΑΙΩΝΙΟΣ RB: ΥΠΕΡΜΟΝΙΟΣ P ΥΠΕΡΑΙΩΝΙΑ P  
 id est om. P 18 et (2) alia manus inseruit in B 19 id est (2) om. P 25 propter ea

strictly speaking God: for to vision is opposed blindness, and to him  
 who sees he who does not see. Therefore He is *ὑπέρθεος* that is, more-  
 than-God—for *θεός* is interpreted 'He Who sees'. But if you have  
 recourse to the alternative origin of this name, so that you under-  
 stand *θεός*, that is, God, to be derived not from the verb *θεωρῶ* (90),  
 that is, 'I see', but from the verb *θέω*, that is, 'I run', the same reason  
*confronts* you. For to him who runs he who does not run is opposed,  
 as slowness to speed. Therefore He will be *ὑπέρθεος*, that is, more-  
 than-running, as it is written: 'His Word runneth swiftly': for we  
 understand this to refer to God the Word, Who in an ineffable way  
 runs through all things that are, in order that they may be (91).  
 We ought to think in the same way concerning Truth: for to truth  
 is opposed falsehood, and therefore strictly speaking He is not truth.  
 Therefore He is *ὑπεραλήθης* and *ὑπεραλήθεια* (92), that is, more-than-  
 true and (more-than-)truth. The same reason must be observed in  
 all the Divine Names. For He is not called Eternity properly, since  
 to eternity is opposed temporality. Therefore He is *ὑπεραιώνιος*  
 and *ὑπεραιωνία* (92), that is, more-than-eternal and (more-than-)  
 eternity. Concerning Wisdom also no other reason applies, and there-  
 fore it must not be thought that it is predicated of God properly,  
 since against wisdom and the wise are set the fool and folly. Hence  
 rightly and truly He is called *ὑπέρσοφος*, that is, more-than-wise,  
 and *ὑπερσοφία*, that is, more-than-wisdom. Similarly, He is more-  
 than-life because to life is opposed death. Concerning Light it must  
 be understood in the same way: for against light is set darkness. For  
 the present, as I think, enough has been said [concerning these  
 (matters)].

A. It must indeed be admitted [that enough has been said]. For  
 the subject of our present debate does not allow us to say all that is  
 necessary concerning such matters because of what must be discussed  
 with a view to the business in hand. Return, therefore, if you please,  
 to the consideration of the decad of the categories.

N. I am surprised at the keenness of your attention which has been  
 vigilant enough up to now (93).

A. On what grounds, pray, do you say that?

N. Did we not say that, strictly speaking, the ineffable Nature can  
 be signified by no verb, by no noun, and by no other audible  
 sound, by no signified thing (94)? And to this you agreed. For it is not  
 properly but metaphorically that it is called Essence, Truth, Wisdom,  
 and other names of this sort. Rather, it is called superessential, more-  
 than-truth, more-than-wisdom. But Do not even these (names) seem

Concerning  
 the names by  
 which God is  
 properly  
 named, in so  
 far as God  
 can be  
 named  
 anything

R<sup>c</sup>B<sup>c</sup>: propterea R\*B\*P praesenti negotio RB: negotio praesenti P 26 nunc  
 om. sed postea in marg. addidit P admittit RB<sup>c</sup>P: ammittit B\* 31 lemma  
 BPRm (de (2) om Rm dici BP: esse Rm) 32 alioque con. L. Bieler: aliquo codd.

de nominibus  
 quae de deo  
 proprie  
 dicuntur  
 quantum  
 potest ali-  
 quid de deo  
 dici

quaedam propria nomina uidentur esse? Nam si essentia proprie non dicitur, superessentialis autem proprie dicitur, similiter si ueritas seu sapientia proprie non dicitur, plus uero quam ueritas et plus quam sapientia proprie uocatur. Non ergo propriis nominibus caret. Haec enim nomina quamuis apud Latinos sub uno accentu subque una compositionis armonia usitate non proferantur excepto eo nomine quod est superessentialis, a Grecis tamen sub uno tenore composita pronuntiantur. Nunquam enim aut uix inuenies superbonum seu supraeternum caeteraque similia [composite proferri].

A. Et ego ipse ualde admiror quo intendebam quando hanc non spernendam inquisitionem intactam praetermiseram atque ideo eam a te aperiri obnix postulo. Quoquo modo enim diuina substantia, seu simplicibus orationis partibus seu compositis graece seu latine, tantum ut proprie, proferetur, non ineffabilis esse uidebitur. Non enim ineffabile est quod quodam modo fari potest.

N. Nunc uigilas ut uideo.

A. Vigilo quidem. Sed de hac interposita quaestione nil adhuc uideo.

N. Redi igitur ad ea quae paulo superius inter nos confecta sunt. Duas nanque, ni fallor, sublimissimas theologiae partes esse diximus, et hoc non ex nobis sed auctoritate sancti Dionysii Ariopagitae accipientes, qui apertissime, ut *dictum est*, bipertitam theologiam asserit esse, id est in ΚΑΤΑΦΑΤΙΚΗΝ et ΑΠΟΦΑΤΙΚΗΝ, quas Cicero in intentionem et repulsionem transfert, nos autem ut apertius uis nominum clarescat in affirmationem et negationem maluimus transferre.

A. Talium, ut arbitror, recordari me uideo. Sed quid ad haec quae nunc considerare uolumus prosint nondum agnosco.

N. Nonne uides haec duo, affirmationem uidelicet et negationem, sibi inuicem opposita esse?

A. Satis uideo et nil plus contrarium potest esse, arbitror.

de consonantia inter καταφατικήν et ἀποφατικήν  
N. Intende igitur diligentius. Nam cum ad perfectae ratiocinationis contuitum perueneris, satis clarum considerabis haec duo quae uidentur inter se esse contraria nullo modo sibimet opponi dum circa diuinam naturam uersantur, sed per omnia in omnibus sibi inuicem consentiunt; *et ut hoc apertius fiat paucis utamur exemplis.* Verbi gratia: ΚΑΤΑΦΑΤΙΚΗ dicit: Veritas est; ΑΠΟΦΑΤΙΚΗ contradicit: Veritas non est. Hic uidetur quaedam forma contradictionis, sed dum

21 cf. Ps.-Dionys., MT iii, PG iii. 1032c 11 sq.

1 nam om. P 1-2 duae lineae quas C in marg. adscripsit erasae sunt in R  
2 dicitur ante similiter om. P ueritas R<sup>c</sup>BP: ueritatis R\* 3 non dicitur RB:  
non uocatur P 4 uocatur om. P 7 a deest in RB\* grecis BP: graecis R  
8 nunquam R<sup>c</sup>BP: quis (?) R\* 11 praetermiseram R<sup>c</sup>BP: praetermiserim R\*  
14-15 non-potest in marg. add. sR 20 nanque R<sup>c</sup>B: namque R\*P  
21 ariopagitae R<sup>c</sup>BP: ariopagita R\* 21-22 post accipientes erasum est  
dicimus in R 22 dictum est in ras. R 23 quas R<sup>c</sup>BP: qua R\*

to be, in a way, proper names? For if it is not called Essence properly, yet it is properly called superessential; similarly, if it is not called Truth or Wisdom properly, yet it is properly called more-than-truth and more-than-wisdom. It does not, therefore, lack names referring properly to it. For although among the Latins these names are not usually pronounced under a single accent or by a unitary harmony of composition, except the name superessentialis, by the Greeks, on the other hand, each is expressed by a single compound. For never, or scarcely ever, will you find [such compounds used in speech as are] superbonus or supraeternus and others like (them).

A. I too wonder what I was thinking of when I let this important inquiry go ignored, and therefore I earnestly ask you to enter into it. For in whatever way the Divine Substance is spoken of, whether by simple parts of speech or by compounds, whether in Greek or in Latin, provided only it be a proper way, it will be seen that it is not ineffable. For that is not ineffable which can be spoken of in any way.

N. Now you are on your guard, I see.

A. Yes indeed. But so far this incidental question is anything but clear to me.

N. Return, then, to the conclusion we reached a little earlier. For, unless I am mistaken, we said that there were two supreme branches of theology—and this we said not of ourselves but on the authority of St. Dionysius the Areopagite, who very clearly, as *has been said*, asserts that theology is divided into two parts, that is, into καταφατική and ἀποφατική, which Cicero translates into ‘intentio’ and ‘repulsio (95)’, but we prefer to render by Affirmation and Negation with a view to expressing the meaning of the terms more accurately.

A. I see that I do remember something of the sort, as I think. But I do not yet see how it helps us in the matter we now wish to consider.

N. Do you not see that these two, namely Affirmation and Negation, are the opposites of one another?

A. I am sufficiently aware of that; and I think there can be no greater contrariety.

N. Attend, then, more carefully. For when you have reached the point of view of perfect reasoning you will see clearly enough that these two which seem to be the contraries of one another are in no way mutually opposed when they are applied to the Divine Nature, but in every way and at every point are in harmony with each other. *And that this may become more evident we shall employ a few examples.* For instance: καταφατική says: ‘It is Truth’; ἀποφατική contradicts: ‘It is not Truth’. Here there appears some kind of

Of the harmony between καταφατική and ἀποφατική

24 uis: ui in ras. R 26-27 quae nunc om. sed postea add. in marg. P  
31 lemma BP 31-32 ratiocinationis BP: racionationis R 35 consentiunt  
in consertiunt corrigere uidetur B

intentius inspicitur nulla controuersia reperitur. Nam quae dicit: Veritas est, non affirmat proprie diuinam substantiam ueritatem esse sed tali nomine per metaforam a creatura ad creatorem uocari posse. Nudam siquidem omnique propria significatione relictam diuinam essentiam talibus uocabulis uestit. Ea uero quae dicit: Veritas non est, merito diuinam naturam incomprehensibilem ineffabilemque clare cognoscens non eam negat esse, sed ueritatem nec uocari proprie nec esse. Omnibus enim significationibus quas ΚΑΤΑΦΑΤΙΚΗ diuinitatem induit ΑΠΟΦΑΤΙΚΗ eam spoliare non nescit. Vna enim dicit: Sapientia est, uerbi gratia, eam induens; altera dicit: Sapientia non est, eandem exuens. Vna igitur dicit: Hoc uocari potest, sed non dicit: Hoc proprie est; altera dicit: Hoc non est, quamuis ex hoc appellari potest.

A. Haec, ni fallor, apertissime uideo et ea quae adhuc mihi a se inuicem discrepantia uidebantur nunc inter se inuicem conuenire et in nullo a se ipsis [dissentire], dum circa deum considerantur, luce clarius patescunt. Sed quomodo ad praesentis quaestionis solutionem attineant nondum nosse me fateor.

N. Attende igitur uigilantius atque ipsas significationes quae prius adiectae sunt, superessentialem dico, plus quam ueritatem plus quam sapientiam caeterasque similes, ad quam partem theologiae pertineant, id est utrum affirmatiuae an negatiuae applicandae sunt, quantum tibi possibile est, edissere.

A. Hoc per me ipsum discernere non satis audeo. Nam cum praedictas significationes negatiua carere particula considero [quae est non] negatiuae parti theologiae adiungere eas pertimesco; si uero affirmatiuae parti easdem adiunxero intellectum earum mihi non consentire cognosco. Nam cum dicitur: Superessentialis est, nil aliud mihi datur intelligi quam negatio essentiae. Qui enim dicit: Superessentialis est, aperte negat quia essentialis est, ac per hoc quamuis in pronuntiatione uocum negatio non appareat, occulte tamen ipsius intellectus bene considerantes non latet. Proinde, ut arbitror, fateri cogor has praedictas significationes quae negatione uidentur carere quantum datur intelligere plus negatiuae theologiae parti quam affirmatiuae conuenire.

quomodo affirmatio simul et negatio in  
 N. Cautissime atque uigilantissime respondisse te uideo multumque approbo quomodo in pronuntiatione affirmatiuae partis intellectum negatiuae subtilissime perspexisti. Fiat igitur, si placet,

1 reperitur B<sup>c</sup>P: repperitur RB\*      3 metaforam B: metaphoram RP  
 6 clare R<sup>c</sup>BP: dare R\*      7 rasura post cognoscens in R      8 ΚΑΤΑΦΑΤΙΚΗ  
 R<sup>c</sup>BP: ΚΑΦΑΤΙΚΗ R\*      15 et in nullo bis R\*      dissentire BP: disintire C in R  
 rasura post dum in R      19 adiectae RB: adiecta P      20 caeterasque R<sup>c</sup>BP: caetera-  
 que R\* ad R<sup>c</sup>BP: at R\*      21 id est om. P      22 est om. P      27 nam cum RB:  
 cum enim P      29 quia essentialis est RB: essentialem esse P      33 theologiae  
 RB: teologiae P      35 lemma BPRm (et negatio simul Rm)      36-37 intel-  
 lectum RB: intellectu P      37 perspexisti RBP<sup>c</sup>; perspexistis P\*

contradiction, but a closer investigation reveals that there is no conflict. For that which says: 'It is Truth', does not properly affirm that the Divine Substance is Truth, but that it can be called by such a name by a transference of meaning from the creature to the Creator; for, the Divine Essence being naked and stripped of every proper signification, it clothes it in such names as these. On the other hand, that which says: 'It is not Truth', clearly understanding, as is right, that the Divine Nature is incomprehensible and ineffable, does not deny that it is, but (denies) that it can properly be called Truth or properly be Truth. For all the significations with which καταφατική clothes the Divinity are without fail stripped off it by αποφατική. For the one, clothing it, says, for instance: 'It is Wisdom', while the other, unclothing it, says: 'It is not Wisdom.' So the one says: 'It can be called this', but does not say: 'It properly is this'; the other says: 'It is not this although it can be called after this.'

A. Unless I am mistaken, I fully understand this, and things which hitherto seemed to me to be mutually contradictory are now seen as clear as day to agree with one another and in no way [to dissent] when they are applied to God. But how this may lead to a solution of the present problem I confess I do not yet see.

N. Pay closer attention, then, and tell me, as far as you are able, to which branch of theology belong those significations which we previously introduced, I mean superessential, more-than-truth, more-than-wisdom, and the others like them, that is to say, whether we should allocate them to the affirmative or to the negative theology.

A. I am not so bold as to decide for myself. For when I see that the aforesaid significations lack the negative particle [which means 'not'], I fear to include them in the negative branch of theology; yet if I include them in the affirmative branch I realize that I am not doing justice to their sense. For when it is said: 'It is superessential', this can be understood by me as nothing else but a negation of essence. For he who says: 'It is superessential', openly denies that it is essential, and therefore although the negative is not expressed in the words pronounced, yet the hidden meaning of it is not hidden from those who consider (them) well. Indeed, as I think, I am compelled to admit that these aforesaid significations which in appearance do not imply a negation belong, as far as they can be understood, rather to the negative than to the affirmative branch of theology.

N. I see that you have shown the greatest care and vigilance in your reply, and I strongly approve the way in which you have very subtly observed behind the outward expression of the affirmative branch the meaning of the negative. Let us then, if you agree, attempt

How affirmation and negation are found together in each

singulis  
nominibus  
inueniuntur  
adiectis super  
uel plus  
quam

praesentis huius quaestionis solutio hoc modo: ut haec nomina quae adiectione 'super' uel 'plus quam' particularum de deo praedicantur, ut est superessentialis plus quam ueritas plus quam sapientia et similia, duarum praedictarum theologiae partium in se plenissime sint comprehensiuua, ita ut in pronuntiatione formam affirmatiuae, intellectu uero uirtutem abdicatiuae obtineant. Et hoc breui concludamus exemplo: Essentia est, affirmatio; essentia non est, abdicatio; superessentialis est, affirmatio simul et abdicatio, in superficie etenim negatione caret, intellectu negatione pollet. Nam quae dicit: Superessentialis est, non quod est dicit sed quid non est; dicit enim essentiam non esse sed plus quam essentiam, quid autem illud est quod plus quam essentia est non exprimit. Dicit enim deum non esse aliquod eorum quae sunt sed plus quam ea quae sunt esse, illud autem esse quid sit nullo modo diffinit.

A. In hac quaestione non diutius demorandum ut aestimo. Et nunc, si uidetur, categoriarum natura consideranda est.

N. Aristoteles acutissimus apud Graecos, ut aiunt, naturalium rerum discretionis repertor omnium rerum quae post deum sunt et ab eo creata(e) innumerabiles uarietates in decem uniuersalibus generibus conclusit, quae decem kategorias, id est praedicamenta, uocauit. Nihil enim ut ei uisum in multitudine creaturarum rerum uariisque animorum motibus inueniri potest quod in aliquo praedictorum generum includi non possit. Haec autem a Graecis uocantur ΟΥΣΙΑ ΠΟΚΟΤΗΤΑ ΠΟΙΟΤΗΤΑ ΠΡΟΚ ΤΙ ΚΕΙΘΑΙ ΕΞΙΟ ΤΟΠΟΚ ΧΡΟΝΟΚ ΠΡΑΤΤΕΙΝ ΠΑΘΕΙΝ, quae latialiter dicuntur essentia quantitas qualitas ad aliquid situs habitus locus tempus agere pati. Horum autem decem generum innumerabiles subdiuisiones sunt, de quibus nunc disputare praesens negotium non admittit ne longius a proposito recedamus—praesertim cum illa pars philosophiae quae dicitur dialectica circa horum generum diuisiones a generalissimis ad specialissima iterumque collectiones a specialissimis ad generalissima uersetur. Sed, ut ait sanctus pater Augustinus in libris de Trinitate, dum ad theologiam, hoc est ad diuinae essentiae inuestigationem, peruenitur categoriarum uirtus omnino extinguitur. Nam si in ipsis naturis a deo conditis motibusque earum kategoriae qualiscunq[ue] sit potentia praeualet, in ea uero natura quae nec dici nec intelligi potest

17 Arist., *Categ.* iv. 1b 25-27; cf. Eriug., *Annot. in Marc.* 81, 18 et 89, 22 Lutz 32 sq. cf. Aug., *De Trin.* v. 1, 2, PL xlii. 912

7 non s.l. R: fortasse legendum non-essentia est 8 abdicatio R<sup>c</sup>BP: abducatio R<sup>c</sup>  
9 nam quae RB: namque P 10 quod R<sup>c</sup>B: quid R<sup>c</sup>P quid R<sup>c</sup>BP: quod R<sup>c</sup>  
12 dicit enim RB: asserens P 14 quid R<sup>c</sup>BP: quod R<sup>c</sup> 15 post demorandum add. est R<sup>c</sup> 16 categoriarum BP: categoriarum R 19 creata codd.: cf. 38, 24 supra 22 post quod add. ad aliquid R<sup>c</sup> 24 ΠΟΚΟΤΗΤΑ ΠΟΙΟΤΗΤΑ R<sup>c</sup>BP: ΠΟΙΟΤΗΤΑ ΠΟΚΟΤΗΤΑ R<sup>c</sup>; lege ποσότης ποιότης ΚΕΙΘΑΙ R: ΚΗΙΘΑΙ BP ΤΟΠΟΚ R<sup>c</sup>BP: ΤΟΠΟΚ R<sup>c</sup> 25 lemma BPRm (kathegoriis B: kategoriis P:

a solution of the present problem as follows: that these names which are predicated of God by the addition of the particles super- or more-than-, such as superessential, more-than-truth, more-than-wisdom, and the like, comprehend within themselves in the fullest sense the two previously mentioned branches of theology, so that in outward expression they possess the form of the affirmative, but in meaning the force of the negative. And let us conclude with this brief example: it is Essence, affirmation: it is Non-essence (96), negation: it is superessential, affirmation and negation together—for superficially it lacks the negation, but is fully negative in meaning. For that which says: 'It is superessential', says not what it is but what it is not; for it says that it is not essence but more than essence, but what that is which is more than essence it does not reveal. For it says that God is not one of the things that are but that He is more than the things that are, but what that 'is' is, it in no way defines.

A. We must not linger over this question any longer, I think. And now, if you agree, the nature of the categories must be considered.

N. Aristotle, the shrewdest among the Greeks, as they say, in discovering the way of distinguishing natural things, included the innumerable variety of all things which come after God and are created by Him in ten universal genera which he called the ten categories, that is, predicables (97). For, as he holds, nothing can be found in the multitude of created things and in the various motions of minds which cannot be included in one of these genera. Now, the Greeks call them ούσία, ποσότης, ποιότης (98), πρὸς τι, κείσθαι, ἐξίς, τόπος, χρόνος, πράττειν, παθεῖν, which are called in Latin essentia, quantitas, qualitas, ad aliquid, situs, habitus, locus, tempus, agere, pati. And of these ten genera there are innumerable subdivisions which our present task does not permit us to discuss lest we should digress too far from our topic—especially as it is the function of that branch of philosophy which is called dialectic to break down these genera into their subdivisions from the most general to the most specific, and to collect them together again from the most specific to the most general. But, as the holy father Augustine says in his books on the Trinity, when we come to theology, that is, to the study of the Divine Essence, the relevance (100) of the categories is wholly extinguished. For if the force of any one of the Categories whatsoever is effective in those natures which are created by God and in their motions, yet in that Nature which can neither be spoken of nor

of the names  
which have  
the prefix  
super or  
more than

Of the ten  
categories  
(99)

kathegoriis Rm) quae cum Q pergrandi initium noui capituli indicat in BP  
29 a RBP<sup>c</sup>: ad P<sup>c</sup> 30 ad RB<sup>c</sup>P: a B<sup>c</sup> 31 iterumque-generalissima om.  
P<sup>c</sup>: suppl. ad calc. P<sup>c</sup> 32 uersetur R<sup>c</sup>B: uersatur R<sup>c</sup>: ueretur P augustinus  
RB: augustinis P 33 ad (1) R<sup>c</sup>BP<sup>c</sup>: a R<sup>c</sup>P<sup>c</sup> 34 glossa nullam kathegoriam  
de deo nisi per methaforam significandi gratia dici posse Rm: cf. lemma ad p. 86, 29  
35 kategoriae qualiscunq[ue] sit R<sup>c</sup>BP: categoriarum R<sup>c</sup>

per omnia in omnibus deficit. Attamen, ut praediximus, quemadmodum fere omnia quae de natura conditarum rerum proprie praedicantur de conditore rerum per metaphoram significandi gratia dici possunt, ita etiam categoriarum significationes, quae proprie in rebus conditis dinoscuntur, de causa omnium non absurde possunt proferri—non ut proprie significant quid ipsa sit sed ut translative quid de ea nobis quodam modo eam inquiringentibus probabiliter cogitandum est suadeant.

A. Clare conspicio nulla ratione kategorias de natura ineffabili proprie posse praedicari. Nam si aliqua categoriarum de deo proprie praedicaretur necessario genus esse deus sequeretur; deus autem nec genus nec species nec accidens est: nulla igitur kategoria proprie deum significare potest.

N. Recte intueris. Non in uanum, ut arbitror, in praedictis rationibus duarum partium theologiae sudare uoluimus. Non enim tam facile ac fere absque ullo labore ad hanc categoriarum disputationem peruenire ualuissemus, non posse scilicet proprie de deo praedicari, nisi prius de primordialibus causis ab una omnium causa praedictis, essentiam dico bonitatem uirtutem ueritatem sapientiam caeterasque huius modi, ad purum conficeremus non aliter nisi translative deum significare. Nam si sublimissimae naturarum omnium post eam ordinatarum creatae causae solisque purae mentis aspectibus perspicuae ab una omnium ineffabili causa excellentia essentiae deseruntur, ut nullo modo earum uocabulis ea proprie possit significari, quid dicendum est de his decem generibus praedictis, quae non solum in rebus intelligibilibus uerum etiam in rebus sensibilibus dinoscuntur? Nunquid credibile est ut uere ac proprie de diuina atque ineffabili natura praedicentur?

A. Ita arbitror, [incredibile] esse. Non est igitur ΟΥCΙΑ quia plus est quam ΟΥCΙΑ, et tamen dicitur ΟΥCΙΑ quia omnium ΟΥCΙΩΝ [id est essentiarum] creatrix est. Non est quantitas quia plus quam quantitas est. Omnis enim quantitas tribus spatiis extenditur, longitudine quidem latitudine altitudine, quae iterum tria spatia senario protenduntur numero. Nam longitudo sursum et deorsum, latitudo dextrorsum et sinistrorsum, altitudo ante et retro protenditur. Deus autem omni spatio caret; caret igitur quantitate. Item

34 senario-numero: cf. Plato, *Tim.* 43B 34-35 longitudo-retro: cf. p. 108, 21 *infra*

1 lemma, *eraso longiore lemmate primario*, de eo quod nulla kategoria proprie de deo praedicatur B\*: cf. lemma ad lin. 29 *infra* 4 dici possunt RB: dicuntur P 8 suadeant R<sup>c</sup>B: suadeat R\*: suadet P 15 uolumus *codd.* 19 caeterasque R<sup>c</sup>BP: caeterisque R\* 21 sublimissimae RB: sublimissime P post eam R<sup>c</sup>BP<sup>c</sup>: post se R\*: pote a P\* 22-23 perspicuae RP: perspicuae B 25 praedictis quae RB: praedictisque P 26 sensibilibus *in ras.* B 27 nunquid RB: numquid P de *s.l.* R 29 lemma BP (kategoria P): nulla categoria de

understood it is throughout and in every respect ineffective; and yet, as we have said before (101), in the same way as almost all that is properly predicated of the nature of created things can be said metaphorically of their Creator, so that some significant statement may be made (concerning Him), so also what is signified by the categories, which strictly speaking can only be discerned in created things, can without absurdity be pronounced about the Cause of all things—not to signify properly what it is, but to show by analogy what we, when in a certain manner inquiring about it, might, with probability, think about it.

A. I clearly see that the categories can in no way be properly predicated of the Ineffable Nature: for if any one of the categories were to be properly predicated of God, it would necessarily follow that God is a genus. But God is neither genus nor species nor accident: therefore no category can properly signify God.

N. Your view is correct. Not in vain, I think, was the trouble we have been willing to take over the two branches of theology. For we should not have been able so easily, and with hardly any difficulty at all, to arrive at this treatment of the categories, namely, that they cannot properly be predicated of God, had we not first satisfied ourselves that, in the case of the primordial causes which were established before all else by the One Cause of all things, I mean Essence, Goodness, Virtue, Truth, Wisdom, and the others of this sort, it is only metaphorically that they signify God. For if the created causes of all things which come first in order after it and which can only be apprehended by the perceptions of sheer mind fall short of the One Ineffable Cause of all things as regards excellence of essence, so that it can by no means be properly signified by their names, what are we to say of these aforementioned ten genera, which are discerned not only in intelligible things but also in sensible things? Surely it is not to be believed that they are truly and properly predicated of the Divine and Ineffable Nature?

A. I think so too: that it is [not to be believed]. So it is not οὐσία because it is more than οὐσία, and yet it is called οὐσία because it is the Creator of all οὐσίαι [that is, of all essences]. It is not quantity because it is more than quantity. For every quantity extends in three dimensions, length, breadth, and depth, and these three dimensions are again produced in six directions: for length goes up and down, breadth to the right and to the left, depth forwards and backwards. But there is no dimension in God; therefore there is in Him no quantity. Moreover quantity (consists) in the number of parts, either

deo proprie predicatur sed metaphorice Rm: cf. *gl. ad p.* 84, 34 (85 *ad calc.*) 30 lemma B ΟΥCΙΩΝ R<sup>c</sup>BP: ΟΥCΙC R\* 31 lemma BP: de qualitate Rm 33 altitudine R<sup>c</sup>BP: et latitudine R\*

That no category is predicated of God properly but metaphorically Concerning οὐσία Concerning quantity



quantitas in numero partium aut naturaliter coniunctarum, ut est  
 linea aut tempus, aut naturaliter disiunctarum, ut sunt numeri seu  
 corporales seu intelligibiles; diuina substantia nec continuis partibus  
 componitur nec diuiduis distinguitur. Non est igitur quantitas.  
 Quantitas tamen non incongrue denominatur duobus modis: aut  
 quia quantitas saepe pro magnitudine uirtutis ponitur aut quia totius  
 quantitatis principium est et causa. De qualitate quoque non aliter  
 intelligendum. Nulla enim deus qualitas est, nulla ei accidit, nullius  
 est particeps. At uero saepissime qualitas de eo praedicatur, aut quia  
 totius qualitatis conditor est aut quod qualitas frequentissime in  
 significatione uirtutum ponitur. Nam et bonitas et iustitia caeteraeque  
 uirtutes qualitates esse dicuntur; deus autem uirtus est et plus quam  
 uirtus. Relationis autem ratio non tam aperte patescit quemadmodum  
 aliarum kategoriarum diffinitiones apparent. Videtur enim ista sola  
 kategoria ueluti proprie in deo praedicari; atque ideo cum summa  
 diligentia inuestigandum esse uideo utrum proprie in summa ac  
 sancta trinitate trium maximarum substantiarum pater relatiue ad  
 filium dicitur, similiter filius ad patrem, spiritus quoque sanctus ad  
 patrem et filium quia spiritus amborum est—haec enim nomina  
 habitudinum esse sanctus Gregorius theologus indubitanter asserit—  
 an etiam quemadmodum caeterae kategoriae ita et ista quae dicitur  
 relationis siue habitudinis metaphoricè de deo praedicari credendum  
 et intelligendum sit.

N. Rationabiliter ut aestimo ad inuestigandum ueritatis mysterium  
 procedis. Nulla enim kategoriarum praeter istam solam de deo proprie  
 praedicari uidetur. Sed utrum ita sit necne piissime cautissimeque  
 inquirendum est. Nam si proprie de deo dicitur omnis ferme praedi-  
 cta nostra ratiocinatio euacuabitur. Vniuersaliter enim diximus nil  
 proprie de deo aut dici aut intelligi posse. Praesertim kategoria  
 relationis non inter decem genera kategoriarum reputabitur si proprie  
 de deo pronuntiatur. Si autem hoc confectum fuerit kategoriarum  
 numerus non denario sed nouennario concludetur. Restat igitur ut  
 intelligamus hanc etiam kategoriam sicut et caeteras translatiue de  
 deo praedicari, uera siquidem ratiocinatio ad hoc inuitat atque  
 coartat ne ea quae praedicta sunt incipiant uacillare. Quid enim?  
 nunquid ueris ratiocinationibus obsistit si dicamus patrem et filium  
 ipsius habitudinis quae dicitur ad aliquid nomina esse et plus quam

1-3 coniunctarum-intelligibiles: cf. Ps.-Aug., *De cat. dec.* lxxiv-lxxix, p. 149,  
 22-p. 150, 26 Minio-Paluello 20 uide supra, p. 70, 21

4 quantitas R<sup>c</sup>BP: quantit\*\* R\* 7 lemma BPRm 8 nullius RB:  
 nullus P 13 non RB: nam P 14 lemma BP: ad aliquid Rm 18 post  
 sanctus rasura in R 22 metaphoricè RB<sup>c</sup>P: metaphoricæ B\* 27 est  
 om. P 28 ratiocinatio BP: racionatio R enim s.l. R 32 nouennario  
 R<sup>c</sup>B: nouenario R\*P 34 praedicari R<sup>c</sup>BP: uocari (?) R\* ratiocinatio BP:  
 racionatio R\* ad R<sup>c</sup>BP: Id B\* hoc R<sup>c</sup>BP: haec R\* 36 nunquid R<sup>c</sup>B:

naturally continuous as in the case of a line or of time, or naturally  
 discontinuous, as in that of corporeal or intelligible numbers; the  
 Divine Substance is neither composed of continuous parts nor  
 divisible into separate parts. Therefore it is not a quantity. And yet  
 it may not inappropriately be called quantity in two ways: either  
 because 'quantity' is often used in the sense of abundance of power,  
 or because it is the origin and cause of all quantity.

Concerning quality also we must think in the same way: for God  
 is no quality, no quality is an accident to Him, in no quality does He  
 participate. And yet quality is very often predicated of Him, either  
 because He is the Creator of all quality or because quality is very  
 frequently used in reference to the virtues. For goodness as well as  
 justice and the other virtues are often called qualities. But God is  
 Virtue and More-than-virtue. The principle of relation is not as  
 patently obvious as are the definitions of the other categories. For it  
 appears to be the only category which is, so to say, properly predicable  
 of God: and for this reason I see that we must inquire with the utmost  
 care whether in the Most High and Holy Trinity of the Three  
 Supreme Substances 'father' is properly said in relation to the Son,  
 similarly 'son' (in relation) to the Father, and 'holy spirit' (in relation)  
 to the Father and the Son because the Spirit is of both—for that these  
 are the names of conditions St. Gregory the Theologian asserts in  
 a manner not to be doubted—, or whether here again, as in the case  
 of the other categories, this one also, which is called relation or con-  
 dition (102), must be believed and understood to be predicated of  
 God metaphorically.

N. Your method of inquiring into the mystery of truth is a reason-  
 able one, as I think. For it does seem as if none of the categories  
 except this one alone is properly predicated of God. But whether  
 this is really so or not must be examined with the utmost reverence  
 and care. For if it is properly predicated of God, almost all our  
 previous reasoning will be undermined. For we asserted that nothing  
 at all can properly be said or understood of God. Indeed, the category  
 of relation will not be reckoned among the ten genera of the categories  
 if it is properly predicated of God. But if this is found to be the case  
 the number of the categories will not be ten but nine. Therefore there  
 is no course left open to us but to understand that this category too,  
 as well as the others, is predicated of God metaphorically; for to this  
 we are prompted and urged by sound reasoning lest what has already  
 been said should begin to appear uncertain. For why, is it contrary  
 to sound reasoning if we say that 'father' and 'son' are names for  
 that condition which is called 'in relation to something' and for what

num quod R\*: num quid P ratio ante ratiocinationibus add. R\* dicamus BP:  
 dicimus R

habitudinis? Non enim credendum est eandem habitudinem in excelsissimis diuinae essentiae substantiis et in his quae post eam ab ea condita sunt. Vt enim, ni fallor, [quemadmodum] superat omnem essentiam sapientiam uirtutem, ita etiam et omnem habitudinem ineffabiliter supergreditur. Quis enim crediderit talem habitudinem inter patrem et uerbum suum esse qualem inter Abraam et Isaac potest cogitare? Hic enim habitus carnalis ex diuisione naturae post peccatum primi hominis in multiplicatione per generationem inquiritur, illic ineffabilis ingenitae genitaeque *substantiae* sibimet copula creditur proutque datur diuini luminis radio cognoscitur. Hic quod quaeritur non ex natura processit, ut diximus, sed ex uitio, illic quod cogitatur ex ineffabili diuinae bonitatis foecunditate procedere cognoscitur. Sed ad caeteras kategorias transeamus.

de situ A. Sex restant ni fallor: quarum prima ΚΕΙCΘΑΙ, id est iacere, quam alii situm appellant. Situs autem intelligitur in positione cuiusdam creaturae siue uisibilis siue inuisibilis. Verbi gratia: de aliquo corpore dicitur aut 'iacet' aut 'stat'[, similiter de animo dicitur, si quietus, 'iacet', si peruigil, 'stat']—status nanque huic kategoriae applicari solet; nam motus ad tempus refertur.—Sed quia deus nec stat nec iacet praedicta kategoria nulla ratione proprie de eo praedicari potest. At uero quoniam standi et iacendi causa est—in ipso enim omnia et stant, hoc est immutabiliter secundum suas rationes subsistunt, et iacent, hoc est quiescunt; finis enim omnium est, ultra quem nihil appetunt—potest de eo translative iacere uel situs praedicari. [Nam si uere proprieque deus iacet aut sedet aut stat positione non caret; si non caret positione localis est. Non est autem localis: nullo igitur situ continetur.]

de habitu N. Clare quid uelis perspicio ac per hoc ad habitudinis kategoriam transeundum esse uideo, quae omnium kategoriarum propter nimiam sui amplitudinem obscurissima esse uidetur. Non enim est ulla kategoria fere in qua habitus quidam inueniri non possit. Nam et essentiae seu substantiae habitu quodam ad se inuicem respiciunt. Dicimus enim rationabilis essentia irrationabilisque qua proportione, id est quo habitu, ad se inuicem respiciunt [(non enim irrationabilis diceretur nisi ab habitu absentiae rationis, quomodo non aliunde rationabilis uocatur nisi habitu praesentiae rationis)]. Omnis enim proportio habitus est, quamuis non omnis habitus proportio. Proprie

2 post eam rasura in R 6 abraam R<sup>c</sup>BP: abraham R\* 7 cogitare R<sup>c</sup>BP: cogitari R\* hinc R: hic B: hinc P 11 quaeritur RB: queritur P 13 kategorias R<sup>c</sup>BP: \*\*\*\*\*tias R\* 14 lemma BPRm ΚΕΙCΤΑΙ codd. 15 appellat RB: apellant P 18 nanque RB: namque P 19 ad: a B\* 22 immutabiliter RB: inmutabiliter P 25 si s.l. R 25-27 deus—continetur illegibilia sunt in R 28 lemma BPRm kategoriam RP: kateriam B 30 lemma BPRm (categoris Rm) 34 id est RB: uel P 35-36 rationis—rationis illegibilia sunt in R 37 omnis RB: omnes P

is more than condition? For the same condition is not to be believed in the most exalted Substances of the Divine Essence and in those which were created after it and by it. For, if I am not mistaken, just as it surpasses every essence, wisdom, and virtue, so also in an ineffable manner it goes beyond every condition. For who would believe that there is the same kind of condition between the Father and His Word as there can be observed between Abraham and Isaac? For the latter condition, being of the flesh and resulting from the division of nature after the sin of the first man, is found, on inquiry, to consist in the multiplication by generation; in the former case it is believed and (in so far as it is revealed by the radiance of the Divine Light) known to be an ineffable bond uniting the Unbegotten and the Begotten *Substances*. In the latter case what is under consideration did not proceed from nature but from transgression; in the former, what is contemplated is known to proceed from the ineffable fertility of the Divine Goodness. But let us pass on to the other categories.

A. There are six left, unless I am mistaken: of which the first is κείσθαι, that is, 'to lie', which others call situation (103). Now situation means the posture of a creature, whether visible or invisible. For instance: it is said of some body either, 'it lies', or, 'it stands'; [similarly it is said of the mind if it is at rest, 'it lies'; if it is alert, 'it stands']—because standing is usually applied to this category; for motion is related to time.—But because God neither stands nor lies the aforesaid category can in no way be predicated of God. And yet, since He is the Cause of standing and of lying—for in Him all things both stand, that is, subsist immutably in their reasons, and lie, that is, find their rest, because He is the End of all things, beyond which there is nothing for them to strive for—, 'to lie' or situation can be predicated of Him metaphorically. [For if God truly and properly lies or sits or stands He does not lack posture: if He does not lack posture He occupies place. But He does not occupy place: therefore He is not contained within any situation.]

N. I clearly see what you mean, and therefore I see fit that we should pass on to the category of condition, which seems to be the most obscure of all the categories because of its excessive range. For there is scarcely any category in which some condition is not found. For even essences or substances stand in regard to one another in respect of some condition. For we state in what proportion, that is, condition, rational and irrational essence stand to one another [for the irrational could not be so called but for its condition of absence of reason, as the rational is not so called save from its condition of the presence of reason]. For every proportion is a condition although not every condition is a proportion; because properly speaking proportion can only be found where there are at least two terms, while

Concerning situation

17 Concerning condition

That condition is found in all the categories

nanque proportio non minus quam in duobus potest inueniri, habitus uero etiam in singulis rebus inspicitur. Verbi gratia: habitus rationalis animae uirtus est. Est igitur proportio species quaedam habitudinis. Si autem exemplo uis declarari quomodo habitus proportionalis in essentia inuenitur, ex numeris elige exemplar. Numeri enim, ut aestimo, essentialiter in omnibus intelliguntur. In numeris nanque omnium rerum subsistit essentia. Vides igitur qualis proportio est in duobus et tribus?

A. Video plane. Sesquialteram esse arbitror; et hoc uno exemplo aliorum omnium substantialium numerorum inter se inuicem collatorum uarias proportionis species possum cognoscere.

N. Intende itaque ad reliqua et cognosce nullas quantitatis species esse seu qualitatis seu ipsius quae dicitur ad aliquid seu situs lociue temporisue agendi uel patiendi in quibus quaedam species habitudinis non reperiatur.

A. Saepe talia quaesiui et ita repperi. Nam, ut paucis exemplis utar, in quantitibus magna et parua et media inter se comparata multa pollent habitudine. [Item in quantitibus numerorum linearum temporum aliorumque similium habitudines proportionum perspicue reperies.] Similiter in qualitate. Verbi gratia, in coloribus album et nigrum mediusque qualiscunque sit color [habitu sibimet iunguntur]. [Album siquidem et nigrum quia extremos colorum locos obtinent, habitu contrarietatis ad se inuicem respiciunt. Color autem ad extrema sui, album dico nigrumque, habitu medietatis respicit.] In ea quoque categoria quae dicitur ΠΡΟΣ ΤΙ, id est ad aliquid, clare apparet, qualis habitus patris ad filium seu filii ad patrem, amici amico, dupli ad simplum caeteraque huius modi. De situ quoque facile patet quomodo stare et iacere habitudinem quandam inter se inuicem possideant. [Haec enim ex diametro sibi inuicem respondent: nequaquam enim intellectum standi absolutum ab intellectu iacendi cogitabis sed semper simul tibi occurrunt, quamuis in re aliqua non simul appareant.] Quid dicendum est de loco quando superiora inferiora et media considerantur? Nunquid habitudine carent?

N. Nullo modo. [Non enim haec nomina ex natura rerum proueniunt sed ex respectu quodam intuentis eas per partes. Sursum

1 nanque RB: namque P inueniri RBP<sup>c</sup>: inueni P\* 3 rationalis R<sup>c</sup>BP:  
 rationalis R\* 4 declarari RB<sup>c</sup>P: declarare B\* 11 proportionis RB<sup>c</sup>P:  
 proportiones B\* 15 reperiatur B<sup>c</sup>P: repperiatur RB\* 16 exemplis R<sup>c</sup>BP:  
 exempla R\* 17 comparata R<sup>c</sup>BP: compar\*ta R\* 20 reperies *sive*  
 repperies *illegibile in R*: reperies B<sup>c</sup>P: repperies B\* 21-25 habitu-iunguntur  
*post scripta sunt quam album-respiciat, quae ad color (lin. 21) pertinent, in R*  
 23 contrarietatis RB: extremitatis P 28 et RB<sup>c</sup>P: aut B\* 28-29 quan-  
 dam RB<sup>c</sup>P: quendam B\* 29 inuicem RB: ex regione P 31 tibi *om.* P  
 33 superiora *ex longiore uoce B*

condition is found in single things also. For instance: the condition of the rational soul is virtue. So proportion is some species of condition. But if you wish it to be made clear by an example how the condition of proportion is found in essence, take the case of numbers. For numbers, as I think, are understood to be present in all things as their essence. For it is in numbers that the essence of all things subsists. Do you see, then, what kind of proportion there is between two and three?

A. Yes, certainly. I think it is the proportion of two-thirds: and from this one example I can get to know the various kinds of proportion of all the other substantial numbers when they are brought into relation with each other.

N. Turn your attention, then, to the rest (of the categories), and learn that there are no species of quantity, or of quality, or of that which is called 'in relation to something', or of situation, or of place, or of time, or of action, or of passion, in which some kind of condition is not found.

A. I have often searched into such matters and have found it to be so. For, to make use of a few examples, in quantities when the great and the small and the medium-sized are compared, condition is plainly evident. [Also in the quantities of numbers, distances, durations of time, and other similar things, you will clearly find the condition of proportion.] Similarly in quality. For instance: in colours, white and black and whatever intermediate colour there may be [are related to each other by condition]. [For white and black, because they occupy extreme positions in the range of colours, stand in regard to one another in the condition of contrariety, while (the range of) colour stands in regard to its extremes, white, I mean, and black, in the condition of intermediacy.] Also, in that category which is called *πρός τι*, that is, 'in relation to something', (condition) is much in evidence, as the condition of father to son or son to father, of friend to friend, of double to single, and other instances of this sort. In the case of situation too it is easily seen how standing and lying possess a condition in respect of one another [for they are diametrically opposed to one another. For you will certainly never form a notion of standing distinct from the notion of lying, but the two always occur to you together, although they do not appear together in any one thing.] What is to be said of place, when the higher and the lower and the intermediate are considered? Do they lack condition?

N. By no means; [for these names do not proceed out of the nature of things but from the point of view of one who observes them part by part. For there is no up and down in the universe, and therefore

siquidem et deorsum in uniuerso non est atque ideo neque superiora neque inferiora neque media in uniuerso sunt, nam uniuersitatis consideratio haec respuit, partium uero introducit intentio. Eadem ratio est de maiori et minori. Nullum enim in suo genere paruum aut magnum esse potest, ex cogitatione tamen comparantium diuersas quantitates talia inuenta sunt, ideoque locorum seu partium contemplatio habitum in talibus gignit. Nulla enim natura maior aut minor alia natura sit, sicut neque superior neque inferior, cum una omnium subsistat natura ex uno deo condita.]

A. Quid de tempore? Nonne in ipsis dum inter se inuicem conferuntur luculenter habitus aridet? Verbi gratia: dies ad horas, horae ad punctos, puncti ad momentum, momenti ad atoma. Similiter in superioribus commensurationibus si quis ascenderit reperiet. [In his enim omnibus habitus totius ad partes partiumque ad totum perspicitur.]

N. Profecto non aliter.

A. Quid in diuersis agendi et patiendi motibus? Nonne habitus ubique relucet? Nam amare et amari habitudines sunt amanti et amati; *siquidem* inter se inuicem respiciunt siue in una persona sint, quod a Graecis dicitur ΑΥΤΟΠΑΘΙΑ, id est cum actio et passio in una eademque inspicitur persona, ut me ipsum amo, siue inter duas personas, quod a Graecis dicitur ΕΤΕΡΟΠΑΘΙΑ, id est cum alia persona amanti et alia amati sit, ut 'amo te.'

N. Et haec uera esse decerno.

A. Quaero igitur a te quare ista kategoria habitudinis, cum caeteris kategoriis naturaliter inesse uideatur, per se specialiter ueluti suis propriis rationibus subnixa suum in denaria kategoriarum quantitate locum obtineat.

N. An forte quia in omnibus inuenitur propterea in se ipsa subsistit? Nam quod omnium est nullius proprie est, sed ita est in omnibus ut in se ipsa subsistat. Eadem enim ratio etiam in kategoria essentiae inspicienda est. Quid enim? nunquid, cum decem kategoriae sint, una earum essentia seu substantia dicitur, nouem uero accidentia sunt et in substantia subsistunt? Per se enim subsistere non possunt. Essentia in omnibus esse uidetur, sine qua esse non possunt, et tamen per se locum suum obtinet. Quod enim omnium est nullius proprie est sed omnium commune, et dum in omnibus subsistat per

32-34 cf. Boethius, *In Isagog. Porph. Comm.* ii. 1, 4; Ps.-Aug. *De cat. dec.* li. p. 144, 19-21 Minio-Paluello

1 ideo BP: eo R      2 neque (1) et (2) s.l. R      inferiora R<sup>c</sup>BP: infora R\*  
in om. R      3 uero s.l. R      7 in talibus s.l. R      9 post natura rasura in P  
post ex rasura in R      11 aridet RB: aridet P      dies RB<sup>c</sup>P: des B\*      13 reperiet B<sup>c</sup>P: repperiet RB\*  
R<sup>c</sup>BP: quae R\*      17 motibus RB<sup>c</sup>P: motus B\*      19 siquidem R<sup>c</sup>BP: uidetur R\*  
20 ΑΥΤΟΠΑΘΙΑ RB: ΑΥΤΟΠΑΤΙΑ P      22 ΕΤΕΡΟ-

in the universe there is nothing either higher or lower or intermediate. These (notions) are rejected by a consideration of the whole, but introduced by attention to the parts. The same thing applies to the greater and the less: for nothing in its own genus can be either small or great, but such concepts have been formed by the thought of those who compare differing quantities, and therefore the condition is brought about in them by the consideration of spaces or of parts. For no nature would be either greater or smaller than any other nature, just as none is either higher or lower, since the nature by which all subsist is one, being the creation of one God.]

A. What of time? When times are compared with one another, does not condition come clearly into view in them?—for instance, days compared to hours, hours to minutes, minutes to the moment, moments (104) to indivisible units? Much the same one will find in the higher units of time if one ascends there. [For in all these is seen the condition of the whole to the parts and of the parts to the whole.]

N. Assuredly it is not otherwise.

A. And how (is it) in the diverse motions of action and passion? Is not condition everywhere in evidence? For to love and to be loved are conditions of the lover and the beloved since they are reciprocal to one another whether they occur in a single person, which is called by the Greeks *αυτοπαθεια*, that is, when action and passion are observed in one and the same person, as 'I love myself'; or between two persons, which is called by the Greeks *ετεροπαθεια* (105), that is, when the lover is one person and the beloved is another, as 'I love you'.

N. This too I see to be true.

A. I ask you therefore why this category of condition, since it seems to be naturally inherent in all the other categories, has its own place as a species by itself in the decad of the categories, as though founded upon its own proper reasons.

N. Is it perhaps for the very reason that it is found in all that it subsists in itself? For that which is of all belongs properly to none, but is in all in such a way as to subsist in itself. For the same may be observed also in the category of Essence. Consider: although there are ten categories, is not one of them called essence or substance, while nine are accidents subsisting in the substance? For they cannot subsist by themselves. Essence appears to be in all, for without it they are not able to be. And yet, it occupies a place of its own, for that which is of all is proper to none but common to all, and while

That *ousia* and quantity and quality are found in all the categories

ΠΑΘΙΑ P: et ΕΡΟΠΑΘΙΑ R<sup>c</sup>B: Ε\*ΡΟΠΑΘΙΑ R\*      25 lemma cur habitus in denaria quantitate continetur Rm  
32 kategoriae RBP<sup>c</sup>: kateriae P\*      29 lemma BP (ΥCΙΑ P KATEGORIIS P)  
35 esse (1) R<sup>c</sup>BP<sup>c</sup>: et R\*; om. P\*      uidetur R<sup>c</sup>BP: uidetur R\*

de eo quod  
ysia et  
quantitas et  
qualitas in  
omnibus  
kategoriiis  
inueniuntur

se ipsum propria sua ratione esse non desinit. De quantitate similiter dicendum est. Dicimus enim quanta essentia quanta qualitas quanta relatio quantus situs quantus habitus quam magnus locus quam paruum uel spatiosum tempus quanta actio quanta passio. Videsne quam late patet per caeteras categorias quantitas? Non tamen suum proprium deserit statum. Quid de qualitate? Nonne et ipsa de omnibus aliis kategoriis frequenter praedicari solet? Dicimus enim qualis OYCIA qualis magnitudo qualis relatio situs habitus locus tempus agere pati. Haec enim omnia qualia sunt interrogamus. Non tamen qualitas sui proprii generis rationem deserit. Quid ergo mirum si kategoria habitudinis dum in omnibus inspicitur propriam suam rationem possidere dicatur?

A. Nullo modo mirandum; nam uera ratio suadet non aliter esse posse.

N. Nonne igitur uides diuinam essentiam nullius habitudinis participem esse, de ea tamen non incongrue, quoniam ipsius est causa, praedicari posse? Si enim proprie de ipsa habitus praedicaretur nequaquam suimet sed alterius esset; omnis quippe habitus in aliquo subiecto intelligitur et alicuius accidens est, quod de deo, cui nullum accidit et accidit nulli in nulloque intelligitur et nullum in ipso, impium est credere.

A. Satis de hac kategoria disputatum est, ut arbitror.

de loco et tempore N. Quid igitur? Nonne ex his quae praedicta sunt de caeteris kategoriis breuiter possumus colligere? Non enim deus locus neque tempus est, attamen locus omnium translative dicitur et tempus, quia omnium locorum temporumque causa est. Omnium enim diffinitiones quasi quidam loci in ipso subsistunt, et ab ipso quasi a quodam tempore per ipsum ueluti per quoddam tempus et in ipsum ueluti in finem quendam temporum motus omnium et incipit et mouetur et desinit dum ipse nec se moueat nec a se nec ab alio moueatur. Quid enim? num si proprie locus diceretur et tempus uideretur non extra omnia per excellentiam essentiae sed in numero omnium quae sunt includi? Locus siquidem et tempus inter omnia quae creata sunt computantur. In his nanque duobus totus mundus qui nunc est consistit et sine quibus esse non potest, ideoque a Graecis dicuntur ΩΝ ΑΝΕΥ ΤΟ ΠΑΝ, id est quibus sine uniuersitas esse non ualet. Omne enim quod in mundo est moueri tempore loco diffiniri necesse

35-36 a Graecis—uniuersitas: cf. p. 126, 32-33 infra

2 est om. P      5 quantitas RB<sup>c</sup>P: quantas B\*      6 quid R<sup>c</sup>BP: quod R\*  
 7 frequenter BP: frequentur R      10 deserit in ras. alia manu R      17 proprie RB<sup>c</sup>P: propriae B\*      20 nulli s.l. R      23 lemma BPRm      25 est s.l. R  
 post omnium erasum est dicitur in R      translative RB<sup>c</sup>P: translative B\*      26 enim RB: quippe P      27 post subsistunt erasa sunt et in ipso in R      30 nec a se RB: per tempus P      31 num RBP<sup>c</sup>: non P\*      36 ΩΝ BP: ΩΝ R      omne RB: omnem P      37 diffiniri RB: diffinire P

it subsists in all it does not cease to be in itself, according to its proper reason. The same may be said of quantity. For we say: What quantity of essence? What quantity of quality? What quantity of relation? What quantity of situation? What quantity of condition? How great a place? How small or how great an extent of time? What quantity of action? What quantity of passion? Do you see how extensively quantity is applied to the other categories? And yet it does not cease to hold its own place. What of quality? Is it not usual for this to be frequently predicated of all the other categories? For we say: What quality of οὐσία? What quality of size? What quality of relation, situation, condition, place, time, action, passion? For we ask in respect of all these what is their quality. And yet quality does not abandon the reason of its proper genus. What, then, is strange if the category of condition, while it is observed in all, is said to possess its own reason?

A. It is not to be considered strange at all. For right reason convinces us that it cannot be otherwise.

N. Do you not then see that the Divine Essence does not participate in any condition, and that nevertheless condition can be not unsuitably predicated of it since (the Divine Essence) is its Cause? For if condition were predicated of it properly, (the Divine Essence) would not be of itself but of another. For every condition is understood to be in some subject and to be the accident of something, which it is impious to believe of God, to Whom nothing is an accident, and Who is not an accident to anything, and Who is not comprehended in anything, nor anything in Him.

A. Enough has been said of this category, as I think.

N. What then? For the remaining categories can we not briefly summarize from what has been said before? For God is neither place nor time, and yet metaphorically He is called the Place and Time of all things because He is the Cause of all places and all times. For the definitions of all things subsist in Him as places, as it were; and from Him as from a certain moment of time, through Him as through a certain period of time, [and] towards Him as towards the end, as it were, of times, the motion of all things both begins and moves and comes to an end, although He Himself neither moves Himself nor is moved by Himself or by another. Consider: if He were properly called place and time would it not appear that He would not be outside all things on account of the excellence of His Essence, but be included in the number of all the things that are? For place and time are counted among all the things that have been created. For in these two the whole of the world that now exists is comprised and (they are that (106)) without which it cannot exist, and therefore they are called by the Greeks ὄν ἀνευ τὸ πᾶν, that is, 'without which the universe' cannot exist. For everything that is in the world must move in

21  
 Concerning  
 place and  
 time

est, et locus ipse diffinitur et tempus mouetur; deus autem nec mouetur nec diffinitur. [Nam locus quo diffiniuntur omnia loca locus locorum est et, quia ille a nullo locatur sed omnia intra se collocat, non locus sed plus quam locus est. A nullo enim diffinitur sed omnia diffinit: 469A causa igitur est omnium. Eodem modo causa temporum tempora 5 mouet, ipsa uero a nullo in nullo tempore mouetur. Est enim plus quam tempus et plus quam motus.] Non est locus igitur neque tempus.

A. Ita quidem etiam luce clarius *apparent* quae dicta sunt in tantum ut *iam nunc* de natura kategoriarum deque earum translatione in diuinae essentiae significationem satis dictum uideatur propter 10 caetera quae ad praesens negotium pertinent.

repetitio  
de decem  
kategoriiis  
N. Horum decem generum quattuor in statu sunt, id est OYCIA quantitas situs locus, sex [uero] in motu, qualitas relatio habitus tempus agere pati. *Nec* te latere hoc aestimo.

A. Immo mihi clare patet ac de his nil amplius quaesierim. Sed 15 quorsum istuc?

de motu et  
statu et  
uniuersitate  
quae intra se  
decem praed-  
dicamenta  
concludunt  
N. Vt scias plane decem genera praedicta aliis duobus superioribus 469B generalioribusque comprehendere, motu scilicet atque statu, quae iterum generalissimo colliguntur genere quod a Graecis TO ΠΑΝ, a nostris uero uniuersitas appellari consuevit. 20

A. Hoc ualde libet propter eos qui putant in natura rerum nullum genus generalius praecedere decem praedicta genera quae ab Aristotele et inuenta et nominata sunt posse reperiri.

N. Ratane itaque tibi uidetur haec diuisio kategoriarum in motu atque statu, id est quattuor in statu, sex in motu? 25

de habitu  
A. Rata quidem. Sed adhuc de duabus non satis mihi patet, de habitu dico et relatione. Hae nanque duae categoriae magis mihi uidentur esse in statu quam in motu. Quodcunque enim ad perfectum 469C peruenerit habitum immutabiliter manet. Nam si quodam modo moueatur iam non esse habitum manifestum est. Virtus [enim] in 30 anima tum uere habitus animi est cum ei immutabiliter adhaeret ut ab eo separari non possit. Ideoque corporum nulla uera habitudo inuenitur; nam armatus uel indutus potest armis seu indumentis carere. In relatione item status praeualere aestimatur. Relatio siquidem patris ad filium seu dupli ad simplum et e contrario immobilis 35 est; nam pater semper pater est [filii], similiter filius [semper filius est patris], et caetera.

30-32 ideoque-inuenitur: cf. p. 108, 35-38 *infra*

3 et RB: e P 4 *rasura post est in R* 7 non-tempus RB: neque locus igitur neque tempus P 8 *apparent R<sup>c</sup>BP: elucent R\** 9 translatione R<sup>c</sup>BP: trans\*atione R\* 12 *lemma BP (KATEGORIIS P): Repeticio de x categoriis* Supra hec x generalissima inuenies duo generaliora motum statum Rm 14 *nec R<sup>c</sup>BP: neque ex non R\** 17 *lemma BP: de motu et statu quae intra se x predicamenta continent supra hec duo unum generalissimum τὸ πᾶν .i. uniuersitas Rm* 19 TO ΠΑΝ B: TO Πᾶν R: ΤΟΠΑΝ P 23 reperiri B<sup>c</sup>P: repperiri RB\*

time and be defined in place; even place itself is defined and time itself moves. But God neither moves nor is defined. [For (He is) the Place of places by which all places are defined, and, since He is not fixed in place by anything but gives place to all things within Him, He is not place but More-than-place. For He is defined by nothing, but defines all things: therefore He is the Cause of all things. In the same way, the Cause of times moves the times, but itself is not moved by any time in any time: for it is More-than-time and More-than-motion.] Therefore He is neither place nor time.

A. Your words are so plain, clearer even than daylight, that enough *already* seems to have been said now on the nature of the categories and about their metaphorical use for denoting the Divine Essence, in view of the further demands of our present task.

N. Of these ten genera four are at rest, that is, *οὐσία*, quantity, situation, place; [while] six are in motion, quality, relation, condition, time, action, passion: *and* I do not think you are unaware of this. 22 A review of the ten categories

A. Yes, this is clear to me, and I have no more questions to ask about it. But what follows from this?

N. That you should plainly understand that the ten genera already mentioned are comprised within two higher and more general genera, namely motion and rest, which again are gathered into that most general genus which is usually called by the Greeks τὸ πᾶν, but by our writers Vniuersitas. Concerning motion and rest and the whole, which comprise within themselves the ten predicables

A. This I much welcome because of those who think that there cannot be found in the nature of things any more general genus to precede the ten already mentioned genera which were discovered and named by Aristotle.

N. Does then this division of the categories (into those) in motion and (those) at rest, that is, four at rest, six in motion, seem to you correct?

A. Yes, except that I am still not sufficiently clear about two: 27 *lemma BP: xxiii de habitu item et relatione semper esse in motu Rm* I mean, condition and relation. For these two categories seem to me 28 *uidentur R<sup>c</sup>BP: uidetur R\** quodcunque enim RB: quod enim cunque P to be rather at rest than in motion. For whatever has attained to its proper condition remains immutable: for if it were to move in any way it would clearly be no longer a condition. [For] virtue in the soul is only then truly a condition of the mind when it abides in it immutably so that it cannot be separated from it. And that is the reason why no true condition is found in bodies; for the armed or the clothed man can be deprived of his armour or his clothing. In relation also rest is thought to prevail. For the relation of father to son or of double to single, and vice versa, is unalterable. For a father is always the father [of his son] just as a son [is always the son of his father] and so forth. 31 *inanimatum P\** 31 *immutabiliter RB: immutabiliter P*

Concerning condition

de relatione

de loco et  
 quantitate et  
 situ

N. Fortassis non magnopere haesitasses si diligentius intuereris quia omne quod non simul connaturaliter perfecte inest creaturae sed per incrementa quaedam ad inseparabilem incommutabilemque perfectionem procedit in motu esse necesse est. Omnis autem habitus motu quodam ad perfectionem ascendit in eo cuius habitus est; de qua perfectione quis firmus fieri in hac uita praesumat? Habitus igitur in motu est. De relatione item miror cur dubitas cum uideas eam in uno eodemque esse non posse, in duobus nanque semper uidetur. Duorum autem ad se inuicem appetitus motu quodam fieri quis dubitarit? Est item alia ratio quae apertissime ea quae in motu ab his quae in statu sunt discernit (ut enim de ipsa generalissima ratione nunc plura non dicam quae omnia quae a deo post deum condita sunt in motu esse manifestat—omnia nanque ex non existentibus in existentia per generationem mouentur ex non esse in esse diuina bonitate omnia uocante ut sint de nihilo, et unumquodque eorum quae sunt ad essentiam suam genusque speciemque numerumque suum naturali appetitu mouetur): ea proprie dicimus in statu esse quae per se subsistunt nulliusque indigent [subiecti] ut sint, quae uero in aliquo existunt quia per se subsistere non possunt in motu esse non incongrue iudicamus. Habitus itaque atque relatio in aliquo subiecto sunt, in quo semper esse naturali motu appetunt quia sine eo esse non possunt. In motu igitur sunt.

A. Quid ergo dicemus de loco de quantitate de situ quae in his quae in statu sunt posuisti? Nam de OYCIA, id est essentia, nemo dubitat quod nullius indiget ad subsistendum; ab ipsa enim caetera fulciri creduntur. Haec uero, locum dico et quantitatem situmque, inter accidentia essentiae connumerantur, ac per hoc illud subiectum in quo sunt et sine quo esse non possunt appetendo mouentur, et si ita est omnia in motu sunt praeter OYCIAN quae sola motu caret (eo solo excepto quo omnia appetunt esse) quoniam sola per se subsistit.

N. Non usquequaque absurda est inquisitio tua quia opinionem communem sequeris. Sed si diligentius intuearis inuenies locum a nullo contineri, continere uero omnia quae in eo locantur. Si enim nil aliud locus sit nisi terminus atque diffinitio uniuscuiusque finitae naturae profecto locus non appetit ut in aliquo sit, sed omnia quae

13-14 omnia—mouentur: cf. p. 64, 3-4 supra 15-17 unumquodque—mouetur: cf. Greg. Nyss., *De hom. opif.* xvi, PG xlv. 184c; eund., *Catech.* vi, PG xlv. 28D 25-26 ab ipsa—creduntur: cf. Ps.-Aug., *De cat. dec.* li, p. 144, 20 Min.-Pal. 26-27 Haec—connumerantur: *op. cit.*, p. 144, 20-21

1 N. Fortassis non magnopere in ras. R 2 perfecte RB: perfectae P 2-3 sed per RB: semper P 5-7 de qua—relatio[ne in marg. R 7 lemma BP 10 inter quae et apertissime erasum est nobis in R 15 post uocante erasa sunt ad se in R 16 quae om. sed postea a C additum est in marg. B 16-17 numerumque BP: nu\*\*rumque R 23 lemma BPRm (xxiii praepanit Rm) 24 posuisti R<sup>c</sup>BP:

N. Perhaps you would not have hesitated much (over this) if you had been more careful to notice that everything which does not perfectly inhere in a creature so as to be of one nature with it but proceeds by certain increases to its perfection which cannot be separated from it and which cannot change must be in motion. But every condition is an ascending motion towards perfection in that of which it is the condition. But who would presume to be assured of perfection in this life? Therefore condition is in motion. Concerning relation (107) also your hesitation is surprising to me, since you see that it cannot exist in one and the same subject, for it always appears in two. But that the mutual attraction of two subjects is the effect of some sort of motion who would doubt? There is also another way in which things in motion are very clearly distinguished from things at rest—to say no more for the moment of that most general principle by which all things created by God after God are shown to be in motion, for all things move through the process of generation from the state of non-existence into the state of existence, for the divine Goodness summons all things out of not-being into being so that they are (created) out of nothing, and each one of the things that are is moved by a natural desire towards its own essence and genus and species and individuality—: we properly say that those things are at rest which subsist by themselves and have no need of any [subject] in order that they may be, while those things which exist in something because they cannot exist by themselves we not inappropriately judge to be in motion. Thus, condition and relation are in some subject, and strive by a natural motion to be in it always, because without it they cannot exist. Therefore they are in motion.

A. Then what shall we say of place, of quantity, of situation, which you have set among the things that are at rest? For concerning *οὐσία*, that is, essence, no one doubts but that it does not require anything in order to subsist: for it is upon it that all the rest are supported. But these, I mean place and quantity and situation, are counted among the accidents of essence, and therefore are moved by desire for the subject in which they are and without which they cannot be. And if this is the case, all are in motion save *οὐσία*, which alone is without movement—except for that by which all things strive towards being—since it alone subsists by itself.

N. Your question is not altogether ridiculous for you follow the common opinion. But if you look more closely you will find that place is not contained by anything but contains all things that are placed in it. For if place is nothing else but the limit and definition of every finite nature, then surely place does not strive to be in something,

positi R\* 28 mouentur R<sup>c</sup>BP: mouetur R\* 29 praeter R<sup>c</sup>BP: propter R\* 31 glossa locum a nullo contineri Rm 33 si RB: sed P

Concerning  
 relation

24  
 Concerning  
 place and  
 quantity and  
 situation

in eo sunt ipsum merito terminum finemque suum semper desiderant, in quo naturaliter continentur et sine quo in infinitum fluere uidentur. Locus itaque in motu non est cum omnia quae in eo sunt ad se moueantur; ipse uero stat. Eadem de quantitate atque situ ratio edocet. Quid enim unumquodque quantitatis seu positionis sensibilis intelligibilisue particeps nisi ut ad perfectam suam quantitatem positionemue perueniat appetit ut in ea quiescat? Non ergo appetunt sed appetuntur; in motu igitur non sunt; stant igitur.

A. Num itaque accidentia OYCIAE haec tria dicenda sunt, *quantitas situs locus*, an per se substantiae?

N. Et hoc dignum quaesitu uideo. Nam iuxta dialecticorum opinionem omne quod est aut subiectum aut de subiecto aut in subiecto est [aut in subiecto et de subiecto]. Vera tamen ratio consultat respondet subiectum et de subiecto unum esse et in nullo distare. Nam si, ut illi aiunt, Cicero subiectum est et prima substantia, homo uero de subiecto secundaque substantia, quae differentia est iuxta naturam nisi quia unum in numero alterum in specie, cum nil aliud sit species nisi numerorum unitas et nil aliud numerus nisi speciei pluralitas? Si ergo species tota et una est indiuiduaque in numeris et numeri unum indiuiduum sunt in specie, quae quantum ad naturam distantia est inter subiectum et de subiecto non uideo. [Similiter de accidentibus primae substantiae intelligendum. Non aliud est enim quod in subiecto dicitur et aliud quod in subiecto simul et de subiecto. Nam disciplina, ut exemplo utar, una eademque est in se ipsa et in suis speciebus numerisque. Non aliud igitur uniuscuiusque propria disciplina, quae a dialecticis in subiecto dicitur solummodo, et aliud generalis disciplina, quae ab eisdem in subiecto et de subiecto uocatur ueluti in subiecto, prima scilicet substantia, subsistens, de subiecto, id est propria alicuius disciplina, praedicetur; sed una eademque est in toto et in partibus. Ac per hoc relinquatur subiectum et in subiecto.] Si autem acutius uestigia sancti Gregorii theologi expositorisque sui Maximi [sapientissimi] sequens inspexeris inuenies OYCIAM omnino in omnibus quae sunt per se ipsam incomprehensibilem non solum sensui sed etiam intellectui esse, atque ideo ex his ueluti circumstantiis suis intelligitur existere, loco dico quantitate situ, additur

11-12 iuxta-opinionem: cf. Boeth., *Comm. in Arist. περὶ ἐρμηνείας* i. 3, p. 57, 28-58, 5; ii. 3, p. 68, 9-10 (Meiser) 15 sq. cf. Arist., *Categ.* v. 2a, 11-19; Eriug., *Annot. in Marc.* iv (2), 95, 27 Lutz 26 in subiecto: cf. Eriug., *Annot. in Marc.* 95, 25 Lutz 27 in subiecto et de subiecto: cf. *op. cit.*, p. 95, 18 31 sq.: cf. Max. Conf., *I Ambig.* xiii, PG xci. 1225D; p. 38, 27-30 *supra*

2 quo RB: qua P 11 lemma BPRm (xxv praeposit Rm) 13 et RB: aut P  
 21 lemma BP 22 enim s.l. R 24 post ipsa est erasum est in RB  
 26 post et rasura in R 35 additur RB<sup>c</sup>P: aditur B\*

but all things which are in it are rightly always seeking it as their limit and their end, in which it is of their nature to be contained and without which it is understood that they would melt away into infinity. Therefore place is not in motion (108), since all that is in place moves towards it; but it itself is at rest. Concerning quantity and situation reason teaches the same. For what does everything which partakes of quantity or position, whether sensible or intelligible, strive for if not that it may attain to its own perfect quantity and position, that there it may find its rest? Therefore they do not seek but are sought after; therefore they are not in motion; therefore they are at rest.

A. Are we then to say that these three, quantity, situation, place, are accidents of *οὐσία*, or that they are substances in their own right?

N. I see that this too is worthy of inquiry. For according to the opinion of the dialecticians everything that is is either a subject, or what is predicated of a subject, or what is in a subject, [or what is predicated of and is in a subject (109)]. But if right reason is consulted it replies that 'subject' and 'what is predicated of a subject' are one, and differ in no respect. For if, as they say, 'Cicero' is a subject and first substance, while 'man' is predicated of the subject and second substance, what difference in regard of nature is there except that the one is in the individual while the other is in the species, since species is nothing else but the unity of the individuals and number (110) nothing else but the plurality of the species? If then the species is total and one and indivisible in the individuals and the individuals are an indivisible unity in the species, what difference there is in respect of nature between 'subject' and 'what is predicated of a subject' I do not see. [The same must be understood concerning the accidents of the first substance: for what is in the subject is not other than what is at the same time in and predicated of the subject. Thus, art, to take an example, is one and the same thing in itself and in its species and in its individuals. Therefore the art of each particular thing, which is called by the dialecticians simply 'that which is in the subject', is not other than art in general, which is called by the same persons 'that which is in the subject and predicated of the subject', since, while it subsists in the subject, that is, in the first substance, it is predicated of the subject, that is, of the art that is proper of something, but in its whole and in its parts it is one and the same thing (111). And so there are left 'subject' and 'what is in a subject'.] But if you look more carefully, taking St. Gregory the Theologian and his [most wise] commentator Maximus as your guides, you will find that in all things that are, *οὐσία* is in itself wholly incomprehensible not only to the sense but also to the intellect, and therefore that it is known to exist (only) from these circumstances, as we may call them, by which I mean place, quantity, situation, to

25 How the subject and what is predicated of the subject constitute the same thing

How what is in the subject and what is at the same time in and predicated of the subject constitute the same thing



etiam his tempus. Intra haec siquidem ueluti intra quosdam fines circunpositos essentia cognoscitur circuncludi ita ut neque accidentia ei quassi in ea subsistentia uideantur esse, quia extrinsecus sunt, neque sine ea existere posse, quia centrum eorum est circa quod uoluuntur tempora, loca uero et quantitates et situs undique collocantur. Kategoriarum igitur quaedam circa OYCIAM praedicantur quomodo quaedam accidentia extra ysiam et quaedam in ipsa et extra eam per alia accidentia apparent quae ueluti ΠΕΡΙΟΧΑΙ, id est circunstantes, dicuntur quia circa eam inspiciuntur esse. Quaedam uero in ipsa sunt quae a Graecis CYMBAMATA, id est accidentia, uocantur: qualitas relatio habitus agere et pati. Quae etiam extra eam [in aliis kategoriis] intelliguntur, uerbi gratia: qualitas in quantitate ut color in corpore; item qualitas in OYCIA ut in generibus inuisibilitas incomprehensibilitasque; item relatio extra OYCIAM: pater ad filium filius ad patrem. Non enim sunt ex natura sed accidenti corporum corruptibili generatione. [Siquidem pater non naturae filii pater est neque filius naturae patris filius est; unius enim eiusdemque naturae sunt pater et filius. Nulla autem natura se ipsam gignit aut a se ipsa gignitur.] In ipsa uero OYCIA relatio est cum genus ad speciem refertur et species ad genus. Genus enim speciei est genus et species generis est species. Habitus quoque et extra OYCIAM et intra reperitur, ut armatum indutum secundum corpus dicimus. Habitus uero OYCIAE generis aut speciei uirtus ipsa immobilis per quam genus dum per species diuiditur in se ipso semper unum indiuiduumque permanet et totum in speciebus singulis et singulae species in ipso unum sunt. Eadem uirtus et in specie percipitur quae dum per numeros diuidatur suae indiuiduae unitatis inexhaustam uim custodit, omnesque numeri in quos diuidi uidetur in infinitum in ipsa finiti unumque indiuiduum sunt. De agendo autem et patiando nemo dubitat cum uideamus corpora [cum ad quantitatem pertineant] et agere et pati. Genera quoque et species ipsius OYCIAE cum se in diuersas species numerosque multiplicat agere uidentur. Si quis uero rationis uirtute iuxta illam disciplinam quae ΑΝΑΛΙΤΙΚΗ uocatur et numeros in species et species in genera genera in OYCIAM colligendo adunauerit pati dicuntur. [Non quod ipse colligat—natura enim collecta sunt, sicut etiam diuisa—sed quia colligere actu rationis ea uidetur. Nam et cum eadem diuidit similiter agere dicitur, ea uero pati.]

A. Haec quamuis uideantur esse obscura non tamen sic animum

13-14 Non enim—generatione: cf. Eriug., *Annot. in Marc.* 98, 14-16 Lutz

1 post intra rasura P 3 quassi R<sup>c</sup>BP: quasi R\* 6 lemma BPRm  
 (OYCIAM P: oysian Rm post ipsa om. et P) 7 quia RB<sup>c</sup>P: qua B\*  
 9 CYMBAMATA RB: CIMBAMATA P 10 et s.l. B 19 speciei R<sup>c</sup>BP:  
 species R\* 20 reperitur B<sup>c</sup>P: repperitur RB\* 22 speciei R<sup>c</sup>BP: speci\*i R\*  
 26 inexhaustam RP: inexhaus\*tam B 27 diuidi uidetur R<sup>c</sup>B<sup>c</sup>P: diuidetur R\*:  
 diuidi diuidetur B\* 29 cum R: dum BP 30-31 in diuersas—multi-

which is also added time. For within these, as within certain boundaries which have been placed about it, essence is known to be enclosed, so that they seem neither to be accidents to it as though subsisting in it—for they are outside it—nor to be able to exist without it, since it is the centre of the revolutions of time and dispositions of place, quantities, and situation. Therefore some of the Categories are predicated around οὐσία, which are said to be a kind of περιοχαί, that is, 'circumstances', because they are seen to be about it, while some, which are called by the Greeks συμβάματα, that is, 'accidents', are within it: quality, relation, condition, action and passion. And these are understood also outside it [in other categories], for example: quality in quantity, as colour in a body; also, quality in οὐσία, as invisibility and incomprehensibility in genera; also, relation outside οὐσία: father to son, son to father; for these are not of nature but of the transitory process of generation which is an accident of their bodies (112). [For the father is father not of the nature of the son nor is the son son of the father's nature: for father and son are of one and the same nature. But no nature begets itself or is begotten of itself.] There is, however, relation even within οὐσία when genus is related to species and species to genus. For genus is the genus of species and species is the species of genus. Condition also is found both outside οὐσία and within, as, with regard to the body, we say that (a person) is armed or clothed. But the condition of οὐσία is the unchangeable virtue of genus and species by which the genus even when it is divided into species still remains one and indivisible in itself and subsists as a whole in each species, and all its separate species form a single whole in it. The same virtue is also seen in the species, which, even when it is divided among individuals, preserves undiminished the force of its own indivisible unity, and all the individuals into which it appears to be infinitely divided are in it finite and an indivisible unity. But concerning action and passion no one is in doubt, for we see that bodies [although they belong to quantity] both act and suffer. Also the genera and species of οὐσία itself when they multiply into diverse species and individuals are seen to act. But if a man should by exercising his reason in accordance with that art which is called ἀναλυτική unite, by gathering them together, the individuals into their species and the species into their genera and the genera into οὐσία, they are said to suffer [not that he himself gathers them, for they are gathered, as also divided, by nature; but because he seems to gather them by an act of his reason: for when he divides them he is also said to act, while they are said to suffer.]

A. Although these things appear to be obscure they do not so

plicant in marg. sR 31 uidentur R<sup>c</sup>BP: uidetur R\* 32 quae RB: quam P 34 ipse R<sup>c</sup>BP: ipsa R\*

How some accidents are outside οὐσία and some are within it and appear outside it by other accidents

meum effugiunt ut nil in eis purum atque discretum ei reluceat, et quoniam uideo fere omnes categorias inter se inuicem concatenatas ut uix a se inuicem certa ratione discerni possint (omnes enim omnibus, ut uideo, insertae sunt), in qua proprietate singula quaeque inueniri ualeant aperias flagito. 472c

N. Quid tibi uidetur? Num OYCIA in generibus generalissimis et in generibus generalioribus in ipsis quoque generibus eorumque speciebus atque iterum specialissimis speciebus quae atoma, id est indiuidua, dicuntur uniuersaliter [proprieque] continetur? 5

de proprietate uniuscuiusque categoriae  
 A. Nil aliud esse uideo in quo naturaliter inesse OYCIA possit nisi in generibus et speciebus a summo usque deorsum descendentibus, hoc est a generalissimis usque ad specialissima, id est indiuidua, seu reciprocatim sursumuersus ab indiuiduis ad generalissima; in his enim ueluti naturalibus partibus uniuersalis subsistit. 10

N. Ingredere ergo ad caetera. Num alibi uidetur tibi esse quantitatis proprietas nisi in numero partium spatiisque atque mensuris, siue illae partes continuae sint ut sunt linearum temporum caeterorumque quae continua quantitate continentur siue segregatae sint certis naturalibus finibus discretas ut sunt numeri atque omnis multitudo [in] quibus discreta quantitas constare manifestum est? 472D 16 20

A. Et hoc luculenter apparet.

[N.] Num et ea quae uocatur qualitas propriam sedem obtinet nisi in figuris et superficiebus, siue in naturalibus corporibus seu in geometricis ut sunt planae triangulae quadratae multigonae rotundae, solida etiam in superficie ut sunt cybica conica spherica? Nam solida corpora siue naturalia siue geometrica quantum interius considerantur propter spatia in quibus sunt, longitudinem dico latitudinem et altitudinem, ad quantitatem applicantur, dum uero superficies eorum perspicitur qualitati iunguntur. Item in rebus incorporalibus nonne maximum obtinet locum cum omnes disciplinae omnesque uirtutes siue rationabiles sint seu irrationabiles, nondum tamen ad immutabilem mentis statum peruenientes, ad eam referantur? 473A 25 30

A. Ingredere ad ea quae restant. Haec enim plane uideo et sic se habere assero. 473B

N. Num et ea quae a Graecis dicitur ΠΡΟΣ ΤΙ, a nobis uero ad aliquid uel relatio, alium locum proprie in natura rerum possidet nisi 35

6 sq.: cf. Eriug., *Annot. in Marc.* 84, 10-17 Lutz

1 purum R<sup>c</sup>BP: parum R\* reluceat R<sup>c</sup>BP: reliceat R\* 2 fere omnes RB: omnes fere P 4 singula quaeque RB: singulae quae P 6 lemma De OYCIA Rm 10 lemma BPRm (KATEGORIAE P: categorie Rm) esse uideo RB: uideo esse P 15 lemma Quantitas Rm quantitatis RBP<sup>c</sup>: quantitas P\* 17-18 temporum-continua R<sup>c</sup>BP: temporumque continua R\* 22 lemma Qualitas Rm 22 obtinet BP: optinet R nisi s.l. R 24 geometricis RP: giometricis B planae R<sup>c</sup>(C)BP: plana R\* post planae *erasum est* spera in R triangulae quadratae multigonae rotundae R<sup>c</sup>(C)BP: triangula quadrata

completely elude my mind that nothing in them is revealed clearly and distinctly; and since I see that almost all the Categories are so interrelated that they can scarcely be distinguished from one another in a definite way—for they all, as it seems to me, appear to be involved in one another—I urge you to show in what property each can be found.

N. How does it seem to you? Is *οὐσία* wholly [and properly] contained within the most general genera and in the more general genera as well as in the genera themselves and in their species and again in those most special species which are called atoms, that is, individuals?

A. I see that there is nothing else in which *οὐσία* can be naturally present except in the genera and species which extend from the highest down to the lowest, that is, from the most general to the most special, that is, the individuals, and up again from the individuals to the most general genera. For in these, as it were in its natural parts, it subsists as a whole.

N. Go on to the remainder then. Does the property of quantity seem to you to exist anywhere but in the number of the parts, or in their spaces, or in their measures, whether those parts be continuous as are the parts of lines or of times and of other things which are held together by continuous quantity, or are discontinuous, being marked off by definite natural limits as are numbers and every multitude, [in] which it is clear that there is discontinuous quantity?

A. This too is clearly apparent.

[N.] And does that which is called quality properly reside anywhere but in shapes and surfaces, either in natural bodies or in geometrical bodies such as plane figures like triangles, rectangles, polygons, and circles; and also in (those of) solid structure (113), such as cubes, cones, and spheres? For solid bodies, whether natural or geometrical, when they are inwardly investigated for the spaces which they occupy, I mean length, breadth, and depth, are allotted to quantity, but when their surface is considered, they belong to quality. Is it not also prominent in incorporeal things, seeing that all arts and virtues, whether they be rational or irrational, as long as they have not yet attained to the immutable stability of the mind, are referred to it?

A. Go on to the remainder. For this I clearly see, and agree that it is so.

N. And does that which is called by the Greeks *πρός τι*, but by us 'with regard to something' or relation, properly occupy any other

multigona rotunda R\* 25 spherica RB<sup>c</sup>: spherica B\*P 28 et om. B\* 29 in rebus s.l. R 30 obtinet BP: optinet R 31 irrationabiles RB: irrationabiles P 32 immutabilem RBP<sup>c</sup>: mutabilem P\* 35 lemma ad aliquid Rm 36 proprie RB<sup>c</sup>P: propriae B\*

Concerning the property of each category

in proportionibus rerum seu numerorum inque reciprocis eorum  
 quae ad se inuicem respiciunt conuersionibus inseparabilibus ita ut  
 quod unum dicitur non a se ipso sed ab altero quod ei opponitur  
 accipere intelligatur? Cuius inconcussae amicitiae inseparabilisque  
 copulae exempla sunt multiplices numeri inter se inuicem copulati, 5  
 dupli tripli quadrupli caeterique id genus in infinitum, item par-  
 ticulares, ut sunt sesquialteri sesquitercii sesquiquarti caeterique huius  
 modi, in quibus omnibus non solum integri numeri ad se inuicem  
 comparati proportionibus diuersis pollent sed etiam singulorum 473C  
 numerorum partes sibi inuicem coniunctae proportionum rationibus 10  
 inseparabiliter copulantur; et non solum hoc in ipsis terminis  
 numerorum uerum etiam in proportionibus proportionum quas  
 arithmetici proportionalitates appellant reperies.

A. Illud quoque non ignoro. Haec enim artium peritis notissima  
 sunt. 15

N. Quid de situ dicendum est? Nonne in ordinibus rerum natura-  
 libus seu artificialibus corporalium seu spiritualium positionibus  
 proprium locum obtinet? Cum enim dico 'primum' 'secundum'  
 'tertium' ac 'deinde' siue in totis siue in partibus siue in generibus  
 siue in speciebus, nonne situm quendam singulorum considero? Item 20  
 si 'dextrorsum' 'sinistrorsum' 'sursum' 'deorsum' 'ante' 'retro' 473D  
 dixero, quid aliud praeter positionem quandam siue generaliter  
 totius mundi seu partium eius demonstro? Nam qui dicit de aliquo  
 corpore 'iacet' seu 'sedet' seu 'stat' nil aliud insinuat nisi aut deorsum  
 accumbit aut sursumuersus erigitur aut ueluti quodam libramine 25  
 inter sursum atque deorsum pendet. Item si quis de animo talia 474A  
 dixerit nil aliud uidebitur intelligere nisi quod aut adhuc in passio-  
 nibus delictorum iaceat aut quodam modo eas deserere conetur aut  
 perfecte in uirtutes erigatur.

A. Et hoc ad intelligendum non adeo difficile uidetur. Sequere 30  
 quae restant.

N. Habitus restat, ut aestimo, qui apertissime in uirtutum seu  
 uitiorum certis possessionibus inspicitur. Omnis enim disciplina,  
 hoc est omnis rationabilis animi motus aut irrationabilis, dum ad  
 certum statum peruenerit ita ut nullo modo ab eo ulla occasione 35  
 moueri possit sed semper animo adhaeret ut unum idipsumque ei  
 esse uideatur habitus dicitur, ac per hoc omnis perfecta uirtus animo  
 inseparabiliter adhaerens uere ac proprie habitus appellatur. Proinde

13 arithmetici-appellant: cf. Boeth., *De arithm.* ii. 40      21 dextrorsum-  
 retro: cf. p. 86, 34-36 *supra*

3 opponitur R<sup>c</sup>BP: apponitur R\*    4 accipere *codd.*: lege accipi    7 caeterique  
 RB: caeterique P    9 diuersis RBP<sup>c</sup>: didiuersis P\*    13 arithmetici R<sup>c</sup>BP:  
 aritmetici R\*    reperies B<sup>c</sup>P: repperies RB\*    14 peritis: -tis *s.l.* R    no-

place in nature than in the proportions of things or numbers, and in  
 the indissoluble ties which exist between those things which stand in  
 regard to one another so that when the one is spoken of the meaning is  
 understood not from itself but from the other which is opposed to it?  
 Of this indestructible affinity and inseparable bond examples are  
 provided by the multiple numbers, which are linked to one another,  
 the double, the triple, the quadruple, and others of the sort up to  
 infinity; and also by fractions such as  $\frac{3}{2}$ ,  $\frac{4}{3}$ ,  $\frac{5}{4}$  (114) and others of this  
 kind, in all of which not only the integers exhibit various proportions  
 when compared with one another, but also the parts of individual  
 numbers, brought into conjunction with one another, are inseparably  
 linked by the ratios of their proportions; and this you will find not  
 only in the terms of numbers themselves but also in the proportions  
 of proportions which the arithmeticians call proportionalities.

A. I am not ignorant of this either: for these things are well known  
 to those who are skilled in the arts.

N. What is to be said of situation? Does it not have its proper place  
 in the natural or artificial distributions of corporeal things or in the  
 dispositions of spiritual things? For when I say 'first', 'second',  
 'third', and 'next', whether in the case of wholes, or parts, or genera,  
 or species, is it not the situation of each that I have in mind? Again,  
 if I say 'to the right', 'to the left', 'upwards', 'downwards', 'for-  
 wards', 'backwards', what else do I indicate but a position either of  
 the whole world in general or of its parts? For he who says of a body,  
 'it lies' or 'it sits' or 'it stands' means nothing else than that it is lying  
 down or is standing up or is suspended in a kind of balance between  
 up and down. Also, if someone says such things of the mind he will  
 seem to mean nothing else than that it is still lying prone under the  
 passions of sins, or is making some effort to get free from them, or  
 has perfectly risen to the virtues.

A. This does not seem so difficult to understand either. Go on  
 to the rest.

N. Next, I think, comes condition, which is most clearly seen in  
 the certain possession of virtues or of vices. For every art, that is,  
 every motion of the rational or irrational mind, once it has attained  
 to a fixed state so that it cannot in any way on any occasion be moved  
 from it but always adheres to the mind so that it seems to be one with  
 the mind itself is called a condition, and therefore every perfected  
 virtue which is inseparably fixed in the mind is truly and properly  
 called a condition. In the same way, in bodies in which nothing

tissima RB: no\*\*\*tissima P    15 sunt R<sup>c</sup>BP: esse inuenimus R\*    16 lemma  
 De situ Rm    17 spiritualium RB<sup>c</sup>P: spiritalium B\*    19 siue (3) *s.l.* B  
 22 quendam RBP<sup>c</sup>: quendam P\*    30 difficile RBP<sup>c</sup>: difficile P\*    32 lem-  
 ma de habitu Rm

in corporibus, in quibus nil stabile uidetur esse, aut uix aut nunquam proprie habitus inuenitur. Quod enim semper non habetur quamuis ad tempus haberi uideatur abusiue habitus nominabitur. 474B

A. Tende ad caetera. Hoc enim uerisimile esse nullus deneget. 5

similiter de loco N. Locus sequitur qui, ut paulo ante diximus, in diffinitionibus rerum quae diffiniri possunt constituitur. Nil enim aliud est locus nisi ambitus quo unumquodque certis terminis concluditur. Locorum autem multae species sunt. Tot enim loca sunt quot res quae circumscribi possunt siue corporales siue incorporeales sint. Verbi gratia: diffinitio corporis corpus est compositio quaedam quattuor elementorum <qualitatibus> sub una quadam specie conglobata. Hac enim diffinitione generali quadam descriptione omnia corpora quae materie ac forma consistunt concluduntur. Item spiritus est natura incorporea forma per se atque materie carens. Omnis enim spiritus siue rationalis siue intellectualis sit per se ipsum informis est, si uero conuersus fuerit ad causam suam, hoc est ad uerbum per quod facta sunt omnia, tunc formatur. Est igitur una forma omnium spirituum rationalium et intellectualium dei uerbum. Si uero irrationabilis spiritus sit, similiter informis per se ipsum, formatur tamen rerum sensibilibus phantasiis. Est igitur forma omnium spirituum irrationabilium phantasia corporalium rerum in memoria eorum per corporales sensus infixata. Item in disciplinis liberalibus plurima loca reperiuntur. Nulla enim ars est quae locis careat, ut sunt loci dialectici a genere a specie a nomine ab antecedentibus a consequentibus a contrariis caeterisque huius modi, de quibus nunc disserere longum est. Nam tam late patent dialectici loci ut undecunque dialecticus animus in natura rerum argumentum quod rei dubiae facit fidem reppererit locum *argumenti esse* describat [seu argumenti sedem]. Similiter in aliis artibus reperies [quae suis locis, id est propriis diffinitionibus, ambiuntur; quarum exempla sunt haec: 474C 25 475A 30

diffinitiones disciplinarum Gramatica est articulatae uocis custos et moderatrix disciplina.

Rethorica est finitam causam persona materia occasione qualitate loco tempore facultate *discutiens* copiose atque ornate disciplina, 35

1-2 in quibus-inuenitur: cf. p. 106, 29-32 supra 6 ut-diximus: p. 100, 33-35 32 sq. cf. Martianus Capella *passim*; Cassiodorus, *Inst.* ii; Hrabanus Maurus, *De uniuerso*, xv. 1, PL cxi. 413D; Alcuin, *De rhetorica et uirtutibus*, MS. Munich Clm 6407; eund., *De dialectica*, PL ci. 947-50; Aldhelm, *Opera*, ed. Ehwald, pp. 277, 3 sq.; 320, 11 sq.

3 haberi RB<sup>c</sup>P: habere B\* 4 uerisimile RP<sup>c</sup>: uerisimile BP\* 6 lemma BPRm (similiter: Item Rm) 7 rerum quae RB: rerumque P 8 concluditur RB: includitur P 9 quot R<sup>c</sup>BP: quo R\* 11 lemma BPRm (xxviii praeposit Rm) 12 hac RB: haec P 13-14 consistunt-forma in marg. sR 14 lemma BPRm

stable is to be seen, condition, strictly speaking, is hardly, if ever, to be found: for to call that a condition which is not possessed all the time though it appears to be possessed for some of the time will be a misuse of the term.

A. Go on to the rest: for no one denies that this is likely to be so.

N. Next comes place, which, as we just said, is constituted in the definitions of things that can be defined. For place is nothing else but the boundary by which each is enclosed within fixed terms. But of places there are many kinds: for there are as many places as there are things which can be bounded, whether these be corporeal or incorporeal. For instance: body is a compound welded together <of the qualities> of the four elements under a single species: for by this definition all bodies which consist of matter and form are included in one general description. Also: spirit is an incorporeal nature without form or matter in itself: for every spirit that is either rational or intellectual is by itself formless, but if it turns towards its Cause, that is, to the Word, by Whom all things are made, then it takes on form. Therefore the one Form of all rational and intellectual spirits is the Word of God. But if the spirit is irrational it is equally formless in itself, but it takes form from the fantasies of sensible things. Therefore the form of all irrational spirits is the fantasy of corporeal things implanted in their memory by means of the corporeal senses. Among the liberal arts also very many definitions (115) are found: for there is no art without its definitions, as there are the dialectical definitions from genus (116), from species (117), from name (118), a priori, a posteriori (119), from contraries, and other definitions of this kind, which there is no time to discuss now. For the dialectical definitions extend over so wide a field that from wherever in the nature of things the dialectical mind finds an argument which establishes a doubtful matter it describes the *esse of the argument* [or the seat of the argument] as a place. You will find the same thing in the other arts [which are bounded by their places, that is, by their proper definitions, of which the following are examples:

Grammar is the art which protects and controls articulate speech.

Rhetoric is the art which carries out a full and elaborate examination of a set topic under the headings of person, matter, occasion, quality, place, time, and opportunity, and can be briefly defined:

14 per se om., sed postea add. C in B 19 spiritus in marg. sP 23 reperiuntur B<sup>c</sup>P: repperiuntur RB\* 24 post locis rasura in R 28 reppererit RB: reperit P\*: reppererit P<sup>c</sup> 29 argumenti in ras. R esse s.l. R 30 reperies B<sup>c</sup>P: repperies RB\* 32 lemma BP: xxviii de vii disciplinis (sic) Rm I in marg. P Gramatica B: Grammatica RP 34 II in marg. P Rethorica B: Retorica RP\*: Rhetorica P<sup>c</sup> est s.l. R 35 *discutiens* B<sup>c</sup>P: disserens RB\*

27 Similarly concerning place

The definition of body

The definition of spirit

Definitions of the arts (120)

breuiterque diffiniri potest: Rethorica est finitae causae septem  
periochis sagax et copiosa disciplina.

Dialectica est communium animi conceptionum rationabilium  
deligens inuestigatrixque disciplina.

Arithmetica est numerorum contemplationibus animi succum- 5  
bentium rata intemerataque disciplina.

Geometrica est planarum figurarum solidarumque spatia super- 475B  
ficiesque sagaci mentis intuitu considerans disciplina.

Musica est omnium quae sunt in motu scibili naturalibus pro- 10  
portionibus armoniam rationis lumine dinoscens disciplina.

Astrologia est caelestium corporum spatia motusque reditusque  
certis temporibus inuestigans disciplina.

Hi sunt generales loci artium liberalium, his terminis continentur;  
intra quos alii innumerabiles sunt.

A. His rationibus cogor fateri non esse locum nisi in animo. Si 15  
enim diffinitio omnis in disciplina est et omnis disciplina in animo,  
necessario locus omnis, quia diffinitio est, non alibi nisi in animo erit.

N. Recte intueris.]

A. Quid igitur dicendum est de his qui dicunt habitationes 475C  
hominum caeterorumque animalium locos esse, similiter istum com- 21  
munem aera terram quoque omnium habitantium in eis locos aesti-  
mant, aquam locum piscium dicunt, planetarum aethera, speram  
caelestem astrorum locum esse putant?

N. Nil aliud nisi ut aut suadeatur eis si disciplinabiles sint [et 25  
doceri uoluerint] aut paenitus dimittantur si contentiosi. Eos enim  
qui talia dicunt uera deridet ratio. Nam si aliud est corpus et aliud  
est locus sequitur ut locus non sit corpus. Aer autem istius corporalis  
atque uisibilis mundi quarta pars est; locus igitur non est. Constat  
etenim hunc mundum uisibilem quattuor elementis ueluti quattuor 30  
generalibus quibusdam partibus compositum esse, et est quasi 475D  
quoddam corpus suis partibus compactum ex quibus, uidelicet  
partibus catholicis, omnium animalium arborum herbarum propria 476A  
specialissimaque corpora mirabili ineffabilique mixtura coeuntia  
componuntur inque eas iterum resolutionis tempore redeunt. Vt  
enim totus iste mundus sensibus apparens assiduo motu circa suum 35

22-23 aquam-locum: cf. p. 122, 3-4 *infra*

1 breuiterque: que s.l. R Rethorica B: Retorica R: Rhetorica P septem  
RB: septe P 2 glossa (ad periochis pertinens) septem ΠΕΡΙΟΧΑΙ, id est circum-  
stantiae, sunt quis quid cur quomodo quando ubi quibus facultatibus sB, P 3 III  
in marg. P animi RB<sup>c</sup>P: animum B\* 4 deligens B<sup>c</sup>: diligens RB\*P 5 IIII  
in marg. P 6 intemerataque R<sup>c</sup>BP: intemerat\*que R\* post disciplina rasura  
in R 7 V in marg. P 9 VI in marg. P in motu scibili B<sup>c</sup>P: siue in  
motu siue in statu in RB\* naturalibus RB: naturalibusque P 11 VII in  
marg. P 17 diffinitio BP: diffitio R 19 qui RB: quae P 21 terram  
s.l. R rasura post quoque in R rasura post locos in R 22 speram R\*BP:

rhetoric is the art which deals acutely and fully with a topic defined  
by its seven circumstances (121).

Dialectic is the art which diligently investigates the rational  
common concepts of the mind.

Arithmetic is the reasoned and pure (122) art of the numbers which  
come under the contemplations of the mind.

Geometry is the art which considers by the mind's acute observa-  
tion the intervals and surfaces (123) of plane and solid figures.

Music is the art which by the light of reason studies the harmony  
of all things that are in motion that is knowable by natural pro-  
portions.

Astronomy is the art which investigates the dimensions of the  
heavenly bodies and their motions and their returnings at fixed  
times (124).

These are the general definitions of the liberal arts, these the terms  
within which they are contained. But inside these definitions there  
are innumerable others.

A. By these arguments I am forced to confess that place exists in 28  
the mind alone. For if every definition is in art and every art is in  
mind, every place, since place is definition, will necessarily be nowhere  
else but in the mind.

N. You observe correctly.] 29

A. Then what must be said of those who declare that the habita-  
tions of men and the other animals are places; who similarly consider  
that this common air, and also the earth, are the places of all who  
dwell in them; who say that water is the place of the fishes; who think  
the aether is the place of the planets, the sphere of heaven that of  
the stars?

N. Nothing but to persuade them (of their error) if they are  
teachable [and wish to be taught]: or if they are stubborn, to dis-  
regard them entirely. For right reason laughs at people who say such  
things. For if body is a different thing from place it follows that place  
is not a body. But the air is the fourth part of this corporeal and  
visible world: therefore it is not a place. For it is agreed that this  
visible world is composed of the four elements as of four general  
parts, and is, as it were, a body built up of its parts, from which,  
namely from these universal parts, coming together (125) in a wonder-  
ful and ineffable mingling, the proper and individual bodies of all  
animals, trees, and plants are composed, and at the time of their  
dissolution return to them once more. For as this sensible world as 30  
a whole rotates with unceasing motion about its pivot, I mean earth,

Questions  
about place

spheram R<sup>c</sup> 24 suadeatur R<sup>c</sup>BP: suadent R\* 25 lemma BP (QUESTIO P)  
paenitus BP: penitus R dimittantur B<sup>c</sup>P: demittantur RB\* 30 esse  
RB: est P 33 coeuntiacodd.: lege coeuntibus

cardinem uoluitur, circa terram dico circa quam ueluti quoddam  
 centrum caetera tria elementa, aqua uidelicet aer ignis, incessabili  
 rotatu uoluuntur, ita inuisibili motu sine ulla intermissione uniuersalia  
 corpora, quattuor elementa dico, in se inuicem coeuntia singularum  
 rerum propria corpora conficiunt, quae resoluta iterum ex pro- 5  
 prietatibus in uniuersalitates recurrunt, manente semper immutabi-  
 liter quasi quodam centro singularum rerum propria naturalique  
 essentia quae nec moueri nec augeri nec minui potest. Accidentia  
 enim in motu sunt, non essentia; nec etiam ipsa accidentia in motu 476B  
 sunt seu in incrementis [detrimentisue] sed participatio eorum ab 10  
 essentia tales patitur mutabilitates. Aliter enim uera ratio non sinit  
 esse; omnis *siquidem* natura seu essentiarum seu eis accidentium  
 immutabilis est, participatio uero, ut diximus, essentiarum ab acci-  
 dentibus seu accidentium ab essentiis semper in motu est. Participatio 15  
*siquidem* et inchoari et augeri minuique potest donec mundus iste  
 ad finem suae stabilitatis in omnibus perueniat, post quem nec  
 essentia nec accidens nec eorum inter se inuicem participatio ullum  
 motum patietur. Omnia enim unum et idipsum immobile erunt  
 quando in suas immutabiles rationes omnia reuersura sunt, [de quo  
 reditu alibi disserendum arbitror]. Qua autem ratione solummodo 476C  
 mundi centrum, id est terra, semper stat, caetera uero elementa circa 21  
 eam aeterno motu uoluuntur non parua indiget consideratione. Nam  
 et saecularium philosophorum et catholicorum patrum de hac  
 quaestione sententias cognouimus. Plato *siquidem* philosophantium  
 de mundo maximus in *Timeo* suo multis rationibus asserit hunc 25  
 mundum uisibilem quasi magnum quoddam animal corpore anima-  
 que componi, cuius animalis corpus quidem est quattuor elementis  
 notissimis generalibusque diuersisque corporibus ex eisdem com-  
 positis compactum, anima uero ipsius est generalis uita quae omnia  
 quae in motu atque in statu sunt uegetat atque mouet. [Hinc Poeta: 30

Principio caelum ac terram camposque liquentes  
 lucentemque globum lunae titaniaque astra 476D  
 spiritus intus alit.]

Sed quia ipsa anima, ut ait ipse, aeternaliter mouetur ad corpus suum, 477A  
 id est totum mundum, uiuificandum regendum diuersisque rationibus 35  
 uariorum corporum singulorum coniunctionibus resolutionibusque

16-18 nec essentia-patietur: cf. p. 120, 27-29 24-25 philosophantium-  
 maximus: cf. 728A 25 in *Timeo*: cf. Plato, *Tim.* 30B, 37D, 39E 31-33 Princi-  
 pio-alit: Virg., *Aen.* vi. 724-6

2 caetera BRP<sup>c</sup>: caera P\* 7 post propria deletum est corpora in P 9 motu  
 RB: matu P 12 siquidem R<sup>c</sup>BP: enim R\* 15 inchoari RBP<sup>c</sup>: inchori P\*

about which, as about a kind of centre, the other three elements,  
 namely, water, air, fire, spin in unceasing rotation; so by an invisible  
 motion which is never interrupted the universal bodies, I mean the  
 four elements, coming together compose the particular bodies of  
 individual things, which at their dissolution return again from par-  
 ticular bodies to universal bodies—although there will always remain  
 without change, like a centre, the natural essence which is proper to  
 each individual, which can neither move nor increase nor diminish.  
 For it is the accidents that are in motion, not the essence; nor is it  
 even the accidents themselves that are in motion either by increase  
 [or by decrease], but it is the participation of them by essence that  
 undergoes such changes. For right reason does not allow it to be  
 otherwise: for every nature, whether of the essences or of their  
 accidents, is immutable: but, as we said, the participation of the  
 essences by the accidents or of the accidents by the essences is per-  
 petually in motion. For participation can have a beginning and  
 increase and decrease, until this world attains its end in the stability  
 (126) in all things, after which neither essence nor accident nor their  
 participation of one another will suffer any motion: for all will be  
 the immovable self-identical One when all things shall have returned  
 to their immutable reasons. [But I think I must discuss this Return  
 in another place (127).] But the reason why only the centre of the  
 world, that is, earth, is always at rest, while the remainder of the  
 elements revolve about it in eternal motion, demands a thorough  
 inquiry. For we know the opinions both of the pagan philosophers  
 and of the Catholic Fathers on this question. For Plato, the greatest  
 of those who philosophized about the world, gives in his 'Timaeus'  
 many reasons for asserting that this visible world is composed of  
 body and soul like some vast animal; and the body of this animal is  
 compacted of the four well-known and general elements and of the  
 various bodies which are made from them, while its soul is a universal  
 life-principle which animates and sets in motion all things which are  
 in motion or at rest (128). [Hence the Poet:

'To begin with, the spirit within nourishes the sky and the earth  
 and the watery wastes, the shining globe of the moon and the Star  
 of Titan.']

But because the soul itself, as he (129) says, is eternally in motion,  
 for the purpose of giving life to its body, that is, to the whole world,  
 and of ruling it, and of imparting movement to it by bringing  
 together and separating again in various ways the diverse particular

19 lemma B: deest in P: Ratio platonis de mundo Rm reuersura R<sup>c</sup>BP: re-  
 uersuraque R\* sunt R<sup>c</sup>BP: erunt R\* 22 uoluuntur RB: uoluuntur P  
 29 anima R<sup>c</sup>BP: animae R\* 30 glossa uirg(ilius) C in marg. B

<sup>31</sup>  
 The reason  
 of the visible  
 world

mouendum, manet etiam in suo naturali immobilique statu, mouetur [ergo] semper et stat, ac per hoc et corpus eius, id est uniuersitas rerum uisibilium, partim quidem stat aeterna stabilitate, ut est terra; partim uero aeterna uelocitate (mouetur), ut est aetherium spatium; partim nec stat nec uelociter mouetur, ut aqua; partim uelociter sed non uelocissime, ut est aer. Et haec ratio summi philosophi non est omnino spernenda, ut aestimo. Acuta enim atque naturalis esse uidetur. Sed quoniam de hac eadem causa magnus Gregorius NYCEYC episcopus subtilissime disputat [in sermone de Imagine] magis uideo ipsius sententiam esse sequendam. Dicit enim conditorem uniuersitatis hunc mundum uisibilem inter duas sibi inuicem contrarias extremitates constituisse, inter grauitatem dico atque leuitatem, quae sibi omnino opponuntur, atque ideo quoniam in grauitate terra est constituta semper immobilis manet [nam grauitas moueri nescit] et est in medio mundi constituta extremumque [ac medium] obtinet terminum, aetheria uero spatia propterea ineffabili uelocitate semper circa media uoluuntur quoniam in natura leuitatis constituta sunt [quae stare ignorat] et extremum mundi uisibilis obtinent finem. Duo uero in medio elementa constituta, aqua uidelicet et aer, proportionali moderamine inter grauitatem et leuitatem assidue mouentur [ita] ut proximum sibi extremum terminum [utraque] magis sequantur quam ab eis longe remotum. Aqua nanque tardius mouetur aere quoniam grauitati telluris adhaeret, aer uero uelocius aqua concitatur quoniam aetheriae leuitati coniungitur. Sed quamuis uideantur extremae mundi partes a se inuicem discrepare propter diuersas earum qualitates non tamen per omnia a se inuicem dissentiunt. Nam aetheria spatia quamuis semper caelerrima uelocitate uoluantur, chorus tamen astrorum suam immutabilem obseruat sedem ita ut et cum aethere uoluatur et naturalem locum ad similitudinem *terraenae stabilitatis* non deserat. Terra uero e contrario cum aeternaliter in statu sit, omnia tamen quae ex ea oriuntur ad similitudinem leuitatis aetheriae semper in motu sunt, nascendo per generationem crescendo in numerum locorum ac temporum iterumque decrescendo et ad solutionem formae atque materiae perueniendo.

3-6 partim quidem-aer: cf. Plato, *Tim.* 55E-56A; Chalc., *In Tim.* xxi-xxii, pp. 72, 5-73, 4 Waszink 9-10 in sermone de imagine: Greg. Nyss., *De hom. opif.* i, PG xlv. 128c sq.; cf. Cic., *De nat. deor.* ii. 45, 115-16; Boyancé, *Le Songe de Scipion* (Bordeaux, 1936), p. 70 19-23 duo uero-remotum: cf. Greg. Nyss., *op. cit.*, 129A 23-25 aqua-coniungitur: *op. cit.*, 129AB 25-35 Sed quamuis perueniendo: *op. cit.*, 129D 25-26 Sed quamuis-discrepare: cf. Chalc., *In Tim.* xx, p. 71, 10-20 Waszink

4 uelocitate RBP<sup>c</sup>: uiocitate P\* 5 uelociter RB<sup>c</sup>P: ueliciter B\* 5-6 partium R<sup>c</sup>BP: partium R\* uelociter R<sup>c</sup>BP: uelocius R\* 11 conditorem R<sup>c</sup>BP: conditorem R\* 12 inter grauitatem RBP<sup>c</sup>: integrauitatem P\* 19 obtinent

bodies, and yet keeps to its own natural and unchanging state; it is [therefore] ever in motion and ever at rest. And thus its body also, that is, the universe of visible things, is partially at rest in eternal stability, as is earth; and partially (moving) with eternal velocity, as is the ethereal region; partially neither at rest nor moving with velocity, as water; partially moving with velocity but not with maximum velocity, as is the case with air. And this theory of the excellent philosopher is not to be despised, as I think: for it seems to be ingenious and true to nature. But since Gregory, the great Bishop of Nyssa, reasons very subtly about the same matter [in his treatise 'On the Image' (130)] I think we had better follow his opinion. For he says that the Founder of the universe established this visible world between two extremes which are the contraries of one another, I mean between heaviness and lightness, which are absolutely opposed to each other; and therefore, since earth is established in heaviness it remains always without motion [for heaviness cannot move] and is set in the centre of the world, and occupies the extreme [and innermost (131)] boundary; while the ethereal regions always revolve with indescribable speed about the centre for the reason that they are constituted in the nature of lightness [which cannot be at rest], and occupy the extreme boundary of the visible world; but the two elements which are constituted between, namely, *water* and air, have a ceaseless movement proportionately moderated between heaviness and lightness [so] that [each] follows more closely the limit which is nearest to it than that which is remote from it: for water moves more slowly than air because it adheres to the heaviness of earth, while air is in more rapid motion than water because it is adjacent to the lightness of aether. But although the extreme parts of the world seem to oppose one another on account of the diversity of their qualities, yet they are not in all things in disagreement: for although the ethereal regions perpetually revolve with the utmost velocity, nevertheless the chorus (132) of the stars maintains its immutable station so that it both revolves with the aether and keeps its natural place *with a stability* that resembles *that of earth*: while, on the other hand, although earth is eternally at rest, all things that originate from it are in an eternal motion which resembles that of the lightness of the aether, in coming to birth through generation, increasing into the number of places and times, and then again decreasing and coming to the point where form and matter fall apart.

R<sup>c</sup>BP: obtinet R\* post obtinent del. locum P 20 aqua R<sup>c</sup>BP: terra R\* 22 quam ab RB: quantab P 23 grauitati R<sup>c</sup>: grauitate R\*BP 26 earum R<sup>c</sup>BP: eorum R\* 27 inuicem dissentiunt in marg. sR aetheria R<sup>c</sup>BP: aethera R\* 28 caelerrima BP: celerrima R uoluantur R<sup>c</sup>BP<sup>c</sup>: uoluentur R\*: uouantur P\* chorus R<sup>c</sup>BP: chorus R\* 29 ut om. P 30 terraenae stabilitatis R<sup>c</sup>B: terrenae stabilitatis P: terrae R\*

A. Videris mihi paulo longius a principali quaestione in incidentem transitum fecisse. Nam cum de loco disputare nostri propositi fuerat loco *relicto* ad mundi tractatum transisti, et quorsum haec tendant adhuc ignoro.

N. Non aliorum nisi ut corporum naturam a locorum natura diligenti ratiocinatione segregemus. Horum nanque confusio aut maxima aut sola est erroris causa multis ac paene omnibus aestimantibus hunc mundum visibilem partesque eius universales atque speciales loca esse. Si enim recta ratione rerum omnium genera acute ac sine ullo errore discernere nullo modo corpus atque locum in uno eodemque genere concluderent. Nemo enim naturas rerum recte considerantium atque discernentium loca et corpora in uno genere miscet sed rationabili discretionem segregat. Nam corpora in categoria quantitatis continentur; categoria autem quantitatis a categoria loci longe naturaliter distat. Non est igitur corpus locus quia localitas non est quantitas, siquidem ut praediximus nil aliud est quantitas nisi partium quae seu sola ratione seu naturali differentia separantur certa dimensio eorumque quae naturalibus spatiis extenduntur, longitudine dico latitudine et altitudine, ad certos terminos rationabilis progressio; locus vero nil aliud est nisi rerum quae certo fine terminantur ambitus atque conclusio. Si igitur mundus iste visibilis corpus est sequitur necessario ut et partes eius corpora sint. At si corpora sunt quantitatis non localitatis generi *subiugantur*; sunt autem corpora; loca igitur non sunt. Videsne itaque quomodo praedictis rationibus confectum est hunc mundum cum partibus suis non esse locum sed loco contineri, hoc est certo definitionis suae ambitu? Aliud est enim quod continet et aliud quod continetur. Corpora continentur locis suis; aliud igitur est corpus et aliud locus, sicut aliud est quantitas partium, aliud definitio earum. Non igitur quattuor ista notissima elementa loca sunt sed in loco circumscripta, quia sunt principales partes quibus universalitas sensibilis mundi completur.

A. Haec quae a te dicta sunt de differentia locorum et corporum uerisimilia esse uidentur, sed subtilius eadem uelim repetas. Non enim [uideo] quare mundus iste locus non sit cum multa in eo locentur.

N. Non te latet, ut arbitror, nullam praedictarum categoriarum quas decem esse Aristoteles diffiniuit dum per se ipsam, hoc est in sua natura, rationis intuitu consideratur sensibus corporeis succumbere.

1 principali R<sup>c</sup>BP: principale R\*      3 loco relicto R<sup>c</sup>BP: de loco R\*  
 4 glossa Item alio loco reperitur C in B *postea erasa*      5 naturam RBP<sup>c</sup>: naturarum P\*  
 11 lemma BP      20 *post est deleta sunt uerba* ut praediximus in R  
 23 *subiugantur* R<sup>c</sup>BP<sup>c</sup>: *subiungantur* R\*(?)P\*      26 certo RB: certe P  
 29 *post non erasum est et in R*      30 elementa RBP\*: elementa P<sup>c</sup> sed R<sup>c</sup>  
 BP: et R\*      circumscripta R<sup>c</sup>BP; circumscript\* R\*      32 lemma BPRm  
 33 uidentur RB: uideo B\*      34 locus non sit RB: non sit locus P      36 aristoteles BP: aristoteles R      diffiniuit RB<sup>c</sup>P: diffiniunt B\*

A. You seem to have been led rather too far away from the main question by an incidental one: for whereas it was our intention to speak about place, you have *abandoned* place and turned aside to treat of the world; and where this is leading I do not know.

N. To no other end but that we should distinguish by careful reasoning between the nature of bodies and the nature of places: for confusion between these is the principal, if not the sole, cause of error to many, if not all, of those who hold this visible world, and its parts both general and particular, to be places. For if, in the light of right reason, they were to distinguish the genera of all things accurately and correctly, they would never include body and place in the same genus. For none of those who rightly consider and distinguish the natures of things confuses places and bodies in a single genus, but separates them by a rational distinction. For bodies are included in the category of quantity, but the category of quantity differs widely by nature from the category of place. Therefore body is not place since a locality is not a quantity; for, as we said before, quantity is nothing else but the definite measuring out of parts which are separated either by the reason alone or by natural differentiation, and the rational extension to definite limits of those things which extend in the dimensions of nature, I mean in length, in breadth, and in depth; while place is nothing else but the boundary and enclosure of things which are contained within a fixed limit. Therefore if this world is a body it necessarily follows that its parts are bodies too. But if they are bodies they belong to the genus of quantity, not to that of locality. But they are bodies: therefore they are not places. Do you then see how it is concluded from the foregoing arguments that this world with its parts is not a place but is contained within place, that is, within the fixed limit of its definition? For that which contains is one thing and that which is contained is another. Bodies are contained in their places: therefore body is one thing and place another, just as the quantity of parts is one thing, their definition another. Therefore those four well-known elements are not places but are enclosed in places, for they are the principal parts which between them make up the totality of the sensible world.

A. What has been said by you concerning the difference between places and bodies seems most likely to be true, but I should like you to go over it again in more detail. For I do not [see] why this world is not a place when many things are placed in it.

N. You are aware, I think, of the fact that none of the aforesaid ten categories which Aristotle defined, when thought of by itself, that is, in its own nature, in the light of reason, is accessible to the bodily senses. For *οὐσία* is incorporeal and the object of no sense,

quid inter corpus et locum

What the difference is between body and place

de eo quod mundus non est locus

That the world is not a place



Nam OYCIA incorporalis est nullique sensui subiacet, circa quam 478D  
aut in qua aliae nouem categoriae uersantur. At si illa incorporea est,  
num tibi aliter uidetur nisi ut omnia quae aut ei adhaerent aut in  
ea subsistunt et sine ea esse non possunt incorporea sint? Omnes  
igitur categoriae incorporales sunt per se intellectae. Earum tamen 479A  
[quaedam] inter se mirabili quodam coitu, ut ait Gregorius, materiem 6  
uisibilem conficiunt, quaedam uero in nullo apparent semperque  
incorporales fiunt. Nam OYCIA et relatio locus tempus agere pati  
nullo sensu corporeo attinguntur, quantitas uero qualitasque situs  
et habitus dum inter se coeuntes materiem, ut praediximus, iungunt 10  
corporeo sensu percipi solent. Si igitur locus inter ea quae nullo  
modo corporeis sensibus succumbunt connumeratur, corpora uero  
si sensibus non percipiuntur corpora non sunt, nonne datur quod  
[locus non] sit corpus? (Corpora nunc dico quae ex coitu quattuor  
mundi elementorum conficiuntur; nam quattuor mundi elementa 15  
dum corpora sint per se ipsa discreta ineffabili sua naturali subtilitate 479B  
atque puritate omnem sensum mortalem superant). Aliud est igitur  
locus et aliud corpus. An tibi aliter uidetur?

de eo quod corpora corruptibilia accidentium concursu efficiuntur  
A. Nullo modo. Et haec postrema ratiocinationis nostrae conclusio  
nequaquam sinit concedere locum et corpus unius generis esse. Sed 20  
quod interpositum a te uideo, nil aliud esse materiem uisibilem  
formae adiunctam (quicquid enim apparet per formam apparet) nisi  
accidentium quorundam concursum, non paruum me mouet.

N. Non te moueat. Nam, ut dixi, magnus Gregorius NYCCEYC  
in sermone De Imagine certis rationibus ita esse suadet, nil aliud 25  
dicens materiam esse nisi accidentium quandam compositionem ex  
inuisibilibus causis ad uisibilem materiem procedentem. Nec im-  
merito; si enim corporalis huius materiae [solubilisque] quaedam 479C  
simplex atque immutabilis essentia et nullo modo solubilis inesset  
nulla ratione [nullaque actione] paenitus solueretur. Iam uero 30  
soluitur; nil igitur ei insolubile subest. Nam genera et species et  
ATCMA propterea semper sunt ac permanent quia inest eis aliquod  
unum indiuiduum quod solui nequit neque destrui. [Ipsa quoque  
accidentia propterea in sua natura immutabiliter permanent quia  
omnibus eis unum quoddam indiuiduum subest in quo naturaliter 35  
omnia unum subsistunt.]

de eo quod substantiae et accidentia per se immotabiliter permanent

A. Nil uerius, ut arbitror. Atque ideo praesentem inquisitionem  
concludas specto.

23 Greg. Nyss., *De hom. opif.* xxiv, PG xlv. 212D

10 iungunt R<sup>c</sup>BP: iunguntur R\* 11 inter ea R<sup>c</sup>BP<sup>c</sup>: interea R\*P\* 12-  
13 succumbunt-sensibus in marg. sR 15 post mundi ad finem lineae quali-  
tatis adscripsit C (?) in B, sed postea erasum est elementa RB: elementa  
P 19 lemma BPRm 19-20 conclusio nequaquam RB<sup>c</sup>P: conclu-  
sione quaquam B\* 26 accidentium quandam RB<sup>c</sup>P: accidenti quodam B\*

while the other nine categories are about it or within it. But if the  
former is incorporeal, surely it must be apparent to you that every-  
thing which is either attached to it or subsists in it and cannot exist 34  
apart from it is incorporeal? Therefore all the Categories are in-  
corporeal when considered in themselves. [Some] of them, however,  
by a certain marvellous commingling with one another, as Gregory  
says, produce visible matter, while some appear in nothing and remain  
for ever incorporeal. For *οὐσία* and relation, place, time, action,  
passion are not reached by any bodily sense, while quantity and  
quality, situation and condition, when they come together and con-  
stitute matter, as we said just now, are normally perceived by bodily  
sense. If, then, place is normally counted among those things which  
are by no means accessible to the bodily senses, while bodies, if not  
perceived by the senses, are not bodies, does that not prove that  
[place] is [not] a body?—I am speaking here of the bodies that are  
produced by the coming together of the four elements of the world.  
For the four elements of the world, although they are discrete bodies  
in themselves, yet because of the indescribable fineness and purity  
of their nature, surpass all mortal sense—. Therefore place is one thing  
and body another. Or does it seem to you otherwise?

A. By no means. And this latest conclusion of our reasoning  
excludes all possibility of allowing that place and body are of a single  
genus. But that which I notice you have added incidentally, that  
visible matter combined with form—for whatever becomes manifest  
becomes manifest through form—is nothing else but a concourse of  
certain accidents, troubles me not a little.

That corruptible bodies are produced by a concourse of accidents

N. Let it not do so. For, as I have said, the great Gregory of  
Nyssa in his homily 'On the Image' proves it to be so by reasons  
beyond doubt, saying that matter is nothing else but a certain com-  
position of accidents which proceeds from invisible causes to visible  
matter. Not unreasonably: for if in this corporeal [and dissoluble]  
matter there should be any simple (133), immutable, and quite indis-  
soluble essence, then it could not be wholly dissolved by any thought  
[or action]. But in fact it is dissolved: therefore there is nothing in  
it which is indissoluble. For genera and species and *ἄτομα* are eternal  
and endure for the very reason that there is in them something which  
is one and indivisible which can neither be dissolved nor destroyed.  
[Also, the accidents themselves remain without change in their own  
nature(s) for the reason that underlying them all there is something  
indivisible in which they all naturally subsist as one.]

That substances and accidents in themselves remain without change

A. Nothing is more true, in my opinion: and therefore I am waiting 35  
for you to bring the present inquiry to a close.

32 lemma BP (inmutabiliter P): quod substantiae et accidentia per se immutabiliter  
manent Rm

soluit quia  
mundus non  
est locus

N. Quid restat nisi ut dicamus, uerbi gratia, dum uidemus corpora nostra in hac terra constituta uel hoc aere circumfusa nil aliud nisi corpora in corporibus esse? Eadem ratione pisces in fluctibus planetae in aethere astra in firmamento corpora in corporibus sunt, minora in maioribus, crassiora in subtilioribus, leuia in leuioribus, pura in purioribus. Haec enim omnia, sensibilia sicut etiam intelligibilia, suis propriis locis, id est naturalibus diffinitionibus, contineri uera ratio edocet.

479D

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480A

A. Nec huic conclusioni resisto dum eam ueram esse uideo; sed ualde miror cur in communem usum humanae uitae peruenit ut omnia haec corpora siue caelestia siue aerea siue aquatica siue terrena minorum intra se corporum loca esse dicere consuescat, quemadmodum nil aliud esse aestimat OYCIAN praeter hoc corpus uisibile atque tangibile; ideoque obnixè flagito ne sit tibi morosum diutius de hac praesenti difficultate disputare.

10

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N. Quid igitur? Nempe iamdudum inter nos est confectum omnia quae uel sensu corporeo uel ratione uel intellectu cognoscuntur de deo merito creatore omnium posse praedicari dum nihil eorum quae de se praedicantur pura ueritatis contemplatio [eum] approbat esse?

480B

A. Id ipsum inconcussum esse luceque clarius ratio edocet.

20

N. Si ergo de deo omnia quae sunt non quidem proprie sed modo quodam translationis quoniam ab ipso sunt rite praedicantur, quid mirum si cuncta quae in loco sunt [dum maioribus se undique uideantur circumfundi] loca possint nominari, cum nullum illorum proprie locus sit sed loco [suae propriae naturae] continentur cumque uideamus per METONOMIAN [id est transnominationem] ab his quae continent nominari ea quae continentur [—non tamen ita continentur ab eis ut sine eis intra naturales suos terminos subsistere non possint. Vsus siquidem mortalium domum uxorem seu familiam solet appellare cum haec naturaliter distent; non enim domus praestat uxori seu familiae substantialiter esse sed naturae locus; quoniam uero in ea possident ab ea denominari solent—], similiterque ea quae continent ab his quae continentur? Verbi gratia: aer continet lucem, ideoque illuminatus aer lux dicitur; oculus uisus uocatur seu uisio dum neque uisus neque uisio sit iuxta naturae proprietatem. Quis enim nesciat oculum partem quandam corporalem

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480B

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480C

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3-4 pisces—firmamento: cf. p. 112, 22-23 supra 12-14 quemadmodum—tangibile: cf. p. 142, 26-27 infra 34 cf. p. 54, 23 sqq. supra 36-p. 124, 3: cf. 730C 11-D 6

1 lemma BPRm dum om. B\* 4 aethere R<sup>c</sup>BP: aetherae R\* 5 crassiora RBP<sup>c</sup>: crassioribus P\* 6 rasura supra intelligibilia in R 14 tangibile ideoque R<sup>c</sup>BP: tangibile atque ideo R\* 16 nempe iamdudum in ras. R confectum RP: confectum B 17 uel intellectu R<sup>c</sup>BP: intellectuali R\* 18 praedicari RB<sup>c</sup>P: praedicare B\* 19 ueritatis R<sup>c</sup>BP: ueritas R\* 20 inconcussum RB: inconcussum P 24 possint RB<sup>c</sup>P: possunt B\*

N. What remains but to say that when, for instance, we see that our bodies are placed on this earth or surrounded by this air, they are simply bodies within bodies? For the same reason the fish in the sea, the planets in the ether, the stars in the firmament, are bodies within bodies, lesser within greater ones, grosser within finer, light ones within lighter, pure within purer. For true reason teaches that all these things, sensible as well as intelligible, are contained within their proper places, that is, in their natural definitions.

He concludes that the world is not a place

A. I do not dispute this conclusion either, for I perceive it to be true. But I wonder very much why the custom has come into common usage in everyday life of saying that all these bodies, whether of heaven or of air or of water or of earth, are the places of the lesser bodies within them, and similarly of holding that οὐσία is nothing else but this visible and tangible body: and therefore I earnestly pray that it may not be tedious for you to prolong further the discussion of this present problem.

36

N. Why, then: we have, have we not, already agreed that all things that are known by bodily sense or reason or intellect can justly be predicated of God because He is the Creator of them all, although a pure contemplation of the truth establishes the fact that [He] is none of the things that are predicated of Him?

A. Reason teaches that this is undeniable, and it is clearer than day.

N. If therefore it is just to predicate of God all things that are, not indeed properly, but by a kind of metaphor because they derive from Him, what is strange if all things which are in place [because everywhere they are seen to be enclosed in things greater than themselves] can be called places, although none of them is strictly speaking a place but is contained within the place [of its proper nature], and although we see that it is by μετονομία [that is, by a transference of name] that those things which are contained are called after the things which contain them [although they are not contained by them in such a way that without them they could not subsist within their natural limits? For the common usage of mortals usually calls the wife or the family a 'house', although by nature the two notions are distinct: for it is not the house which confers on wife or family their substantial being, but the place of their nature. But because it is in it that they possess (their substantial being) they are customarily called after it], and similarly the things that contain (are called) after the things that are contained by them? For example: air contains light, and therefore air filled with light is called light; the eye is called sight or vision although in respect of the property of its nature it is neither sight nor vision.

37

25 continentur RB: continentur P 26 METONOMIAN R: metonomian BP 34 lucem RBP<sup>c</sup>: locem P\* 35 uocatur R<sup>c</sup>BP: dicitur R\* 36 quandam RB<sup>c</sup>P: quondam B\*

capitis humidamque esse per quam uisus radiorum instar ex menica, hoc est membranula, cerebri foras funditur? [Menica uero luminis naturam ex corde, ignis uidelicet sede, recipit.] Est enim uisus naturalis luminis in sensu uidendi possidentis radiatim foras prosiliens emissio, quae cum coloribus formisque exteriorum sensibilibum corporum circumfunditur mirabili celeritate [ipsis coloratis uisibilibus formis con]formatur. Est enim uisio formarum colorumque corporalium in radiis oculorum quaedam imago conformata quae nulla mora interstante sensu recipitur memoriaeque sentientis infigitur. Eadem ratio est et in sensu aurium. Nam et particula capitis quae proprie auris dicitur ex auditu denominatur quoniam instrumentum auditus est; atque id genus mille.

480D  
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481A  
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A. Et hoc plane perspicio.

N. Videsne itaque qua consuetudine rerumque significandarum necessitate inops uerarum rerum discretionis humanitas has abusiue rerum denominationes reppererit imam mediamque mundi uisibilibus partem, terram dico, animalium gressibilibus nominans locum? Cui similiter coadunatam inseparabilemque partem qualitateque frigiditatis proximam, aquam uidelicet, locum natantium euocat, deinde naturali ordine tertiam mundi partem pennati generis locum esse aestimat, eodemque modo amplissima aetheris spatia caelestium corporum circulariter in eo reuolutorum loca nominare consueuit; quae omnia uera ratione discretionis naturarum consulta non loca sed partes mundi suis locis circumscripta(e) perspicuntur. Vt autem perspicue cognoscas has praedictas mundi generales partes earumque partium partes usque ad minutissimas peruenientes partitiones non esse loca sed locis circumscriptas ipsius loci natura paulo diligentius, si tibi placet, consideranda est.

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481B

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A. Placet equidem; et ad hoc audiendum ardentem insisto.

N. Accipe igitur tale ratiocinationis huius modi exordium, quam a sanctis patribus, Gregorio uidelicet theologo sermonumque eius egregio expositore Maximo, sumpsimus. Omne quodcunque est praeter deum, qui solus super ipsum esse proprie subsistit, intelligitur in loco; cum quo [uidelicet loco] semper et omnino cointelligitur

30

481C

1-2 menica-cerebri: cf. Eriug., *Annot. in Marc.* 3, 29; 105, 24 Lutz 3 cf. p. 162, 14 *infra* 6-7 ipsis-conformatur: cf. 731A 11-12; 854A 2 32-p. 126, 2 Omne-potest: Max. Conf., *I Ambig.* vi. 38, PG xci. 1180B 8-13

3 lemma BPRm enim s.l. P 4 post uidendi deletum est possidendi in P radiatim RBP: radiantim P\* 6 celeritate RB: caeleritate P 7 lemma BPRm 7-8 corporalium RBP: corporum R\* 8 post quaedam add. corporibus R\* 10 sensu aurium RBP: sensuarium B\* 11 denominatur RBP: denominetur B\* 12 id genus RBP: indignus B\*P\* 13 perspicio BP: perspitio R 14 lemma BPRm 15 inops RB: inops P 16 reppererit RB: reppererit R\*P 18 inseparabilemque BP: inseparabilemque R 20 pennati RB: paennati P 22 reuolutorum RBP: reuolutorum B\* 23 uera ratione RBP: ueratione B\* 25 generales RBP: generalis B\* 26 minutissimas RBP: munitissimas B\* 30 lemma BP: locus et tempus inse-

For who does not know that the eye is a corporeal part of the head and that it is moist, and that it is that through which the sight pours forth from the brain like rays out of the meninx, that is, membrane (134). [The meninx, however, receives the nature of light from the heart, that is, from the seat of fire.] For sight is the emission of natural light in the sense of seeing of him who possesses it, bursting forth in the manner of rays, which, when it surrounds the colours and forms of sensible bodies without, with marvellous swiftness takes on the form [of those coloured visible shapes]. For vision is an image, formed in the rays of the eyes, of the shapes and colours of bodies, which with no intervening delay is seized by the sense and implanted in the memory of the percipient. It is the same with the sense of the ears. For that part of the head which is properly called ear is also called after hearing because it is the instrument of hearing; and so it is for a thousand (other examples) of this kind.

The definition of sight

The definition of vision

A. This too I plainly perceive.

N. Do you then see that it is by custom and for the necessity of having something significant to say about things that humanity, incapable of distinguishing the things that truly are, has devised these misleading names for them, calling the lowest and central part (135) of the visible world, I mean earth, the place of animals that walk? Similarly to this it calls the part that is adjacent to it and inseparable from it, and closest to it by the quality of coldness, I mean water, the place of all (animals) that swim; and then it considers the part of the world that comes third in the natural order to be the place of the winged species, and in the same way it customarily names the immense spaces of the aether the places of the celestial bodies which revolve about it in circular motion: all of which, if studied according to the true reason of the distinction of natures, are seen to be not places but parts of the world enclosed within their places. But in order that you may clearly know that these aforesaid general parts of the world and the parts of those parts down to the smallest divisions are not places but are enclosed within places, the nature of place itself must be considered a little more carefully, if you agree.

38 That the parts of the world are not called places properly

39

A. Certainly I agree, and I am burning with zeal to hear this.

N. Take then, to start with, this kind of reasoning, which we have taken over from the Holy Fathers, namely from Gregory the Theologian and the excellent commentator of his homilies, Maximus: everything that is, except God Who alone properly subsists above being itself, is understood to be in place, with which [namely with place] time is always and in every way simultaneously understood.

That place and time are inseparable

parabilia sunt Rm tale s.l. P 31-32 sermonumque eius egregio in marg. sR 32 egregio RBP: egregio P\* sumpsimus RBP: sumsimus B\* marginalia erasa in B

de eo quod partes mundi non proprie dicuntur loca

de eo quod locus et tempus inseparabilia sunt

tempus. Non enim possibile est locum *subtracto* tempore intelligi, sicut neque tempus sine loci *cointelligentia* diffiniri potest. Haec enim inter ea quae simul et semper sunt inseparabiliter ponuntur, ac sine his nulla essentia quae per generationem accepit esse ullo modo ualet *consistere uel cognosci*. Omnium itaque existentium essentia localis 5 atque temporalis est, atque ideo nisi in loco et tempore et sub loco et sub tempore nullo modo cognoscitur. Non enim omnium rerum uniuersitas sub se ipsa et intra se ipsam est. Hoc enim statuere irrationabile est et impossibile, ipsam uidelicet uniuersitatem super 481D suimet uniuersitatem esse, dum circumscriptionem habeat post omnia 10 circumscribentem omnia [sub se ipsa in se ipsa] causalissimam uirtutem. Ipse itaque finis exterior locus uniuersitatis est, sicut quidam definiunt locum dicentes: Locus est ipse extra uniuersitatem ambitus, uel ipsa extra uniuersitatem positio uel finis comprehendens 15 in quo comprehenditur comprehensum. Sub tempore etiam uniuersa comprobantur quoniam non simpliciter sed aliquo modo esse 482A habent uniuersa quaeque post deum esse habent, ac per hoc non carent principio. Omne enim quodcunque rationem recipit alicuius modi essentiae etsi est non erat. Itaque aliquo modo esse, hoc est 20 localiter esse, et aliquo modo inchoasse esse, hoc est temporaliter esse; ideoque omne quod est praeter deum quoniam aliquo modo subsistit et per generationem subsistere inchoauit necessario loco ac tempore concluditur. Vnde deum esse dicentes non aliquo modo esse dicimus [ac] per hoc et 'est' et 'erat' simpliciter et infinite et absolute 25 in ipso dicimus. *Incomprehensibile* enim omni rationi et intellectui diuinum est, atque ideo praedicantes ipsius esse non dicimus ipsum esse. Ex ipso enim esse sed non ipsum esse. Est enim super ipsum esse 482B aliquo modo superesse et uniuersaliter super [quod] dicitur et intelligitur. Si autem aliquo modo sed non uniuersaliter ea quae sunt 30 habent esse, quemadmodum sub loco esse per positionem et finem rationum in quibus secundum naturam sunt et sub tempore esse omnino per principium non ostenduntur? Videsne igitur locum tempusque ante omnia quae sunt intelligi? Numerus enim locorum et temporum, ut ait sanctus Augustinus in sexto De Musica, praecedit 35 omnia quae in eis sunt. Modus siquidem, id est mensura, omnium

8-19 Hoc enim-non erat: Max. Conf., *I Ambig.* vi. 38, PG xci. 1180C 3-  
 D 3 23-32 Vnde-ostenduntur: Max. Conf., *I Ambig.* vi. 38, PG xci. 1180D  
 3-1181A 2 33-35 Aug., *De musica* vi. 58, PL xxxii. 1192-3

1 subtracto R<sup>c</sup>BP: sine R\* 2 loci cointelligentia R<sup>c</sup>BP: loco R\*  
 4 accepit R<sup>c</sup>B<sup>c</sup>P: acce\*\*\* R\*: accipit B\* 5 consistere uel cognosci in  
*breuioris uocis rasura* R 9 super s.l. B 10 post dum add. sub se ipsa in  
 se ipsa R\* (cf. lin. 11) 12 lemma B: diffinitio loci PRm 13 definiunt  
 RB<sup>c</sup>P: difiniunt B\* 16 comprobantur RB: comprobantur P 17 habent  
 RB: babent P 19 essentiae s.l. R est (1) bis in R\* 20 et aliquo  
 modo inchoasse esse om., sed postea add. ad calc. P 21 omne RB: omnem P

For it is impossible to conceive place if time *is withdrawn*, as it is impossible for time to be defined without *understanding it in connexion* with place. For these are included among the things which are always found inseparably together; and without these no essence which has received being through generation can by any means *exist or be known*. Therefore the essence of all existing things is local and temporal, and thus it can in no way be known except in place and time and under place and time. For the universe of all things is not under itself or within itself: for it is irrational and impossible to make a statement to this effect, namely, that the universe itself is above the totality of itself, when, in fact, it is defined by the ultimate causative Power, which is beyond everything and defines everything [under itself in itself]. The place of the universe, then, is its outer limit, according to the definition some give to place, saying: Place 25 is the boundary outside the universe, or its very position outside the universe, or the comprehensive limit in which that which is comprehended is comprehended. Again, all things will be shown to be under time by the fact that all things which possess being after God do not possess it simply but after some manner, and therefore are not without a beginning. For everything which receives the reason of essence after some manner, although it is, yet was not. Therefore to be after some manner, this is to be in place; and beginning after some manner to be, this is to be in time. And therefore since everything that is, except God, subsists after some manner and has begun to subsist through generation, it is necessarily enclosed within place and time. Hence, when we say that God *is*, we do not say that He is after some manner; [and] therefore we use the words 'is' and 'was' in Him simply and infinitely and absolutely. For the Divine is *incomprehensible* to all reason and all intellect, *and therefore* when we predicate being of Him we do not say that He is; for being is from Him but He is not Himself being. For above this being after some manner there is More-than-being, and absolute Being beyond language and understanding. If, however, the things that are possess being after some manner but not absolutely, how will their being under place not be manifested by their position and the limitation of the reasons in which they are established by nature, and their being wholly under time by their beginning? Do you see then that place and time are understood (to be) prior to all things that are? For the number of places and times, as St. Augustine says in chapter six of the 'De Musica', precedes all things that are in them: for the mode, that is, measure, of all things that are created is, in the nature (of things),

Definitions  
of place

25 incomprehensibile R<sup>c</sup>BP: inaccessible R\* rationi RB<sup>c</sup>P: ratione B\* 26 atque  
 ideo R<sup>c</sup>BP: ac per hoc R\* 28 uniuersaliter, i.e. esse 32 ostenduntur  
 R<sup>c</sup>BP: ostenduntur R\* 32-33 locum tempusque RB: locumque tempus P

rerum quae creata sunt naturaliter conditionem earum ratione  
 praecedit, qui modus atque mensura uniuscuiusque locus dicitur et  
 est. Similiter principium nascendi atque inchoatio ante omne quod  
 nascitur atque inchoat ratione praecedere perspicitur, ideoque omne  
 quod non erat et est a principio temporis coepit esse. Solus itaque  
 deus infinitus est, caetera ubi et quando terminantur [id est loco et  
 tempore]; non quod locus et tempus in numero eorum quae a deo  
 creata sunt non sint sed quod omnia quae in uniuersitate sunt non  
 spatiis temporum sed sola ratione conditionis praecesserint. Neces-  
 sario enim ea quae continent prius intelliguntur quam ea quae  
 continentur, sicut causa praecedit effectum, ignis incendium, uox  
 uerbum caeteraque similia, ac per hoc non aliam beatitudinem his  
 qui digni sunt aestimamus esse promissam nec alium huius mundi  
 finem [fore] quam ut omnes qui gloriam theoseos, id est deificationis,  
 accepturi sunt ultra loca et tempora ascendant. Nam qui loco et  
 tempore coartantur finiti sunt; aeterna autem beatitudo infinita est.  
 Aeternae igitur beatitudinis atque infinitae *participes* neque loco  
 circumscribentur neque tempore. Quod enim de solo Melchisedech  
 scriptum est, patre ac matre caruisse nullumque dierum principium  
 per generationem in essentiam neque finem temporis habuisse,  
 uniuersaliter de omnibus qui futurae beatitudinis participes erunt  
 intelligendum arbitror. Omnes siquidem qui ad aeternas suas  
 rationes quae neque initium temporis [per generationem in loco  
 tempore] neque finem [per resolutionem] habent neque ulla locali  
 positione circumscribuntur reuersuri sunt [ut solae in eis et nil aliud  
 sint] profecto omni locali temporalique termino carebunt. Causae  
 enim omnium rerum, quae omni caret circumscriptione quoniam  
 infinita est, infiniti in infinitum adhaerebunt; solus nanque deus in  
 ipsis apparebit quando terminos suae naturae transcendit—[non  
 ut in eis natura pereat sed ut in eis solus appareat qui solus uere est;  
 et hoc est naturam transcendere: naturam non apparere, sicut aer,  
 ut saepe diximus, luce plenus non apparet quoniam sola lux regnat].  
 Quod igitur de generali loco generalique tempore uniuersalis creaturae  
 intelligitur necessario de partium eius locis temporibusque specialibus  
 et propriis a summo usque deorsum intelligetur. Praecedit autem  
 locus generalis tempusque generale secundum *intelligentiam* omnia  
 quae in eis sunt: praecedit igitur specialium priorumque loco-  
 rum temporumque cognitio ea quae in eis specialiter proprieque

19 Heb. vii. 3

3 inchoatio RB<sup>c</sup>P: inchoatio B\* 7 locus RB<sup>c</sup>P: locus B\* 13 promissam RB:  
 permissam P 15 ascendant R<sup>c</sup>BP: ascendunt R\* 18 lemma BPRm  
 (MELCHISEDECH P) post beatitudinis *erasum est* participes in R 21 qui RB<sup>c</sup>:  
 quae B\*: qua P 22 aeternas RB: aeterna P 25 reuersuri R<sup>c</sup>BP: euersuri R\*  
 26 omni RB: enim P 28 in (1) om. P 31 apparere R<sup>c</sup>BP: apperere R\* 32 post

logically prior to their creation; and this mode and measure of each  
 is called its place, and so it is. Similarly, the origin and beginning of  
 its birth is seen to be logically prior to everything which is born and  
 has a beginning, and therefore everything which was not and is has  
 begun to be from a beginning in time. Thus, only God is infinite, all  
 else is limited by a 'where?' and a 'when?' [that is, by place and  
 time]—not that place and time are not in the number of those things  
 that are created by God, but that they are prior, not in extent of time  
 but only in respect of creation, to all things that are in the universe.  
 For that which contains is necessarily understood as prior to that  
 which is contained, as the cause precedes the effect, fire the conflagration,  
 voice the word, and so on; and therefore we hold that no  
 other beatitude is promised to those who are worthy, and [that there  
 will be] no other end of this world, but the ascent beyond places and  
 times of all those who shall receive the glory of theosis, that is,  
 deification. For those who are bound by place and time are finite; but  
 the eternal beatitude is infinite. Therefore those *who participate* in  
 the eternal and infinite beatitude will be encompassed neither by  
 place nor by time. For that which is written concerning Melchisedech  
 alone, that he had no father or mother, nor a beginning of days to his  
 attaining essence through generation, nor end of his time, must,  
 I think, be understood generally of all who shall participate in the  
 beatitude that is to come. For all who shall return into their eternal  
 reasons which have neither a beginning of time [through generation  
 in place and time] nor an end [through dissolution], and are not  
 defined by any local position so that only (their eternal reasons), and  
 nothing else, will be in them] will surely lack every local and tem-  
 poral limit. For being infinite they will to infinity adhere in the Cause  
 of all things, which lacks all definition because it is infinite; for only  
 God will be manifest in them when they surpass the limits of their  
 nature [—not that their nature perishes in them, but that in them He  
 alone is manifest Who alone truly is. And to surpass nature is this:  
 that nature is not manifest, just as air, as we have often said, when full  
 of light, is not manifest because the light prevails alone.] Therefore,  
 that which is understood generally of the place and time of the uni-  
 versal creature will necessarily be understood of the special and  
 individual places and times of its parts from the highest downwards.  
 But according to *the intelligence* place in general and time in general  
 are prior to all that is in them: therefore the knowledge of special  
 and individual places and times is prior to those things which are

regnat *erasa sunt nonnulla uerba quae adscripserat* C in R 34 temporibusque:  
 que *erasum est, sed postea s.l. restauratum in R* 35 et RB: ex P intelligitur B:  
 intelligitur RP 36 intelligentiam R<sup>c</sup>BP: generationem R\* 37 pro-  
 priorumque: que om. P 38 post eis *erasum est sunt in R* post proprieque  
*adscriptum est s.l. et, sed postea erasum in R*

de  
 Melchisedech

40  
 Concerning  
 Melchisedech

conclusio de  
 loco et  
 tempore

intelliguntur. Ac per hoc concluditur nil aliud esse locum nisi natura-  
 lem diffinitionem modumque positionemque uniuscuiusque siue gene-  
 ralis siue specialis creaturae, quemadmodum nil aliud est tempus nisi  
 rerum per generationem motionis ex non esse in esse inchoatio[nem] 483c  
 ipsiusque motus rerum mutabilium certae dimensiones donec ueniat 5  
 stabilis finis in quo immutabiliter omnia stabunt.

A. Claurescit paululum, ut reor, huius ratiocinationis intentio.  
 Nam nil aliud appetit, quantum mihi datur intelligere, quam ut nihil  
 esse locum suadeat nisi naturalem uniuscuiusque creaturae diffiniti- 10  
 onem, intra quam tota continetur et extra quam nullo modo extendi-  
 tur. Ac per hoc datur intelligi siue locum quis dixerit siue finem siue  
 terminum siue diffinitionem siue circumscriptionem unum idipsum-  
 que significare, ambitum uidelicet finitae naturae. Quamuisque  
 multae diffinitionum species quibusdam esse uideantur, sola ac uere  
 ipsa dicenda est diffinitio quae a Grecis YCIAΔEC, a nostris uero 15  
 essentialis, uocari consuevit. Aliae siquidem aut connumerationes  
 [intelligibilium] partium YCIAE aut argumentationes quaedam 483D  
 extrinsecus per accidentia aut qualescunque sententiarum species  
 sunt, sola uero YCIAΔEC id solum recipit ad diffiniendum quod per-  
 fectionem naturae quam diffinitio complet ac perficit. Diffinitio enim, 20  
 ut ait Augustinus, nihil maius nihil minus tenet quam id quod sus-  
 ceptum est ad explicandum; aliter omnino uitiosa est. 484A

quae uera  
 debet dici  
 diffinitio

N. Clare perspicis. Non enim aliud praeter quod dixisti praedicta  
 ratio appetit suadere.

A. Sed miror nec pure perspicio quomodo diffinitio cuiuscunque 25  
 essentiae non intra ipsam sed extra esse dicatur, hoc est neque totum  
 ipsius neque pars dici ualeat.

N. Attentior igitur esto ut et hoc plane cognoscas.

A. Quantum lux interior admittit.

utrum inter  
 uisibilia aut  
 inuisibilia  
 diffinitiones  
 continentur

N. Dic quaeso: cum rerum omnium duo genera sint, omne enim 30  
 quod dicitur esse aut uisibile est et sensibus corporeis percipitur [aut  
 percipi potest], aut inuisibile et intelligentiae obtutu consideratur  
 [aut considerari possibile est aut per se aut per aliquod sibi ad-  
 haerens], in quo praedictorum generum diffinitiones esse iudicas? 484B

A. Ridiculum istuc. Quis enim locum seu finem seu diffinitionem 35  
 seu qualemcunque circumscriptionis speciem qua uniuscuiusque  
 substantia ambitur inter ea quae sensibus corporeis succumbunt recte

4 ex non esse in esse: cf. p. 192, 23 et loca illic laudata 21 Aug., *De quant. animae* xxv. 47

1 lemma BPRm 4 inchoationem RB: inchoatione P 5 certae RB<sup>c</sup>:  
 caertae B\* 9 suadeat R<sup>c</sup>B: suadet R\*P 13 lemma BPRm (uera  
 BRm: uero P dici BP: esse Rm) quamuisque RB: quamuis quae P  
 17 argumentationes *codd.*: lege augmentationes 18 qualescunque R: qualis-  
 cunque B: qualescunque P 22 uitiosa RBP<sup>c</sup>: uisitiosa P\* 25 cuiuscun-

understood in them as species and individuals. And thus it is con-  
 cluded (136) that place is simply the natural definition and mode and  
 position of each creature, whether a general creature or a species,  
 just as time is simply the beginning of the movement of things through  
 generation from not-being into being, and the fixed measurements of  
 this motion of changeable things until there shall come the enduring  
 end in which all things shall be immutably at rest.

Conclusion  
 concerning  
 place and  
 time

A. The purpose of this reasoning is beginning to become clear,  
 I think: for, as far as I can understand, it seeks to accomplish nothing  
 else than to prove that place is simply the natural definition of each  
 creature, within which it is wholly contained and beyond which it  
 by no means extends: and from this it is given to understand that  
 whether one call it place or limit or term or definition or circumscrip-  
 tion, one and the same thing is denoted, namely, the confine of a  
 finite creature. And although some think there are many kinds of defini-  
 tion, that alone and truly is to be named definition which is usually  
 called by the Greeks *ὀνομάδης*, but by our writers essentialis: 41  
 for others are either enumerations of the [intelligible] parts of the  
*ὀνοσία*, or corollaries drawn from outside by means of its accidents, or  
 any kind of opinion about it whatsoever. But only the *ὀνομάδης*  
 admits for purposes of definition that alone which fully completes  
 the perfection of the nature it defines. For a definition, as Augustine  
 says, admits nothing more and nothing less than that which it has  
 undertaken to define; otherwise it is utterly faulty.

41  
 What should  
 be meant by  
 a true  
 definition

N. You see it clearly. The foregoing argument seeks to show just  
 what you have said.

A. But I wonder and do not clearly see how the definition of each  
 essence is said to be not within it but outside it, that is, how it can  
 be said to be neither the whole nor a part of it.

N. Be more attentive, then, so that you may learn this too.

A. As much as the inner light allows.

N. Tell me, pray: As all things are comprised in two genera—for  
 everything which is said to be is either visible and perceived [or can  
 be perceived] by the bodily senses, or is invisible and contemplated  
 [or can be contemplated] by the eye of the intelligence [either in  
 itself or through something that is associated with it]—in which of  
 the aforesaid genera do you consider definitions to be?

Whether  
 definitions  
 are contained  
 within the  
 visibles or  
 the invisibles

A. That is an absurd question. For who among the truly wise 42  
 would put place, or limit, or definition, or any kind of circumscrip-  
 tion within which each substance is confined, among the things which

que RB: cuiuscunque P 28 Attentior: At *in ras.* P 29 admittit RBP<sup>c</sup>:  
 admitti P\* 30 lemma BPRm 31 et RB: aut P 35 *post* Ridiculum  
*eratum est a in P* 36 qualemcunque RB: qualemcunque P circumscriptionis  
 BP: circumscriptionis R

sapientum posuerit cum uideat terminos liniae seu trianguli seu alicuius planae solidaeue figurae incorporeos esse? [Punctus siquidem, ex quo linea incipit et in quo terminatur nec linea nec pars eius est sed terminus liniae, ac per hoc locus eius nec sensu percipitur sed sola ratione cogitatur; punctus enim sensibilis pars liniae est, non autem eius principium seu finis. Similiter et ipsa linea ratione consulta incorporea est et est principium superficies. Item superficies incorporea est et est finis liniae, principium uero soliditatis. Soliditas quoque incorporea est et est finis totius perfectionis. Quicquid enim in his, id est siue punctum siue lineam siue superficiem siue soliditatem uisibilem, corporeus sensus attigerit, profecto figurae incorporalium rerum sunt, non earum ipsa uera substantia, quae incorporea est.] Similiterque naturalium corporum siue sensibilia sint per temperantiam elementorum quibus subsistunt siue subtilitate sui mortales fugitent contuitus solo intellectu naturae fines perspiciuntur. [Forma siquidem quae omnem materiam corporum continet incorporea est. Ipsa etiam materies, si quis intentus aspexerit, ex incorporeis qualitibus copulatur.]

N. Itaque in genere inuisibilium diffinitiones quas locos rerum circumscriptarum diximus concludi arbitraris?

A. Ita quidem arbitror et nil certius uideo.

de inuisibilium speciebus  
N. Recte aestimas. Sed quia iterum genus inuisibilium in multas species diuidi patitur, quaedam enim inuisibilium sunt quae intelliguntur et intelligunt, quaedam intelliguntur et non intelligunt, quaedam neque intelliguntur neque intelligunt, in qua specie horum diffinitiones connumerandas esse censet?

[A.] In ea profecto quae intelligit et intelligitur; actio siquidem diffinitionis ratiocinantis intelligentisque naturae actio est.

N. Nec aliter uidetur esse posse; nulla enim natura quae se ipsam non intelligit esse aut sui aequalem aut se inferiorem potest diffinire. [Nam quod supra se est quomodo potest cognoscere dum eius notitiam non ualeat superare?]

A. Solius ergo intellectualis naturae quae in homine angeloque constituitur diffinitionis peritia est. [Sed utrum angelus aut homo se ipsum aut homo angelum aut angelus hominem possit diffinire non parua quaestio est, de qua quid tibi uidetur nosse cupio.]

N. Videtur mihi neque se ipsos neque inter se inuicem diffinire posse. Nam si homo se ipsum uel angelum diffinit maior se ipso est

1 liniae RB: lineae P    2 planae solidaeue *deleta sunt in P*    punctus R: punctum BP    10 siue (1) s.l. R    11 uisibilem s.l. R    14 elementorum RBP\*: elementoru P<sup>c</sup>    20 arbitraris R<sup>c</sup>BP<sup>c</sup>: arbitra\*\*s R\*: arbitaris P\*    22 *lemma* BP: de inuisibilibus speciebus s.l. Rm    23 patitur RB: partitur P    27 In R<sup>c</sup> BP: in R\*    31 est s.l. R    cognoscere in ras. R    32 ualeat in ras. R    33 Solius R<sup>c</sup>BP: Solus R\*    35 angelus RP: augelus B    36 uidetur s.l. R    37 .N. s.l. R    diffinire RB: diffiniri P    38 *post uel erasum est potest (?) in R*

are accessible to the bodily senses, when he sees that the limits of the line or triangle or any plane or solid figure are incorporeal? [For the (geometrical) point, from which the line begins and in which it ends, is neither the line nor part of the line, but its limit, and therefore its place is not perceived by sense but thought of by the reason alone. The sensible point (137), on the other hand (138), is part of a line, but is not its beginning or its end. Similarly, the line itself also, rationally considered, is incorporeal, and is the beginning of a surface. The surface is incorporeal too, and is the end of the line but the beginning of a solid. But the solid also is incorporeal, and is the end of the perfection of the whole. For whatever there is in these that bodily sense has managed to grasp, that is, any point or line or surface or solidity that is visible, surely consists of figures of incorporeal things, not their true substance, which is incorporeal.] And similarly in the case of natural bodies, whether they are sensible by the proper mixing of the elements of which they consist or elude mortal powers of perception by their fineness, the limits of their nature are perceived by the intellect alone. [For form, which contains all matter of bodies, is incorporeal. Matter itself, if one examines it carefully, is also built up of incorporeal qualities.]

N. So you think that it is to the genus of the invisibles that definitions, which we have called the places of circumscribed things, belong?

A. Indeed I think so, and there is nothing that I see more surely.

N. You think rightly. But as the genus of the invisibles may in turn be divided into many species—for there are some of the invisibles which are understood and understand, some which are understood and do not understand, some which neither are understood nor understand—in which of these species do you think that definitions should be included?

[A.] Surely in that which understands and is understood. For the act of defining is the act of a reasoning and understanding nature.

N. There seems to be no alternative. For no nature that does not understand that it itself *exists* can define either a nature that is equal to itself or one that is its inferior. [For as to what is its superior, how can it get to know that when it cannot rise above the knowledge of itself? (139)]

A. Therefore the intellectual nature alone, which is constituted in man and angel, possesses the skill of definition. [But whether angel or man can define himself, or man angel, or angel man, is no small question: concerning which I desire to know your opinion.]

N. My opinion is that they can neither define themselves nor each other. For if man defines himself or the angel he is greater than

43 Concerning the species of the invisibles

et angelo. Maius enim est quod diffinit quam quod diffinitur. Eadem de angelo est ratio. Hos itaque ab ipso solo qui eos ad imaginem suam condidit diffiniri posse arbitror.

A. Videtur mihi hac ratione concludi non alias naturas rationabili animo diffiniri nisi inferiores se siue uisibiles sint siue inuisibiles.] 5

N. Quisquis hoc dixerit [ueritate] non errat; ideoque ubi diffinitiones sunt eorum quae diffiniuntur ibi profecto et loci eorum quae circumscribuntur. Praedictis enim rationibus confectum est locum diffinitionem esse et diffinitionem locum.

A. Confectum scilicet. 10

de eo quod  
loca id est  
diffinitiones  
corporum  
in anima  
rationabili  
compre-  
henduntur

N. Atqui diffinitiones [corporum rerumque ratione carentium] non alibi nisi in anima rationabili sunt. In ea itaque et loci omnium quae localiter comprehenduntur. At si rationalis anima incorporea est, unde nullus sapiens dubitat, necessario quicquid in ea intelligitur incorporeum esse manifestum est; [et] locus in anima intelligitur, sicut prius datum est: incorporalis est igitur. 15

A. Et hoc iure conclusum uideo. [Siue enim angelica natura rerum inferiorum se diffinitiones contineat, ut Augustino uidetur placere, nam et angeli inferiora se creduntur administrare, siue ad superiora se semper intendat, id est ad causas rerum aeternas, huic rationi non obstat. Non enim a ueritate distat, ut uideo, si quis aestimauerit humanum animum terrenis adhuc fanthasiis depressum causas creatas inferiorum se naturarum posse comprehendere si pure uixerit, angelicum uero omnium rerum aeternas appetere rationes, et ad hoc semper caritate motus humanam naturam attrahere. 20

N. Recte uides.] Videsne itaque non aliud esse locum nisi actionem intelligentis atque comprehendentis uirtute intelligentiae ea quae comprehendere potest, siue sensibilia sint siue intellectu comprehensa? [Atqui si ita est] aliud igitur est quod diffinitur et aliud eius diffinitio. 25

A. Aliud esse uideo; sed intellectus qui se ipsum intelligit quoniam se ipsum diffinit suimet locus esse uidetur. 30

N. Nec hoc absurde quis dixerit si ullus intellectus post deum, qui intellectus omnium dicitur, se ipsum potest intelligere. Si autem omnis intellectus praeter deum non a se ipso sed a superiori se circumscribitur, nullus intellectus suimet locus erit sed intra superiorem se collocabitur; [et hoc paulo superius nonne inter nos conuenerat non aliter esse?] 35

18 cf. Aug., De Gen. ad litt. iv. 24, p. 123, 23-124, 5 CSEL

4 post naturas erasa sunt quattuor uerba in R 5 inferiores se RB: inferior esse P 6 errat R<sup>c</sup>BP: erat R\* 11 lemma BPRm (corporum om. Rm; rationali Rm) 15 locus P: Locus RB 19 angeli s.l. R 20 intendat R<sup>c</sup>BP: intendat R\* 22 fanthasiis RB: phantasiis P 24 appetere RB: apetere P 25 motus codd.: lege motum 27-28 comprehendentis-intelectu bis in R\* 28 siue (2) RB<sup>c</sup>P: seue B\* 29 aliud: Aliud codd. 34 a superiori RBP<sup>c</sup>: aperiore P\* 36 inter nos om. P

himself or the angel. For that which defines is greater than that which is defined. The same argument applies to the angel. Therefore I think that these can only be defined by Him Who created them in His own image.

A. From this argument I conclude that no other natures are defined by the rational mind than those which are inferior to itself, whether they be visible or invisible.]

N. Whosoever says this (140) does not stray [from the truth]; and therefore wherever are the definitions of things that are defined, there too, surely, will be the places of things that are circumscribed. For from the reasons given above it results that place is definition and definition is place.

A. It is evidently so.

N. But the definitions [of bodies and of things devoid of reason] are nowhere but in the rational soul. In it therefore will also be the places of all things that are comprehended in place. But if the rational soul is incorporeal, which no wise man doubts, it is plain that whatever is understood in it must be incorporeal; [and] place is understood in the soul, as has already been determined: therefore it is incorporeal.

The places, that is, the definitions, of bodies are comprehended in the rational soul

A. I see that this too is rightly concluded. [For whether the angelic nature contains the definitions of the things that are inferior to it, as Augustine seems to hold, for the angels are also believed to minister to the things that are below them, or whether it eternally contemplates the things that are above it, that is, the eternal causes of things, this argument holds. For he is not severed from the truth, as I see, who believes that the human mind, though still burdened with earthly fantasies, can comprehend the created causes of natures inferior to itself if he lives a pure life; but that the angelic (mind) seeks the eternal reasons of all things, and, moved by love, is ever drawing human nature towards the same.

N. You perceive rightly.] Do you then see that place is simply the act of him who understands and by virtue of his understanding comprehends those things which he can comprehend, whether they be sensible or accessible (only) to the intellect? [However, if this is so,] then (141) that which is defined is one thing and its definition is another.

A. I see that they are different. But an intellect which understands itself (142) seems to be the place of itself because it defines itself.

N. It would not be unreasonable to say this either, if there is any intellect, after God, Who is called the Intellect of all things, that can understand itself. But if every intellect except God is defined not by itself but by that which is above it, no intellect will be the place of itself but will be placed within that which is above it. [And did we not agree a little earlier on that this must be so?]



A. De hoc alibi latius disputandum aestimo; nunc autem uelim scire utrum aliud est natura animi diffinientis, id est omne quod ab eo intelligitur cognitionis loco comprehendentis, et aliud locus ipse seu diffinitio locati uel diffiniti.

N. Nec hoc inquisitione indignum esse uideo; multi enim de hoc dubitant. Sed quoniam uidemus aliud esse constitutas in anima liberales artes, aliud ipsam animam quae quasi quoddam subiectum est artium, artes uero ueluti inseparabilia naturaliaque animae accidentia uidentur esse, quid nos prohibet diffiniendi disciplinam inter artes ponere, adiungentes dialecticae cuius proprietas est rerum omnium quae intelligi possunt naturas diuidere coniungere discernere propriosque locos unicuique distribuere, atque ideo a sapientibus uera rerum contemplatio solet appellari? Nam cum in omni rationabili intellectualique natura tria inseparabilia semperque incorruptibiliter manentia considerantur, OYCIAN dico et ΔYNAMIN ΕΝΕΡΓΙΑΝque, hoc est essentiam uirtutem operationem (haec enim teste sancto Dionysio inseparabiliter sibi met adhaerent [ac ueluti unum sunt] et nec augeri nec minui possunt quoniam immortalia sunt atque immutabilia), num tibi uerisimile uideatur certaeque rationi conueniens omnes liberales disciplinas in ea parte quae ΕΝΕΡΓΙΑ, id est operatio, animae dicitur aestimari? Siquidem a philosophis ueraciter quaesitum repertumque est artes esse aeternas et semper immutabiliter animae adhaerere ita ut non quasi accidentia quaedam ipsius esse uideantur sed naturales uirtutes [actionesque] nullo modo ab ea recedentes nec recedere ualentes nec aliunde uenientes sed naturaliter ei insitas, ita ut ambiguum sit utrum ipsae aeternitatem ei prestant quoniam aeternae sunt eique semper adhaereant ut aeterna sit, an ratione subiecti quod est anima artibus aeternitas administratur (OYCIA enim animae et uirtus et actio aeternae sunt), an ita sibi inuicem coadhaereant dum omnes aeternae sint ut a se inuicem segregari non possint.

A. Huic rationi quoniam uera est nescio quis audeat reluctari. [Nam quodcunque horum quis firmauerit rationi non resistit. Ultimum tamen quod a te positum est uerisimilius esse caeteris elucet.] Sed ut ad eadem redeamus non mihi plane patet quomodo OYCIA siue in generibus siue in speciebus siue in atomis diffiniri possit cum in

15 OYCIAN-ΕΝΕΡΓΙΑΝque: cf. pp. 144, 19-21; 180, 15-16; 567A; 942A infra 16 teste-Dionysio: Ps.-Dionys., CH xi. 2, PG iii. 284D 4-6 21-30 artes-possint: cf. Eriug., Annot. in Marc. 96, 32-36 Lutz; op. cit., MS. Bodl. Auct. T II 19, ff. 60<sup>v</sup>12-61<sup>r</sup>3

15 ΔYNAMIN RB: ΔΙΝΑΜΙΝ P 16 dionysio BP: dyonysio R 16-17 sibi-met R<sup>c</sup>BP: simet R\* 17 unum om. P 18 post immutabilia add. sunt R\* num R<sup>c</sup>BP: nonne R\* 22 adhaerere in ras. R 25 insitas RB<sup>c</sup>P: insistas B\* 26 prestant RB: praestant P 27 quod in ras. R rasura post administratur in R 31 Huic in ras. R marginalia erasa in R

A. I think we must have a fuller discussion about this at another time. But now I should like to know whether the nature of the mind which defines, that is, which comprehends within the place of its knowledge everything which is understood by it, is different from the place itself, or definition of the thing placed or defined.

N. I see that this is not unworthy of investigation either, for many are in doubt about it. But since we see that the liberal arts which are constituted in the soul are different from the soul itself, which is a kind of subject of the arts, while the arts seem to be a kind of accidents which are inseparable from, and natural to, the soul (143), what hinders us from placing the method of defining among the arts, attaching it to the art of Dialectic, whose property is to divide and combine and distinguish the natures of all things which can be understood, and to allot each to its proper place, and therefore is usually called by the wise the true contemplation of things? For as in every rational and intellectual nature there are observed three things which are inseparable from one another and abide indestructibly for ever, I mean οὐσία and δύναμις and ἐνέργεια (144), that is, Essence, Power, and Operation—for according to St. Dionysius, these are eternally associated with one another [and are, as it were, one], and can neither be increased nor diminished, since they are immortal and immutable—does it not seem likely to you and consistent with sound reason that all the liberal arts should be held to be in that part which is called the ἐνέργεια, that is, the operation, of the soul? For it has been rightly sought out and found by the philosophers that the arts are eternal and are immutably attached to the soul forever, in such a way that they seem to be not some kind of accidents of it, but natural powers [and actions] which do not and could not withdraw from it, and which do not come from anywhere but are innate in it as part of its nature, so that it is doubtful whether it is the arts which confer eternity upon it because they are eternal and eternally associated with it so that it may be eternal, or whether it is by reason of the subject, which is the soul, that eternity is supplied to the arts (for the οὐσία and the Power and the Operation of the soul are eternal), or whether they coinhere in each other, all being eternal, in such a way that they cannot be separated from one another.

A. To this argument, since it is true, I know of no one who would dare to object. [For each of your alternatives could be affirmed without coming into conflict with reason. But the one you put forward last is clearly more likely to be true than the others.] But to return to the same problem: it is not quite clear to me how οὐσία, whether in genera or species or individuals, can be defined, since in earlier

praedictis rationibus huius libelli conclusum sit eam nullo sensui corporeo nullo intellectui comprehensibilem esse.

de eo quod nulla essentia diffiniri potest quid est sed quia est  
N. OYCIAN per se ipsam diffinire et dicere quid sit nemo potest; ex his autem quae inseparabiliter ei adhaerent et sine quibus esse non potest, ex loco dico et tempore—omnis enim OYCIA de nihilo creata localis temporalisque est, localis quidem quia aliquo modo est quoniam infinita non est, temporalis uero quoniam inchoat esse quod non erat—, solummodo diffiniri potest quia est. OYCIA itaque nullo modo diffinitur quid est sed diffinitur quia est. Ex loco nanque, ut diximus, et tempore accidentibusque aliis quae siue in ipsa seu extra intelliguntur esse tantummodo datur non quid sit sed quia est. Et hoc generaliter de omni OYCIA siue generalissima siue specialissima siue media non incongrue quis dixerit. Nam et causa omnium, quae deus est, ex his quae ab ea condita sunt solummodo cognoscitur esse, nullo uero creaturarum argumento possumus intelligere quid sit, atque ideo sola haec diffinitio de deo praedicatur, quia est qui plus quam esse est.

A. Huic quoque rationi nemo sane intelligentium, ut opinor, obstat.

firmissime rationes quod nulla pars mundi locus esse potest  
N. Nunc igitur sole lucidius perspicis eos esse deridendos, immo etiam dolendos, ac per hoc ad ueram rerum discretionem reuocandos, si uelint, aut penitus relinquendos, si suam consuetudinem ueritati inimicissimam sequi malint, qui partes huius mundi uisibilis caeterorum corporum intra se constitutorum naturalia loca esse opinantur. Nam, ut uerbi gratia de meo corpore dicam (animam quippe corporalibus huius mundi spatiis putare contineri impudentissimum est), si aer iste locus eius est sequitur ut quarta pars sui locus suus sit; nam [omne corpus uisibile] quattuor partibus constare omnibus notum est, ex igne uidelicet aere terra aqua. Nil autem irrationabilitati propinquius quam ut totum [corpus] sui parte locari *putetur*; totum siquidem omnes suas partes comprehendere, non autem pars totum recte aestimatur ambire. Item si corpus meum in isto aere ueluti in suo loco dicam sequitur nullum certum locum [ibi] posse habere; iste etenim aer semper circa terram uoluitur ac per hoc uno eodemque temporis spatio innumerabiles locos habere corpus eo constitutum necesse est, quod nulla ratione conceditur, praedictis siquidem rationibus suasum est locum in statu esse nulloque motu uariari.

11 non quid—est: cf. p. 40, 6-7 supra et al.

1 sensui R<sup>c</sup>BP: sensu R\* 3 lemma BP: nulla essentia potest diffiniri quid sit sed quia est Rm 6 quia RB<sup>c</sup>P: qui B\* 8 potest—itaque B: potest quia est OYCIA. Itaque R\*: potest quia est. OYCIA Itaque R<sup>c</sup>: potest OYCIA. Itaque P 14 condita in ras. R post sunt rasura in R cognoscitur R<sup>c</sup>BP: cognoscimus R\* 15 creaturarum argumento: -urarum argumento alia manu in ras. R 16 praedicatur BP: predicata R\*: predicatur R<sup>c</sup> 16-17 qui plus quam RB: quibusquam P 19 obstat R<sup>c</sup>BP: obstat R\* 20 lemma BPRm (firmissime B: finissime P

arguments in this book it was agreed that it is incomprehensible to any bodily sense or to any intellect.

N. Nobody can define *οὐσία* in itself or say what it is. But from the things which are inseparably associated with it and without which it cannot be, I mean from its place and time—for every *οὐσία* created out of nothing is local and temporal: local because it is after some manner since it is not infinite, temporal because it begins to be what it was not—, one can define only that it is. Therefore *οὐσία* is in no way defined as to what it is, but is defined that it is: for from place, as we have said, and from time and from other accidents which are understood to be either within it or outside, is given not what it is but only that it is; and this could aptly be said of all *οὐσία* universally, the most general, the most special, and the intermediate kinds. For even the Cause of all things, which is God, is only known to be from the things created by Him, but by no inference from creatures can we understand what He is, and therefore only this definition can be predicated of God: that He is He Who is More-than-being.

A. To this argument also none of those who are of sound understanding will, in my opinion, object.

N. So now you see more clearly than daylight that those should be laughed at, or rather pitied, and therefore be recalled to a true discernment of things if they are willing, or should be left quite alone if they prefer to persist in their attitude, which is utterly inimical to truth, who hold the opinion that the parts of this visible world are the natural places of the other bodies which are constituted within them. For, to speak for example of my own body—because to suppose that the soul is contained within the corporeal spaces of this world would be quite outrageous—, if this air is its place, it follows that its place is the fourth part of it; for it is known to everyone that [every visible body] consists of four parts, namely, of fire, air, earth, and water. But nothing could be nearer to unreason than *to suppose* that the whole [of a body] is placed within a part of it. For the right view is that the whole comprehends all its parts but the part does not contain the whole. Also, if I should say that my body is in this air as in its place, it follows that it can have no fixed place [there]. For this air is constantly revolving about the earth, and therefore a body placed in it must have at one and the same time an innumerable number of places, which reason does not allow at all. For it has been proved by earlier arguments that place is at rest and is not varied by

firmissime—quod om. Rm) 23 inimicissimam R<sup>c</sup>BP: inimicitiam R\* 26 impudentissimum BP: impudentissimum R 27 post pars deletum est mundi in P 30 locari putetur R<sup>c</sup>BP: locatur R\* 31 comprehendere BP: comprehendere R post pars deletum est totius in R 32 in (2) s.l. R 34 etenim RB<sup>c</sup>P: enim B\* 35-36 constitutum in ras. R

That no essence can be defined as to what it is but only that it is

46 The strongest arguments that no part of the world can be a place

Sicut ergo qui in flumine stat sedetue seu natat illam partem fluminis non potest retinere ut possit dicere certum locum fluminis possidere cum constat sine ulla intermissione illud transire, ita nemo debet dicere locum corporis sui hunc aerem sine ulla intermissione mobilem nulloque temporis momento stantem. Si autem quis huic rationi obiecerit terram, quoniam semper stat, corporum iure appellari locum uideat similiter terram materiem corporum esse, non locum. Quis autem materiam corporum eorundem esse locum ratione utens audeat dicere? [praesertim cum materia per se ipsam ratione considerata nec in motu nec in statu sit. In motu siquidem non est quod nondum inchoat certa forma contineri. Nam per formam mouetur materia, sine forma immobilis est, ut Graeci uolunt. Quo enim mouebitur quod nullo loco nullo tempore certo adhuc coartatur? Nec in statu est quia nondum finem suae perfectionis possidet; status siquidem finis motionis est. Quomodo autem potest in statu fieri quod non coepit iam moueri? Quomodo igitur materia corporis locus corporis quod ex ea conficitur potest esse cum et ipsa in se ipsa nullo certo loco seu modo seu forma circumscribatur, nulla certa ratione diffini(a)tur nisi per negationem? Negatur enim aliquid esse eorum quae sunt cum ex ea omnia quae creata sunt condita esse credantur.] Item si partes huius uisibilis mundi nostrorum corporum seu aliorum loca sunt loca nostra semper esse non possunt; dum enim corpus cuiusdam animalis solutum fuerit partesque illius ad sedes suas naturales ex quibus assumptum est separatim reuertantur locus eius, aer uerbi gratia seu aqua seu terra seu ignis, non erit, sed singulae partes unius corporis singulis connaturalibus sibi elementis ita commiscetur ut unum <cum> eis sint [non ut in eis sint ueluti aliquid in aliquo]. Quod enim reddetur aeri aer erit et non quasi in quodam loco aeris statuitur. [Non ut confusio quaedam corporum sit sed mirabili naturae modo unusquisque partem suam propriam in singulis habebit elementis totam per totum, non in parte partem, ita ut resurrectionis tempore nullus accipiet nisi quod suum est, sicut multorum luminarium lux simul est coniuncta ut nulla in ea sit commixtio nulla segregatio. Dum enim una eademque lux uideatur esse unumquodque tamen luminare suam propriam possidet lucem alterius luci non commixtam, sed mirabiliter totae in totis fiunt et

12 ut Graeci uolunt: cf. Procl., *In Tim.* i, p. 387, 30 sq. 32-p. 142, 1  
 sicut multorum—conficiunt: cf. Ps.-Dionys., *DN* ii. 4, PG iii. 641A 13-B 9

1 post fluminis uocem possidere a linea sequenti introduxit P 3 post intermissione add. mobile (?) R\*P\* 6 appellari RB: apellari P 8 lemma BP (post materie erasum est corporis in B) 10 post statu erasum est in R 12 immobilis RB: immobilis P 15 rasura post autem in P 16 coepit B<sup>c</sup>P: cepit RB\* iam s.l. R 18 circumscribatur RB: circumscribatur P 19 diffinitur codd. nisi s.l. P 20 sunt (2) s.l. R 23 illius RBP<sup>c</sup>: aliud P\*

any motion. So just as whoever stands or sits or swims in a river cannot keep to that part of the river so as to be able to say that he occupies a fixed place in the river, since it is agreed that it is unceasingly flowing by, so no one ought to call this air the place of his body, for it is unceasingly mobile and at no moment of time is at rest. But if anyone should object to this argument that earth, because it is always at rest, is correctly called the place of bodies, let him likewise consider that earth is the matter of bodies, not their place. And who, if he uses his reason, would dare to say that the matter of bodies is the place of the same bodies? [—especially since matter in itself, if rationally considered, is neither in motion nor at rest. It is not in motion since it does not yet begin to be contained within a definite form—for it is through form that matter is moved; without form it is immobile, according to the Greeks—for how will that be moved which is not yet limited by any place or fixed time? And it is not at rest because it does not yet possess the end of its perfection. For rest is the end of motion. But how can that be at rest which has not yet begun to move? How therefore can the matter of a body be the place of the body which is made from it, when even matter itself is not, in itself, circumscribed by any certain place or mode or form, (and) is not defined in any definite way save by negation? For it is negatively defined as not being any one of the things that are, since it is from it that all the things that are created are believed to be made.] Again, if the parts of this visible world are the places of our bodies or of others, our places cannot be for ever. For when the body of an animal has decayed and its parts return in separation to their natural abodes from which each was taken, its place, air, for instance, or water or earth or fire, will no longer exist, but the individual parts of the one body become so mingled each with the element whose nature it shares that it is one <with> it [—though they are not in their elements as one thing in another]. For that which is restored to air will be air, and is not, as it were, established in some place in the air [—not that there is any confusion of bodies, but in nature's admirable way each will possess its own part in each of the elements as a whole throughout the whole, not as a part in a part, so that at the time of the resurrection no one will receive what is not his own; just as the light from many luminaries is joined together in such a way that there is in it no confusion and no separation. For while it appears to be one and the same light, yet each luminary possesses its own light not confused with the light of another, and yet in a wonderful way they all become a whole and produce a single light.] Therefore (145) air is one thing and its place another. In the same way, I think, must be understood

Concerning matter

30 modo s.l. R 32 accipiet BP: accipiat R 34 post commixtio pro nulla habebat neque R\* eademque: que s.l. R 35 post lucem rasura in B

unum lumen conficiunt.] Aliud igitur est aer et aliud locus eius. Eodem modo de caeteris elementis partibusque solutorum corporum sibi redditis intelligendum esse censeo. Et si ita est necessario dabitur aut istas partes mundi generales loca corporum ab eis perfussorum [compositorumque] non esse aut corpora ipsa certum locum non habere aut paenitus omni loco uacare, quod natura rerum ueraque ipsius contemplatio non sinit concedere. Non enim ulla creatura certo suo loco atque immutabili certisque temporum spatiis finibusque, siue corporea sit siue incorporea, potest carere, ideoque, ut saepe diximus, duo haec, locus profecto et tempus, a philosophis ωΝ ΑΝΕΥ appellantur, hoc est quibus sine; nam sine his nulla creatura generatione inchoans et aliquo modo subsistens potest consistere. Vtque proximo rerum utamur argumento, si locus corporis est omne quodcumque ei circumfunditur color erit locus corporis; nullum etenim uisibile corpus est quod luce coloris non circumfundatur. Si autem color colorati corporis locus est necessario dabitur qualitas locus corporis esse; sed quis tam dira stultitia opprimatur ut qualitatem corporis locum corporis esse fateatur? At si color corporis qualitas est incorporea et extra corpus undique corpori circumfunditur non tamen locus eius esse ulli sapientum uidetur. Quae ratione aer iste seu aliquid aliud mundi elementum, quamuis corporibus intra se positus circumfusa sint, eorum tamen ullo modo esse [posse] loca non conceditur.

de eo quod nulla creatura sine loco et tempore potest) esse

quid inter corpus et essentiam suam

A. Satis de hoc disputatum; sed aduersus eos qui non aliud esse corpus et aliud corporis essentiam putant, in tantum seducti ut ipsam substantiam corpoream esse uisibilemque atque tractabilem non dubitent, quaedam [breuiter] dicendum esse arbitror. Nam multi ac paene omnes tali errore fatigantur naturales rerum differentias ignorantes.

N. Aduersus stultitiam pugnare nil est laboriosius; nulla enim auctoritate uinci fatetur, nulla ratione suadet. Sed quoniam non est aequalis hominum stultitia nec eadem erroris caligine mentes eorum obscurantur paucis argumentationibus aduersus eos utendum uideo.

A. Utendum sane. Si enim eis proderit lucrum erit; sin uero, nosmet ipsos de talibus naturarum discretionibus disputationis studio certiores efficiemus.

N. Has itaque paucas de pluribus dialecticas collectiones intentus considera: omne corpus quod materia formaque componitur quoniam

11 Vide supra p. 96, 34-36 26 cf. p. 122, 13-14 supra

1 igitur R<sup>c</sup>BP: ergo R\* 4 perfussorum RB<sup>c</sup>: perfusorum B\*P 6 aut paenitus loco carere scripserat C in marg. R, sed postea erasa sunt paenitus BP: penitus R 7 lemma BP: nulla creatura sine loco et tempore potest esse Rm 9 incorporea: in s.l. B 11 ωΝ ΑΝΕΥ R<sup>c</sup>B: ω ΝΑΝΕΥ R\*: ΟΝ ΑΝΕΥ P

the case of the other elements and of the restoration to them of the parts of bodies that have decayed. And if so, it will necessarily follow either that these general parts of the world are not the places of the bodies they pervade [and compose]; or that the bodies themselves have no definite place or have no place at all, which the nature of things and a true view of it do not allow us to concede. For no creature can be without its own definite and unchangeable place and its own fixed duration and limits of time, whether it be corporeal or incorporeal; and that is why, as we have often said, these two, namely, place and time, are called by the philosophers *ὦν ἀνευ*, that is, 'without which'; for without these no creature which has its beginning by generation and subsists after some manner can exist. And to take the first example that comes to hand, if everything which surrounds a body is its place, then colour will be the place of a body, for there is no visible body which is not surrounded by the light of a colour. But if colour is the place of a coloured body, it will necessarily follow that a quality is the place of the body: but who is burdened with such appalling stupidity as to maintain that the quality of a body is the body's place? But if the colour of a body is an incorporeal quality, and, being outside the body, surrounds it all about, that it is not its place will be evident to any wise man. On these grounds it is not allowed that this air or any other element of the world, although they surround the bodies that are placed within them, [can], for all that, *by any means* be their places.

That no creature is without place and time

A. Enough has been said about this. But I think [a few words] should be said against those who think that the body and the body's essence are one and the same, being so deceived that they have no doubt but that substance itself is corporeal and visible and tangible. For many, indeed almost all, labour under this error, not distinguishing the natural differences of things.

47 What the difference is between a body and its essence

N. Nothing is more tedious than battling against stupidity. For before no authority does it admit defeat, by no reason is it convinced. But since stupidity is not equal in (all) men, and their minds are not (all) clouded to the same extent, I see that a few arguments must be brought against them.

A. Certainly they must. For if they profit from them there will be gain, but if not, we shall ourselves, from the exercise of our discussion, obtain a firmer grip on these distinctions of natures.

N. Let us then carefully consider these few of the many syllogisms of Dialectic: Every body which is composed of matter and form, since

appellantur RB: apellantur P quibus s.l. B 13 omne RB: omnem P 14 quodcumque RB: quodcumque P 18 at BP: ac R 19-20 circumfunditur RB: circumfunditur P 22 ullo modo BP: non R\*: nullo modo R<sup>c</sup>(C) 24 lemma BPRm (sui B\*) 33 argumentationibus RBP<sup>c</sup>: argumentationis P\* 39 post componitur erasum est corpus in R

solui potest corruptibile est: mortale autem corpus materia formaque  
 componitur: corruptibile est igitur. [Item] omnis OYCIA simplex est  
 nullamque ex materia formaque compositionem recipit quoniam  
 unum inseparabile est: nulla igitur OYCIA corpus mortale rationabiliter  
 conceditur esse. [Hoc autem dictum est quia omnis OYCIA, quanquam  
 intelligatur ex essentia et essentiali differentia composita esse—hac  
 enim compositione nulla incorporea essentia potest carere, siquidem  
 et ipsa diuina OYCIA quae non solum simplex sed plus quam simplex  
 creditur esse essentialem differentiam recipit, est enim <in ea>  
 ingenua genita procedens <substantia>—, ipsa tamen compositio quae  
 sola ratione cognoscitur nulloque actu et operatione fieri comprobatur  
 rationabiliter simplicitas esse iudicanda est.] Vt autem firmitus  
 cognoscas OYCIAN, id est essentiam, incorruptibilem esse lege librum  
 sancti Dionysii Ariopagitae De Diuinis Nominibus eo loci quo de  
 natura demonum deque eorum malitia disputat [quod nullam  
 essentiam neque eorum neque aliorum corrumpere possit] et re-  
 peries eum disputare subtilissime nullum eorum quae sunt in quan-  
 tum essentia et natura est ullo modo corrumpi posse. Haec enim tria  
 in omni creatura siue corporea siue incorporea, ut ipse certissimis  
 argumentationibus edocet, incorruptibilia sunt [et inseparabilia]:  
 OYCIA, ut saepe diximus, ΔΙΝΑΜΙΣ ΕΝΕΡΓΕΙΑ, hoc est essentia uirtus  
 operatio naturalis.

de eo quod  
 essentia et  
 uirtus et  
 operatio  
 naturalis in  
 omni  
 creatura  
 insepara-  
 bilia sunt

A. [Horum trium exemplum posco.

N. Nulla natura siue rationalis siue intellectualis est quae ignoret  
 se esse quamuis nesciat quid sit.

A. Hoc non ambigo.

N. Dum ergo dico, Intelligo me esse, nonne in hoc uno uerbo quod  
 est Intelligo tria significo a se inseparabilia? nam et me esse, et posse  
 intelligere me esse, et intelligere me esse demonstro. Num uides uno  
 uerbo et meam OYCIAM meamque uirtutem et actionem significari?  
 Non enim intelligerem si non essem neque intelligerem si uirtute  
 intelligentiae carerem nec illa uirtus in me silet sed in operationem  
 intelligendi prorumpit.

A.] Verum et uerisimile.

N. Num igitur necesse est eos qui dicunt corpus materiale OYCIAN  
 esse aut corpus suum ex forma materiaque compositum non esse  
 fateri sed OYCIAN incorruptibilem esse, aut corpus suum corruptibile

14 Ps.-Dionys., DN iv. 23, PG iii. 724C-728A  
 e.g. 486 BC

21 ut saepe diximus:

6 essentia R<sup>c</sup>BP: essenti R\* differentia BP: differen<sup>t</sup>ia R hac RB: haec P  
 11 comprobatur: batur in ras. R 14 dionysii BP: dyonisi R 15 demonum  
 B: daemonum RP malitia RB: militia P 16-17 reperies B<sup>c</sup>: repperies  
 RB\*P 18 lemma BP: essentia et uirtus et operatio naturalis in omni creatura  
 Rm ullo modo R<sup>c</sup>BP: nullo modo R\* 19 corporea R<sup>c</sup>BP: corpor<sup>a</sup> R\*

it can be dissolved, is corruptible; but mortal body is composed  
 of matter and form; therefore it is corruptible. [Again] every οὐσία  
 is simple and admits no composition of matter and form, since it is  
 an indivisible unity; therefore no οὐσία is reasonably allowed to be  
 a mortal body. [Now this is said because every οὐσία, although it is  
 understood to be composed of essence and essential difference—for  
 this is a compositeness which no incorporeal essence can be without,  
 for even the Divine Οὐσία itself which is held to be not only simple  
 but more-than-simple admits essential difference, because there is  
 <in it> the Unbegotten, the Begotten, and the Proceeding <Sub-  
 stance>—, nevertheless this compositeness, which is recognizable by  
 the reason alone and which demonstrably comes about by no act or  
 operation, is reasonably considered a simplicity.] But for a firmer  
 assurance that οὐσία, that is, essence, is incorruptible, read the book  
 of St. Dionysius the Areopagite 'On the Divine Names' at that place  
 where he deals with the nature of demons and their wickedness  
 [(saying) that it can corrupt no essence of either themselves or  
 others] and you will find that he argues very subtly that nothing of  
 the things that are, in so far as it is an essence and a nature, can by  
 any means be corrupted. For there are these three things which in  
 every creature, whether corporeal or incorporeal, as he himself  
 demonstrates by the surest arguments, are incorruptible [and  
 inseparable]: οὐσία, as we have often said, δύναμις, ἐνέργεια, that is,  
 Essence, Power, its natural Operation.

A. [I request an illustration of these three.

N. There is no nature, whether rational or intellectual, which does  
 not know that it is, although it may not know what it is.

A. This I do not doubt.

N. Thus, when I say, 'I understand that I am', do I not imply in  
 this single verb, 'understand', three (meanings) which cannot be  
 separated from each other? For I show that I am, and that I can  
 understand that I am, and that I do understand that I am. Do you  
 not see that by the one verb are denoted my οὐσία and my power,  
 and my act? For I would not understand if I were not (147), nor  
 would I understand if I lacked the power of understanding, nor does  
 that power remain latent in me, but breaks forth in the operation of  
 understanding.

A.] True and truthlike.

N. Then must not those who say that the material body is an οὐσία  
 either confess that their body is not composed of form and matter  
 but is an incorruptible οὐσία; or be compelled by truth to admit

post certissimis deletum est rationi in P 20 inseparabilia RB<sup>c</sup>P: iseparabilia B\*  
 24 intellectualis BP: intell<sup>e</sup>ctualis R 27 in s.l. B uno uerbo RB: uerbo uno P  
 31 uirtute RB: uirtutem P 36 post esse (1) add. profiteri R\*

48  
 That  
 essence and  
 power and  
 natural  
 operation are  
 in every  
 creature  
 inseparable  
 (146)

et materiale esse ac per hoc OYCIAN non esse ueritate coacti concedere?

A. Necessse sane. Sed mihi uideris non omne corpus OYCIAN esse uniuersaliter sed omne corpus materia formaque compactum solummodo negare.

N. Intentus itaque haec intueri ne me aestimes non de specie quadam corporum sed uniuersaliter de omni corpore dixisse, quamuis specialiter de corpore composito ex forma materiaque dixerim pro praesentis quaestionis utilitate aduersus eos qui mortalia sua corpora transitoriaque non aliud esse nisi suam OYCIAN suamque OYCIAN nihil aliud esse nisi corpus materiale suum diuersisque compositum, forma uidelicet atque materia [uariisque accidentibus], <dicunt>. Vt autem plane cognoscas uniuersaliter OYCIAN nullum corpus esse hanc argumentationis accipe speciem.

A. Accipiam. Sed prius quandam formulam praedictae argumentationis fieri necessarium uideo. Nam praedicta ratiocinatio plus argumentum e contrario uidetur esse quam dialectici syllogismi imago.

acutissima  
 argumenta de  
 discretionem  
 corporis et  
 essentiae

N. Fiat igitur maxima propositio sic:—Vtrum OYCIA corpus corruptibile est. Omnis OYCIA incorruptibilis est; omne *incorruptibile* corpus materiale *non est*: omnis igitur OYCIA corpus materiale non est. Et reflexim:—omne igitur corpus materiale OYCIA non est. Item omne corpus quod ex forma atque materia componitur simplex non est; omnis autem OYCIA simplex est: nullum igitur corpus forma materiaque compositum OYCIA est. [Item omnium hominum una eademque OYCIA est (omnes enim unam participant essentiam ac per hoc quia omnibus communis est nullius proprie est); corpus autem commune omnium hominum non est (nam unusquisque suum proprium possidet corpus): non et OYCIA igitur communis est et corpus est; est autem communis: non est igitur corpus. Eadem ratio in caeteris animalibus inanimalibusque perspicue splendet.]

A. Haec formula idonea est. Redi [precor] ad promissam argumenti uniuersalem speciem [qua concluditur nullum corpus OYCIAM esse].

N. Omne quod longitudine latitudine altitudine comprehenditur quoniam diuersis spatiis concluditur corpus est. Quod autem nullum praedictorum spatiorum recipit quoniam unum est atque simplex nullumque motum naturae suae per spatia potest recipere necessario incorporale est. OYCIA autem nec longitudine nec latitudine nec

1 coacti *codd.*: lege coactos 6 ne *codd.*: lege ut 10 nisi suam  
 om. P, sed ad calc. adscribit sP OYCIAN (1) R<sup>c</sup>BP<sup>c</sup>: OYCIAM R\*P\* OYCIAN  
 (2) R<sup>c</sup>BP: OYCAM R\* 12 dicunt, quod in nostris *codd.* deest, ex cod. Trin. Coll.  
 Cantab. o. 5. 20 supplent Gale et Floss 14 accipe RBP<sup>c</sup>: accept\* P\* 16 ratiocinatio RBP<sup>c</sup>: raticinatio P\* 19 lemma BP (ACCVTISSIMA P): argumenta de discretionem corporis et anime Rm 20-21 omne-

that their body is corruptible and material, and therefore not an οὐσία?

A. Surely they must. But you seem to me to be denying not that every body in general is an οὐσία, but only every body which is composed of matter and form.

N. Listen carefully then, so that you may judge that I was not speaking of some species of bodies but generally of every body, although I mentioned the special case of the body which is composed of form and matter for the purpose of the present inquiry directed against those who <say> that their mortal and transient bodies are nothing else than their οὐσία, and that their οὐσία is nothing else but their body, which is material and composed of different (parts), namely, of form and matter [and the various accidents]. But that you may learn for certain that it is universally true that no body is an οὐσία, take the following kind of argument.

A. I will. But I see that first we must have some kind of regular form for this argument. For the foregoing reasoning was more like an argument from contraries than the model of a dialectical syllogism (148).

N. Let this be the main theme: Whether οὐσία is a corruptible body. All οὐσία is incorruptible; nothing *incorruptible* is a material body: therefore no οὐσία is a material body. And conversely: therefore no material body is an οὐσία. Again: No body which is composed of form and matter is simple; but all οὐσία is simple: therefore no body composed of form and matter is an οὐσία. [Again: All men have one and the same οὐσία—for all participate in one essence, and therefore because it is common to all it is the property of none—; but body is not common to all men—for each possesses his own proper body—: therefore οὐσία is not common and at the same time a body; but it is common: therefore it is not a body. The same is evidently true with regard to the other animals and to inanimate creatures.]

Very acute  
 arguments  
 concerning  
 the distinction  
 between  
 body and  
 essence

A. This formula answers the purpose. Return [pray] to the general type of argument which you promised (149) [whereby it is concluded that no body is an οὐσία].

N. Everything which is comprehended within length, breadth, and depth, since it is enclosed in diverse kinds of dimension, is a body, while that which admits none of these dimensions because it is one and simple and cannot admit into its nature any motion through space is necessarily incorporeal; but οὐσία is not *extended* in length or

non est R<sup>c</sup>BP: omne corpus materiale corruptibile est R\* 25-31 item-splendet: vide p. 152, 17-30 infra 26 OYCIA BP: YCIA adscripsit s.l. C in R omnes BP: omnis R 28 hominum BP: hom\*num R 29 OYCIA BP: OYCIAE R 32-33 argumenti R<sup>c</sup>BP: argumentis R\* 33 speciem s.l. R

altitudine protenditur et quoniam in suae naturae simplicitate indiui- 491C  
 dua permanet incorporalis est. Nulla itaque OYCIA quoniam caret  
 spatio corporalis est, sicut nullum corpus quoniam spatiis extenditur  
 OYCIA est.

A. Hoc etiam certa dialectica formula imaginari uolo. 5

N. Fiat itaque forma syllogismi conditionalis ita. Maxima pro-  
 positio: utrum OYCIA corpus est. Si OYCIA corpus est longitudinis  
 latitudinis altitudinisque spatia recipit; OYCIA autem longitudinem  
 latitudinem altitudinemque non recipit: corpus igitur non est. Si  
 autem ENTYMEMATIC, hoc est conceptionis communis animi, 10  
 syllogismum, qui omnium conclusionum principatum obtinet quia  
 ex his quae simul esse non possunt assumitur, audire desideras, 491D  
 accipe huius modi formulam. Non et OYCIA est et incorporalis non  
 est; est autem OYCIA: incorporalis igitur. Non enim simul esse potest  
 ut et OYCIA sit et incorporea non sit. Item non et OYCIA est et 15  
 corpus est; est autem OYCIA: non est igitur corpus. Item non non et  
 OYCIA est et incorporalis est; est autem OYCIA: incorporalis igitur.  
 Maximum itaque argumentum est ex quo dinoscitur aliud esse corpus  
 aliud OYCIAN. Nam OYCIA in genera et species diuiditur, corpus 492A  
 uero ueluti totum quoddam in partes separatur. Item corpus in parti- 20  
 bus suis totum non est. In capite enim seu manibus pedibusue totum  
 corpus non comprehenditur, et est maius in omnibus suis partibus  
 simul, minus uero in singulis non simul. E contrario autem OYCIA  
 tota in singulis suis formis speciebusque est nec maior in omnibus 25  
 simul collectis nec minor in singulis a se inuicem diuisis. Non enim  
 amplior est in generalissimo genere quam in specialissima specie nec  
 minor in specialissima specie quam in generalissimo genere. Et, ut  
 exemplis utamur, OYCIA non est maior in omnibus hominibus quam  
 in uno homine nec minor in uno homine quam in omnibus hominibus,  
 non est maior in genere in quo omnes species animalium unum sunt 492B  
 quam in homine [solo] uel boue uel equo nec minor in his singulis 31  
 speciebus quam simul in omnibus. Item corpus in partes potest  
 secari ut totum suum pereat, uerbi gratia, dum soluitur in ipsa eli-  
 menta ex quibus coeuntibus superaddita forma conficitur totum perit.  
 Vbi enim partes simul non sunt neque propria forma continentur 35  
 totum simul esse non potest in aliqua re actu et opere—quamuis

10 ENTYMEMATIC (i.e. ἐνθυμήματος)—animi: cf. Eriug., *Annot. in Marc.*,  
 103, 31-32 Lutz; eund., *De praed.* ix. 3, PL cxxii. 391B 4-5; 415C 1-3; Boeth., *In*  
*Topica Ciceron.*, PL lxiv. 1142D; Cassiod., *Expos. in Ps.* xx. 8, 124 sq. (C.C.), PL  
 lxx. 149D; Arist., *An. pr.* ii. 27; *An. post.* i. 1, 71<sup>a</sup>11 20 totum—separatur:  
 cf. Eriug., *De praed.* iii. 5, PL cxxii. 367C 11-368A 3; Mart. Cap., *De nupt.* iv. 350,  
 p. 161, 11 sqq. Dick (p. 105, 21 Eyssenhardt)

1 protenditur in ras. R et s.l. R simplicitate RB<sup>c</sup>P: simplicitate B\*  
 2 post est uox quae erasa est in R itaque R<sup>c</sup>BP: igitur R\* 5 imaginari  
 BP: imaginari R 6 post itaque add. sic R\* ita R<sup>c</sup>BP: quae petis R\*

breadth or depth, and because it remains indivisible in the simplicity  
 of its nature is incorporeal; therefore no οὐσία, being without dimen-  
 sion, is corporeal, just as no body, being extended in space, is an οὐσία.

A. I should like this too to be put in the shape of a regular dia-  
 lectical formula.

N. Let it be then the conditional form of syllogism, thus: Main  
 theme: Whether οὐσία is a body. If οὐσία is a body it admits the  
 dimensions of length, breadth, and depth; but οὐσία does not admit  
 length, breadth, and depth: therefore it is not a body. But if you wish  
 to hear the syllogism of ἐνθύμημα, that is, of the common concept of  
 the mind (150), which holds the primacy of all conclusions because  
 it is deduced from those things which cannot be at the same time,  
 take a formula of this kind: (A thing) is not both οὐσία and not incor-  
 poreal; but it is οὐσία: therefore it is incorporeal: for it cannot  
 be simultaneously (true) that it is οὐσία and that it is not incorporeal.  
 Again: (A thing) is not both οὐσία and a body; but it is οὐσία: there-  
 fore it is not a body. Again: (It is) not (true that a thing) is not both  
 οὐσία and incorporeal; but it is οὐσία: therefore it is incorporeal.  
 There is therefore a very strong proof by which it is recognized that  
 body is one thing and οὐσία is another: for οὐσία is divided into  
 genera and species, while a body is separated as a whole into its parts.  
 Again, a body is not a whole in (any of) its parts, for the whole body  
 is not comprehended in the head or in the hands and feet, and it is  
 greater in the sum of all its parts, but less in each of its parts when they  
 are not taken together; while οὐσία, on the other hand, is whole in each  
 of its forms and species, and is not greater in the sum of them when  
 they are gathered together, nor smaller in each of them when they are  
 separated from each other. For it is not more extensive in the most  
 general genus than in the most specified species, nor less in the  
 most specified species than in the most general genus; and, to take an  
 example, οὐσία is not greater in all men than in one man, nor smaller  
 in one man than in all men; it is not greater in the genus in which all  
 species of animals are one than in man [alone], or ox, or horse; nor is  
 it smaller in any one of these species than in all of them together. Again,  
 a body can be cut up into parts so that its whole perishes: for instance,  
 when it is resolved into those elements from which it is produced  
 when they come together and form is added to them, it perishes as a  
 whole. For when the parts are not together and are not contained  
 within their proper form, by no act or operation can there be in any-  
 thing a whole existing together, although they (i.e. the parts) can be

10 ENTYMEMATIC R<sup>c</sup>BP: ENTYM EMATIC R\* 11 omnium R<sup>c</sup>BP: om-  
 mum R\* 13 OYCIA s P\* 15 OYCIA (2) RBP<sup>c</sup>: YCIA P\* 16 et post  
 autem add. P\* non non RB: non P 17 et s.l. B 20 separatur  
 R<sup>c</sup>BP: dirimitur R\* 25 lemma BP 30 omnes R<sup>c</sup>BP: omnis R\*  
 32 quinque lineae erasae in marg. R 33 secari RB<sup>c</sup>P: securi B<sup>c</sup>

Examples of  
 essence and  
 body

exempla de  
 essentia et  
 corpore

simul uideantur esse naturas rerum considerantis cogitatione. [Sed aliud est simul esse rationabili naturae consideratione quae omnia simul semper intellectu colligit et inseparabiliter comprehendit uniuersitatem, aliud quod operatione agentis aut passione patientis uisibiliter in separatione seu collectione sensibilibus partium peragitur. 5 Ratio siquidem omnium numerorum in unitate inconcussa est nec 492C augeri potest nec minui, corporales uero numeri seu fantastici et quomodo 10 OYCIA quamuis sola ratione in genera sua speciesque numerosque diuiditur sua tamen naturali uirtute indiuidua permanet ac nullo 10 actu seu operatione uisibili segregatur; tota enim simul et semper in suis subdiuisionibus aeternaliter et incommutabiliter subsistit omnesque subdiuisiones sui simul ac semper in se ipsa unum inseparabile sunt. Atque ideo etsi corpus, quod nihil aliud est quam OYCIAE 15 quantitas et ut uerius dicam non quantitas sed quantum, actu et 492D operatione uel certe suae fragilitatis passione in diuersas segregetur partes, ipsa per se, id est OYCIA cuius est quantum corpus, immortalis inseparabilisque sua propria naturalique uirtute perdurat. Ideo autem addidi rectius corpus quantum uocari quam quantitas quoniam 20 illa accidentia quae naturalia dicuntur dum in se ipsis naturaliter perspiciuntur incorporalia sunt et inuisibilia et circa ipsam OYCIAM seu in ipsa solo rationis contuitu considerantur et ueluti quaedam 493A causae suorum effectuum sunt, ut est ipsa quantitas et qualitas [causa quanti et qualis] caeteraque accidentium genera, de quibus satis ut arbitror diximus, [quoniam inuisibiles sunt suos uisibiles effectus 25 gignunt]. Corpus igitur non est OYCIAE quantitas sed quantum, sicut color uisibilis qui circa corpus sentitur non est OYCIAE qualitas sed quale in quanto constitutum, caeteraque id genus. Placuit etiam sententiam sancti patris Augustini ex libro quem de 30 Kategoriis Aristotelis scripsit nostris disceptatiunculis inserere: 'Descripta igitur' [inquit] 'OYCIA quoniam diffiniri non potuit propter 'eas causas quas superius memorauimus accidentium diffinitionem neces- 'sarius ordo posebat, quorum primum est quantum. Nec sine causa; 493B 'Nam cum aliquid uiderimus id necesse est quantum sit aestimare. 'Quantum uero sit inueniri non potest nisi fuerit adhibita mensura 35

31-p. 152, 8 Descripta-uideamur: Ps.-Aug., *De cat. dec.* lxxi-lxxii, p. 149, 4-17 Minio-Paluello

3 post simul erasum est esse in R comprehendit: hendit in ras. R post  
comprehendit erasum est in in R 4 rasura post quod in R 7 seu R<sup>c</sup>BP:  
se R\* 8 lemma sB, PRm (OYCIA Rm cum Rm) in infinitum, quae  
deerant in R, alia manu in marg. adscripta sunt 9 genera RBP<sup>c</sup>: genere P\*  
11 operatione RB<sup>c</sup>P: operationem B\* 14 lemma BP (in longiore primario lemmate  
eraso scriptum B OYCIA P) 16 certe RB: certae P diuersas RBP\*:  
diuisas P<sup>c</sup> 18 lemma BP: de inuisibilibus accidentibus Rm 20 in

conceived together in the thought of one who considers the natures of things. [But it is one thing to be together in the reason's contemplation of nature, which always gathers together all things in the intellect and comprehends them inseparably as a whole; another thing, what is effected by the operation of the agent or the passivity of the patient in the way of separation or collection of sensible parts. For the reason of all numbers is in undistributed unity, and can neither be increased nor diminished, but corporeal or imaginary numbers (151) can be both increased to infinity and reduced until they are almost nothing.] On the other hand, *οὐσία*, although, by the reason alone, it is divided into its genera and species and individuals, nevertheless remains indivisible by virtue of its nature and cannot be separated by any visible act or operation. For it subsists in its subdivisions eternally and immutably as a whole that is always together, and all its subdivisions are always together as an inseparable unity in it. And therefore although a body, which is nothing else but the quantity of *οὐσία*, or, to speak more accurately, not the quantity but a quantum, can be separated into parts by an act and operation or at least by suffering its own fragility, itself, that is, the *οὐσία* of which the body is a quantum, remains immortal and inseparable by virtue of its proper nature. Now the reason why I added that a body is more rightly called a quantum than quantity is that those accidents which are called natural, when regarded in themselves as they naturally are, are incorporeal and invisible and are beheld only by the eye of reason (as being) about *οὐσία* itself or within it and are, as it were, causes having their effects, as quantity itself and quality are [the cause of a quantum and a quale] and the other genera of accidents, of which I think we have said enough [(that is) that whereas they are invisible, they produce visible effects] (152). Therefore a body is not the quantity of *οὐσία*, but a quantum, just as the visible colour which is perceived about a body is not the quality of *οὐσία*, but a quale constituted in a quantum, and so forth. I thought we might also introduce into our little discussion a sentence of the holy father Augustine from the book which he wrote on the 'Categories' of Aristotle (153): 'After 51 the description of *οὐσία*' [he says], 'seeing that a definition of it was impossible for the reasons I have recorded above, the next thing inevitably required was a definition of its accidents, of which the first is the quantum. Not without reason. For when we see anything it is necessary to estimate how much of it there is. But how much of it there is cannot be discovered unless it is surveyed under the

se s.l. B 22 solo RB<sup>c</sup>: sola B\*P 23 suorum R<sup>c</sup>BP: s\*orum R\* 25 quoniam  
codd.: lege quamquam inuisibiles codd.: lege inuisibilia 27 post corpus erasa  
est una littera in R 30 kategoriis BP: categoriis R post scripsit erasum est  
in in R 31 quoniam codd.: quia Ps.-Aug. 35 adhibita BP: abhibita R



'collectum. Si ergo omissa latitudine solam quis longitudinem uoluerit  
 'emetiri, longitudo sine latitudine mensurae subiecta ΓΡΑΜΜΗ dicitur  
 '—non quod sit longitudo aliqua quae careat latitudine sed quod solam  
 'quis metiens longitudinem ΓΡΑΜΜΗΝ metiri dicitur. Emensa uero  
 'cum longitudine latitudo dicitur ΕΠΙΦΑΝΙΑ, sin autem et altitudo  
 'fuerit mensurae sociata corpus cuncta perficiunt, quod tamen non ita  
 'accipimus quemadmodum solemus accipere naturale ne ad ΟΥΚΙΑΝ  
 'reueri uideamur.' Hoc ideo dictum est ut has singulas regulas in  
 geometricis corporibus sciamus esse constitutas, in quibus haec tria  
 separatim discreta esse possunt. In naturalibus autem inseparabiliter  
 cohaerent, in quibus solo intellectu quantitas ab ΟΥΚΙΑ separatur.  
 Nam cum uidetur quis de quantitate disputare tanquam de ΟΥΚΙΑ  
 quid diceret putatur confundere. [[Videsne quid summae auctoritatis  
 magister edicat? 'Cum uidetur', inquit, 'quis de quantitate', hoc est  
 de spatiis quibus corpus conficitur, 'disputare', ab his qui nil aliud  
 esse ΟΥΚΙΑΝ aestimant nisi corpus quod uident de ipsa ΟΥΚΙΑ  
 putatur quid dicere.] Si igitur geometrica corpora, quae solo animi  
 contuitu contemulamur solisque memoriae imaginationibus fingere  
 procuramus, in aliqua ΟΥΚΙΑ subsistunt profecto naturalia sunt,  
 nullaque inter geometrica et naturalia differentia est. Nunc uero  
 quoniam geometrica solo animo consideramus in nullaque ΟΥΚΙΑ  
 subsistunt atque ideo phantastica iure uocantur, naturalia uero  
 corpora propterea naturalia sunt quoniam in naturalibus suis ΟΥΚΙΑ,  
 id est essentiis, subsistunt et sine quibus esse non possunt ideoque  
 uera sunt (alioqui non in rebus naturalibus sed sola ratione cogita-  
 rentur), profecto datur intelligi aliud esse corpus aliud ΟΥΚΙΑ,  
 quoniam corpus aliquando caret ΟΥΚΙΑ aliquando adhaeret ΟΥΚΙΑΕ  
 ut uerum sit, sine qua uerum fieri non potest sed quadam imaginatione  
 figuratum, ΟΥΚΙΑ uero nullo modo corporis indiget ut sit quoniam per  
 se ipsam subsistit.] Satis de his dictum esse reor.

A. Satis plane. Sed restat, sicuti uideo, ut de ipsa materia forma-  
 que quibus materialia corpora componi asseris pauca edisseras. Non  
 enim praetereundum est ut arbitror, siquidem non mihi satis elucet  
 utrum eadem forma est et quae generi subditur et quae materiae ut  
 corpus sit copulatur.

1 omissa R<sup>c</sup>B: missa R\*: omni ssa P\*: ommissa P<sup>c</sup> 2 emetiri RBP\*: metiri  
 P<sup>c</sup> dicitur R<sup>c</sup>BP: \*icitur R\* 4 metiens R<sup>c</sup>BP: metuens R\* metiri R<sup>c</sup>BP:  
 mentiri R\* 5 glossa uel (s)up(erf)ic(i)es) B 7 post naturale habet corpus Ps.-Aug.  
 8 regulas alia manu s.l. B 12 cum uidetur: cumi ui- in ras. R 13-17 uides-  
 ne-dicere quamuis in marg. ascripsit C in R nihilominus ad textum pertinere non  
 uidentur: uide commentarium ad loc. 13 Videsne: -ne s.l. R 14 edicat BP:  
 dicat R inquit R<sup>c</sup>BP: inquis R\* 17 lemma BP (ysiam B: ΟΥΚΙΑΜ  
 P uera B: ueram P) 17-30 si igitur-substitutit eadem quae marginalia ad  
 p. 146, 25-31 adscripsit manu in marg. R 17 solo B<sup>c</sup>: sola RB\*P 27 quoniam  
 RBP<sup>c</sup>: Omnem (?) P\* 31 sicuti B<sup>c</sup>P: ut RB\* 32 corpora om. P  
 34 generi RB: generis P

application of measurement. If, then, one wishes to measure its  
 length without regard to its breadth, length without breadth sub-  
 jected to measure is called γραμμή—not that there is any such thing as  
 length without breadth, but because anyone who measures the length  
 alone is said to measure a γραμμή. But when breadth is measured  
 together with length it is called an ἐπιφάνεια (154), while if depth is  
 brought into the measurement as well, altogether they constitute  
 a body—but we do not take this body in the sense that we are used  
 to take the natural (body) lest we should seem to be reverting to  
 οὐσία.' This is said in order that we should know that these norms  
 (of measuring) have their several existence in geometrical bodies, in  
 which these three can be separately distinct; but they are inseparably  
 associated in natural bodies, in which only by the intellect can  
 quantity be separated from οὐσία. For while one seems to be speaking  
 of quantity, he is thought to be confusing things as though he were  
 saying something about οὐσία. [[Do you see what it is that this master  
 of the highest authority is saying? When, he says, someone seems to  
 be discussing quantity, that is, the dimensions upon which a body is  
 constructed, he is thought by those who believe that οὐσία is nothing  
 else but the body which they see to be saying something about οὐσία  
 itself (155).] If, then, geometrical bodies, which we contemplate only  
 by the mind's eye, and which we only manage to construct from the  
 images in our memory, subsist in some οὐσία, then surely they are  
 natural, and there is no difference between geometrical and natural  
 bodies. But as it is, since we contemplate (156) geometrical bodies  
 with the mind alone, and since they do not subsist in any οὐσία and  
 are therefore rightly called imaginary (157), while natural bodies are  
 natural for the very reason that they subsist in their natural οὐσία,  
 that is, their essences, and cannot exist without them, and therefore  
 are true bodies—otherwise they would not be contemplated in natural  
 things, but in the reason alone—we are straightway given to under-  
 stand that body is one thing and οὐσία another, since a body is  
 sometimes without οὐσία and sometimes, so as to be a real body,  
 is associated with οὐσία, without which it cannot become real but is  
 merely a figure in the imagination; while οὐσία by no means requires  
 a body in order to be since it subsists by itself.] I think enough has  
 been said about these things.

A. Quite enough. But, as I see, it remains for you briefly to dis-  
 cuss matter itself and form, of which you assert that material bodies  
 are composed. For I think this must not be omitted, since it is not  
 sufficiently clear to me whether it is the same form which underlies  
 genus and which combines with matter to produce a body.

What the  
 difference is  
 between  
 geometrical  
 bodies and  
 natural  
 bodies,  
 which by  
 reason of  
 their οὐσία  
 are real

de differentia  
 formarum

N. Formarum aliae in OYCIA aliae in qualitate intelliguntur, sed  
 quae in OYCIA sunt substantiales species generis sunt. Nam de ipsis  
 genus praedicatur quia in ipsis subsistit. Genus nanque, ut saepe  
 diximus, totum in singulis suis formis est, quemadmodum et singulae  
 formae unum in suo genere sunt; et haec omnia, id est genera et  
 formae, ex uno fonte OYCIAE manant inque eam naturali ambitu  
 redeunt. Formae uero quae qualitati attribuuntur in naturalibus  
 corporibus proprie formae, in geometricis *autem* figurae uocantur.  
 Omne enim geometricum corpus spatiis solummodo atque figura,  
 nulla uero substantia continetur. Omne siquidem fantasticum corpus  
 uniuersalibus tribus spatiis perficitur, longitudine uidelicet latitudine  
 altitudineque, non autem uniuersaliter omnia corpora geometrica  
 una figura circumscribuntur. Eorum nanque alia ex triangula surgunt  
 figura alia ex tetragona alia ex pentagona caeterisque in infinitum  
 polygonis alia ex circulari crescunt superficie, atque ideo in quantum  
 numerus linearum ex ternario inchoans progreditur in tantum et  
 figurarum et superficierum multiplex ordo uariatur. Numerus itaque  
 spatiorum et linearum in geometricis corporibus quantitati deputatur,  
 laterum uero angulorumque ordo atque positio superficierumque  
 habitudines qualitatis proprium est et dicitur forma geometrica seu  
 proprie figura. Dum uero in naturalibus corporibus numerus mem-  
 brorum atque distinctio siue naturalibus discretionibus segregentur  
 siue naturaliter sibi inuicem coniuncta sint perspicitur, quantitatis  
 proprium esse nemo denegat; ordinem uero atque positionem  
 naturalium partium seu membrorum ad qualitatem referri formam-  
 [que] proprie uocari. Dicimus enim formam hominis sursum uersus  
 erectam, caeterorum uero animalium deorsum uersus pronam. [Vnde  
 deformes dicuntur qui congrua membrorum armonia carent seu  
 coloris pulchritudine priuantur, quae ex qualitate ignea quae est  
 calor corporibus innascitur. Nam color dicitur quasi calor mutatione  
 unius litterae et forma uocatur a formo, hoc est calido, conuersa mum  
 syllaba in ma. Antiqui siquidem formum dicebant calidum, unde et  
 forcipes formum capientes appellantur. Innormes quoque eos qui  
 naturalem membrorum regulam excedunt quasi sine norma, id est  
 regula, solemus nominare.] Nonne uides hoc non in numero nec

32-33 cf. Marius Victorinus, *Ars grammatica* i. 4 (Keil, *Gramm. lat.* vi. 26, 11);  
 Paulus-Festus, *Sexti Pompei Festi de uerborum significatu quae supersunt cum Pauli  
 epitome*, ed. Ponor, i (Budapest, 1889), p. 59; Müller, p. 84; Lindsay, p. 81, 10 sq.

1 lemma BPRm 4 sex lineae in marg. erasae sunt in B 6 inque RB<sup>c</sup>P:  
 in quae B\* 7 attribuuntur R<sup>c</sup>BP: attribuuntur R\* 8 autem R<sup>c</sup>BP: uero (?) R\*  
 10 fantasticum RB: phantasticum P 11 longitudine R<sup>c</sup>B<sup>c</sup>P: latitudine R\*B\*  
 13 circumscribuntur RB: circumscribitur P\*: circumscribuntur P<sup>c</sup> 15 poly-  
 gonis RB: polugonis P\*: polygonis P<sup>c</sup> marginalia erasa in B 16-17 et  
 figurarum: et fi in ras. B 17 lemma BP 18 quantitati RBP<sup>c</sup>: quantitate P\*

N. Of the forms, some are understood in *oδoia*, others in quality;  
 but those which are in *oδoia* are the substantial species of the genus.  
 For of them genus is predicated because it subsists in them. For  
 the genus, as we have often said, is whole in each of its forms, just  
 as also the several forms are one in their genus; and all these, that is,  
 genera and forms, flow from the single source of *oδoia* and by  
 a natural circulation return to it again. But the forms which are  
 assigned to quality are properly called forms (only) in natural bodies,  
 while in geometrical bodies they are called figures. For every geo-  
 metrical body is comprised by spatial dimensions and figure alone,  
 but by no substance. Every imaginary body is, of course, produced  
 by the three general dimensions, namely, length, breadth, and depth,  
 but not all geometrical bodies are circumscribed by one general figure.  
 For some originate from the triangular figure, others from the quadri-  
 lateral, others from the pentagonal or from some other of the infinite  
 number of polygons, others are developed from the circular surface;  
 and thus, as far as the number of lines can progress from three  
 onwards, so far can the manifold arrangement both of figures and  
 surfaces be varied. Therefore the number of dimensions and lines in  
 geometrical bodies is assigned to quantity: but the arrangement and  
 position of sides and angles and the conditions of the surfaces are  
 a property of quality, and this is called the geometrical form or,  
 properly, figure. But as in natural bodies the number and distinction  
 of their members are considered, whether they are separated by  
 natural divisions or are naturally joined, nobody denies that these  
 are the property of quantity; and that, on the other hand, the order  
 and position of their natural parts or members are assigned to quality  
 [and] are properly called form. For we say the form of man is standing  
 upright and that of the other animals is stooping downwards. [Hence  
 those are called deformed who do not possess a suitable harmony of  
 their members or are deprived of the beauty of colour, which is  
 produced in bodies from the fiery quality which is calor. For color  
 stands for calor by the change of a single letter, and forma is called  
 after formum, that is, 'hot', by changing the syllable -mum into  
 -ma. For the men of old (158) called a hot thing formum, whence  
 also 'forceps' get their name, formum capientes (159). We are  
 also accustomed to call enormous those who exceed the natural  
 measure of their limbs, as it were without norm, that is, without  
 measure.] Do you not see that this (160) consists not in the number  
 and size of the members but in the position of the parts of the body

52  
 Concerning  
 the  
 differences  
 of forms

What  
 difference  
 there is  
 between  
 quantity and  
 quality in  
 geometrical  
 bodies

Again, what  
 difference  
 there is in  
 natural  
 bodies  
 between  
 quantity and  
 quality

Why colour  
 is also called  
 form

21 lemma BP proprie figura RB<sup>c</sup>: propriae figurae B\*P post figura[e] erasa est  
 una littera in P 27 lemma sR, BP (forma BP: calor R) erectam-deorsum  
 in marg. sR 29 post quae (1) erasa est una littera in R 30 calor (1) RB:  
 color P 32 rasura post unde in R 33 innormes BP: in\*normes R

magnitudine membrorum sed in positione partium corporis [luceque coloris] consistere? An tibi aliter uidetur?

A. Non, ut opinor. Sed quid ad propositam quaestionem talis attineat differentia nosse specto.

N. Num praedictis rationibus inter nos est concessum aliud esse corpus aliud OYCIAN? 5

A. Satis plurimumque.

quid inter  
formam ysiac  
et qualitatis

N. Si itaque naturali discretione quantitas corporis ab intellectu OYCIAE separatur, quamuis sibimet adhaereant, ita ut OYCIA 495B  
subiectum quantitatis sit et quanti, ipsa uero quantitas seu quantum 10  
accidentia sint OYCIAE nonne luce clarius est aliam esse formam  
quae in ipsa OYCIA non ut accidens sed ut id ipsum ei perspi-  
citur, aliam quae ex qualitate quantitati adiuncta corpus efficit per-  
fectum?

A. Iam uideo quo tendis. 15

N. Putasne me uelle formam essentialem materiae adiunctam naturale corpus efficere?

A. Ne id quidem. Immo uero nolle te uideo.

N. Dic quaeso quomodo.

A. Ex praedicta formarum differentia, *usiadum* scilicet qualita- 20  
tuarumque uideris mihi non aliud suadere nisi eam formam quae  
species qualitatis est materiae superadditam corpus cui OYCIA  
subsistit perficere. [Haec etenim tria in omnibus naturalibus in- 495C  
spiciuntur corporibus, OYCIA quantitas qualitas; sed OYCIA solo  
semper intellectu cernitur, in nullo enim uisibiliter apparet; quan- 25  
titas uero et qualitas ita inuisibiliter in OYCIA ut in quantum et quale  
uisibiliter erumpant dum corpus sensibile inter se coniunctae com-  
ponunt.] Si enim geometricum corpus, cui nulla subest OYCIA, sola  
quantitate spatiorum linearumque qualitatisque forma quae figura 30  
dicitur rationabiliter constare probatur, quid impediti est ut  
naturale corpus, cui uirtus OYCIAE ad permanendum substat quan-  
tum manere ualet, ea forma quae ex qualitate est adiecta quantitati  
quae ex materia assumitur perfici non dicamus? Non enim aliud te 495D  
suadere aestimo quam ut cognoscamus quattuor mundi huius eli- 35  
mentorium in se inuicem concursu contemperantiaque materiam  
corporum fieri, cui adiecta qualicumque ex qualitate forma perfectum  
corpus efficitur. [Non enim mihi obstat quod multis. Videmur nan-  
que eis contra nosmet agere contrariaque et nobis aduersantia firmare

ex quali  
materie et  
forma  
subsistente  
ysia  
corpus  
efficitur

1 in positione RB: impositione P 3 opinor BP: pinor R 8 lemma BP  
(OYCIAE P) 9 adhaereant R<sup>c</sup>BP: adhaerent R\* 10 quantitatis RBP<sup>c</sup>: quan-  
titas P\* *rasura post* quanti in R 16 essentialem RB: essentiale P 18 nol-  
le te R<sup>c</sup>BP: te nolle R\* 19 quomodo RB: quo P 20 differentia  
R<sup>c</sup>BP: differenti\* R\* 23 tria s.l. R 29 qualitatisque: que s.l. R  
33 lemma BP (MATERIAE P OYCIA P) non (1) *erasum est in* R 35 con-  
temperantiaque R<sup>c</sup>BP: contemperantiaque R\* 36 qualitate R<sup>c</sup>BP: qualitate R\*

[and in the light of its colour]? Or does it seem to you other-  
wise?

A. Not (otherwise), in my opinion. But how this difference is  
pertinent to the question we have set ourselves I am waiting to know.

N. Was it not settled between us by the reasons given above that  
body is one thing and οὐσία is another?

A. Sufficiently and abundantly.

N. So if by a natural distinction the quantity of a body is separated  
from the concept of its οὐσία, although they are attached to each other  
in such a way that οὐσία is the subject of quantity and of a given  
quantum, while quantity itself or the given quantum are accidents of  
οὐσία, is it not clearer than day that the form which is beheld in οὐσία  
not as an accident to it but as it itself is different from that which from  
quality in combination with quantity produces the perfect body?

A. Now I see your drift.

N. Do you think that I mean that it is the essential form which, in  
combination with matter, produces the natural body?

A. Certainly not that. Rather I see that it is what *you* do not mean.

N. Pray tell me how.

A. From the aforesaid distinction of forms, namely into *essential*  
forms and qualitative forms, you appear to me to suggest nothing  
else but that it is that form which is a species of quality that, when it  
is joined to matter, produces a body, of which the substance is οὐσία.  
[For these three are found in all natural bodies: οὐσία, quantity,  
quality; but οὐσία is always discerned by the intellect alone, for in  
nothing does it appear visibly. Quantity and quality, however,  
(inhere) invisibly in οὐσία (161) in such a way that they break forth  
into visibility in a quantum and a quale when by uniting with one  
another they compose a body.] For (162) if the geometrical body, in  
which there is no ground of οὐσία, is reasonably shown to consist  
only of the quantity of its dimensions and lines and the quality of its  
form, which is called figure, what objection is there to our saying that  
the natural body, whose permanence, in so far as it can be permanent,  
is grounded on the virtue of its οὐσία, is produced by that form  
which is brought from quality into conjunction with the quantity  
which is taken from matter (163)? For I think that you are suggesting  
nothing else than that we should recognize that it is from the con-  
course and commingling of the four elements of this world that the  
matter of bodies is made, by which, when whatever form from  
quality is added, the finished body is produced. [For what is a dif-  
ficulty for many is none for me. For they think we are going against  
ourselves and making affirmations which are contradictory and which  
conflict with our own opinion when at one point we say that matter

53  
What  
difference  
there is  
between the  
form of οὐσία  
and that of  
quality

From what  
kind of  
matter and  
form, on the  
ground of  
οὐσία, the  
body is  
produced

38 nosmet agere RB: nosm\*\* et agere P *rasura post et in* R

dicentes aliquando quattuor elementorum coitum materiam gignere, 496A  
 aliquando quantitatis atque qualitatis OYCIAE conuentum causam  
 materiae esse. Nec mirum, quoniam illos latet non aliunde mundi  
 huius elementa nisi praedictorum OYCIAE accidentium concursu  
 componi. Ignem siquidem caliditas ariditati, aera caliditas umiditati, 5  
 aquam umiditas frigiditati, terram frigiditas ariditati copulata con-  
 ficiunt. Et quoniam praedictae qualitates sibimet coeuntes per se  
 apparere non possunt, quantitas sumministrat eis quantum in quo  
 sensibiliter eluceant. Quantitas siquidem ueluti secundum subiectum  
 est post OYCIAN ideoque in ordine categoriarum prima post eam 10  
 ponitur, quoniam sine quantitate qualitas nescit manifesta fieri. Si  
 itaque elementa quantitate qualitateque fiunt et corpora ex elementis 496B  
 ex quantitate igitur et qualitate corpora sunt.]

N. Quoniam [igitur] uideo te intentionis nostrae finem acute  
 prospexisse dic, oro, num tibi haec diuisio formarum in duas species 15  
 diuersi generis, OYCIAE uidelicet atque qualitatis, rata esse uidetur  
 necne.

A. Rata quidem uerique similis, licet non sine animi mei scrupulo  
 hanc rationabilem esse concesserim. Etenim facilius mihi suaderes 20  
 formam substantialem materiae *adiectam* naturale corpus constituere  
 quam qualitatiuam. Causam siquidem constitutionis corporis OYCIAN  
 esse, non qualitatem, probabilius crediderim. [Praedictis nanque  
 rationibus collectum opinor qualitatem non solum materiae uerum  
 etiam formae causam esse, excepto quod materiam mixta quantitati 496C  
 efficiat, formam uero per se sola materiae superfundat—non quod 25  
 nescierim unam causam multos ex se effectus producere, cum uideam  
 ex uno igne calorem simul et lucem erumpere, ipsamque lucem  
 causam splendoris et umbrarum esse. Quid dicam? Quanta diuersa  
 corpora una eademque fiunt materia? Vna forma in quot multiplicatur 30  
 numeros? et caetera huius modi—atque ideo OYCIAN ipsam formam  
 materiae fieri putarim, non autem eius accidentia.]

N. Miror ualde cur tam cito quae paulo ante inter nos ad purum  
 deducta sunt tua labuntur memoria. Considera itaque diligentius  
 atque eadem breuiter repetamus.

A. Presto sum. Repete. 35

N. Num inconcusse inter nos conuenerat OYCIAN incorpoream  
 esse?

A. Conuenerat.

5-7 cf. Arist., *De gen. et corr.* ii. 4, 331<sup>a</sup>24; Basil., *Hex.* iv. 89c, p. 266 Giet.

2 atque: que s.l. R 5 caliditas ariditati R<sup>c</sup>B: caliditati ariditati P: caliditas  
 ariditas R\* umiditati R<sup>c</sup>BP: umiditas R\* 6 ariditati R<sup>c</sup>BP: ariditati R\* 8 *rasura*  
*post quo in R* 9 eluceant R<sup>c</sup>BP: elucet R\* 10 OYCIAN BP: OYCIANque R  
 categoriarum R<sup>c</sup>BP: categoria R\* 12 et corpora R<sup>c</sup>BP: corpora igitur R\*  
 15 diuisio s.l. R formarum *insulari manu scriptum in B* 20 *post formam erasum*  
*est quae in R* 21 causam RBP<sup>c</sup>: Casam P\* 23 opinor s.l. R, B<sup>c</sup>P: opinor B\*

is produced by the concourse of the four elements, at another that  
 the cause of matter is the joining of quantity and quality to *οὐσία*.  
 Nor is this strange, for they do not know that the elements of this  
 world are composed of nothing but the concourse of the aforesaid  
 accidents of *οὐσία*. For fire is produced by the conjunction of heat  
 and dryness, air by that of heat and moisture, water by that of  
 moisture and cold, earth by that of cold and dryness (164). And  
 since these qualities which come together cannot by themselves  
 become manifest, quantity supplies them with a quantum in which  
 they can make a sensible appearance. For quantity is, as it were,  
 a second subject after *οὐσία*, and that is why it is placed first after it  
 in the order of the categories, since without quantity quality cannot  
 become manifest. Therefore, if the elements are made from quantity  
 and quality, and the bodies are made from the elements, then bodies  
 are (produced) from quantity and quality.]

N. Since [, then,] I perceive that you have accurately foreseen the  
 end which I am pursuing, tell me, pray, whether you think this  
 division of forms into two species each of a different genus, namely,  
 forms of *οὐσία* and forms of quality, to have been established or not.

A. I think it is established, and likely to be true, although it is not  
 without some mental reservation that I allow it to be reasonable.  
 For you would more easily persuade me that *it is the addition of* sub-  
 stantial, rather than of qualitative, form to matter that produces  
 a natural body. For I would more readily believe that the cause which  
 produces the body is *οὐσία* than that it is quality. [For it was estab-  
 lished, I think, by reasons already given that quality is the cause not  
 only of matter but of form, only that it produces matter by being  
 mingled with quantity, while it is by itself alone that it casts form  
 upon matter—not that I do not know that a single cause produces out  
 of itself many effects, for I see that from the single cause of fire breaks  
 forth heat as well as light, and that light in turn is the cause of bright-  
 ness and of shadows. Again: how many different bodies are made  
 from one and the same matter! Into how many individuals is one  
 form multiplied! And so forth—and therefore I should think that  
*οὐσία* itself, and not its accidents, becomes the form to matter.]

N. I very much wonder why what was clearly agreed between us  
 just before has slipped from your memory. Consider, then, more  
 carefully, and I will go over it again briefly.

A. I am ready. Go over it again.

N. Was it not definitely agreed between us that *οὐσία* is incorporeal?

A. Yes.

materiae BP: materiae\* R 25 efficiat RB<sup>c</sup>P: efficiet B\* 27 calorem RB<sup>c</sup>P: colo-  
 rem B\* 29 multiplicatur RBP<sup>c</sup>: multiplicantur P\* 30 numeros RBP\*:  
 numeri P<sup>c</sup> et s.l. R ideo s.l. R 36 inconcusse RB<sup>c</sup>: inconcussae B\*: inconcuse P

N. Atqui nondum obliuioni te dedisse aestimarim quantitates  
 qualitatesque quantum in se ipsis cogitantur incorporeas esse, et non  
 in alio subiecto nisi in OYCIA cui accidunt subsistere et inseparabiliter  
 in ea manere.

A. Hoc quoque firmiter teneo.

N. Num itaque probabiliter dicendum est omne quod quantitate  
 et qualitate conficitur, hoc est quantum et quale, non aliunde con-  
 stitutionis suae causam accipere nisi ab ipsa OYCIA cui naturaliter  
 ipsa quantitas et qualitas ueluti prima accidentia maximaque pro-  
 bantur accidere et sine qua non possunt esse? Quicquid enim ex his  
 quae in fonte sunt progreditur cur non ad ipsum fontem referatur  
 non habeo, praesertim cum ipsa OYCIA in quantum OYCIA est  
 nullo modo uisibiliter tractabiliterque ac spatiosae ualeat apparere,  
 concursus uero accidentium quae ei insunt uel circa eam intelliguntur  
 sensibile quoddam spatiosumque per generationem potest creare.  
 Quantitas siquidem et qualitas quantum et quale inter se coniungunt,  
 quae duo sibi inuicem coniuncta modo quodam temporeque genera-  
 tionem accipientia corpus integrum ostendunt; caetera enim acci-  
 dentia his superaddita esse uidentur. Haec enim quattuor in  
 corporibus nostris caeterorumque [animalium inanimaliumque]  
 principaliter inquirimus: quantum sit; quibus partibus constet—num  
 spatiis longitudinis protenditur latitudinisque altitudinisque; quale  
 sit—rectae formae atque humanae pronaeue atque bestialis; quo  
 tempore genitum quouo modo diffinitur atque in se locatur ne  
 infinitum sit sed unum aliquod in suo genere terminatum. Haec, ut  
 diximus, in corporibus nostris primordialiter inspiciuntur; extra uero  
 haec altiori consideratione OYCIAM, quae est formarum substanti-  
 alium origo, contemplamur. Dicimus enim: hoc corpus uel hoc,  
 cuius OYCIADIC, id est substantialis, formae est? utrum humanae  
 an equinae [alicuiusue irrationabilis animalis intra OYCIAM compre-  
 hensi]? His enim nominibus non animalium corpora sed substantia-  
 les [eorum] formae appellantur. Tria siquidem discrete debemus  
 cognoscere siue de nobismet ipsis cogitantes siue de aliis animalibus:  
 quid sumus; quid nostrum est; quid circa nos. Nos sumus substantia  
 nostra quae uitalis atque intelligibilis est [supra corpus omnesque  
 eius sensus uisibilemque formam]. Nostrum est, non [autem] nos,  
 corpus quod nobis adhaeret quanto et quali caeterisque accidentibus  
 compositum atque sensibile [mutabile solubile corruptibile; nihilque

quattuor in  
 unoquoque  
 corpore  
 considerari  
 debent

cuius formae  
 substantialis  
 omne corpus  
 inter-  
 rogandum  
 est

quid sumus

quid nostrum

5 quoque R<sup>c</sup>BP: equidem R\*      9 maximaque: que s.l. R      11 pro-  
 greditur R<sup>c</sup>BP: procedit R\*      14 uel R<sup>c</sup>BP: ut R\*      20 lemma BPRm  
 (CONSIDERE P)      24 diffinitur atque RB<sup>c</sup>: diffiniturque B\*: diffinitur itaque  
 P      25 lemma BP      27-28 OYCIAM-contemplamur R<sup>c</sup>BP: OYCIA  
 formarum substantialium origo inspicitur R\*      29 cuius in ras. R      OYCIA-  
 ΔIC BP: ousiadis R<sup>c</sup>: \*\*\*iadis R\*      30 equinae RB: aequinae P      OYCIAN  
 RB: OYCIAM P      32 discrete R<sup>c</sup>BP: discretae R\*      34 lemma

N. And I should certainly assume that you have not yet forgotten  
 that quantities and qualities, in so far as they are contemplated in them-  
 selves, are incorporeal, and do not subsist in any subject save οὐσία, of  
 which they are the accidents, and that they abide in it inseparably.

A. To this too I firmly hold.

N. Must we not, then, say that it is probable that whatever results  
 from quantity and quality, that is, every quantum and every quale,  
 receives the cause of its establishment from no other source than οὐσία  
 itself, to which quantity and quality themselves are shown naturally  
 to occur, as its first and greatest accidents, and without which they  
 cannot be? For I see no reason why whatever proceeds from those  
 things which are in the source should not be traced back to that very  
 source—especially as οὐσία itself, in so far as it is οὐσία, can by no  
 means possess a visible or tangible or spatially extended appearance,  
 but it is the concourse of the accidents which are in it or which are  
 understood about it which, by coming into being, is able to create  
 something sensible and extended in space. For quantity and quality  
 combine together to produce a quantum and quale, and these two,  
 combining together and receiving generation in a certain mode and  
 at a certain time, manifest the finished body; for the other accidents  
 appear to be added to these. For there are these four principal  
 questions which we ask about our bodies and about those of others  
 [whether animate or inanimate]: How much is there of it? Of what  
 parts is it made up—is it extended in the dimensions of length and  
 breadth and depth? Of what sort is it—of upright and human form,  
 or of stooping and animal? At what time was it born, or after what  
 mode is it defined and established in itself so that it may not be  
 infinite but a unity confined within its own genus? These things, as  
 we have said, are primordially observed in our bodies; but by inquir-  
 ing further beyond these we contemplate, in a loftier consideration,  
 its οὐσία, which is the source of substantial forms. For we say: of  
 what οὐσιώδης, that is, substantial, form is this or that body? Is it  
 of human form, or equine [or that of some other irrational animal  
 included within οὐσία]? For by these names it is not the bodies of the  
 animals that are denoted, but [their] substantial forms. For whether  
 we are considering ourselves or other animals, there are three things  
 which we ought to know distinctly: what we are; what is ours; what  
 is about us. We are our substance, which is endowed with life and  
 intellect [beyond our body and all its senses and its visible form].  
 Ours, [but] not our own self, is the body which is attached to us and  
 composed of a quantum and a quale and the other accidents, and is  
 sensible [mutable, dissoluble, corruptible; and the truest thing to say

Four things  
 ought to be  
 considered in  
 every body

Of every  
 body it must  
 be asked of  
 what sub-  
 stantial form  
 it is

54

What we are

What is ours

BPRm      36 lemma BPRm      37 caeterisque RB: caeteris P      38 nihilque  
 BP: nilque R

aliud esse uerissimum est dicere quam sensuum instrumenta uel  
 sedes quae a Graecis uocantur ΑΙCΘΗΤΗΡΙΑ, id est ΑΙCΘΗCΕΩΝ 497D  
 ΤΗΡΙΑ, sensuum custodiae. Dum enim anima incorporea sit suasque  
 operationes per se ipsam sine sensibus aperire non possit sensusque  
 ipsi non nisi in sedibus quibusdam custodiri ualeant, naturae conditor 5  
 corpus ad usus animae condidit in quo sua quasi quaedam uehicularia,  
 id est sensus, custodiret]. Circa nos sunt omnia sensibilia quibus 498A  
 utimur, ut sunt quattuor mundi huius elementa corporaque ex eis  
 composita. Non enim mortalia nostra corpora sine his possunt  
 permanere. Terra siquidem pascuntur, humore potantur, aere in- 10  
 spirantur, igne calificantur. Duobus crescunt et nutriuntur, terra et  
 aqua; duobus ut uiuant administrantur, aere et igne. Duo patiuntur  
 in corpus transeuntia, terra et aqua; duo operantur officinam corporis  
 conflantia, aer et ignis. Ignea siquidem uirtus, cuius sedes in corde 15  
 est, cibi potusque subtilem per occultos poros in diuersas corporis  
 partes uaporem distribuit, foeculentum in secessum discernit; sed  
 ipse ignis nisi aereo spiritu insuffletur ciboque ac potu ueluti quibus-  
 dam fomentis nutriatur cito extinguitur, ac sine mora totum cor-  
 poris aedificium solum collapsumque rigescit frigore uim caloris 498B  
 superante. Sed de his alius disserendi locus est. 20

A. Haec probabiliter accipio. Sed mecum tractare non desino  
*qualiter* haec sibimet possunt conuenire, quo modo incorporeales res  
 per se atque inuisibiles suo concursu inter se inuicem uisibilia cor-  
 pora efficiunt ita ut nihil aliud sit materia nullamque aliam causam  
 constitutionis habeat nisi eorum quae solo sapientiae contuitu con- 25  
 siderantur inter se ipsa in se ipsis et non in aliquo temperatum  
 coitum—praesertim magnifico Boetio summo utriusque linguae  
 philosopho in libris suis de Arithmetica talia asserente: 'Sapientia est  
 rerum quae sunt siueque immutabilem substantiam sortiuntur com-  
 prehensio ueritatis. Esse autem illa dicimus quae nec intentione 498C  
 crescunt nec retractione minuuntur nec uariationibus permutantur  
 sed in propria semper ui suae se naturae subsidiis nixa custodiunt.  
 Haec autem sunt qualitates quantitates formae magnitudines parui-  
 tates aequalitates habitudines actus dispositiones loca tempora et

1-3 instrumenta-custodiae: cf. 569c 3-5 14-15 cuius-est: cf. p. 124, 3, supra  
 28-p. 164, 5 Boeth., *De inst. arithmet. prooem.*, p. 7, 26-p. 8, 13 Friedlein

2 graecis B: grecis RP ΑΙCΘΗΤΗΡΙΑ RB: ΑΙCΘΗΤΗΡΙΑ P 2-3 ΑΙCΘΗ-  
 CΕΩΝΤΗΡΙΑ B ΑΙCΘΗCΕΩΝΤΗΡΙΑ RP 4 operationes eadem manu quae  
*marginalia in pp.* 146, 152 *adscriptis s.l. scriptum est in R<sup>c</sup>* operationes R<sup>c</sup>BP:  
 cogitationes R\* 5 nisi s.l. R conditor RB: conditor P 6 quasi quaedam  
 s.l. R 7 lemma BPRm 8 huius s.l. R post huius add. mundi P\*  
 10 siquidem s.l. R humore R\*B: umore R<sup>c</sup>P 11 inspirantur R<sup>c</sup>BP<sup>c</sup>: spi-  
 rantur R\*P\* 13 terra s.l. R officinam: of *insulari manu s.l. B* 13-14 cor-  
 poris-ignis in *margin.* B 14 et ignis *super uocem deletam* R 15 occultos R<sup>c</sup>BP:  
 oculos R\* 17-18 ciboque-nutriatur s.l. R 18 nutriatur: triatur s.l. R  
*rasura post ac in P* 19 aedificium RBP<sup>c</sup>: aedificium P\* 19-20 frigore-superante

of it is that it is nothing else but the organs or seats of the senses,  
 which are called by the Greeks *αἰσθητήρια*, that is, *αἰσθήσεων τήρια*,  
 'keepers of the senses'. For as the soul is incorporeal and unable to  
 reveal her operations by herself without the senses, and the senses  
 themselves are ineffective unless they are kept in certain seats, the  
 Creator of nature created for the use of the soul a body in which she  
 might keep certain vehicles of hers, so to speak; that is, the senses].  
 About us are all the sensible things of which we make use, such as  
 the four elements of this world and the bodies which are composed  
 out of them. For our mortal bodies cannot survive without them.  
 For they feed upon earth, they drink water, they breathe air, they  
 are warmed by fire. Two bestow growth and nourishment: earth and  
 water; two provide life: air and fire (165). Two are passive, in so far  
 as they pass into the body: earth and water; two are active, in so far  
 as they kindle the furnace (166) of the body: air and fire (167). For  
 the power of fire, whose seat is in the heart, distributes the subtle  
 exhalation of food and drink by hidden channels to the different  
 parts of the body, and separates off the excrement into the privy.  
 But unless the fire itself is fanned by the breath of air and fed by  
 food and drink, as though it were by kindling wood, it quickly goes  
 out, and without delay the whole frame of the body crumbles and  
 falls and grows numb since the cold overcomes the strength of the  
 heat. But the place for discussing these things is elsewhere.

A. I accept this as probable. But I do not cease to ask myself of  
 what kind their (168) meeting with one another can be, how things  
 that are incorporeal and invisible in themselves, by coming together  
 with one another, produce visible bodies, so that matter is nothing  
 else, and has no other cause for its establishment, but the tempered  
 mixture, among themselves in themselves and not in another, of  
 things which are contemplated by the eye of wisdom alone—  
 especially as the great Boethius (169), outstanding among the  
 philosophers of either tongue, asserts in his books 'On Arithmetic'  
 as follows: 'Wisdom is the comprehension of the truth of the things  
 which are and possess their own immutable substance. Now we say  
 that those things are which neither increase by expansion nor  
 diminish by contraction nor change by variation, but ever preserve  
 themselves in their own vigour by relying upon the resources of their  
 own nature. Now these are: qualities, quantities, forms, magnitudes,  
 smallnesses, equalities, conditions, acts, dispositions, places, times,

s.l. R 21 lemma BPRm (efficiunt Rm) 22 qualiter B<sup>c</sup>P: quomodo  
 RB\* post conuenire *alia manu in ras.* id est *scripta sunt in R, sed desunt in BP*  
 24 materia R<sup>c</sup>BP: materia R\* 27 coitum RB: contuitum P glossa Boeti  
 Rm 29-30 comprehensio R<sup>c</sup>B<sup>c</sup>P: comprehensione R\*B\* 31 retracti-  
 one RB<sup>c</sup>P<sup>c</sup>: retractione B\*P\*

quid circa  
 nos

quomodo de  
 inuisibilibus  
 rebus  
 uisibilia  
 corpora  
 efficiuntur

What is  
 about us

55  
 How visible  
 bodies are  
 made from  
 invisible  
 things

'quicquid adunatum quodam modo corporibus inuenitur, quae ipsa  
 'quidem natura incorporea sunt et immutabilis substantiae ratione  
 'uigentia, participatione uero corporis permutantur et tactu uariabilis  
 'rei in uertibilem inconstantiam transeunt. Haec igitur quoniam, ut  
 'dictum est, natura immutabilem substantiam uimque sortita sunt 5  
 'uere proprieque esse dicuntur.' Num ex hac sententia aperte datur 498D  
 intelligi aliud esse materiam corpusque ex ea factum aliud quanti-  
 tatem et qualitatem caeteraque quae sola contemplantur sapientia  
 immutabilemque naturae suae uirtutem semper custodiunt, materia  
 uero corpusque quibus accidunt uariabili permutatione diuersa 10  
 inconstantiaque sunt? Quid enim? nunquid uerisimile uidetur si ex  
 quantitate et qualitate caeterisque naturalibus accidentibus sibi  
 inuicem copulatis materia subsisteret necessario et ipsa immutabilis 499A  
 esset? nam quod de causis intelligitur cur non etiam de effectibus  
 earum intelligatur, ut quemadmodum quantitates et qualitates 15  
 caeteraque similia solo animi contuitu aspiciuntur ita et materia et  
 corpus non sensibus corporeis sed intellectui succumbant? Nunc  
 uero formatam materiam qua corpus efficitur [nam informis omnino  
 intelligibilis est] sensu corporeo percipimus, quantitatem uero et 20  
 qualitatem solo intellectu uidemus. Quomodo igitur quantitas et  
 qualitas materiam longe ab eis distantem possunt conficere?

N. Acute admodum falso argumento falleris aut alios fallere uis.  
 Sed utrum tu ipse de his dubitas an aliorum de his dubitantium  
 personas arripis adhuc ignoro. 24

A. Vtrumque in me ipso perspicio. Nam et ex aliorum persona qui 499B  
 non inmerito de talibus aut haesitant aut paenitus ignorant haec pro-  
 ponere curauit, et me ipsum non adhuc tantae puritatis in his esse  
 uideo ut iam nil amplius de eis inquiram.

N. Vtendum igitur est, ut opinor, ratione et auctoritate ut haec ad  
 purum dinoscere ualeas; his enim duobus tota uirtus inueniendae 30  
 rerum ueritatis constituitur.

A. Vtendum sane. Haec enim a multis quaesita sunt, paucis uero  
 reperta.

N. Dic itaque: quid tibi uidetur de ipsa materia ex qua formata  
 corpora fiunt? Num per se dum sit informis sensu an ratione con- 35  
 sideratur?

30-31 his-constituitur: cf. Aug., *Contra Acad.* iii. 20, 43

5 sortita R<sup>c</sup>BP: sortia R\* 6 proprieque R<sup>c</sup>BP: propriaeque R\* 7 in-  
 telligi s.l. R 8 contemplantur B<sup>c</sup>P: contemplatur RB\* 10 permuta-  
 tionem RP: permutatione B. Cf. p. 172, 7 *infra* 17 non s.l. R succumbant  
 RB<sup>c</sup>P: succumbunt B\* 18 formatam RB<sup>c</sup>P: formato B\* qua RB: quam  
 P efficitur RBP<sup>c</sup>: efficitur P\* 19 uero R<sup>c</sup>BP: autem R\* 20 uidemus  
 s.l. R 22 aut-uis s.l. R 23 de his s.l. R 24 adhuc ignoro s.l. R  
 25 in me ipso perspicio s.l. R 26 aut (1) s.l. R haesitant R<sup>c</sup>BP: haessi-

and whatever is found united in some manner to bodies, which,  
 although they are themselves incorporeal by nature, and vigorous by  
 reason of (their) immutable substance (170), yet are changed by the  
 participation of body, and at the touch of a variable thing pass into  
 mutable inconstancy. These, then, possessing by nature, as has been  
 said, immutable substance and force, are truly and properly said to  
 be.' Does not this opinion give us clearly to understand that matter 56  
 and the body that is made out of it are something different from  
 quantity and quality and the other things which are contemplated  
 only by wisdom and which eternally preserve the immutable power  
 of their nature, while the matter and body of which they are the  
 accidents are diverse and unstable as a result of variable change?

For, why: does it not seem likely that if matter consisted of the  
 coming together of quantity and quality and the other natural acci-  
 dents, it would of necessity also itself be immutable? For why is what  
 is understood of the causes not also understood of their effects, so  
 that, as the quantities and qualities and other like things are beheld  
 by the eye of the mind alone, so too matter and body are subject not  
 to the bodily senses but to the intellect? But as it is, we perceive the  
 formed matter of which the body is made with the bodily sense [for  
 the unformed (matter) is nothing but intelligible], although we per-  
 ceive quantity and quality only by the intellect. How then can  
 quantity and quality produce matter, which is something very  
 different from them?

N. You are seriously misled, or wish to mislead others, by a false  
 argument. But whether you yourself are in doubt about these things  
 or are assuming the role of others who are in doubt about them I am  
 not yet sure.

A. I see that each is the case with me. For I was both concerned  
 to put this question on behalf of others who justifiably are either  
 uncertain about such matters or are wholly ignorant of them, and  
 I see that I too am not so clear about them that I have no further  
 inquiry to make into the matter.

N. I think, then, that reason and authority must be brought to  
 bear in order that you may be fully clear about these things. For on  
 these two is based the whole ability of discovering the truth of  
 things.

A. Indeed they must. For these questions have been asked by  
 many, but few have found the answer.

N. Say then: what do you think about the matter itself from which,  
 when it is formed, bodies are made? By itself, when it is unformed,  
 is it contemplated by sense or by reason?

tant R\* aut penitus (*sic*) ignorant s.l. R 28 inquiram RBP<sup>c</sup>: inquiram P\*  
 35 informis RB<sup>c</sup>P: informes B\*

A. Ratione profecto; non enim audeo dicere sensu, nam materia forma carens nullo sensu corporeo potest attingi.

N. Recte respondisti. Sed uide ne diutius de his quae nunc assumpseris iterum nos interrogas. Nam in talibus nimium moramur cum altiora ad considerationem sui nos inuitent.

de materia

A. De his quae nunc inter nos puro mentis intuitu fuerint diffinita non, ut arbitror, ulterius sollicitum te faciam. De eo autem quod dixisti, altiora ad considerandum nos inuitant, mirari non desino. Quid enim altius sit ratione considerandum post deum quam informis materia non uideo, dum quaeritur quid sit materia, quid forma, quid ex materia formaque conficitur, unde materia, num inter primordiales causas quae primitus a deo conditae sunt connumeranda sit an etiam inter sequentes causas quae ex primordialibus nascuntur, num in his quae sensibus incumbunt an in his quae intellectui computanda, et utrum diffiniri possit dum adhuc infinita est an etiam [in]finita diffiniri potest. Quod rationi uidetur resistere cum a sanctis patribus ad purum deductum sit duo solummodo esse quae nullo modo possunt diffiniri, deum uidelicet atque materiam. Deus siquidem infinitus informisque quoniam a nullo formatur dum sit forma omnium, materia similiter informis infinita, aliunde enim formari indiget finiri que dum per se non forma sed formabilis sit; et haec similitudo causae omnium, ex qua et in qua et per quam et ad quam omnia sunt, et ipsius causae informis (dico autem materiae), quae ad hoc creata est ut ea quae per se sensibus attingi non possent quodam modo in ea sensibiliter apparerent, e contrario intelligitur. Nam summa omnium causa per excellentiam omnium formarum finiumque informis est atque infinita: non enim solummodo forma omnium est principalis sed plus quam forma omnem formam superans omneque formabile [et informabile] formans. [Nam et eorum quae formari possunt forma est quoniam eam aut appetunt aut ad eam conuertuntur, et eorum quae formari nequeant propter suae excellentiam naturae proximamque ei, uidelicet causae, similitudinem informitas est. Siquidem ipsa informitas eorum quae informabilia sunt non ideo dicitur informitas ut omni forma careat sed quia omnem formam sensibilem intelligibilemque superascendat atque ideo ipsa omnium causa et firmari et negari solet uti de ea sic dicatur: Forma est, forma

31-33 eorum-informitas est: cf. p. 170, 33.

1 Ratione RB: Ratio P    2 corporeo RB: corporo P    6 lemma BP: Quid sit materia Rm    7 sollicitum R<sup>o</sup>BP: solacitum R\*    9 considerandum post deum: andum post deum in ras. R    quam RB: quoniam P    10 quid (3) RB<sup>o</sup>P: quod B\*    16 rationi RB<sup>o</sup>P: ratione B\*    19 lemma de informi materia manu fere contemporanea adscribitur in marg. R. Cf. infra, p. 168, 14 23 autem s.l. R    25 sensibiliter: sen s.l. R    27 est atque s.l. R    'omnium s.l. R    28 principalis s.l. R    29 rasura ante nam in R    33 eorum-sunt s.l. R    36 de s.l. R

A. Surely by reason. For I dare not say by sense, since matter which lacks form cannot be grasped by any corporeal sense.

N. You have answered correctly. But see that you do not again question us further about what you have now assumed. For we are wasting too much time over such matters when others more important await our consideration.

A. Concerning what has now been defined between us by pure speculation I shall not, I think, trouble you further. But I keep wondering at your having said that more important matters await our consideration: for what should be more important, after God, for the reason to consider than unformed matter I do not see, when the questions it raises are: What is matter? What is form? What is made from matter and form? Whence (comes) matter? Is it to be included among the primordial causes which were created by God first of all, or even from the secondary causes which proceed from the primordials? Is it to be reckoned among the things which are subject to the senses or among those which are to be allotted to the intellect? And can it be defined when it is still infinite or is it definable even when it is finite?—which seems to conflict with reason, since it has been clearly established by the holy fathers that there are two, and two only, that cannot be defined, God and matter. For God is without limit and without form since He is formed by none, being the Form of all things. Similarly matter is without form and without limit, for it needs to be formed and limited from elsewhere, while in itself it is not form but something that can receive form. And this similarity between the Cause of all things, from which and in which and through which and for which all things exist, and this unformed cause—I mean matter—which was created to the end that those things which in themselves cannot be grasped by the senses might by some means have a sensible appearance in it, is understood in contrary sense. For the supreme Cause of all things is without form and limit because of its eminence above all forms and limits. For it is not only the principal Form of all things, but More-than-form, surpassing every form and forming everything that can receive form [and everything that cannot]. [For it is both the Form of the things that can be formed, because they either desire it or turn to it, and the Formlessness of those things which, because of the excellence of their nature and their close similarity to itself, namely their Cause, cannot be formed. For this Formlessness of the things that cannot be formed is not called formlessness as if it lacked form, but because it is above every sensible and intelligible form: and that is why this Cause of all things is usually predicated both affirmatively and negatively: it is Form; it is not Form: it is Formlessness; it is not Formlessness.

Concerning matter



non est; informitas est, informitas non est. Quicquid enim de ipsa praedicatur et firmari et negari potest quia super omne quod dicitur et intelligitur et non intelligitur est.] Materia uero informis uocatur per priuationem omnium formarum. Ab ea siquidem nihil formatur, sed diuersas recipit formas.

N. Non longe distas a uero. Num igitur materia informis quoniam solo mentis oculo, ratione dico, perspicitur, necessario eam incorpoream esse sequetur?

A. Ne hoc quidem negare ausim.

N. Igitur incorporea est?

A. Est quidem; meoque iudicio conclusum me esse uideo.

N. Visne hoc auctoritate roborari?

A. Valde et ut fiat posco.

de informi materia

N. Multos de materia disputasse reperimus et mundanae et diuinae sophiae peritorum, sed paucorum testimonio uti sat est. Sanctus Augustinus in libris Confessionum informem materiem esse asserit mutabilitatem rerum mutabilium omnium formarum capacem; cui assentit Plato in Timeo, similiter informem materiam esse dicens formarum capacitatem. His ambobus sibimet consentientibus potest sic dici et diffiniri: Mutabilitas rerum mutabilium capax omnium formarum informis materia est. Sanctus Dionysius Ariopagita in libro de Diuinis Nominibus materiam dicit esse ornatus et formae et speciei participationem, quibus sine per se informis est [materia] et in nullo intelligi potest. Ac sic secundum Dionysium potest colligi: Si materia est ornatus et formae et speciei participatio, quod ornatus et formae et speciei participatione caret materia non est sed quaedam informitas. Siue itaque informis materia mutabilitas sit formarum capax secundum Augustinum atque Platonem siue informitas quaedam speciei formae ornatusque participatione carens secundum Dionysium, non negabis, ut arbitror, si quodam modo intelligi potest non nisi solo intellectu percipi.

A. Iamdudum hoc inconcusse dedi.

N. Quid? ipsam speciem formamque ornatusque quorum participatione informitas illa praedicta seu mutabilitas in materiam uertitur putasne aliter nisi mentis contuitu considerari?

A. Nullo modo. Nam de forma et specie, sine quibus nullus ornatus fieri potest, omnino incorporea esse praedictis rationibus satis est actum.

16-17 Aug., *Conf.* xii. 6, 6, p. 269, 14-17 Knöll = PL xxxii. 829: mutabilitas rerum mutabilium ipsa capax formarum omnium in quas mutantur res mutabiles 18-19 Plato, *Tim.* 48E-51B. Cf. Chalcedius, *Comm. in Tim.* 280 (302 Wrobel) 21-24 Ps.-Dionys., *DN* iv. 28, PG iii. 729A 2-3

2 omne RB: omnem P 7 post eam deletum est n in R 14 lemma BP: Quid sit informis materia Rm 7 repperimus B<sup>c</sup>P: repperimus RB\* 17 mutabilitatem RB: mutabilem P 19 consentientibus RB<sup>c</sup>P: consentibus B\* 20 et diffiniri s.l. R 21 informis RB<sup>c</sup>P: in formas B\* 22 et (1) s.l. R 24 dionys-

For whatever is predicated of it can be both affirmed and denied, because it is above everything that can be said and that can be understood and that cannot be understood.] Matter, on the other hand, is called formless by reason of its being deprived of all forms. For by it nothing is formed, but it receives different forms.

N. You are not far from the truth. Does it not therefore necessarily follow that since formless matter is beheld only by the eye of the mind, I mean by the reason, it is incorporeal?

A. Not even this would I dare to deny.

N. It is incorporeal, then?

A. It is indeed. I see that I am caught in my own judgement.

N. Do you wish this to be confirmed by authority?

A. Very much, and I pray that this be done.

N. We find that many of those proficient in both profane and sacred wisdom have treated of matter, but it is enough to rely on the testimony of a few. St. Augustine in his book of 'Confessions' asserts that formless matter is the mutability of mutable things which is receptive of all forms: and with this Plato agrees in the 'Timaeus', saying in similar language that formless matter is the receptivity of forms (171). From the unanimity of these two it can be defined in these words: Formless matter is the mutability of mutable things, receptive of all forms. St. Dionysius the Areopagite in his book 'On the Divine Names' says that matter is participation in adornment and form and species (172), for without these [matter] is formless and cannot be understood in anything. And from what Dionysius says can be gathered the following: if matter is participation in adornment and form and species, that which lacks participation (173) in adornment and form and species is not matter but a certain formlessness. Therefore, whether formless matter is a mutability receptive of forms, as Augustine and Plato say, or a formlessness which lacks participation in species and form and adornment, as Dionysius says, you will not deny, I think, that if it can be understood at all, it is perceived only by the intellect.

A. I have long agreed that this is undeniable.

N. Again, do you think that the species and form and adornments themselves, by participation in which that formlessness or mutability we mentioned is changed into matter, is considered by any other means than by the eye of the mind?

A. By no means. For as to form and species, without which there can be no adornment, it has been sufficiently demonstrated by the reasons given above that they are wholly incorporeal.

sium BP: dyonysium R colligi RB<sup>c</sup>: intelligi P\* 25-26 quod-participatio[ne in marg. R 31 non om. B\*P 32 inconcusse BP: inconcuse R 36 quibus RB<sup>c</sup>P: quibus B\*

57  
Concerning  
formless  
matter

N. Nunc itaque uides ex incorporeis, mutabili uidelicet informitate formarum quidem capaci ex ipsaque forma, quoddam corporeum, materiam dico corpusque, creari.

A. Plane uideo.

N. Concedis itaque ex incorporalium coitu corpora posse fieri? 5

A. Concedo ratione coactus.

N. Atqui dum haec ita sint necessario fateberis corpora in incorporea posse resolui ita ut corpora *non sint* sed paenitus soluta; incorporea uero naturali suo concursu mirabilique armonia ita corpora 10  
 conficiunt ut naturalem suum statum immobilemque uigorem nullo modo desinant habere, quemadmodum (ut quadam similitudine utamur) ex luce et corpore umbra nascitur neque tamen lux neque 501 C  
 corpus in umbram mouetur, umbra uero dum soluitur in causas suas, corpus uidelicet atque lucem, intelligitur redire. Vmbrarum siquidem causam corpus lucemque esse uera ratio edocet, in quibus naturaliter 15  
 silent dum in nullo loco apparere ualeant propter undique circa corpora circumfusam luminis claritatem. Errant enim qui putant umbram perire dum sensibus non apparet. Non enim umbra nihil est sed aliquid; alioqui non diceret scriptura, 'Et uocauit deus lucem 20  
 diem et tenebras noctem.' Deus nanque non nominat nisi quod ex ipso est, neque eo loci altitudo theoriae aufert ueritatem historiae. [Ibi siquidem secundum rerum factarum considerationem non aliud tenebras noctemque accipimus nisi umbram terrae solarium radi- 501 D  
 orum circumfusione factam instar coni semperque globo luminis oppositam. Eademque ratio est in minoribus umbris qualicunque 25  
 lumine corporibusque proiectis, seu finitae seu infinitae sint et qualiscunque formae sint.] Non mireris itaque ex incorporalibus causis corpora creari inque easdem iterum resolui, ipsas uero causas ab una eademque rerum omnium creatrice creatas procedere. Ex 29  
 forma enim omnium, unigenito uidelicet patris uerbo, omnis forma 501 A  
 siue substantialis siue quae ex qualitate assumitur materiaeque adiuncta corpus generat, creata est; ab ipsa quoque omnis informitas. Nec mirum ex informi forma per excellentiam informitatem quae est formarum omnium priuatione conditam fieri quandoquidem non solum monogena sed etiam eterogena, hoc est non solum quae sunt 35  
 unius sed etiam quae sunt diuersi generis, et non solum quae per

19-20 Gen. i. 5 22-25 cf. 716A 10-B 5 29-32 ex forma-creata est: cf. 529B, 546A, 556 sq., 624B, 629B; Col. ii. 16-17; Origen., *De princ.* i. 2; Clem. Alex., *Strom.* iv. 635, 9

2 corporeum RB: incorporeum P 5 incorporalium RB<sup>c</sup>P: corporalium B\* 7 in om. P 8 corpora RB: corporea P paenitus B: penitus RP 13 lemma BP: d(e) u(ombra) erasum Rm 17 glossa Errant qui putant umbram perire Rm 19 alioqui RB<sup>c</sup>P: aliqui B\* 21 aufert BP: aufert R 24 instar R<sup>c</sup>BP: snstar R\* 25 oppositam R<sup>c</sup>BP: opositam R\* 27 formae R<sup>c</sup>BP: formis R\* mireris R<sup>c</sup>BP: mereris R\* 28 inque R<sup>c</sup>BP: in quae R\* 31 assumitur BP: assumitur R 33 forma R<sup>c</sup>BP: fo<sup>c</sup>ma R\*

N. So now you see that from incorporeal things, namely mutable formlessness which yet is receptive of forms, and form itself, something corporeal, namely matter and body, is created.

A. I see it clearly.

N. You admit, then, that bodies can be made from the concurrence of incorporeal things?

A. I admit it, since I am compelled by reason.

N. Surely you must confess, since this is so, that bodies can be 58  
 resolved into incorporeal things so as *not to be* bodies (any more) but wholly dissolved; while incorporeal things by their natural concurrence and marvellous harmony produce bodies in such a way that they do not by any means lose their natural state and unchanging vigour, just as, to employ a simile, shadow is produced from light and body, and yet neither the light nor the body is changed into shadow; shadow, on the other hand, when it vanishes, is understood to return 59  
 into its causes, namely into body and light. For the right view is that the cause of shadows is body and light, in which their nature is latent because they have no place in which they can appear on account of the brightness of the light which surrounds the bodies on all sides. For they are wrong who think that shadow perishes when it is not apparent to the senses. For shadow is not nothing, it is something. If it were not so Scripture would not say, 'And God called the light day and the darkness night', for God does not give a name to anything that is not from Himself. Nor in that passage does the loftiness of the theory obscure the truth of the history. [For if the actual events are there considered, we hold that darkness and night are nothing else but the earth's shadow cast by the rays of the sun that are poured around it, shaped like a cone, and always pointing away from the globe of light. And the same (174) is true of lesser shadows by whatsoever kind of light and bodies they are projected, whether (the shadows) are finite or infinite and of whatever shape they are.] Do not then be surprised that bodies are created from incorporeal causes and are resolved into them again, while the causes themselves are created by, and proceed from, one and the same Cause that is creative of all things. For from the Form of all things, namely, the 59  
 only-begotten Word of the Father, every form is created, whether it be substantial or the kind which derives from quality and in union with matter generates body. From the same source also comes every formlessness. Nor is it surprising that from the Form which is formless because of its eminence should come to be created the formlessness which is due to the privation of all forms, when not only homogeneous but also heterogeneous things, that is, not only things of a single genus but also things of differing genus, and not only those that are said to be or not to be because of their eminence, but also

Concerning shadow

confirmat  
 sicut  
 praedixit  
 corpora ex  
 accidentium  
 concursu  
 effici

excellentiā sed etiam quae per priuationem dicuntur esse uel non esse ab eodem fonte omnium manant. Quid igitur? num iam tibi clare lucet non sine ratione a nobis dictum esse ex accidentium concursu corpora fieri, auctoritatem sancti Gregorii Nysaei sequentes, cum uideas alios siue Grecos siue Latinos auctores ex incorporalibus 502B  
 asserere corpora fieri? Ideoque praedicti patris Gregorii sententiam 6  
 disputationi nostrae placuit inseri. Ait enim in libro de Imagine aduersus eos qui dicunt materiam deo esse coaeternam agens: 'Neque 'extra ea quae consequenter inuenta sunt de materia susceptio illa 'fertur quae ex intellectuali et immateriali eam subsistere profert. 10  
 'Omnem siquidem materiam ex quibusdam qualitibus consistere 'inuenimus, quibus si nudata fuerit per se ipsam nulla ratione com- 'prehenditur. Atqui unaquaeque qualitatis species ratione subiecto 'separatur. Ratio autem intellectualis est quaedam et incorporalis 'theoria, ut puta proposito quopiam animali seu ligno in theoria seu 15  
 'aliquo alio materialium constitutionem habentium multa circa 'subiectum secundum intelligentiam diuisione intelligimus, quorum 502C  
 'uniuscuiusque ad id quod consideratur inconfuse habetur ratio. Alia 'siquidem coloris et alia grauitatis ratio, alia iterum quantitatis et 'alia intelligentiae quae est secundum tactum proprietatis; mollities 20  
 'enim et bicubitale, caetera etiam eorum quae dicta sunt, neque sibi 'inuicem neque corpori secundum rationem commiscetur. Nam in 'unoquoque horum specialis iuxta quam est interpretata intelligitur 'causa nullaque' [earum] 'quae circa subiectum theorizantur alteri 'qualitati promiscetur. Si ergo intelligibilis color, intelligibilis etiam 25  
 'soliditas et quantitas et caetera talium specialitatum, horum autem 'unumquodque si sublatum fuerit subiecto omnis ratio corporis 502D  
 'simul soluetur, consequens erit, quorum absentiam solutionis corporis 'causam inuenimus, horum concursum materialem naturam creare 'assumere. Vt enim non est corpus cui res,' [id est] OYCIA, 'et figura et 30  
 'soliditas et distantia et grauitas caeteraque specialitatum non assunt '(horum autem unumquodque corpus non est sed alterum quod 'praeter corpus seorsum inuenitur), sic conuersim ubicunque quae 'dicta sunt concurrerint corporalem substantiam perficiunt. At si 'intelligibilis est specialitatum intelligentia, intelligibilis quoque natura 503A

8-p. 174, 4 Greg. Nyss., *De hom. opif.* xxiv, PG xlv. 212D sq. 29-30 horum-  
 assumere: cf. 479C

manifestis-  
 sima ratio  
 de concursu  
 accidentium

2 lemma BP (HIC CONFIRMAT . . . P): hic confirmat corpora ex accidentium concursu fieri Rm 3 lucet R<sup>c</sup>BP: relucet R\* 4 nysaei B: nysae R\*: nysae R<sup>c</sup>: nysei P 6 asserere RB: asserere P 7 disputationi RP: disputationi B. Cf. supra, p. 164, 10 16 materialium: lege materialem (ὀλικήν) 18 inconfuse RB: inconfuse P 21 bicubitale R<sup>c</sup>BP: cubitale R\* 22 corpori RBP<sup>c</sup>: corporis P\* 22-23 unoquoque: quo insulari manu s.l. B 23 quam RB<sup>c</sup>P: quem B\* interpreta-  
 ta codd.: lege interpretatiua (ἐρμηνευτικός) 25 promiscetur codd.: lege permiscetur

those of which this is said on account of privation, flow from the same Source of all things (175). For, why: is it not now quite clear to you that it was not without reason that we said, on the authority of St. Gregory of Nyssa, that bodies are made from the concurrence of accidents, when you see that other authors, both Greek and Latin, assert that bodies are made from incorporeal things? And that was why I decided to introduce into our discussion the assumption of the aforesaid father Gregory. For, disputing with those who say that matter is co-eternal with God, he says in the book 'On the Image': 'Nor does that opinion concerning matter which teaches that it has its subsistence from the intellectual and the immaterial seem to be (176) inconsistent with what is deduced from what follows. For we find (177) that all matter is produced from certain qualities, and that if it is divested of these it will by no means (178) be comprehended by itself. Nevertheless, each species of quality is separated from its subject by reason. But reason is an intellectual and incorporeal speculation. Thus, when some animal or piece of wood or anything else of the things which have the constitution of material things (179) is submitted to our speculation, we get to know many things about the subject by way of division (180) by the intelligence, each of which is related unconfusedly to what is being considered. For to take into account its colour is one thing, its weight another; another again its quantity, and another, the particular way it feels to the touch (181). For softness, and two-cubit length, and the other things that have been mentioned are not, from the point of view of reason, confused with one another or with the body. For in each of these is understood its special cause with regard to which it is interpretative, and none' [of these( causes)] 'which are considered about the subject (182) is confused with any other quality. If, then, colour is (solely) intelligible, and if solidity (183) is (solely) intelligible, and quantity, and the other peculiarities of this kind, and if when any of these is withdrawn from the subject the whole concept of the body shall disappear as well (184), it will follow( for us) to assume that, of those things whose absence we find to be the cause of the dissolution of the body, the coming together creates its material nature. For as there is no body in which "thing", (185) [that is], οὐσία, 'and shape and solidity and extension and weight and the rest of the peculiarities are not present—yet none of these is a body but something else which is found to be apart beside the body—so, on the other hand, when the aforesaid things come together, they produce the corporeal substance. But if the understanding of peculiarities is intelligible, and if God also is an intelligible nature, it is not at all inconsistent that these

He confirms what he said before, that bodies are produced from the concurrence of accidents

A very clear argument concerning the concurrence of the accidents

28 soluetur R<sup>c</sup>BP: soluitur R\* 29 lemma BP (rasura post accidentium in B) 30 pro res id est οὐσία lege color. In exemplari Iohannes χρέμα pro χρώμα legerat

'deus, nil inconsequens ex incorporali natura has intellectuales oc-  
'casiones ad corporum generationem substitutas esse ab intellectuali  
'quidem natura intelligibiles substituente uirtutes, harum uero ad se  
'inuicem concursu materialem naturam in generationem adducente.'  
Num itaque uides maximum fortissimumque praedicti magistri argu- 5  
mentum [sufficere]? Si [enim] aliud esset corpus praeter accidentium  
[OYCIAE] concursum subtractis *eisdem* in se ipso per se ipsum sub-  
sisteret. Siquidem omne subiectum per se subsistens accidentium  
non indiget ut sit, sicut ipsa OYCIA; siue enim accidant ei siue non  
accidant siue in ea sint quae sine ea esse non possunt siue ab ea re- 10  
cedant *quae ab ea segregari possunt seu sola cogitatione seu actu et opere,*  
suis naturalibus subsidiis semper immutabiliterque subsistit. Corpus 503B  
autem subtractis accidentibus nullo modo per se subsistere potest  
quoniam nulla sui substantia fulcitur. Nam si quantitatem a corpore  
subtraxeris corpus non erit; spatiis enim membrorum numeroque 15  
continetur. Similiter si qualitatem ab eo dempseris deforme remanebit  
et nihil. Eadem ratio in caeteris accidentibus quibus corpus contineri  
uidetur contemplanda est. Quod igitur sine accidentibus per se non  
potest subsistere nihil aliud intelligendum est praeter eorundem  
accidentium concursum esse. [Quid ergo mirum aut rationi contra- 20  
rium si similiter accipiamus magnificum Boetium non aliud aliquid  
uariabilem rem intellexisse nisi corpus materiale quod ex concursu  
earum rerum quae uere sunt, ut ait ipse, constituitur et dum in ipso  
considerantur mutabilitatem quandam pati necesse est? Nec hoc 25  
mirum si aliter res per se immutabiles puro mentis contuitu perspici-  
entur in sua simplicitate aliter sensu corporeo in aliqua materia ex  
concursu earum facta compositae cum uideamus ea quae per se  
simplicia sunt et incorruptibilia compositum quoddam atque cor-  
ruptibile inter se coeuntia perpetrare. Cui enim incognitum sit hanc 30  
molem terreni globi ex quattuor simplicibus elementis esse com-  
pactam, quae quidem corruptibilis solubilisque dum sit, ea tamen  
elementa ex quibus conficitur in sua simplicitate insolubili permanent?  
Et haec in omnibus fere corporibus communiter speculatur ratio.] 503D  
Ac de his satis dictum aestimo.

A. Satis profecto. Et iam ad reliquarum categoriarum theoriam 35

22-24 Boeth., *De inst. arithm.*, p. 8 Friedlein

1 incorporali R<sup>c</sup>BP: in incorporali R\* natura s.l. B 2 substitutas RB<sup>c</sup>P:  
substitutatus B\* 7 *eisdem* R<sup>c</sup>BP: accidentibus R\* 10 possunt R<sup>c</sup>BP:  
possint R\* 11 quae-opere R<sup>c</sup>BP: siue in ea extinguantur ut non sint R\*  
12 lemma BP: corpus sine accidentibus non potest esse Rm 14 sui R: sul B:  
om. P 16 similiter R<sup>c</sup>BP: simili ratione R\* ab eo R<sup>c</sup> (*alia manu*) BP: corpore R\*  
21 aliud aliquid RB: aliquid aliud P 24 pati necesse est R<sup>c</sup>BP: patiuntur R\*  
25 mentis R<sup>c</sup>BP: mente R\* 25-26 perspicentur R<sup>c</sup>BP: perspiciuntur  
R\* 26 in sua simplicitate s.l. R 27 *post facta erasum est* uidentur in R

intellectual causes (186) are supplied to the coming into being of the  
bodies from the incorporeal Nature, the intellectual Nature supplying  
the intelligible powers (187), and (188) the coming together of these  
with one another producing the generation of the material nature.'  
Do you not then see that this Doctor's excellent and very powerful 60  
argument [clinches the matter]? [For] if the body were something  
else besides the concurrence of the accidents of *οὐσία*, when *these* were  
withdrawn it would subsist in itself by itself. For no subject which  
subsists by itself requires accidents in order that it may be. Such  
a subject is *οὐσία* itself: for whether it has accidents or does not have  
them, whether there are in it things which cannot exist without it or  
whether *things which, either by thought alone or by act and operation,*  
*can be separated from it* withdraw from it, it always subsists without  
change by its own natural resources. But body, when the accidents  
are withdrawn, can by no means subsist by itself since it is not sup-  
ported by any substance of its own. For if you withdraw quantity  
from body it will not be a body; for it is held together by the dimen-  
sions and number of its members. Similarly if you take quality  
away from it, what is left will be shapeless and nothing. The same  
view must be taken of the other accidents by which the body is seen  
to be held together. So that which cannot subsist by itself without  
accidents must be understood to be nothing else but the concurrence  
of those same accidents. [So what is strange or contrary to reason in 61  
taking the excellent Boethius likewise to have understood by 'the  
variable thing' nothing else but the material body which is constituted,  
as he says, from the concurrence of things which really are; and (that)  
as long as they are considered in it they must necessarily suffer  
a certain mutability? Nor is it strange that things which by themselves  
are immutable will be observed otherwise in their simplicity by the  
pure gaze of the mind than they will be seen by the bodily sense in  
their composition in some matter made from their own commingling,  
since we see that those things which are simple and incorruptible by  
themselves produce, when they come together with one another,  
something composite and corruptible. For who does not know that  
this mass of the earthly globe is made up of four simple elements,  
and that while it is corruptible and dissoluble, those elements from  
which it is produced all the same remain in their indissoluble sim-  
plicity? And this relation (189) can be generally applied to almost all  
bodies.] And (190) I think enough has been said about these matters.

A. Enough, surely. And I see that we must now return to a

28 compositum BP: compositum R 29 cui RB: cum P 30 *post simplici-*  
*bus una littera erasa est in R* esse s.l. R 31 ea RB: et P 32 permanent  
s.l. R 33 haec R\*BP: hoc R<sup>c</sup> *rasura post fere in R* 35 categoriarum  
BP: categoriarum R

That body  
cannot sub-  
sist by itself  
without its  
accidents

redundum est uideo, nam de his diutius dubitare minus considerantium rerum naturas esse dubium non est, ac per hoc meae tarditatis in multis me pudet et poenitet.

N. Non te pudeat nec poeniteat. Quamuis enim haec de quibus disputamus tam praeclara sapientibus sint ut eorum nullus in eis haesitet rudibus tamen et ex inferioribus ad superiora rationis iter carpentibus utilia esse non ambigo.

A. Nullo modo ambigendum et hoc in me perspicio. Perge ad caetera.

N. Duae categoriae contemplationi restant ni fallor, agendi uidelicet et patiendi. Nam disputantes de loco quaedam de tempore quantum praesentis disputationis necessitas exigebat discussimus.

A. Nil nunc amplius de tempore deque loco a te quaero; sufficiunt enim quae de his dicta sunt. Nam si de singulis omnia quae ratio considerari appetit quis dixerit aut uix aut nullum finem disputatio habebit.

de agere et pati N. Considera itaque. Num actio passioque de deo praedicantur an sicut caeterae categoriae per metaphoran dici aestimandum est?

A. Per metaphoran sane. Quid enim? nunquid arbitrandum est has duas aliarum regulas excedere cum minoris uirtutis uideantur esse?

N. Dic quaeso, quid tibi uidetur? Mouere et moueri nonne agere est et pati?

A. Aliter non esse uideo.

N. Similiter, ut opinor, amare et amari.

A. Eadem regula colliguntur. Haec enim uerba sui que similia actiua et passiuua esse nemo artium liberalium peritus ignorat.

N. Si igitur haec uerba siue actiuae siue passiuuae significationis sint non iam proprie sed translatiue de deo praedicantur, et omnia quae translate praedicantur non re uera sed quodam modo de eo dicuntur; re uera neque deus agit neque patitur neque mouet neque mouetur neque amat neque amatur.

A. Haec postrema conclusio non paruae indiget considerationis. Nam huic, ut opinor, totius sanctae scripturae sanctorumque patrum reluctari uidetur auctoritas. Quotiens enim, ut nosti, sancta scriptura deum manifeste pronuntiat agere et pati, amare et amari, diligere et diligere, uidere et uideri, mouere et moueri caeteraque id genus,

2 non s.l. R 3 me R<sup>c</sup>BP: mae R\* poenitet B<sup>c</sup>: penitet RB\*: paenitet P  
4 poeniteat B<sup>c</sup>: peniteat RB\*: paeniteat P 6 superiora RB: superaora P  
7 carpentibus R<sup>c</sup>BP: carpientibus R\* 10 ni RB<sup>c</sup>P: nisi B\* 12 exigebat R<sup>c</sup>BP:  
exigit R\* 13 rasura post Nil in R deque loco s.l. R 14 enim s.l. R  
17 lemma BPRm 18 caeterae RB: caetere P categoriae BP: cathegoriae R  
metaphoran B<sup>c</sup>P: metaforan R: metaphoram B\* 20 metaphoran BP:  
metaforan R 25 opinor RP: pinor B 27 liberalium s.l. R 29 quae RB:  
que P 30 post dicuntur deletum est. Igitur in R 34 nam R<sup>c</sup>BP: et R\*  
opinor RB<sup>c</sup>P: pinor B\* 36-37 diligere et diligere R\*BP: deligere et deligere R<sup>c</sup>

consideration of the rest of the categories. For there is no doubt that to hesitate longer over these matters is the mark of those who understand too little of the natures of things; and therefore I feel shame and regret for my slowness on many occasions.

N. Do not feel shame or regret. For although the subjects we are discussing are so clear to the wise that none of them would feel uncertain about them, I have no doubt that (such discussions) are useful to the uninstructed and to those who are taking the path of reason from lower to higher planes.

A. By no means is it to be doubted, and I see that this is the case with me. Go on to the rest (191).

N. Two categories remain for examination unless I am mistaken, namely, those of acting and suffering. For in discussing place we said something of time as well—as much as was required for the purpose of the present inquiry.

A. I am not now asking anything further about time or place, for what has been said about these is sufficient. For if one says concerning each (subject) everything that reason seeks to be considered, the discussion will scarcely, if ever, come to an end.

N. Consider, then: are action and passion predicated of God, or is it to be held that, as in the case of the other categories, they are employed metaphorically? Concerning acting and suffering

A. Metaphorically, surely. For is it to be thought that these two override the rules that bind the others when they are seen to be of slighter power?

N. Tell me, pray, how does it seem to you? Are not moving and being moved an acting and suffering?

A. I see that it is not otherwise.

N. Similarly, I think, loving and being loved?

A. They come under the same rule: that these verbs and their like are actives and passives no one instructed in the liberal arts is ignorant.

N. If then these verbs, whether they are active or passive in meaning, are no longer properly predicated of God, but metaphorically, and if nothing that is predicated metaphorically is said of Him in very truth but after a certain manner, then in very truth God neither acts nor is acted upon, neither moves nor is moved, neither loves nor is loved.

A. This last inference requires not a little looking into. For against it, as I think, there seems to be ranged the authority of the whole of Holy Scripture and of the Holy Fathers. For how often, as you know, does Holy Scripture explicitly affirm that God acts and suffers, loves and is loved, desires and is desired, sees and is seen, moves and is moved, and all else of this sort. The instances of these (expressions)

quorum exempla quoniam innumerabilia sunt passimque quaerenti  
 occurrunt ne nunc prolixitatem gignerent placuit praeterire, satis-  
 que hoc uno euuangelico utendum est exemplo: Qui deligit me  
 deligetur a patre meo et ego deligam eum et manifestabo me ipsum  
 illi. Sanctus item Augustinus in Exameron suo de diuino motu dis- 5  
 serens haec uerba protulit: Spiritus quidem creator mouet se ipsum  
 sine tempore et loco, mouet conditum spiritum per tempus sine loco,  
 mouet corpus per tempus et locum. Si itaque agere et pati de deo, ut 504D  
 praediximus, non re uera, id est non proprie, praedicantur, sequitur  
 nec mouere nec moueri. Mouere enim agere est, moueri uero pati. 10  
 Item si nec agit nec patitur quomodo dicitur amare omnia et amari  
 ab omnibus quae ab eo facta sunt? Amare enim motus quidam  
 agentis est, amari uero patientis et causa et finis est motus. [Sed hoc  
 dico usum publicum sequens. Nam si quis diligentius rerum in- 505A  
 spexerit naturam reperiet multa uerba quae cum sola uocis superficie 15  
 actiua esse uideantur intellectu tamen passiuam habent significa-  
 tionem, et e contrario passiuam superficiem actum significat. Nam qui  
 amat uel deligit ipse patitur, qui uero amatur uel deligitur agit.]  
 At si amat deus quae facit profecto uidetur moueri, suo enim amore  
 mouetur. Et si amatur ab his quae amare possunt siue sciant quid 20  
 amant siue nesciant, nonne certum est quia mouet? Amor siquidem  
 pulchritudinis ipsius ea mouet. Quomodo ergo dicitur neque mouere  
 neque moueri ne uideatur agere et pati per me ipsum considerare  
 nequeo ac per hoc huius quaestionis nodum soluas obnixius postulo.

N. Putasne in his qui agunt aliud esse agentem aliud posse agere 505B  
 aliud agere an unum idemque? 26

A. Non unum esse opinor sed tria quaedam a se differentia. Amans  
 enim, hoc est qui amat, substantia quaedam certae ac diffinitae per-  
 sonae est cui accidit quaedam potentia per quam ipsa substantia  
 potest agere siue agat siue non. Si uero ipsa substantia per ipsam 30  
 potentiam se mouerit ut aliquid agat agere dicitur. Ac per hoc tria  
 quaedam uidentur esse, substantia uidelicet cui inest agere posse  
 cuius possibilitatis ueluti cuiusdam causae effectus est in aliqua re  
 agere, siue ipsa actio reciproca sit, id est in eandem redeat, seu in  
 alteram transeat personam. 35

3-5 Ioh. xiv. 21      6-8 Aug., *De Gen. ad litt.* viii. 20, p. 259, 22-25 CSEL

3 euuangelico B: euangelico RP    est in ras. B      3-4 deligit . . . deligetur . . .  
 deligam R<sup>c</sup>BP\*: diligit . . . diligitur . . . diligam R\*P<sup>c</sup>      5-6 disserens R<sup>c</sup>BP:  
 disserans R\*      9 praedicantur R<sup>c</sup>BP: praedicatur R\*      10 uero RP: aro  
 B      11 agit R<sup>c</sup>BP: patitur R\*      12 quidam RB<sup>c</sup>P: quidem B\*      14 publi-  
 cum BP: publicum R      hic inchoandum ad sequens *pertinens grandibus litteris*  
*scripta est in marg.* B      15 reperiet R<sup>c</sup>B<sup>c</sup>P<sup>c</sup>: repperiat R\*: repperi et B\*: reperi  
 et P\*      16 habent RB<sup>c</sup>P: habint B\*      17 e RBP<sup>c</sup>: eo P\*      18 deli-  
 git R<sup>c</sup>BP\*: diligit R\*P<sup>c</sup>      deligitur RBP\*: diligitur P<sup>c</sup>      post deligitur *deletum*  
*est profecto in R*      19 at RB<sup>c</sup>P: et B\*      22 pulchritudinis RB: pulcritu-  
 dinis P      24 obnixius R<sup>c</sup>BP: obnixie R\*      25 agere, quod deerat, *adscripsit in*

I have decided to omit lest they should lead to prolixity, seeing that  
 they are innumerable and occur everywhere to anyone who seeks  
 them; and the use of this single example from the Gospel is sufficient:  
 'Whoso loveth Me shall be loved by My Father and I shall love him  
 and shall reveal Myself to him.' Again, St. Augustine in his *Hexe-*  
*meron*, discussing the divine motion, has uttered these words:  
 'Now the Spirit that creates moves itself without time and place;  
 it moves the spirit that is created through time without place; it  
 moves the body through time and place.' If, then, acting and suffer-  
 ing are predicated of God not in very truth, that is, not properly, as  
 we said above, it follows that neither are moving or being moved.  
 For to move is to act, while to be moved is to suffer. Further, if He  
 neither acts nor suffers how is He said to love all things and to be  
 loved by all things which were made by Him? For loving is a motion  
 of the agent, while being loved is the cause and the end of the motion  
 of the patient. [But here I am speaking after the common usage. For  
 if one looks into the nature of things more closely one will find that  
 many verbs which have a merely superficial appearance of being  
 active because of their sound, yet in their meaning have a passive  
 sense; and on the other hand what is superficially passive has an  
 active sense. For he who loves or desires suffers himself, while he  
 who is loved or desired acts.] But (192) if God loves what He makes  
 He is surely seen to be moved; for He is moved by His love. And  
 if He is loved by those who can love whether they know what they  
 love or do not know it, is it not certain that He moves (them)? For  
 it is the love of His beauty that moves them. Therefore how it is said  
 that He neither moves nor is moved lest it should appear that He acts  
 and suffers is something I cannot find out by myself, and therefore  
 the more insistently demand that you untie the knot of this question.

N. Do you think that, in those who act, the agent is one thing, the  
 ability to act is another, and the acting another, or that they are one  
 and the same?

A. My opinion is that they are not one, but three, differing from  
 each other. For the lover, that is, he who loves, is a substance of  
 a certain definite person, who has an accident of a certain potency by  
 which this substance can act whether he does so or not; while if this  
 substance moves itself by means of this potency so as to perform some  
 act he is said to act. And thus there are seen to be three things,  
 namely, a substance, and the potency to act that is in it, and the act-  
 ing out of this potency upon some object, as the effect of some cause,  
 whether this action be reflexive, that is, whether it turns back upon  
 the same person, or whether it passes on to another.

*marg.* sR      27 Non unum R<sup>c</sup>BP: Num R\*      29 ipsa substantia *om.* P  
 30 siue non BP: seu non R      34 eandem R<sup>c</sup>BP: eadem R\*

N. Recte discernis. Quid tibi uidetur? Nonne eadem discretio est obseruanda in eo qui patitur ut aliud sit patiens aliud posse pati aliud ipsum pati, siue a se ipso quis patiatur siue ab alio? 505c

A. Eadem profecto.

N. Haec igitur tria et in his qui amant et in his qui amantur eiusdem naturae non sunt? 5

A. Non sunt ut opinor. Alia siquidem natura est substantiarum alia accidentium. Nam qui agit uel patitur substantia est, posse autem agere uel pati et ipsum agere uel pati accidentia sunt.

N. Miror quomodo eorum quae in praedictis ratiocinationibus et quaesita et inuenta, ut arbitrator, et diffinita sunt oblitus es. 10

A. Admone precor et quae sunt illa in memoriam reuoca; nam me uitio memoriae quod est obliuio neglegentem obliuiosumque esse non denego.

N. Recordarisne collectum conclusumque a nobis fuisse OYCIAN DYNAMIN ENERGEIAN, id est essentiam, ut saepe diximus, uirtutem et operationem, trinitatem quandam inseparabilem incorruptibilemque nostrae naturae esse quae sibi inuicem mirabili naturae armonia coniuncta est ut et tria unum sint et unum tria neque ueluti diuersae naturae sunt sed unius atque eiusdem, non ut substantia eiusque accidentia sed quaedam essentialis unitas substantialisque differentia trium in uno? 15 505D

A. Recordor ac deinceps nunquam obliuioni tradam. Apertissimam nanque conditoris imaginem obliuioni tradere stultissimum est atque miserrimum. Sed quorsum istac nondum uideo, nisi forte quia tria quaedam a se inuicem discrepantia dum a te interrogatus [sum] responderim unum quidem secundum subiectum duo uero secundum accidens esse. Quae tria prioribus tribus longe uidentur abesse ac per hoc aut illa tria quae diximus unius eiusdemque substantiae esse sola uereque sunt, id est essentia uirtus et operatio, quae uero nunc a me addita sunt, id est substantia cum accidentibus, possibilitate uidelicet agendi ipsiusque possibilitatis effectu quod est agere, *superflua esse nullaue ratione reperta arbitrandum*; aut e contrario; aut etiam (quod rectius dicendum mihi uidetur) et haec et illa in natura rerum sunt suisque naturalibus differentiis discernuntur. Sed utrum ita concedendum necne tuo iudicio discernendum committo. 30 506B 36

2 post patiens una littera erasa est in P ut opinor R<sup>c</sup>BP: equidem R\*  
8-9 posse autem agere alia manu in ras. R 10 ratiocinationibus R<sup>c</sup>BP:  
rationibus a nobis R\* 13 obliuio neglegentem R<sup>c</sup>BP: obliuionelegere R\*  
obliuiosumque s.l. R 15 Recordarisne RBP<sup>c</sup>: Recorderisne P\* 16 ΔY-  
NAMIN RB: ΔINAMIN P saepe RB: sepe P 17 quandam RB<sup>c</sup>P: quendam B\*  
18 mirabili R<sup>c</sup>BP: mirabile R\* 21 essentialis R<sup>c</sup>BP: ess<sup>\*\*</sup>tialis R\* unitas  
RBP<sup>c</sup>: uniuersitas P\* 23 nunquam B<sup>c</sup>: numquam RB\*P 25 miser-  
rimum R<sup>c</sup>BP: misserrimum R\* 26 discrepantia R<sup>c</sup>BP: discretantia R\* dum-  
sum R<sup>c</sup>BP: nuper a te interrogatus R\* 29 substantiae RB: substantia P  
31 possibilitate: pos deletum est in R

N. You draw a correct distinction. How does it seem to you? Must not the same distinction be observed in him who suffers, so that the patient is one thing, the potency to suffering another, and the suffering itself another, whether he suffers at his own hands or at another's?

A. The same, surely.

N. So these three are not of the same nature either in those who love or in those who are loved?

A. They are not, in my opinion. For substances have one nature, accidents another. For he who acts or suffers is a substance, but the potency of acting or suffering and the acting and suffering themselves are accidents.

N. I wonder how you have forgotten the questions which arose and were answered, I think, and finally settled in our earlier discussions.

A. Please prompt me, and call back to my memory what they were; for I do not deny that I am heedless and forgetful through a defect of the memory which is forgetfulness.

N. Do you remember that it has been deduced and concluded by us that οὐσία, δύναμις, ἐνέργεια, that is, essence (as we have often said), power and operation (193), form an inseparable and incorruptible trinity in our nature which by the wonderful harmony of nature is so integrated with itself that the three are a unity and the unity is three, and that they are not as it were of diverse nature but of one and the same, not as a substance and its accidents but as an essential unity and substantial differentiation of three in one?

A. I remember it and will never again commit it to oblivion. For to commit to oblivion the most apparent image of the Creator is a most foolish and unfortunate thing to do. But I do not yet see where this is to lead, unless perhaps that when I was asked by you I replied that there were three things distinct from one another, one being in the nature of a subject while two are in the nature of accidents; and these three seem to be very different from the previous three, and thus either only those three which we said were of one and the same substance truly exist, that is, essence, power, operation; while those which I have now introduced, that is, substance and its accidents, namely, the possibility of acting and the effect of this possibility, which is acting, *must be supposed to be superfluous and not to be deduced by reason*; or the reverse; or again (which I think must be the more correct opinion), both the latter and the former exist in the nature of things and are distinguished by their own natural differences. But whether this is to be conceded or not, this I leave to your judgement to decide.

de trina et uniuersali rationabilium maxime et intelligibilium essentia et uirtute et operatione. et trinitate quae in singulis considerari potest

N. Quod nouissime posuisti rectae rationi uidetur conuenire. Quisquis enim dixerit essentialem trinitatem, essentiam scilicet uirtutem operationem, inconcussam incorruptibilemque omnibus inesse et maxime rationabilibus intellectualibusque naturis a ueritate, ut opinor, non recedit; quae trinitas in omnibus quibus inest nec augeri nec minui potest. Sequens uero trinitas ueluti praecedentis trinitatis effectus quidam intelligitur esse. Non enim ueritati obstrepat, ut aestimo, si dicamus ex ipsa essentia quae una et uniuersalis in omnibus creata est omnibusque communis atque ideo quia omnium se participantium [est] nullius propria dicitur [esse] singulorum se participantium *quandam* propriam substantiam quae nullius alicuius est nisi ipsius solummodo cuius est naturali progressionem manare, cui etiam substantiae propria possibilitas inest quae aliunde non assumitur nisi ex ipsa uniuersali uirtute ipsius praedictae uniuersalis et essentiae et uirtutis. Similiter de propria operatione specialissimae et substantiae et potestatis dicendum non aliunde descendere nisi ab ipsa uniuersali operatione [eiusdem] uniuersalis et essentiae et uirtutis. Nec mirum si haec tria quae in singulis considerantur quasi quaedam accidentia praedictae uniuersalis trinitatis dicantur esse primae[que] apparitiones quandoquidem ipsa per se unum sit et in omnibus quae ex ea et in ea existunt incommutabiliter *permanet* nec augeri nec minui nec corrumpi nec perire potest. Haec uero quae specialissime in singulis considerantur augeri possunt et minui multipliciterque uariari. Non enim omnes similiter participes sunt uniuersalis essentiae et uirtutis et operationis, alii enim plus alii minus, nullus tamen participatione ipsius penitus priuatur. Ipsa *quoque* in omnibus participantibus se una atque eadem permanet nullique ad participandum se plus aut minus adest, sicut lux oculis. Tota enim in singulis est et in se ipsa. Augeri autem uel minui quidam defectus seu perfectus est participationis *ideoque* non irrationabiliter accidens esse iudicatur; nam quod semper id ipsum est uera substantia recte dicitur, quod uero uariatur aut ex mutabilitate instabilis substantiae aut ex participatione accidentium siue naturalium siue non naturalium procedit. Et ne mireris quaedam accidentia substantias dici quoniam aliis accidentibus subsistunt dum uides quantitatem, quae sine dubio accidens substantiae est, alia accidentia

de  
 accidentibus  
 accidentium

1 lemma BP (essentia B: ESSENTIAE P uirtute B: VNITATE P): de essentiali trinitate rationabilium intelligibiliumque naturarum Rm 3 inconcussam BP: inconcussam R post omnibus *erasum est* creaturis (?) in R 6 sequens in *ras*. B trinitatis RBP<sup>c</sup>: trinitas P\* 7 *sex lineae erasae sunt in marg.* B 10 dicitur RB<sup>c</sup>P: dicitus B\* post singulorum *habet* uero R 11 *quandam* R<sup>c</sup>BP: quaedam R\* alicuius RB<sup>c</sup>P: alicuius B\* 12 *rasura* post progressionem in R manare BP: emanat R\*: emanare R<sup>c</sup> 13-14 assumitur B<sup>c</sup>P: assumitur RB\* 15 uirtutis P<sup>c</sup>: uirtus P\* 16 descendere R<sup>c</sup>BP: descendere R\* 17 essentiae: ess in *ras*. B 20 apparitiones RB<sup>c</sup>: apparitionis B\*: aparitiones P 21 quae R<sup>c</sup>BP: suae R\* 23 specialissime RB: specialissimae P

N. What you proposed last seems to agree with right reason: for whoever says that the essential trinity, namely, essence, power, operation, is constantly and incorruptibly present in all natures and especially in rational and intellectual natures does not, I think, depart from the truth; and this trinity cannot be increased or diminished in anything in which it is present. But the trinity that comes after it is understood to be as it were an effect of the preceding trinity. For it does not conflict with the truth, I think, if we say that from essence itself, which is created one and universal in all things and common to all things and therefore, because it belongs to all that participate in it, is said [to be] the property of none of the individuals that participate in it, there emanates by a natural progression a certain proper substance which belongs to no one else but to him only whose it is; and furthermore this substance has its own possibility which derives from nowhere else but from the universal power itself of the aforesaid universal essence and virtue (194). Similarly with regard to the proper operation of the most particular substance and the most particular potency it must be said that it descends from nowhere else but from the universal operation itself of the [same] universal essence and universal power. Nor is it strange if these three which are considered in individuals are said to be a kind of accidents of the aforesaid universal trinity, [and] its first manifestations, since it itself is by itself one and immutably abides in all things which have their existence from it and in it, and cannot either increase or diminish or be destroyed or perish: while these which are most particularly considered in individuals can increase and diminish and vary in many ways. For not everyone participates in the universal essence and power and operation in the same way: some do so more, some less, but no one is totally deprived of participation in it. *Furthermore*, it itself remains one and the same in all that participate in it, and to no one does it make itself more or less available for participating in it, any more than light to the eyes. For it is whole in each of them and in itself. But to be increased or diminished is a falling short of or a perfecting of participation, *and therefore* is not unreasonably judged to be an accident. For that which is always what it is is rightly called the true substance, while that which is variable proceeds either from the mutability of an unstable substance or from participating in accidents, whether natural or not natural. And do not be surprised that some accidents are called substances because they act as the substances of other accidents, when you see that to quantity, which is undoubtedly an accident of substance, other accidents occur, such

Concerning the three-fold and universal essence and power and operation, especially of rational and intelligible natures; and the trinity which can be considered in individuals

63

Concerning the accidents of accidents

26 priuatur R<sup>c</sup>BP: priuatus R\* 27 *quoque* in R<sup>c</sup>BP: uero R\* in *insulari manu s.l.* B 28 aut RBP<sup>c</sup>: ad P\* 30 *ideoque* R<sup>c</sup>BP: id est R\* 34 lemma BPRm mireris R<sup>c</sup>BP: mereris R\* 36 est RBP<sup>c</sup>: esse P\*



diffinitio  
temporis

accidere, ut est color qui circa quantitatem apparet et tempora quae in morosis rerum motibus intelliguntur. [Est enim tempus mutabilium rerum morae motusque certa rationabilisque dimensio.] 507B

A. In hoc nostrae intentionis non discrepat finis ut arbitror. Sed breuiter lucideque de hac rerum postrema consideratione diffinias uellem. 5

N. Trinam rerum intelligentiam, hoc est essentiae uirtutis operationis, immutabilem subsistentiam firmumque fundamentum [rerum] a conditore omnium constitutum ponamus si placet.

A. Ponendum arbitror. 10

N. Deinde illa trinitas quae in singulis considerari potest et a prima trinitate essentiali procedens ueluti praecedentis causae effectus eiusque primordiales motus quaedamque primordialia accidentia pensanda est, ut uideo.

A. Hoc quoque fatendum. 15

N. Quicquid autem illis tribus sequentibus siue interius siue exterius siue naturaliter siue quibusdam euentibus acciderit ueluti accidens accidentium fieri uidetur. 507C

A. Huic etiam conclusioni non resisto. Nam cum sint secundum Aristotelem decem genera rerum quae categoriae, id est praedicamenta, dicuntur et huic diuisioni rerum in genera nullum Grecorum uel Latinorum obstare repperimus, sub uno genere omnes primas essentias quas Greci ΟΥΧΙΑC appellant (merito quia per se sunt et nullius indigent ut sint; sic enim a conditore omnium ueluti quaedam immutabilia fundamenta stabilitae sunt) conclusas esse uidemus et ad similitudinem principalis omnium causae mirabili incommutabilique sua trinitate subsistunt, hoc est, ut saepe iam dictum, essentia uirtute operatione; caetera uero nouem genera accidentia esse dicuntur (nec sine ratione; non enim per se sed in praedicta essentiali trinitate subsistunt). Nam quod a Grecis locus et tempus appellantur ΩΝ ΑΝΕΥ, hoc est sine quibus caetera esse non possunt, non ita intelligendum est ut inter ea quae sine loco et tempore non ualent subsistere substantialis [illa] trinitas praedicta rerum computetur; ea nanque loci temporisque auxilio ut subsistat non eget dum per se ipsam ante supraque tempus et locum conditionis suae dignitate existat. Sed nouem genera quae solis accidentibus attribuuntur ita ab auctoribus diuisa sunt ut ipsa accidentia quae primordialiter in essentiis

item de  
accidentibus  
accidentium

23 quia per se sunt: cf. 867A, 914D 28 caetera—accidentia: cf. Ps.-Aug., De cat. dec. 20-21 30 uide supra, pp. 96, 36; 142, 11

2 lemma BPRm 7 uirtutis RBP<sup>c</sup>: uirtus P\* 8 subsistentiam RBP<sup>c</sup>: substantiam P\* 13 quaedamque R<sup>c</sup>BP: et ueluti quaedam R\* 17 euentibus RB: euenientibus P 20 aristotelem BP: aristotelem R rerum quae in ras. R 22 repperimus RB\*: reperimus B<sup>c</sup>P 23 appellant RB: apellant P 25 rasura post immutabilia in R stabilitae R<sup>c</sup>B<sup>c</sup>P: stabilitate R\*: stabilita B\*

as colour which makes its appearance about quantity, and periods of time which are discerned in the limited movements of things. [For time is the exact and rational measurement of the stopping and going of mutable things.] The definition of time

A. This, I think, is exactly what I was driving at. But I should like you to give a brief and clear outline of this last way of considering things.

N. Let us, if you agree, assume that the triple understanding of things, that is, of essence, of power, of operation, is established by the Creator of all as the immutable subsistence and firm basis [of things].

A. It must be assumed, I think.

N. Then that trinity which can be contemplated in individuals and which proceeds from the first essential trinity must be regarded, as I see it, as the effect, as it were, of a preceding cause, and its primordial motions and a kind of primordial accidents.

A. This too must be admitted.

N. But whatever occurs to those three which come after, whether from within or from without, whether naturally or from some chance events, is seen to come about, as it were, as an accident of accidents.

A. Again, I do not object to this conclusion. For since, according to Aristotle, there are ten genera of things, which are called categories, that is, predicaments—and we find that none of the Greeks or the Latins oppose this division of things into genera—we see that all first essences, which the Greeks call οὐσίαι—rightly, because they are by themselves, and do not require anything in order that they may be; for so they have been established by the Creator, like a kind of immutable foundations—are included under a single genus, and they subsist in their wonderful and unchanging trinity in the likeness of the principal Cause of all things, that is, as has often been said before, in essence, power, operation, while the other nine genera are said to be accidents—and not without reason; for they subsist not by themselves but in the aforesaid essential trinity. For the name which the Greeks give to place and time, ὦν ἀνευ, that is, without which the other things cannot exist, is not to be understood as meaning that the substantial trinity we have mentioned is to be counted among the things which cannot subsist without place and time; for it does not require the aid of place and time to subsist since it exists by itself by the excellence of its own creation before and above place and time.

But the nine genera which are allotted to accidents alone are so divided by our authorities that these accidents which are originally

Concerning  
the acci-  
dents of

30 appellantur RB: apellantur P ΩΝ ΑΝΕΥ RB<sup>c</sup>P: ΩΝΑ ΝΕΥ B\* 31 ita RB: itaque P 32 est om. P 33 nanque RB: namque P 35 lemma B (pro longiore lemmate eraso), PRm 36 attribuuntur R\*B<sup>c</sup>P: adtribuuntur R<sup>c</sup>B\*

conspiciuntur mox uertantur in substantias quoniam aliis accidentibus subsistunt. Prima *siquidem* rerum omnium diuisio est in essentias et accidentia, secunda accidentium in substantias, quae fere in infinitum *protenditur* dum quod nunc accidens est prioris se mox sequentis se substantia efficitur. Sed de his alibi disputandum, nunc uero, si tibi uidetur, quod nobis propositum est sequamur.

N. Quid igitur? putasne accidentia [non] nisi cuiuspiam essentiae aut accidentis esse? 508B

A. Nullus artium peritus *aliter* dixerit. Non enim aliam ob causam accidens uocari meruit nisi quia aut essentiae aut substantiae aut alicui accidenti contingit. 10

N. Agere et pati accidentium numero continentur?

A. Etiam.

de agere et  
pati  
repetitio

N. Cuiuspiam igitur substantiae sunt. [Haec etenim proprii accidenti substantiis, nam generalibus essentiis nihil accidit.] 15

A. Nec hoc negarim.

N. Dic quaeso: num summae ac simplici diuinae[que] naturae aliquid accidit?

A. Absit.

N. Num ipsa accidit alicui? 20

A. Nec hoc quidem dixerim; alioqui passibilis mutabilisque alteriusque naturae capax esse uideretur.

N. Nullum ergo accidens recipit nullique accidit?

A. Nullum profecto nullique.

N. Agere et pati accidentia sunt? 25

A. Et hoc datum est. 508C

N. Summa igitur omnium causa summumque principium, quod deus est, agere et pati non recipit.

A. Huius ratiocinationis uiolentia nimium coartor. Nam si dixerio falsum esse fortassis *ipsa ratio* me deridebit [omneque quod hactenus dedi uacillare non sinet]; si uerum, necessario sequetur ut quod de agere et pati concesserim id ipsum etiam de caeteris actiuis passiuisque uerbis [cuiusquecunque generis uerborum sint] concedam, hoc est neque deum amare neque amari neque mouere neque moueri similiaque mille [eoque magis neque esse neque subsistere]. At si hoc, uidesne quot et quantis (quanque) frequentibus scripturae sanctae obruar telis? [Vndique enim uidentur obstrepere atque hoc falsum 35

2 et quod omissum erat s.l. adscripsit C in B 3 substantias R<sup>v</sup>BP: subsistentias R\* 4 prioris BP: priori R 12 lemma BP: de agere et pati Rm 15 nihil RP: nichil B 16 Nec RB: Ne P 17 num s.l. R 22 naturae R: ae in ras. B: nature P 26 Et om. B\* 29 coartor R<sup>v</sup>BP: cohartor R\* 30 rasura post esse in R fortassis BP: fortasis R hactenus RB<sup>v</sup>P: actenus B\* 31 glossa ad dedi pertinens (longiore glossa primaria uel lemmate eraso) glo(ssa). dedi enim nullam cathegoriam proprie uel secundum accidens posse de deo praedicari: quod non sinet ratio uacillare B: quae in maiusculis ut lemma apparet in P

seen in essences soon change into substances because they act as substance towards other accidents. For the first division of all things is into substances and accidents, the second is of accidents into substances, and this division *can be carried* almost to infinity because that which is at the moment an accident of what is prior to it is soon made into the substance of what follows it. But of this we must speak elsewhere, while for the present, if you agree, let us continue with the subject we set ourselves.

N. Well, then: is it your opinion that there are [no] accidents but of some essence or of some accident?

A. Nobody skilled in the arts would say *otherwise*. For accident was rightly so called for no other reason than that it occurs to an essence or substance or to some accident.

N. Are acting and suffering included in the number of the accidents?

A repetition concerning acting and suffering

A. Certainly.

N. Then they belong to some substance. [For they are the accidents of particular substances, since to general essences no accident occurs.]

A. I would not deny this either.

N. Tell me, pray: does any accident occur to the supreme and simple [and] divine Nature?

A. Far be it (from me to say such a thing).

N. Is it an accident of anything?

A. I would not say this either; for if so it would appear to be passible and mutable and receptive of another nature.

N. So it does not admit any accident and it is not an accident to anything?

A. None surely, and to nothing.

N. Acting and suffering are accidents?

A. This too has been granted.

N. Then the supreme Cause of all things and supreme Principle, which is God, does not admit acting or suffering?

A. The force of this reasoning allows me too little space to manoeuvre. For if I say it is false, *reason itself* might easily make a laughing-stock of me [and forbid me to be unfaithful to all that I have so far admitted]: if I say that it is true, it will necessarily follow that what I have granted in the case of acting and suffering I should also similarly grant in the case of the other active and passive verbs [of whatever class of verbs they may be], that is, that God neither loves nor is loved, neither moves nor is moved, and a thousand similar things [and, what is more, that He neither is nor subsists]. But if I do so, do you see under how many and how great and how frequent missiles of Holy Scripture I shall succumb? [For their din is all about

(KATEGORIAM): nulla cathegoria proprie uel secundum accidens de deo predicatur Rm 33 rasura post uerbis in R 35 similiaque RB<sup>v</sup>P: simili\*\* B\*

esse conclamare.] Nec te latet, ut opinor, quam arduum difficileque 508b  
 simplicibus animis talia suadere quandoquidem eorum qui uidentur  
 esse sapientes dum haec audiunt aures horrescunt.

N. Noli expauescere; Nunc enim nobis ratio sequenda est quae  
 rerum ueritatem inuestigat nullaue auctoritate opprimitur, nullo 5  
 modo impeditur ne ea quae [et] studiose ratiocinationum ambitibus 509A  
 inquiri et laboriose inuenit publice aperiat [atque pronuntiat].  
 Sanctae siquidem scripturae in omnibus sequenda est auctoritas  
 quoniam in ea ueluti quibusdam suis secretis sedibus ueritas possidet.  
 Non tamen ita credendum est ut ipsa semper propriis uerborum seu 10  
 nominum signis fruatur diuinam nobis naturam insinuans sed quibus-  
 dam similitudinibus uariisque translatorum uerborum seu nominum  
 modis utitur infirmitati nostrae condescendens nostrosque adhuc  
 rudes infantilesque sensus simplici doctrina erigens. Audi Apostolum 15  
 dicentem, 'Lac uobis potum dedi non aescam.' In hoc enim diuina  
 student eloquia ut de re ineffabili incomprehensibili inuisibilique  
 aliquid nobis ad nutriendam nostram fidem cogitandum tradat atque 509B  
 suadeat. Siquidem de deo nil aliud caste pieque uiuentibus studiose-  
 que ueritatem quaerentibus dicendum uel cogitandum nisi quae in  
 sancta scriptura reperiuntur, neque aliis nisi ipsius significationibus 20  
 translationibusque utendum his qui de deo siue quid credant siue  
 disputent. Quis enim de natura ineffabili quippiam a se ipso repertum  
 dicere praesumat praeter quod illa ipsa de se ipsa in suis sanctis  
 organis, theologis dico, modulata est? Sed ut hoc firmiter et credas et 25  
 teneas sancti Dionysii theologi testimonium huic loco inserendum, si  
 tibi uidetur, arbitror.

A. Videtur plane et nil libentius accipio quam rationem firmissima  
 auctoritate roboratam.

N. Capitulo primo de Diuinis Nominibus auctoritatem sanctae  
 scripturae praedictus theologus magnis laudibus commendat. Ast 509C  
 quia more suo perplexe yperbaticeque disputat ideoque ualde obs- 31  
 trusus difficilisque ad intelligendum multis uidetur placuit mihi de  
 hac re sententiam ipsius faciliore uerborum ordine ad intelligendum  
 quam suo loco scripta est depromere. 'Vniuersaliter', inquit, 'non  
 'audendum dicere neque intelligere quid de superessentiali . . . 35

8 Sanctae-auctoritas: cf. 672c, 762A 15 1 Cor. iii. 2 29 Ps.-Dionys.,  
 DN i. 1, PG iii. 585B-588A 34-35 Ps.-Dionys., DN i. 1, PG iii. 588A 2-3  
 35-p. 190, 3 *ibid.* 4-6

3 horrescunt RB<sup>c</sup>P: orrescunt B\* 6 ratiocinationum RB: ratiocinantium P  
 ambitibus RB: ambitus P 13 condescendens RBP<sup>c</sup>: condescenderis (?) P\*  
 15 aescam BP: escam R enim s.l. P 17-18 tradat . . . suadeat *codd.*: lege tra-  
 dant . . . suadeant 19 post dicendum *erasum est a in R post nisi erasum est ea in R*  
 20 reperiuntur B<sup>c</sup>: repperiuntur RB\*P 21 post utendum *erasum est est in R*  
 22 quis R<sup>c</sup>BP: quid R\* 23 illa ipsa RB<sup>c</sup>P: ipsa illa B\* 24 modulata  
 RB<sup>c</sup>P: medullata B\* 25 dionysii R<sup>c</sup>BP: dionysii R\* 26 *rasura post*

me, proclaiming that this is false.] You are also well aware, I think,  
 how troublesome and difficult it is to put such an opinion to simple  
 souls when the ears of those who are seen to be wise are horrified  
 when they hear it.

N. Do not be afraid. For now we must follow reason, which investi-  
 gates the truth of things and is not overborne by any authority, and  
 is by no means prevented from revealing publicly [and proclaiming]  
 to all men the things which it [both] zealously searches out by  
 circuitous reasoning and discovers with much toil. For the authority 64  
 of Holy Scripture must in all things be followed (195) because the  
 truth dwells there as though in a retreat of its own, but it is not to be  
 believed as a book which always uses verbs and nouns in their proper  
 sense when it teaches us about the Divine Nature, but it employs  
 certain allegories and transfers in various ways the meanings of the  
 verbs or nouns out of condescension towards our weakness and to  
 encourage by uncomplicated doctrine our senses which are still un-  
 trained and childish. Hear the Apostle when he says: 'I gave you  
 milk to drink, not food.' For the purpose of the Divine Oracles (196)  
 is to convey to us and suggest concerning what is ineffable and  
 incomprehensible and invisible something to think about for the  
 nourishment of our faith. For concerning God nothing must be said  
 or thought by those who live pure and pious lives and are serious  
 seekers after the truth except what is found in Holy Scripture, and  
 no meanings or allegorical interpretations but its own are to be used  
 by those who either believe in or discourse about God. For who  
 would presume to pronounce about the Ineffable Nature anything  
 invented by himself, except such measures as it has played itself  
 concerning itself upon its sacred instruments, I mean, the theo-  
 logians (197)? But in order that you may be more firmly convinced,  
 I think the testimony of the theologian St. Dionysius must be intro-  
 duced at this point, if you agree.

A. I certainly agree, and I welcome nothing more gladly than to  
 have reason confirmed by the soundest authority.

N. In the first chapter of the book 'On the Divine Names' this  
 theologian has much to say in praise of the authority of Holy Scrip-  
 ture. But because in his usual way he expresses himself in an involved  
 and distorted language, and therefore many find him extremely  
 obscure and difficult to understand, I have decided to present his  
 opinion on this subject by arranging his words in an order easier to  
 understand than that in which they are written in their own place.  
 'We must by no means (198)', he says, 'risk saying anything or forming

arbitror in B 27 firmissima RB<sup>c</sup>P: firmissima B\* 28 roboratam  
 RB<sup>c</sup>P: roborato (?) B\* 30 praedictus RBP<sup>c</sup>: praedictis P\* ast R<sup>c</sup>BP: at  
 R\* 34 inquit R<sup>c</sup>BP: inquiri R\* 35 audendum R<sup>c</sup>BP: audiendum R\*

'diuinitate praeter diuinitus nobis ex sacris eloquiis expressa: ipsius  
 'enim super rationem et intellectum et essentiam superessentialitatis  
 '... superessentialis scientia referenda est... ad superiores claritates  
 'circa diuina temperantia et sanctitate coartatas, in tantum sursum  
 'respicientes quantum se infert diuinorum eloquiorum radius.' 5  
 Videsne quemadmodum uniuersaliter prohibet ne quis de occulta 509D  
 diuinitate praeter quae in sanctis eloquiis dicta sunt dicere audeat?  
 Quae, uidelicet eloquia, gloriosissimo uerissimoque nomine appellat  
 'superiores claritates in sanctitate et temperantia circa diuina coar-  
 'tatas'. Idem in eodem paulo post: 'Sicut enim incomprehensibilia et 10  
 'incontemplabilia sunt sensibilibus inuisibilia et [in] his quae sunt in 510A  
 'figmento et similitudine simpla et similitudine carentia et secundum  
 'corporum figuras formatis incorporalium intacta et non figurata  
 'informitas iuxta eandem ueritatis rationem superat essentias super-  
 'essentialis magnitudo et animos super animum unitas et omnibus 15  
 'uirtutibus impossibile est quod super sensum est arcanumque rati-  
 'oni omni superrationabile bonum: unitas unifica omnis unitatis et  
 'superessentialis essentia et intellectus inuisibilis et uerbum arcanum  
 'irrationabilitas et inuisibilitas et innominabilitas secundum nullum  
 'eorum quae sunt existens et causale quidem essendi omnibus, ipsum 20  
 'autem non ON, quippe omnis essentiae summitas et utcunque ipsa  
 'de se ipsa proprie et scienter manifestat. De hac igitur, ut dictum  
 'est, superessentiali et occulta diuinitate non audendum dicere neque 510B  
 'intelligere quid praeter diuinitus nobis expressa, etenim sic ipsa de  
 'semet ipsa in eloquiis optime tradidit. Eius quidem qualis est scientia 25  
 'et contemplatio omnibus quae sunt inuia est tanquam omnibus  
 'superessentialiter separata.' Haec de sequenda auctoritate solum-  
 modo sanctae scripturae in diuinis maxime disputationibus sufficiunt.  
 Ratio uero in hoc uniuersaliter studet ut suadeat certisque ueritatis  
 inuestigationibus approbet nil de deo proprie posse dici quoniam 30  
 superat omnem intellectum omnesque sensibiles intelligibilesque  
 significationes qui melius nesciendo scitur, cuius ignorantia uera est  
 sapientia, qui uerius fidelisque negatur in omnibus quam firmatur.  
 Quodcunque enim de ipso negaueris uere negabis, non autem omne 510C  
 quodcunque firmaueris uere firmabis. Siquidem si approbaueris hoc 35

3 Ps.-Dionys., *DN* i. 1, PG iii. 588A 7      3-4 *ibid.* 9-11      4-5 *ibid.* 7-9  
 10-27 Ps.-Dionys., *DN* i. 1-2, PG 588B 1-C 8

2 super rationem RB: superationem P      3 superessentialis om. P      4 post  
 sanctitate *erasa sunt* circa diuina in R      post sursum *erasum est* uersus in R  
 8 uerissimoque RB: uerissimoque P      appellat RB: apellat P      9-10 coartatas  
 RB<sup>c</sup>P: courtatas B\*      11 in his RB: his P      13 non figurata RBP<sup>c</sup>: con-  
 figurata P\*      17 omni *s.l.* R      21 non ON: .n. ON R: .NON B: .N.ON P  
 23 occulta BP: oculata R      26 tanquam RP: tamquam B      27 sequenda RB<sup>c</sup>P:  
 secuenda B\*      30 proprie RP: prop.rie B

any notion of the superessential . . . Divinity (199) except what is  
 divinely revealed to us by the Holy Oracles. For the superessential  
 knowledge of the Superessentiality which is above reason and intellect  
 and essence must be applied (200) . . . to the higher radiancies which  
 are girt about by prudence and sanctity concerning divine things  
 (201), fixing their gaze on high in so far as the illumination of the  
 Divine Oracles inspires them (202). Do you see how he absolutely 65  
 prohibits anyone from daring to say anything concerning the hidden  
 (203) Divinity except what is said in the Holy Oracles? To which,  
 namely the Oracles, he gives a most glorious and most true name:  
 'higher radiancies which are girt about by prudence and sanctity  
 concerning divine things (204).' The same (theologian) in the same  
 chapter a little later (writes): 'For just as the invisible things (205)  
 cannot be comprehended or contemplated by sensible things, nor  
 simple things and things lacking likeness (206) by those which are  
 (moulded) into shape and likeness, nor the untouched (207) and  
 the unfigured formlessness of incorporeal things by things formed in  
 the shapes of bodies; by the same principle of truth the superessential  
 Grandeur (208) surpasses the essences and the Unity above mind  
 surpasses the minds (209), and the suprasensible (One) is impossible  
 to all virtues (210), and hidden from all reason is the suprarational  
 Good (211), the Unity which unifies all unity and the Essence which  
 is beyond all essence and the Intellect which is invisible (212) and  
 the Word which is hidden (213); Irrationality (214) and Invisibility  
 (215) and Namelessness, existing after such a manner as do none of  
 the things that exist, and, while causing the being of all things, is  
 yet itself not an *ὄν*, for it is the summit of all being (216)—and in  
 whatever (other) way it reveals itself properly and knowably (217).  
 Therefore, as has been said, concerning this superessential and  
 hidden Divinity one must not dare to say or even to understand any-  
 thing except the things which have been divinely expressed to us  
 (218): for this is the way in which it has transmitted the most  
 excellent revelation of itself in the Oracles. For such knowledge  
 and contemplation of it as there is, is inaccessible to all things that  
 exist, being superessentially remote from them all.' These words  
 suffice on the necessity of following the authority of Holy Scrip-  
 ture alone, especially in discussions about the Divine; while reason 66  
 is wholly concerned with suggesting, and proving by the most ac-  
 curate investigations into the truth, that nothing can be said prop-  
 erly about God, since He surpasses every intellect and all sensible  
 and intelligible meanings Who is better known by not knowing,  
 of Whom ignorance is the true knowledge, Who is more truly and  
 faithfully denied in all things than He is affirmed. For whatever  
 negation you make about Him will be a true negation, but not every

ΑΠΟΦΑΤΙΚΗ

uel hoc illum esse falsitatis redargueris, quia omnium quae sunt quae dici uel intelligi possunt nihil est; si uero pronuntiaueris: 'Nec hoc 'nec illud nec ullum ille est,' uerax esse uideberis, quia nihil horum quae sunt et quae non sunt est, ad quem nemo potest accedere nisi prius corroborato mentis itinere sensus omnes deserat et intellectuales operationes et sensibilia et omne quod est et quod non est et ad unitatem (ut possibile est) inscius restituatur ipsius qui est super omnem essentiam et intelligentiam, cuius neque ratio est neque intelligentia neque dicitur neque intelligitur neque nomen eius est neque uerbum. Non autem irrationabiliter, ut saepe diximus, omnia quae a summo usque deorsum sunt de eo dici possunt quadam similitudine aut dissimilitudine aut contrarietate aut oppositione quoniam ab ipso omnia sunt quae de eo praedicari possunt. Non enim similia sibi solummodo condidit sed etiam dissimilia quoniam ipse similis est et dissimilis, contrariorum quoque causa est. Virtute siquidem eorum quae uere ab eo condita sunt ea [etiam] quae contraria uidentur esse et per priuationem essentiae non sunt uera ratio contineri approbat. Nullum enim uitium inuenitur quod non sit alicuius uirtutis umbra aut quadam fallaci similitudine aut aperta contrarietate: similitudine quidem ut superbia [uerae] potentiae [umbram gerit], luxuria quietis, furor fortitudinis, ira correctionis [iustitiaeque] et similia; contrarietate uero ut malitia bonitatis. Quemadmodum enim bonitas ex non existentibus existentia ducit ut sint, ita malitia appetit corrumpere omnia quae sunt et penitus soluere ne sint, et si hoc esset [id est si omnia perirent] simul et ipsa periret. Nam si periret natura periret simul et uitium. Sed uirtute bonitatis omnis natura continetur ne pereat. Adhuc *tamen* malitia permittitur in ea [uidelicet natura] ad laudem bonitatis ex contraria comparatione et exercitationem uirtutum rationabili operatione et purgationem ipsius naturae quando absorbebitur mors in uictoria et sola bonitas in omnibus apparebit et regnabit et uniuersaliter peritura malitia. Sed de his *in quinto latius disputabitur*. Nulla itaque auctoritas te terreat ab his quae rectae contemplationis rationabilis suasio edocet. Vera enim auctoritas rectae rationi non obsistit neque recta ratio uerae

de eo quod  
deus  
similium et  
dissimilium  
et contrari-  
orum et  
priuationum  
causa sit et  
ordinator

11-12 similitudine aut dissimilitudine: cf. Ps.-Dionys., CH ii. 3, PG iii. 140c 1-4 15-17 uirtute-contineri: cf. Ps.-Dionys., DN iv. 19, PG iii. 716c 13-15 23 ex non existentibus-ut sint: cf. pp. 62, 21; 100, 13-14; 130, 4 supra; 553B, 580c, 596B, 597A, 627B, 629A, 647B, 796A infra 22-24 Quemadmodum-ne sint: cf. Plato, Resp. x. 608E; Procl., De mal. subsist. xiii, pp. 15-16 Boese; Ps.-Dionys., DN iv. 19, 716c 1-3; Marinus Bardisan., De recta in deum fide, PG xi. 1801c 25 et ipsa periret: cf. Ps.-Dionys., DN iv. 23, 724c 8 30 quando-uictoria: cf. 1 Cor. xv. 54

2 lemma sRBP 3 nec illud RBP<sup>c</sup>: ne illud P\* 4 nemo: ne- s.l. B 5 corroborato R<sup>c</sup>BP: corroboratio R\* deserat RBP<sup>c</sup>: dese\*\*rat P\* 12 op- positione RB: appositione P 13 lemma BP (dissimilium B: dissimilium P) de eo R<sup>c</sup>BP: deo R\* enim RB: autem P 21 quietis: -is s.l. R 23 ex RBP<sup>c</sup>: et P\* 27 adhuc tamen R<sup>c</sup>BP: sed adhuc R\*B\* 29 exercitationem

affirmation you make will be a true affirmation: for if you show that He is this or that you will be proved wrong, for He is none of the existing things that can be spoken of or understood. But if you declare: 'He is not this nor that nor anything', you will be seen to speak the truth, for He is none of the things that are or of those that are not, and no one may draw near Him who does not first, by persevering in the way of thought (219), abandon all the senses and the operations of the intellect, together with the sensibles and everything that is and that is not, and, having achieved a state of not-knowing, is not restored to the unity—as far as is possible—of Him Who is above every essence and understanding, of Whom there is neither reason nor understanding, Who is neither spoken nor understood, for Whom there is neither name nor word. But not unreasonably, as we have often said, all things that are, from the highest to the lowest, can be spoken of Him by a kind of similitude or dissimilitude or by contrariety or by opposition, since He is the Source of all things which can be predicated of Him. For He created not only things similar to Himself but also things dissimilar, since He Himself is the Like and the Unlike, and the Cause of contraries. For right reason shows that by virtue of the things that are truly created by Him [even] those which seem to be their contraries and which through privation of essence do not exist are contained (in Him). For no vice is found which is not the shadow of some virtue, either by deception or by open contrariety—by deception, as pride wears the shadow of [true] might, luxuriousness of tranquillity, rage of fortitude, anger of chastisement [and justice], and so forth; by contrariety, as wickedness of goodness: for as goodness conducts existing things out of non-existence in order that they may be, so wickedness strives to corrupt all things that are and to dissolve them utterly so that they may not be; and if this were so [that is, if all things were to perish], it also would perish at the same time: for if nature were done away, so also would vice be done away. But by the virtue of goodness all nature is sustained so that it may not perish, *though* up to now wickedness has been tolerated in her [namely, in nature] so that goodness may be honoured by contrast with its contrary, and the virtues exercised by a rational activity, and nature itself be purged when death shall be swallowed up in victory and goodness alone will both be manifest in all things and reign over all things, *and* wickedness will be totally done away. But *there is a fuller discussion* of these things *in the Fifth Book* (220). So do not let any authority frighten you away from the things which the rational deduction from right contemplation teaches you. For true authority does not conflict with right reason, nor right

Ἀποφατική

That God is  
the Cause  
and the  
Arranger of  
likenesses  
and  
unlikenesses  
and contraries  
and  
privations

RB: exercitatione P 32 in quinto latius R<sup>c</sup>B<sup>c</sup>P: alibi R\*B\* disputabitur  
R<sup>c</sup>: disputatur R\*BP

auctoritati. Ambo siquidem ex uno fonte, diuina uidelicet sapientia, manare dubium non est. Vna quidem de natura incomprehensibili ineffabilique pie quaerentibus multa concessit ac tradidit et cogitare et dicere ne uerae religionis studium in omnibus sileat ut et rudes adhuc in fidei simplicitate doctrinae nutriat et catholicae fidei aemulis instructa [armataque (atque) diuinis propugnaculis munita] respondeat; altera uero ut simplices adhuc in cunabulis ecclesiae [nutriti] pie casteque corrigat ne quid indignum de deo uel credant uel aestiment, ne omnia quae sanctae scripturae auctoritas de causa omnium praedicat proprie praedicari existiment, siue gloriosissima et summa omnium sint ut uita, ut uirtus caeterarumque uirtutum nomina, siue media ut sol lux stella cunctaque quae ex partibus sublimioribus huius mundi uisibilis de deo praedicantur, siue ex inferioribus uisibilis creaturae motibus ut spiritus nubs splendor ortus tonitru ros imber pluuiia, item aqua flumen terra petra lignum uinea oliua cedrus isopum liliu homo leo bos equus ursus pardalis uermis, item aquila columba piscis KHTH caeteraque innumerabilia quae ex natura condita ad naturam conditricem transformatione quadam figurataque significatione transferuntur, eoque mirabilius non solum ex creatura ad creatorem artificiosa scriptura translationes fecit uerum etiam ex naturae contrariis, ex insania uidelicet ebrietate crapula obliuione ira furore odio concupiscentia caeterisque similibus, quibus minus simplicium animi falluntur quam superioribus transfigurationibus quae ex natura fiunt. Rationabilis siquidem anima quamuis admodum simplex naturalium rerum nomina de deo praedicari audiens proprieque de ipso dici aestimans fallatur, non tamen omnino decipitur ut eorum quae contra naturam sunt nomina de conditore rerum praedicari auscultans aut omnino falsa esse iudicet et respuat aut figurate dicta et concedat et credat.

de eo quod plus anima audiens similia de deo praedicari quam desimilia fallitur

A. Non ita sum territus auctoritate aut minus capacium animorum expauesco impetum ut ea quae uera ratio clare colligit indubitanterque diffinit aperta fronte pronuntiare confundar, praesertim cum de talibus non nisi inter sapientes tractatum sit, quibus nil suauius est

21-22 ex insania-similibus: cf. p. 74, 8-11 supra 30 territus auctoritate: cf. p. 192, 32 supra

1 auctoritati R<sup>c</sup>B<sup>\*</sup>: rationi R<sup>\*</sup>B<sup>c</sup>P 2 de in ras. R: s.l. B 5 fidei (1) R<sup>c</sup>BP: fide R<sup>\*</sup> doctrinae nutriat RB: doctrina enutriat P post et rasura in R aemulis BP: emulis R<sup>c</sup>: emulos R<sup>\*</sup> 6 diuinis R<sup>c</sup>BP: diuiis R<sup>\*</sup> 7 nutriti codd.: lege nutritos 8 post deo add. sit R<sup>\*</sup> 8-9 aestiment BP: estiment R 10 proprie R<sup>c</sup>BP: propriae R<sup>\*</sup> existiment Gale: examinet R<sup>\*</sup>: examinet R<sup>c</sup>BP 11 ut (2) om. P 13 uisibilis (1) R<sup>c</sup>B<sup>c</sup>P: uisibiles R<sup>\*</sup>B<sup>\*</sup> 14 creaturae BP: creatlae R rasura (? sanctus) post ut in R tonitru RB: tronitsu P 15 imber RB: amber P 17 KHTH R<sup>c</sup>BP: cete ex caete R<sup>\*</sup> caeteraque RBP<sup>c</sup>: ceteraque P<sup>\*</sup> 20 artificiosa: ciosa s.l. R: osa insulari manu scriptum s.l. B 24 lemma BP 25 naturalium R<sup>c</sup>BP: naturaliumque R<sup>\*</sup> 26-27 de ipso-

reason with true authority, since there is no doubt but that both flow from the same source, the Wisdom of God. The one has conceded and conferred to pious inquirers the ability to think and say many things about the incomprehensible and ineffable Nature, so that the study of true religion should not be silent on all matters, but nourish those who are as yet ignorant in the simplicity of the teaching of their faith (221), and that, instructed [and armed (and) fortified by divine defences], it may have an answer for those who challenge the Catholic Faith; while the purpose of the other is to correct, by the instillation of religion and piety (222), those simple people who thus far have been nourished in the nursery of the Church, lest they should either believe or think anything unworthy of God, or should suppose (223) that everything that Holy Scripture predicates of the Cause of all things is predicated properly, whether it is a question of the most glorious and exalted names such as Life or Virtue or the names of the other virtues; or intermediate names such as Sun, Light, Star, or anything from the higher regions of this visible world which is predicated of God; or those (taken) from the lower motions of the visible creature, such as Breath, Cloud, Brightness, Sunrise, Thunder, Dew, Shower, Rainfall; also Water, River, Earth, Stone, Log, Vine, Olive, Cedar, Hyssop, Lily, Man, Lion, Ox, Horse, Bear, Panther, Worm; also Eagle, Dove, Fish, Monster, and the numberless other names which are taken from the created nature and applied to the Creative Nature by a kind of metaphor and figurative manner of expression; and, what is more strange, not only from the created nature did Scripture in its ingenuity make these transpositions to the Creator, but even from things which are contrary to nature, namely, Frenzy, Drunkenness, Intoxication, Forgetfulness, Anger, Rage, Hatred, Concupiscence, and other similar terms, by which the minds of the uninstructed are less seriously deceived than by the aforementioned metaphors which are taken from nature. For the soul, rational, to be sure, but somewhat simple, may be deceived into thinking, when it hears the names of natural things predicated of God, that they are applied to him properly; it is not, however, entirely gullible, so that when it hears the names of those things that are contrary to nature predicated of the Creator it either judges that they are altogether false and rejects them, or acknowledges and believes that they are said figuratively.

67

That the soul is more easily deceived by hearing like things predicated of God than unlike

A. I am not so much in awe of authority or so fearful of offending less capable minds as to be ashamed of announcing frankly the clear deductions and unassailable definitions of right reason, especially as discourse about such matters is held only among the wise, to whom

quae contra in marg. sR 26 fallatur R<sup>\*</sup>BP<sup>c</sup>: fallitur R<sup>c</sup>: fallant P<sup>\*</sup> omnino R<sup>c</sup>B<sup>c</sup>P: omnini R<sup>\*</sup>B<sup>\*</sup>

ad audiendum uera ratione, nil dilectabilius ad inuestigandum quando quaeritur, nil pulchrius ad contemplandum quando inuenitur. Sed quid praedicta ratiocinatione moliris nosse expecto.

N. Quid tibi uiderer his argumentationibus machinari nisi ut intelligas quemadmodum significatiua rerum uocabula siue substantiarum sint siue accidentium [siue essentiarum] translatiue, non autem proprie, ita etiam significatiua naturalium seu non naturalium naturae conditae motuum uerba de natura conditricis translatiue, non autem proprie, posse praedicari? Si enim essentiarum [uocabula] seu substantiarum seu accidentium non re uera sed quadam necessitate ineffabilis naturae significandae in deo ponuntur, *num* necessario sequitur ut et uerba quae essentiarum substantiarum accidentium significant motus proprie de deo dici non posse, qui omnem essentiam substantiam omneque accidens omnemque motum actionemque et passionem et quodcumque de talibus dicitur et intelligitur et quodcumque nec dicitur nec intelligitur et tamen eis inest incomprehensibili ineffabilique suae naturae excellentia superascendit? Quid enim? si deus per metaforam amor dicitur dum sit plus quam amor omnemque superat amorem, cur non eodem modo amare diceretur dum omnem motum amoris exsuperat? [Quia nihil praeter se ipsum appetit dum solus omnia in omnibus sit.] Similiter si agens et actor, faciens et factor non iam proprie sed modo quodam translationis nominatur, cur non et agere et facere uel agi uel pati eodem locutionis genere praedicaretur? De caeteris item uerbis quae omnes totius mutabilis creaturae motus seu naturales seu non naturales seu intellectuales seu rationabiles seu irrationabiles seu corporales seu incorporeos seu locales seu temporales rectos obliquos angulares circulares sphericos significant similiter intelligendum esse arbitror.

A. Admodum urges me talia rationabiliter fateri. Sed auctoritate sanctorum patrum aliquod munimen ad haec roboranda uellem inseras.

N. Non ignoras, ut opinor, maioris dignitatis esse quod prius est natura quam quod prius est tempore.

A. Hoc paene omnibus notum est.

N. Rationem priorem esse natura, auctoritatem uero tempore didicimus. Quamuis enim natura simul cum tempore creata sit non tamen

36 natura-creata: cf. 639c, 667b

quid inter  
rationem et  
auctoritatem

1 audiendum RBP<sup>c</sup>: audiend\*\* P\* dilectabilius RBP\*: dilectabilis P<sup>c</sup>  
3 ratiocinatione RBP<sup>c</sup>: rationecinatione P\* 4 rasura post Quid in R uiderer:  
r in ras. R: rer in ras. sB 9 marginalia quae sex lineas expleuerunt erasa sunt  
in B 12 sequitur RBP<sup>c</sup>: sed P\* 13 qui RB: quia P 15-16 quod-  
cumque RB<sup>c</sup>P: quodcumque B\* 16-17 incomprehensibili R<sup>c</sup>BP: incompre-  
hensibile R\* 18 metaforam R<sup>c</sup>BP: metaphoram R\* 20 exsuperat R<sup>c</sup>B<sup>c</sup>P:  
exuperat R\*B\* 21 actor R<sup>c</sup>BP: auctor R\* 22 translationis in ras.  
B 25 motus RB: notus P post non erasum est i in R 25-26 natura-

nothing is more pleasing to the ear than true reason, nothing more delightful to investigate when it is being sought after, nothing more beautiful to contemplate when it is found. But I am waiting to hear what you intend by this reasoning.

N. What do you think I intend by these arguments except that you should understand that as the nouns which denote the things (of created nature), whether substances or accidents [or essences (224)], can be predicated of the Creative Nature metaphorically but not properly, so also the verbs that denote the motions of created nature, whether natural or not natural, can be predicated of it metaphorically but not properly? For if [the names] of essences or substances or accidents are applied to God not in a real sense but from the need to express somehow His inexpressible Nature, does it not necessarily follow that the verbs also which denote the motions of the essences, substances, and accidents cannot be applied properly to God, Who by the incomprehensible and ineffable excellence of His Nature rises above every essence, every substance, and every accident; every motion and every activity and passivity; and everything which is said and understood concerning such things, and everything which is neither said nor understood and yet which is within them? For, why: if God is called Love by metaphor although He is More-than-love and surpasses all love, why should He not in the same way be said to love although He surpasses every motion of loving? [For He seeks nothing apart from Himself since He alone is all in all things.] Similarly, if He is named He Who acts and Actor, He Who makes and Maker, not indeed properly but by a kind of verbal transposition, why should not [also] acting and making, or being acted upon or suffering, be predicated of Him in the same manner of speaking? And I think the same must be understood in the case of the other verbs which denote all the motions of the mutable creature, whether natural or not natural, whether intellectual or rational or irrational, whether corporeal or incorporeal, whether local or temporal, whether straight or oblique or angular or circular or spherical (225).

A. You strongly press me to admit that this is reasonable. But I should like you to bring in some supporting evidence from the authority of the Holy Fathers to confirm it.

N. You are not unaware, I think, that what is prior by nature is of greater excellence than what is prior in time.

A. This is known to almost everybody.

N. We have learnt that reason is prior by nature, authority in time. For although nature was created together with time (226), authority

les seu in[te]lectuales quae deerant adscripsit in marg. sR 26-27 incorpo-  
reos: os in ras. R 30 munimen: men in ras. R 32 lemma BPRm  
34 paene B: pene RP 35-36 didicimus RB: dicimus P

69  
What  
difference  
there is  
between  
reason and  
authority

ab initio temporis atque naturae coepit esse auctoritas, ratio uero cum natura ac tempore ex principio rerum orta est.

A. Et hoc ipsa ratio edocet. Auctoritas siquidem ex uera ratione processit, ratio uero nequaquam ex auctoritate. Omnis enim auctoritas quae uera ratione non approbatur infirma uidetur esse, uera autem ratio quoniam suis uirtutibus rata atque immutabilis munitur nullius auctoritatis astipulatione roborari indiget. Nil enim aliud uidetur mihi esse uera auctoritas nisi rationis uirtute reperta ueritas et a sanctis patribus ob posteritatis utilitatem litteris commendata. Sed forte tibi aliter uidetur?

N. Nullo modo. Ideoque prius ratione utendum est in his quae nunc instant ac deinde auctoritate.

A. Ingredere quo uis ordine; tui etenim pedisequus sum.

N. Num tibi uidetur facere et pati sine aliquo motu facientis uel patientis posse esse?

A. De faciente non dubito, facere enim facientem sine aliquo suo motu posse non uideo. Quod uero patitur quomodo moueatur in se ipso non iam clare cognosco.

N. Nonne uides quia omne quod facit ad hoc se mouet aut mouetur ut id quod appetit facere ab eo quod non erat in id quod est moueat? Nihil enim ab eo quod non erat in id quod est sine suo et alieno motu potest transire siue illos motus sciat siue nesciat. [Non iam dico motum illum generalem communemque naturaliter omnibus creaturis quo omnia de nihilo in esse mouentur sed usitatum temporibus motum quo cotidie mutabilis materia siue natura mouente siue arte formas quasdam qualitatiuas accipit.]

A. Iam perspicio et me ipsum nimiae tarditatis accuso [qui non uidebam omne quod patitur motus suos seu alienos seu utrosque pati].

N. Faciens igitur et factum motus suos patiuntur. Nam quod facit suum motum ad faciendum patitur, quod uero fit suum motum et alienum sustinet: suum quidem ex eo quod non erat in id quod est transeundo, alienum uero quia non est sui motus causa per se ipsum sed facientis se aut naturalis motus aut libera uoluntas aut quaedam necessitas. Quod ergo fit, ut diximus, et motum proprium et alienum, quod uero facit proprium solummodo patitur. [Quamuis saepe contingat ut ab alia causa moueatur ad faciendum qui facit ut et

11-12: cf. Aug., *De ord.* ii, 9, 26

1 coepit R\*BP: cepit R<sup>c</sup> 3 edocet RB<sup>c</sup>P: etocet B\* ratione: r in ras. R  
7 lemma diffinitio auctoritatis PRm roborari RB<sup>c</sup>P: poborari B\* nil RBP<sup>c</sup>:  
nihil P\* 8 uidetur mihi RB: mihi uidetur P uera RB: uere P 9 po-  
steritatis RB<sup>c</sup>P: posteritatibus B\* 13 ordine-sum RBP<sup>c</sup>: ordinetui etenim-  
pedisse quussum P\* pedisequus B: pedisequs R: edissequus P<sup>c</sup> 14 pati sine  
aliquo RBP<sup>c</sup>: patis in aliquo P\* motu RBP<sup>c</sup>: motu P\* facientis R<sup>c</sup>BP: facientes  
R\* 20 appetit RP: appetit B 21 nihil RB: nil P 23 communemque

did not come into being at the beginning of nature and time, whereas reason arose with nature and time out of the Principle of things (227).

A. Even reason herself teaches this. For authority proceeds from true reason, but reason certainly does not proceed from authority. For every authority which is not upheld by true reason is seen to be weak (228), whereas true reason is kept firm and immutable by her own powers and does not require to be confirmed by the assent of any authority. For it seems to me that true authority is nothing else but the truth that has been discovered by the power of reason and set down in writing by the Holy Fathers for the use of posterity. But perhaps it seems otherwise to you?

N. By no means. And that is why reason must be employed first in our present business, and authority afterwards.

A. Proceed in what order you like: for I am your follower.

N. Do you think there can be any making or suffering without some motion of the maker or the sufferer?

A. About the maker I have no doubt, for I do not see that it is possible for the maker to make (something) without some motion on his part. But how that which suffers experiences motion in itself I do not yet clearly discern.

N. Do you not see that everything that makes (something) moves itself or is moved to the end that it may move that which it seeks to make from that which was not into that which is? For nothing can pass from that which was not into that which is without some motion of its own and of another, whether it is conscious of those motions or not. [I am not now speaking of that general motion that is common to all creatures, by which all things are moved from nothing into being, but of the usual motion in time by which every day mutable matter, moved either by nature or by art, receives qualitative forms.]

A. I see now, and reproach myself for being so slow-witted [in not perceiving that everything that suffers suffers either its own motions or another's or both].

N. Therefore the maker and the thing made suffer motions of their own. For that which makes suffers its motion towards making, while that which is made sustains its own motion and another's: its own by passing from that which was not into that which is; another's because it is not by itself the cause of its own motion, but (this is) either the natural motion or the free will or some necessity of him who makes it. Therefore that which is made, as we have said, suffers its own motion and another's, while that which makes suffers its own alone [although it may often happen that he who makes is moved to make by some other cause, so that maker and sufferer are seen to be

BP: communemque R 27 accuso BP: accusso R 30 motus suos R<sup>c</sup>BP:  
motu suo R\*



faciens et patiens unus atque idem uideatur esse.] Sed ipse facientis 514B  
 motus quamuis ex uariis causis siue naturalibus siue libentibus siue  
 non libentibus nascatur propterea proprius dicitur quoniam non  
 extra ipsum sed in ipso intelligitur.

A. Istuc mihi a te suasum esse non denego [ideoque quae restant 5  
 expecto.]

de motu N. Nullum motum principio ac fine carere posse arbitror; non  
 enim aliter ratio sinit nisi ut omnis motus ex quodam principio  
 inchoet et ad quendam finem tendat, in quo dum peruenerit quiescat.  
 Quod apertissime [uenerabilis] Maximus in tertio capitulo de Am- 10  
 biguis asserit dicens: 'Si deus immutabilis est utputa omnium  
 plenitudo, omne autem quod [ex] non existentibus esse accipit  
 mouetur, merito ad quandam omnino fertur causam.' Nam, ut alibi  
 docet idem Maximus, 'causa omnium eadem [et] finis omnium est. 514C  
 Deus enim principium, id est causa, omnium creaturarum est et 15  
 finis quoniam ab ipso et accipiunt et incipiunt esse et ad eum  
 mouentur ut in eo quiescant.' Idem in eodem capitulo paulo post:  
 'Eorum quae facta sunt est motus, siue intelligibilium intelligibilis  
 siue sensibilium sensibilis. Nullum enim eorum quae facta sunt  
 omnino . . . est immobile.' Et paulo post: 'Talem autem motum 20  
 uirtutem uocant naturalem ad suum finem festinantem,' qui sacram  
 diuinorum nobis mysteriorum scientiam sacre introduxerunt; 'aut  
 passionem, id est motum ex altero uenientem ad alterum cuius finis  
 est impassibilitas, aut operationem actiuam cuius finis est per se  
 ipsam perfectio. Nullum uero eorum quae facta sunt suimet finis 25  
 est quoniam neque sui causa est. Alioqui et ingenitum et carens 514D  
 principio et incommutabile esset, merito ad nullum quoquo modo  
 habens moueri. Transcenderet enim eorum quae sunt naturam, ut-  
 pote pro nullo esset—siquidem uera de ipso diffinitio est quamuis  
 aliena quae dicit: Finis est pro quo omnia, ipse uero pro nullo. 30  
 Neque per se perfectio. Alioqui non efficeretur, iure plenum; et 515A  
 similiter et a nullo esse haberet, per se enim perfectum quemad-  
 modum et incausale. Neque impassibilitas; alioqui et manens et  
 infinitum et incircumscripsum esset. Non enim pati naturaliter inest  
 quod uniuersaliter impassibile est, quod neque amatur ab alio aut 35

11-13 Max. Conf., *I Ambig.* iii, PG xci. 1069B 4-7 14-17 causa-quiescant:  
 cf. Max. Conf., *I Ambig.* iii, PG xci. 1073C 3-9 15-17 deus-quiescant: cf.  
 Ps.-Dionys., *DN* v. 10, PG iii. 825B 1-2 18-20 Eorum-immobile: Max. Conf.,  
*op. cit.* iii. 1072A 14-B 2 20-21 Talem-festinantem: *ibid.* 1072B 10-12  
 22-p. 202, 1 aut passionem-per amorem: *ibid.* 1072B 11-C 11

1 facientis RB: faciens P 3 propterea BP: propraeterea R proprius RBP<sup>c</sup>:  
 propriis P\* 7 lemma BP 8 quodam RBP<sup>c</sup>: quo P\* 9 inchoet  
 et RB\*P: inchoet at B<sup>c</sup>, fortasse inchoet in inchoat mutare uolens 11 immu-  
 tabilis RB: mutabilis P 12 ex, quod introduxit C in R, om. BP 14 maxi-  
 mus R<sup>c</sup>BP: max\*mus R\* 14-15 eadem-causa om. P\*, suppl. ad calc. P<sup>c</sup>

one and the same]. But this motion of the maker, although it may  
 arise from various causes, either natural or voluntary or involuntary,  
 is called his own for this reason, that it is understood (to be) not  
 external to him but within him.

A. I do not deny that you have convinced me of this [and therefore  
 I look forward to the rest of your exposition].

N. I think no motion can lack a beginning and an end. For reason Concerning  
 insists that every motion starts from some beginning and tends motion  
 towards some end in which once it has arrived it comes to rest. And  
 this [the venerable] Maximus asserts most explicitly in the third  
 chapter of the 'Ambigua', where he says: 'If God (229) is immutable,  
 as being the fullness of all things, but everything which receives  
 being [from] the things that are not is moved, then certainly it is  
 wholly borne towards some cause (230).' For, as the same Maximus  
 teaches elsewhere, 'the Cause of all things is the same [as] the End  
 of all things. For God is the Beginning, that is, the Cause, of all  
 creatures and their End since from Him they receive their being and  
 begin to be, and towards Him they are moved in order that they may  
 attain in Him their rest.' The same (author says) in the same chapter  
 a little later: 'He is the motion of the things that have come into  
 being, whether the intellectual motion of intellectual things or the  
 sensible motion of sensible things: for there is nothing of the things  
 that have come into being that is wholly . . . immovable.' And a little  
 later: 'Now, this motion' our holy instructors in the sacred science of  
 the Divine Mysteries 'call natural power, which hastens towards its  
 own end; or passion, that is, a motion which passes from one to  
 another, of which the end is impassibility; or active operation, of  
 which the end is self-perfection. But none of the things that have come  
 into being is its own end, for it is not its own cause either: otherwise  
 it would be unbegotten and without beginning and immutable, as  
 (231) having nothing to which it could by any means move, for it  
 would surpass the nature of the things that are, as having nothing  
 for the sake of which to exist—for that is a true definition of it,  
 although it is another's (232), which says: An end is that for the sake  
 of which all things (are), while it itself is for the sake of nothing. Nor  
 is it perfection in itself; otherwise it would not (have to) be made  
 (233), as (234) being complete; and similarly it would not receive its  
 being from anything either. For it would be perfect in itself, as also  
 non-causal. Nor is it impassibility; otherwise it would be permanent  
 (235) as well as infinite and uncircumscribed. For suffering is not by

15 et s.l. RP 22 nobis R<sup>c</sup>BP: mobilis R\* 23 post altero add. uerum R\*  
 26 alioqui RB<sup>c</sup>P: alioque B\* 27 incommutabile R<sup>c</sup>BP: commutabile R\*  
 30 aliena R<sup>c</sup>BP: \*liena R\* 33 alioqui R<sup>c</sup>BP: aliqui R\* 35 uniuersali-  
 ter RB: naturaliter P

'mouetur ad aliud quid per amorem . . .' 'Soliis enim dei est finis  
'esse et perfectio et impassibilitas, merito incommutabilis et pleni  
'et impassibilis, eorum uero quae facta sunt ad finem principio  
'carentem moueri . . .' 'Omnia enim quaecunque facta sunt patiuntur  
'moueri, sicut ea quae non sunt per se ipsum motus aut per se ipsam 5  
'uirtus sunt. Si ergo quae genita sunt rationabilia subsistunt omnino  
'etiam mouentur utpote ex principio secundum naturam per esse ad 515B  
'finem secundum cognitionem per bene esse mota. Finis enim eorum  
'quae mouentur motus ipsum in eo quod semper est bene esse est,  
'sicut et principium est ipsum esse quod quidem est deus, qui et 10  
'esse dat et bene esse donat, iure principium et finis. Ex ipso enim  
'et absolute moueri nos ut a principio et quoquo modo moueri ad se  
'ut ad finem est; si autem mouetur corrationabiliter sibimet intel-  
'lectualiter intellectuale omnino etiam intelligit; si autem intelligit 15  
'omnino amat quod intelligit; si amat patitur omnino ad ipsum ut  
'amabile excessum; si autem patitur profecto etiam festinat; si  
'festinat omnino intendit ualidum motum; si autem intendit ualidum  
'motum non stat quousque fiat totum in toto amato et a toto compre- 515C  
'hendatur libenter totum secundum uoluntatem salutarem accipiens 20  
'circumscriptionem ut totum toto afficiatur circumscribente, ut nihil  
'omnino restet uelle ex se ipso se ipsum totum cognoscere ualendo  
'circumscriptionem sed ex circumscribente, sicut aer per totum il-  
'luminatur lumine et igne ferrum totum toto liquefactum.' Videsne  
quomodo praedictus uenerabilis magister omnem motum non nisi 25  
his quae a principio inchoant et per naturalem motum ad finem suum  
tendunt edocet inesse, ipsumque naturalem motum tripliciter dif-  
finit sic: 'Motus est uirtus naturalis ad suum finem festinans'; uel  
sic: 'Motus est passio ex altero ueniens ad alterum cuius finis est  
'impassibilitas'; aut sic: 'Motus est operatio actiua cuius finis est per  
'se ipsam perfectio'? Quod autem dixit: 'Motus est passio ab altero 30  
'ueniens ad alterum', dum de naturali motu intelligitur non ita est 515D  
intelligendum ut aliud sit principium ex quo passibilis motus, id est  
motum suum patiens, inchoat et aliud finis quem appetit, dum  
omnium quae naturaliter mouentur principium et finis unum sit  
(est enim deus, a quo et per quem et ad quem mouentur omnia). 35

de trimoda  
diffinitione  
motus

1-4 Max. Conf., *I Ambig.* iii, PG xci. 1073B 4-7 4-23 *ibid.* 1073B 14-1076A 3  
22-23 sicut-liquefactum: cf. *pp.* 54, 22-24; 56, 33-36 *supra* 27 Max. Conf.,  
*I Ambig.* iii, PG xci. 1072B 10-12 27-29 *ibid.* B 12-13 29-30 *ibid.* B 13-14

1 est RB: et P 2 impassibilitas R<sup>c</sup>BP: impossibilitas R\* 5 ipsum BP:  
ipsam R 7 etiam *in ras.* B 9 motus R<sup>c</sup>BP: mouetus R\* 24 uene-  
rabilis R<sup>c</sup>BP: nenerabilis R\* motum RB: in totum P 27 lemma BP  
31 de *om.* P

nature present in that which is wholly impassible (236), which is  
neither loved by another (237) nor moved towards something else  
by love (238) . . . 'For to be an end and perfection and impassibility  
belongs only to God, since He is unchanging and fulfilled and  
impassible; while to the things that have been made it belongs to be  
moved towards the End that has no beginning . . . For all things that  
have been made suffer being moved, just as those things that are not  
are motion in itself and power in itself (239). If then the things that  
come into being are rational things, then they are also certainly (240)  
in motion, since they are moved in accordance with their nature from  
their beginning by being, in accordance with their knowledge (241)  
towards their end by well-being. For the end of the motion of things  
that are moved is the (242) well-being in that which is eternally, just  
as the beginning also is Being itself, which indeed is God, Who gives  
both being (as a natural gift) and well-being (as a grace) (243), since  
(244) He is the Beginning and the End. For our general motion is  
from Him as from a beginning, and our particular motion (245) is  
towards Him as towards an end. But if the intellectual nature (246)  
is moved intellectually as is rationally consistent with itself, it cer-  
tainly also understands (247); but if it understands it certainly loves  
that which it understands; if it loves then it certainly suffers its out-  
going towards it as something lovable; but if it suffers (this passion  
for it), it surely hastens (towards it) also; if it hastens, it is certainly  
embarked upon a powerful motion (248); but if it is embarked upon  
a powerful motion, it does not rest until it becomes a whole in the  
whole beloved and is comprehended in that whole, freely accepting  
the whole in accordance with its choice as a salutary limitation, in  
order that it may become whole in that limiting whole, so that from  
itself it no longer wishes anything at all, being able to understand that  
it is a limited whole, but from that which limits it (249); as air is  
wholly illuminated by light, and the whole lump of iron is liquefied  
(250) by the whole of the fire.' Do you see how this venerable master  
teaches that no motion is to be found except in those things which  
begin from an origin and proceed by their natural motion to their  
end; and how he defines this natural motion in three ways, thus:  
'Motion is a natural power hastening towards its end'; or thus: 'Motion  
'is a passion coming from one to another, of which the end is impass-  
'bility'; or thus: 'Motion is an active operation, of which the end is  
'self-perfection'? But as to his saying: 'Motion is a passion coming  
'from one to another', while this is understood of natural motion, it  
must not be understood as meaning that the origin from which the  
passible motion, that is, that which suffers its own motion, arises is  
other than the end it seeks, for of all things which are naturally  
moved the beginning and the end are (but) one—for it is God from

Concerning  
the triple  
definition of  
motion

Sed quia alius intellectus est principii et alius intellectus finis ideoque quasi alterum et alterum ipsi duo intellectus dicuntur dum circa unum omnium principium et finem uersantur; uerbi gratia, ueluti si quis dixerit ab intellectu principii ad intellectum finis in deo. Deinde considera quia omne quod principio caret et fine omni quoque motu carere necesse est. Deus autem anarchos, hoc est sine principio, est quia nil eum praecedit nec eum efficit ut sit, nec finem habet quoniam infinitus est; nil enim post eum intelligitur dum terminus omnium sit ultra quem nihil progreditur. Nullum igitur motum recipit; non enim habet quo se moueat dum plenitudo et locus et perfectio et statio et totum omnium sit, immo etiam plus quam plenitudo et perfectio, plus quam locus et statio, plus quam totum omnium est. Plus enim est quam quod de se dicitur et intelligitur quouis modo et dicatur quid de eo et intelligatur.

A. Haec mihi clare lucescunt, ut opinor.

N. Si igitur omnem motum creaturae distribuis, deum uero liberum omni motu facis, tantaene tarditatis es ut ei a quo omnem motum abstrahis facere uel pati tribuas cum ista duo indubitanter non nisi in his quibus motus inest fieri posse prioribus rationabilibus conclusionibus, ut arbitror, non incerte dederis?

A. De pati nullo modo dubitarim. Impassibilem nanque deum esse omnino et credo et intelligo. Passionem dico quae opponitur facere, id est fieri. Quis enim dixerit aut crediderit, quanto magis intellexerit, deum pati fieri dum creator sit, non creatura? Dum enim, ut iam dudum inter nos confectum est, fieri deus dicitur figurata quadam locutione dici manifestum est. Fieri siquidem aestimatur in creaturis suis uniuersaliter dum in eis non solum intelligitur esse sine quo esse non possunt sed etiam eorum essentia sit. 'Esse enim omnium est 'super esse diuinitas,' ut sanctus ait Dionysius. Dicitur etiam in animabus fidelium fieri dum aut per fidem et uirtutem in eis concipitur aut per *fidem* quodam modo inchoat intelligi. Nil enim aliud est fides, ut opinor, nisi principium quoddam ex quo cognitio creatoris in natura rationabili fieri incipit. De facere uero nondum clare uideo totam sanctam scripturam catholicamque fidem factorem omnium deum fateri audiens.

N. Facere sine motu facientis esse non posse iam dedisti.

29-30 Ps.-Dionys. CH iv. 1, PG iii. 177D 1-2

1 principii in ras. R      3 et R<sup>c</sup>BP: est R\*      4 in deo R<sup>c</sup>BP: deinde R\*  
 9 ultra RB<sup>c</sup>P: intra B\*      13 plus enim est RB: plus est enim P      19 ista  
 RB: isti P      20 posse B<sup>c</sup>P: possit R\*: possint R<sup>c</sup>B\*      23 opponitur  
 R<sup>c</sup>BP: oponitur R\*      25 ut s.l. P      27 lemma BP      32 lemma BP

Whom and through Whom and towards Whom all things are moved. But what is thought of as a beginning is different from what is thought of as an end, and therefore these two meanings are spoken of, as it were, as two different things although they refer to the One Beginning and End of all things; as for instance if someone were to say: 'From what is understood as the beginning to what is understood as the end in God.' Then consider that everything which lacks a beginning and an end necessarily lacks all motion also. But God is anarchos, that is, without beginning, because nothing precedes Him or makes Him to be; nor does He have an end because He is infinite: for it is understood that there is nothing after Him since He is the Limit of all things beyond which nothing proceeds. Therefore He does not admit any motion. For He has nowhere to move Himself, since He is the Fullness and the Place and the Perfection and the Station and the Whole of all things, or rather, He is More-than-fullness-and-perfection, More-than-place-and-station, More-than-whole-of-all-things. For He is more than that which is said or understood of Him, in whatever way anything is either said of Him or understood.

A. These things are quite clear to me, I think.

N. If then you attribute all motion to the creature while you make God free from all motion, are you so slow-witted as to attribute making and suffering to Him from Whom you exclude all motion, when you have unhesitatingly admitted, I think, in your earlier and reasonable deductions, that these two cannot occur save in those things in which there is motion?

A. About suffering I would have no doubt at all. For that God is impassible I wholly believe and understand. By suffering I mean that which is opposed to making, that is, being made. For who would say or believe, still less understand, that God suffers being made when He is the Creator, not a creature? For when, as we have long agreed, God is said to be made, this is said obviously by a figure of speech. For He is held to be made in His creatures generally because in them He, without Whom they cannot be, is not only understood to be, but also is their Essence. 'For the Being of all things is the Divinity that is beyond being', as St. Dionysius says. He is also said to be made in the souls of the faithful when He is either conceived in them by faith and virtue or begins somehow to be understood through *faith*. For faith is nothing else, in my opinion, but a certain principle from which knowledge of the Creator begins to emerge in the rational nature. But about making I do not yet have a clear view, for I hear all Holy Scripture and the Catholic Faith declare that God is the Maker of all things.

N. You have already admitted that there cannot be making without a motion of the maker.

71

How being made is predicated of God

The definition of Faith

A. Dedi.

N. Aut igitur motum deo dabis, sine quo facere non intelligitur, aut simul et motum et facere ab eo auferes. Haec enim duo inter ea quae simul sunt computantur simulque oriuntur et occidunt.

A. Motum deo dare non possum, qui solus immutabilis est nec habet quo uel ad quid se moueat cum in ipso omnia sint, immo cum sit ipse omnia; facere uero ab eo auferre non possum cum sit factor omnium.

N. Segregabis ergo motum et facere?

[A.] Ne id quidem dum inseparabilia esse a se inuicem uideo.

N. Quid ergo factururus eris?

A. Nescio atque ideo uiam quandam mihi aperias summaque hac difficultate me liberares obnixè supplico.

N. Accipe igitur hunc ratiocinandi progressum: Quid tibi uidentur? Num deus erat priusquam omnia faceret?

A. Videtur mihi fuisse.

N. Accidens ergo ei erat facere. Nam quod ei coaeternum non est atque quoessentiale aut aliud extra eum est aut ei accidens.

A. Aliud praeter eum et extra eum esse non crediderim; in ipso enim omnia sunt et extra ipsum nihil est. Nullumque ei accidens temere dederim; alioqui simplex non est sed ex essentia et accidentibus quaedam compositio. Nam si aliud cum ipso intelligitur quod ipse non est aut si quippiam ei accidit profecto neque infinitus est neque simplex, quod fides catholica ueraque ratio firmissime denegat. Fatetur enim deum infinitum esse plusque quam infinitum (infinitas enim infinitorum est) et simplicem et plus quam simplicem (omnium enim simplicium simplicitas est) et cum ipso nihil esse credit uel intelligit quoniam ipse est ambitus omnium quae sunt et quae non sunt et quae esse possunt et quae esse non possunt et quae ei seu contraria seu opposita uidentur esse, ut non dicam similia et dissimilia. Est enim ipse similitudo et dissimilitudo dissimilium, oppositorum oppositio, contrariorum contrarietas. Haec enim omnia pulchra ineffabilique armonia in unam concordiam colligit atque componit. Nam quae in partibus uniuersitatis opposita sibimet uidentur atque contraria et a se inuicem dissona, [dum] in generalissima ipsius uniuersitatis armonia considerantur conuenientia consonaque sunt.

N. Recte intelligis, et uide ne quid de his quae nunc dederis de caetero te dedisse poeniteat.

7 immo cum RBP<sup>c</sup>: immotum P\* 11 Ne RBP<sup>c</sup>: Nec P\* 13 aperias B<sup>c</sup>P: apperias RB\* 18 ei (1) om. P 19 quoessentiale B: coessentiale RP 26 infinitum (2) R<sup>c</sup>BP: infinitis R\* 34 pulchra RB: pulchra P 37 considerantur R<sup>c</sup>BP: considerat R\* 39 N. Recte: N. R- in ras. R 40 poeniteat B<sup>c</sup>P: poeniteat RB\*

A. I have.

N. You must either, then, allow motion to God, without which making is inconceivable, or you must deny Him both motion and making. For these two are counted among the things which go together and which arise and pass away together.

A. I cannot allow motion to God, Who alone is immutable and has nowhere and nothing towards which to move Himself, since in Him are all things, indeed, since He himself is all things; on the other hand I cannot deny Him making since He is the Maker of all things.

N. Then you will separate motion from making?

[A.] I cannot do that either, since I see that they are inseparable from (251) one another.

N. What will you do then?

A. I do not know: and therefore I earnestly beg you to open some way for me and to free me from this extreme difficulty.

N. Adopt this method of reasoning then: what is your opinion? Did God exist before He made all things?

A. It seems to me that He did.

N. Then making was an accident to Him. For that which is not co-eternal and co-essential with Him is either some other thing outside Him or an accident to Him.

A. I would not believe that there was another thing apart from Him and outside Him. For in Him are all things and outside Him is nothing. And I would not be so bold as to allow any accident to Him: otherwise, He is not simple but a composite of essence and accidents. For if another thing which is not Himself is understood (to be) with Him, or if there is something accidental to Him, then surely He is neither infinite nor simple—a thing which the Catholic Faith and true reason most firmly deny. For they confess that God is infinite and more than infinite—for He is the Infinity of infinites—and simple and more than simple—for He is the Simplicity of all simple things—and they believe and understand that there is nothing with Him, since He is the periphery of all things that are and that are not and that can be and that cannot be and that appear to be either contrary or opposite to Him, not to say like and unlike: for He is the Likeness of like things and the Unlikeness of unlike things, the Oppositeness of opposites, the Contrariness of contraries. For He gathers and puts all these things together by a beautiful and ineffable harmony into a single concord: for those things which in the parts of the universe seem to be opposed and contrary to one another and to be discordant with one another are in accord and in tune [when] they are viewed in the most general harmony of the universe itself.

N. You understand rightly; see now that you do not in what follows regret having admitted any of the things you now admit.

A. Ingredere quo uis ordine. Te sequar et quodcumque iam concessero non repetam.

N. Deus ergo non erat prius quam omnia faceret?

A. Non erat. Si enim esset facere omnia ei accideret, et si ei accideret omnia facere motus et tempus in eo intelligerentur. Moueret enim se ad ea facienda quae iam non fecerat temporeque praecederet actionem suam, quae nec sibi coessentialis erat nec coaeterna.

de facere N. Coaeternum igitur est deo suum facere et coessentialis? 518A

A. Ita credo et intelligo.

N. Duone quaedam sunt deus et suum facere, hoc est sua actio, an unum simplex atque indiuiduum? 10

[A.] Vnum esse uideo. Deus enim numerum in se non recipit quoniam solus innumerabilis est et numerus sine numero et supra omnem numerum causa omnium numerorum.

N. Non ergo aliud est deo esse et aliud facere sed ei esse id ipsum est et facere? 15

A. Huic conclusioni resistere non audeo.

N. Cum ergo audimus deum omnia facere nil aliud debemus intelligere quam deum in omnibus esse, hoc est essentiam omnium subsistere. Ipse enim solus per se uere est et omne quod uere in his quae sunt dicitur esse ipse solus est. Nihil enim eorum quae sunt per se ipsum uere est, quodcumque autem in eo uere intelligitur participatione ipsius unius qui solus per se ipsum uere est (uere esse) accipit. 20 518B

A. Nec hoc negare uelim. 25

N. Videsne ergo quemadmodum uera ratio kategoriam faciendi ex natura diuina paenitus segregat mutabilibusque ac temporalibus principioque ac fine carere non ualentibus distribuit?

A. Hoc quoque clare perspicio. Et iam nunc nullam kategoriam in deum cadere incunctanter intelligo. 30

N. Quid igitur? num eadem ratione debemus inspicere omnium uerborum quae sancta scriptura de diuina natura praedicat uirtutem ut nil aliud per ea aestimemus significari praeter ipsam simplicem incommutabilem incomprehensibilemque omni intellectu ac significatione diuinam essentiam et plus quam essentiam? Verbi gratia, dum audimus deum uelle et amare aut diligere uidere audire caeteraque uerba quae de eo praedicari possunt nil aliud oportet nos cogitare 35 518C

13-14 solus-numerorum: cf. 590B, 633B *infra*; Eriug., *De praed.* ii. 3, PL cxxii. 362B 8-10; eund., *Comm. in Boeth. de cons. philos.* iii. 9, 6, p. 53 Silvestre; Aug., *De Gen. ad litt.* iv. 3 (p. 99, 23-27 CSEL); iv. 4. (p. 100, 12-16 CSEL); *Sermo cxvii de uerbis Eu. Ioann.* i. 1-3, PL xxxviii. 662-3; Max. Conf., *I Ambig.* vi. 41, PG xci. 1185B 8-c 1

6 fecerat RBP<sup>c</sup>: faceret P\* temporeque RBP<sup>c</sup>: temperat P\* 8 lemma BP  
12 enim s.l. P post numerum rasura in B 14 omnium s.l. R 17 ante Huic  
erasum est N in B 19 quam R<sup>c</sup>BP: quoniam R\* 27 paenitus BP: penitus R

A. Proceed in what order you please. I shall follow you, and shall not take back anything that I have conceded.

N. God, then, did not exist before He made all things?

A. No: for if He did, the making of all things would be an accident to Him; and if the making of all things were an accident to Him, it would be understood that motion and time were in Him, for He would move Himself to make the things which He had not yet made, and He would precede in point of time His own action, which was neither co-essential with Him nor co-eternal.

N. Then His action of making is co-eternal with God and co-essential? Concerning making

A. So I believe and understand.

N. Are God and His making, that is, His action, two things, or one simple and indivisible thing?

[A.] I see that they are one: for God does not admit number in Himself, since He alone is innumerable and Number without number and the Cause of all numbers which surpasses every number.

N. Therefore it is not one thing for God to be and another to make, but for Him being is the same as making?

A. I dare not resist this conclusion.

N. So when we hear that God makes all things we ought to understand nothing else than that God is in all things, that is, that He is the Essence of all things. For only He truly exists by Himself, and He alone is everything which in the things that are is truly said to be. For none of the things that are truly exists by itself, but whatever is understood truly (to be) in it receives (its true being) by participation of Him, the One, Who alone by Himself truly is.

A. Nor would I wish to deny this.

N. Do you see, then, how true reason completely excludes the category of making from the Divine Nature and attributes it to the things which are mutable and temporal and cannot be without a beginning and an end?

A. I see this clearly too: and now at last I understand without any doubt that no category applies to God.

N. What then? Should we not examine in the same way the force of all the verbs which Holy Scripture predicates of the Divine Nature, so as to conclude that nothing else is signified by them but the Divine Essence and More-than-essence itself, which is simple and immutable and cannot be grasped by any intellect or signification? For instance: when we hear that God wills and loves or desires, sees, hears, and the other verbs which can be predicated of Him, we should 73

30 incunctanter R<sup>c</sup>BP: indubitanter R\* 32 praedicat uirtutem R<sup>c</sup>P: praedicaturtutem B\* 36 dum RBP<sup>c</sup>: deum P\* et BP: aut R uidere audire R<sup>c</sup>BP: uidereue audireue R\*

nisi ineffabilem ipsius essentiam atque uirtutem connaturalibus nobis significationibus suaderi ne in tantum uera ac pia xristiana religio de creatore omnium sileat ut nil de eo fari audeat ad simplicium animorum instructionem hereticorumque semper ueritati insidiantium eamque eruere laborantium minusque in ea eruditos fallere appetentium *refellendas astutias*. Non aliud itaque deo esse et uelle et facere et amare et diligere et uidere caeteraque huius modi quae de eo, ut diximus, possunt praedicari sed haec omnia in ipso unum idipsumque accipiendum suamque ineffabilem essentiam eo modo quo se significari sinit insinuant.

A. Non aliud quidem. Vbi enim est uera et aeterna et insolubilis per se ipsam simplicitas ibi aliud-et-aliud et multum diuersumque fieri impossibile est. Vellem tamen apertius mihi suadeas ut clare uideam dum audio deum amare uel amari nil aliud nisi ipsius naturam sine ullo motu amantis uel amati intelligam. Cum enim hoc fuerit suasum nequaquam haesitabo ubicunque legero seu audiero ipsum uelle uel desiderare et desiderari, diligere et diligi, uidere et uideri, appetere et appeti, mouere similiter et moueri. Haec enim omnia uno eodemque accipienda sunt intellectu. Vt enim uoluntas et amor et delectio uisio desiderium quoque et motus dum de deo praedicantur unum idipsumque nobis insinuant, ita uerba seu actiua seu passiuia seu neutralia sint et cuiuscunque modi significatione proferantur nulla intelligentiae differentia intelliguntur discrepare, ut opinor.

N. *Nec* in talibus deceptum [te reor]; ita enim sunt ut arbitraris. Primum igitur hanc amoris diffinitionem accipe: Amor est connexio ac uinculum quo omnium rerum uniuersitas ineffabili amicitia insolubilique unitate copulatur. Potest et sic diffiniri: Amor est naturalis motus omnium rerum quae in motu sunt finis quietaque statio, ultra quam nullus creaturae progreditur motus. His diffinitionibus aperte sanctus Dionysius astipulatur in amatorii ymnis dicens: 'Amorem siue diuinum siue angelicum siue intellectualem siue animale siue naturalem dicamus unitiuam quandam et continuatiuam intelligamus uirtutem superiora quidem mouentem in prouidentiam inferiorum et aequiformia iterum in sociabilem uicissitudinem et nouissima subiecta ad meliorum et superpositorum conuersionem.' Idem in eisdem: 'Quoniam ex uno multos amores

32-37 Ps.-Dionys., DN iv. 15, PG iii. 713A6-B4 37-p. 212, 1 Quoniam-ordinauimus: *ibid.* 16, 713B6-7

2 c ante xristiana erasum in R 5 rasura post ea B 6 refellendas R<sup>c</sup>BP: expellendas R\* rasura post non in B deo RB<sup>c</sup>P: de B\* 9 rasura post essentiam in P 16 nequaquam RB: nullo modo P audiero RBP<sup>c</sup>: adiero P\* 17 diligere et diligi BP: deligere et deligi R 20 delectio RB: dilectio P 21 insinuant RB<sup>c</sup>P: insinuat B\* 25 té reor R(C)B: te reor P 26 lemma BPRm amor est RB: amorem P connexio B<sup>c</sup>: conexio RB\*P 31 ama-

simply understand that we are being told of His ineffable Essence and Power in terms which are adapted to our nature, lest the true and holy Christian religion should be so silent about the Creator of all things that it dare not say anything for the instruction of simple minds and in refutation of the subtleties of the heretics who are always lying in wait to attack the truth and labouring to overthrow it and seeking to lead into error those who are less well instructed in it. Therefore to be and to will and to make and to love and to desire and to see and the other things of this sort which, as we said, can be predicated of Him, are not different things for God, but all these are to be accepted as one and the same in Him, and indicate His ineffable Essence in the way in which it allows itself to be signified.

A. Indeed (they are) not different. For where there is true and eternal and indissoluble simplicity by itself, there cannot be anything which is either this and that or which is much and various. But I should like you to tell me more explicitly, so that I may clearly see, how, when I hear that God loves or is loved, I shall understand nothing but His Nature without any motion of lover or beloved. For when I have been shown this I shall have no misgiving at all in reading anywhere or hearing that He wills or desires or is desired, loves or is loved, sees or is seen, seeks or is sought, and likewise that He moves or is moved. For all these must be accepted in one and the same sense. For as will and love and desire and vision and longing too and motion, when predicated of God, indicate to us one and the same thing, so the verbs, whether they be active or passive or neutral and in whatever sense they are uttered, are understood not to disagree (with one another) by any difference of meaning, in my opinion.

N. [I think you] are not deceived in this *either*, for it is as you think. First, then, take this definition of love: Love is a bond and chain by which the totality of all things is bound together in ineffable friendship and indissoluble unity. It can be defined in this way too: Love is the end and quiet resting place of the natural motion of all things that are in motion, beyond which no motion of the creature extends. These definitions St. Dionysius openly supports in the 'Amatory Hymns' (252), saying: 'Let us think of love, whether we are speaking of divine or angelic or intellectual or psychic or natural (253) love, as a certain unitive and continuative (254) power which moves the higher things to provide for the lower, and again those of equal form (255) to exercise a close influence upon one another (256), and those things which are placed lowest (257) to turn to those that are better and are placed above them.' The same (author says) in the same (Hymns): 'Since we have given in order the many kinds of love which

torii: iis s.l. R 32 Amorem R<sup>c</sup>BP: amare R\* 34 intelligamus R<sup>c</sup>BP: intelligemus R\* 35 aequiformia R<sup>c</sup>B<sup>c</sup>P: aequiformium R\*B\*

Diffinitio  
 amoris

The  
 definition  
 of Love

'ordinauimus . . . nunc iterum omnes in unum et complicitum  
'amorem et omnium ipsorum patrem conuoluamus simul et con-  
'gregemus ex multis: primo in duas comprehendentes eum amatorias  
'uniuersaliter uirtutes quarum potentatur et principatur omnino ex  
'omnium summitate omnis amoris immensurabilis causa et ad quam 5  
'extenditur connaturaliter unicuique existentium ex existentibus  
'omnibus uniuersalis amor.' Idem in eisdem: 'Age nunc et has iterum',  
hoc est amoris uirtutes, 'in unum congregantes dicamus quia una  
'quaedam est simplex uirtus se ipsam mouens ad unitiuam quandam  
'temperantiam ex optimo usque existentium nouissimum et ab illo 519D  
'iterum consequenter per omnia usque ad optimum ex se ipsa et per 11  
'se ipsam et ad se ipsam se ipsam reuoluens et in se ipsam semper  
'eodem modo reuoluta.' Merito ergo amor deus dicitur quia omnis  
amor causa est et per omnia diffunditur et in unum colligit omnia et  
ad se ipsum ineffabili regressu reuoluitur totiusque creaturae ama- 520A  
torios motus in se ipso terminat. Ipsa quoque diuinae naturae in 16  
omnia quae in ea et ab ea sunt diffusio [omnia] amare dicitur non  
quia ullo modo diffundatur quod omni motu caret omniaque simul  
implet, sed quia rationabilis mentis contuitum per omnia diffundit 20  
[et mouet dum diffusionis et motus animi causa sit] ad eum in-  
quirendum et inueniendum et quantum possibile est intelligendum  
qui omnia implet ut sint et uniuersalis amoris pacifica copulatione in  
unitatem inseparabilem quae est quod ipse est uniuersa colligit et  
inseparabiliter comprehendit. Amari item dicitur ab omnibus quae  
de pati ab eo facta sunt non quod ab eis aliquid patiat qui solus impassi- 25  
bilis est, sed quia eum omnia appetunt ipsiusque pulchritudo omnia 520B  
ad se attrahit. Ipse enim solus uere amabilis est quia solus summa  
ac uera bonitas et pulchritudo est. Omne siquidem quodcunque in  
creaturis uere bonum uereque pulchrum amabileque intelligitur ipse  
est. Sicut enim nullum bonum essenziale est ita nullum pulchrum 30  
seu amabile essenziale praeter ipsum solum. Sicut ergo lapis ille qui  
dicitur magnetes quamuis naturali sua uirtute ferrum sibimet pro-  
pinquans ad se attrahat nullo modo ut hoc faciat se ipsum mouet aut  
a ferro aliquid patitur quod ad se attrahit, ita rerum omnium causa  
omnia quae ex se sunt ad se ipsam reducit sine ullo sui motu sed sola 35

1-7 Ps.-Dionys., DN iv. 16, PG iii. 713C3-11

7-13 *ibid.* 17, 713D1-7

de similitudo  
de magnetis

1 complicitum R<sup>c</sup>B<sup>c</sup>P: complicitum R<sup>\*</sup>B<sup>\*</sup> 3 glossa ad duas pertinens  
duas amatorias uirtutes dicit quarum una est quae omnia sensibilia, altera quae  
omnia intelligibilia in se inuicem copulat et unificat BP eum *codd.*: lege eorum  
5 omnis R<sup>c</sup>: omnes R<sup>\*</sup>B<sup>\*</sup> 6 ex R: et BP 18 ullo RB: nullo P  
omniaque RB<sup>c</sup>P: omnia quae B<sup>\*</sup> post simul deletum est caret in R 20 diffu-  
sionis BP<sup>c</sup>: diffusionis R: diffunonis P<sup>\*</sup> 22 copulatione RBP<sup>c</sup>: copulationes  
P<sup>\*</sup> 24 lemma B (in eiusdem lemmatis alia manu paulo altius scripti rasura), P  
26 pulchritudo RB: pulcritudo B 27 enim RB<sup>c</sup>P: e<sup>\*</sup>im B<sup>\*</sup> 29 amabile-

derive from the One . . . let us now . . . (258) involve them all together  
again into the one and all-embracing Love and Father of them all and  
collect them together from (being) many, first comprehending in two  
general (virtues) (259) all (their) (260) amatory virtues, over which  
absolutely commands and rules, from the summit of all things (261),  
the immeasurable (262) Cause of all love, towards which also is  
directed all the love from all things that exist in conformity with the  
nature of each existent.' The same (author says) in the same (Hymns):  
'Come now, and gathering these', that is, the virtues of love (263),  
'again into one, let us say that there is one simple virtue which moves  
itself (264) to a unitive mingling (of all things) from the Best (265) to  
the lowest of beings and back from that through all things in order  
to the Best again, spinning itself out from itself through itself towards  
itself (266) and ever winding itself up again into itself in the same  
way.' Rightly therefore is God called Love since He is the Cause of  
all love and is diffused through all things and gathers all things  
together into one and involves them in Himself in an ineffable  
Return, and brings to an end in Himself the motions of love of the  
whole creature. Moreover this diffusion of the Divine Nature into all  
things which are in it and from it is said to be the love [of all things],  
not that what lacks all motion and fills all things at once is diffused in  
any way, but because it diffuses through all things the rational mind's  
way of regarding (them) [and moves it, for it is the Cause of the  
diffusion and motion of the mind] to seek Him and to find Him and  
to understand Him, as far as it is possible to understand one who fills  
all things in order that they may be, and in the pacific embrace of  
universal love gathers all things together into the indivisible Unity  
which is what He Himself is, and holds them inseparably together.  
Again, He is said to be loved by all things that were made by Him  
not because He suffers anything from them—for He alone is im-  
passible—but because all things seek Him and because His beauty  
draws all things to Himself. For He alone is truly lovable because  
He alone is the supreme and real Goodness and Beauty. For He Him-  
self is whatever in creatures is understood (to be) really good and  
really beautiful and lovable. For as there is no essential good so there  
is nothing essential(ly) beautiful and nothing essential(ly) lovable  
apart from Himself alone. Therefore, as that stone which is called  
the magnet, although by a natural power of its own it attracts to itself  
the iron which approaches it, does not move itself in any way in order  
to do this nor suffers anything from the iron which it attracts to itself;  
so the Cause of all things leads back to itself all things that derive  
from it without any motion of its own but solely by the power of its

Concerning  
suffering

75  
A simile  
from the  
magnet

que RB<sup>c</sup>P: amabilemque B<sup>\*</sup> 31 lemma BP sicut ergo R<sup>c</sup>BP: si ergo P<sup>\*</sup>  
33 faciat R<sup>c</sup>BP: faciet R<sup>\*</sup> 34 attrahit RB<sup>c</sup>P: attrait B<sup>\*</sup>

suae pulchritudinis uirtute. Hinc idem sanctus Dionysius inter  
 caetera ait: 'Quare autem theologi deum aliquando quidem amorem  
 'aliquando uero dilectionem aliquando amabile et delectabile euo-  
 'cant?' Concluit sermonem sic dicens: 'Quia eo quidem mouetur  
 'eo uero mouet.' Quam conclusionem apertius uenerabilis Maximus  
 exponens ait: 'Vt amor quidem subsistens deus et dilectio mouetur;  
 'ut uero amabile et delectum mouet ad se ipsum omnia amoris et  
 'delectionis acceptiua. Et planius iterum proferendum: mouetur  
 'quidem quasi coniunctionem ingerens inseparabilem amoris et  
 'delectionis eorum acceptiuis; mouet autem quasi attrahens per  
 'naturam eorum quae in ipsum mouentur desiderium. Et iterum:  
 'Mouet et mouetur quasi sitiens sitiri et amans amari et deligens  
 'deligi.' Nam et lux ista sensibilis quae totum uisibilem mundum  
 implet dum sit semper immobilis quamuis uehiculum eius quod  
 solare corpus dicimus per media aetheris spatia circa terram aeterno  
 motu uoluatur, ipsa uero lux ab ipso uehiculo ueluti quodam fonte  
 inexhausto manans ita totum mundum radiorum suorum immensura-  
 bili diffusionem perfundit ut nullum locum relinquat quo se moueat,  
 manetque semper immobilis. Vbique enim in mundo est plena semper  
 et integra, nullum locum deserens uel appetens praeter portiunculam  
 quandam inferioris huius aeris circa terram quam ad capiendam  
 umbram telluris quae nox dicitur relinquat. Omnium tamen anima-  
 lium lumen sentire ualentium obtutus mouet et ad se ipsam attrahit  
 ut per eam aspiciant quantum aspiceri possunt quod aspiceri possunt.  
 Ideoque moueri putatur quia radios oculorum ut ad se moueantur  
 permouet [hoc est oculorum motionis ad uidendum causa est]. [Et  
 ne mireris audiens naturam lucis quae est ignis totum mundum  
 sensibilem implere immutabiliterque ubique esse. Nam et sanctus  
 Dionysius hoc docet in libro de Caelesti Ierarchia, sanctus item  
 Basilius in Exameron eadem adfirmat. Substantiam quidem luminis  
 ubique esse, in uero mundi luminaribus siue magnis siue paruis  
 naturali quadam operatione prorumpere, non ut solum illuminet sed  
 ut motibus caelestium corporum omne tempus distingat.] Quid  
 dicam de artibus quas sapientes liberales appellant disciplinas, quae  
 dum in semet ipsis per semet ipsas plenae integrae immutabiles-  
 que permanent moueri tamen dicuntur quando rationabilis animi

520C

5

10

520D

15

521A

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25

29

521B

35

quomodo  
 deus amor  
 et amabile  
 dicitur

similitudo ex  
 luce  
 corporea

similitudo de  
 disciplinis

2-4 Quare-euocant: Ps.-Dionys., DN iv. 14, PG iii. 712C 1-3 4 Con-  
 clusit-dicens: Max. Conf., I Ambig. xix, PG xci. 1260C 2-3 4-5 Quia-mouet:  
 Ps.-Dionys., op. cit. 712C 4-5 6-13 Vt amor-deligi: Max. Conf., op. cit. 1260C  
 4-12 22 umbram-dicitur: cf. p. 170, 22-23 supra; 716A 10-B 5 infra 29 Diony-  
 sius-Ierarchia: cf. Ps.-Dionys., CH ix. 3, PG iii. 260C 12-D 6 30-33 Basilius-  
 distingat: cf. Basil., Hex. ii. 7, PG xxix. 45A, 48B; vi. 120D, 121A, 124A

3 aliquando uero dilectionem om. B\* 4 lemma BP: quomodo deus et amabilis  
 dicitur Rm 8 delectionis RB: dilectionis P\*: delectationis P<sup>c</sup> 12 sitiri  
 RB: sitiri P 13 lemma B (in ras.), PRm 20 praeter RBP<sup>c</sup>: propter P\*

beauty. Hence again St. Dionysius says among other things: 'But . . .  
 why (267) do the theologians call God sometimes Love but at other  
 times (268) Desire, at other times Lovable and Desirable (269)?'  
 He concludes his homily by saying: 'Because . . . under the one  
 aspect He is moved, under the other He moves.' This conclusion the  
 venerable Maximus expounds more fully by saying: 'As being Love  
 and Desire God is moved, while as Lovable and Desired He moves  
 to Himself all things which are receptive of love and desire.' And this  
 must be explained more clearly still: He is moved as bringing an  
 inseparable bond of love and desire to those who are receptive of  
 them, but moves as attracting through nature the desire of those who  
 are moved towards Him. And again: He moves and is moved as  
 thirsting to be thirsted for and loving to be loved and desiring to be  
 desired. For even this sensible light which fills the whole visible  
 world, while it remains ever immutable although its vehicle, which  
 we call the solar body, revolves in an eternal motion through the  
 intermediate spaces of ether about the earth, nevertheless the light  
 itself, flowing forth from this vehicle as from an inexhaustible source,  
 so pervades the whole world by the immeasurable diffusion of its  
 rays that it leaves no place into which it may move itself, and re-  
 mains ever immutable. For everywhere in the world it is always full  
 and whole, and it does not depart from any place nor does it seek any  
 place save a certain small part of this lower air about the earth, which  
 it leaves free for the purpose of admitting the earth's shadow which  
 is called night; and yet it moves the gaze of all animals which are  
 sensitive to light and draws them to itself that by it they may see in  
 so far as they can see what they can see; and therefore it is thought  
 to be moved, because it moves the rays of the eyes so that they are  
 moved towards it [that is, it is the cause of the motion of the eyes  
 towards seeing]. [And do not be surprised to hear that the nature  
 of light, which is fire, fills the whole sensible world and is everywhere  
 without change. For St. Dionysius also teaches this in his book on  
 the 'Celestial Hierarchy', and St. Basil too affirms the same in the  
 'Hexameron', (saying) that the substance of light is everywhere, but  
 breaks forth by some natural operation in the luminaries of the world  
 whether they be great or small, not only in order to provide illumina-  
 tion but that it may mark off the whole of time into portions by the  
 motions of the celestial bodies.] What shall I say of the skills which  
 the wise call the Liberal Arts, which, while they remain in themselves  
 by themselves complete, whole, and immutable, yet are said to be  
 moved when they move the rational mind's way of regarding (them)

How God is  
 called Love  
 and Lovable

A simile  
 from cor-  
 poreal light

A simile  
 from the  
 Arts

portiunculam R<sup>c</sup>P: partiunculam R\*B<sup>c</sup>: pertiunculam B\* 27 ignis s.l. R  
 32 naturali quadam operatione RB<sup>c</sup>P: natura quadam operationis B\* post  
 operatione erasum est sunt in B 33 lemma BP (similitudo: -li- s.l. P)



contuitum ad se quaerendas inueniendas permouent et ad se considerandas attrahunt ita ut et ipsae dum per se, ut diximus, immutabiles sunt moueri tamen in mentibus sapientum uideantur cum eas moueant? Et multa alia in quibus diuinae uirtutis obscura conspiciuntur similitudo. Ipsa enim est super omnem similitudinem omneque excellit exemplum, quae dum per se et in se immutabiliter aeternaliterque stat mouere tamen omnia dicitur quoniam per eam et in ea omnia subsistunt et ex non esse in esse adducta sunt (essendo enim eam omnia de nihilo ad esse procedunt et ad se omnia attrahit), moueri quoque dicitur quoniam se ipsam ad se ipsam mouet ac per hoc se ipsam mouet ac ueluti a se ipsa mouetur. Deus itaque per se ipsum amor est, per se ipsum uisio, per se ipsum motus, et tamen neque motus est neque uisio neque amor sed plus quam amor, plus quam uisio, plus quam motus. Et est per se ipsum amare uidere mouere, nec tamen est per se ipsum mouere uidere amare quia est plus quam amare uidere mouere. Item per se ipsum amari est uiderique mouerique, non tamen per se ipsum moueri est neque uideri neque amari quoniam plus est quam [ut possit,] amari et uideri et moueri. Amat igitur se ipsum et amatur a se ipso in nobis et in se ipso, nec tamen amat se ipsum nec amatur a se ipso in nobis et in se ipso sed plus quam amat et amatur in nobis et in se ipso. Videt se ipsum et uidetur a se ipso in se ipso et in nobis, nec tamen uidet se ipsum nec uidetur a se ipso in se ipso et in nobis sed plus quam uidet et uidetur in se ipso et in nobis. Mouet se ipsum et mouetur a se ipso in se ipso et in nobis, non tamen mouet se ipsum nec mouetur a se ipso in se ipso et in nobis quia plus quam mouet et mouetur in se ipso et in nobis. Et haec est cauta et salutaris et catholica de deo praedicanda professio: ut prius de eo iuxta catafaticam, id est affirmationem, omnia siue nominaliter siue uerbaliter praedicamus, non tamen proprie sed translative; deinde ut omnia quae de eo praedicantur per catafaticam eum esse negemus per apofaticam, id est negationem, non tamen translative sed proprie (uerius enim negatur deus quid eorum quae de eo predicantur esse quam affirmatur esse); deinde super omne quod de eo predicatur superessentialiter natura quae omnia creat et non creatur superessentialiter superlaudanda est. Quod ergo uerbum caro factum suis discipulis ait, 'Non uos estis qui loquimini sed spiritus patris uestri qui loquitur in uobis', uera ratio cogit nos de aliis similibus similiter credere dicere

37-38 Matth. x. 20

2 ipsae RB: ipse P  
ras.), P (et om.)  
15-16 quia est-mouere in marg. sR  
16-17 post uiderique erasum est a in B  
18 ut possit B: deest in R: in marg. alia manu P  
26-27 quia-in nobis ad calc. sR  
in se ipso RB<sup>c</sup>P: a se ipso B\*  
27 haec RB: hec P et (4) s.l. R  
29 uerbaliter R (uerb in ras.), P: uerbabiliter B  
33 lemma ex asum in B  
34 de eo R<sup>c</sup>BP: deo R\*

to seek them, to find them, and attract it to consider them, so that they too, although, as we said, they are immutable in themselves, yet seem to be moved in the minds of the wise because they move them? And there are many other things in which an obscure likeness of the Divine Power is seen. For it itself is above every likeness and surpasses every example, and while by itself and in itself it is immutably and eternally at rest, yet it is said to move all things since all things through it and in it subsist and have been brought from not-being into being, for by its being, all things proceed out of nothing, and it draws all things to itself. And it is said to be moved because it moves itself to itself, and therefore it moves itself and, as it were, is moved by itself. Therefore God by Himself is Love, by Himself is Vision, by Himself is Motion (270); and yet He is neither motion nor vision nor love, but More-than-love, More-than-vision, More-than-motion. And He is by Himself Loving, Seeing, Moving; and yet He is not by Himself moving, seeing, loving, because He is More-than-loving, More-than-seeing, More-than-moving. Also, by Himself He is Being-loved and Being-seen and Being-moved; yet He is not by Himself being-moved nor being-seen nor being-loved, because He is More-than-being-loved (271) and More-than-being-seen and More-than-being-moved. Therefore He loves Himself and is loved by Himself in us and in Himself; and yet He does not love Himself nor is loved by Himself in us or in Himself, but more than loves and is loved in us and in Himself. He sees Himself and is seen by Himself in Himself and in us; and yet He does not see Himself nor is seen by Himself in Himself or in us, but more than sees and is seen in Himself and in us. He moves Himself and is moved by Himself in Himself and in us; yet He does not move Himself nor is moved by Himself in Himself or in us, because He more than moves and is moved in Himself and in us. And this is the prudent and catholic and salutary profession that is to be predicated of God: that first by the Cataphatic, that is, by affirmation, we predicate all things of Him, whether by nouns or by verbs, though not properly but in a metaphorical sense; then we deny by the Apophatic, that is, by negation, that He is any of the things which by the Cataphatic are predicated of Him, only (this time) not metaphorically but properly—for there is more truth in saying that God is not any of the things that are predicated of Him than in saying that He is; then, above everything that is predicated of Him, His superessential Nature which creates all things and is not created must be superessentially More-than-praised. Therefore that which the Word made Flesh says to His disciples, 'It is not you who speak but the Spirit of your Father that speaks in you', true reason compels us to believe, and say, and understand in the same way with reference to other like things: it is not you

καταφατική  
and  
ἀποφατική

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ΚΑΤΑΦΑ-  
ΤΙΚΗ  
et  
ΑΠΟΦΑΤΙΚΗ

intelligere: Non uos estis qui amatis, qui uidetis, qui mouetis, sed spiritus patris qui loquitur in uobis ueritatem de me et patre meo et se ipso ipse amat et uidet me et patrem meum et se ipsum in uobis et mouet se ipsum in uobis ut diligatis me et patrem meum. Si ergo se ipsam sancta trinitas in nobis et in se ipsa amat [se ipsam] et uidet et mouet, pro certo a se ipsa amator uidetur mouetur secundum excellentissimum modum nulli creaturae cognitum quo se ipsam et amat et uidet et mouet et a se ipsa in se ipsa et in creaturis suis amator uidetur mouetur [cum sit super omnia quae de se dicuntur. De ineffabili enim quis et quid potest fari, cuius nec nomen proprium nec uerbum nec ulla uox propria inuenitur, nec est nec fieri potest, qui 'solus habet immortalitatem et lucem habitat inaccessibilem'? 'Quis enim cognouit intellectum domini?']. Sed priusquam praesentem disputationem terminemus sententiam sancti Dionysii de diuino statu motuque uisum est mihi huic loco inserendam, si tibi uidetur.

522C  
5  
10  
522D  
16

A. Videtur sane. Atque hac nouissima ratiocinatione ab omni ambiguitate purgatum me esse uideo.

N. In libro de Diuinis Nominibus, 'Reliquum autem' [inquit] 'et de diuino statu siue sede dicamus. Quid autem aliud praeter manere ipsum in se ipso deum et immobili naturali immutabilitate unimode fixum esse et supercollocari secundum eadem et circa id ipsum et similiter operari et secundum stabilissimum ipsum ex se ipso omni modo subsistere et secundum id ipsum intransmutabilem et uniuersaliter immutabilem, et haec superessentialiter? Etenim ipse est omnium stationis et aedificationis causalis, qui est super omnem aedificationem et stationem et in se ipso omnia constituit ex priorum bonorum statione immobilia et custodita. Quid autem? et cum iterum theologi et in omnia prouenientem et mutabilem dicunt immutabilem, nonne diuinitus et hoc intelligendum? Moueri enim ipsum pie arbitrandum non secundum delationem aut alienationem aut alternationem aut conuersionem aut localem motum, non rectum, non circulariter ferentem, non ex ambobus, non intelligibilem, non animale, non naturalem, sed in essentiam ducere deum et continere omnia et uniuersaliter omnibus praeuidere et adesse omnibus omnium immensurabili circumstantia et in existentia omnia prouidens processionibus et operationibus. Sed et motum dei

523A  
20  
25  
30  
523B

12 1 Tim. vi. 16 (Vulg.) 13 Rom. xi. 34 (intellectum Aug. semel: sensum Vulg.) 19-p. 220, 6 Ps.-Dionys., DN ix. 8-9, PG iii. 916B-D

3 uidet me R<sup>c</sup>BP: uidetur R\* 12 immortalitatem BP: immortalitatem R  
14 rasura post disputationem in R Dionysii RBP<sup>c</sup>: dionysius P\* 19 inquit in ras. R: inquit P\* 21 lege (in) immobili? cf. Ps.-Dionys. 22 et circa id in ras. B 22-23 et-ipsam in marg. sR 23 se om. P 24-25 et uniuersaliter immutabilem s.l. R 27 constituit RBP<sup>c</sup>: constituit P\* ex RB: et P 28 immobilia in ras. B 33 glossa ad ambobus pertinens obliquum motum dicit qui

who love, who see, who move, but the Spirit of the Father, Who speaks in you the truth about Me and My Father and Himself, He it is Who loves Me and sees Me and My Father and Himself in you, and moves Himself in you that you may desire Me and My Father. If then the Holy Trinity loves and sees and moves Itself in us and in Itself, surely It is loved and seen and moved by Itself after a most excellent mode known to no creature, by which It both loves and sees and moves Itself, and is loved, seen, and moved by Itself in Itself and in Its creatures [although It surpasses all that is said about It. For who and what can speak about the Unspeakable, for Whom no proper noun or verb or any proper word is found or exists or can come into existence, and 'Who alone possesses immortality and dwells in inaccessible light'? 'For who knows the intellect of the Lord?'] But before we end the present discussion I thought I should insert at this point the opinion of St. Dionysius on the Divine Rest and Motion, if you agree.

A. Certainly I agree. And by this last piece of reasoning I see that I am purged of every doubt.

N. In the book 'On the Divine Names' [he says]: 'But let us say what remains (to be said) concerning the Divine Station or Seat (272). But what else is it but God's remaining Himself in Himself and being, after a unique mode (273), established in unchanging natural immutability (274), and His . . . being enthroned (275) above all things, and His (always) working in the same respect about the same thing in the same way, and His subsisting wholly from Himself in His utter stability, and (His being) unchangeable and wholly immutable in relation to Himself, and being all these things after a superessential mode? For He is causal of the station and structure (276) of all things, Who is above every structure and station, and Who establishes in Himself all things, immutable and preserved by the stability of their proper goods. Again: even when the theologians say that the Immutabile goes forth into all things and is mutable, must not this also be divinely (277) understood? For that motion of His is to be piously understood not as a carrying away (278), or as an alienation from oneself (279), or as an exchanging (280), or as a turning round (281), or as a motion in place, not in a straight line (282), not in a circle, not in a combination of the two, not intelligible, not psychic, not physical; but as God's bringing into essence and containing all things, and providing in every way for all things, and being present to all things by His immeasurable circumambience of them (283), and by His providential outgoings and operations (284) towards all existing things. But it must also be permitted us to celebrate the motion of

ex recto et circulari motu componitur B. Vide p. 220, 3-4 34 animale RB: amabilem P

'immutabili diuinitus ratione concedendum laudare et rectus quidem  
'inflexibilis intelligendus et inreuocabilis processio operationum et  
'ex se ipso omnino generatio, elicoeides uero', id est obliquus,  
'statheralis processio et fertilis status, quod autem secundum cyclum,  
'id ipsum ab ipso prouenientium continens et continenda continere et  
'in ipsum ab ipso prouenientium conuersio.' 524A  
6

conclusio de  
agere et pati

A. Ordo exigit, ut uideo, breuem complexionem de eo quod agere  
et pati seu facere et fieri de deo proprie praedicare nemo ualeat  
colligas ac sic terminum libello imponas.

N. Iamdudum dedisti, ni fallor, non aliud deo esse et agere seu  
facere sed unum atque idipsum ei est et esse et agere et facere. Non  
enim recipit simplex natura intellectum substantiae et accidentium. 10

A. Inconcuse quidem dedi.

N. Vt igitur de eo praedicatur esse dum non sit proprie esse quon-  
iam plus est quam esse et causa omnis esse et essentiae et substantiae,  
ita etiam de eo dicitur agere et facere dum sit plus quam agere et  
facere et causa omnium faciendi et agendi sine ullo motu qui secun-  
dum accidens possit intelligi super omnem motum. Omnium nanque  
motu(u)m omniumque accidentium sicut et omnium essentiarum  
causa est atque principium. 15  
524B

A. Et hoc indubitanter concesserim.

N. Quid igitur restat nisi ut intelligas omnino necesse esse ut  
quemadmodum ab ipso et esse et agere et facere proprie aufertur,  
ita et pati et fieri auferatur? Quod enim agere et facere non recipit  
quomodo pati et fieri recipere possit non uideo. 20  
25

A. *Figē limitem libri: sat enim est [in eo] complexum.*

1 immutabili *codd.*: lege immutabilis (τοῦ ἀκινήτου) 3 elicoeides RB<sup>c</sup>P:  
elicoeides B\* 4 glossa ad statheralis *pertinens* Glosa (*deest* B) statheralem (statera-  
lem P\*) ac fertilem processionem dicit obliquum motum quia partim rectis lineis  
partim curuis (caruis P) quas fertiles uocat componitur. Curua autem linea propterea  
fertilis dicitur quoniam in se ipsam fertur ne in infinitum progrediatur (progreditur  
P) BP statheralis RB<sup>c</sup>: stat heralis B\*: stateralis P *alia glossa ad statheralis*  
*pertinens* id est ponderalis sBP 7 lemma BP 9 libello imponas RB<sup>c</sup>P:  
libellum ponas B\* 13 Inconcuse RB: Inconcuse P 14 eo BP: deo R  
16 *rasura post agere* (1) in P 16-17 dum-facere in marg. sR 18 nanque RB:  
namque P 19 motum *codd.* 21 concesserim BP: concesserim R 24 re-  
cepit RB<sup>c</sup>P: recipit B\*

God the Immutable in a manner befitting to God (285) by the reason,  
and while motion in a straight line must be understood as the un-  
deviating and irrevocable procession of His operations and the  
generation of all things from Himself, helicoidal' (286), that is,  
oblique, 'motion must be understood as His steady (287) procession  
and fruitful rest (288), and motion in a circle as His self-identity  
(289) holding together the middle and the extreme parts, the con-  
tainer (290) and the contained, and as the return of those things  
which have come forth from Him into Himself.'

A. Our method requires, I think, that you should gather up into  
a brief conclusion what has been said about the impossibility of  
anyone properly predicating of God acting and suffering, or making  
and being made; and so bring this book to its end.

Conclusion  
concerning  
acting and  
suffering

N. You have long conceded, if I am not mistaken, that for God to  
be is not other than to act or make, but that for Him it is one and the  
same thing (both) to be as well as to act and to make. For a simple  
nature does not admit the notion of substance and accidents.

A. Yes, I conceded it with conviction.

78

N. Therefore, just as being is predicated of Him although He is  
not in the strict sense being because He is more than being and is the  
Cause of all being and essence and substance, so also He is said to  
act and to make although He is more than acting and making and  
is the Cause of all for making and acting without any motion that  
could be attributed to accident, being beyond all motion. For of all  
motions and of all accidents, as indeed of all essences, He is the Cause  
and Principle.

A. To this too I would unhesitatingly agree.

N. What is left, then, but that you should understand that it is  
altogether necessary that, just as strictly speaking being as well as  
acting and making are removed from Him, so suffering and being  
made are removed? For how that which is not liable to acting and  
making can be liable to suffering and being made I do not see.

A. Set an end to the book: for there is enough contained [in it].

## NOTES ON TEXT AND TRANSLATION

1. See Introduction, pp. 9-10.
  2. With this opening section cf. Boethius, *c. Eutych. et Nestor.* 188 sq. Peiper.
  3. NVTRITOR-ALVMNVS. In the three ninth-century MSS. on which this edition of Bks. I-III is based the two interlocutors are clearly indicated by the letters N and A, assumed to stand for Nutritor and Alumnus (Cappuyns, pp. 196-7). In some later MSS. these are replaced by M and D, for Magister and Discipulus, as in previous editions. The problem of the names of the interlocutors is not a simple one, and will be more fully discussed in the Introduction to Bks. IV-V, when some of the later MSS. will have to be called into service. For the dialogue form see H. Jordan, *Geschichte der altchristlichen Literatur* (Leipzig, 1911), pp. 242-62.
  4. *Saepe mihi cogitanti*: a good classical opening phrase deriving from Cicero (Cappuyns, p. 197). See P. d'Hérouville, 'Une formule cicéronienne qui a fait fortune', *Revue de philologie*, iii (1927), 81-83; P. Debouxhtay, 'Cogitanti mihi . . .', *Musée belge*, xxiv (1930-2), 325.
  5. The division of totality into what is and what is not is common in Egyptian documents (cf. Erman, *Aeg. Grammatik*, 192) and occurs in the *Hermetica*, e.g. *Corp. herm.* v. 9 *ad fin.* This passage is imitated by Heiric of Auxerre in his commentary on Alcuin's introductory verses to Ps.-Aug., *Categoriae decem* (MS. Paris, Bibl. Nat. lat. 12949, *olim* S. Germ. 1108, f. 24'): Quidquid est, siue uisibile siue inuisibile, sensibile seu intelligibile, creans seu creatum, natura dicitur. Ergo generale nomen est natura omnium rerum et earum quae sunt et earum quae non sunt.
  6. For this *lemma* see Introduction, p. 6.
  7. For the categories of the Possible and the Impossible see 595B below.
  8. Literally, 'opposition'.
  9. i.e. species: cf. 148, 24; 154, 1-2.
  10. Alumnus recognizes the first three *diuisiones* from St. Augustine; cf. *De ciu. dei* v. 9, PL xli. 151: Causa itaque rerum quae facit nec fit deus est; aliae uero causae et faciunt et fiunt, sicut sunt omnes creati spiritus maxime rationales; corporales autem causae quae magis fiunt quam faciunt non sunt inter causas efficientes enumerandae. The fourth, however, comes from a Greek source, Origen, *De princ.* v. 27, PG xi. 929, which E knew in Rufinus' translation (J. Dräseke, 'Johannes Scotus Erigena und dessen Gewährsmänner in seinem Werke De diuisione naturae libri v', *Studien zur Geschichte der Theologie und Kirche*, ix. 2 (Leipzig, 1902), 28 sq.); but Alumnus is represented as being less familiar with the Greek authorities than with the Latin. Nutritor postpones the answer to Alumnus' query until 526D, where the fourth *diuisio* is identified as the Final Cause. It is also discussed in Bk. II. 1-6; III. 1 and 23; IV. 1-2; V. 39.
- The scheme of the four *diuisiones* can be traced back through Macrobius, *In somn. Scip.* i. 5, 16 (p. 494, 27-30 Eyssenhardt) to a theory known in Neoplatonic circles (Philolaos, fr. B. 20 = Diels, *Vors.* i (Berlin, 1950), p. 416, 8-22; Lydus, *De mens.* ii. 12, p. 33, 8 sq. Wünsch) and attributed by Philo, *De opif. mund.* c-ci (pp. 33, 26-34, 19 Cohn) to the Pythagoreans: the Monad

begets without being begotten (for all numbers derive from it while it derives from none); the Tetrad begets and is begotten (for it is the product of 2, and produces 8); the Ogdoad is begotten, being a product of 4, but within the totality of the Decad produces nothing; while the Hebdomad neither begets nor is begotten. See further Sheldon-Williams, 'The Greek Christian Platonist Tradition from the Cappadocians to Maximus and Eriugena', in A. H. Armstrong's *History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy* (Cambridge, 1966), pp. 522-3.

11. *Primordiales causae* are first mentioned by Ammianus (xxx. 1, *init.*), but in a non-technical sense (du Cange, Georges). Bett (40 n. 1) calls this theory E's most important debt to the Ps.-Dionysius (*DN* v. 9, 824C 10-12; *MT* i. 3, 1000; *Ep.* i. 1065 *et al.*), but it owes a great deal also to the *rationes aeternae* of St. Augustine. The Primordial Causes are discussed in detail in Bk. ii; see note on 529A.

12. *lux mentium*: i.e. God.

13. P's *omnem* is acceptable as giving balance to the sentence. The glosses are irrelevant.

14. *materiae* has crept into P under the influence of the glosses mentioned in the last note, and damages the syntax by separating *ab eo* from *deo*. Although it is true that Aristotelian matter is *nec quid nec quantum nec quale*, i.e. 'eludes all sense and all intellect', it does not do so 'because of the excellence of its nature', but for the contrary reason. At p. 166, 9-10, below, matter is said to be the most important thing the reason can consider *after God*; but if *materiae* were to be retained here, it could only mean that it was on an equal level with God.

15. 'Reasons' and 'essences' are here synonymous. The former (*rationes*) are the *rationes aeternae* of St. Augustine: for the latter see 464A below. Since they are alternative names for the Primordial Causes (see note 11), that which is not, under this mode of interpretation, includes the first two of the four *diuisiones* as well as the fourth. Therefore, that which is = the third *diuisio*.

16. St. Gregory of Nazianzus, whom E knew only through the *Ambigua* of St. Maximus. Although he is aware that St. Gregory Nazianus and St. Gregory of Nyssa are not the same person (568A), he frequently refers to them as though they were, as St. Augustine and others had done. Cf. 735D, 804CD, 808A, 831D, 860A, 879C = 880B, 899C, 922D.

17. Except where he is writing of the Trinity, where, after the manner of the Greeks, he speaks of Three Substances in One Essence, E uses the terms 'substance' and 'essence' more or less indiscriminately. Cf. St. Aug., *De Trin.* v. 8, 9, PL xlii. 917: *Essentiam dico quae οὐσία graece dicitur, quam usitatius substantiam uocamus.* See also Apuleius, *De Platone*, i. 6, 193 = *Opera quae supersunt*, iii. 88 Thomas: *Et primae quidem substantiae uel essentiae primum deum esse et mentem formasque rerum et animam.*

18. *secretissimis*: the usual expression is *secretissimis sinibus*, cf. p. 42, 15-16 *et passim*.

19. The balance of the sentence requires P's *per se*.

20. Cf. St. Aug., *Enarr. in ps.* lxxiv. 9, PL xxxvi. 952: *Quem nulli licet ut est cognoscere et quem nemo permittitur ignorare.* The distinction between *cognoscere quid* and *cognoscere quia* is applied to God (771B, 788A), Intellect (585B, 767D, 771B), and Soul (788A).

21. Privation (*στέρησις*) is one of Aristotle's three principles of 'becoming', the other two being matter and form (*Phys.* 190<sup>b</sup>23-29). He blames Plato for omitting this principle, and thus attributing to matter a kind of non-being which does not belong to it and seems to reduce it to absolute non-being

(ibid. 192<sup>a</sup>3-12). Syrianus, however (*In Met.* 110, 18 sq. on Arist. *Met.* 990<sup>a</sup>13), makes it account for the resistant element in matter and identifies it with Plato's Errant Cause; and Plotinus may have done the same (Inge, *Philosophy of Plotinus*, i, ed. 3, 134 sq.). Proclus includes it among the products of the Good (*El. theol.* 57 ad fin.), and his opponent Nicolaus of Methone approves his doing so. The Ps.-Dionysius, while careful to distinguish its non-being from the superessential Non-being of God (which is under discussion here: cf. n. 14), agrees with Proclus (*DN* iv. 18 sq., 713D sq.). E goes further and excludes *priuationes* from the operations of God, i.e. from Nature, altogether: *mutatis mutandis*, this is a return to Plato's position.

22. Cf. St. Aug., *Conf.* xi. 4: (Deus) quo comparato nec pulchra sunt nec bona sunt nec sunt. The thought is common in Orthodox theology; cf. St. Gregory Palamas, *Capita cl physica theologica moralia et practica*, lxxviii, PG cl. 1176B: 'If God is a nature, all else is not nature: if that which is not God is nature, then God is not a nature; nor is He even being if all other things are'; Berdyaev, *Freedom of the Spirit*, Eng. tr., 67: 'If the natural world is being, then God is Not-being and Nothingness.'

23. The stock scholastic example of a proprium of man.

24. P's interpolation reproduces in literary form the gloss at p. 42, 2, and therefore has E's authority.

25. *ordinem* 'seems necessary and is implied in the 12th century lemma. The author apparently first wrote (or dictated) *usque dum ad supremam omnium* (i.e. *essentiam*) *perueniatur . . . ipsa uero . . .*, but then, by an easy mental substitution, thought in terms of *ordo*, and went on: *deorsum uero nouissimus* (instead of *nouissima*). Re-reading the passage, he eliminated the inconsistency, and at the same time introduced some other changes and additions in the interest of greater clarity. This passage alone seems fairly strong proof of C's being Eriugena's autograph' (Bieler).

26. The interpolation breaks the continuity, and seems to be a gloss that has crept into the text; but the word *omotages* indicates that the source is Eriugena, who explains it in his Commentary on *CH* vi. 2, 201A 5 = PL cxxii. 1050A 2. See *Expos. super Ier. cael.* vi. 7, p. 282 Dondaine. The interpolator, however, has not benefited much from the explanation.

27. *uel* often has the force of *et* in late Latin.

28. A favourite expression: cf. p. 44, 22; 551B, 603C, 632C, 658B, 661B, 700AC, 710AB, 711C, 714B, 731A, 822C (of man, the microcosm); *Annot. in Marc.* 297, 3 Lutz. See also n. 18 above.

29. Cf. *Corp. Herm.* v. 9 Nock: *ἔστιν οὗτος καὶ τὰ ὄντα καὶ τὰ μὴ ὄντα, τὰ μὲν γὰρ ὄντα ἐφάνερωσε, τὰ δὲ μὴ ὄντα ἔχει ἐν ἑαυτῷ*. Scott (*Hermetica* ii (Oxford, 1925), 165) interprets *τὰ μὴ ὄντα* as 'the things that are to be hereafter', citing a Gnostic document in C. Schmidt, *Koptische-Gnostische Schriften*, i. 358: 'Thou art the Demiurge of those things that have not yet manifested themselves, for these thou alone knowest: we know them not.'

30. Cf. St. Aug. *De Trin.* iii. 9, 16, PL xlii. 877-8: *Ista quippe originaliter ac primordialiter in quadam textura elementorum cuncta iam creata sunt, sed acceptis opportunitatibus prodeunt; id., De Gen. ad litt.* iv. 33, 51, PL xxxiv. 318: *Quapropter quam facilis ei efficacissimus motus est, tam facile deus condidit omnia, quoniam per illum sunt condita, ut hoc quod nunc uidemus temporalibus interuallis ea moueri ad peragenda quae suo cuique generi competunt, ex illis insitis rationibus ueniat quas tanquam seminaliter sparsit deus in ictu condendi, cum dixit et facta sunt, mandauit et creata sunt.*

P's interpolation which follows breaks the continuity.

31. See note 28.

32. See p. 39, 4.

33. Alumnus' objection is based on the third mode of not-being, according to which the Primordial Causes are not because they are unknowable (ch. 5). Nutritor's solution introduces the doctrine of Theophanies, which occupies the three ensuing chapters. Then, with ch. 11, the main theme of Bk. I, the First Species of Nature, is at last broached.

34. *rationes*: see notes 11 and 15. There is no satisfactory equivalent in English for *ratio* in this sense, which has some, but not all, of the functions of the Greek *logos*. The *rationes*, like the Stoic *logoi*, are things as they exist perfectly and eternally in the Mind of God. The *ratio* of a created thing is that in it which is perfect and eternal in accordance with which it is created. It is consequently the basic principle, the cause, and the essence of the thing. In English, neither 'principle' nor 'essence' has all these connotations. Therefore *rationes* is translated 'reasons', and it is hoped that the meaning will in most cases be clear from the context.

35. For the Theophanies see Ps.-Dionys., *CH* iv. 3, 180c; 'Maximus' (i.e. John of Scythopolis), *schol. ad loc.*, PG iv. 55c; Eriug., *Expos. ad loc.* 269-72 Dondaine; eund., *Comm. in euang. Ioann.*, PL cxxii. 302AB.

36. In *Rep.* x Plato criticizes artists and poets for making an image of an image instead of looking directly at the Archetype (cf. *Rep.* 601-2); and Plotinus refused to have his portrait painted because it would be *εἰδῶλον εἰδῶλον* (Porphyry, *Vit. Plot.* i. 8). E found this phrase in Greg. Nyss. (see 790 below), who no doubt derived it from these sources.

37. See 763A.

38. *ipsius*, genitive, as though the verb were *memini*.

39. *causas*, where we had *rationes* at 46, 14. For the identity of the *rationes* and the Primordial Causes see note 15.

40. Cf. Eriug., *Comm. in euang. Ioann.* 302B: *In eis (theophaniis) quaerentibus et diligentibus se deus manifestat, in quibus ueluti quibusdam nubibus rapiuntur sancti obuiam Christo.*

41. For E's influence in promoting the theory of the unknowability of God see P. M. de Cotenson, 'Avicennisme latin et vision de Dieu au début du xiii<sup>e</sup> siècle', *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge*, xxvi (1959). He is transmitting the doctrine of the Cappadocians, who, confronted with the rationalism of Arius and the intellectualism of Eunomius which developed out of it, emphasized the inadequacy of the human intellect before the inaccessibility of the Divine Mystery. The Ps.-Dionys., in the wake of St. Greg. Nyss., developed a theology of beatitude in which *θέωσις* is not so much an intellectual grasp of God as a vital communion with the inapprehensible. St. Maximus, who expounded both St. Greg. Nyss. and the Ps.-Dionys., elaborated a negative theology which implied that no one has ever seen nor ever will see the Divine Essence. Cf. Vincent Lossky, *Studia patristica*, ii (Berlin, 1957), 512-37; id., *The Vision of God* (London, 1963); R. Leys, *Stud. patr.* ii. 495-511; de Cotenson, *art. cit.* 30 n. 5.

42. A favourite quotation: cf. 551C, 680D, 681A, 898B. See also Ps.-Eriug., *Comm. in Boet. Cons. Philos.* 292, 25-293, 5 Silk: *In eo uero quod dicit LVCI INACCESSAE concordat beato Paulo qui dicit, Qui habitat lucem inaccessibilem. Quod ideo dicitur quia nullus intellectus penetrare eum sufficit sicuti est. Hunc idem apostolus alibi (Phil. iv. 7), Pax dei quae exuperat omnem sensum tam angelicum quam humanum. This text is also used by E in the present book, from which this passage of the Boethius Commentary seems to derive.*

43. The interpolation of *dei* is justified in the interests of clarity.

44. Anastasius gives the same gloss for *theosis* in the first chapter of E's version of the *Celestial Hierarchy*, MS. Munich Clm 14137, f. 5<sup>r</sup>.

45. *dilectionem . . . caritatem* (54, 9). E's vocabulary of affection (it seems the proper word) consists of *amor*, *dilectio*, *caritas*, *desiderium*. Of these the first alone implies no deficiency in the agent, and therefore is the only one which can be attributed to God. The others describe in different ways the manner in which man is affected by God. *Desiderium* is the longing for the Beloved's presence, a sensation of lack which need not involve the reason; *caritas*, the value at which the Beloved is rated, involving judgement; *dilectio*, which I have translated 'choice', the wilful decision to choose the Beloved rather than another, to which the evaluation is a necessary preliminary. It is therefore (with its verb *diligere*) the most common Christian word to describe man's proper attitude to God: a preference for God above all things. It is exactly equivalent to *ἀγάπη* as defined by St. Maximus Confessor at the beginning of his *Centuries concerning Agape*: *Ἀγάπη μὲν ἐστὶ διάθεσις ψυχῆς ἀγαθῆ, καθ' ἣν οὐδὲν τῶν ὄντων τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ γνώσεως προτιμᾷ* (PG xc, *op. cit.*, *ad init.*). E, however, does not always rigorously observe these distinctions, which absolves his translator from observing them either.

46. Cf. Eriug., *Comm. in euang. Ioann.* 338<sup>v</sup>-339<sup>A</sup>: *Purgabitur prius per fidem, illuminabitur per scientiam, perficietur per deificationem*. The three phases of the soul's ascent to deification were first precisely marked by the Ps.-Dionys. following in the steps of Origen and St. Greg. Nyss. Cf. R. Roques, *L'Univers dionysien* (Paris, 1954), 98 n. 2.

47. Cf. Ps.-Dionys., *CH* iii. 2, 165<sup>C</sup> 2-8: *ἡ θεία μακαριότης, ὡς ἐν ἀνθρώποις εἰπεῖν, ἀμυγῆς μὲν ἐστὶν ἀπάσης ἀνομοιότητος, πλήρης δὲ φωτὸς αἰδίου, τελεία καὶ ἀνευδεῆς ἀπάσης τελειότητος, καθαίρουσα καὶ φωτίζουσα καὶ τελεσιουργούσα, μᾶλλον δὲ κάθαρσις καὶ φωτισμὸς καὶ τελείωσις, ὑπὲρ κάθαρσιν ὑπὲρ φῶς προτέλειος αὐτοτελεταρχία*, and E's commentary *ad loc.*: *Purgans et illuminans et perficiens: Ordinem ierarchie tribus modis contineri predixit, purgatione scilicet illuminatione perfectione. Et quoniam ipsius ordinis fons et origo est diuina beatitudo, ipsa est per se ipsam purgatrix purgantium et purgatorum, ipsa est illuminatrix illuminantium et illuminatorum, ipsa est perfectrix perficientium et perfectorum* (*Expos. s. Ier. cael.* ix, pp. 257-8 Dondaine).

48. The discussion started with a query by Alumnus about the angels' knowledge of the Primordial Causes, but E's citation of his Greek authorities has led him into a digression. He reverts by a sudden reference to the angels, emphasized by P's addition, and by transferring this sentence to Alumnus, who is thus made to see some relevance to his original question in what has intervened.

49. Cf. pp. 122, 32-33; 202, 22-23. These *pulcherrima paradeigmata* were not invented by Maximus: cf. Posidonius *ap.* Seneca, *NQ* 11: *Aer frigidus per se et obscurus. Lumen illi calorque aliunde sunt*; Plutarch, *De fac. in orb. lun.* 922<sup>A</sup>. Cleomenes, 4, 102, perhaps following Posidonius, says that air is permeated by light as a sponge is filled with water; and Plotinus, *Enn.* iv. 5, 2, 56-57, that air is dark and must be overcome by light. For a full discussion see G. Pépin in *Divinitas*, xi (1967), pp. 331-75.

50. The dative *luci* (and perhaps the neuter *idipsum*) is due to the influence of the Greek on which the passage is based; cf. St. Max. Conf., *I Ambig.*, PG xci. 1076<sup>A</sup>: *ἔν' ὄλον ὄλον τῷ περιγράφοντι . . . ὡς ἀήρ δι' ὄλον πεφωτισμένος φωτὶ*.

51. *ratio* here is a word of the same order as *intellectus*, denoting a faculty of the soul. As by intellect the soul intellects, so by *ratio* it reasons. In normal English the word can only have this sense in the singular.

52. The Divine Power (*uirtus* = *δύναμις*), for the Divine Essence is absolutely unmanifested. It is what the Ps.-Dionys. calls 'the radiation of the Divine Dark', *τοῦ θείου σκότους ἀκτίνα*, *MT* i. 1, 1000<sup>A</sup> 2.

53. Taken, no doubt, from Max. Conf., *I Ambig* vi. *ad init.*, PG xci. 1105<sup>C</sup> 10-14.

54. See note 51.

55. Cf. *Corp. Herm.* x. 19 Nock: *ψυχῇ δὲ ἀνθρωπίνῃ, οὐ πάσα μὲν, ἢ δὲ εὐσεβῆς, δαιμονία τίς ἐστὶ καὶ θεία: καὶ ἡ τοιαύτη καὶ μετὰ τὸ ἀπαλλαγῆναι τοῦ σώματος . . . ὄλη νοῦς γίνεται*. For the Hermetist, as for the Orphic, the body is left behind in this ascent; for the Christian it is caught up in it.

56. i.e. St. Greg. Naz.

57. The analogy is used by Origen (*De princ.* ii. 6) for the 'soul plunged in the Word', when 'all that it feels, all that it wills, all that it does, is God'. See further 879<sup>AB</sup> below.

58. *queruntur*, an accepted spelling for *quaeruntur* as in P.

59. The main theme of Bk. I begins here. What has gone before is an introduction dealing with the general principles on which Nature is to be divided. This is emphasized in R, which here, and here only, introduces a title into the text. The title is numbered II, which may indicate that the words *περὶ φύσεως μερισμοῦ*, which stand at the head of the text in R, and are represented by a (Latin) lemma in B, are meant for the title of the first section only. See Introduction, pp. 5-6. A trace of the old division of the book into sections survives in B, where, although this title is now included among C's lemmata, the paragraph it marks begins with a large capital, not found elsewhere in B, the preceding line being left blank. The size of this letter distracts the attention from the N which indicates the interlocutor, and the fact that this was first omitted by P suggests that he was copying either from B or from an exemplar which had the same peculiarity.

60. Cf. p. 204, 6; 562<sup>A</sup>, 585<sup>A</sup>, 909<sup>A</sup>.

61. Cf. schol. in Plato, *Legg.* iv. 715<sup>E</sup> (451 Bekk.): *θεὸν μὲν τὸν δημιουργὸν σαφῶς, παλαιὸν δὲ λόγον λέγει τὸν ὀρφικόν, ὅς ἐστιν οὗτος*:

*Ζεὺς ἀρχή, Ζεὺς μέσσα, Διὸς δ' ἐκ πάντα τέτυκται,*

*καὶ ἀρχὴ μὲν οὗτος ὡς ποιητικὸν αἴτιον, τελευτῆ δὲ ὡς τελικόν, μέσσα δὲ ὡς ἐξ ἴσου πᾶσι παρών, κἂν πάντα διαφόρως αὐτοῦ μετέχη.* The verse as it stands here cannot bear this interpretation, but it is Plato's own (*ὁ μὲν δὴ θεός, ὡς περὶ καὶ ὁ παλαιὸς λόγος, ἀρχὴν τε καὶ τελευτὴν καὶ μέσσα τῶν ὄντων ἀπάντων ἔχων*), and is borne out by the version quoted in Ps.-Arist., *De mundo* vii. 401<sup>a</sup>25:

*Ζεὺς πρῶτος γένετο, Ζεὺς ὕστατος ἀργικέραυτος*

*Ζεὺς κεφαλῆ, Ζεὺς μέσσα: Διὸς δ' ἐκ πάντα τελείται*

(though even here Festugière translates 'C'est de Zeus que tout a reçu l'être', and not 'leur fin' (*Révélation d'Hermès Trismégiste*, ii (Paris, 1949), 476)). See also O. Kern, *Orphicorum fragmenta* (Berlin, 1922), fr. 21a, pp. 90 sq. According to E. Zeller (*Kleine Schriften*, ii. 120 sq., esp. 146-80) the poem belongs to a period not earlier than the Stoics, but the expression was known to Archytas in the fourth century B.C.: *ὁ θεὸς ἀρχὴ τε καὶ τέλος καὶ μέσον ἐστὶ πάντων τῶν κατὰ δίκαν τε καὶ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον περαιωμένων* (*Περὶ σοφίας ap.* Iamblichum, *Protrept.* iv. 160, p. 23, 3 Pistelli).

Considerable importance was attached to it by the Neoplatonists: cf. Procl., *Plat. theol.* vi. 8, 368 (on the passage from the *Laws*); Theon, *De mus.* xli. 157 Bull; Lydus, *De mus.* 20. See also Josephus, *c. Apion.* ii. 22 (190). E's language closely resembles that of the scholiast quoted above, and presumably

derives from the same source. See further Des Places, 'La Tradition indirecte des Lois de Platon (livres i-vi)', *Mélanges J. Saunier* (Lyons, 1944), 34-35; W. L. Lorimer's note *ad loc.* in his edition of the *De mundo* (Paris, 1933).

62. An etymology proposed by the Eleatic philosophers and adopted by Plato in the *Cratylus*. E could have found it in St. Greg. Naz., *Orat.* xxx. 18, except that this passage is not commented upon in the *Ambigua* of St. Maximus, which seems to have been his only source for St. Greg. Naz.; but it also occurs in St. John Damascene. Heiric borrowed this passage for his gloss on Ps.-Augustine, *De dialectica*: Dicitur deus a graeco quod est theos conuersa T in D. θεός autem est a uerbo θέω, id est curro. Inde est, Velociter currit (*ap.* B. Hauréau, *Histoire de la philosophie scolastique*, i (Paris, 1872), 187). For a similar etymology cf. the derivation of Vishnu from the Skt. *vis*, 'pervade' (*Taittiriya upanishad* and *Padina Purana*). The double etymology is found in a work closely associated with E, MS. Laon 444, in the section *Incipiunt graeca Praesciani de [x]viii partibus et constructione*, f. 282<sup>v</sup>: θέω (cf. the uncertain reading of R\*) uideo. Vnde θεός deus dicitur quod uidet omnia. Item θέω .i. curro. Vnde θεός deus dicitur quod discurret omnia.

63. Cf. p. 78, 8; 642C, 643AB, 709B.

64. Cf. St. Paul, 'I live, yet not I . . .'; St. Aug., 'I should not exist wert not Thou already with me'; St. Catherine of Genoa, 'My Me is God, nor do I know my selfhood save in Him'.

65. This addition is not one of the enlargements to R, but was omitted by the scribe as a result of the similarity of its ending to that of the preceding sentence. It provides evidence that R was copied from an earlier MS.

66. Cf. the *Testament* of Labadie *ap.* Inge, *Philosophy of Plotinus*, i. ed. 3, 121 n. 1: 'I surrender my soul heartily to my God, giving it back like a drop of water to its source, and rest confident in Him, my origin and ocean.'

67. Cf. pp. 64, 4; 100, 14; 192, 23; 580C, 647B, 681A.

68. Cf. St. Thomas, *Summ. theol.* i, qu. 19, art. 1: Sicut suum intelligere est suum esse, ita et suum esse est suum uelle.

69. Cf. p. 208, 19-20.

70. P's insertion shows that he did not understand the qualifying effect of *naturale*.

71. E is quoting from memory; cf. p. 52, 34-35, where the same text is quoted still less accurately.

72. The negative is required by the sense. The proximity of the *non* which precedes *irrationabiliter* might be the cause of the omission.

73. i.e. the images taken from the sensible world with which we clothe our thoughts. See below.

74. Four stages in the development of the text are discernible: (i) R, in which the first formation of the intellect is simply described as 'certain forms' (*formas quasdam*), and the second as 'certain signs of words' (*quibusdam uocum signis*) and 'other perceptible indicators' (*aliis sensibilibus indicibus*); (ii) R enlarged = B, in which the 'forms' of the first formation are qualified by the words *rerum seu uocum sensibilibus*, which show them to be the Forms (in the Platonic sense) of which the *uocum signa* and *alia sensibilia indicia* of the second formation are the copies. This requires at line 26 the change to *sentientium* from *audientium* which relates to *uoces* only; (iii) B enlarged = P, in which other kinds of forms are implied by the insertion of *formarum siue* in the second formation; (iv) P enlarged, which specifies another kind of forms (*seu colorum*), and inserts an explanation of *formarum siue uocum*. The former insertion is redundant, since it is already included in *caeterorumque*, and it is

not balanced by anything in the second formation; but the other insertion is required to explain the significance of *formarum siue* of B enlarged, since all possible kinds of expression of the forms seem to be accounted for by *aliis sensibilibus indicibus*. We now see, however, if P correctly interprets E's thought, that these *formae* are the forms of geometry which are expressed by figures, as the *uoces* are expressed by letters. In the full text, therefore (omitting *seu colorum*), there are three instances of the first formation balanced by three of the second:

<i>First Formation</i>	<i>Second Formation</i>
(i) formae rerum = formae matheseos	signa formarum rerum = figurae
(ii) formae uocum	signa (formarum) uocum = litterae
(iii) formae caeterorum sensibilibus	alia sensibilia indicia

75. Professor Bieler suggests that P's insertion *utrum sit* originated from a gloss on *quid*, 'i.e. which of the two it is (creative or created)'. If so, P would not have copied directly from B, but from an intermediate MS. which had this gloss. See also note 26.

76. e.g. p. 48, 31-33.

77. God is Being, as Cause of Being in all that is (the Father); Wisdom, as the Cause of the rational disposition of all that is (the Son); Life, as the Cause in all that is of motion and life (the Holy Spirit). These three Divine Attributes are discussed by the Ps.-Dionys. in *DN* v-vii respectively (*περί ὄντος* . . . ; *περί ζωῆς*; *περί σοφίας* . . .). The triad is an ancient one. Plato says that τὸ παντελῶς ὄν involves νοῦς and ζωή (*Sophist* 249A); in Plotinus it represents (i) the three formal aspects of the action of the higher realities on the lower: ἀφ' οὗ πάντα . . . ἐστι καὶ ζῆ καὶ νοεῖ· ζωῆς γὰρ αἴτιος καὶ νοῦ καὶ τοῦ εἶναι (*Enn.* i. 6, 7, 10-12); (ii) the three aspects of Nous: τὸ γὰρ ὄν οὐ νεκρόν, οὐδὲ οὐ ζωῆ οὐδὲ οὐ νοοῦν· νοῦς δὲ καὶ ὄν ταυτὸν (*Enn.* v. 4, 2, 44-46; cf. vi. 6, 18, 35 f.); (iii) stages of its inner development and coming into being: εἰ δὲ τὸ ὄν πρῶτον δεῖ λαβεῖν πρῶτον ὄν, εἶτα νοῦν, εἶτα τὸ ζῶν· τοῦτο γὰρ ἤδη πάντα δοκεῖ περιέχειν, ὁ δὲ νοῦς δεύτερος, ἐνέργεια γὰρ τῆς οὐσίας (*Enn.* vi. 6, 17-20). But Plotinus is careful to point out that these distinctions are logical, not ontological, and ζωή is never a link between the other two (Dodds, *Proclus*, ed. 1. 253), as it became under his successors, Porphyry (*ap.* Procl., *In Tim.* iii. 6, 84), Iamblichus (*ibid.* 45, 5), Theodore of Asine (*ibid.* ii. 274, 23; iii. 64, 8), *Anonymus Taurinensis* (xiv. 15 Kroll), Syrianus (*In Metaph.* 46, 37), and Proclus, whose 101st proposition of the *El. theol.* is πάντων τῶν νοῦ μετεχόντων ἡγείται ὁ ἀμέθεκτος νοῦς, καὶ τῶν τῆς ζωῆς ἢ ζωῆς, καὶ τῶν τοῦ ὄντος τὸ ὄν αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων τὸ μὲν ὄν πρὸ τῆς ζωῆς, ἢ δὲ ζωῆς πρὸ τοῦ νοῦ, and the 102nd, πάντα μὲν τὰ ὄντα οὐκ ἐκ πέρατός ἐστι καὶ ἀπειροῦ διὰ τὸ πρῶτον ὄν· πάντα δὲ τὰ ζῶντα ἐαυτῶν κινήτικα ἐστι διὰ τὴν ζῶν τὴν πρῶτην· πάντα δὲ τὰ γνωστικά γνώσεως μετέχει διὰ τὸν νοῦν τὸν πρῶτον. The Ps.-Dionys., in a passage of which E must be thinking here, distributes the functions in the same way: ἢ δὲ τοῦ ὄντος (θεωνυμία) εἰς πάντα τὰ ὄντα ἐκτείνεται καὶ ὑπὲρ τὰ ὄντα ἐστίν· ἢ δὲ τῆς ζωῆς εἰς πάντα τὰ ζῶντα ἐκτείνεται καὶ ὑπὲρ τὰ ζῶντα ἐστίν· ἢ δὲ σοφίας εἰς πάντα τὰ νοερά καὶ λογικά καὶ αἰσθητικά ἐκτείνεται καὶ ὑπὲρ πάντα ταυτά ἐστίν (*DN* v. 1, 816B 11-16). But (i) these Causes are one, not three: οὐκ . . . ἄλλο τὸ ὄν καὶ ἄλλο τὴν ζωῆν ἢ τὴν σοφίαν, οὐδὲ πολλὰ τὰ αἴτια (*ibid.* c 13-14); (ii) they are not arranged hierarchically: οὐδὲ . . . ἄλλων ἄλλας παρακτικὰς θεότηας, ὑπερεχούσας καὶ ὑφειμένας (14-15); (iii) they inhere not in Nous, but in the One, i.e. the Godhead Itself: ἀλλ' ἐνὸς θεοῦ τὰς ὄλας ἀγαθὰς προόδους (*ibid.* 15-16). These divergences from the Procline system are

necessary to Christian doctrine, but the first of them, representing a return to the Plotinian position, may indicate that the Ps.-Dionys. is not copying Proclus, but some older model. The connexion of ζωή with motion, mentioned by Proclus but not in the passage quoted from the Ps.-Dionys., is found elsewhere in the latter, e.g. *DN* vi. 1, 856A 5-B 1: τὸ ἀνώλεθρον αὐτὸ τῆς ἀγγελικῆς ἀεικωνίας ἐξ αὐτῆς (sc. τῆς ζωῆς τῆς αἰωνίου) καὶ δι' αὐτὴν καὶ ἔστι καὶ ὑφέστηκε.

78. *essentia* here is not 'essence' in the normal sense of οὐσία, but is the verbal noun = τὸ εἶναι, 'from the fact that things that are are'.

79. In writing of the Trinity E invariably uses the Greek terms; but in a later book he explains that they do not differ doctrinally from the Western usage.

80. Cf. 601A.

81. St. Greg. Naz. *ap.* Max. Conf.

82. Cf. St. Aug., *De Trin.* v. 5, *Opera* viii (Paris, 1694), 834G-835A: In deo . . . nec tamen omne quod dicitur secundum substantiam dicitur. Dicitur enim ad aliquid, sicut pater ad filium et filius ad patrem . . . Quamuis diuersum sit patrem esse et filium esse, non est tamen diuersa substantia quia hoc non secundum substantiam dicitur sed secundum relatiuum. See also Boethius, *Opusc. sacr.* ii.

83. Detailed discussion of the categories begins at 462A. By way of introduction N here examines the possibility of predicating any epithet of the Deity, and this leads him on to explain the difference between the Cataphatic and Apophatic Theologies.

84. See note 42.

85. With this section cf. Ps.-Dionys., *MT* iii-v. The Ps.-Dionys. treats of the Apophatic in *MT* and the first two *Epistles*, which are commentaries upon it; and of the Cataphatic in *DN*. See, however, *DN* i. 4-6; vii. 1 and 3; xiii. 3.

86. Cf. A. E. Taylor, *Plato the Man and His Work*, ed. 4 rev., 287: 'Because it is the source of all reality, every predicate which expresses a positive perfection must in its degree characterise the sum of all perfections and must be ascribed to it analogically.'

87. Examples are given at p. 194, 13-22.

88. For the expression cf. St. Greg. Nyss., *In cant. cant.* vi. 6, PG xlv. 885D (174. 2-3 Langerbeck): ἡ μὲν ἀκτιστός ἐστι καὶ ποιητικὴ τῶν ὄντων, αἰεὶ οὐσα ὅπερ ἐστὶ καὶ πάντοτε ὡσαύτως ἔχουσα.

89. Cf. 627D, 704B.

90. With the reading in RB cf. MS. Laon 444 quoted in note 62.

91. Cf. p. 60, 23-25.

92. P's insertions at p. 78, 12 and 15, seem to be required.

93. It is obvious from Alumnus' reply that this is intended as a rebuke, and *admiror* must be ironical. We should expect N to say: 'I wonder what has become of the keenness of your attention, which so far has been vigilant enough' (Bieler).

94. Cf. p. 76, 25.

95. *intentionem et repulsionem*. The terms *intentio* and *repulsio* (or *depulsio*) are given as the Latin equivalents of *κατάφασις* and *ἀπόφασις* in the *de rhetorica* of C. Julius Victor, tentatively assigned by the *Thesaurus linguae latinae* to the fourth century A.D., and edited by C. Halm in *Rhetores Latini minores* (Leipzig, 1863): *intentio* est id quod primum dicit qui mouet litem, siue accusator siue petitor, ut est 'occidit patrem Sextus Roscius': *repulsio* est 'non occidit'. Ex intentione et repulsione nascitur quaestio 'an occiderit'.

Hoc τὸ κρινόμενον Graeci dicunt. Hic est status causae, qui nascitur ex intentione et repulsione. Non omnis tamen status ex prima propositione et repulsione comprehenditur . . . hoc ergo interest quod in superiore ex cataphasi et apophasi tantum, id est intentione et depulsione τὸ κρινόμενον inuenitur: in hac autem posteriore, relicta cataphasi et apophasi, ex causatione, ἐκ τοῦ αἰτίου, et continentia, ἐκ τοῦ συνέχοντος, τὸ κρινόμενον apparet (*op. cit.* ii. 375, 17 sqq. Halm). Julius is discussing the doctrine of *στάσεις* (*status*) invented by Hermagoras of Temnos, a rhetor of the second century B.C., who formulated a number of general questions, logical or legal, which must be considered in all disputes, of which one was the *status causae*.

Cicero was familiar with the theory of Hermagoras, who profoundly influenced rhetorical theory for many centuries, and he refers to it in his rhetorical works, notably in the *De inuentione*, e.g. quaestionem ex qua causa nascitur constitutionem appellamus. Constitutio est prima conflictio causarum ex depulsione intentionis profecta, hoc modo: 'Fecisti.' 'Non feci', aut: 'Iure feci' (*op. cit.* i. 10); but in the *Topica* also he refers briefly to the *depulsio criminis* (93), and to the *κρινόμενον* and the *continentia* (95), i.e. τὰ συνέχοντα. However, unlike Julius, he does not quote the Greek words which the logico-legal terms of rhetoric, *intentio* and *depulsio*, represent.

The theological terms *καταφατική* and *ἀποφατική* (*θεολογία*), though no doubt derived from the 'status theory', for, e.g., 'Deus est: Deus non est' would be as good an example of *intentio* and *repulsio* as the one which Julius gives, do not seem to occur before the Ps.-Dionysius (although the casual way in which he introduces them suggests that they were already well known).

In implying that they were known to, and translated by, Cicero, Eriugena is affected by a confusion of reminiscences. The Cataphatic and Apophatic Theologies, fresh in his mind from his reading of the Ps.-Dionysius and St. Maximus, are related to what he had learnt in his earlier rhetorical studies, which could well have included Julius Victor, since both he and Cicero were known in Carolingian times: the former was used, e.g. by Alcuin in his *De rhetorica*, and the latter exists in several MSS. of the eighth and ninth centuries. Indeed Julius may reasonably be supposed to be the direct source for *Annot. in Marc.* 112, 4 Lutz: Principalis status est 'Occidisti, non occidi'. At the same time he projected back to Cicero Julian's equating of *intentio* and *repulsio* with *κατάφασις* and *ἀπόφασις*. For the information contained in this note I am much indebted to Dr. W. Ehlers, Generalredaktor of the *Thesaurus linguae Latinae*, and to Professor Bieler.

96. The conjecture that the inserted *non* was intended to precede *essentia* (see apparatus criticus) is Professor Bieler's. It improves the sense since the contrast is between the three predicates, *essentia*, *non-essentia*, *superessentia*. They correspond to, and perhaps derive from, the three ways of approaching God described by Celsus (Origen, *c. Cels.* vii. 44, PG xi. 1484CD): *synthesis* with other things, τῇ συνθεσει τῇ ἐπὶ τὰ ἄλλα, i.e. the Cataphatic Theology; *analytical distinction* from other things, τῇ ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἀναλώσει, i.e. the Apophatic; and *analogy*, which is a combination of the two, and is better than either since it leads 'to the threshold of the Gods' (Plato, *Philebus* 64C 1-2). It follows from this that positive statements have their own value since without them there can be no analogy.

Origen opposes Celsus on the ground that Scripture denies that man can by his own effort come to a knowledge of God. His position is consistent with the Neoplatonic doctrine that the Cataphatic Theology does not have a value of its own, but is merely a means of access to the Apophatic knowledge of the One, to be shed when this has been reached: εἰ δ' ἄρα τις ὀτιοῦν



αὐτῷ προστίθῃσιν, ἢ οὐσίαν ἢ νοῦν ἢ καλὸν τῇ προσθήκῃ ἀφαιρεῖται αὐτοῦ τὰ γὰρ εἶναι (Plotinus, *Enn.* v. 5, 13, 9–13). But the Christian cannot stop there. The purpose of ‘analysis’ is to gain a pure knowledge of God, not a knowledge which is no knowledge at all. Therefore, the same process which leads the Neoplatonists to a negation leads St. Clement of Alexandria, for instance, to an infinite richness: *εἰ τοίνυν, ἀφελόντες πάντα ὅσα πρόσσεσι τοῖς σώμασι καὶ τοῖς λεγομένοις ἀσωμάτοις, ἀπορρίψωμεν ἑαυτοὺς εἰς τὸ μέγεθος τοῦ Χριστοῦ· κἀκεῖθεν εἰς τὸ ἀχανές ἀγνόησι προΐοιμεν, τῇ νοήσει τοῦ παντοκράτορος ἀμηγεπηῇ προσάγοιμεν, οὐχ ὃ ἔστιν, ὃ δὲ μὴ ἔστι γνωρίσαντες* (*Strom.* v. 11, PG ix. 108B–109A).

The line pursued by the Neoplatonists and Origen ends with the statement, ‘Even if we say that which He is not we do not say that which He is’, *καὶ γὰρ λέγομεν ὃ μὴ ἔστιν· ὃ δὲ ἔστιν οὐ λέγομεν* (Plot., *Enn.* v. 3, 14, 6–7); that followed by St. Clement and the Cappadocians leads to the discovery that ‘the knowledge of God is the perception of His incomprehensibility’, *εἰδῆσις τῆς θείας οὐσίας ἢ αἰσθησις αὐτοῦ τῆς ἀκαταληψίας* (St. Basil, *Ep.* 235, 2, PG xxxii. 869c 1–2; cf. id., *Adu. Eun.* i, 14, PG xxix. 544A 10–B 15; St. Greg. Nyss., *De vit. Moys.* ii, PG xlv. 377A; id., *In cant. cant.* vi, PG xlv. 893B (182, 2–3 Langerbeck)).

The difference between them is that the one leads to *non-essentia*, the other to *superessentia*. The Neoplatonists and Origen declare that the Cataphatic Theology must yield to the Apophatic, and it is true that God is better described as Non-Essence than as Essence; but best of all is He described as Superessence, for, as the Ps.-Dionys. taught, developing the Cappadocian tradition, He transcends both affirmation and negation: *οὐδέ ἔστιν αὐτῆς καθόλου θεοῖς οὔτε ἀφαιρέσις* (MT v, 1048A15–B1); affirmation, because nothing that is said of Him can express His Nature, negation because every concept is discarded not because He lacks what it connotes but, on the contrary, possesses it in a degree too eminent for the name by which the concept is known in association with His creatures to be applied literally to Himself. But it may be applied to Him analogically, *per metaphoram*; and analogy can only be drawn between terms both of which represent realities. The Ps.-Dionys. goes beyond St. Clement and the Cappadocians in insisting upon the real content of the Divine Names (V. Lossky, ‘La Théologie négative dans la doctrine de Denys l’Aréopagite’, *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques*, xxviii (1939), 206); and it is his doctrine that E is reproducing here.

97. Cf. Heiric’s gloss on Ps.-Aug., *Cat. dec.* in MS. Paris, Bibl. Nat. lat. 12949, f. 24<sup>r</sup>: Aristoteles praececellens et acutissimus Graecorum fuit philosophus qui primus has categorias composuit.

98. The order of the words in R\* was amended to agree with the order in which the Categories are discussed later. This is Aristotle’s own order (*Cat.* iv, 1<sup>b</sup>25–2<sup>a</sup>4; *Top.* i. 9, 103<sup>b</sup>20–23), reproduced in Ps.-Aug., *Cat. dec.* (144, 17–19 Minio-Paluello); and also that of Cassiodorus (*Inst.* ii. 10). More than once E declares that *quantitas* is the first of the accidents of *essentia*, cf. 497B. But he is also aware of the other tradition, preserved by Ps.-Archytas, *Περὶ τῶν καθόλου λόγων*, Martianus Capella iv (170, 11 sq. Dick), Boethius (*In Porph. Isag.* i and ii. 1, 4), and Chalcidius (*In Tim.* cccv, 307, 3–6 Waszink), according to which quality is the first accident of substance: *A quibusdam post substantiam quantitas ponitur, a quibusdam qualitas* (Eriug., *Annot. in Marc.* 86, 17 Lutz); and hesitates between the two, as here and also in *Annot. in Marc.*, where in the first set of glosses on the *De dialectica* quantity comes before quality (84, 5), and in the second quality before quantity (89, 16). He was following two conflicting authorities, the *Cat. dec.* and Martianus.

Cf. *Annot. in Marc.* 93, 23–26 with *Cat. dec.* 45, p. 143, 10–13 Minio-Paluello for another inconsistency. The Ps.-Aug. treats *species* and *forma* as synonymous, as E does in the present work (see note 9 and references given there); but in his gloss on Martianus, which derives from Ps.-Aug., E cites St. Aug.’s authority for distinguishing between the two: *Secundum Augustinum species differt a forma. Nam forma potest fieri genus, species autem proprie individua intelligitur.*

99. The correct position of this lemma must be at the beginning of N’s speech, where the turn of phrase is appropriate to the opening of a new section, and this is in fact where the excerpt preserved in the St. Gall and Ambrosian MSS. (Introduction, pp. 14–15) begins. The displacement of the lemma perhaps explains why *Quae*, in all three MSS., begins a new sentence, with an exceptionally large majuscule *Q* in B and larger still in P. If so, this would suggest that R, which does not have the lemma, but nevertheless begins a new sentence with *Quae*, was copied from an exemplar which had the lemma, displaced as in BP.

100. Significance: lit. ‘virtue’.

101. Page 74, 6.

102. Both here and at pp. 69–72 E uses *habitus* and *habitus* as synonyms of *relatio*, and indeed at p. 70, 1 where he introduces the latter category he calls it *habitus*, inserting the alternative *relatio* as an afterthought. When he comes to deal with the category of condition itself he restricts the discussion almost exclusively to proportion, which he regards as a species of condition (p. 90, 36–37), but which is in fact a species of relation. The two categories are not really distinct in his mind. Cf. p. 92, 25–27.

103. Cf. Ps.-Aug., *Cat. dec.* 125, PL xxxii. 1434, p. 162, 20–22 Min.-Pal.: *Apud Graecos κείσθαι, apud nos iacere* (siue, ut Agorius, quem ego inter doctissimos habeo, uoluit, situs) dicitur.

104. *momenti*: a ‘romance’ plural.

105. In R the correction -t- in *et ΕΡΟΠΤΑΘΙΑ* is badly formed and could be read as *N*. Hence probably the reading ΕΝΟΠΤΑΘΙΑ in MS. Cambridge Trin. Coll. O. 5. 20 (reproduced in Gale), an indication of the dependence of this MS. on R.

106. The Latin is anacoluthic.

107. The omission in R shows that it was copied from an earlier MS. The copyist skipped a line of it.

108. Aristotle, *Auscult. phys.* iv. 4, defines place as the motionless limit of body. See also Ficino’s translation of the *Timaeus*, 484.

109. These four categories are implied by Boethius, *loc. cit.* The first (*subiectum*) is substance (cf. Aristotle, *Metaph.* Z 3, 1028<sup>b</sup>36–1029<sup>a</sup>2: *τὸ δ’ ὑποκείμενον ἐστὶ καθ’ οὗ τὰ ἄλλα λέγεται, ἐκείνο δὲ αὐτὸ μηκέτι κατ’ ἄλλου· διὸ πρῶτον περὶ τούτου διοριστέον· μάλιστα γὰρ δοκεῖ εἶναι οὐσία τὸ ὑποκείμενον πρῶτον*); the others are accidents either of the species or of the individual or of both. *De subiecto* are the accidents attributable to the species generally (*De subiecto dicitur genus semper ad species*, Boet., *op. cit.* i. 3, p. 58, 9–10), as ‘colour’ is predicated of black, white, etc. (*ibid.* 15–16), i.e. they are accidents of accidents (*ibid.* 14). *In subiecto* are those attributable to the individual (*ibid.* 11–12), as ‘running’, which cannot be predicated of a species, but only of the individual who runs (*ibid.* 19–21). *In subiecto et de subiecto* are those which are attributable both to the species and to the individual, which is in fact the case of all *de subiecto*; for colour can be attributed to the individual as well as to the species of colour which is an accident of the individual, and motion can be attributed to a moving individual as well as

to the species of motion (e.g. running) which is its accident (*ibid.* 23–28). Cf. *ibid.* ii. 3, p. 69, 5–14: Cum enim dico *mouetur*, uerbum quidem est et accidens, sed uniuersale. Motus enim plures species sunt, ut cursus sub motu ponitur. Ergo cursus si diffiniendus est motum de cursu praedicamus. Quocirca motus genus quoddam est cursus atque ideo motus de cursu ut de subiecto praedicabitur, cursus uero ipse, quoniam species alias non habet, in subiecto tantum est, id est in currente. Motus autem quamquam et ipse sit in subiecto, tamen de subiecto praedicatur.


110. It is impossible to reproduce in English the balance of the Latin since *numerus* here = the abstract quality of numerousness, not, as in the first part of the sentence, the individual.

111. E has assimilated *subiectum* and *de subiecto* on the one hand; and *in subiecto* and *in subiecto et de subiecto* on the other; thus reducing the four categories to two. Why they are not further reducible he explains in *Annot. in Marc.* 95, 18–35, where it is shown that whereas all *in subiecto* is *in subiecto et de subiecto*, not all *de subiecto* is *in subiecto*: DE SVBIECTO ET IN SVBIECTO EST UT DISCIPLINA . . . sicut enim homo praedicatur de omnibus hominibus, ita disciplina de rhetorica et de ceteris . . . in subiecto autem ideo dicitur disciplina quia per se sine aliqua substantia non potest esse. Disciplina enim in aliquo subiecto intelligitur, ut in Cicerone. Homo autem non potest esse in subiecto quia nulla substantia, id est prima, ut Cicero, uel secunda, ut homo, in aliquo possunt esse inseparabiliter. Atque in hoc discordat disciplina que est in [de Lutz: in *ex* de MS. Bodl. Auct. T II 19, f. 61<sup>r</sup>] subiecto et homo qui est de subiecto. Disciplina enim in aliquo intelligitur atque ideo in subiecto est. Homo autem, quamuis de subiecto, id est Cicerone, praedicatur, in subiecto tamen non potest esse. Concordat igitur quia homo de subiecto est et disciplina de subiecto. Discordat quia disciplina in subiecto est, id est in Cicerone, homo in nullo subiecto potest esse.

112. Cf. *Annot. in Marc.*, *loc. cit.*: Homo enim secundum naturam non est pater neque filius; accidit enim homini pater uel filius esse.

113. *solida* is abl., agreeing with *superficie*: cf. *in figuris et superficiebus*, line 23.

114. *sesqualteri sesquiterii sesquiquarti*: probably from Martianus Capella. Cf. *Annot. in Marc.* 18, 15–36: Si uero uoces sesqual[i]tera proportione, ut sunt tria ad duo, sibimet copulentur, mediam symphoniam, que diapente dicitur, reddunt. At si extremitate sua (suo *codd.*) cum sesquiteria pro-



(from G. Morin, *Revue bénédictine*, xxv. 17)

portione, ut sunt quattuor ad tria, sibi inuicem respondent, minima absque dubio consonantia quae diathessaron uocatur resonabit, et hoc est quod ait DVPLIS SESQUA(L)TERIS SESQVITERIIS (-vs *cod.*) . . . et ne qui(s) existimet (existimat *codd.*) nos contraria docere dicentes extremos sonos concentum, medios uero succentum, reddere, dum ipse Marcianus succentibus DVPLIS AC SESQUALTERIS NEC NON ET SESQVITERIIS dicat, in extremis quippe sonis, dupla seu sesquialtera seu sesquiteria proditur consonantia, ordinem uerborum intentus perspiciat, atque ita disponat octauis etiam succinentibus, id est tonus.

A diagram illustrating these proportions appears in the *Anonymus Cellotanus*, once thought to be by E, now attributed to Heriger of Lobbes, and is reproduced here.

115. lit. 'places'.

116. e.g. *Annot. in Marc.* 129, 6–7: A genere: si animal dicitur corpus anima participans, nomen animal igitur est homo quia sic potest diffiniri: Homo est animal, etc.

117. e.g. *id.* 8–9: A spetie: si homo dicitur animal, corpus anima participans nomen similiter animalis, omnes species ita diffiniuntur.

118. *Id.* 15–16: A nomine ut si consul est qui consulit.

119. *Id.* 103, 9–11: Nulla illatio reflexe (MS. Bodl.: reflexionis Lutz) modum efficit, nisi illa sola quae ex subiectiua prioris sumpti et declaratiua sequentis efficitur.

120. E could find material for these definitions in Cassiodorus, *Institutiones* ii, which was well known in his time under the separate title of *De artibus ac disciplinis liberalium artium*, of which it formed a kind of encyclopaedia; Martianus Capella, *De nuptiis Mercurii et Philologiae*, an allegory in which the Seven Arts play the role of bridesmaids at the wedding; and the *Etymologiae* of Isidore of Seville, of which the first three books are devoted to the seven liberal arts: i, Grammar; ii, Rhetoric and Dialectic; iii, Arithmetic, Geometry, Astronomy, and Music.

121. With the gloss on *periochis* cf. the passage quoted by J. Brummer (*Vitae Vergilianae* (Leipzig, 1912), 61–62) from the end of the first of four notices on Virgil (perhaps by Remigius; cf. Cappuyns, p. 74 n. 7) contained in MS. Wolfenbüttel, Gud. lat. F. 70: Set Iohannes Scottus has breuiter scripsit periochas dicens: quis, quid, cur, quomodo, quando, ubi, quibus facultatibus.

122. Professor Bieler suggests that *intemerata* may convey the idea of 'pure' mathematics.

123. Cf. p. 106, 22 sq. *supra*.

124. The restriction of the Liberal Arts to seven is most reasonably derived from the educational theory of classical times. Cicero, who first invented the phrase *artes liberales* = *artes libero dignae*, in *De Oratore* i. 8–12, mentions Grammar, Mathematics, Music, Rhetoric, and Philosophy; and later in the same work (i. 187; iii. 127) says that Mathematics comprises Geometry and Music. Since Music has been accounted for already, he may have intended Arithmetic; but this still does not provide the medieval list of the seven arts, as Gilson claims (E. Gilson, *La Philosophie au moyen âge* (Paris, 1947), 175). But the number of seven arts had been elaborated in the school of Nisibis (Josef Strzигowsky, *Origins of Christian Art*, Eng. tr., 14) and had become fixed in the West by the end of the fourth century (M. W. Laistner, *Thought and Letters in Western Europe*, ed. 2, p. 41). St. Augustine, whose *de Musica* is extant, records in the *Retractationes* (i. 6) that he had written a *De Grammatica* and intended to write a *De Dialectica*, *De Rhetorica*, *De Geometria*, *De Arithmetica*, *De Philosophia*. The theory of the Seven Liberal Arts was

established by the enormous popularity of Martianus Capella's work, which is E's principal source here. Martianus no doubt influenced both Cassiodorus and Isidore, and was thus the originator of the educational curriculum of the Middle Ages. The division into the Trivium and Quadrivium had already taken place in E's time, since Prudentius of Troyes thought that E was referring to it in *De praedestinatione* i (PL cxxii. 357c 4-5 with Floss's note). It was probably one of the Carolingian reforms in education (P. Rajna, 'Le denominazioni Triuim e Quadriuium', *Studi medievali*, N.S. i (1928), 4-36; Laistner, *loc. cit.*, n. 2).

125. Grammatically *coeuntia* agrees with *corpora*, but this is a confusion of thought: it is by the coming together of the elements that 'the proper and individual bodies' are formed, not by their own coming together.

126. i.e. its end, which consists in stability.

127. i.e. Bk. V.

128. E's source for the *Timaeus* is not known. He never quotes from Chalcidius' translation. In his gloss on Boeth., *De cons. philos.* iii met. 9, 13 he attributes the notion of the world as animal vaguely to 'philosophi'.

129. *ipse*, i.e. Plato, as is apparent if the inserted quotation from Virgil is ignored.

130. The name under which E knew the *de hominis opificio*. E. von Ivanka ('Die Quelle von Ciceros De natura deorum ii, 45-60', *Archivum philologicum* (1935), 1-12; 'Die Autorschaft der Homilien εἰς τὸ Πουήσωμεν ἄνθρωπον', *Byz. Zeitschr.*, 1936, 46 sq.) notes that this essentially Stoic cosmology is found in Cicero, *De nat. deor.*, and suggests a common source in Posidonius' *Περὶ θεῶν*.

131. The words *ac medium* are inserted under the influence of the picture E has just given of the earth at the still centre and the ether spinning around it, cf. *in medio* in the preceding line. He is now presenting St. Gregory's picture, in which the earth is a dead weight at the *bottom* of the universe. The interpolation of 'and outermost' in the second half of the sentence is as much for the sake of clarity as of balance. In the Epicurean doctrine, which may have influenced St. Gregory, the *centre* is also the place of heaviness: *Στράτων τε καὶ Ἐπικούρου πᾶν σῶμα βαρύτερα ἔχει νομίζοντες καὶ πρὸς τὸ μέσον φέρεσθαι, τῷ δὲ τὰ βαρύτερα ὑψίζάνειν τὰ ἥττον βαρέα ὑπ' ἐκείνων ἐκθλίβεσθαι βίᾳ πρὸς τὰ ἄνω, ὥστε εἴ τις ὑψείλε τὴν γῆν, ἐλθεῖν ἂν τὸ ὕδωρ εἰς τὸ κέντρον, καὶ εἴ τις τὸ ὕδωρ, τὸν ἀέρα, καὶ εἴ τις τὸν ἀέρα, τὸ πῦρ* (Simplicius, *In Arist. de caelo*, 267, 29 = Epicurus, fr. 52 W).

132. In the sense of the chorus of Greek drama, in which the members move but never change their mutual position.

133. i.e. incomposite.

134. *menica* is a Latinization of *μήνιγξ*. Cf. Galen, *Περὶ χρείας μορίων*, viii, 9 (iii. 659 Kühn) *ἔστι μὲν γὰρ αὐτοῦ καὶ ἡ παχεία μήνιγξ σκέπασμα: μᾶλλον δ' οὐχ ἀπλῶς σκέπασμα χρὴ καλεῖν αὐτήν, ἀλλ' οἷον ἀμνητήριον τι πρόβλημα ταῖς τοῦ κρανίου προσβολαῖς ἐγκείμενον· ἀλλ' ἡ μὲν λεπτή τι ξύμφυτον ἔστιν ὄντως αὐτοῦ σκέπασμα. . . ὥσπερ οὖν ὁ Πλάτων γῆς καὶ πυρός, ἐπειδὴ πόρρω ὄντως αὐτοῦ σκέπασμα. . . ὡς περὶ οὖν ὁ Πλάτων γῆς καὶ πυρός, ἐπειδὴ πόρρω καὶ γὰρ φαίην ἂν ἐγκεφάλου τε καὶ κρανίου, πόρρω ταῖς οὐσίαις διεστηκότων ἐν τῷ μεταξύ θείναι τὴν φύσιν ἀμφοτέρων τὰς μήνιγξας.* In the *Annot. in Marc.* E mentions three *membranulae*, one that is common to all animate creatures, rational and irrational (3, 29-32), one that is confined to human beings of both sexes, and one that is confined to the female. These are respectively the *menica*, the *fren* (*φρήν*), and the *hymen*. The first is described as *membranula cerebri ex qua diuurse fistulae quinquepertiti sensus profluunt* (3, 29-30) and

*membranula circa cerebrum ex quo cerebro omnes uoluptates et semina per poros, id est uenas, descendunt per totum corpus* (105, 24-26). The usual Latin form is *meninga*.

135. See note 131.

136. The argument is resumed from p. 128, 9.

137. If the reading of BP is correct at line 2, the distinction is between *punctum*, n., 'point', and *punctus*, m., 'dot', and *sensibilis* (line 5) probably would agree with *pars*. But I can find no evidence for *punctum* and *punctus* thus distinguished in meaning. The text therefore follows R, with *sensibilis* agreeing with *punctus*, the distinction being between *punctus* (*geometricus*) and *punctus sensibilis*. As in many cases, the enlargement does not have the same degree of composition as the text. The writer is thinking as he goes along, and when he introduces the example of the point he has not yet thought of contrasting it with the sensible point.

138. *enim* is here almost adversative, as is not rarely the case with *nam* in Late Latin. See Löfstedt, *Aetheria*, 34.

139. The sense requires that *eius* should be translated as *sui*.

140. The reference is to the sentence preceding the enlargement, i.e. that the art of definition is found only in the intellectual nature.

141. Although *igitur* is not impossible in the sentence as it stands, I suspect that, like the capital A of *Aliud* noted in the apparatus, it was not intended to retain it after the insertion of *atqui-est*.

142. Inferred from p. 132, 29-30, where mention is made of natures that can have intelligence of what is equal to themselves.

143. See notes 109 and 111.

144. Cf. Ps.-Dionys., *loc. cit.*: *ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ εἰς τρία διήρηνται τῷ κατ' αὐτοὺς ὑπερκοσμίῳ λόγῳ πάντες οἱ θεῖοι νόες, εἰς οὐσίαν καὶ δύναμιν καὶ ἐνέργειαν.* But the Ps.-Dionys. says nothing of their inseparability or of their non-susceptibility to increase or decrease. Julian held that it is only in God that the three are inseparable (M. de Gandillac *ad* Ps.-Dionys., *CH* xi. 2, p. 143 n. 2, *Sources chrét.* edition). For the triad in the Deity, but with Essence replaced by the Good, cf. *Corp. Herm.* xiv. 4 (ii. 223, 11-12 Nock): *θεὸν μὲν διὰ τὴν δύναμιν, ποιητὴν δὲ διὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν, πατέρα δὲ διὰ τὸ ἀγαθόν.*

The triad obviously derives from Aristotelian teaching on potency and act, and must have become a commonplace by the time of Porphyry, if the genuineness of the *De mysteriis* of Iamblichus be accepted (as by Roques, 'La Notion de hiérarchie selon le ps.-Denys', *Arch. d'hist. doctr. et litt. du moyen âge*, xvii (1949), 202 n. 3; Bidez, 'Le philosophe Jamblique et son école', *Rev. des études grecques*, xxxii (1919), 17; id., 'Proclus *περὶ τῆς ἱερατικῆς τέχνης*', *Mélanges Franz Cumont* (1936), 87, n. 2; 90 sq.), for in it Porphyry inquires how the Demon differs from the soul: *κατ' οὐσίαν . . . ἢ κατὰ δύναμιν ἢ κατ' ἐνέργειαν*, and no attempt is made to explain the expression. This is also the case with Ps.-Dionys., *DN* iv. 23, 724c 9-10, which seems to derive from Porphyry's question, and where it is asked, if demons corrupt, how and what do they corrupt: *οὐσίαν ἢ δύναμιν ἢ ἐνέργειαν*. It was only when John of Scythopolis came to annotate the Ps.-Dionys. that an explanation of this triad was felt necessary. Taking the example of fire he says that the *φύσις* of fire is its *οὐσία*, its capacity to illuminate is its *δύναμις*, and its *ἐνέργεια* is the effect of that capacity (*ἀποτέλεσμα*), i.e. the acts of illuminating and burning (PG iv. 93A 9-12). This is how E understands the terms at 490B below and elsewhere, as an example of a cause which has two effects, fire which causes both light and heat. Although the codex of the Ps.-Dionys. which he used was not furnished with these scholia, he seems to have known them.

145. The reference is to what preceded immediately in the unenlarged text.

146. The opening passage of this section is imitated by Heiric of Auxerre in his note on his metrical life of St. German (*Vit. Germ.* 437): In omni natura rationali intellectuali tria haec (*οὐσία, δύναμις, ἐνέργεια*) inseparabiliter semperque manentia considerantur. Horum exemplum: nulla natura, siue rationalis siue intellectualis, est quae ignorat se esse quamvis nesciat quid sit. Dum ergo dico, Intelligo me esse, nonne hoc uerbo quod est intelligo tria significo a se inseparabilia? Nam et me esse et posse et intelligere me esse demonstro. Non enim intelligerem si non essem neque intelligerem si uirtute intelligentiae carerem, nec illa uirtus in me silet sed in operationem intelligendi prorumpit.

147. The Cartesian *cogito ergo sum*, already found in St. Aug., e.g. in *De lib. arbitr.* and *Solil.*

148. As promised at p. 142, 38–39.

149. At lines 6–14 *supra*.

150. E probably took his definition of *ἐνθύμημα* as *conceptio mentis*, which also occurs in *Annot. in Marc.* and *De praed.*, from Boethius, less probably from Cassiodorus. It is also found in Philoxenus, MS. Paris, Bibl. Nat. lat. 7651, f. 103<sup>r</sup> marg.: entimima, mentis conceptio; and in the *Thesaurus linguae Graecae* of Henri d'Estienne, s.v.: ἐνθύμημα animi conceptus. The enthymeme is so defined because it is a syllogism of which part is suppressed because it is obvious or directly conceived by the mind without being expressed: Enthymema igitur quod latine interpretatur mentis conceptio quam imperfectum syllogismum solent artigraphi nuncupare (Cassiodorus, *Inst.* ii, PL lxx. 1165B): Enthymema ergo est syllogismus imperfectus (Boethius, *Posteriorum analyticorum Aristotelis interpretatio*, xxvii, PL lxiv. 711A).

But E always adds another definition unrelated to the first, namely, argument from contraries: ex his quae simul esse non possunt assumitur (123. 3): a contrario assumitur, hoc est per negationem negationis (*Annot. in Marc., loc. cit.*): Restant ea quae contrarietatis loco sumuntur, quibus tanta uis inest significandi ut . . . a Graecis entimemata dicantur, hoc est conceptiones mentis (*De praed.* ix. 3, 391B 1–4). P. G. Théry thought that E may have found this definition in the grammatical work of Macrobius of which the *Defloratio* in MS. Paris, Bibl. Nat. lat. 7186 has been attributed to him ('Scot Érigène, traducteur de Denys', *Bulletin du Cange*, vi (Paris, 1931), 215–17).

151. i.e. physical bodies and imaginary (geometrical) bodies. See p. 152, 8–30.

152. In R *gignunt* is marked with a *signe de renvoi* over an erasure, the purpose of which was perhaps to indicate that the latter part of the next enlargement should be inserted here (see note 156). But the sense is against this, and the *signe de renvoi* no longer corresponds to the one that is found there, though it may have done with the one erased at the end of the first part of that enlargement.

153. The work to which E refers, the *Categoriae decem*, is, among the Latin sources of *Periphyseon* i, second only to Martianus Capella. At the time of the Carolingian Renaissance it was generally held to be a Latin translation by St. Augustine of Aristotle's work, and is so described by Alcuin: *Categoriae Aristotelis ab Augustino de graeco in latinum mutatae* (Hauréau, *Histoire de la philosophie scolastique*, i (Paris, 1872), 95). It is not, however, a translation but a paraphrase, and from the way E writes of it he seems to have known this: ex libro quem de Kategoriis Aristotelis scripsit. Certainly Heiric did.

Transtulit ipse beatus Augustinus has *Categoriae*, non quidem uerbum e uerbo, sed sensum e sensu. Vnde ea quae ipse Aristoteles obscure dixerat iste ex suo manifestare studuit, ea uero quae nimis dilatauerat adbreuiare curauit. Ideo *Kategoriarum* potius *Expositiones* quam *Kategoriae* possunt dici. It is unusual to find Heiric knowing anything that E does not know, and E is almost certainly the source of his information here. The context of the quotation closely resembles E's own introduction to the *Categoriae* at p. 84, 17 ff. But it is not so clear how E himself knew it, since the *Cat. dec.* seems to have been his sole source for Aristotle's *Categoriae*.

The belief that the work was by St. Augustine endured much longer. The first doubt is expressed by an annotator of the fourteenth century in MS. Brussels, Bibl. roy. 49–62 (1117 v. d. Gheyn), f. 151<sup>v</sup>: Vtrum tamen hunc librum Augustinus fecerit uel alius ad aliquem suum filium non est bene certum; and the Maurists refuted the ascription at the end of the seventeenth century in their edition of St. Augustine (ed. Paris, i. 21–22; ed. Antwerp, i. 619–20). It was probably a product of the philosophical circle which centred about Themistius (320–390) in Rome in the fourth century. Themistius paraphrased, and commented on, the *Prior Analytics*, and these paraphrases were translated by Vettius Agorius Praetextatus (Boeth., *Comm. in libr. Aristot. De interpretatione*, ii. 3, 7–4, 3 Meiser). The *Cat. dec.* may similarly have been a translation of a Themistian paraphrase made by another member of the same circle (not Praetextatus, who is mentioned in the text), perhaps one of the Albinus, whose name could have been corrupted into 'Augustinus' by an error similar to that which caused the *De dialectica* of Alcuin ('Albinus') to be ascribed to St. Augustine in the Florentine edition of 1489 and the Venetian of 1500.

The *Cat. dec.* has recently been edited by L. Minio-Paluello (*Aristoteles Latinus* I. 1–5 *Categoriae uel Praedicamenta* (Bruges–Paris, 1961), pp. 129–75), to whom I am indebted for the substance of this note. See further Minio-Paluello, *op. cit.*, Praef., lxxvii–xcvi; id., *Class. Quart.* xxxix. 63–74.

154. i.e. surface. Cf. gloss, *ad loc.*; Arist., *Cat.* 5<sup>a</sup>2.

155. The bracketed portion of the marginalia (lines 13–17) cannot be an enlargement of the text, for the words immediately preceding it, which it appears to comment, are not part of the quotation. *Magister* (line 14), as the words stand, could only refer to E himself or his Nutritor. If to the former, we should have to abandon the opinion that hand C, in which the bracketed words are written (but not the remainder of these marginalia), is either E's autograph or that of a scribe who writes directly under his supervision; if to the latter, who is supposed to be speaking them? Professor Bieler suggests that the bracketed passage was intended to be an alternative comment to that which immediately follows the quotation (lines 8–13); but we are then faced with the task of explaining the fact that the bracketed portion explicitly quotes from the preceding comment (Cum uidetur–disputare 14–15 = 5), and of answering the question, Who is the subject of *inquit* (line 14)? If the subject is *Augustinus*, as would follow from Professor Bieler's suggestion, the whole sentence Cum uidetur–dicere (14–17) would have to be regarded as a rough paraphrase of part of the Augustine quotation, perhaps of non ita–uideamur (6–8). But in that case we should have expected instead of *inquit* some such phrase as *ac si dixisset*. The problem remains unsolved.

156. In R *consideramus* was marked by a *signe de renvoi* which has been erased. It probably corresponded with that which precedes *in nullaque* which continues the enlargement at the foot of the previous page; and was erased

in the belief that these words were to follow *gignunt* (150, 26). See note 152.

157. See note 151.

158. *formus* is in fact pre-classical.

159. A correct etymology. Cf. Lewis and Short.

160. *hoc* refers back to the words preceding the enlargement, the insertion of which has broken the continuity. The attempt to repair it by the addition of *luceque coloris* is not happy.

161. Quantity and quality in *οὐσία*. E is following *Cat. dec.* lii. 144, 22–23 Minio-Paluello: *Qualitas quantitas et iacere in ipsa usia sunt*. Cf. Ps.-Eriug., *In Boeth. op. sacr.* 41, 19–21 Rand: *Legimus in Categoriis (= Cat. dec.) quia quaedam accidentia in ipsa usia, alia extra et infra sunt. Sed qualitas et quantitas semper intra usiam sunt et nunquam extra.*

162. Referring to the sentence before the enlargement.

163. The two kinds of body, then, are composed as follows: Geometrical Body = Form (figure) + Quantity (the measures of lines and surfaces); Natural Body = *οὐσία* + Form (qualitative) + Quantity (material).

164. Cf. Eriug., *Comm. in Boeth. Cons. Philos.* iii met. 9, MS. Brussels, Bibl. roy. 10066–77, f. 158<sup>ra</sup>, *ad init.*: *Ver enim calidum et humidum sicut aer, estas calida et sicca sicut ignis, autumnus siccus et frigidus sicut terra, hiemps frigida et humida sicut aqua.*

165. The former pair minister to the vegetative soul, the latter to the sensitive. The rational soul, being independent of matter, does not require the ministrations of the elements.

166. Furnace: lit. 'workshop', such as a smithy, where fire is used in manufacture and air required to fan the flame. At 530B 10 and D 5 E uses the same word, *officina*, to translate the Greek *ἐργαστήριον*, applied to human nature itself, as being a kind of crucible or mixing-bowl in which all the natural materials are fused together.

167. The classification of the elements into active and passive is common to the Peripatetics and the Stoics: cf. Aristotle, *De gen. et corr.* ii. 1, 329<sup>a</sup>32–<sup>b</sup>3; Ocellus, *Περὶ τοῦ παντὸς φύσεως*, ii. 5, 23 Harder (probably using a younger peripatetic commentator on *De gen. et corr.*; see Diels, *Dox.* 188; R. Harder, *Ocellus Lucanus* (Berlin, 1926), 97 sq.): *τῶν δὲ τεσσάρων τὸ μὲν θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρὸν ὡς αἴτια καὶ ποιητικά, τὸ δὲ ξηρὸν καὶ ὑγρὸν ὡς ὕλη καὶ παθητικά.* The Stoic doctrine is quoted by Nemesius, *De nat. hom.* v. 126: *τῶν στοιχείων τὰ μὲν εἶναι δραστηκὰ, τὰ δὲ παθητικά: δραστηκὰ μὲν ἀέρα καὶ πῦρ, παθητικά δὲ γῆν καὶ ὕδωρ.*

168. i.e. of the four elements. See p. 158, 1.

169. See Dräseke, 'J. S. E. u. s. Gewährsmänner', *Stud. z. Gesch. d. Theol. u. d. Kirche*, ix (1902), 12 sq.

170. Lit.: 'and flourish by reason of their immutable substance.' *immutabilis substantiae* is the reading of MSS. Bamb. HJ iv 13 (s. xi), Munich 14601 (s. xii, probably a copy of the preceding) and 6405 (s. xi). Friedlein, however, in his edition prints *immutabili substantiae*.

171. Not a quotation from the *Timaeus*, but a précis of Plato's theory that there is an indeterminate something in which becoming takes place (*ἐκείνω ἐν ᾧ γίγνεται*, 50C), a sort of receptacle of generation (*πάσης γενέσεως ὑποδοχή*, 49A), a matrix which underlies all things (*ἐκμαγεῖον γὰρ φύσει παντὶ κέεται* 50C), in fact a *causa informis* (cf. 500A). The term 'matter' is, of course, not Platonic but Aristotelian: cf. Arist., *Phys.* 193<sup>a</sup>29–30 ἡ πρώτη ἐκάστῳ ὑποκειμένη ὕλη τῶν ἐχόντων ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀρχὴν κινήσεως καὶ μεταβολῆς. But Chalcidius, by translating *χώρα* in the *Timaeus* by *silua*, made it easy for

the medieval philosophers to apply Aristotle's term to the corresponding Platonic notion.

172. *κόσμος*, *κάλλος*, and *εἶδος* in the original.

173. The omission by sR of everything between *participatio* (line 25) and the *-ne* of *participatione* (line 26) must be due to his eye's running on from the one word to the other; further evidence that he was copying from another text.

174. i.e. that shadow is not destroyed when it vanishes.

175. See note 21.

176. *fertur* = *φαίνεται*.

177. *inuenimus* = *εὕρησομεν*, 'we shall find'.

178. *nulla ratione* = *οὐδαμοῦ*, 'nowhere'.

179. *materialium* represents the Greek *ὕλικήν*. The correct translation would be 'a material constitution'.

180. St. Gregory wrote 'by abstraction', *δι' ἀφαίρεσιν*.

181. *ὁ τῆς ποιᾶς κατὰ τὴν ἀφῆν ιδιότητος*.

182. 'For in each-with another quality.' This seems to be what E means, but his translation is so faulty that it is impossible to be sure. The Greek is *ἐκάστου γὰρ τούτων ἴδιος καθ' ὃ (quam!) ἐστὶν ὁ ἐρμηνευτικὸς ὄρος (interpretat(iu)a . . . causa) ἐπινοεῖται, οὐδὲν (nullaque!) ἐπικοινωνῶν ἄλλη τινὲ τῶν περὶ τὸ ὑποκείμενον θεωρουμένων ποιότητι*: 'The term which in the case of each of these defines it as to what it is is understood to be special to each, and does not communicate in anything with any other quality of those things which are considered about the subject.'

183. *soliditas* = *ἀντιτυπία* 'resistance to bodies'. Cf. Plot., *Enn.* ii. 6, 2, 12.

184. *simul soluetur* = *συνδιαλύεται*.

185. The Greek is *χρῶμα*, which E must have read as *χρήμα*.

186. *has intellectuales occasiones* = *τὰς νοερὰς ταύτας ἀφορμάς*.

187. *ab intellectuali . . . natura . . . substituente* = *τῆς . . . νοητῆς φύσεως . . . ὑφιστώσεως*, a genitive absolute which E takes for an ablative of the agent; *ab* therefore is redundant.

188. *quidem . . . uero* = *μὲν . . . δέ*.

189. i.e. of the incorporeal and corporeal.

190. *ac* co-ordinates this sentence with that which precedes the enlargement.

191. The long discussion on Place, which began at p. 96, 23, ends here.

192. *at* refers to the sentence before the enlargement.

193. i.e. potency and act. See note 144.

194. The accretions in P are the effect of *et essentiae et uirtutis* in lines 17–18 here.

195. For Reason and Authority see p. 164, 29–31.

196. An expression which E learnt from the Ps.-Dionys.: *ἱερά λόγια*, of Hermetic origin, but already in use among Christians by the time of Eusebius; cf. *PE* iv. 21. In the language of the fourth century, these 'Oracles' constitute *theologia* in the sense of instruction given by God to man rather than, and prior to, man's reasoning about God—i.e. the Scriptures and the Unwritten Tradition (C. Pera, 'Denys le Mystique et la *θεομαχία*', *Rev. des sciences philol. et théol.* xxv (1936), 12). See next note.

197. *theologi* in the sense of *theologia* given in the previous note. In Ps.-Dionys. the *theologi* (translated by de Gandillac 'les porte-parole de Dieu') are the men who, inspired by God, transmit their teaching through the Scriptures, i.e. the writers of the books of the Bible, especially of the Old Testament (Pera, 'I teologi e la *teologia* nello sviluppo del pensiero cristiano dal iii al iv secolo', *Angelicum*, xix (Jan. 1942), 397). This sense also goes back

to the fourth century: (αἱ Γραφαὶ) διὰ θεολόγων ἀνδρῶν παρὰ θεοῦ ἐλαλήθησαν καὶ ἐγράφησαν (St. Athanas., *Orat. de incarnat.* 56, PG xxv. 196A 8–9). Eusebius speaks of οἱ πάντες Ἑβραίων θεολόγοι (PE vii. 15), and calls Moses 'the great, the marvellous theologian' (*ibid.* vii. 7 and 11).

198. *uniuersaliter* = καθόλου.

199. The Greek has 'superessential and hidden (καὶ κρυφίας) Divinity'. E restores the omitted epithet when he refers to this passage below.

200. 'For the superessential-applied': the Greek is: τῆς γὰρ ὑπὲρ λόγον καὶ νοῦν καὶ οὐσίαν αὐτῆς ὑπερουσιότητος ἀγνωσία, αὐτῇ τὴν ὑπερούσιον ἐπιστήμην ἀναθετόν: 'For of the same Superessentiality beyond reason and intellect and essence (there can be only) not-knowing. To it the superessential science must be applied.' ἀγνωσία was omitted from the Greek text used by E, who himself ignores in his translation αὐτῇ. In the resulting telescoped sentence the genitive *ipsius* . . . *superessentialitatis* can only have the function of depending on *referenda* in the place of the missing αὐτῇ, though how E justified the case we cannot know.

201. 'applied-divine things.' The Greek is πρὸς τὰς ὑπερέτερας αὐγὰς τῇ περὶ τὰ θεῖα σωφροσύνη καὶ ὁσιότητι συστέλλομένους: 'gathering ourselves together towards the higher rays by prudence and sanctity in relation to divine things.' *συστέλλομένους*, masculine and standing in a subjective relation to ἀναθετόν, becomes the feminine *coartatas* agreeing with *claritates*. The mistake is repeated at lines 8–10, where the Ps.-Dionys. is praised for a description of the Scriptures which he never gave.

202. 'fixing-inspires them': τοσοῦτον ἐπὶ τὸ ἀναντες ἀνανεύοντας ὅσον ἑαυτὴν ἐνδίδωσιν ἢ τῶν θεαρχικῶν λογίων ἀκτίς. ἀνανεύοντας is in apposition to *συστέλλομένους*, agreeing with ἡμᾶς. The effect of changing the function of *coartatas* is to destroy the syntax of this part of the sentence. The rearrangement of the phrases is in accordance with the method E has told us he would adopt, but it cannot be said that it has achieved its purpose.

203. See note 199.

204. See note 201.

205. *inuisibilia* = τὰ ἀνόητα. See note 212.

206. *similitudine carentia* = ἀτύπωτα, 'unshaped'.

207. *intacta* = ἀναφής, 'impalpable'.

208. *magnitudo* = ἀπειρία, which E found in his text. Migne has ἀοριστία.

209. καὶ τῶν νοῶν ἢ ὑπὲρ νοῦν ἐνότης.

210. καὶ πάσαις διανοίαις ἀδιανόητόν ἐστι τὸ ὑπὲρ διάνοιαν εἶναι: 'and the One beyond reason is inaccessible to reason for all reasons.' (For *διανοίαις* see note 46.) E does not translate εἶναι because it was erased in his text, and reads *διανοίαις ἀδιανόητον* as *δυνάμεσι ἀδύνατον*.

211. ἀρρήτόν τε λόγῳ παντὶ τὸ ὑπὲρ λόγον ἀγαθόν: 'and the Good that is beyond speech is incapable of being spoken by any speech.'

212. *inuisibilis* = ἀνόητος. See note 205.

213. *arcantum* = ἀρρήτος, 'unutterable'.

214. *irrationabilitas* = ἀλογία, 'wordlessness'.

215. *inuisibilitas* = ἀνοησία. See notes 205, 212.

216. ὡς πάσης οὐσίας ἐπέκεινα.

217. καὶ ὡς ἂν αὐτῇ περὶ ἑαυτῆς κυρίως καὶ ἐπιστητῶς ἀποφαίνοντο.

218. The Greek adds ἐκ τῶν ἱερῶν λόγων.

219. *Corroborato mentis itinere*: cf. Cic., *Acad.* ii. 10, 31: *mens hominis usque eo philosophiam ipsam corroborat ut uirtutem efficiat.*

220. The correction suggests that when the original text was written, the work was not planned in detail.

221. *fidei* gen. dependent upon *doctrinae*.

222. lit.: 'to correct religiously and piously.'

223. Gale's conjecture seems to be the only possibility. Professor Bieler, comparing *uel credant uel aestiment* (194, 8–9) with *siue . . . credant siue disputent* (188, 21–22), and *praedicari examinent* (194, 10 *codd.*) with *dici aestimans* (194, 26), suggests that in this passage (line 10) also *aestiment* might be the genuine reading.

224. The insertion *siue essentialium* appears superfluous. In any case, it should precede *siue substantiarum* as in the sentences which follow.

225. 'spherical': either the motion of a sphere rotating about itself, or the motions of the concentric spheres conceived as a single motion. E probably took the expression from Macrobius; cf. *In somn. Scip.* ii. 14, 31.

226. St. Augustine (following Plotinus) replies to those who ask what God was doing before He made the world: *Videant itaque nullum tempus esse posse sine creatura et desinant istam uanitatem loqui* (*Conf.* xi. 30).

227. Authority is born *in* time and is therefore temporal; reason is born *with* time and is therefore non-temporal, like nature and time itself.

228. Hauréau (*Hist. phil. scol.* i. 153) compares the words of another Irishman, St. Columbanus, in his challenge to the Pope: 'Your power will last as long as your reason is sound' (*Epist.* v. 11).

229. *deus* = τὸ θεῖον, as in the better MSS. Migne has τὸ θεῶν.

230. 'but everything—some cause': in the Greek this all forms part of the protasis *πάν δὲ τὸ ἐκ μὴ ὄντων τὸ εἶναι λαβὸν καὶ κινήτόν, ὡς πρὸς τινα πάντως φερόμενον αἰτίαν*: 'but everything which takes its being from the things that are not, and is in motion, as being wholly carried along towards some cause . . .'. E ends the quotation in the middle of the sentence.

231. *merito* = ὡς. Cf. 202, 2 and notes 234, 244.

232. i.e. that of Evagrius. See J. Muyldermans, *Euagriaana Syriaca* (Louvain 1952), p. 34.

233. *non efficeretur* = ἀνεέργητον.

234. *iure* = ὡς. Cf. note 231.

235. *manens* = μόνον. E must have read μένον.

236. οὐ γὰρ πάσχειν πέφυκε (*naturaliter inest*) καθόλου τὸ ἀπαθές, 'for impassivity is wholly not-suffering'.

237. The Greek is τὸ μητ' ἐρᾶν ἄλλον, 'by the fact that it does not love another'.

238. *per amorem* = κατ' ἔφεσιν.

239. ὡς μὴ ὄντα αὐτοκίνησις ἢ αὐτοδύναμις: 'since they are not movement-in-itself or power-in-itself.'

240. *omnino etiam mouentur* = καὶ κινεῖται πάντως.

241. *secundum cognitionem* = κατὰ γνώμην, 'according to their will'.

242. *ipsum* translates the definite article.

243. ὁ καὶ τοῦ εἶναι δοτήρ καὶ τοῦ εἶναι ἐξ εἶναι χαριστικός.

244. *iure* = ὡς. Cf. notes 231, 234.

245. *quoquo modo moueri* = τὸ πῶς κινεῖσθαι.

246. *intellectuale* = τὸ νοερόν.

247. *intelligit* = νοεῖ, 'functions as a νοερόν'.

248. ἐπιτείνει πάντως τὸ σφόδρον τῆς κινήσεως.

249. ὡς μηδ' ὅλως λοιπὸν βούλεσθαι ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ αὐτὸ ἐκεῖνο ὅλον γνωρίζεσθαι δύνασθαι τὸ περιγραφόμενον ἄλλ' ἐκ τοῦ περιγράφοντος.

250. *liquefactum* = πεπυρακτωμένος, lit. 'inflamed'.

251. P's *a* is necessary.

252. 'The Amatory Hymns of the most holy Hierotheos' are quoted in the

DN of the Ps.-Dionys., who represents Hierotheos as his Master. If the latter was a real person (see Sheldon-Williams, 'The Ps.-Dionysius and the Holy Hierotheos', *Studia patristica* viii (Texte und Untersuchungen 93 (1966), pp. 108-17), and therefore these are really quotations, and not compositions of the Ps.-Dionys. himself, they are probably translated from the Syriac, since the Greek version is in prose.

253. *naturalem* = φυσικόν, physical.  
 254. *continuatium* = συγκρατικὴν, 'holding all things together'.  
 255. *aequiformia* = ὁμόστοιχα, 'of equal rank'.  
 256. εἰς κοινωνικὴν ἀλληλουχίαν.  
 257. ἐπ' ἐσχάτων ὑφειμένα.  
 258. ἀναλαβόντες, not translated by E.  
 259. According to Pachymer, the two are τὰς νοητάς and τὰς νοεράς, i.e. *amor angelicus* and *amor intellectualis*; see p. 210, 32.  
 260. *eum* (which yields no sense) = αὐτῶν read by E as αὐτόν.  
 261. *ex omnium summitate* = ἐκ τοῦ πάντων ἐπέκεινα, 'from that which is beyond all things'.  
 262. *immensurabilis* = ἄσχετος, 'which cannot be participated in'.  
 263. According to Pachymer, this refers to the two hierarchies referred to above, i.e. this is the second stage of the *adunatio*: the Many having been reduced to the Dyad, the Dyad is now brought back to the Monad.  
 264. ἀπλή δύναμις ἢ αὐτοκινητική. E does not translate ἢ, indistinguishable in his Greek exemplar from the definite article.  
 265. *ex optimo* = ἐκ τὰγαθοῦ. *Optimus* is E's usual translation for ἀγαθός.  
 266. *ad se ipsam* = ἐφ' ἑαυτῆς.  
 267. *Quare* = τί . . . βουλόμενοι.  
 268. By writing *aliquando uero* for καί E obscures what he must have known to be the sense. Probably a slip. Read 'Love and Desire', i.e. Eros and Agape.  
 269. ἐραστὸν καὶ ἀγαπητόν.  
 270. Perhaps *per se ipsam uisio* should be read, 'God is Love-in-itself, Vision-in-itself, Motion-in-itself'.  
 271. The reading of RP\* is preferable. *ut possit* does not yield sense.  
 272. E's text read ἀπολειπόμενον δὲ καὶ περὶ τῆς στάσεως ἦτοι καθέδρας φαμέν, omitting the interrogative τί before δέ. Since E's text had no punctuation marks, this made it difficult for E to see that ἀπολειπόμενον (*recte ἀπολιμπανόμενον*), with which he begins his quotation, really belongs to the preceding sentence.  
 273. *unimode* = μονίμως, which E connected with μόνος.  
 274. *naturali immutabilitate* = ταυτότητι, 'self-identity'.  
 275. ἀραρότως ὑπεριδρῶσθαι. Both Hilduin and E omit the adverb in their translations.  
 276. *aedificationis* = ἔδρας. Cf. *sede* (καθέδρας) above.  
 277. *diuinitus* = θεοπρεπῶς, 'in a manner worthy of God'.  
 278. *delationem* = φοράν, 'complete change of place, and especially the inability to stand by oneself when one wishes' ('Maximus' = Jn. Scythop., *Schol.*, PG iv. 381B).  
 279. *alienationem* = ἀλλοίωσιν. 'It occurs when the subject remains unchanged but changes its accidents' (*ibid.*).  
 280. *alternationem* = ἑτεροίωσιν, 'change of the subject into something unlike itself' (*ibid.* 381C).  
 281. *conuersionem* = τροπήν.  
 282. *rectum* = εὐθείαν. But the text used by Hilduin and E has θείαν, translated by the former *diuinam*. This must have been E's own correction.

The other suggestion made by Théry (*ad loc.*) that this was one of the corrections which the *Versio* underwent would mean either that these corrections were made, and made known to E, before *Periphyseon* i was written, or that R represents a recension of Bk. I in which these corrections were introduced from the corrected *Versio*. Neither hypothesis seems likely.

283. *immensurabili circumstantia* = ἀσχετῶ περιουσίᾳ. See note 262.  
 284. ταῖς ἐπὶ τὰ ὄντα πάντα προνοητικαῖς προόδοις καὶ ἐνεργείαις.  
 285. *diuinitus* = θεοπρεπῶς.  
 286. ἑλικοειδές, the combination of straight and circular referred to above, for a spiral motion is circular, but yet progresses in a straight direction. I translate 'helicoideal' rather than 'spiral' since it is apparent that E did not know what it meant. Hermias and Proclus, both of the fifth century, speak of the helicoideal movement as an intermediary between the circular, which is the perfect movement, and the straight, which is subordinate to it. Hermias (*In Plat. Phaedr. schol.* v. 20, 27-21, 4 Couvreur) says that Nous has three motions: τὴν μὲν κυκλικὴν ὅτε πρὸς ἑαυτὸν καθ' ἑαυτὸν ἐπιστρέφεται . . . ἑλικοειδῆ δὲ ὅτε τῇ διανοίᾳ ἐφίησι καὶ ταύτην ἀνάγει πρὸς τὴν ἀληθῆ ἕξιν . . . κατ' εὐθὺ δὲ ὅτε συνάγει καὶ τὴν δόξαν οὐ πρὸς ἐκείνην ἀλλὰ περὶ τὰ ἐκείνης ἀναστρεφόμενος, i.e. the three movements are equated with intellect, reason, and sense. For Proclus 'the figure of the helix is no empty symbol, but fills the middle place between bodies that move in a straight line and those that are carried round in a circle' (*In Tim.* iii. 80 Diels). He allots the circular movement to the fixed stars, the helicoideal to the planets (*σύμμιξις ἔχουσα περιφερείας τε καὶ εὐθείας*), the straight to the world of becoming. Elsewhere (*Plat. theol.* vi. 8-9; in *Remp.* 70 Schöll) he relates the straight and the helicoideal respectively to the πρόοδος and the ἐπιστροφή, the universal outgoing from, and return to, the One, the *proudis processionibus et operationibus* mentioned above (see note 284). Doubtless the circular motion is to be related in the same way to the μονή, the eternal abiding of the One within itself.

The Ps.-Dionys., like Hermias, applies the three motions to *Nous*, but for him the *νός* are the angels, whose circular motion consists in 'the uniting of themselves with the illuminations of the Beautiful and the Good which are without beginning and without end', while their rectilinear motion is the πρόοδος by which 'they advance processively to exercise their providence on the orders below them', and the helicoideal is the complex movement by which, 'at the same time as they exercise their providence on the orders below them, they still abide indivisibly in their likeness to themselves and cease not to form a chorus' (see note 132) 'about the Beautiful and the Good, Who is the Cause of their self-likeness' (*DN* iv. 8, 704D 1-705A 2). This is the Thearchy, which contains the three motions κατ' αἰτίαν, as is clear from the present passage: the circular in the 'identity and envelopment of the intermediaries and the extremes, which at the same time contain and are contained, and also the return to God of all that proceeded from Him'; the helicoideal in 'His immobile procession and fertile immobility'; the rectilinear in 'the undeviating procession' which gives birth to all.

The Ps.-Dionys. may have been contemporary with Hermias and Proclus, and there is no need to suppose direct dependence on either. Proclus, in the passage quoted, implies that the doctrine is already known (*ὡς εἴρηται*), and it is characteristic of Neoplatonism to interpose between the contraries circular and rectilinear an intermediary which should partake of the nature of both.

287. *statheralis* = σταθεράν, correctly translated by Hilduin *stabilem*.  
 288. τὴν σταθεράν πρόοδον καὶ τὴν γόνιμον στάσιν. See note 286 *ad fin.* It is apparent from the glosses that E misunderstood both epithets. The glossator

(? E) who wrote *id est ponderalis* in B evidently connected *σταθεράν* with *statera*.

289. *id ipsum* = τὸ ταυτόν, 'His self-identity'.

290. Professor Bieler suggests that the singular *continens* may indicate that E read *περιέχον τε καὶ* for *περιέχοντα καί*. Hilduin has *circumtenet* (sic) *et circumtenta*; but Thérèse does not note a variant here, as is his normal custom.

## ADDENDUM TO NOTES 272-275

*Id ipsum*: In his translations from the Greek Eriugena uses this expression to represent both τὸ αὐτό ('the same') and αὐτὸ τό οὐ τὸ . . . αὐτό ('the [thing] itself'). In this edition it is normally printed as one word in the former case, and as two separate words in the latter. In the first sentence of the quotation from the *DN* on p. 218, however, it is twice printed as separate words (lines 21, 23) although in the former instance it is translated 'the same'. E's translations is at fault here, not the Greek text, as can be clearly seen when Eriugena's word-for-word translation is aligned with the original:

Ἀπολειπόμενον δὲ καὶ περὶ τῆς θείας στάσεως ἦτοι καθέδρας φαμέν. Τί δὲ  
Reliquum autem et de diuino statu siue sede dicamus. Quid autem  
ἄλλο γε παρὰ τὸ μένευ αὐτὸν ἐν ἑαυτῷ τὸν θεὸν καὶ ἐν ἀκινήτῳ ταυτό-  
aliud praeter manere ipsum in se ipso deum et <in> immobili naturali-  
τητι μονίμως πεπηγέναι καὶ ἀραρότως υπεριδρῶσθαι καὶ τὸ κατὰ  
immutabilitate unimode fixum esse et supercollocari, et secundum  
τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ὡσαύτως ἐνεργεῖν καὶ κατὰ τὸ ἀμετάστατον  
eadem et circa *id ipsum* et similiter operari, et secundum stabilissimum  
αὐτὸν ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ πάντως ὑπάρχειν καὶ κατὰ τὸ ἀμετάστατον αὐτὸ  
ipsum ex se ipso omni modo subsistere, et secundum *id ipsum* intransmuta-  
καὶ ὀλικῶς ἀκίνητον καὶ ταῦτα ὑπερουσίως;  
bilem et uniuersaliter immutabilem, et haec superessentialiter?

In the first case, by translating τὸ αὐτό differently from the τὰ αὐτὰ which immediately precedes it Eriugena shows that he understood it to mean something different, that is, something other than 'the same.' He was probably right, for τὸ αὐτό here seems to mean 'sameness itself' (τὸ αὐτὸ (αὐτό)) as τὸ ἀμετάστατον αὐτό below means 'irremovability itself'. In the second case, although he has, for once, abandoned the order of the Greek, *ipsum* is still to be taken with *intransmutabilem*, and is therefore masculine, which he thought ἀμετάστατον to be. What meaning he intends to convey by his Latin is not clear, but the Greek he was trying to translate means 'and with regard to irremovability itself'. He has created difficulties for himself by translating the previous ἀμετάστατον (which *is* masculine) by *stabilissimum* thus not only making *ex se ipso* unintelligible but also obscuring the connexion between the two phrases. Consequently it is impossible to get out of the Latin what the Ps.-Dionysius meant to say: that the Divine Stasis means that God is irremovable from Himself, but that He Himself *is* that very Irremovability, and not only identical with Himself but that very Self-identity. (I. P. Sh.-W.)

E's translation of the last phrase but one, *secundum id ipsum intransmutabilem et uniuersaliter immutabilem* makes such poor sense that I hesitate to believe that this is what he wrote. I wonder whether the masculine accusatives *intransmutabilem* and *immutabilem* (instead of the correct neuter forms) are errors of the archetype which passed unnoticed by the author. E. would hardly have misunderstood τὸ ἀμετάστατον αὐτό, in spite of the difficulty which he had created for himself by translating the first ἀμετάστατον as *stabilissimum*. (L. B.)

## APPENDIX

## Enlargements, Glosses, and Interpolations in R, B, P

Words and Phrases in italics are catchwords from the earlier state of the text to indicate the position of the enlargement. Unless otherwise stated, enlargements to R are incorporated in B, and those to B in P. Scribal insertions of omissions are disregarded

	R (Periphyseon II)	B (Periphyseon III)	P
441A			<i>nihil enim</i> in uniuerso <i>cogitationibus</i>
443A	<i>ut diximus</i> diuisione in		<i>non solum</i> omnem <i>sen-</i> <i>suum</i> <i>in solo deo</i> materiaque
B			
	<i>c est</i> diuisionis <i>eorum</i>		
		<i>C non uideo</i> nisi forte quis dixerit rerum quae sunt absen- tias et priuationes non omnino nihil esse sed earum quarum priuationes seu absentiae seu oppositiones sunt mirabili qua- dam naturali uirtute contineri ut quodam modo sint.	
444A	<i>rationalis</i> irrationalisque creaturae		
	A <i>rationabilis</i> irrationabilis- que <i>animae partem</i> nutritiuam dico et auctiuam quae pars animae ultima quoniam corpus nutrit et auget.	<i>ultima est</i>	<i>pars generalis animae</i>
	A <i>nouissimo</i> quie st cor- porum et in quo omnis diuisio terminatur		
	A/B <i>superioris est affirmatio</i> eodemque modo superioris af- firmatio inferioris est negatio. negatio uero superioris erit af- firmatio inferioris		
B		(Gloss on <i>Affirmatio</i> <i>enim</i> glosa Notandum quod non de homine ante peccatum hoc dictum sit)	<i>Affirmatio enim ho-</i> <i>minis</i> mortalis adhuc dico
	B <i>Affirmatio est angeli</i> et uicissim	(Gloss. Exempla sunt haec: affirmatio ho-	<i>et uicissim.</i> si enim homo est animal ratio-