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SCOTTI ERIVGENAE

PERIPHYSEON

(De Diuisione Naturae)

LIBER TERTIVS

EDITED BY

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FOREWORD

WHEN Dr. Sheldon-Williams died on 10 October 1973 he left among his papers an edition (with translation) of Book III of the *Periphyseon* in an advanced state of preparation: this now appears with the same title-page as the previous volumes of the *Periphyseon* in the *Scriptores Latini Hiberniae* series. My responsibility was confined to seeing this volume through the Press—a task made possible for me by a Fellowship from the Trustees for Harvard University at the Dumbarton Oaks Research Library and Collection, Georgetown, Washington, D.C., which I gratefully acknowledge. It is intended that Books IV and V of this edition will be published in due course.

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CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION TO BOOK III

- | | |
|-------------------------|----|
| 1. The Manuscripts | 1 |
| 2. The Argument | 2 |
| 3. Analysis of Book III | 3 |
| 4. Bibliography | 23 |
| 5. Sigla | 23 |
| 6. Acknowledgements | 24 |

TEXT AND TRANSLATION 26

NOTES ON TEXT AND TRANSLATION 308

INTRODUCTION TO BOOK III

I. THE MANUSCRIPTS

As stated in the Introduction to Book I,¹ this edition attempts to present the text with which Eriugena finally came to be satisfied, and at the same time to indicate the stages of its development. Consequently, as in the case of the first two books, the present text is based on the three MSS, contemporary with the author and in two cases showing signs of having undergone his personal supervision, which supply evidence for three of these stages of development, which I have called *Periphyseon A*, *Periphyseon B*, and *Periphyseon C*.² These three MSS are Rheims 875 (R) which was originally an exemplar of *Periphyseon A* but which, by marginal additions some of which at least were in the author's hand, in its final stage became the archetype (presumably) of *Periphyseon B*; Bamberg Ph 2/1 (B) in which these marginalia are incorporated into the text and which therefore was originally an exemplar of *Periphyseon B*, but which by a further series of marginal additions of the same type became the presumed archetype of *Periphyseon C*; and finally *Paris Bibl. Nat. lat.* 12964 (P) in which this second series of marginalia as well as the first is incorporated into the text, and which therefore is an exemplar of *Periphyseon C*.

Again as in the first two books the three recensions will be, as far as possible, distinguished by typographical devices. But since R is defective for this book, having lost its twenty-seventh gathering,³ there is for the parts of the text which this gathering contained, pp. 176, 4-178, 17; 178, 31-202, 5, no contemporary evidence for *Periphyseon A*; for this is preserved only in R, and the contents of this recension for this part of the text have to be deduced from later MSS which appear to derive from R or from some other exemplar of *Periphyseon A* rather than from B or P. The MSS I have used for this purpose are all of the twelfth century: the scribe who, in R, has replaced the missing gathering and who appears to be identical with the writer of the lemmata in this MS (Rm); Avranches 230 (A);⁴ Cambridge Trin. Coll. o 5 20 (T);⁵ and the 'Oxford Epitome', Bodl. Auct. F. III 15 (O).⁶

¹ *Scriptores Latini Hiberniae*, vii (Dublin, 1968), p. 27.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 5-6.

³ Book I, p. 11.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 18.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 19-21.

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 21-23.

Indeed, this third book brings to an end the state of affairs in which the three recensions can be clearly and certainly distinguished, for B, which gives the clearest evidence for *Periphyseon B*, contains only these first three books; and R comes to an end in the middle of Book iv. Hereafter, then, the text will have to be established on a different basis.

2. THE ARGUMENT

In the second book Eriugena has discussed in general terms the Second Division of Nature, Nature as creative and created, i.e. the Primordial Causes; in the first section of the present book (619A-630A) he concludes his account of this Division with an examination of the individual Causes and their relations to one another and to their source. He then embarks upon his account of the Third Division of Nature, Nature as created but non-creative, i.e. the effects of the Primordial Causes, introduced by a discussion of their relation to their Causes, namely participation (630A-634A), and their differentiation from their Causes. If a thing exist solely in its Cause, what is there in the thing that is not its cause? From what material does the Cause create its effect? Authority replies that all things are created *ex nihilo*; but what is meant by *nihilum*? Eriugena's reply takes the form of a self-contained minor treatise, the *Quaestio de nihilo* (chapters 5-23, 634A 14-690B 4), in which he re-examines the five definitions of not-being with which he had qualified the opening proposition of the *Periphyseon* that Nature, of which he is about to investigate the Four Divisions, comprises all that is and all that is not,¹ and comes to the conclusion that the *nihilum* which is the ground of creation must be that mode of not-being by which things are said not to be because *per excellentiam suae naturae non solum sensum sed etiam omnem intellectum rationemque fugiunt . . . quae non nisi in solo deo et in omnium rerum quae ab eo conditae sunt rationibus atque essentiis recte intelliguntur*.² Thus the Third Division, like the Second and Fourth, is not radically different from the First, but all are different aspects of the same Reality. Having established this point he turns his attention to the individual effects in a commentary on the *Hexaemeron*, which occupies the rest of the book and the first part of Book iv. The present book ends with the operations of the Fifth Day.

¹ *Periphyseon*, i. 2-7, pp. 38, 11-44, 24.

² *Ibid.*, 3, p. 38, 21-25.

3. ANALYSIS OF BOOK III

1. *Preamble* (619A 7-622A 9), consisting of: a recapitulation of Book ii (619A 7-D 6); the proposal to devote the book to the Third Division of Nature (619D 7-620B 4), which, however, is postponed until three matters arising out of Book ii have been dealt with: the reason why the Creator is included within the divisions of Nature (620B 4-621B 11); the reason why He is placed as the First Division (621B 11-622A 9); and a detailed discussion of the Primordial Causes, which constitutes the second section of the book.

2. *The Primordial Causes*. The Primordial Causes are infinite in number. Eriugena confines himself to the first ten: the Good, Being, Life, Reason, Intellect, Wisdom, Virtue, Beatitude, Truth, and Eternity (622B 5-624A 1). This order of precedence, however, is not in nature, for in their nature all the Causes are one so that none will precede another, but in the mind which contemplates them through their ordered effects (624A 1-D 8). In nature they are like the radii of a circle, which are one at the centre whence they originate, but infinitely numerous at the circumference, where none can be considered prior to any other, for all are equidistant from the centre (624D 8-626D 7). The mind sees them in this particular order because, first, the concept of the Good precedes that of Being for two reasons: it is the Divine Goodness that calls forth Being out of not-being, and therefore the Good is the Cause of Being and not vice versa (626D 6-628A 13); the Good is the Cause not only of the being of things that are but also of the not-being of things that are not, so that being and not-being are species of the genus Good, and in discourse the mind proceeds from the genus to the species (628A 13-D 1). Then Being is conceived before Life for the same reason, for Being is the genus of which Life is the species (628D 1-629A 2); and similarly Life before Reason, for Reason is a species of Life (629A 2-6); and similarly Reason before Wisdom since Reason is the genus of which Wisdom and science are the two species (629A 6-8)—the definitions of Wisdom or Theology (629A 8-14) and Science or Physics (629A 15-B 12) are given parenthetically—and so it is with all the other Causes that have been named. The mind's selection of this order is determined not by the Causes themselves, but by the way in which the effects participate in them; for there are more participations in the Good than in Being, more in Being than in Life, more in Life than in Reason, more in Reason than in Wisdom (629B 12-630A 2). Therefore before entering upon the effects themselves we should examine what is meant by participation (630A 2-5).

3. *De participatione* (630A 5-634A 13). All things can be divided into

four categories: that which participates; that which is participated; participation; and that which participates and is participated (630A 5-7). Definitions of *participatum* (630A 7-13), *participans* (630A 13-B 7), *participatum et participans* (630B 7-C 11), and *participatio* (630C 11-631A 15). Participation is found in all the other three categories; it is to the orders of nature what proportion is to number (630C 12-631A 5). It is the distribution through the orders of the hierarchy of gifts and of graces, e.g. the gift of being and the grace of well-being.

[An enlargement¹ distinguishes two senses of well-being: (a) that according to which all things are said to be good because they are created by the Divine Goodness and participate in Goodness to the extent that they exist; and (b) that according to which all things that are good in this sense are embellished by the virtues so that their natural goodness shines forth. It is the latter sense of well-being that is meant by grace (631A 15-B 15).]

Not all participation is equally extensive. Being and well-being are distributed throughout the whole of created nature, but Life does not extend to the lowest order: Sense is distributed only as far as the irrational animals, Reason and Intellect only as far as the rational and intellectual creature respectively (631C 4-16). By the gifts (*dationes*) created nature subsists, by the graces (*donationes*) it is adorned; thus, essence is a gift, virtue a grace.

[An enlargement divides virtues into three categories: substantial virtue, which is the middle term of the triad *essentia-uirtus-operatio*; the virtues which repair the deficiencies of nature, e.g. health, learning; the virtues which resist the vices, e.g. humility, chastity, and which equal in number the vices they resist (632A 3-B 2).]

Participation is better expressed by the Greek *μετοχή* or *μετουσία* than by the Latin *participatio*, since the prefix *μετα-* which Eriugena understands in the sense of 'after' indicates that that which participates is secondary to that in which it participates, and that participation is a procession from the latter to the former (632B 2-13), which are related to one another as the spring to the water that flows from it (632B 14-D 3).

[An enlargement links the argument to what follows by pointing out that the water is essentially one with the spring from which it flows, and therefore, since the spring is hidden and the water visible, a theophany of it (632D 3-633A 7).]

Every intelligible and sensible is therefore a theophany, that is, an intelligible or sensible appearance, of that which in itself is non-apparent (633A 10-B 7). This is illustrated by the analogy of the

¹ For the 'enlargements' to the text see Introduction to Books I-III, *Scriptores Latini Hiberniae*, vii. 6-9.

intellect and its means of self-expression (633B 8-634A 3). But this analogy is not wholly apt since the intellect expresses itself in matter which is external to itself whereas the Divine Goodness has nothing outside Itself in which or by which It can express Itself, but creates *ex nihilo*. This leads directly to the *Quaestio de nihilo*, which is the subject of the next section (634A 3-13).

4. *Quaestio de nihilo* (chs. 5-23, 634A 14-690B 4).¹ In the expression *creatio de nihilo*, does *nihilum* mean absolute privation of all being, or the Divine Super-essence which is not being because it is more than being (634B 1-3)? Eriugena gives first the traditional answer, then a tentative alternative answer, and finally his considered opinion.

A. The Traditional Answer

The *nihilum* out of which God created all things is not a material external to Himself, but the absolute privation of all being (634C 9-635A 7). This answer, however, cannot be reconciled with the fact that all things are eternal in the Divine Wisdom (636A 11-12), and therefore Eriugena proposes an alternative answer.

B. Eriugena's Tentative Alternative Answer (636C 13-666C 5)

It has been agreed that what is eternal in the Wisdom of God and what is created by God are identical; and that the Divine Wisdom is itself created in all that it creates. The problem therefore is to determine how the Divine Wisdom which is eternal is also created, and how the world created out of formless matter is also eternal (646D 6-647C 1), and at the same time to avoid falling into pantheism (650D 1-6).

A way out of the dilemma is suggested by the theory of numbers (chs. 11-12, 651A 13-661C 3). There are the numbers in the intellect which are contemplated by the arithmeticians; and the numbers in things which the intellectual numbers number. The intellectual numbers are the immutable principles of all things (651D 3-652B 1), and their own principle is the Monad (652B 1-7), from which they are eternally caused, in which they eternally subsist, and to which they eternally tend.

[An enlargement anticipates the objection that number tends to infinity by stating that infinity itself is contained within the Monad (652D 1-653B 10).]

Therefore the Monad from which all numbers proceed is none other than the Monad in which all numbers end. Therefore the intellectual

¹ This little treatise has been carefully studied by Gustavo A. Piemonte, 'Notas sobre la "Creatio de nihilo" en Juan Escoto Eriugena', pt. 1, *Sapientia*, xxiii (Buenos Aires, 1968), 37-58, on which the following analysis is based.

numbers are eternal in the Monad for their procession from it is also their return to it (652B 8–654A 6). The first procession of number from the Monad is to the dyad, the second to the triad, the third to the tetrad, and so on; but before they proceed there is among them no order of precedence, for there all are one. And that is their primordial condition; if they were not first in the Monad they could not proceed from it. Therefore their immutability in the Monad is the cause of their procession into the mutable many (654A 6–655A 12).

If the Monad is the unity of the numbers, it could not exist if there were no numbers to unite; nor would the numbers end in the Monad if while proceeding from it they did not eternally subsist in it (655A 12–B 14).

From this it follows that the numbers that proceed from the Monad and return to it are none other than the numbers that are eternally in the Monad (655B 14–C 3).

To say that numbers begin together and end together does not necessarily mean that they are eternal, for this is true of all things that depend on each other for their existence, e.g. form and matter or voice and word: each pair begins together and ends together, but neither is eternal (655C 3–10). Therefore a further proof for the eternity of the numbers must be found.

One of the numbers at least is manifestly eternal, the number 6. This number is perfect because it is the exact sum of its parts; and what is true of 6 is equally true of the three numbers that follow it, each of which partakes of its nature, for 7, 8, and 9 are produced by increasing 6 by its sixth part, its third, and its half respectively. Another proof of the eternity of 6 is that it is the number of the days within which the creation of the world was perfected, and one cannot suppose that that within which all things, including place and time, were made, can itself be subject either to place or time. As to the other numbers, we are told that God created all things in measure and number and weight. Here again we cannot suppose that number, in which all things, including time, were made, can itself be subject to time (655C 10–656C 6).

The eternity of the numbers in the Monad having been established, it is now necessary to show how they are created in the Many (656C 6–658D 5). They are eternal in the Monad *ui et potestate*, they are created in the Many *actu et opere*. The difference between the intellectual numbers and the numbers created in things lies not in the numbers themselves, for these are identical, but in these two modes of existence (657B 1–11). It is therefore necessary to define *uis*, *potestas*, *actus*, and *opus*.

Vis is the power by which the numbers subsist in the eternity of the Monad.

Potestas is their capacity for proceeding from the Monad to the Many.

Actus is the motion of the soul by which it contemplates the procession of the numbers independently of the things into which they proceed.

Opus is the motion of the soul by which it contemplates the numbers in the many things into which they proceed (657B 11–658D 5).

[An enlargement points out that the procession of the numbers is not a consequence of the motion of the soul, but is a part of created reality. For if the numbers in things were products of a created soul they would not be eternal (658A 3–B 1).]

Therefore the numbers are both eternal and created: eternal in the Monad; created first in the intellect, secondly in the reason, thirdly in the phantasies brought by the senses to the memory (658D 5–659B 10).

It is noted parenthetically that phantasies come either from the memory or from the surface of objects of sense; but in the former case they are properly called not phantasies but phantasmata. The phantasma is a product of the phantasy, and therefore an image of an image (659B 10–D 6).

It follows from what has been said that the created numbers are contemplated by the soul in two ways: either in their purity without the admixture of phantasy; or as presented to the soul by sense and memory mingled with phantasy or phantasma which appear to be the material cause out of which, or in which, they are created. This, however, is not so; for the phantasies and phantasmata are not composed of the matter of the bodies from which they derive, but from their qualitative form, which by definition is immaterial and therefore intelligible. Therefore the numbers in things are no less intelligible than the numbers in the eternity of the Monad. Once the numbers in things have been shown to be immaterial there is nothing to differentiate them from the numbers in the Monad. The same numbers are received by the soul either from above through the intellect in theophanies, or from below through the senses in phantasies (659D 6–661C 4).

The fact that the phantasies are presented to the soul in corporeal form does not argue to the contrary, for creatures that are known to be spiritual occasionally appear in corporeal form, as the soul of Moses to the Apostles at the Transfiguration and the soul of Samuel to Saul at Endor, and shapes and colours, which are in themselves incorporeal, always appear so. Indeed, nothing owes its visibility to its matter, for it has already been shown that unformed matter is invisible and incorporeal and depends for its visibility and corporeality on quality (shape and colour) and quantity, which are

intelligibles,¹ for they derive from the elemental qualities which are intelligible. Now, the intelligible is not nothing, and therefore bodies formed from the concourse of the elements are not formed from nothing. Nor do the elements come from nothing; for if nothing were their cause there would be no place in the scheme of things for the Primordial Causes (663C 1-2). Secondly, if nothing were the cause of anything it would not be nothing, for it would be a cause (C 2-6). Thirdly, even if nothing could be a cause, since the cause is superior to that which it causes, nothing would be better than something, which is absurd. Therefore the *nihilum* which is the material cause of all things cannot be absolute privation of being. Therefore it must either be the Divine Wisdom or Word, i.e. the Formal Cause which has already been identified with the Efficient Cause; or else some principle other than, and external to, the Word. But in that case it would not be *nihil*, but the very opposite, *omnia*; for all things subsist primordially in their cause (663D 3-4); and it would have to be either antithetical to God like the Evil Principle of the Manichaeans, or the co-eternal matter postulated by the pagan philosophers (664C 7-D 4), in neither case reconcilable with the Christian Faith. It must be, then, that the elements derive from the Primordial Causes in the Word.

Nor can the Primordial Causes derive from nothing in the sense of privation of being, for what is in the Word is eternal being. In fact, nothing in the sense of privation of being cannot be anywhere, whether in the Word or external to it (665A 4-5). It is nothing and nowhere and totally meaningless. 'All things were created out of nothing' simply means that there was a time when they were not, that is to say, when they were outside place and time, not *actu et opere* but *ui et potestate*, a mode of existence not accessible to sense or intellect, and therefore quite properly called not-being (665A 10),² just as when they acquire forms and species they are properly said to be.

But granted that this is true of the Primordial Causes, it still remains to show that it is equally true of their effects (666B 6-C 5); it confirms the eternity but not the createdness of the one, and the createdness but not the eternity of the other. This final step is taken in Eriugena's considered opinion, in which he shows himself at his boldest and most original.

C. Eriugena's Considered Opinion (666C 5-688A 1)

It has been admitted (in an enlargement) that in the words, *Omnia in sapientia fecisti*,³ *omnia* must include the eternal as well as the

¹ *Periphyseon*, i. 34, p. 120, 20-23; 42, p. 132, 17-18; p. 158, 1.

² Cf. *Periphyseon*, i. 2, p. 38, 21-23.

³ Ps. ciii. 24.

temporal (666C 1-2). Therefore the Primordial Causes are part of the object of *fecisti*, and they, as well as their effects, are created; and since what is created *in sapientia*, i.e. in the Word, must have existed from eternity, as has just been shown, the effects, as well as their Causes, are eternal.

It has also long been agreed that God knows that which He creates and knows it as His Will. There is no difference between His Will to create and the creation that He wills. But God's Will is not different from His Essence, or rather, Superessence. When He Who, before creating, was not even being, takes being upon Himself, by that very act the Primordial Causes came into being, as also, within them, did the principles of the effects that were to proceed from them, for it is not when things begin to appear that they begin to be (669B 2-4), just as it is not when they cease to appear that they cease to be.¹ That which God has made, and nothing else, is always that which He has willed and that which He has seen. But that which He has always willed and seen is eternally within Himself, and nothing is external to Himself. But that which is eternally within Him cannot be other than co-essential with Him, and nothing external to Him is co-essential with Him. The Scriptures reveal this in their opening words, *In principio*, i.e. in His Word or Wisdom. Therefore we must regard God and His creation not as two distinct natures but as one and the same (678B 15-C 2). The Unmanifest Uncreated makes Himself manifest and created (678C 3-679A 9). As the matter of the intelligible and sensible numbers by which they are differentiated from the Monad in which they pre-exist derives from themselves, and as the accidents through which things become manifest are produced from the *uis seminum*, which was in them from the beginning (679B 7-12),² so the Divine Power does not receive from outside itself the matter in which it creates itself and, in itself, all things. Therefore not even matter is made from nothing, but from nothing else than God (679B 5-7), and there is no place in the universe for nothing in the sense of privation of being (679B 12-14).³ Supporters of the traditional view, described at the beginning of the treatise as *paene omnes scripturae expositores* (with *paene* added as an afterthought) (635A 3-7), are now dismissed as *qui minus intelligunt* (679B 15). The correct interpretation of *nihil* is not *omnino nihil*, but the purity of the Divine Goodness which descends from not-being into being (680D 1-6); not *materia informis* nor *nihil per priuationem* (686A 4-5), but *nihil per excellentiam* (681A 5, 684C 15-D 4, 687D 6-688A 4). This is the *nihil* out of which God created the world, and into which it will return (683B 10-15), and, since God is

¹ Cf. *Periphyseon*, v. 867B 7-D 12.

² Cf. 669C 7-670A 1; 671C 10-672C 2.

³ Cf. *Periphyseon*, i. 3, p. 40, 10-12; 665A 4.

principium, medium et finis, this *nihil per excellentiam* which is His Nature is present throughout the duration of the created world from its beginning to its end, though hidden from us as a consequence of original sin (683C 3–684C 14).

The supporters of the traditional view are well aware that *nihilum* can denote the Divine Superessence as well as the privation of being, and acknowledge that we speak more truly of God when we say what He is not than when we attempt to say what He is; moreover He is often called *nihilum* in Scripture (684C 15–685A 2)—

[An enlargement invokes the authority of Dionysius for the Apophatic Theology. All things that are created from nothing participate in a common nature. Therefore that nature is created from nothing. But we also know that the nature out of which all things are created is the Word of God. In a sense, then, the Word of God is *nihilum* (685A 2–686A 3).]

—but they err when they take that *nihilum* to be the privation of being, not understanding that privation is the opposite of possession, and opposition is a relation, so that the one cannot exist without the other. Privation, in fact, is privation of possession. Where there has been no possession there can be no privation. If all things were made out of the privation of being, there must have been a previous possession out of which that privation was made. Therefore *nihilum* can only denote the Superessence of Him Who is nothing of the things that are, *qui melius nesciendo scitur* (686A 4–687A 3). For if *informis materia* were also included under this term *nihilum*, the whole of reality would be completely filled with God and the creation *ex nihilo*, and there would be no place in reality for this *nihilum*, which would thus be a meaningless term. Therefore the *nihilum* out of which all things were made is, exclusively, the Divine Superessence (687A 3–B 9). Finally, if the creature derives from God, God will be the Cause of which the creature is the effect. But an effect is a cause that has been effected or made; therefore God is effected or made in His effects (687B 9–688A 1).

D. Conclusion

The conclusion is that the material cause of the Universe or third division of nature, like the formal cause or second division (and, as will be shown later in the work, the final cause or fourth division), is identical with the efficient cause or first division. The four divisions had already been reduced to one in the Second Book,¹ but now the intermediate stage of identifying the first and fourth with the Creator and the second and third with the creature is replaced by a direct application of the axiom that God is *principium, medium et finis*

¹ *Periphyseon*, ii. 526A–528B.

(689A 12–C 2). In the visible and corporeal creature God has set the term to His descent and His manifestation. Whatever the *principium* is, that also is the *finis*, and also the *medium*. If God created the world out of absolutely nothing at all, then it ends in absolutely nothing at all, and the whole course of its history is absolutely nothing at all; which is absurd. Although it appears that the world came into existence where formerly there was nothing at all, in fact it always pre-existed in the Primordial Causes, which are the intelligible manifestation of God; and although it appears to have a future end when, where it formerly was, there will be nothing at all, in fact that end will be the resolution into its constituent elements which are intelligible and derive from the Primordial Causes, and therefore will be its return to God. Therefore Nature in all its four divisions is from God and in God (690A 8–10).

The descent from *nihil* to *esse* does not involve a divine causality *ad extra*, nor does the formation of creatures *ad extra* imply that the Divine Substance is an indeterminate matter, for the descent from the Primordial Cause to the effects, like the descent from the Word to the Causes, occurs within God Himself. Therefore the only acceptable meaning of *nihil* is the Divine Goodness which transcends all things and therefore is itself no thing; and the only acceptable definition of creation is *aeterna conditio rerum in Verbo dei*. The activity of the Holy Spirit in distributing the genera, species, and individuals is not simply creation, but a *secunda conditio* out of the *Esse* which already existed. This *secunda conditio* produces the Third Division of Nature, which is examined in detail in the Commentary on the Hexaemeron which immediately follows.

5. The First Five Days (chs. 24–40, 690B 5–742B 9)

A. The First Day (690C 13–693B 13)

In principio fecit deus caelum et terram. This refers to the creation of the Primordial Causes, invisible and visible: invisible in the Divine Mind (690C 12–691A 1), visible in their effects.

Fiat lux et facta est lux. This refers either to the creation of the Celestial Hierarchy (691A 4–7), or to the creation of the first element, fire (691A 7–B 8).

Et vidit deus lucem quod esset bona et diuisit lucem a tenebris appellauitque lucem diem et tenebras noctem. If light is understood as fire, this refers to the creation of visible light, defined by periods of darkness (691B 8–C 9); if light is understood as the Celestial Hierarchy, it refers either to the formation of the visible creature out of formless matter, in which case light is understood in its secondary sense of perfection of form, and darkness is the chaos of formlessness (691C

9-15); or to the distinction within the celestial essences of their eternal existence in God from their actual existence as creatures under God (691C 15-692A 5).

Et factum est uespere et mane dies unus. The beginning of one operation is the end of the preceding operation. The completion of the one day is the end of the operation which begins with the creation of light (692A 5-12).

Alternative interpretations (692A 14-693B 13). The creation of heaven and earth in the beginning signifies the creation of the Primordial Causes, invisible and visible; the creation of light signifies their procession into their effects, for the darkness denotes their invisibility in themselves, the light the visibility of the shapes they assume when they pass into their effects, i.e. their theophanies (692A 14-D 1). The separation of the light from the darkness denotes the elucidation of the effects from the obscurity of the causes, so that 'day' means the appearance of the Causes, visible and invisible, in their shapes, 'night' their hidden existence as causes (692D 2-693A 10). *Et factum est uespere et mane dies unus* signifies that the separation of the manifest effect from the hidden cause does not destroy the unity of the creature in its cause and in its effect (693A 10-B 5).

Nutritor concludes with an apology for introducing his own interpretation, which is non-committally accepted by Alumnus (693B 5-c 8).

B. *The Second Day* (693C 9-698C 2)

The interpretation will not be allegorical but historical (693C 10-15). *Fiat firmamentum in medio aquarum* (693D 1-694C 1). While all agree that the Firmament means the visible heaven, some understand it as the sphere of the fixed stars; others as the space between this and the sphere of the moon; others again as the whole of extra-terrestrial space (693D 3-694A 7). In the first case it will owe its name of firmament to its support of the waters above it; in the second to its support of the stellar sphere; in the third the name will either mean a solid case which contains the visible world or will refer to the corpulency of the meteorological phenomena which occur within it (694A 7-B 5). Eriugena himself, however, deduces from its Greek name, *στερέωμα*, which he interprets as 'all things compacted together', that it is so called because it is the place and limit of all corporeal creatures (694B 5-C 1).

Et diuidat aquas ab aquis (694C 1-698B 3). According to St. Basil the waters divided by the Firmament are the abyss which surrounds the earth, over which there was darkness, upon which the Spirit was borne, and which on the third day are to be gathered into one place—but his opinion is refuted by St. Augustine (694C 4-D 1); according

to others the waters below the Firmament are the seas and rivers, and those above are the vapours suspended in the air as clouds, which is the view of St. Augustine (694D 1-7). Eriugena's own explanation (694D 7-696C 9) is that nature can be divided into three categories, the wholly corporeal, the wholly spiritual, and that which is intermediate between body and spirit. To the first belong the *rationes* in which the world is constituted in its totality; to the second belong the bodies which are its parts; to the third belong the elements of which the bodies are composed, for these are non-composite like the *rationes* but must have something corporeal in their nature without which bodies could not be composed of them. The waters below the Firmament are the wholly corporeal creatures; those above the Firmament are the wholly spiritual creatures; and the Firmament between them is the nature of the elements which is equidistant between the visible nature of the body and the invisible nature of spirit (695A 4-696B 10).

[An enlargement links the argument with what follows: the Causes proceed into the elements, the elements proceed into the bodies; the bodies are resolved into the elements, the elements return to the Causes (696B 10-15).]

Therefore the passage should be interpreted as follows: let the simple elements form a solid barrier between the profundity of the Causes from which they proceed and the flux of bodies which proceed from their concurrence (696B 15-c 9).

[An enlargement distinguishes the simplicity of the elements from that of the Causes: the former is subject to space, time, and accident, while the latter is not (696C 9-D 1)].

At this point Eriugena introduces a rule which applies not only to the interpretation of the operations of the Second Day, but to those of the others as well. Each operation is recorded twice: first by the verb *fiat* or some other jussive subjunctive, then by an indicative, *facta est, fecit*, etc. The first refers to the creation of the specific Primordial Cause, the second to its procession into its effect (692D 2-697A 4).

Vocauitque deus firmamentum caelum. Eriugena connects 'caelum' with the verb 'caelare' referring to the stars with which the heavens are studded; and derives the Greek *οὐρανός* from *opos avw* which he interprets *uisio desuper* since the Firmament, being simple, is above every corporeal creature (697A 4-12).

At this point Eriugena refutes the literal interpretation of the waters above the Firmament which is supposed to be borne out by the pallid appearance of the stars, supposed to indicate the frigidity of water. But frigidity is found in the fiery element as well as in the

watery, as we can see from ice, which is both cold and fiery. Fire is only hot when it burns, and only burns where there is matter to burn. Such matter does not exist in the spiritual sphere (697A 12-698B 5). This explains why Saturn, the planet which is nearest to the fixed stars, is cold and pale whereas the Sun is coloured and hot. For the Sun is equidistant from the earth and the fixed stars, and therefore participates in the immateriality of the one and the materiality of the other, and its colour is intermediate between the pallor of the stars and the ruddiness of fire when it is kindled on earth. Jupiter, Mars, Venus, and Mercury change their colours as they change their positions in relation to it, being pale when they are above it, ruddy when they are beneath it (697C 12-698A 15).

Et factum est uespere et mane dies unus. The general meaning of this phrase has already been given. Here it is to be applied in the sense that although we form distinct concepts of Cause, simple element, and composite body, yet all these refer to a single whole (698B 5-14).

C. *The Third Day* (698C 2-710B 14)

Congregentur aquae quae sub caelo sunt in locum unum et appareat arida. The traditional interpretation is that the waters beneath the Firmament, which at first covered and obscured the whole earth, are now swept back behind the shores of Ocean so as to allow space for earth, air, and aether (698C 5-D 6). Against this Eriugena declares that the creation of the earth, the diffusion of the abyss of the waters about it, the division of the waters by the Firmament, and the gathering together of the lower waters into one place did not succeed one another at temporal intervals, but intelligibly, as the word succeeds the voice that utters it (698D 7-699D 3). Therefore the seas and lakes were confined to their natural bounds from the moment that they emerged from their hidden causes as one of the four primary bodies of which the world is composed (699D 3-700B 15). Having described the framework of the universe, i.e. the two extremes of the simple principles on the one hand, and the composite bodies that are constructed out of them on the other, both of which, for reasons already given, are to be understood by the 'waters', and then the interposition of the Firmament of the four elements, Genesis now turns to consider the lower extreme, i.e. corporeal nature (700B 15-D 8). All bodies that derive from the concourse of the four elements display three aspects: matter; the qualitative form imposed on matter; and the substantial form which is the immutable base of their existence, supporting the qualitative form and defining the matter (700D 8-701A 11). Therefore he must first differentiate the substantial form from the formed matter. Since the Firmament represents

the elements, the waters under the Firmament which are separated from the dry land will represent the composites of qualitative form and mutable matter; and the dry land, from which they are separated, the substantial form which subsists immutably in its genus, and which must be distinguished from the mutable composite body if it is to be discerned from its accidents (701A 11-704A 10).

Eriugena here recapitulates the definitions of substantial and qualitative form which he has already given in Book 1:¹ Substantial form is that by participation in which each species is formed, in which all the species are one, and which is one in them, neither numerically greater in the greater number nor fewer in the few, but equal in all and always the same. Qualitative form is dispersed in the species by a process of differentiation that comes to it from without, e.g. from circumstance of place and time and nurture and climate, and not from within its own substance, and is mutable (703B 5-c 8).

Et uocauit deus aridam terram congregationesque aquarum appellauit maria. This duplication of the names of substantives, light/day and darkness/night on the first day, Firmament/Heaven on the second, dry land/earth and water/seas on the third, like the duplication of verbs already mentioned, signifies the double creation of all things, first in their causes, then in their effects (704A 10-B 5).

Et uidit deus quod esset bonum. The vision of God is the creation of the Universe, since for Him to see is to create. Moreover His vision is His Will and His Will is His operation. Therefore it must be that all that the Divine Goodness sees is good, for It is the cause of all good things and *is* all good things (704B 5-c 5).

Germinet terra herbam uirentem et facientem semen, etc. This refers to the creation in the Primordial Causes of the *uis seminum* which is the field of operation of the nutritive and auctive soul which ministers therein germination, nourishment, and distribution by increase into place and time, and thus brings the seeds forth from their substantial form in which they were invisible into their appearance as living beings (704C 5-705A 2).

Et protulit terra . . . semen iuxta genus . . . et . . . secundum speciem suam. The procession of the Primordial Causes into their effects under the administration of soul proceeds first into the genera and then into the species. For every species is contained in its genus, and every genus is contained in substance; and every substance extends by its proper power (*δύναμις*, *uirtus*) through genera into species; and this whole process is operated by the operation (*ἐνέργεια*, *operatio*) of the *uis seminum* (705A 2-710A 12).

In the course of commenting on this passage Eriugena recalls that he has promised that his interpretation will be historical and not

¹ *Periphyseon*, i. 53, pp. 156, 8-158, 17.

allegorical, and now explains that, contrary to appearance, this is what he has been doing. *Sophia* is divided into four branches: practical or active science, physical or natural science, theology, and logic. Practical science studies the virtue by which vices are eradicated; physics studies the *rationes* of natures both in their causes and their effects; theology studies God as First Cause; and logic studies the rules by which all these studies are to be conducted. If the historical interpretation of scripture is a part of philosophy at all it belongs to the branch of physics. If so, it will be seen that the interpretation that has been given is historical and not allegorical; for the operations of the first three days have been considered as physical events—the creation of light, the separation of the waters by the Firmament, and the separation of the lower waters from the dry land. These are the visible manifestations, and not merely allegories, of the general procession of the Causes into their effects, the division of the effects into the spiritual creatures, the elements, and the bodies, and the division of bodies into substance and accident respectively. For the Scriptures commonly speak of intelligible substances in terms of physical events by the figure of speech known as metaphor, which is not the same as allegory; for the substitution of one mode of expression for another is not figurative but an expression of reality; for every visible body can be regarded under two aspects: its underlying and immutable and invisible substance, and its accidental and mutable appearance (705A 12–707B 5). The difference between his historical interpretation and that of St. Basil is that St. Basil, preaching to a congregation of simple folk, confines himself to the mutable appearance, which was all that they could comprehend, whereas Eriugena is addressing himself to the erudite who could comprehend what lay behind the appearance (707B 5–709B 4).

[An enlargement likens the continuity of the procession from God through the effects to a ball which, once set rolling down a slope, continues to roll until it reaches the bottom. The motion, like the Divine Goodness, is one and indivisible in the heights and in the depths (709B 4–D 5).]

The commentary on the Third Day ends with a footnote on substance and accidents. Just as the waters that have been separated cannot stand by themselves but need the dry land to keep them in place, so the accidents cannot exist without the support of substance (710A 12–B 12).

D. *The Fourth Day* (710C 5–727D 2)

The two lower parts of the visible world, earth and water, with their genera and species, having been segregated, we now turn to the two higher parts, air and fire.

Fiant luminaria in firmamento caeli (710C 14–726A 12). We have

already heard of the general creation of the heavenly bodies before the creation of day and time and place; we now hear of their special creation, that is to say, the procession into their effects, separated by intervals of place and time. We have heard of the division of the corporeal world into dry land and water, that is to say, into substance and accidents, and its adornment with plants and trees, that is to say, with genera and species; we are now to hear of the division of the Firmament into the elements (712A 1–715A 11).

In themselves the elements are absolutely pure and incomprehensible and universal; but by coming together in certain proportions they produce all the sensible bodies, great and small, whether celestial or aerial or aquatic or earthy—in short, the whole celestial sphere and everything it contains. They take their names, fire, air, water, earth, from the greatest bodies that are formed from them. Strictly speaking, however, the bodies are formed not from the substances of the elements but from the mingling of their qualities, heat, moisture, coldness, and dryness, with the addition of substantial corporeal form. Of these qualities, two are active, heat and coldness, two passive, moisture and dryness. The reason why fire and air play the active part, water and earth the passive, in generating the bodies (although the coldness of water as well as the heat of fire is active, and the moisture of air as well as the dryness of earth is passive) in the seeds, is that water is moist as well as cold, since its proper coldness is infected with the moisture of the adjacent air, and it is the passive quality which it receives from its neighbour that is warmed by the heat of fire in the act of generation, while its proper coldness remains active in the seeds (712A–713B 7).

[An enlargement explains that there can be no begetting from coldness unmixed with heat or from heat unmixed with coldness, and no giving birth by moisture unmixed with dryness or by dryness unmixed with moisture (713A 7–14).]

The elements are diffused through all bodies, etherial, aerial, aquatic, and terrestrial, so that every body, *qua* body, is a concourse of the elemental qualities, though not the substantial form of the body, which is simple and immutable (713B 7–714A 2). On the proportion of the mixture of the qualities depends the position each body occupies in the scale which extends from absolute lightness to absolute heaviness, or from absolute mobility to absolute stability. Those that have the greatest proportion of the fiery quality are the lightest and most mobile, and those that have the greatest proportion of the terrestrial quality are the heaviest and most stable. The Firmament, therefore, in which the elements are undifferentiated and equally balanced, holds the balance between mobility and stability,

and ensures the stability of the cosmic motion (714A 2-B 11). These characteristics of the elements are demonstrated by their Greek names: fire is called $\pi\upsilon\rho$ because by its subtlety it penetrates into the interstices ($\pi\acute{o}\rhoοι$) of things; $\acute{\alpha}\eta\rho$ means breath and is so called because it breathes through all things; $\upsilon\delta\omega\rho$, derived from $\epsilon\acute{\iota}\delta\omicron\varsigma$ $\acute{o}\rho\acute{\omega}\mu\epsilon\nu\omicron\nu$, is the name given to water because it is sufficiently stable to be visible; and earth is called $\acute{\alpha}\chi\theta\omicron\varsigma$ because of its weight, and $\gamma\eta$ interpreted as 'valley' because it is the receptacle in which each body is enfolded (714B 11-D 8). The colour of a body derives from the fiery quality, its sound from the aerial, its shape from the aquatic, and its weight from the terrestrial (714D 8-715A 11).

By the creation of the luminaries in the Firmament is meant the concentration of the universally diffused element of fire into the circumscribed heavenly bodies which are the vehicles of light which carry the element about the world at regular intervals of time and place; some, like the moon, in an orbit so close to the earth that it passes through the earth's shadow; some, like the Sun and the planets that revolve about it, in the middle distance; some, like the 'fixed' stars, at the uttermost bound of the universe (715A 11-C 4).

The intervals between the luminaries constitute the harmony of the universe, of which the constituent numbers are 6, 7, and 8. The full circle of the earth is the diapason or octave. The circumference of the earth in thousands of stades is 252, or 7×6^2 . The proportion of the distance from the earth to the moon to the circumference of the earth is one tone, i.e. 1:2. Therefore the distance from the earth to the moon in thousands of stades is 126, or $7 \times 6 \times 3$, 3 being the diameter of which 6 is the circumference (715C 15-719A 3).

These calculations are based on Eratosthenes' measurements. Pliny and Ptolemy use other measurements (719A 3-720A 11).

About the size of the moon there are also different opinions. Some say that it is the same size as the earth, but others give the measurement of its diameter as 42,000 stades, which is one sixth of the circumference of the earth, and the product of 6 and 7 in thousands of stades. Thus, the proportion 6:7 is everywhere manifest in the created universe. Six is the number of stability, seven the number of mobility. Therefore the product reveals the stable motion and the moving stability of the regular rotation of the heavens (720A 11-D 3). The reason why the stade is used as the unit of measurement is that 1 stade = 125 or 5^3 paces. Five is a reflexive number, i.e. it recurs whenever it is multiplied by itself, signifying the cyclic motion of all parts of the universe (720D 3-721A 4).

As has already been said, the orbit of the Sun occupies the central position between the extreme lightness and mobility of the outermost sphere and the extreme gravity or stability of the earth at the centre

(721B 13-C 2). Its distance from the lunar orbit is twice the distance of the lunar orbit from the earth. Therefore its distance from the earth is one diapason. Therefore the whole distance from the circumference of the universe to the centre is two diapasons (722B 1-D 2).

The diameter of the solar orbit is seven times the diameter of the earth, i.e. 882 thousands of stades; and therefore its circumference is 1,764 thousands of stades. The circumference of the lunar orbit is twice the distance from the earth to the moon + the circumference of the earth = 756 thousands of stades. The diameter of the universe is twice this number + the diameter of the earth = 1638 thousands of stades. Therefore the circumference of the universe is 3276 thousands of stades, showing that the number of the total universe is concluded in the perfect number 6 (732D 2-723A 11).

Eriugena concludes his calculations with an apology for going beyond the authority of Scripture (723A 12-724B 2). Authority does not forbid but encourages the use of reason. As sensible observation leads to reason, so reason leads to God. By availing ourselves of it we distinguish ourselves from the irrational animals (723B 1-C 9).

[In an enlargement it is argued that even before his fall man must have had knowledge of the created world to the government of which he was appointed, and that his reason is a trace of this knowledge preserved from the ruin (723C 9-D 3).]

Authority and Reason are the two garments in which Christ appeared at the Transfiguration; we should contemplate Him in both (723D 3-724A 7).

Eriugena concludes his commentary on this passage with an apology for his method. After excusing himself for using pagan authorities by the traditional reference to the 'spoiling of the Egyptians' (724A 7-B 2), he defends the credibility of his theories. The inclusion of all parts of the universe within a limited number of stades is no more remarkable than the inclusion of representatives of all living creatures within the limited number of cubits of Noah's Ark (724B 2-C 7), nor the suspension of the earth at the centre of the universe than the position of the centre of any circle or sphere (724C 7-726A 12).

Et diuidant diem ac noctem (726A 12-B 8). This does not mean that day and night are not always co-existing, but that when the Sun is present it always irradiates its greater light, and when it is absent the moon and stars irradiate a lesser light.

Et sint in signa et tempora (726B 8-C 2). *Signa* refer to meteorological portents, *tempora* to the measures of time marked out by the revolutions of the luminaries.

Luminare maius ut praeesset diei et luminare minus ut praeesset nocti et stellas (726C 12-727A 9). The greater is the Sun whose presence

constitutes day, the lesser is the moon whose presence supplies a variable quantity of light to the night with the help, when required, of the stars, which, although they revolve with the world, are fixed in their relative positions.

Vt lucent super terram (727A 9-B 9). The preposition 'super' refers to the fact that the earth is the lowest of the great bodies that constitute the universe, and has nothing below it.

The commentary on the fourth day concludes with a note to the effect that the division into night and day does not affect the luminaries themselves but the inhabitants of the earth on which they shine, for since the luminaries are light, and night is the absence of light, there can be no night where the luminaries are (727B 9-C 13).

E. *The Fifth Day* (727D 3-742B 9)

Producant aquae reptile animae uiuentis et uolatile (727D 3-742A 13). This is the first mention of soul, and some have inferred from this that the creatures of the first four days were without soul. But against this is Plato's doctrine of the World Soul, which all the best commentators of the Scriptures accept. For everything that moves moves because of life, and all the wise identify this universal life principle with the World Soul. This universal soul or life administers everything that is contained within the celestial sphere through its species, and itself participates in the one substantial soul which is the fount of life and the distributor to all things visible and invisible of their individual lives, and is in turn participated in by all rational and sensible creatures. For not even bodies are wholly without life. For as the composition and formation of the body is administered by its own life, so too is its dissolution and loss of form; and no seed can grow unless it first dies and is buried. The life which quickens the seed was already in the seed before it was quickened. The dissolution which we call death is the dissolution of the matter of the body, not of its nature, which is indivisible and eternal. Man never ceases to be man; but in man is body and soul. Therefore body and soul never cease to be body and soul. Man's dissolution occurs when and because soul withdraws its control of the body and allows it to return to the elements of which it is composed. The relation of the parts of the body to the whole does not then cease to exist. What appears to the senses to be a separation of the parts from the whole a loftier consideration shows to be nothing of the kind. Nor does the soul of the dead man cease to exist or to administer the elements into which the body is dissolved any less than it administered the body when they composed it. For soul is spiritual and therefore is even more closely associated with the elements that are quasi-spiritual than with what is wholly corporeal.

The elements are a series of links in the chain of communication between the inertia of body at the centre of the microcosm and the vitality of soul at the circumference. Earth contributes to the composition of the bones, flesh, sinews, and veins; water to the blood and other fluids which irrigate and nourish and build the body outward from the centre, but always within its physical confines; air supplies the sense of hearing by which the body's powers are extended beyond its physical confines; and fire supplies the sense of sight by which they are extended to the sphere of the fixed stars at the very limit of the macrocosm. Sight is a light which is kindled by the fire in the heart whence it rises to the summit of the body and enters the brain, and thence travels to the eye and through the eye to the world without; hearing is a reverberation caused by the air in the lungs which ascends to the brain and thence to the ear and thence to the air without, through which it receives external sounds. Thus, the parts composed of the lighter elements possess mobility by which they can leave the body and associate with things that are at a distance from it (730B 12-731B 2). But the utmost mobility is possessed by the soul itself which is contained in no place, and controls and quickens the elements in whatever place they are. It is always ready to receive the phantasies which are formed in the organs of sense: from the eye the vision of the stars that comes through the ether; from the ear the sound of voices that comes through the air; from the sense of smell odours whether from without or from within; taste from the sense of taste; and touch from the sense of touch; and having received them, to store them in the memory, to order them by reason, and to evaluate them by the intellect according to the divine numbers of which she receives knowledge from above. (731B 2-C 13).

For there are eight orders of number:

1. The numbers in the eternal causes beyond the intellect by which the rational soul discriminates all things.
2. Number in the bodies from which the bodily senses are formed, and in which the phantasies are produced, which is furthest from the soul.
3. Number in the corporeal senses themselves, which are the first phantasies to be produced, still external to the soul, but approximate to it.
4. *Numeri occursores*, which receive the phantasies, and which, like all that follow, are within the soul.
5. *Numeri progressores*, which bring the numbers to the gates of the memory.
6. *Numeri recordabiles*, which receive the numbers and store them in the memory.

7. *Numeri rationabiles*, which dispose the numbers for evaluation.
 8. *Numeri intellectuales*, which evaluate the numbers (731C 13–732A 13).

Since the soul's operations in the body, when it is living, extend so far beyond the limits of the body when it is compacted of the elements, it is not strange that it should continue its operations when the body is dissolved into its elements. And what is true of the human soul is true of the universal soul. Universal soul is divided into the rational and the irrational, of which the former is found in angels and in men. Again, rational soul is divided into the intellectual and the rational in the specific sense, or, in less precise terms, into intellect and soul, of which the former is proper to the angels and the latter proper to man. The rational soul is distinguished from the irrational by being formed after the image of God.

The irrational soul is also divided into two parts, the animal soul which is endowed with sense, and the vegetative soul which is insensible. It is only below the vegetative soul that there is no soul and no life; and it is only in man that the totality of creation is found, for not only does his body contain the totality of the four elements but also his soul contains the totality of the four psychic parts, for he can contemplate like an angel, reason like a man, sense like an animal, and live like a plant; and since he is body and soul, no part of creation is lacking in him (732A 13–734B 1).

Clearly none of this could be so if soul had not been created before the fifth day, when the angels, the elements, and the plants had already been created. But until the fifth day soul was so imperfect that it was more like body than soul, although the epithet *uiuientis* clearly implies the previous existence of soul not so qualified. *Anima* here means soul endowed with sense as well as life. But the division of soul into rational, sensible, and vegetative, which is accepted both by the Fathers and the philosophers, plainly shows that the word is used here relatively. The irrational but sensible soul is appropriately introduced on the fifth day because its operations are divided among the five corporeal senses (734B 1–10).

Anima, here perfected, is immortal; for if the rational soul is immortal, then so must the irrational soul be. For all the species exist as long as the genus exists; if the soul is immortal, all its parts will be immortal. Those who hold that the irrational soul perishes conceive of it not as soul but as material body; but it is evidently not so, for no material body could possess the sight of an eagle or the memory of Ulysses' dog (734B 10–739C 15).

Super terram sub firmamento caeli (739D 1–742A 13). The living creatures produced from the water are of two kinds, the *reptilia* and

the *uolatilia*. The former are born of the seas and rivers which are heavier because they are adjacent to the earth, the latter from the lighter waters that are suspended in the air. Consequently the movement of the former is more sluggish, that of the latter more volatile. This also means that soul is less developed in the former than in the latter, for we know that fishes are less acute of sight and hearing than birds. But the division is not a hard and fast one, for some of the *reptilia* lead an amphibious life on water and on land, and there are birds that live in water and in air.

Creauitque deus κήρη grandia (742A 14–B 9). Eriugena contents himself with a grammatical note on the declension of the noun κήτος, and brings the book to an abrupt conclusion.

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5. SIGLA

R	MS Rheims 875.
B	MS Bamberg Ph. 2/1.
P	MS Paris, Bibl. Nat. lat. 12964.
A	MS Avranches 230.
T	Cambridge Trin. Coll. O. 5. 20.
O	Oxford Bodl. Auct. F. III 15.
R	ATORm.
C	Eriugena's supposed autograph.
sC	other scribes writing apparently from Eriugena's dictation.
sR, sB, sP, sA, sT, sO, sRm	} supplementation, in the hands of the scribes of the MSS, of words or passages omitted.
R*, B*, P*, A*, T*, O*, Rm*	
R ^c , B ^c , P ^c , A ^c , T ^c , O ^c , Rm ^c	} corrected readings.

Rm	the scribe of the twelfth-century lemmata and of ff. 212-17 in R.
*(**)	one (two) letter(s) erased.
< . . . >	words or letters added to the text.
[. . .]	words or letters excluded from the text.
[. . .]	additions to the text of R, in hand C except for ff. 212-17 (where they are deduced from internal evidence) and where otherwise stated.
[2. . .] ²	additions in hand C to such additions.
< . . . >	additions to the text of B, in hand C except where otherwise stated. (The lemmata, however, which are in hand C except where otherwise stated, are not distinguished typographically).
Small type	additions to the text in P.
Italics	corrections in hand C to RB.

In view of the fact that MSS RBP represent three successive recensions of the text it has been decided to give a full 'positive' apparatus criticus, and to do so, for the sake of consistency, even where a manuscript variant is merely a scribal blunder.

In the *apparatus fontium* and in the Notes the titles of the Ps.-Dionysian treatises are abridged as follows: *CH* = *De caelesti hierarchia*; *EH* = *De ecclesiastica hierarchia*; *DN* = *De diuinis nominibus*; *MT* = *De mystica theologia*; *Ep.* = *Epistolae*.

The numbers and letters in the right-hand margin of the Latin text refer to columns and sections of PL cxxii; the numbers in the right-hand margin of the English text give the chapters into which the Latin text is divided in the earlier editions.

6. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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¹ P. Lucentini's important notice, 'La nuova edizione del "Periphyseon" dell'Eriugena', *Studi Medievali*, ser. 3^a, xvii (1976), pp. 393-414, appeared after Dr. Sheldon-Williams' death. I have to thank G. Madec, *Études Augustiniennes*, Paris, for placing at my disposal a list of passages in *Periphyseon*, iii, borrowed from or influenced by St. Augustine (J. J. O'M.).

PERIPHYSEON

LIBER III

*ΑΝΑΚΕΦΑ-
ΛΑΙΩCIC
secundi libri

N. In secundo libro tota fere nostrae ratiocinationis intentio est 619A
constituta de secunda uniuersalis naturae consideratione et ut ita
dicam forma seu specie quaecunque uerisimilia nobis uisa sunt et 5
ad liquidum, ut arbitror, deducta ueraeque rationis conclusionibus
inconcusse munita litteris mandare.

Vniuersalis autem naturae secunda consideratio est in ea ipsius 619B
parte quae et creatur et creat, in qua rerum omnium principia, hoc
est primordiales causae seu, ut saepe dictum est, praedestinationes 10
rerum creandarum seu diuinae uoluntates et sanctorum patrum
auctoritas et ipsa recta ratione consulta ueritas edocet esse consider-
anda, *ubi etiam* disputationis necessitas exigebat quaedam de ince-
dentibus quaestionibus principalis quaestionis reuelandae gratia intro-
ducere. Nulla siquidem principalis quaestio est, ut opinor, quae non 15
incidentes quaestiones, dum diligenti mentis contuitu inuestigatur,
recipiat [—enodari enim aliter impossibile est—], praesertim cum
necessarium atque ineuitabile fieret, dum de principiis rerum dis-
putabamus, hoc est de primordialibus causis, de uno etiam omnium 619C
principio, deo uidelicet, qui solus est sola ac prima causarum omnium 20
causa et supercausalis causa et superessentialis bonitas, cuius partici-
patione omnia principia et omnes causae omnium rerum subsistunt,
ipse uero nullum participat, quia omni principio superiori se uel
secum existenti <et> non coessentiali sibi omnino caret, quod animo
occurrebat inseri. Quis enim de creatis causis recte quid dicet, nisi 25
prius unicam omnium causam per se subsistentem et a nulla praee-
cedenti se creatam pure perspiciat in quantum de ineffabili datur fari
deque incomprehensibili comprehendi de superante omnem intel-
lectum intelligi?

1 *titulus* incipit tertius ΠΕΡΙΦΥCΕΩΝ B(C)P: *lemma* incipit liber tertius Rm
3 *lemma* B *quod pro subtitulo habet* P: ΑΝΑΚΕΦΑΛΕΩCIC BP 4 *lemma* de
natura quae creatur et non creat et de ordine dispositionis Rm 9 quae RB:
qua P in qua B^cP: et in qua RB* 10 praedestinationes RB: prae-
destinationes P 13 *ubi etiam in ras.* R 13-14 *incidentibus* RBP: *inciden-*
tibus A 16 *incidentes* RBP: *incidentes* A 18 *post* fieret ut *erasum* R
20 *sola s.l.* R 24 et non coessentiali B^cP: non tamen coessentiali RB*
coessentiali: *glossa* glo hoc dictum est propter filium et spiritum sanctum qui et
coessentialis patri sunt et principia rerum subsistunt non tamen tria sed unum
principium *in alia glossa erasa adscripsit* C in B 25 *inseri* R^cBP:
inserere R* *dicet* R^cBP: *dicat* R*

PERIPHYSEON

BOOK III

N. In the Second Book almost the entire purport of our reasoning 619A
was directed towards setting down in writing what seemed to us
likely to be true, and what we had, I think, brought to a clear explana- 5
tion and fortified with the irrefutable conclusions of true reason, con-
cerning the second aspect or, if I may so call it, form or species of
universal Nature.

Now the second aspect of universal Nature consists in that part of
it which both is created and creates, in which we are taught both by
the authority of the Holy Fathers and by the Truth itself, when reason
is applied to it, to consider the principles of all things, that is to say,
the primordial causes or, as they have often been called, the pre-
destinations of things that are to be created or the divine volitions;
and *in which also* the trend of the discourse required that we should
include something about incidental problems in order to elucidate
the main one. For there is no main problem, I think, which does not
involve incidental problems when it is being investigated by a diligent
mind [—for it would be impossible to solve it otherwise—], espe-
cially as it became necessary and inevitable in the course of discussing
the principles of things, that is, the primordial causes, to introduce
what it came into our mind (to say) about the one principle of all
things also, that is, about God, Who only is the one and first Cause
of all causes and the Cause beyond causality and the Goodness
beyond being, by participation in Whom all principles and all causes
of all things subsist, while He Himself participates in none because
He has no principle at all whether superior to Him or co-existent
with Him that is not coessential with Him. For who shall rightly
say anything about the created causes unless he first has a clear view
of the unique Cause of all things which subsists by Itself and is
created by nothing prior to Itself?—in so far as it is given (us) to
utter the unutterable or comprehend the incomprehensible (or)
understand that which passes all understanding.

Recapitula-
tion of the
Second Book

Cum his etiam quaedam de reditu rerum mutabilium atque segregatarum per diuersas naturae diuisiones et partes quibus mundus [iste] perficitur iterum in principia sua ex quibus procedunt et in quibus immutabiliter subsistunt, dum finis omnium uenerit eorumque quae in motu sunt status apparuerit, post quem nihil mouebitur praelibauimus.

His itaque aliisque ut diximus secundi sermonis ordo textitur. Deinde consequentia quaestionum ni fallor exigit tertium librum deo duce de tertia uniuersalis naturae consideratione, hoc est de ea parte creaturae quae creatur et non creat, quicquid nobis in mente lux aeterna patefecerit texi.

A. Non aliter disputandi uiam ingredi oportet ut aestimo. Nam si primus liber de ea natura cuncta creante et a nullo creata deque solo deo intellecta, secundus uero de ea quae et creatur et creat et in primordiis rerum cognoscitur rationabili tractat progressionem, num consequens est ut et tertius de tertia quae creatur et non creat constitutionis suae materiam suscipiat?

Sed priusquam ad [e]nodandam hanc naturae partem transeamus nosse uelim qua ratione eam naturam quae ab omnium naturarum uniuersitate per excellentiam sui atque infinitatem remouetur ueluti primam partem ipsius uniuersitatis ponere uoluisti. Uniuersitas siquidem formarum suarum partiumque numeris impletur ac per hoc in infinitum non progreditur. Suis enim finibus sursum uersus atque deorsum terminatur. Ab intellectuali siquidem creatura [quae in angelis est constituta] et ut altius ascendamus a primordialibus causis supra quas uera ratio nil superius praeter solum deum repperit inchoans, per naturales [ordines] intelligibilium caelestiumque essentialium et uisibilium mundum istum constituentium usque ad extremum totius creaturae ordinem qui corporibus corporumque incrementis <ac> detrimentis [impletur] uariis quoque decessionibus et successionibus per catholicorum elementorum in propria coitum eorumque iterum in katholica solutionem [peragitur] descendit.

Creatrix uero totius uniuersitatis natura quoniam infinita est nullis finibus sursum uel deorsum concluditur. ipsa siquidem ambit omnia et a nullo ambitur. Nec mirum dum nec a se ipsa ambiri non sinitur quia uniuersaliter nescit ambiri. Quemadmodum uniuersaliter a se

8 post exigit erasum est ut in R tertium librum R^c(C)BP: tertius liber R*
 11 texi R^cBP: textitur ex texatur R* 12 oportet in ras. R(C) 13 ea
 in ras. R(C) et a nullo in ras. R(C) 17 materiam R^cP: materiae R*B
 19 eam scripsit C in B 20 sui R^cBP: suam R* 21 uniuersitas RB^cP:
 uniuersitatem B* 25 et in ras. R(C) 26 repperit BP: reperit R
 27 inchoans R^cBP: inchoantem R* 30 ac detrimentis B^c(C)P: detrimentisque
 R*: detrimentis R*B* 31 elementorum R^cBP: elementorum R* propria
 in ras. R 32 eorumque RB^cP: eorum quae B* katholica R recte: catholi-
 cas BP 35 ambiri non sinitur R^c(C)BP: ambiens R*

Also, in addition to these matters we made some preliminary remarks about the Return of mutable and dispersed things through the various divisions and parts of nature which make up [this] world back into their principles from which they proceed and in which they immutably subsist when the end of all things shall come and rest shall come to all things in motion, after which nothing will move.

Of these, then, and other matters the composition of the second discourse is made up. The questions that follow upon them require, unless I am mistaken, that the Third Book shall consist, under God's guidance, of whatever the Divine Light shall reveal to our minds concerning the third aspect of universal Nature, that is, concerning that part of creation which is created and does not create.

A. In no other way should we embark upon the discussion, as I think. For if the First Book deals with *that* nature which creates all things *and* is created *by nothing* and which is recognized in God alone, and the second, in logical succession, with that which both is created and creates and is recognized in the origins of things, does it not follow that the third also should take the subject of its composition from the third (nature), which is created and does not create?

But before we pass on to the elucidation of this part of Nature I should like to know for what reason you decided to represent *that* nature which is separated from the universe of all natures because of its excellence and infinity as though (it were) the first part of that universe. For the universe is completed by the numbers of its species and parts, and therefore does not extend to infinity. For above and below it is bounded by limits; for, starting from the intelligible creature [which is established in the angels] *and*, to go higher, from the primordial causes than which right reason has discovered nothing higher save God alone, it descends through the natural [orders] of the intelligible and celestial essences and of the visible essences which compose this world as far as the lowest of the whole creation, which [is occupied] by bodies and the growth <and> decline of bodies and [is brought about] by departures and replacements through the coming together of the universal elements into particulars and their dissolution into universals once again.

But the nature which creates the whole universe, being infinite, is not enclosed by any bound above or below, for it bounds all things and is bounded by nothing. And no wonder, since it *may not* be bounded even by itself because it knows no boundary at all. Since, being beyond nature, it escapes all comprehension by itself, how

ipsa, quanto magis ab alio, comprehendi seu in aliquo diffinito uel diffinibili *supernaturaliter effugit* intelligi?—nisi forte quis dicat in hoc solo se ambit dum se sapit ambiri non posse, in hoc se comprehendit dum se sapit comprehensibilem non esse, in hoc se intelligit dum sapit in ullo se intelligi impossibile esse—quia omne quod est et potest esse superat. et cum ita sit nullusque recte philosophantium his rationibus temere resistat, cur intra uniuersitatis diuisiones a te constituitur non plane uideo.

N. In diuisionibus uniuersitatis conditae nullo modo eam posuerim, in diuisionibus autem ipsius uniuersitatis quae uno naturae uniuersalis uocabulo comprehenditur non uno sed multiplici rationis intuitu ponendam iudicaui. Eo nanque nomine quod est natura non solum creata uniuersitas uerum etiam ipsius creatrix solet significari. Prima siquidem et maxima diuisio est uniuersalis naturae in creatricem uniuersitatis conditae et creatam in ipsa condita uniuersitate. Ni mirum cum naturalis ista diuisio in omnibus uniuersitatibus in infinitum uniformiter seruetur. Nam uniuersalis boni prima sectio est in illud unum ac summum incommutabile per se *et* substantiale bonum ex quo omne bonum manat, et in illud bonum quod participatione summi et incommutabilis boni bonum est. Similiter uniuersalis essentiae uniuersalis uitae uniuersalis sapientiae uniuersalis uirtutis eadem principalis diuisio est. In his enim caeterisque similibus primo discernitur ea natura quae per se ipsam a se ipsa in se ipsa uere et immutabiliter essentia est et uita et sapientia et uirtus ab ea natura quae participatione summi boni aut tantum est aut et est et uiuit *aut est et uiuit et sentit aut et est et uiuit et sentit et ratiocinatur aut et est et uiuit et sentit et ratiocinatur et sapit*.

Videsne quemadmodum totius uniuersitatis conditor primum [in diuisionibus] obtinet locum?—nec immerito dum sit principium omnium et inseparabilis ab omni uniuersitate quam condidit et sine quo subsistere non potest. In ipso enim immutabiliter et essentialiter sunt omnia et ipse est diuisio et collectio uniuersalis creaturae et genus et species et totum et pars dum nullius sit uel genus uel species seu totum seu pars sed haec omnia ex ipso et in ipso et ad ipsum sunt. Nam

1 *post* alio effugit *erasum* R comprehendi R^cBP: intelligi(?) R* 2 *super-*
naturaliter effugit *in ras.* R(C) 4 comprehensibilem RB: comprehensibile P
5 impossibile esse R^c(C)BP: possibile non esse R* 6 superat BP: superrat R
12 nanque BP: namque R 13 *post* significari: uniuersitatis *cancelatum* R
18 et *scripsit* C in B 24 ipsa uere RBP^c: ipsam re P* 25 quae RB:
qua P 25-26 aut est et uiuit et sentit aut—et sapit B^c(C): aut est
et uiuit et sapit et uirtutem participat R*: aut est et uiuit et sapit aut est et uiuit
et sapit et uirtutem participat R^c: aut est et uiuit et sentit (et sentit *in marg.*)
aut est et uiuit et sentit et sapit et uirtutem participat B*(?): aut et est et uiuit
et sentit et ratiocinatur aut et est et uiuit et sentit et ratiocinatur et sapit
P 28-29 in diuisionibus sC in R 29 dum sit principium *bis*
scriptum R*

much more (will it elude) any defined or definable intellect?—unless perhaps someone should say: 'There is this one way in which it bounds itself: by its knowledge that it cannot be bounded. There is this way in which it comprehends itself: by its knowledge that it cannot be comprehended. There is this way in which it understands itself: by its knowledge that it is impossible for it to be understood in anything.' For it transcends everything that is or can be. And since this is the case, and none of those who correctly practise philosophy would be so rash as to dispute these arguments, why it is included by you among the divisions of the universe I am at a loss to see.

N. Among the divisions of the created universe I certainly would not place it, but for placing it among the divisions of that universe which is comprehended by the term universal Nature I have not one but many reasons. For by that name, 'Nature', is usually signified not only the created universe but also that which creates it. For the first and greatest division of universal Nature is into that which creates the established universe and that which is created in that established universe. No wonder, for this division of nature persists uniformly throughout all the universes to infinity. For the first division of the universal Good is into that one and supreme Good (which is) immutable in itself and substantial, from which every good flows, and that good which is good by participation in the supreme and immutable Good. The same principal division is similarly (found) in the universal Essence, the Universal Life, the universal Wisdom, and the universal Power. For in these and in others like them is the first discrimination of that Nature which through itself by itself in itself truly and immutably is Essence and Life and Wisdom and Power from that nature which by participation in the supreme Good either has being only, or has both being and life, *or has being and life and sense, or has both being and life and sense and reason or has both being and life and sense and reason and wisdom.*

Do you see how the Creator of the whole universe takes the first place [in the divisions]?—not without reason, for He is the Beginning of all things and is inseparable from every universe that He has created and (is that) without which it cannot subsist. For in Him are all things immutably and essentially; and He is the Division and Collection of the universal creature, and Genus and Species and Whole and Part although He is neither genus nor species nor whole

et monas principium numerorum est primaque progressio et a bea omnium numerorum *pluralitas* inchoat eorundemque reductus atque collectio in ea consummatur. Siquidem omnes numeri uniuersaliter et incommutabiliter in monade subsistunt et in omnibus eis totum et pars est et totius diuisionis primordium [dum sit ipsa in se ipsa neque numerus neque pars eius]. Eadem ratio est centri in circulo [seu sphaera], signi in figura, puncti in linea. Cum igitur totius uniuersitatis diuisio ab ipsius causa et creatrice incipiat non eam ueluti primam partem uel speciem debemus intelligere sed ab ea omnem diuisionem et partitionem inchoare quoniam omnis uniuersitatis principium est et medium et finis et dum haec de ea et praedicantur et intelliguntur, hoc est dum in diuisionibus uniuersitatum primum locum obtineat, nemo tamen est pie credentium et ueritatem intelligentium qui non continuo absque ulla cunctatione exclamet causam totius uniuersitatis conditae creatricem supernaturalem esse et superessentialem et super omnem uitam et sapientiam et uirtutem et super omnia quae dicuntur et intelliguntur et omni sensu percipiuntur dum sit horum omnium principium causale et medium implens essenziale et finis consummans omnemque motum stabilitans quietumque faciens et ambitus omnia quae sunt et quae non sunt circumscribens.

A. His altae cautaeque ratiocinationis collationibus libenter cedo ac uerisimiles eas approbo. sed priusquam ad considerandos effectus primordialium causarum ex quibus maxime prima omnium et una creatrix causa solet denominari accedas ordinem naturalem earum nosse conuenit. Adhuc enim mixtim indistincteque introductas esse arbitror. Nam ni fallor ad earum effectuumque suorum perfectam notitiam non mediocre auxilium quaerentibus praestabit si prius naturalis ordo quo a creatore conditae sunt luculenter patefactus fuerit.

N. Primordialium causarum seriem diuinae prouidentiae sollers inuestigator sanctus dionysius ariopagita in libro de diuinis nominibus apertissime disposuit. Summae siquidem bonitatis quae nullius particeps quoniam per-se-ipsam bonitas est primam donationem et participationem asserit esse per-se-ipsam bonitatem cuius participatione quaecunq[ue] bona sunt bona sunt ideoque per-se-ipsam bonitas

33 Cf. DN xi. 6, PG iii. 953C 8-956B 10.

2 pluralitas in ras. R(C) 3 omnes P recte: omnis RB 8 post eam tamen *erasum* R 15 causam totius RB: totius causam P 20 quietumque RB: quaecumque P 21 circumscribens RB: circumscribens P 22 altae RB: alte P 24 et una om. P 26 indistincteque RB: indistinctaeque P introductas RB: introductis P 27 suorum R^eB: suarum R*: suarumque suarum P 29 lemma BP quo RB: quae P 31 post causarum naturarum *erasum* R 32 dionysius RB: dionysius P 33 marg. I B: I per se ipsam bonitas P: i bonitas Rm

nor part of anything, but all these are from Him and in Him and (return) to Him. For the monad also is the beginning of numbers and the leader of their progression, and from it the *plurality* of all the numbers begins and in it is consummated the return and collection of the same. For all numbers subsist as a whole and immutably in the monad, and in all of them it is the whole and the part, and of the whole division it is the beginning [although it is itself in itself neither number nor a part of it]. It is the same with the centre of a circle [or of a sphere], with the sign for a figure, with the point on a line. Since then the division of the whole universe starts from its Cause and Creator, we ought to regard Him not as the first part or species but as that from which every division and partition originates, since of every universe He is the Beginning and Middle and End; and although those things are predicated and understood of Him, that is, although He occupies the first place in the divisions of universes, yet there is no one of those who devoutly believe and understand the truth who would not persistently and without any hesitation declare that the creative Cause of the whole universe is beyond nature and beyond being and beyond all life and wisdom and power and beyond all things which are said and understood and perceived by any sense, since He is the causal Beginning of all those things, and the essential Middle which fulfils (them), and the End in which they are consummated and which brings to rest every motion and imposes tranquillity, and the boundary which bounds all things that are and all things that are not.

A. To these conclusions of lofty and cautious reasoning I gladly give way and acknowledge that they are likely to be true. But before you come to consider the effects of the primordial causes from which especially the first and unique creative Cause of all things is wont to be named, it would be convenient to know the natural order (of the causes). For up to now I think that they have been mentioned in a confused and indiscriminate sequence. For, if I am not mistaken, it will help inquirers not a little towards a perfect knowledge of them and of their effects if we start by making clear the natural order in which they were established by their Creator.

N. The order of the primordial causes has been very clearly set out by that industrious investigator of the Divine Providence St. Dionysius the Areopagite in his Book on the Divine Names. For he

Concerning the Order of the Primordial Causes

dicitur quia per se ipsum summum bonum participat. Caetera enim bona non per se ipsa summum et substantiale bonum participant sed per eam quae est per se ipsam summi boni prima participatio. 622c
Et haec regula in omnibus primordialibus causis uniformiter obseruatur, hoc est quod per se ipsas participationes principales sunt unius 5 omnium causarum quae deus est.

II Quoniam uero summae ac uerae naturae prima consideratio est qua intelligitur summa ac uera bonitas, secunda uero qua intelligitur summa ac uera essentia, non immerito primordialium causarum secundum locum obtinet per-se-ipsam essentia, quae cum summae 10 ac uerae essentiae prima participatio sit omnia quae post se sunt sua participatione accipiunt esse ac per hoc non solum bona uerum etiam existentia sunt.

III Tertia diuinae naturae intentio est qua intelligitur summa ueraque uita ideoque tertia in primordialibus causis per-se-ipsam uita connumeratur, quae summae ac uerae uitae prima per se participatio 15 subsistens ut omnia post eam uiuentia participatione eius uiuerent creata est. Hinc conficitur et bona et existentia et uiuentia esse eiusdem naturae. 622D

III Quarta theoria qua summa ac uera ratio cognoscitur. Hinc perspicitur quartam inter primordiales per-se-ipsam ratio sessionem primamque summae ac uerae rationis participationem omniumque post se rationabilium, hoc est rationis participantium, possidere 20 primordia. 623A

V Diuinae naturae quinta theoria in summa ac uera intelligentia uersatur. Intellectus enim est intelligens omnia priusquam fiant ac per hoc quinta in ordine primordialium cognoscitur per-se-ipsam intelligentia, cuius participatione intelligunt quaecunque intelligunt et intellectus sunt, ipsa uero prima participatio summae ac uerae intelligentiae condita est. 25 30

VI Sexta contemplatio diuinae naturae in uera summaque sapientia constituitur. Hinc non immerito inter primordiales causas sexto loco per-se-ipsam sapientia collocatur, quae prima participatio est summae

2 ipsa R recte: ipsam BP participant RB^cP: participat B* 3 ipsam RB: ipsa P. 5 sunt s.l. R 6 causae s.l. alia manu B 7 uerae RB: uere P 8 marg. II B: II per se ipsam essentia P: ii essentia Rm post intelligitur (2) rasura R 10 obtinet RB: optinet P 14 marg. III B: III per se ipsam uita P: iii uita Rm 15 ideoque: -o- s.l. R 17 eam RB^cP: eum B* participatione RB: participatio P 18 post conficitur ut erasum R et existentia: et om. P post uiuentia rasura R 20 marg. IIII B: IIII per se ipsam ratio P: iiii ratio Rm 20-21 perspicitur RB^c: perficitur B*: est quod P 21 inter R^cBP: in R* 22 participationem RB^cP: participationis B* 23 possidere RB: possidet P 25 marg. V B: V per se ipsam intelligentia P: v intelligentia in ras. Rm 26-28 uersatur-intelligentia om. P 28 quaecunque B: quaecumque R: quaecunque intelligunt om. P 29 intellectus R^cBP: intellectu R* 31 marg. VI B: VI per se ipsam sapientia P: vi sapientia Rm 33 collocatur -c- s.l. R

asserts that the first gift and participation of the Supreme Goodness, I which participates in nothing since it is Goodness-through-Itself, is that goodness-through-itself by participation in which whatsoever things are good are good, and that is why it is called goodness-through-itself, because it participates in the Supreme Goodness-through-Itself. For the other goods do not through themselves participate in the supreme and substantial Good but through that which is through-itself the first participation of the Supreme Good. And this rule is uniformly observed in the case of all the primordial causes, that is, that they are in themselves the principal participations of the One Cause of all things Who is God.

But since the first aspect of the supreme and true nature is that by which it is understood as the supreme and true Goodness while the second is that by which it is understood as the supreme and true II Essence, the second place among the primordial causes is not inappropriately occupied by essence-through-itself, and since this is the first participation of the supreme and true Essence, all things after it that have essence receive their essence by participation in it, and therefore are not only goods but existents.

The third aspect of the Divine Nature is that by which it is understood as the supreme and true Life, and therefore life-through-itself III is reckoned third among the primordial causes, and this, the first subsisting participation-through-itself of the supreme and true Life, was created in order that all things after it that have life have it by participation in it. Hence it is that goods and existents and living things are of the same nature.

The fourth aspect is that by which it is known as the supreme and IV true Reason. Therefore reason-through-itself is seen to have the fourth seat among the primordials and the first participation of the supreme and true Reason, and the origins of all reasonable beings after it, that is, of all things that participate in reason.

The fifth aspect of the Divine Nature concerns the supreme and V true Intellect. For intellect is that which has intellectual knowledge of all things before they are made, and therefore fifth in the order of the primordials is known intellect-through-itself, by participation in which all things that have intellectual knowledge have intellectual knowledge and are intellects, whereas it itself is established as the first participation of the supreme and true Intellect.

The sixth aspect of the Divine Nature is constituted in the true VI and supreme Wisdom. Hence wisdom-through-itself is not inappropriately set in the sixth place among the primordial causes, for it is the first participation in the supreme and true Wisdom, but is

ac uerae sapientiae, participatione uero sui omnibus post se sapientibus sapiendi causa *creata est*.

VII Verae ac summae naturae septima contemplatio est quae considerat summam ipsius ac ueram uirtutem ac per hoc per-se-ipsam uirtus inter primordiales septimam sedem occupat et est prima participatio summae ac uerae uirtutis, caetera[e] uero post eam uirtutum species participationes ipsius sunt. 623B

VIII Octauus theoriae gradus est in quo mens pura summam ueramque diuinae naturae beatitudinem intuetur, cuius prima participatio est per se beatitudo quam ueluti octauam primordialium participant beata quaecunque post se beata sunt omnia. 10

VIII Nona in ordine theoria diuinae ac summae ueritatis, cuius prima participatio est per-se-ipsam ueritas post quam et per quam quasi primordialium nonam uera quaecunque uera sunt omnia.

X Decima ponitur per-se-ipsam aeternitas, quae prima participatio est summae ac uerae aeternitatis et post quam et per quam aeterna sunt quaecunque aeterna sunt omnia. 15 623C

Eadem ratio est de magnitudine de amore et pace de unitate et perfectione. Per has enim primordiales causas a summa omnium causa descendunt quaecunque magnitudinis amoris pacis unitatis perfectionis participantia sunt. 20

Sufficiunt haec ut arbitrator ad ea quae uolumus manifestanda. Praedicta siquidem theoria uniformiter in omnibus rerum omnium principiis in infinitum progredientibus mentis obtutibus deiformiter arridet ubique siue in his quae et intelligi et nominari possunt siue in his quae solo intellectu percipiuntur significationibus tamen deficient siue in his quae nec intellectu comprehenduntur nec nominationibus exprimuntur, fugiunt enim omnem sensum omnemque mentis contutum, nimia siquidem altitudinis suae claritate obscurantur. In ipso enim sunt de quo apostolus dixit: 'Qui solus habet immortalitatem et lucem habitat inaccessibilem.' 25 623D

Nec mirum si causae primordiales in infinitum protendantur. Vt enim prima omnium causa ex qua et in qua et per quam et ad quam conditae sunt infinita est ita et ipsae finem nesciunt quo claudantur praeter creatoris sui uoluntatem. 30 624A 35

30-31 1 Tim. vi. 16.

1 sapientiae s.l. R omnibus R^cBP: omnia R* 2 creta est in ras. R(C)
3 marg. VII B: VII per se ipsam uirtus P: vii uirtus Rm 5 sedem RB: sedet P occupat R^cBP: occupata R* 8 marg. VIII B: VIII per se beatitudo P: viii beatitudo Rm summam ueramque R recte: summa ueraque BP
10 per se om. P 11 beata quaecunque B^cP: beataque sunt quaecumque R: beataque sunt quaecumque B* 12 marg. VIII B: VIII per se ueritas P: ix ueritas Rm 14 uera quaecunque B: uera sunt quaecumque R: uera sunt quaecumque P 15 marg. X B: X per se aeternitas P: x aeternitas Rm se

created to be the cause of the possession of wisdom for all those who by participation in it possess wisdom after it.

The seventh aspect of the true and supreme Nature is that which regards its supreme and true Power, and therefore power-through-itself occupies the seventh seat among the primordials and is the first participation of the supreme and true Power, whereas the other kinds of powers after it are participations of it. VII

The eighth degree of contemplation is that in which the pure mind beholds the supreme and true Blessedness of the Divine Nature, of which the first participation is blessedness-through-itself, in which all blessed beings that are blessed after it participate as in the eighth of the primordials. VIII

Ninth in order (is) the aspect of divine and supreme Truth, of which the first participation is truth-through-itself, after which and through which, as the ninth of the primordials, all truths are true. VIII

The tenth place is occupied by eternity-through-itself, which is the first participation in the supreme and true Eternity, and after which and through which all eternal things are eternal. X

The same can be said of Magnitude, of Love and Peace, of Unity and Perfection. For through these primordial causes there descend from the supreme Cause of all things whatever partakes of magnitude, love, peace, unity, perfection.

This is enough, I think, to explain what we mean. For all the principles of all things, extending to infinity, divinely reveal themselves everywhere to the contemplations of the mind under aspects uniform with those that have been mentioned, whether in things which can be understood and receive a name, or in those which can be perceived by the intellect alone but cannot be signified, or in those which are neither comprehended by the intellect nor expressed by names because they elude every sense and every mental concept, for they are hidden¹ by the excessive brightness of their transcendence. For they abide in Him of whom the Apostle said, 'Who alone hath immortality and dwelleth in inaccessible light'.

Nor is it strange that the primordial causes should extend to infinity. For as the First Cause of all things, from which and in which and through which and for which they are created,² is infinite, so neither do they know any end to limit them but the will of their Creator.

s.l. R 17 quaecunque B: quaecumque R: quaecunque-omnia om. P
18 lemma xi magnitudo Rm 20 lemma xii amor Rm quaecunque B:
quaecumque RP 21 lemma xiii pax Rm 24 lemma xv perfectio Rm
25 siue . . . siue RB: seu . . . siue P nominari R^cBP: nomina R* 34 ipsae RB: ipse P

Et notandum quod ordo iste primordialium causarum quem a me
exigis ad certum progrediendi modum inconfuse discerni non in
ipsis sed in theoria, hoc est in animi contuitu quaerentis eas earumque
quantum datur notitiam in se ipso concipientis eamque quodam modo
ordinantis, constitutus sit ut de eis certum aliquid puraque intelli- 5
gentia diffinitum pronuntiare possit. Ipsae siquidem primae causae in
se ipsis unum sunt et simplices nullique cognito ordine diffinitae aut
a se inuicem segregatae. Hoc enim in effectibus suis patiuntur et
sicut in monade dum omnes numeri sola ratione subsistunt, nullus
tamen numerus ab alio numero discernitur—unum enim sunt et 10
simplex unum et non ex multis compositum unum, siquidem ex 624B
monade omnis numerorum multiplicatio progreditur in infinitum,
non autem monas ex multiplicibus et a se progredientibus numeris
ueluti in unum collectis conficitur—, similiter primordiales causae
dum in principio omnium, in uerbo uidelicet dei unigenito, sub- 15
stitutae intelliguntur unum simplex atque indiuiduum sunt, dum
uero in effectus suos in infinitum multiplicatos procedunt numerosam
ordinatamque sui pluralitatem recipiunt—non quia causa omnium
ordo non sit uel ordinatio uel non per-se-ipsam ordinatio in prin-
cipiis rerum [non] numeretur cum omne ordinatum participatione 20
ipsius sit ordinatum, sed quia omnis ordo in summa omnium causa
et in ipsius prima participatione unus ac simplex [est] nullisque
differentiis discernitur, ubi omnes ordines a se ipsis non discre-
pant quoniam unum inseparabile sunt, unde rerum multiplex ordo 624C
discendit. Ordo itaque primordialium causarum iuxta contemplantis 25
animi arbitrium constituitur in quantum earum cognitio de diuinis
causis disputantibus datur. Licet enim pie ac pure philosophantibus
ab unaquaque earum prout uult inchoare et per caeteras mentis
oculum qui est uera ratio ordine quodam contemplationis [conuol-
uere] omnes quascunque potest percipiens et in qualicunque earum 30
terminum suae theoriae constituere, sicut nunc intentionis nostrae
humilis capacitas ex bonitate primordialium causarum, ueluti quo-
dam ordine constitutarum, numerum cepit computare et in ea quae
dicitur per-se-ipsam perfectio ueluti quinto decimo loco constituta 624D
finem exemplo dedit, quoniam exempli gratia has principales causas 36
pro uiribus intentionis suae elegit et ut ei uisum est ordinauit,—non
quod ita natura sua sint constitutae ubi omnia unum sunt et simul

14–16 Cf. Aug. *De diu. qu.* 83. 46. 2; *De Trin.* vi. 10. 11.

2 ad R^cBP: a R* 3 animi R^cBP: animae R* 8 a s.l. R lemma BP
patiuntur RB: partiuntur P 15 dei RB: dum P 23–24 discrepant
R^cBP: discrep*nt R* 25 descendit RB: descendit P 26 earum RB:
pirum P 27 *rasura ante licet* R 29 *post ratio rasura* R 30 quascunque
RB: quascumque P 33 cepit RB: coepit P 37 sint RBP^c: sit P*

And be it noted that this sequence of the primordial causes which
you ask me to set out distinctly in a definite order of precedence is
constituted not in themselves but in the aspects, that is, in the concept
of the mind which investigates them and which conceives in itself
such knowledge of them as is permitted and arranges that know-
ledge methodically so that it should be possible to say something
about them which should be sure and defined by a pure understand-
ing. For in themselves these first causes are one and simple and none
knows the order in which they are placed or are distinguished one
from another. For this is something that happens to them in their
effects, and as in the monad although in the sphere of reason alone
all the numbers subsist in it, yet no number is distinguished from
another number—for they are one and a simple one and not a one
that is a composite of many, for it is from the monad that every
multiplication of numbers proceeds to infinity whereas the monad
is not composed from the multiples that issue in progression from it
as though it were made up of the collection of them into one—,
similarly the primordial causes when seen by the intellect to be
substantially existing in the Beginning of all things, that is, in the
only begotten Word of God, are a simple and indivisible One, but
when they proceed into their effects that are multiplied to infinity
they acquire their numerable and ordered plurality—not that the
Cause of all things is not Order or Ordering, or that order-through-
itself is not included among the principles of things, for every ordered
thing is ordered by participation in it; but because all order in the
supreme Cause of all things and in the first participation in it [is]
one and simple and is distinguished by no differences, and in it no
order clashes with any other since they are an inseparable one from
which the multiple order of things descends. Therefore the order of
the primordial causes is constituted in the judgement of the mind
which contemplates them in so far as knowledge of them is granted
to those who discourse on the divine causes. For a devout and pure-
minded philosopher may start from any one of them at will and let
his mind's eye, which is true reason, [embrace] the others in any
order of contemplation, observing all of them that he can, and con-
clude his contemplation at any one of them whatever, just as in the
present case the humble capacity of our contemplation began the
enumeration of the primordial causes from Goodness, as though
they were constituted in a definite order, and ended the example in
that which is called perfection-through-itself as though it were consti-
tuted in the fifteenth place—for it was by way of example that to the
best of its contemplative power it selected these principal causes and
set them in the order that seemed good to it, not because they are so

An example
concerning
the Primor-
dial Causes

et simpliciter sunt, sed quod quaerentibus eas deque eis quiddam
 exempli gratia proferre uolentibus sic uel sic et multipliciter et
 infinite diuino radio illuminant[e] in theophaniis suis solent apparere
 —et, ut hoc exemplo rerum sensibilium clarius luceat, centrum et
 circumscriptum ei circulum diligenter intueri rectasque lineas a
 centro inchoatas et ad circulum porrectas ibique terminatas.

aliud
paradigma

A. Saepe hoc aspexi seu in animo per phantasiam interius seu in
 figura uisibili corporeaue exterius sensibus subiecta.

N. Non intuitus es quomodo omnes lineae in centro adunantur ut
 nulla illarum ab aliis discerni possit? Nimirum quia omnes in eo
 unum sunt et nullo modo a se ipsis discrepant ita ut rationabiliter
 non iunctura linearum in unum sed fons atque principium simplex
 et indiuiduum ex quo siue naturaliter siue arte multiplex linearum
 numerus procedit centrum diffiniatur. Est enim centrum uniuersale
 linearum initium in quo omnes unum sunt.

A. Hoc quoque in geometricis rationibus mihi apertissime suasum.
 Sed haec omnia plus animo quam sensu percipiuntur siue interius
 per phantasiam siue exterius per sensum de talibus uelit quis disputare.

N. Recte dicis. Haec enim et huius modi pura mentis acie diiudi-
 cantur. Vides ni fallor in prima linearum progressionem ab ipsa unitate
 quae in centro est quantum sibi inuicem lineae coniunguntur ut uix
 discerni a se inuicem possint, dum uero longius a centro protendun-
 tur latius paululum spatia quibus a se inuicem segregantur crescere
 incipiunt donec ad extremum circulum quo finiuntur perueniant ubi
 latissima sua diastemata mensurantur, hoc est spatia inter lineas
 constituta, quae sibi inuicem aequalia sunt ut nulla eorum latiora
 aut angustiora aliis reperiuntur quemadmodum et in ipsis lineis una
 eademque longitudo est in tantum ut earum nullae longiores aliis aut
 breuiores sint, naturali rationabilique aequalitate in utrisque seruata,
 in latitudine spatiorum dico et in longitudine linearum.

A. Ita est et plane intelligo.

N. Quid si uelis spatiorum et linearum numerum dinoscere et in
 ordinem quendam redigere? Num potes speciale spatium lineamue
 speciali[ter] inuenire ex quo uel ex qua naturaliter ac proprie
 incipias?

A. Mihi quaerenti non occurrit. Tanta siquidem aequalitas in his

3 infinite RB^cP: infinitae B* 4 lemma BP 5 circumscriptum RB:
 circumscriptum P 5 a RB: ad P 8 sensibus RB: sensui P 18 dis-
 putare RB: disputari P 27 aut RB: ut P reperiuntur R^cBP: repperiantur R*
 33 potes RB^cP^c: potest B*P* spatium RB: spacium P 35 incipias R^cBP:
 incipies R*

constituted by their own nature, for there all things are one and
 simple and simultaneous, but because to those who inquire into
 them and wish to have something to say about them for the sake of
 example, they are wont to appear by the illumination of the divine
 radiance in theophanies of themselves as this or that and as many
 and infinite—and, to make things clearer by this example from
 sensible nature, consider carefully the centre and the circle circum-
 scribed about it and the straight lines that are begun from the centre,
 produced to the circumference, and made to end there.

another
example

A. I have often regarded it either inwardly in the mind by imagina-
 tion or outwardly in a visible and corporeal figure subject to the
 senses.

N. Have you not noticed how all the lines are united at the centre
 so that none of them can be distinguished from the others? No
 wonder, for all are one in it and are in no way distinct from one
 another so that the centre is reasonably defined not as the place where
 the lines come together in one but as the source and simple and
 indivisible principle from which either by nature or by art the
 multiplicity of the lines proceeds. For the centre is the common
 starting-point of the lines in which they are all one.

A. I am fully persuaded of this also on geometrical grounds. But
 all these things are perceived more by the mind than by the sense
 whether one wishes to argue about such matters inwardly by
 imagination or outwardly by sense.

N. You say well. For these and like matters are judged by the
 sheer sharpness of the mind. You see, if I am not mistaken, at the
 beginning of the progression of the lines from that unity which lies
 at the centre how the lines are so closely linked to one another that
 they can scarcely be distinguished from one another; but as they
 extend further from the centre the spaces between them begin
 gradually to widen until they reach the circle which bounds them,
 where their 'diastemata', that is, the spaces that are formed between
 the lines, attain their greatest width; and these are equal to one
 another so that none of them is found to be wider or narrower than
 another, as also in the lines there is found one and the same length
 so that none of them is longer or shorter than another, a natural and
 reasonable equality being preserved in both, I mean, in the width
 of the intervals and in the length of the lines.

A. So it is and so I plainly understand.

N. Suppose you want to discover the number of the intervals and
 lines and reduce them to some order? Are you able in any specific
 way to discover some specific interval or line from which, be it
 interval or line, the natural or proper beginning may be made?

A. When I look for one I find none. For such equality prevails

praeualet ut nullum spatium ab alio, nulla linea ab alia [per] differentiam quandam seu proprietatem possit discerni. Nam et ille circulus intra cuius ambitum omnia colliguntur ita sibimet in se ipso similis est ut nulla pars eius ab alia discernatur seu natura seu arte. Continua nanque quantitate pollet ac per hoc nullo certo principio inchoat, nullo constituto fine concluditur, sed totus suimet in toto et principium est et finis [subsistit]. Hinc est quod circularis motus ANAPXOC a Graecis, hoc est principio carens, recte nominatur aliorumque motuum, id est recti et obliqui, obtinent principatum.

N. In his omnibus non falleris ut opinor. Non enim aliter uera edocet ratio. Num itaque cernis quod nulla lex figurarum tibi obstat uel te cohibet ne ab omni spatio seu linea incipias totam figuram et ordinare et numerare? Sic enim imperat ratio ac per hoc quot spatia lineaeque sunt tot principia finesque numerandi et ordinandi fieri possunt.

A. Huic etiam conclusioni non resisto sed quorsum tendit expecto nosse.

N. Non aliorum nisi ut luce clarius cognoscamus summos theologos eorumque pedissequos omnino posse nulla ratione obstante et ab omnibus primordialibus causis contemplationis earum initium sumere et in omnibus prout cuique uisum fuerit ipsius contemplationis finem constituere ita ut quot primordiales causae sunt et ut cautius eloquar quot in contemplantium intellectibus quoquo modo formantur seu formari possunt tot earum ordines numerosaque pluralitas recte philosophantibus iuxta capacitatem singulorum theoriae prout quisque uoluerit mirabili diuinae prouidentiae dispositione ultro sese offerunt; et dum haec in mentibus theorizantium diuinae disciplinae diuinarumque teophaniarum modis diuersis mirabilibusque peraguntur ipsae per se ipsas omnium quae sunt primordiales rationes uniformiter et incommutabiliter in uerbo dei in quo factae sunt unum et id ipsum ultra omnes ordines omnemque numerum aeternaliter subsistunt.

A. Clare iam uideo tuae intentionis ratiocinationisque finem, siquidem ut arbitror nil aliud suadere contendis nisi ut in ipsis principiis rerum nullus ordo [naturaliter specialis] quaeratur. Et merito. Quis enim in his quae super omnem numerum omnemque ordinem excelsitudine suae naturae a conditore omnium creata sunt ordinem

30-31 Cf. Aug. De Trin. vi. 10. 11.

4 continua: -u- s.l. R 7 circularis R^cBP: circulus R* 8 ANAPXOC
BP: anarcos R*: anarchos R^c: ANAPXOC in marg. C in R 10 enim s.l. R
12 cohibet R^cBP: cohibeat R* ne RB: ut P 13 enim in ras. R(C)
quot in ras. R: quod P 18 pedissequos B^c(C): pedissecos RB*: pedisequos P
25 theoriae: glossa interlin. genitium C in B 25-26 dispositione RB^cP: dispositionem B*
26-27 ultro-disciplinae quae praetermissa erant adscriptis in marg. sB 26 offerunt: -unt s.l. R(C): offerant B*: of- in ras. B 27 teophaniarum B: theophaniarum RP 28 ipsae RB: ipse P 30 omnes ordines R^cBP: omnem ordinem R*

among them that no interval or line can be distinguished [by] any difference or property from any other. For even that circle which gathers them all into its circumference is so self-identical that no part of it is distinguishable from another either by nature or by art. For it displays a continuous quantity and therefore starts from no definite beginning and ends in no constituted term, but the whole of it wholly is both beginning and end. Therefore circular motion is rightly called by the Greeks *ἀναρχος*, that is, without beginning; and over the other motions, that is, the straight and the oblique, it holds the primacy.

N. In none of this are you mistaken, in my opinion. For right reason does not teach otherwise. Do you then see that there is no law relating to figures to restrain or prevent you from starting to order and number the whole figure from any interval or line? For so does reason demand, and therefore as many beginnings and endings of numbering and ordering can be made as there are intervals and lines.

A. Here again is a conclusion that I do not resist; but I am waiting to know where it leads.

N. To no other end than that we should see more clearly than light that the greatest theologians and their successors can, without reasonable objection, both make a start of their contemplation of the primordial causes from any one of them at all and set the term of their contemplation in any one of them as each may wish so that as many as there are of the primordial causes, or rather, to speak more cautiously, as many as they are formed in whatever way they are or can be formed in the intellects of those who contemplate them, so many are the ways of ordering and numbering them that offer themselves of their own accord by a wonderful dispensation of the Divine Providence to those who practise philosophy rightly in accordance with their capacity for contemplation and in accordance with the inclination of each; and although they operate in various and marvellous modes of divine science and divine theophanies in the minds of those that contemplate (them), in themselves the primordial reasons of all things that are subsist eternally as an immutable unity in the Word of God in which they are made all one and the same beyond all ways of ordering and numbering.

A. Now I see clearly the end you intended in your reasoning. For, as I think, you intend to say nothing else than that in the principles of nature themselves there is no order to look for [that is special to their nature]. And rightly so: for who would reasonably look for order or number in those things which are created by the Creator of all things because of the loftiness of their nature beyond every order and every number, seeing that the beginnings of all number and all

uel numerum rationabiliter quaesierit dum sint omnis numeri
 omnisque ordinis initia in semet ipsis sibi inuicem unita et a nullo
 inferioris naturae contuitu discreta? Sola siquidem gnostica condi-
 toris earum uirtus eas numerare discernere multiplicare ordinare
 diuidere non incongrue creditur posse. Quoniam uero modo quodam
 incognito *ultraque* naturam reperto in theophaniis suis mentibus
 contemplantium conformantur, in eis etiam et multiplicari et diuidi
 et numerari posse <dinoscuntur>, in [intellectibus] dico prout datur
 eis contemplantium, ac per hoc conficitur eas, id est primordiales
 causas, nullum ordinem intellectui uel sensui [cognitum] in semet
 ipsis recipere, in earum uero theorico, hoc est contemplatiuo, animo
 quosdam ordines diuersos atque multiplices conceptione quadam
 intelligentiae praecedente in ratione per quasdam imaginationes
 uerisimiles nasci. Sed cum haec ita se habeant non te crediderim
 sine aliqua speciali ratione principalium causarum connumerationem
 ab ipsa per-se-ipsam bonitate inchoasse. Non enim est rite disputan-
 tium otiosum quid causa carens dicere.

N. Hoc fortassis non temere diceres si de numero pie ac perfecte
 disputantium et nullo modo de uerae ratiocinationis semita decli-
 nantium unum me esse cognosceres; quoniam uero inter magnorum
 philosophorum extremos pedisequos uix locum inuenio habere non
 incaute de processioneibus meis per altissimos theoriae ascensus
 promittendum. Saepe nanque melioris ingenii puriorisque sine com-
 paratione in ipsis ascensionibus inchoantes ingredi aut errantes
 deuiauerunt aut altius ascendere non ualentes ad inferiora reuersi
 sunt aut eas silentio honorificantes altiora se adtingere caute ac
 rationabiliter non praesumentes siluerunt. Perfectissimorum nanque
 est diuinae radii splendoribus illuminatorum ac per hoc ad sacra-
 tissima caelestium mysteriorum adyta manufactorum altissima
 diuinae theoriae bimata, hoc est gradus, superare ac sine ullo errore
 apertissimae ueritatis speciem nulla caligine obstante intueri; quae
 quoniam ultra uires intentionis nostrae constituta sunt nec adhuc
 possumus attingere carnalium sensuum pondere oppressi, ne pigri
 uideamur in diuinis negotiis talentum dominicum in terra fodientes
 ac sine ulla usura pecuniam domini neglegentes malique serui senten-
 tiam promerentes, de his quae nunc inter nos conferimus, quantum

33-36 Cf. Mt. xxv. 25-30; Aug. *De uera rel.* liv. 105-106.

2 unita R^cBP: munita R* 6 *ultraque* R^c(C)BP: ac ultra R* 18 for-
 tassis RB: fortassis P si de RB: sepe P*: sede P^c 21 pedisequos B^cP: pedi-
 secos R: pedisequos B* 24-25 errantes RB: errando P 26 adtingere RB:
 attingere P 28 radii RB: radiis P 29 adyta B^cP adita RB* manu-
 ductorum RB^cP: manu ductorum B* 30 bimata: *glossa interlin.* .i. gradus sB
 (cf. P) 31 obstante RB: distante P 34 uideamur RB: uideamus P 35 ulla
 usura RB: ullo usufructu P domini RB: deum P serui RBP^c: serue P

order are in themselves united with one another and cannot be seen
 apart in the eyes of any lower nature? For it is not inappropriate to
 believe that only the gnostic power of their Creator can number,
 distinguish, multiply, set in order, (and) divide them. But because
 by some means unknown and supernaturally discovered they take
 shape in their theophanies in the minds of those who contemplate
 them, in them too <they are seen> to be able to be multiplied and
 divided and numbered, I mean in [the intellects] of those who con-
 template them in so far as they are able; and the result of this is that
 in themselves they, that is, the primordial causes, admit no order
 [that is known] to any intellect or sense, while in the mind that
 theorizes, that is, contemplates them, many different ways of ordering
 them are, as it were, conceived by the intellect in the reason and
 born as certain images that resemble them. But although this is so
 I would not believe that it is without some special reason that you
 began your enumeration of the principal causes from goodness-
 through-itself. For it is not the way of those who dispute in an
 orderly manner to waste time in saying anything without reason.

N. You would perhaps not be so rash as to say this if you knew
 that I am of the number of those who dispute devoutly and perfectly
 and in no way deviate from the path of true reasoning, but since I
 find that I scarcely have a place among the least of the followers of the
 great philosophers, I must not make any rash promise concerning my
 advances along the highest ascents of contemplation. For it often
 happens that those who begin to enter upon those ascents without
 the help of a better and purer mind either stray and lose their way
 or, when they can go no higher, fall back to the lower levels or,
 honouring these ascents in silence, too cautious to suppose it reason-
 able that they should reach the higher levels, they have remained
 silent. For it is for those who are most perfect and who are enlight-
 ened by the splendours of the divine radiance, and are thus brought
 to the most sacred shrines of the celestial mysteries, to scale the
 highest 'bimata', that is, steps, of divine contemplation and behold
 without any error the form of truth fully revealed without any cloud
 obscuring it. But since these (shrines) are set beyond our powers of
 penetration and since, weighed down by the weight of the corporeal
 senses, we are not yet able to attain them, lest we should seem to be
 indolent in our God's affairs and to be burying the Lord's talent in
 the earth and neglecting to make the Lord's money yield profit and
 deserving the sentence of the wicked servant, we shall, to the extent
 that the inward light bestows itself upon the capacity of those that

intima lux capacitati quaerentium se donauerit quicquid uerisimilius
uisum fuerit dicemus, humilitatis regula ubique obseruata ne nosmet 627c
esse aestimemus quod nos non sumus. Scriptum est enim: 'Noli
altum sapere sed time.'

Hac igitur ratione specialiter principia rerum ab ipsa per-se-ipsam 5
bonitate incipere introductus sum. Perspexi siquidem nec absque
sanctorum patrum auctoritate et maxime Ariopagitae Dionysii
generalissimam diuinarum donationum esse per-se-ipsam bonitatem
aliasque quodam modo praecedere. Causa nanque omnium creatrix
10 bonitas quae deus est ad hoc ipsam causam quae per-se-ipsam
bonitas dicitur primo omnium creauit ut per eam omnia quae sunt in
essentias ex non existentibus adduceret. Diuinae siquidem bonitatis
proprium est quae non erant in essentiam uocare. Vniuersitatis
etenim conditae in essentiamque adductae diuina bonitas et plus 627D
quam bonitas et essentialis et superessentialis causa est. Si igitur 15
creator per suam bonitatem omnia de nihilo ut essent deriuauit
necessario intellectus per-se-ipsam bonitatis intellectum per-se-
ipsam essentiae praecedit. Non enim per essentiam introducta est
bonitas sed per bonitatem introducta est essentia. Nam et hoc
apertissime scriptura pronuntiat quae dicit: 'Et uidit deus omnia et 628A
ecce ualde bona.' Non enim dicit: Et uidit deus omnia et ecce ualde 21
sunt. Quid enim ualeret solummodo esse adempto bene esse? Omnia
siquidem quae sunt in tantum sunt in quantum bona sunt, in quan-
tum autem bona non sunt aut ut ita dicam in quantum minus bona
25 sunt in tantum non sunt ac per hoc adempta penitus bonitate nulla
remanet essentia. Simpliciter enim esse uel aeternaliter esse sublato
bene esse et bene aeternaliter esse abusiue dicitur [et] esse [et]
aeternaliter esse. Subtracta itaque bonitate proprie non dicitur
essentia aut aeterna essentia. Ac ne forte ad haec dicas: Nunquid
similiter possumus pronuntiare subtracta penitus essentia nulla 30
bonitas remanebit? Pereunte existentia nullum bonum subsistet - - 628B
accipe maioris uirtutis argumentum: Non solum quae sunt bona sunt
uerum etiam quae non sunt bona dicuntur eoque amplius meliora
dicuntur quae non sunt quam quae sunt. Nam in quantum per
35 excellentiam superant essentiam in tantum superessentiali bono, deo

3-4 Rom. xi. 21. 20-21 Gen. i. 31. 22 sq. cf. Aug. De doctr. Chr.
i. 32. 35.

5 lemma principia rerum a bonitate quae generalior est omni essentia et eoque
amplius meliora dicuntur quae non sunt quam quae sunt. quanto fiunt deo qui
per excellentiam sui nil est ***** et quod dionysius genus est essentiae essentia
in te uita nominis ratio sapientiae una altera scientie Rm 7 ariopagitae RB:
ariopagitae P dionysii RB: dionysii P 15 essentialis et RBPC: essentia-
liter P* 18 lemma BP 22 ualeret R*BP: ualerent R* 28 proprie
R*BP: propriae R* 30 pronuntiare RBP^c: praenuntiare P* 34 nam
RB: non P 35 bono om. R*

seek it, say whatever seems to us to be most like the truth concerning
the subject of our discussion, at every point observing the rule of
humility and not esteeming ourselves to be what we are not. For it is
written: 'do not become proud, but stand in awe.'

This was the reason, then, that brought me to start the principles 2
of things from goodness-through-itself particularly—for it was not
without the authority of the Holy Fathers and especially of Dionysius
the Areopagite that I saw goodness-through-itself to be the most
general of the divine gifts and in some manner to precede the others.
For the Cause of all things, the creative Goodness which is God,
created that cause which is called goodness-through-itself first of all
for this purpose: that through it all things that are should be brought
from non-existents to essences. For it is a property of the Divine
Goodness to call the things that were not into existence. For the
Divine Goodness and More-than-Goodness is both the essential and
superessential cause³ of the universe that it has established and
brought to essence. Therefore if the Creator through His goodness
brought all things out of nothing so that they might be (essences),
the aspect of goodness-in-itself must necessarily precede the aspect
of being-through-itself. For goodness does not come through essence
but essence comes through goodness; for this too is very clearly
stated by Scripture, which says: 'And God saw all things and behold,
(they were) indeed good.' For it does not say: And God saw all
things and behold they were indeed (essences); for of what value
would being alone be if well-being were taken away? For all things
that are, are in so far as they are good, but in so far as they are not
good, or rather, in so far as they are less good, to that extent they
are not, and so, if goodness is wholly removed, no essence remains.
For simply being or eternally being, if well being and eternally well
being are altogether removed,⁴ are wrongly named [on the one hand]
being, [on the other] eternally being. Therefore, if goodness is with-
drawn we cannot properly speak of essence or eternal essence. And
lest perchance you should say to this: Can we not in the same way
declare that if being is altogether removed no goodness will remain,
(for) when that which exists passes away no good will remain; here
is a stronger argument: Not only are the things that are good, but the
things that are not are also called good, and furthermore the things
that are not are said to be better than the things that are. For the
further they transcend essence by reason of their excellence, the
nearer they approach the Superessential Good, namely God, whereas

What the
difference is
between
goodness and
essence

uidelicet, appropinquant, in quantum autem essentiam participant
in tantum a superessentia bono elongantur. Non esse autem ut
arbitror dicuntur quae nec sensu nec intellectu prae nimia sui excel-
lencia inseparabilique unitate et simplicitate percipi possunt, esse
uero aestimantur quae intellectibus sensibusque succumbunt et in
quadam certa diffinitaque substantia differentiis proprietatibusque
circumscribuntur, accidentibus quoque subiecta locis temporibusque
uariata atque dispersa semel et simul esse non ualentia.

Videsne igitur quantum generalior est bonitas quam essentia
bonorum? siquidem una species <bonitatis> est in his quae sunt,
altera in his quae non sunt, ac per hoc a generalioribus diuinae
largitatis donationibus inchoans et per specialiores progrediens ordi-
nem quendam primordialium causarum theologia duce constitui.

A. Iam intelligo non irrationabiliter te inchoasse principiorum
considerationem. Quicumque enim recte diuidit a generalissimis
debt incipere et per generaliora progredi ac sic prout uirtus con-
templationis succurrit ad specialissima peruenire, quod etiam in
ipsis rerum principiis quae primo posuisti interius perspiciens ni-
fallor intelligo. Vt enim bonitas ueluti quoddam genus est essentiae,
essentia uero species quaedam bonitatis esse creditur, ita essentia
genus est uitae. Siquidem omnia quae sunt diuiduntur in ea quae
<per se> uiuunt *et ea quae per se non uiuunt*—non enim omnis essentia
<per se> uiuit aut uita est—, ac per hoc eorum quae sunt una species
est in his quae <per se> uiuunt uel uita sunt, altera in his quae nec
<per se> uitam participant nec uita sunt. Hoc quoque in sequentibus
potest inspicere. Nam uita quoddam genus rationis est. Omnia siquidem
quae uiuunt aut rationalia sunt aut irrationabilia ac per hoc una
species uitae est rationalis, altera irrationabilis. Rationis item duplex
proprie dicitur uirtus illa qua contemplatiuus animus siue humanus
siue angelicus diuina aeterna et incommutabilia considerat, siue
circa primam omnium causam uersetur siue circa primordiales rerum
causas quas pater in uerbo suo semel simulque condidit, quae species
rationis a sapientibus theologia uocatur. Scientia uero est uirtus
qua theoreticus animus siue humanus siue angelicus de natura rerum

29 sq. Cf. Aug. De Trin. xii. 15. 25.

2 Non s.l. RB 3 sui RB^cP: ui B* 4 non ante possunt erasum R
7 circumscribuntur B: circumscribuntur RP accidentibus quoque RB: acciden-
tibusque P 9 quantum R^cBP: quintum R* generalior R^cBP: generarior
R* quam s.l. R 10-11 his . . . his quae R^cBP: is . . . isque R* a om.
P 12 per s.l. B 13 quendam RB^cP: quendam B* 15 qui-
cumque B: quicumque R: et utcumque P 17 lemma BP 18 interius
perspiciens R^c(C)BP: dum interius perspicias R* 22 et ea quae per se non
B^c(C)P: et quae non RB* enim om. P 23 uiuit RB: uiuet P 26 est in
ras. B(C) 28 uitae RB: uita P lemma differentia sapientie et scientie et
quid sit fisica et ethica Rm 30 proprie R^cBP: propriae R* qua RB: quo P

the more they participate in essence the further they are separated
from the Superessential Good. Now, as I think, those things are said
not to be which by virtue of their excessive excellence and indivisible
unity and simplicity can be apprehended neither by sense nor by
intellect, while those things are thought to be which submit to
intellects or senses and are confined by differences and properties
within some fixed and definite substance, and being subject to acci-
dents and to variation and to dispersal in places and times, cannot
exist at once and all together.

Do you then see how much more general is the goodness of good
things than is their essence? For there is one species <of goodness>
in the things that are, another in the things that are not; and that is
why, beginning from the more general gifts of the Divine Beneficence
and proceeding through the more special gifts, I have, with Theology
as my guide, established a certain order in the primordial causes.

A. Now I understand that (the point from which) you have begun
your consideration of the principles was not unreasonably (chosen).
For everyone who employs the method of division correctly ought
to begin from the most general and proceed through the more gen-
eral, and so, as far as his contemplative power enables him, arrive
at the most specific; and this I see for myself, and, unless I am mis-
taken, understand in those principles of nature which you gave first,
regarding them from within. For as goodness is, as it were, a kind of
genus of essence while essence is believed to be a kind of species of
goodness, so essence is the genus of life. For all things that are, are
divided into those things which live <through themselves> and those
which do not live through themselves—for not every essence lives
<through itself> or is life—, and therefore of the things that are there
is one species in those which live <through themselves> or are life,
the other of those which neither partake of life <through themselves>
nor are life. And the same can be seen in the succeeding (causes).
For life is a kind of genus of reason. For all things that live are either
rational or irrational, and therefore the rational is one species of life,
the irrational the other. Of reason also the two species are well
known, wisdom the one, science the other. For the proper definition
of wisdom is that power by which the contemplative mind, whether
human or angelic, contemplates the eternal and immutable things of
God, whether it concerns itself about the First Cause of all things
or about the primordial causes of nature which the Father created at
once and all together in His Word; and this species of reason is called
by the wise theology. But science is the power by which the contem-
plative mind, whether human or angelic, discourses on the nature of

Concerning
the divisions
of the pri-
mordial
causes

ex primordialibus causis procedentium per generationem inque genera ac species diuisarum per differentias et proprietates tractat, siue accidentibus succumbat siue eis caret, siue corporibus adiuncta siue penitus ab eis libera, siue locis et temporibus distributa siue ultra loca et tempora [sui] simplicitate unita atque inseparabilis, quae species rationis physica dicitur. Est enim physica naturarum sensibus intellectibusque succumbentium naturalis scientia quam semper sequitur morum disciplina.

Et si quis intentus fuerit eandem regulam aut in omnibus aut in multis primordialibus causis reperiet, non quod ut arbitror primordialium causarum quaedam quidem generaliora sint quaedam uero specialiora—talis enim inaequalitas in his in quibus summa unitas et summa aequalitas pollet impossibilis ut arbitror est—, sed quia in effectibus earum plures participationes aliarum, aliarum uero pauciores contemplantis animus rerumque multiplex diuisio inuenit. Multipliciores siquidem sunt participationes per-se-ipsam bonitatis quam per-se-ipsam essentiae. Vnam quidem participant quae sunt et quae non sunt, alteram uero solummodo quae sunt. Eodem modo de caeteris principiis intelligere non alienum est a ueritate. Essentiam nanque participant quae uiuunt et quae non uiuunt, uitam uero solummodo qui uiuunt. Vitam participant rationabilia et irrationalia, rationem uero sola rationabilia. Rationem participant sapientia et scientia, sapientiam uero soli illi intellectus qui circa deum ultra omnem naturam uisibilem et inuisibilem et extra se ipsos aeterno et ineffabili motu et circa rerum principia reuoluuntur.

Ac per hoc non in ipsis rerum principiis genera uel species pluralitas paucitasue intuenda sunt sed in eorum participationibus, hoc est non in ipsis causis in uerbo dei uniformiter et incommutabiliter et aequaliter factis *uerum* in earum effectibus quibus mundus uisibilis et inuisibilis impletur. In ipsis quidem summa est aequalitas ac nulla diuersitas, in his uero multiplex et infinita differentiarum *uarietas*. Sed quid sit participatio nondum intelligo, sine cuius intelligentia nemo potest praedicta ad purum dinoscere, ut arbitror.

N. Omne quod est aut participans aut participatum aut participatio est aut participatum <simul> et participans. Participatum solummodo est quod nullum superius se participat, quod de summo ac solo omnium principio quod deus est recte intelligitur. Ipsum

5 post unita sit *erasum* R 6 physica RB: phisica P physica RB: phisica P
 14 effectibus BP: affectibus R 20 nanque RB: quoque P
 26-27 post pluralitas seu *erasum* R 27 paucitasue RB: paucitasque P post sed non P
 29 uerum R^(C)BP: sed R* 31 differentiarum *uarietas* R^(C)BP: differentia (?) R*
 34 lemma BP: deo fit aut participans aut participatum aut participatio aut et participatum et participans Rm 35 participatum simul et participans B^(sC)P: participatum aut participans R*: participatum et participans R^(C): participatum aut et participans B* 36 quod de summo RB: quo de summo P
 37 principio RB: participatio P

the things which proceed from the primordial causes through generation and which are divided into genera and species by means of differences and properties, whether it is susceptible to accidents or free from them, whether joined to bodies or altogether free from them, whether it is distributed over places and times or, outside place and time, is unified and indivisible by reason of [its] simplicity; and this species of reason is called physics. For physics is the natural science of natures which are susceptible to senses and intellects; and the discipline of morals always follows it.

And if one observes carefully one will find that the same rule applies either to all or to many of the primordial causes, not, as I think, because among the primordial causes some are more general while others are more special—for such inequality where the utmost unity and the utmost equality prevail would be, as I think, impossible—but because in their effects the mind of him who contemplates, and the divisions that are inherent in nature, find that of some there are more, of others fewer, participations. For of goodness-through-itself there are more participations than of essence-through-itself; the one is participated by the things that are and the things that are not, the other only by the things that are. It would not be untrue to think of the other principles in the same way. For essence is participated by things that live and things that do not live, but life only by things that live. Life is participated by rational and irrational beings, but reason by rational beings only. Reason is participated by wisdom and science, but wisdom only by those intellects which revolve about God, beyond every nature of things visible and invisible, and beyond themselves in an eternal and ineffable motion, and about the principles of nature.

And therefore it is not in the principles of nature themselves that genera or species, multiplicity or paucity are to be observed, but in the participations of them, that is, not in the causes themselves, which as they are made in the Word of God are (all) one and immutable and equal, *but* in their effects, by which the world, visible and invisible, is filled. In those there is absolute equality and no diversity; but in these there is a manifold and unlimited *variety* of differences. But what participation is I do not yet understand, and without understanding this nobody can have a clear knowledge of what has been said above, as I think.

N. Everything that is is either participant, or participated or participation, or <both> participated *and* participant at once.⁵ That which is only participated is that which participates in nothing above itself, which is understood to be true of the Supreme Principle of all

siquidem omnia quae ab eo sunt participant, quaedam quidem immediate per se ipsa, quaedam uero per medietates interpositas.

Participans uero solummodo est quod supra se naturaliter constitutum participat, a nullo uero infra se posito participatur quoniam infra se nullus ordo naturalis inuenitur, sicut sunt corpora quorum participatione nulla rerum subsistit—non enim umbras inter subsistentes res connumeramus—corpora nunc dico non illa simplicia inuisibilia et uniuersalia sed illa quae ex ipsis sunt composita sensibusque et corruptioni, hoc est solutioni, obnoxia.

Caetera uero quaecumque ab uno omnium principio per naturales descensiones gradusque diuina sapientia ordinatos usque ad extremitatem totius naturae qua corpora continentur in medio sunt constituta et participantia et participata sunt et uocantur. Excellentissima nanque inter quae et summum bonum superius nulla creatura interposita est immediate deum participant et sunt principia omnium rerum, hoc est primordiales causae circa et post unum principium <uniuersale> constitutae post quas sequentes essentiae earum participatione subsistunt. Videsne quemadmodum primus ordo uniuersitatis conditae et particeps est unius omnium principii et participatus ex subsequentiis se creaturis? Simili ratione de caeteris ordinibus intelligendum. Omnis enim ordo a summo usque deorsum in medio constitutus, hoc est a deo usque ad corpora uisibilia, et superiorem se ordinem participat et ab inferiori se participatur ac per hoc et participans est et participatus.

Participatio uero in omnibus intelligitur. Vt enim inter numerorum terminos, hoc est inter ipsos numeros sub una ratione constitutos, similes proportionales, ita inter omnes ordines naturales a summo usque deorsum participationes similes sunt quibus iunguntur; et quemadmodum in proportionibus numerorum proportionalitates sunt, hoc est proportionum similes rationes, eodem modo in naturalium ordinationum participationibus mirabiles atque ineffabiles armonias constituit creatrix omnium sapientia quibus omnia in unam quandam concordiam seu amicitiam seu pacem seu amorem seu quocumque modo rerum omnium adunatio significari possit conueniunt. Sicut enim numerorum concordia proportionis, proportionum uero collatio proportionalitatis, sic ordinum naturalium distributio participationis nomen, distributionum uero copulatio amoris generalis accepit, qui omnia ineffabili quadam amicitia in unum

5 inuenitur RB: inuenit P
27 post proportionales sunt erasum R
R^cBP: proportionalitatis R*
R^cBP: proportionalitas R*

10 quaecumque BP

31 naturalium om. P

36 collatio RB^cP: collocatio B*
37 distributionum: di- in ras. R

things alone, that is, of God. For He is participated by all things which come from Him, some immediately through themselves, others through interposed mediations.

But that which is only participant is that which participates in what is naturally established above it but is not participated by anything situated below it because below it no order of nature is found; such are bodies, for no nature subsists by participation in them—for we do not count their shadows among things that subsist. By bodies I here mean not those simple, invisible, and universal ones but those that are composed of them and are subject to the senses and to corruption, that is, to dissolution.

But all the rest that are established between them, below the One Principle of all things descending through the natural gradations ordained by the Divine Wisdom as far as the extremity of universal nature which the bodies occupy, are both participant and participated, and are so named. For the most excellent things, between which and the Supreme Good above them no creature is interposed, participate in God immediately, and are the principles of all things, that is, the primordial causes that are constituted in and after the One <Universal> Principle; and the essences that follow after them subsist by participation in them. Do you see how the first order of the created universe is both participant in the One Principle of all things and participated by the creatures that come after it? The same must be understood of the other orders. For every order that is established between (that which is only participated and that which is only participant) from the highest downwards, that is, from God to the visible bodies, both participates in an order above it and is participated in one below it, and therefore is both participant and participated.

But participation is understood of all. For as between the terms of numbers, that is, among the numbers when they are constituted under one principle, the proportions are similar, so between all the natural orders from the highest to the lowest the participations by which they are related are similar; and as between the numerical proportions there are the proportionalities, that is to say, similar principles of proportion, in the same way the Wisdom that is the Creator of all things has constituted between the participations of the natural orders marvellous and ineffable harmonies by which all things come together into one concord or amity or peace or love or whatever other name can signify the unification of all things. For just as the concord of numbers has been given the name of proportion but the bringing together of the proportions is called proportionality, so the distribution of the natural orders has been given the name of participation but the bringing together of the distributions is called universal Love, which in a kind of ineffable amity gathers all

colligit. Est igitur participatio non cuiusdam partis assumptio sed diuinarum dationum et donationum a summo usque deorsum per superiores ordines inferioribus distributio. Primum siquidem primo ordini immediate a summo omnium bono et datur et donatur, uerbi gratia [datur] esse, *donatur* bene esse. Ipse uero primus ordo sequenti se distribuit esse et bene esse ac sic distributio essendi et bene essendi a summo omnium bonorum datorum uel donationum fonte gradatim per superiores in inferiores usque ad extremos ordines defluit [—ubi notandum duobus modis bene esse intelligi, uno quo omnia quae sunt bona dicantur esse quoniam a summo bono facta sunt et in tantum sunt in quantum participant bonitatem, altero autem quo omnia quae naturaliter bona subsistunt uirtutum donationibus ut eorum naturalis bonitas plus appareat exornantur. Quamuis enim maxime ac principaliter rationali et intellectuali creaturae dona gratiae quae uirtutis uocabulo solent significari distribuuntur, nulla tamen naturarum etiam extremarum secundum suam proportionem diuinae gratiae participationis expers esse arbitranda est. Vt enim omnia participant bonitatem ita participant et gratiam, bonitatem quidem ut sint, gratiam uero ut et bona et pulchra sint].

Similiter de uita de sensu de ratione de sapientiae aeterisque diuinis dationibus et donationibus accipiendum. Eodem enim modo per superiora inferioribus distribuuntur in quantum perueniunt. Non enim omnes dationes usque ad extrema descendunt. Esse siquidem et bene esse secundum naturam usque ad extremum uniuersitatis conditae distribuitur, uita uero extremum ordinem non attingit. Non enim corpora per se ipsa uiuunt uel uita sunt sed [per] superiorem se ordinem uiuere recipiunt, qui ordo in nutritiua et auctiua uita constitutus est inque seminibus uiget. Quid dicam de sensu et ratione et intellectu? Nempe omnibus patet quia sensus usque ad irrationabilia descendit animantia, ratio et intellectus rationabilia et intellectualia non excedunt?

Inter dationes autem et donationes talis differentia est. Dationes quidem sunt et dicuntur proprie distributiones quibus omnis natura subsistit, donationes uero gratiae distributiones quibus omnis natura subsistens ornatur. Itaque natura datur, donatur gratia. Siquidem omnis creatura perfecta ex natura constat et gratia. Hinc conficitur omnem essentiam datum, omnem uirtutem donum uocari. Hinc

5 sq. Cf. Aug. *De Gen. ad litt.* xi. 8. 10.

4-5 uerbi gratia datur esse donatur bene esse R^cBP: uerbi gratia esse et bene esse R* 6 post distribuit *rasura* R 7 fonte RB: fronte P 9 quo RB: quae P 14 post creaturae quae *erasum* B 18 et gratiam *om.* P 19 pulchra RB: pulchra P 26 per superiorem se R^c(C)B^cP: superiorem se R*: superiorem per se B* 27 nutritiua RB^cP: nutriua B* 30 *glossa* de dato et dono satis in quinto disputatum est BP 31-32 dationes quidem R^c(C)BP: dum dationes R* 33 post uero *rasura* R 34 datur donatur RB: dat donat P 35 hinc conficitur *in ras.* R 36 omnem—uocari R^cBP: omnis essentia datum omnis uirtus donum uocatur R*

things into one. Participation, therefore, is not the taking of some part, but the distribution of the divine gifts and graces⁶ from the highest to the lowest through the higher orders to the lower. For first there is given both a gift and a grace to the first order immediately after the Supreme Good of all things, for example [the gift] of being, the grace of well-being.⁷ But this first order distributes being and well-being to that which follows it, and thus the distribution of being and well-being flows down by degrees from the Supreme Source of all good gifts and graces through the higher orders to the lower as far as the lowest of all. [And here it must be noted that well-being is to be understood in two ways: one by which all the things that are, are said to be good because they are made by the Supreme Good, and are only to the extent that they participate in goodness, the other by which all things that are naturally good are adorned by the gifts of the virtues so that their natural goodness may be apparent. For although it is chiefly and primarily to the rational and intellectual creature that the gifts of grace which are usually designated by the word 'virtues' are distributed, yet none of the natures, not even the lowest, must be thought to be denied participation in a divine grace proportionate to itself. For as all things participate in goodness so they also participate in grace, in goodness that they may be, in grace that they may be both good and beautiful.]

The same⁸ must be accepted in regard to life, to sense, to reason, to wisdom, and to the rest of the divine gifts and graces. For in the same way they are distributed through the higher to the lower, so far as they reach; for not all gifts descend to the lowest, for while being and well-being are naturally distributed as far as the lowest (level) of the created universe, life does not extend to the lowest order. For bodies neither live through themselves nor are life, but they receive the (gift of) living [through] the order that is above them, the order which is constituted in the nutritive and augmentative life and which flourishes in the seeds. What shall I say of sense and reason and intellect? Is it not clear to all that sense descends as far as the irrational animals, while reason and intellect do not go beyond the rational and the intellectual?

Now between 'dationes' and 'donationes' the difference is this: 'dationes' are and are said to be the distributions by which every nature subsists, while 'donationes' are the distributions of grace by which every subsisting nature is adorned. Therefore nature is a 'datio', grace is a 'donatio'. For every perfect creature consists of nature and grace. Hence it comes about that every essence is called a 'datum', every virtue a 'donum'. Therefore Theology says, 'Every good "datum" and every perfect "donum" comes down from above, descending from the Father of Lights.' But Holy Scripture often

theologia dicit: 'Omne datum optimum et omne donum perfectum 632A
desursum est descendens a patre luminum.' Saepe tamen sancta
scriptura et datum pro dono et donum pro dato solet ponere.
I [Sciendum quoque uirtutem tripliciter intelligendam. Est enim
uirtus substantialis, omne nanque quod subsistit naturali quadam 5
trinitate subsistit, essentia uirtute et operatione, de quibus in primo
II libro satis disputatum est. Secunda species uirtutis est quae pugnat
aduersus corruptionem naturae ut sanitas aduersus egritudinem, scien-
tia et sapientia aduersus ignorantiam et stultitiam. Tertia est quae op-
ponitur malitiae ut humilitas superbiae, castitas libidini, quae species 10
in tantum patet in quantum liberae uoluntatis irrationabilis motus
intellectualis naturae porrigitur. In quantum enim malitia uitiorum
species multiplicat in tantum bonitas uirtutum oppugnacula opponit]. 632B

Et notandum quod participatio significantius expressiusque et ad
intelligendum facilius a Graecis dicatur, in quorum lingua METOXH 15
uel MEΘOYCIA participationem significat, METOXH autem quasi
METAEXOYCA, hoc est post-habens uel secundo-habens, METOYCIA
quoque quasi METAOYCIA, hoc est post-essentia uel secunda essen-
tia. Hinc facillime datur intelligi nihil aliud esse participationem nisi
ex superiori essentia secundae [post eam] essentiae deriuationem et 20
ab ea quae primum habet esse secundae ut sit distributio, et hoc
exemplis naturae possumus argumentari.

Siquidem ex fonte totum flumen principaliter manat et per eius
alueum aqua quae primo surgit in fonte in quantamcunque longi- 632C
tudinem protendatur semper ac sine ulla intermissione defunditur. 25
Sic diuina bonitas et essentia et uita et sapientia et omnia quae in
fonte omnium sunt primo in primordiales causas defluunt et eas esse
faciunt, deinde per primordiales causas in earum effectus ineffabili
modo per conuenientes sibi uniuersitatis ordines decurrunt, per
superiora semper ad inferiora profluentia, iterumque per secretissimos 30
naturae poros occultissimo meatu ad fontem suum redeunt. Inde
enim est omne bonum omnis essentia omnis uita omnis sensus omnis
ratio omnis sapientia omne genus omnis species omnis pulcritudo
omnis ordo omnis unitas omnis aequalitas omnis differentia omnis
locus omne tempus et omne quod est et omne quod non est et omne 632D
quod intelligitur et omne quod sentitur et omne quod superat 36
sensem et intellectum.

1-2 Iac. i. 17.

4 marg. I B intelligendum *codd.*: lege intelligendam 5 nanque
R^cBP: autem R* 7 II B est om. P 8 egritudinem RB:
aegritudinem P 9 marg. III B stultitiam BP: stultiam R opponitur
RB: apponitur P 10 libidini R^cB^cP: libidine R*: libini B* 11 irationabilis
R^cBP: irrationabiles R*: glossa interlin. nominatiuum C in B 13 lemma differ-
entia inter donationes et donationes et inter datum et donum et uirtutem tripliciter
intelligendum (*sic*) Rm oppugnacula BP: obpugnacula R 15 METOXH

puts 'datum' for 'donum' and 'donum' for 'datum'. [Know also that
virtue (or power)⁹ is to be understood in three ways: for there is
substantial power, since everything that subsists subsists by a certain
natural trinity, essence, power, and operation, which we discussed
sufficiently in the first book; the second kind of power is that which
contends with the corruption of nature, as health contends against
sickness, science and wisdom against ignorance and folly; the third
is that which is opposed to vice, as humility to pride, chastity to lust,
and this kind is evident wherever the irrational motion of the free
will of the intellectual nature obtrudes. For to the extent that evil
multiplies the species of the vices, to the same extent goodness brings
up to resist them the defences of the virtues.]

And notice that participation is given a more significant and
expressive and more easily understandable name by the Greeks, in
whose language μετοχή and μετουσία signify participation, μετοχή as
if μετα-εχουσα, that is, 'having after' or 'having second', μετουσία also
as μετα-ουσια, that is, 'after-essence' or 'second essence'. From this it
is very easy to understand that participation is nothing else but the
derivation from a superior essence of the essence that follows [after
it] and the distribution from that which first possesses being to that
which follows it in order that it may be; and this we can demonstrate
from examples drawn from nature.

For the whole river first flows forth from its source, and through 4
its channel the water which first wells up in the source continues to
flow always without any break to whatever distance it extends. So
the Divine Goodness and Essence and Life and Wisdom and every-
thing which is in the source of all things first flow down into the
primordial causes and make them to be,¹⁰ then through the primordial
causes they descend in an ineffable way through the orders of the
universe that accommodate them, flowing forth continuously through
the higher to the lower; and return back again to their source through
the most secret channels of nature by a most hidden course. For
thence is all good, all essence, all life, all sense, all reason, all wisdom,
all genus, all species, all beauty, all order, all unity, all equality, all
difference, all place, all time, and everything that is and everything
that is not and everything that is understood and everything that is
sensed and everything that surpasses sense and understanding.

RB: METOKE P 16 MEΘOYCIA RB: metoysia P participationem significat:
-nem significat in ras. R(C) 17 METAEXOYCA R^cB: METEXOYCA R*:
METAEXOICA P 21 ea quae R^c(C)BP: eo quod R* 24 quantamcunque P
recte: quantamcunque RB 25 defunditur RB: defunditur P 27-28 defluunt-
causas quae omnia erant addidit ad calcem sB: om. P 28 lemma lau(des) trini-
tatis Rm 30 iterumque BP: iterumque R 31 occultissimo RBP^c:
occultissime P* 33 pulcritudo RB: pulchritudo P

[Summae siquidem ac trinae soliusque uerae bonitatis in se ipsa immutabilis motus et simplex multiplicatio et inexhausta a se ipsa in se ipsa ad se ipsam diffusio causa omnium, immo omnia *est*. Si enim intellectus omnium est omnia et ipsa sola intelligit omnia, ipsa igitur sola est omnia quoniam sola gnostica uirtus est ipsa quae priusquam essent omnia cognouit omnia et extra se non cognouit omnia quia extra eam nihil est sed intra se habet omnia. Ambit enim omnia et nihil intra se est in quantum uere est nisi ipsa quia sola uere est. Caetera enim quae dicuntur esse ipsius theophaniae sunt quae etiam in ipsa uere subsistunt.] Deus itaque *est* omne quod uere est quoniam ipse facit omnia et fit in omnibus, ut ait sanctus Dionysius Ariopagita.

de theophaniis Omne enim quod intelligitur et sentitur nihil aliud est nisi non apparentis apparitio, occulti manifestatio, negati affirmatio, incomprehensibilis comprehensio, [ineffabilis fatus, inaccessibilis accessus,] inintelligibilis intellectus, incorporalis corpus, superessentialis essentia, informis forma, immensurabilis mensura, innumerabilis numerus, carentis pondere pondus, spiritualis incrassatio, inuisibilis uisibilitas, illocalis localitas, carentis tempore temporalitas, infiniti diffinitio, incircumscripsi circumscripctio et caetera quae puro intellectu et cogitantur et perspiciuntur et quae memoriae sinibus capi nesciunt et mentis aciem fugiunt. Et hoc exemplis nostrae naturae possumus conuicere. Nam et noster intellectus cum per se sit inuisibilis et incomprehensibilis [signis] tamen quibusdam [et] manifestatur et comprehenditur dum uocibus uel litteris uel aliis nutibus ueluti quibusdam corporibus incrassatur et dum sic extrinsecus apparet semper intrinsecus inuisibilis permanet dumque in uarias figuras sensibus comprehensibiles prosilit semper statum suae naturae incomprehensibilem non deserit et priusquam exterius patefactus fiat intra se ipsum se ipsum mouet, ac per hoc et silet et clamat et dum silet clamat et dum clamat silet et inuisibilis uidetur et dum uidetur inuisibilis est et incircumscriptus circumscribitur et dum circumscribitur incircumscriptus perseuerat et dum uult uocibus et litteris incorporatur et dum incorporatur incorporeus in se ipso subsistit et dum sibi ueluti quaedam uehicula quibus ad aliorum sensus possit prouehi de aeris

3 sq. Cf. Aug. De ord. ii. 9. 26.
Aug. De Gen. ad litt. iii. 3, 4, 8.

11 cf. 168. 29-170. 35 infra. 17-18 cf.

3 est B^c(C)P: sunt RB* si RBP^c: sic P* 4 ipsa (2) R^cBP: ipse R*
9 enim om. P 10 Deus itaque est B^c(C)P: Deus est itaque R: Deus itaque B*
11 dionysius RB: dyonisius P 12 omne enim quod RB^c(C): omne quod
B*: omne nanque quod P 13 lemma BP 14 ineffabilis-accessus sC in R
accessus RB: accessus P 16 immensurabilis RB: immensurabilis P
18 tempore in ras. B 19 incircumscripsi circumscripctio RB: incircumscripsi
circumscripctio P 25-26 apparet-intrinsecus om. P 26 dumque R^c(C)BP: et
dum R* 27 suae R^cBP: suum R* 31 incircumscripctus circumscribitur
RB: incircumscripctus circumscribitur P dum circumscribitur RB^c: circun-
scribitur B*: circumscribitur P

[For the motion of the supreme and threefold and only true Goodness, which in Itself is immutable, and the multiplication of its simplicity, and Its unexhausted diffusion from Itself in Itself back to Itself, is the cause of all things, indeed *is* all things. For if the understanding of all things is all things and It alone understands all things, then It alone is all things; for that alone is the gnostic power which knows all things before they are, and does not know all things outside Itself because outside It there is nothing, but It possesses all things within Itself. For It encircles all things and there is nothing within It but what, in so far as it is, is not Itself, for It alone truly is; for the other things that are said to be are Its theophanies, which likewise have their true subsistence in It¹¹.] Therefore God *is* everything that truly is because He Himself makes all things and is made in all things, as St. Dionysius the Areopagite says.

For everything that is understood and sensed is nothing else but the apparition of what is not apparent, the manifestation of the hidden, the affirmation of the negated, the comprehension of the incomprehensible, [the utterance of the unutterable, the access to the inaccessible,] the understanding of the unintelligible, the body of the bodiless, the essence of the superessential, the form of the formless, the measure of the measureless, the number of the unnumbered, the weight of the weightless, the materialization of the spiritual, the visibility of the invisible, the place of that which is in no place, the time of the timeless, the definition of the infinite, the circumscription of the uncircumscribed, and the other things which are both considered and perceived by the intellect alone and cannot be retained within the recesses of the memory and which escape the sharpness of the mind. And we can acquire a hint of this from examples from our own nature. For our own intellect too, although in itself it is invisible and incomprehensible, yet becomes [both] manifest and comprehensible by certain [signs] when it is materialized in sounds and letters and also indications as though in sorts of bodies; and while it becomes externally apparent in this way it still remains internally invisible, *and* while it breaks out into various figures comprehensible to the senses it never abandons the incomprehensible state of its nature; and before it becomes outwardly apparent it moves itself within itself; and thus it is both silent and cries out, and while it is silent it cries out and while it is crying out it is silent; and invisible it is seen, and while it is being seen it is invisible; and uncircumscribed it is circumscribed, and while it is being circumscribed it continues to be uncircumscribed; and it becomes embodied at will in sounds and letters, and while it is being embodied it subsists bodiless in itself; and when it makes for itself out of airy matter or

Concerning
Theophanies

materia uel sensibilibus figuris efficit mox ut ad sensus exteriores eorum
peruenerit ipsa uehicula deserens solus per se ipsum absolutus intima
corda penetrat aliisque intellectibus se miscet et fit unum cum his
quibus copulatur, et cum peragat semper in seipso manet et dum
mouetur stat et dum stat mouetur—est enim status mobilis et motus
stabilis—et dum aliis adiungitur suam simplicitatem non relinquit. Et
multa alia quae mirabiliter et ineffabiliter de natura quae ad imaginem
dei facta est exagitari possunt. Sed haec exemplo sufficiunt ad insinu-
andam diuinae bonitatis ineffabilem diffusionem per omnia a summo
usque deorsum, hoc est per uniuersitatem ab ipsa conditam, quae
ineffabilis diffusio et facit omnia et fit in omnibus et omnia est.

A. Sufficiunt sane et copiose affluunt in quantum res ineffabilis
quibusdam similitudinibus fari potest dum omni similitudine remota
est. Praedicta siquidem similitudo quam exempli gratia ab intellectu
nostro suscepisti in hoc deficit ut opinor [ab ea cuius similitudo est]
quod intellectus ut dicis uehicula [illa] in quibus ad aliorum sensus
inuehitur de materia extra se creata [et facit et] suscipit. Diuina uero
bonitas extra quam nihil est non de aliquo apparitionis suae materiem
sumpsit sed de nihilo.

de quali
nihil fecit
deus omnia

Sed cum audio uel dico diuinam bonitatem omnia de nihilo creasse
non intelligo quid eo nomine quod est nihil significatur: utrum
priuatio totius essentiae uel substantiae uel accidentis an diuinae
superessentialitatis excellentia.

N. Non facile concesserim diuinam superessentialitatem nihil esse
[uel tali nomine priuationis posse uocari]. Quamuis enim a theologis
dicatur non esse non eam tamen nihil esse suadent sed plus quam esse.
Quomodo enim causa omnium quae sunt nulla essentia intelligere-
tur esse cum omnia quae sunt eam uere esse doceant—nullo uero
argumento eorum quae sunt intelligitur quid sit? Si igitur propter
ineffabilem excellentiam et incomprehensibilem infinitatem diuina
natura dicitur non esse, nunquid sequitur omnino nihil esse dum
non aliam ob causam praedicetur non esse *superessentialis* nisi quod
in numero eorum quae sunt numerari eam *uera non sinit ratio* dum
super omnia quae sunt et quae non sunt esse intelligatur?

1 figuris efficit in ras. R eorum in ras. B(C) 6 relinquit R^cBP: reliquit R*
7 post de ea erasum R 8 exagitari R^cBP: excogitari R* 11 diffusio RB:
diuisio P 16 post intellectus ita erasum R sensus R^cBP: sensibus R*
post sensus rasura R 17 suscipit RB^cP: sufficit B* 20 lemma BP: quali B:
qua P de nihilo C in R: et quomodo omnia quae creasse sapientia essentia sunt
de nichilo facta sunt et de materia informi addidit Rm 23 excellentia R^cBP:
excellencia R* 24 nihil esse om. P 25 uocari: -c- s.l. R theologis R^cBP:
theologiis R* 27 essentia R^cBP: esentia R* 28 eam RBP^c: iam P* 29 eorum
quae R^cBP: eorumque R* 30 ineffabilem R^cBP: inefabilem R* excellen-
tiam R^cBP: excellentiam R* 31 nunquid RB: nihil P omnino in ras. B
32 superessentialis R (C in ras.) B: sed superior essentialis P 33 uera-ratio
R^c(C)BP: non sinitur R*

out of sensible figures certain vehicles, as it were, by means of which
it can convey itself to the senses of others so that it may quickly
reach *their* external senses, it then abandons these vehicles and pene-
trates by itself absolutely alone into the heart's core and mingles
itself with other intellects and becomes one with those to whom
it is joined; and when it acts abroad it ever remains within
itself, and when it moves it is at rest, and when it is at rest it
moves—for it is moving rest and resting movement—and while
it is being joined to others it does not relinquish its own
simplicity. And (there are) many other examples that in a
marvellous and ineffable way can be evoked from the nature that
was made in the image of God. But these are enough to illus-
trate by example the diffusion of the Divine Goodness through all
things from the highest downwards, that is, throughout the
universe that was established by It; and this ineffable diffusion
both makes all things and is made in all things and is all things.

A. Certainly they are enough and are in generous measure, in so
far as it is possible to express by similitudes what is inexpressible
and remote from all similitude. For this similitude that you have
taken as an example from our intellect falls short in this respect, as
I think, [from that of which it is a similitude]: that the intellect,
as you say, [both makes and] takes [those] vehicles in which it is
conveyed to the senses of others from matter that was created out-
side itself, whereas the Divine Goodness, outside of which there is
nothing, does not take the matter for its manifestation from some-
thing, but from nothing.

But when I hear or say that the Divine Goodness created all things
out of nothing I do not understand what is signified by that name,
'Nothing', whether the privation of all essence or substance or
accident, or the excellence of the divine superessentiality.

N. I would not easily concede that the divine superessentiality was
nothing [or could be called by so privative a name]. For although it
is said by the theologians not to be, they do not mean that it is
nothing but that it is more than being. For how could the Cause of
all things that are be understood to be no essence when all things that
are show that it truly is—although by no demonstration of the things
that are is it understood what it is? Therefore, if it is on account of
its ineffable excellence and incomprehensible infinity that the Divine
Nature is said not to be, does it follow that it is nothing at all, when
not-being is predicated of *the superessential* for no other reason than
that *true reason does not allow* it to be numbered among the things
that are because it is understood to be beyond all things that are and
that are not?

5
Of what sort
of nothing
God made
all things

A. Quid ergo intelligam [quesso te] audiens deum de nihilo omnia quae sunt fecisse?

N. Intellige ex non existentibus existentia uirtute bonitatis diuinae facta fuisse. Ea enim quae non erant acceperunt esse. De nilo nanque facta sunt quia non erant prius quam fierent. [Eo nanque uocabulo quod est nihilum non aliqua materies <existimatur>, non causa quaedam existentium, non ulla praecessio seu occasio quam sequeretur eorum quae sunt conditio, non aliquid deo coessentiale et coaeternum neque extra deum per se subsistens seu ab aliquo unde deus ueluti materiam quandam fabricationis mundi susceperit <significari>, sed omnino totius essentiae priuationis nomen est et ut uerius dicam uocabulum est absentiae totius essentiae. Priuatio enim habitudinis est ablatio. Quomodo autem <fortassis quis dixerit> poterat fieri priuatio priusquam fieret habitus? Nullus enim habitus erat antequam omnia quae sunt habitudinem subsistentiae acciperent.]

A. Eo igitur nomine quod est nihil[um] negatio atque absentia totius essentiae uel substantiae, immo etiam cunctorum quae in natura rerum creata sunt insinuatur.

N. Ita est, ut arbitror; nam *paene* omnes sanctae scripturae expositores in hoc consentiunt quod conditor uniuersae creaturae non de aliquo sed de omnino nihilo quaecunque uoluit fieri fecit.

A. Nebulis ualde tenebrosis cogitationum mearum undique circum me esse sentio. In talibus equidem nil mihi remanet nisi sola fides quam sanctorum patrum tradit auctoritas, dum uero de his quae sola fide retineo aliquid conor ad purum intelligentiae habitum perspicere fugientium me subtilissimarum rationum nimia obscuritate, immo etiam nimia claritate aciem mentis percussus repellor.

N. Dicas quaeso ubi nunc haesitas et quid te tantum perturbat ut ad nullum purae intelligentiae habitum ualeas ut ais peruenire aut ubi nostra ratiocinatio uacillat quando te ad nullam certam diffinitionem rerumque cognitionem potest adducere.

A. Magnanimum te esse meaeque tarditatis morulas patienter sustinere postulo. Crediderim nanque has rerum tenuissimas inquisitiones etiam perfectiorum me interioribus oculis non tam facile lucescere ut confestim ad firmum habitum possint adhaerere, praesertim dum ex his quae hactenus iamdudum ueluti ad liquidum

1 quesso B: quaesso RP 4 nilo B: nihilo RP 11-12 priuationis-
essentiae om. P 13 fortassis B: fortassis P 14 enim in ras. R(C)
17 absentia in ras. R(C) 20 ut s.l. B(C) paene B(C): et RB*: pene P
23 mearum R^oBP: earum R* 26 fide R^oBP: fidem R* aliquid R^oBP: aliquod R*
27 subtilissimarum RB: subtilissimorum P 29 quaesso R^oBP: quaeso R*
33 Magnanimum RB^oP: Magna nimium B* 34 has RB: his P 35 tam R^oBP: tamen R*
36 lucescere RB: lucessere P 37 praesertim R^oBP: presentim R*
hactenus RB: actenus P iamdudum B(C)P: inter nos RB*

A. What then [pray] am I to understand when I hear that God made all things that are from nothing?

N. Understand that the things that exist have been made from the things that do not exist by the power of the Divine Goodness; for the things that were not received being. For they were made from nothing because they were not before they came into being. [For that word 'Nothing' is taken to mean not some matter, not a certain cause of existing things, not anything that went before or occurred of which the establishment of things was a consequence, not something coessential or coeternal with God, nor something apart from God subsisting on its own or on another from which God took as it were a kind of material from which to construct the world; but it is the name for the total privation of the whole of essence and, to speak more accurately, it is the word for the absence of the whole of essence; for privation means the removal of possession. But how <perhaps someone may ask> could there be privation before there was possession? For there was no possession before all things that are received the possession of subsistence.]

A. By the name, 'Nothing', then, is meant the negation and absence of all essence or substance, indeed, of all things which are created in nature?

N. Such is the case, as I think. For almost all the commentators of Holy Scripture agree in this, that the Creator of the universal creature made whatever he willed to be made not out of something but out of nothing at all.

A. I feel myself to be surrounded on all sides by the dark clouds of my thoughts. In such matters at least nothing is left for me but faith alone which the authority of the Holy Fathers transmits. But when I try to achieve a clear intellectual perception concerning the things which I retain by faith alone I am repulsed, my attention being daunted by the excessive obscurity, or rather, the excessive brightness, of the very subtle reasons that elude me.

N. Please tell me where you are now in doubt and what disturbs you so much that you cannot, as you say, arrive at any clear intellectual perception, or where our reasoning falters since it cannot bring you to any sure definition or knowledge of things.

A. I beg of you to be indulgent and patiently bear with the delays my slowness causes. For I would believe that these very subtle inquiries into things would not easily so appear to the inward eyes of even better men than me that they would be able to attach themselves to a firm conviction at once, especially as the things that are at

perducta sunt haec mihi nunc obscura uidentur ingeri. Confectum
 est enim inter nos de primordialibus rerum omnium causis *quod* a
 patre in uerbo suo unigenito, hoc est in sua sapientia, simul et semel
 et aeternaliter factae sunt ita ut quemadmodum ipsa sapientia patris
 aeterna est suoque patri coaeterna *sic* etiam cuncta quae in ea facta
 sunt aeterna sint eo excepto quod in ipsa omnia facta sunt *quae* non
 est facta *sed* genita et factrix. Siquidem in condenda uniuersali
 creatura sicut una eademque patris et filii uoluntas ita una eademque
 est operatio. In primordialibus itaque suis causis omnia in sapientia
 patris aeterna sunt non tamen ei coaeterna. Praecedit enim causa
 effectus suos. Vt enim intellectus artificis artis intellectum praecedit,
 intellectus autem artis praecedit intellectum eorum quae in ea et
 per eam fiunt, ita intellectus patris artificis intellectum suae artis,
 hoc est suae sapientiae in qua condidit omnia, antecedit, deinde
 intellectum ipsius artis omnium quae in ea et per eam facta sunt
 sequitur cognitio. Omne siquidem quod uera ratio quoquo modo
 praecessione praecedere inuenit iuxta naturalem consequentiam praecede-
 re necesse est ac per hoc artifex omnium deus pater secundum
 causam artem suam praecedit. Artifex siquidem causa suae artis est, ars
 autem sui artificis non est causa, ipsa uero ars praecedit omnia quae in
 ea et per eam et ab ea subsistunt. eorum nanque causa est. Hinc con-
 ficitur in patris sapientia omnia aeterna *esse*, non tamen ei coaeterna.

N. Haec iam dudum [inter nos] discussa et ad inconcussum mentis
 habitum deducta <sunt>, uera ratione sanctorumque patrum testi-
 moniis in hoc consentientibus.

A. Num itaque uides quod non inmerito moueor et aduersantibus
 sibi inuicem diuersarum cogitationum fluctibus allidor? Nam quo-
 modo haec sibi inuicem conuenire possunt? Si omnia quae sunt in
 sapientia creatrice aeterna sunt quomodo de nihilo sunt facta?
 Quomodo enim potest aeternum esse quod priusquam fieret non erat
 aut quod incipit esse in tempore [et cum tempore] quomodo potest
 esse in aeternitate? Omne siquidem aeternitatis particeps nec incipit
 esse nec desinit, quod autem non erat et incipit esse necessario
 desinet esse quod est. Omne nanque quod initio non caret fine carere

13-14 Cf. Aug. *De lib. arb.* iii. 15. 42.

1 haec: -a- s.l. R nunc: -n- s.l. R obscura uidentur R^cBP: obscurai
 dentur R* 2-4 quod-factae sunt B^c(C): quod facta sunt P: a patre-factas
 esse RB* 4 aeternaliter: a- s.l. R 5 aeterna RB: eena P sic B^c(C)P:
 ita RB* 6 quae in ras. R(C) 7 sed in ras. R(C) 8-9 post eademque
 est RB* 9 post est eorum erasum R 10 glossa glo prius enim intel-
 ligitur artifex deinde ars deinde quae in arte et per artem fiunt BsP ei om. P
 13 suae artis: suae in ras. R 16 glossa glo quod enim uidet uera ratio praecede-
 re necessario rerum ordine praecedit BsP: ordine B: ordinem sP 19 causa
 RB: causam P 20 sui RB: suae P 22 in patris-esse R^c(C)BP: quod (?)
 in patris-sunt R* 23 discussa RB: discussa P 27 fluctibus R^cBP:
 fructibus R*

the moment dark to me seem to derive from those which have
 already *long ago* been, as it were, brought out into the light. For
 concerning the primordial causes of all things it was agreed between
 us *that they were made* by the Father in His only-begotten Word,
 that is, in His Wisdom, all together and once for all and eternally,
 so that as that Wisdom of the Father is eternal, and coeternal with the
 Father, *so* also all things which are made in it are eternal, except that
 they are all made in that *which* is not made *but* is begotten and is their
 maker; for in the establishing of the universal creature, as the will
 of the Father and the Son is one and the same, so is the operation
 one and the same. Therefore in their primordial causes all things
 are eternal in the Wisdom of the Father but not coeternal with it;
 for the cause precedes the effects. For as the concept of the artificer
 precedes the concept of his art, while the concept of the art precedes
 the concept of the things that are made in it and through it, so the
 concept of the Father Artificer precedes the concept of His Art, that
 is, of His Wisdom in which He created all things, then the concept
 of that Art is followed by the knowledge of all things that are made
 in it and through it. For everything that true reason finds to precede
 by whatever kind of precedence must precede in accordance with
 the natural sequence, and therefore the Artificer of all things God
 the Father precedes His Art as Cause. For the artificer is the cause
 of his art but the art is not the cause of its artificer, but the art precedes
 all things that subsist in it and through it and from it; for it is their
 cause. Hence it is concluded that in the Wisdom of the Father all
 things are eternal, but are not coeternal with it.

N. These things have already been discussed [between us] and
 <have been> brought to an unshakeable mental conviction that agrees
 with true reason and the testimonies of the Holy Fathers.

A. Do you not see, then, that it is not without reason that I am
 disturbed, and tossed about on the conflicting waves of thoughts
 which are inconsistent with one another? For how can these things
 be reconciled with one another? For if all things that are, are eternal
 in the creative Wisdom, how are they made out of nothing? For how
 can that be eternal which before it was made was not, or how can
 that which begins to be in time [and with time] be in eternity? For
 nothing that participates in eternity either begins to be or desists
 from being, whereas that which was not and begins to be will of
 necessity desist from being what it is. For nothing that is not without

non potest. Non inuenio itaque quomodo haec sibi inuicem non obpugnant.

Qua ratione et omnia in sapientia dei aeterna sunt et de nihilo facta, hoc est priusquam fierent non erant? Nisi forte quis dicat primordiales rerum causas in sapientia patris semper esse aeternas, informem uero materiem in qua et per quam in effectus suos per generationem proueniunt in genera et species quibus mundus impletur aeternam non esse. Sed quisquis hoc dixerit cogetur fateri materiem de nihilo factam causaliter intra aeternas rerum causas non connumerandam et si hoc concesserit necessario concludetur et cogetur dare non omnia sed quaedam in sapientia patris aeterna esse. Materiem autem informem in numero omnium quae a deo facta sunt in sapientia [sua] connumerari nemo recte philosophantium abnegarit. Quomodo enim rerum omnium causas in uerbo dei aeternaliter conditas esse, informem uero materiem sua causa carere quis potest dicere omnino non reperio. Proinde si in numero uniuersitatis conditae materia concluditur necessario sequitur ut ipsius causa ex numero causarum aeternaliter in sapientia dei creatarum non excludetur.

de informi
materie

N. De informi materia quam Graeci HAHN uocant nullus in sancta scriptura exercitatorum naturarum conditionem recta ratione considerans ambigit quod a conditore omnium et causaliter inter causales et inter causarum effectus secundum suas proportiones condita sit. Qui enim fecit mundum de materia informi ipse fecit informem materiem de omnino nihilo. Siquidem non alius est auctor mundi de informi materia facti et alius ipsius materiae de omnino nihilo prius creatae sed unus atque idem utriusque est conditor quoniam ab uno principio omnia quae sunt siue informia siue formata procedunt. Ab uno enim uniuersitas creata est [sicut a monade omnes numeri et a centro omnes lineae erumpunt]. Nam et in hoc maxime saecularium philosophorum qui de mundi huius factura tractare ausi sunt error conuincitur quoniam informem materiem coaeternam deo esse dixerunt de qua deus ueluti extra se subsistente et coaeterna sibi suorum operum sumpsit auspiciam. Indignum nanque eis uisum est materiem informem a deo fieri creatam. Quomodo enim, inquit, ex forma omnium informe fieret, ab immobili et in nullo in se ipso uariabili uarium ac mutabile, ab eo cui nihil accidit uariis accidentibus subiectum, a non distento per spacia locorum et temporum quod recipit locorum temporumque interualla et quantitatam, similiter ab

23-24 Cf. Aug. Conf. xii. 3. 3-8, 8.

5 informem RB^cP: informen B* 15 materiem R: materia P sua causa
R^cBP: suae causae R* 19 lemma BP: materie B: materiae P HAHN RB:
YLHN P 26 nihilo RB^cP: nichilo B* 28-29 sicut-erumpunt sC
in R 30 saecularium RB: saecularum P 37 a non RB: an P spacia
RB: spatia P

a beginning can be without an end. Therefore I cannot discover how these opinions do not contradict each other.

How can it be (true) both that all things are eternal in the Wisdom of God, and that they are made out of nothing, that is, that before they were made they were not?—Unless perhaps someone were to say that the primordial causes of things are always eternal in the Wisdom of the Father, but that the unformed matter in which and through which they proceed through generation into their effects, into the genera and species with which the world is filled, is not eternal. But whoever should say this will be forced to admit that matter which is made from nothing is not to be reckoned as a cause among the eternal causes of nature, and if he concedes this he will have to grant the necessary conclusion that not all but some things are eternal in the Wisdom of the Father. But none of those who practise philosophy correctly will deny that unformed matter is to be reckoned in the number of all things that were made by God in [His] Wisdom; for how anyone can say that the causes of all things are eternally created in the Word of God, but that unformed matter does not have its own cause I do not see. Then, if matter is included in the number of the established universe it necessarily follows that its own cause will not be excluded from the number of the causes which are eternally created in the Wisdom of God.

N. Concerning unformed matter, which the Greeks call *ύλη*, none of those who are learned in Holy Scripture, if with right reason he considers the establishment of natures, doubts that it is established by him who established all both as a cause among causals and among the effects of the causes according to their proportions. For He Who made the world from unformed matter also made unformed matter out of nothing at all. For there is not one author of the world that is made out of unformed matter and another of that matter previously created out of nothing at all, but one and the same Creator of both, since all things that are, whether unformed or formed, proceed from the same Beginning. For the universe is created from the One [just as all numbers burst forth from the monad and all radii from the centre]. For in this especially the error of the pagan philosophers who have dared to treat of the making of this world is principally condemned: that they said that unformed matter is coeternal with God, and that from it, as though it subsisted apart from Himself and coeternal with Him, God took the raw material for His works. For it seemed to them unworthy that unformed matter should be created by God. For how, they ask could the unformed come from the Form of all, the variable and mutable from Him Who is immutable and invariable in anything in Himself, that which is subject to various accidents from Him to Whom no accident occurs, that which admits

Concerning
Unformed
Matter

eo quod nulli qualitati subditum diuersarum qualitatum figurarum- 637B
que receptium, ab incorruptibili corruptibile, a simplici composi-
tum, et caetera id genus, suae falsae ratiocinationis nebulis obcaecati?
Nos autem sanctae scripturae ueritatem inspicientes diuinorumque
ipsius interpretum uestigia sequentes et informitatem rerum omnium 5
et formas et omne quod in eis siue secundum essentiam siue secun-
dum accidens est ab una omnium causa condita esse et per fidem
credimus et quantum datur per intellectum consideramus.

Non enim uniuersitatis conditor omnipotens et in nullo deficiens 637C
et in infinitum tendens similia sibi solummodo uerum etiam dis- 11
similia creare potuit et creauit. Nam si solummodo sui similia, hoc 11
est uere existentia aeterna incommutabilia simplicia inseparabiliter
unita incorruptibilia immortalia rationalia intellectualia scientia
sapientia caeterasque uirtutes, condiderit in dissimilium [et opposi-
torum] creatione defecisse uideretur et non omnino cunctorum quae 15
ratio posse fieri *docet* opifex iudicaretur.

Dissimilia autem sui [et opposita] dicuntur esse et sunt omnia quae
praedictis uirtutibus opponuntur, non ut negatiua sed naturae dis-
similitudine [et oppositione]. Siquidem perfectae essentiae [similiter 20
in genera formasque per differentias et proprietates uniformiterque 20
ordinatae per singulas species omni confusione subtracta] imperfectio
informis adhuc materiae et mobilitas opponitur, aeternis temporalia,
immutabilibus mutabilia, simplicibus composita, et caetera quae 637D
ueluti ex diametro sibi inuicem e contrario respondent. Horum itaque 25
omnium, similium dico et dissimilium, unus atque idem artifex est, 25
cuius omnipotentia in nullius naturae deficit operatione.

Proinde pulchritudo totius uniuersitatis conditae similium et dissimi-
lium mirabili quadam armonia constituta est ex diuersis generibus 638A
uariisque formis differentibus quoque substantiarum et acciden- 30
tium ordinibus in unitatem quandam ineffabilem compacta. Vt enim 30
organicum melos ex diuersis uocum qualitibus et quantitibus
conficitur dum uiritim separatimque sentiuntur longe a se discre-
pant[ibus] intentionis et remisionis proportionibus segregatae, dum
uero sibi inuicem coaptantur secundum certas rationabilesque artis
musicae regulas per singulos tropos naturalem quandam dulcedinem 35

27-28 Cf. Aug. *De ord. i.* 7. 18; *De ciu. Dei* xi. 18; xi. 22; xvi. 8.

7 una A: uno RBP 9 lemma diuinam totam similium et dissimilium esse
conditionem Rm 10 infinitum R^cBP: finitum R* 11 potuit RB: poterit P
15 defecisse BP: defecisse R uideretur RBP^c: uideatur P* 16 posse—docet
B^c(C)P: inuenit posse fieri R: posse fieri B* 19 perfectae: *glossa interlin.*
datium C in B 19-21 similiter—subtracta sC in R 20 per om. R*B*
uniformiterque: -que s.l. R 21 confusione R*BP: confusione R^c 22 op-
ponitur RB: opponit P 26 deficit RBP^c: efficit P* 27 pulchritudo RB:
pulchritudo P 30 post compacta *rasura* R 31-32 et quantitibus om. P
conficitur: -icitur in ras. R(C) 33 remisionis RB: remissionis P 35 singulos
tropos RB: singulis tropis P

intervals of places and times and quantities from Him Who is not
extended by intervals of places and times, similarly that which is
receptive of divers qualities and figures from Him Who is subject to
no quality, the corruptible from the Incorruptible, the composite
from the Simple, and other objections of that sort, blinded by the
mists of their false reasoning. But we, studying the truth of Holy
Scripture and following in the steps of its divine interpreters, both
believe by faith and, as far as it is permitted us, apprehend by our
understanding that both the formlessness of all things and the forms
and everything that is in them either as essence or as accident are
established by the one Cause of all things.

For the Creator of the universe, omnipotent and in nothing 6
deficient and reaching out to infinity, could and did create not only
the things that are similar to Himself but also things dissimilar. For
if He were to have established only His likenesses, that is, the things
that truly exist as eternal, immutable, simple, inseparably unified,
incorruptible, immortal, rational, intellectual—knowledge, wisdom
—and the other powers, he would seem to have failed in the
creation of things dissimilar [and opposite], and would not be
judged the Maker of absolutely everything that reason *teaches* that
it is possible to make.

Now the things that are dissimilar [and opposite] to Him are said
to be and are all things which are opposed to the aforesaid powers,
not as being their negatives but from the unlikeness [and opposition]
of their nature. For to perfect essence [in like manner ordered through
differences and properties into genera and species, and uniformly
ordered through each species without confusion] is opposed the im-
perfection and mobility of matter as yet unformed; to eternal things
temporal things; to immutable, mutable; to simple things compo-
sites; and all other things that stand to one another as diametrically
opposed. All these, then, I mean the similars and the dissimilars,
have one and the same Artificer, Whose omnipotence does not fail
in the operation of any nature.

Furthermore, the beauty of the whole established universe con-
sists of a marvellous harmony of like and unlike in which the diverse
genera and various species and the different orders of substances and
accidents are composed into an ineffable unity. For as instrumental
melody is made up of a variety of qualities and quantities of sounds
which when they are heard individually and separately are distin-
guished from one another by widely differing proportions of tension
or relaxation, but when they are attuned to each other in accordance
with the fixed and rational rules of the art of music give forth through
each piece of music a natural sweetness, so the harmony of the

reddent[ibus], ita uniuersitatis concordia ex diuersis naturae unius subdiuisionibus a se inuicem dum singulariter inspicuntur dissonantibus iuxta conditoris uniformem uoluntatem coadunata est.

His itaque diffinitis non immerito ut inquis diuersis cogitationum fluctibus sibi inuicem aduersantibus allideris. Confectum est enim et inconcuse diffinitum omnia quae sunt et quae non sunt ab uno omnium principio confluere siue in primordialibus causis semel et simul in uerbo dei unigenito aeternaliter factis siue in materia informi ex qua primordiales causae uisibilis creaturae apparitionis suae per generationem occasiones acceperunt siue in effectibus earum quibus mundus iste ab initio usque ad finem naturali ordine diuina prouidentia ministrante peragitur, sicut ait dominus: 'Pater meus usque modo operatur et ego operor.' Sed quemadmodum haec ueluti sibi aduersantia in unam quandam intelligentiae copulam conueniunt, hoc est quomodo omnia simul et aeterna et facta sunt, non solum tibi uerum etiam et mihi diligentissima rationis inquisitione dignum esse uidetur.

A. Dignum quidem. Hac enim quaestione nullam altiozem inquisitionibus ueritatis quaerendam esse arbitror. Etenim ut praediximus facta aeternis opponuntur ac per hoc si facta non sunt aeterna, si aeterna non <sunt> facta. Nam ut eadem et aeterna simul et facta sint qua ratione doceri ualeat non mihi occurrit. Proinde nil aliud restat ut aestimo nisi ut [aut ista] penitus prae nimia sui altitudine silentio honorificetur aut si quid tibi de ea uidetur inuestigandum inuestigare incipias.

N. Vtrunque mihi uidetur ut et eandem quantum acies contemplationis nostrae deo illuminante ex nimio subtilitatis suae fulgore non repellitur inuestigare nos non pigeat ne desidia seu inertiae culpam incurramus; ubi uero intentionis nostrae uirtutem exsuperat et non patitur mentibus adhuc terrena habitatione depressis perspicere et ad purum dinosci silentio cordis et oris honorificanda est ne quid temere de ea diffiniamus.

A. Ita fiat ac sine more huius inquisitionis uiam arripe.

N. De eo quod omnia in uerbo dei unigenito aeterna sint primo dicendum iudico.

A. Nec aliter uolo. Ab eo enim quod praecedat ratiocinatio est

12 In. v. 17. 30 Sap. ix. 15.

1 reddentibus R^cBP: redd*ent R* 4 itaque RB: ita P 6 inconcuse RB: inconcuse P 8 materia informi RB: materiam formi P 10 generationem occasiones RB: generationes occasionem P 15 lemma quomodo et eterna et facta sunt Rm 18 hac RB: haec P post altiozem rasura R 21 lemma BP: condita B: condidit P et aeterna RB: aeterna P 26 Vtrunque RB: Vtrunque P 28 repellitur RB: repellatur P 29 exsuperat RB: exuperat P 31 oris RB^cP: horis B* 34 lemma quomodo omnia in deo eterna sunt Rm 35 dicendum R^cBP: dicendo R* 36 est in ras. B

universe is established in accordance with the uniform will of its Creator out of the divers subdivisions of its one nature which when regarded individually clash with one another.

So now that these facts have been established it is not surprising that, as you say, you are tossed about on the conflicting waves of thought which contend with one another. For it is agreed and incontrovertibly established that all things that are and that are not flow together from the one Principle of all things whether in the Primordial Causes which were eternally made once and for all in the only begotten Word of God; or in the unformed matter from which the primordial causes of the visible creation received the occasions for their appearance through generation; or in their effects by which, under the ministration of the Divine Providence, this world is running out its course in the material order from its beginning to its end, as the Lord says: 'My Father works until now, and I work.' But how these things which appear to contend with each other are reconciled in the unifying embrace of the understanding, that is, how all things are at one and the same time both eternal and made, seems not only to you but also to me to merit a most careful investigation by the reason.

A. Certainly it merits it. For I think there is no more profound question than this that seekers after the truth should investigate. For, as we said above, things made are opposed to things eternal, and therefore if made they are not eternal, if eternal <they are> not made. For how it can be argued that the same things are both eternal and made does not occur to me. Hence there is nothing left, as I think, but [either] to respect [it] in complete silence in deference to its excessive profundity or for you to begin your investigation if it seems to you that there is anything about it to be investigated.

N. I think we should do both, so that on the one hand we should not shirk it so long as our attention, enlightened by God, is not repulsed by the excessive brightness of its subtlety lest we incur the blame of idleness or apathy; but on the other hand where it is beyond our reach and does not suffer itself to be observed and elucidated by minds that are still weighed down by their earthly habitation it should be respected in the silence of our hearts and our lips lest we should give some rash explanation of it.

A. So let it be; and embark upon this inquiry without delay.

N. I consider that we should begin by speaking of the proposition that all things are eternal in the only begotten Word of God.

A. I do not wish otherwise. For our reasoning must begin from

de eo quod uniuersitas condita aeterna simul et facta

How the established universe is at once eternal and made

inchoanda. Praecedit autem aeternitas facturam. Ab ea igitur est inchoandum.

N. Esto itaque intentus et uide ne quid incaute concedas ne iterum te concessisse peniteat.

A. Ingrederere. Intentus sum ne quid temere concedam.

N. Quid tibi uidetur? Num deus accidentium capax est?

A. Absit ab his qui de ueritate sanum sentiunt hoc dicere uel cogitare. Natura enim ipsius simplex est et plus quam simplex omnibusque accidentibus absoluta et plus quam absoluta.

N. Nihil ergo deo accidit?

A. Omnino nihil.

N. Itaque non est ei accidens uniuersitatem condere, eam tamen condidisse scriptura sancta non tacet [sed aperte clamat [²dicens]²: 'In principio fecit deus caelum et terram', et caetera quae de operibus primorum sex dierum leguntur].

A. Deus et uniuersitatem creaturarum condidit eamque condidisse non est ei accidens.

N. Non ergo erat [subsistens] antequam uniuersitatem conderet. Nam si esset conditio sibi *rerum* accideret.

A. Deum praecedere uniuersitatem credimus non tempore sed ea sola ratione qua causa omnium *ipse* intelligitur. Si enim tempore praecederet accidens ei [secundum tempus] *facere* uniuersitatem foret. Quoniam uero ea sola ratione qua causa est uniuersitatem ab eo conditam praecedit sequitur uniuersitatis conditionem non esse deo secundum accidens sed secundum quandam ineffabilem rationem qua causatiua in causa [sua] semper subsistunt.

N. Si igitur nulla alia ratione deus uniuersitatem a se conditam praecedit praeter illam solam qua ipse causa est, ea uero causatiua et omne causatiuum semper in causa subsistit—aliter enim nec causa causa est nec causatiuum causatiuum—*deoque* non accidit causalis esse—semper enim causa et est [et erat et erit], semper igitur causatiua in sua causa subsistunt [et substeterant et substitutura sunt]—proinde uniuersitas in sua causa quoniam causatiua est, hoc est *suae causae* particeps, aeterna est. Totius ergo creaturae uniuersitatem aeternam *esse* in uerbo dei manifestum est.

A. Huic conclusioni contradicere non ualeo dum sine ulla ambiguitate considero omnes numeros in monade et omnes lineas in

6–11 Cf. Aug. *De Trin.* v. 4. 5–5. 6. 14 Gen. i. 1 (creauit, *Vulg.*).

1–2 inchoandum R^cBP: inchoanda R* 4 peniteat RB: poeniteat P
7 ante uel *rasura* in R 10 N RP: NT B 13–15 sed leguntur
sC in R 18 conderet RB: concederet P 19 sibi RB: si in P
rerum in ras. R 21 ipse R^c(C)BP: se R* 22 *facere in ras.* R 30 *deoque*
R^c(C)BP: et deo R* causalis R^cBP: causale R* 31 causa et est BP: causa
est R*: et causa est R^c(C) 32 substitutura B^c: substitura BP*P 34–35 uni-

what goes before. Eternity goes before making. Therefore we must begin from that.

N. Pay attention, then, and see that you do not concede anything incautiously lest you repent again of what you have conceded.

A. Proceed. I am paying attention so as not to concede anything rashly.

N. How does it seem to you? Is God receptive of accidents?

A. Far be it from those who have a wholesome perception of the truth to say or think such a thing. For His Nature is simple and more than simple, and free and more than free from all accidents.

N. Then nothing in God is an accident?

A. Nothing at all.

N. Then it was not an accident in Him to establish the universe, and yet Holy Scripture is not silent about His having established it [and openly exclaims [²saying]²: 'In the beginning God made¹² heaven and earth', and the other things that are read of the works of the first six days.]

A. God both established the universe of creatures, and it was not an accident in Him to have established it.

N. Then He was not [subsisting] before He created the universe. For if He were, the establishment of *things* would be an accident in Him.

A. We believe that God is prior to the universe not in time but solely for the reason that the cause of all things is understood (to be) Himself. For if He were prior in time, it would be an accident in Him *to make* the universe [in time]. But since He is prior to the universe which He created solely for the reason that He is its Cause, it follows that the creation of the universe is not in God as accident but is in accordance with a certain mysterious reason on account of which caused things¹³ subsist always in [their] cause.

N. If, then, God is prior to the universe which He established for no other reason than the sole fact that He is the Cause while it is the caused, and every caused thing always subsists in its cause—for otherwise neither is the cause cause nor the caused caused—and it is not an accident in God to be causal—for always He is Cause [and was and will be], always therefore do the caused things subsist in their Cause [and had subsisted and will subsist]—, then the universe, since it is caused, that is, participates in its cause, is eternal in its cause. Therefore it is evident that the universe of the whole creation *is* eternal in the Word of God.

A. This conclusion I cannot contradict since without any uncertainty I see that all numbers eternally and uniformly subsist in the

uniuersitatem R^cBP: uniuersitas R* aeternam BP: aeterna R 35 esse R^cBP:
est R 36 Huic R^cBP: Hinc R*

centro aeternaliter et uniformiter subsistere et quamuis actu et opere numerantis et lineantis in uarias numerorum species figurasque formentur, semper tamen in principiis suis, in monade dico et centro, uniformiter permanent nec unquam sine eis principia intelliguntur fuisse nec in ipsis principiis fieri inchoasse et dum ab eis multipliciter profluunt uniformi tamen ratione aeterno atque incommutabili statu in eis esse non desinunt.

N. Simillimo uerissimoque usus es exemplo. Testimonia quoque et sanctae scripturae [et] sanctorum patrum omnia in deo esse aeterna perhibent. Apostolus: 'In quo uiuimus', inquit, 'et mouemur et sumus'. [In deo enim sumus per excellentem et ante existentem in ipso nostrae essentiae rationem, mouemur autem in deo secundum praecedentem in ipso bene essendi rationem per uirtutes bonae actionis, porro in deo uiuimus secundum praecedentem in ipso semper uiuendi et existendi rationem. Et ne quis aestimaret aliud nos esse et aliud nostras rationes, non dixit: In quo nostrae rationes uiuunt et mouentur et sunt, sed dixit: 'In quo uiuimus et mouemur et sumus.' Nihil enim aliud nos sumus in quantum sumus nisi ipsae rationes nostrae aeternaliter in deo substitutae.]

Sanctus [item] Augustinus in opusculis suis operationis diuinae quadriformem rationem exponens saecula in uerbi dei dispensatione non facta sed aeterna esse adfirmat, ubi non solum saecula uerum etiam omnia quibus saecula et peraguntur et implentur uoluit intelligi. ['Operatio', inquit, 'diuina quae saecula creauit et gubernat quadriformi ratione distinguitur: primo quod in uerbi dei dispensatione non facta sed aeterna sunt qui nos Apostolo teste ante tempora saecularia praedestinauit in regnum.'] Item alibi [de Trinitate scribens], 'Verbum dei', inquit, 'per quod facta sunt omnia ubi incommutabiliter uiuunt omnia, non solum quae fuerunt uerum etiam quae futura sunt, nec tamen in ipso fuerunt nec futura sunt sed tantummodo sunt et omnia unum sunt et magis unum est.' Item in Examerio de deo uerbo, 'Aliter', inquit, 'sub ipso sunt ea quae per ipsum facta sunt, aliter in ipso sunt ea quae ipse est', [tanquam aperte diceret: Aliter sub illo sunt dum per generationem facta in generibus et formis locis quoque in temporibus uisibiliter per materiem

10-11 Act. xvii. 28. 24-27 ap. Bed., *De nat. rer.* i; PL xc. 187A-188A.
26-27 cf. 2 Tim. i. 9; Tit. i. 2; 1 Cor. ii. 7. 28-31 *De Trin.* iv. 1. 3.
32-33 *De Gen. ad litt.* ii. 6. 12.

2 lineantis R*BP: liniantis R^c 8 lemma in ipso uiuimus mouemur et sumus
Rm 10 aeterna perhibent om. P. 11-19 in deo-substitutae sC in R
13-14 bene essendi-in ipso om. P. 15 existendi RB^cP: existent B* 17 uiuunt
RB^cP: uiunt B* 24-27 operatio-regnum sC in R 25 distinguitur B^cP: di-
stingitur RB* uerbi R^cBP: uerbo R* 26 qui RB: quo P nos RB: in P
27 praedestinauit RB: praedistinauit P 27-28 de trinitate scribens sC in R
30 nec tamen-futura sunt om. P 31-32 item in examerio RB: inter examerio P
35 in temporibus RB: temporibusque P

monad and all radii in their centre, and although in the actual process of counting the numbers and drawing the radii they take the forms of different kinds of numbers and figures, yet they still abide as one form in their principles, I mean in the monad and in the centre, and it is understood that neither were the principles ever without them nor was there a beginning to their being made in the principles, and while they flow forth from them as many, yet they do not cease to be in them under the form of one because of their eternity and immutability.

N. You have used an example that is most apt and most true. Moreover the testimonies both of Holy Scripture [and] of the Holy Fathers allow that all things are eternal in God, 'in Whom', says the Apostle, 'we live and move and have our being'. [For we have our being in God because the reason of our being is excelling and pre-exists in Him; we move in God because the reason of our well-being pre-exists in Him through the powers of our good deeds; finally we live in God because the reason of our eternal life and existence pre-exists in Him. And lest anyone should suppose that we are one thing and our reasons are another, he did not say, In Whom our reasons live and move and have their being, but He said: 'In Whom we live and move and have our being.' For in so far as we are, we are nothing else but those reasons of ours which subsist eternally in God.]

St. Augustine [also], expounding in his minor works the fourfold principle of the divine operation, affirms that in the dispensation of the Word of God the ages are not made but are eternal, and here he wishes it to be understood that not the ages merely, but all things by which the ages are brought about and fulfilled. ['The divine operation', he says,¹⁴ 'which created and governs the ages, is distinguished by a fourfold principle: first (there is the fact) that in the dispensation of the Word of God the ages are not made but are eternal; for, according to the Apostle, before the beginning of secular time He predestined us for His kingdom.'] Again, in another place [writing on the Trinity] he says: 'The Word of God through Whom all things are made, wherein all things live immutably, not only the things that have been but also the things that shall be; and yet in Him they neither have been nor shall be but only are, and all are one, or rather all is one.' Again in the Hexaameron he says of God the Word: 'In one way the things that were made through Him are under Him, in another way the things that He is are in Him', [as though he were saying openly: In one way they are under Him when, made through generation, they appear in genera and species,

33 tanquam-mundi sC in R

apparent, aliter in ipso sunt dum in primordialibus rerum causis quae non solum in deo uerum etiam deus sunt aeternaliter intelliguntur. Et ideo ait 'ea quae ipse est'—non quod alia sint quae in deo sunt et deus esse dicuntur propter unitatem naturae et alia quae per generationem in mundum ueniunt, sed quia una eademque rerum 5 natura aliter consideratur in aeternitate uerbi dei, aliter in temporalitate constituti mundi]. 640D

Sanctus quoque Dionysius Ariopagita in capitulo de Perfecto et Vno de deo loquens, 'Vnum', inquit, 'dicitur quia omnia uniuersaliter est . . . nullum enim existentium est non-participans unius', et paulo 10 post: 'Itaque et hoc cognoscendum quia secundum unum uniuscuiusque praecogitata est species; unire dicitur unita et omnium est unum exemplar et si interimas unum neque uniuersitas . . . neque aliud aliquid existentium erit. Omnia enim in se ipso unum uniformiter praeambit et circumprendit.' 641A 15

His atque huius modi exemplis ac testimoniis in unum collectis apertissime datur intelligi omnia in uerbo dei non solum aeterna uerum etiam *ipsum* [uerbum] *esse*. Quoniam uero et facta simul omnia et aeterna sunt in uerbo dei sanctae scripturae testimoniis planissime declaratur; Ioannes euangelista, 'Omnia', inquit, 'per ipsum facta sunt et sine ipso factum est nihil.' Ecce apertissime facta esse omnia in uerbo dicit. Sed ne quis aestimaret facta esse solummodo et non aeterna sequitur: 'Quod factum est, in ipso uita erat', ac si dixisset: Quod factum est siue in principalibus causis siue in earum effectibus in ipso uerbo in quo rationes omnium aeternae sunt uita erat. Item Apostolus: 'In quo creata sunt omnia quae sunt in caelis et quae in terra siue uisibilia siue inuisibilia siue throni siue dominationes siue principatus siue potestates. Omnia ex ipso et per ipsum et in ipsum creata sunt.' 'Causas enim', ut ait beatus Maximus, 'eorum quae facta sunt habens ante saecula praesubstitutus uoluntate bona secundum eas uisibilem et inuisibilem ex non existente substituit creaturam ratione et sapientia < . . . > secundum oportunitatem tempus et fecit et facit et quae uniuersaliter sunt et quae per singula. Causam quidem angelorum creationis praeduxisse credimus, causam uniuscuiusque complementum mundum qui super nos est essentiarum et uirtutum, rationem hominum, rationem uniuscuiusque ex deo 35

9-10 DN xiii. 2; PG iii. 977C 4-7.
20-21 In. i. 3. 23 In. i. 3-4.
1 *Ambig.* iii; PG xci. 1080A 2-B 11.

11-15 *op. cit.* xiii. 3; PG iii. 980B 1-6.
26-29 Col. i. 16. 29-p. 78.7

3 et ideo ait RB: qui deus nisi P 7 constituti RB: constitutum P 8 *glossa*
in libro de nominibus diuinis P dionysius RB: dionisius P 9 de om. P
18 ipsum esse in ras. R(C) 20 iohannes RB: iohannes P 22 aestimaret
RB: existimaret P 26 item RB: et P 29 in ipsum RB: in ipso P
34 quidem: -dem in ras. R(C) creationis *conieci*; creans *codd.*

in places also and times, visibly through matter; in another way they are in Him when they are understood eternally in the primordial causes of nature which are not only in God but also are God. And that is why he says, 'the things that he is'; not that the things which are in God and are said to be God on account of the unity of their nature are other than those which come into the world through generation, but because one and the same nature is considered in one way in the eternity of the Word of God, in another way in the temporality of the world He has constituted.]

St. Dionysius the Areopagite also in his chapter on the Perfect and the One says, speaking of God: 'He is called the One because He is universally all things . . . for there is not one of the things that exist that is not a participant of the One'; and a little later: 'Therefore this too must be understood: that in the One the species of each is preconceived; the One is said to unify the things that are unified and is the exemplar of all things, and if you remove the One, there will be neither a universe . . . nor anything else of the things that exist. For the One precedes and embraces all things in its uniformity.'

If we take together these and similar examples and testimonies, we are given to understand most clearly that all things are not only eternal in the Word of God but also *are* [the Word] *Itself*. But it is stated in plainest terms by the testimonies of Holy Scripture that all things are made at once as well as being eternal in the Word of God, for John the Evangelist says, 'All things were made through Him and without Him was made nothing.' See how he says quite openly that all things were made in the Word; but lest any one should suppose that they were only made and not eternal he continues: 'That which was made was life in Him'—as though he had said: That which was made, whether in the primordial causes or in their effects, was life in that Word in Whom the reasons of all things are eternal. Also the Apostle: 'In Whom are created all things that are in heaven and in earth, whether visible or invisible, whether thrones or dominations or principalities or powers; all are created from Him and through Him and to Him.' 'For', as the Blessed Maximus says, 'having the reasons of the things that have been made presubstantiated in His good will, he substantiated in accordance with them, out of that which is not, the visible and invisible creation; and at their appropriate times made and is making in His Word and Wisdom . . . both universal and particular beings. For we believe that He prescribed the reason for the creation¹⁵ of the angels, the reason for each of the essences and powers that fill the world above us, the reason for the creation of men, the reason for each of the things that takes its being

esse accipientium <. . .> in se ipsum omnia recapitulans', hoc est 641C
 consummans, 'per quem et esse et permanere et ex quo quae genita
 sunt quantum genita sunt et ad quem genita sunt imanentia et mota
 participant deum. Omnia enim participant eo quod ex deo facta sunt
 proportionaliter deum siue per intellectum siue rationem siue sensum 5
 siue motum uitalem siue essentialem et habitam oportunitatem ut
 magno et diuino manifestatori Dionysio uidetur Ariopagitae.'

Neminem itaque fidelium pieque sanctam scripturam inuesti-
 gantium dubitare oportet de eo quod omnia in deo uerbo et aeterna
 simul et facta sunt—nam et uera ratio et sanctae scripturae auctoritas 10
 in hoc unanimiter sentiunt—et non alia esse quae aeterna sunt et
 alia quae facta sed eadem sunt simul et aeterna et facta. Qua uero 641D
 ratione aeterna sunt facta et facta aeterna possumus intelligere exigis
 a me non immerito explanare, siquidem id ipsum aeternum et factum
 subsistere uidetur tibi uerae rationi non conuenire et fortassis nondum 15
 ego ipse quomodo hoc conueniat ad purum dinosco.

A. Incipe itaque de hac quaestione si quid dicendum et inquire[re] 642A
 et aperire.

N. Rationes omnium rerum dum in ipsa natura uerbi quae super-
 essentialis est intelliguntur aeternas esse arbitror. Quicquid enim in 20
 deo uerbo substantialiter est quoniam non aliud praeter ipsum uer-
 bum est aeternum esse necesse est ac per hoc conficitur et ipsum
 uerbum et multiplicem totius uniuersitatis conditae principalissi-
 mamque rationem id ipsum esse. Possumus etiam sic dicere: Simplex
 et multiplex rerum omnium principalissima ratio deus uerbum est. 25
 Nam a Grecis logos uocatur, hoc est uerbum uel ratio uel causa.
 Inde quod in greco euangelio scribitur, EN APXH HN O ΛΟΓΟΣ,
 Λόγος potest interpretari: 'In principio erat uerbum', uel: In principio erat 642B
 ratio, uel: In principio erat causa. Quodcunque enim horum quis
 dixerit ex ueritate non deuiabit. Nam unigenitus dei filius et uerbum 30
 est et ratio et causa, uerbum quidem quia per ipsum deus pater dixit
 fieri omnia—immo etiam ipse est patris dicere et dictio et sermo sicut
 ipse ait in euangelio: 'Et sermo quem locutus sum uobis non est
 meus sed ipsius qui misit me', tanquam diceret aperte: Ego qui sum
 sermo patris qui locutus sum uobis non sum meus sed loquentis me 35
 patris et ex secretis substantiae suae sinibus me gignentis et omnia

27 In. i. 1. 25-25 cf. Aug. De Trin. vi. 4. 6. 33-34 In. xiv. 24.

4 eo om. P 7 dionysio RB: dionisio P 10 auctoritas: -s in ras. B
 12 uera RB: uero P 13 post intelligere rasura R 14 marginalia erasa P
 non RBP^c: aon P* post siquidem rasura R 15 uerae R^cBP: uera R*
 19 lemma quod unigenitus dei filius et deus est et ratio Rm 22 et ipsum: et
 in ras. R(C) 26 logos RB: ΛΟΓΟΣ P 27 lemma B(?C)P inde R^cBP:
 deinde R* 29 causa in ras. B enim om. P 31 post ratio est erasum R
 34 Ego qui RBP^c: Ego iui P* 35 in ante me erasum R 36 sinibus R^cBP:
 si* nibus R*

from God . . . recapitulating', that is, summing up, 'all things in
 Himself, in Whom is being and permanence and from Whom and to
 Whom is the becoming of things that become: things at rest and
 things in motion participate in God. For all things, because of their
 coming into being from God, participate in God according to their
 proper capacity, whether through intellect or through reason or
 through sense or through vital motion or through their opportunity
 for being and possessing, as is the opinion of Dionysius the Areo-
 pagite, the great and divine revealer.'

Therefore none of the faithful or of those who devoutly investigate
 Holy Scripture ought to doubt that all things are at once both
 eternal and made in the Word—for both right reason and the
 authority of Holy Scripture agree unanimously in this—and that the
 things that are eternal are not other than the things that are made
 but the same things are at once both eternal and made. But you do
 well to demand from me an explanation as to how we can understand
 eternal things to be made and made things to be eternal, since it does
 not seem to you to accord with right reason that the same thing
 should be eternal and made, and perhaps I myself have not yet
 made it quite clear how it does accord.

A. Begin, then, with the investigation and explanation of what can
 be said on this question.

N. My opinion is that the reasons of all things, so long as they are 9
 understood in the very nature of the Word, which is superessential,
 are eternal. For whatsoever is substantially in God the Word, since
 nothing but the Word Itself is eternal, must (themselves) be eternal,
 and therefore we conclude that the Word Itself and the multiple and
 most primary reason of the whole created universe are one and the
 same thing. We can also say this: The most primary reason of all
 things, which is simple and multiple, is God the Word. For it is 10
 called by the Greeks Logos, that is, Word or Reason or Cause. Λόγος
 Therefore that which is written in the Greek gospel, ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν ὁ
 λόγος, can be interpreted 'In the beginning was the Word', or: 'In
 the beginning was the Reason', or: 'In the beginning was the Cause'.
 For nobody who makes any one of these statements will be deviating
 from the truth. For the only-begotten Son of God is both Word and
 Reason and Cause, Word because through Him God uttered the
 making of all things—in fact He is the Utterance of the Father and
 His Saying and His Speech, as He Himself says in the gospel, 'And
 the speech which I have addressed to you is not Mine but His that
 sent Me'—as though He were saying openly: I Who am the Speech
 of the Father, I Who have addressed you, am not of Myself but of the
 Father Who speaks Me and begets Me out of the secret recesses of
 His Substance, and Who, through Me, that is, in begetting Me, makes

per me, hoc est gignendo me, facientis—, ratio uero quoniam ipse est omnium uisibilium et inuisibilium principale exemplar ideoque a Grecis ΙΔΕΑ, id est species uel forma, dicitur—in ipso enim pater 642c omnia quae uoluit fieri priusquam fierent uidit facienda—, causa quoque est quoniam occasiones omnium aeternaliter et incommu- 5 tabiliter in ipso subsistunt.

Quoniam igitur dei filius et uerbum et ratio et causa est non incongruum dicere: Simplex et in se infinite multiplex creatrix uniuersitatis conditae ratio et causa dei uerbum est, ac sic recurrit: Dei uerbum est simplex et in se infinite multiplex creatrix uni- 10 uersitatis conditae ratio et causa; simplex quidem quia rerum omnium uniuersitas in ipso unum indiuiduum et inseparabile est uel certe indiuidua et inseparabilis unitas omnium dei uerbum est quoniam ipsum omnia est, multiplex uero non immerito intelligitur esse quoniam per omnia in infinitum defunditur et ipsa diffusio subsi- 642D stentia omnium est. 'Attingit enim a fine usque ad finem fortiter et 16 disponit omnia suauiter.' Item in psalmo: 'Velociter currit sermo eius.'

Sermonem dixit propheta uerbum patris quod uelociter currit per omnia ut omnia sint. Ipsius enim cursus per omnia multiplex et 20 infinita omnium subsistentia est. Hinc sanctus Dionysius in capitulo de Perfecto et Vno, 'Perfectum quidem est', inquit, 'non solum ut 643A per-se-ipsum perfectum <. . .> secundum se ipsum a se ipso unifor- miter segregatum et totum per totum perfectissimum sed et <. . .> 25 plus quam perfectum secundum omnium excellentiam et omnem quidem multitudinem terminans, omni uero summitati super- expansum et a nullo locatum aut comprehensum sed extensum <. . .> in omnia simul et super omnia non deficientibus augmentis et 30 infinitis operationibus. Perfectum iterum dicitur et uelut non auctum et semper perfectum et ut indiminutum ut omnia in se ipso superans et supermansans secundum unam et incessabilem per se superplenam et non minoratam largitatem.'

Manet ergo in se ipso uniuersaliter et simpliciter quoniam in ipso unum sunt omnia, attingit autem a fine usque ad finem et uelociter 643B currit per omnia, hoc est sine mora facit omnia et fit in omnibus 35 omnia, et dum in se ipso unum perfectum et plus quam perfectum et ab omnibus segregatum subsistit extendit se in omnia et ipsa

3 Cf. Aug. *De diu. qu.* 83. 46. 2. 16–17 Sap. viii. 1. 17–18 Ps. cxlvii. 15. 22–32 DN xiii. 1; PG iii. 977B 4–C1.

2 lemma ΙΔΕΑ scripsi: ΙΔΕΑ B(?C)P 4 fierent RB: uiderent P
5 occasiones R^cBP: ocasiones R* 8 simplex s.l. B 9 dei uerbum om.
P 9–11 ac-causa om. P 9 recurrit B^c: recurrere RB* 14 lemma
ipsum omnia est Rm 15 diffusio R^cBP: difusio R* 17 psalmo R^cBP: salmo R*
19 dixit RB: dicit P 21 subsistentia: -a in ras. R est in ras. R dionysius

all things—; Reason because He is the principal Exemplar of all things visible and invisible, and therefore is called by the Greeks *ιδέα*, that is, species or form—for in Him the Father beholds the making of all things He willed to be made before they were made—; and Cause because the origins of all things subsist eternally and immutably in Him.

Since, then, the Son of God is both Word and Reason and Cause it is not inappropriate to say: the creative Reason and Cause of the established universe, simple and in itself infinitely multiple, is the Word of God, and to put it the other way: The Word of God is the creative Reason and Cause of the established universe, simple and in itself infinitely multiple; simple, because the universe of all things is in Him an indivisible and inseparable One, or rather the indivisible and inseparable unity of all things is the Word of God since He is all things; and not unreasonably understood to be multiple because He is diffused through all things to infinity, and that diffusion is the subsistence of all things. For He spreads mightily from end to end and sweetly disposes all things. Also in the Psalm: 'His speech runneth swiftly.'

By 'speech' the prophet meant the Word of the Father which runs swiftly through all things in order that all things may be. For its multiple and infinite course through all things is the subsistence of all things. Hence St. Dionysius in the chapter on the Perfect and the One says: 'It is perfect not only as perfect-through-itself (and) separated in the form of unity in itself by itself and all through all most perfect, but also (as) more-than-perfect by reason of its transcendence over all things and because it sets a limit to every multitude and yet extends beyond every limit and is not confined or comprehended by anyone, but is extended (both) in all things at once, and beyond all things by virtue of its unfailing gifts and infinite operations. Again, it is called perfect both because it is incapable of being increased and is ever perfect, and because it is incapable of being diminished as transcending and overflowing all things in a single and incessant generosity that is through itself overfull and undiminished.'

Therefore in itself it remains universal and simple, since in it all things are one; and yet it reaches from end to end and runneth swiftly through all things, that is, without expenditure of time it makes all things and is made in all things, and while in itself it subsists as One, Perfect and More-than-perfect and separate from all things, it extends itself into all things, and that very extension is all

RB: dionysius P 22 perfecto et uno R^cBP: perfectum et unum R* inquit
R^cBP: inquit R* 24 perfectissimum R^cB: et perfectissimum R*: et per-
fectissimum P 27 sed RB^cP: sex B* extensum R^cBP: existentum R*
31 incessabilem: -sa- in ras. R 34 attingit BP: attingit R 35 fit RB: fecit
P 36 post ipso rasura R 37 subsistit BP: subsistit R

extensio est omnia. Hoc etiam nomine ipsius caelestis essentiae quod est cherubim significari uidetur, siquidem cherubim fusio sapientiae interpretatur ut sapientes ebraeorum tradiderunt, ubi subtilissime intelligendum quod fusio sapientiae uel extensio uel cursus uel quoquo alio modo infinita uerbi multiplicatio dicatur non quasi in 5
 ea quae prius erant quam funderetur uel extenderetur uel curreret uerbum patris et sapientia sed ipsius fusio uel extensio uel cursus praecedit omnia et causa existentiae omnium est et omnia. Quis enim ueritatem consulens crediderit uel cogitauerit deum praeparasse sibi locos per quos sese diffunderet qui nullo loco continetur 643C
 dum locus omnium communis sit ac per hoc locus locorum nullo loco capitur? Aut sibi praeparasse spatia localia seu temporalia per quae sese extenderet cursuue suo curreret qui omni spatio caret et omnia tempora sua aeternitate superat? Aut quis dixerit quod 10
 incredibilius est, ipsi deo dico ab alio ueluti principio praeparata 15
 fuisse locorum temporunquae spatia seu qualiumcunque quantitatum interualla quae sua diffusionem impleteret uel suo cursu perageret uel sua extensione solidaret? Haec enim de natura ineffabili et superessentially non solum dicere uerum etiam cogitare falsisque imaginationibus fingere et ridiculosissimum [est] et perniciosissimum. Non 643D
 enim alia mors rationalis animae turpior peiorque est quam talia monstra abhominandaque idola de creatore omnium cogitare cum ueritas ipsa [in] intellectibus pie quaerentium ac diligentium creatorem suum intelligibili uoce proclamet generaliter de omnibus quae 20
 sunt et quae non sunt, hoc est quae sensu uel intellectu comprehendi 25
 possunt et quae sensum aut intellectum superant quorum esse est 644A
 omni comprehensibili essentia carere, nihil aliud subsistere praeter unius solius omnium causae participationem.

Omne autem quod participatur et participationem sui et participantia se praecedit. Deus igitur praecedit omnia quaecumque se 30
 participant et quorum essentia participatio eius est. Hinc magnus Dionysius Ariopagita in libro de Caelesti Hierarchia, hoc est episcopatu, quarto capitulo, 'Primum', inquit, 'omnium illud dicere uerum' est 'ut bonitate uniuersali superessentials diuinitas eorum quae sunt

9 Cf. Aug. *De mag.* xi. 38; *De Trin.* xiv. 6. 8. 33-84.10 CH iv. 1; PG iii. 177C 6-D 5.

1 nomine RB: nomina P 2 cherubim . . . cherubim RB: cherubin P fusio R^cBP: difusio R* 2 lemma quid significat cherubim et quia omnia participatio et de processione dei per omnia Rm 3 ebraeorum B^c(C): aebraeorum B*: ebraeorum RP 6 extenderetur RB: extendetur P curreret RB: cucurreret P 9 consulens: -ens in ras. R(C) 10 continetur in ras. B 13 curreret RBP^c: carreret P* 14 post tempora rasura R 17 interualla quae B^c(C)P: interuallaque RB* 19 falsisque BP: falisque R 20 perniciosissimum B: perniciosissimum RP 21 rationalis R^cBP: rationis R* 22 abhominandaque R^c: ἀβὸμῖναδαque B: abominandaque R*P 26 aut B^c(C)P: et RB* 29 omne-participationem om. P 32 dionysius RB: dionisius P

things. Moreover, it seems to be what is signified by the name of that celestial essence 'Cherubim', for Cherubim is interpreted 'Effusion of Wisdom', as we are told by those who are learned in Hebrew lore, of which the most subtle interpretation is: the Wisdom's fusion, or extension or running or whatever other name is used for the infinite multiplication of the Word, is not as if it were into things which existed before the Word and Wisdom of the Father was diffused or was extended or ran, but that that very effusion or extension or running precedes all things and is the cause of the existence of all things and is all things. For who, taking thought for the truth, would believe or think that God had prepared for Himself places through which He might diffuse Himself, He Who is contained in no place since He is the common place of all things and therefore, as Place of places, is held by no place; or that He had prepared for Himself intervals of place or time through which He might extend Himself or run His course, He in Whom there is no interval and Whose eternity transcends all times? Or who would say something which would be still harder to believe, I mean that spatial and temporal or any other sort of quantitative intervals had been prepared for God Himself as though by another principle so that He might fill them by the diffusion of Himself or traverse them in His running or give them solidity by the extension of Himself? For not only to say such things of the ineffable and superessential nature but even to think them or depict them in false imaginings [is] most ridiculous and most harmful. For there is no worse nor more disgraceful death for the rational soul than to conceive of the Creator of all things in terms of such monsters and abominable idols, when the Truth Itself [in] the intellects of those who devoutly seek and love their Creator declares with intelligible voice generally concerning all things that are and that are not, that is, things that can be comprehended by sense or intellect and things that surpass sense or intellect of which the essence is that they are without any comprehensible essence, that they have no other subsistence than as participation in the one only Cause of all.

But everything which is participated is prior both to the participation in itself and to the things that participate in it. Therefore God is prior to whatever things participate in Him and the participation in Him that is their essence. Hence the great Dionysius the Areopagite in the Book of the Celestial Hierarchy, that is, of the (Celestial) Episcopate, in the fourth chapter, says: 'First of all, that is a true saying that by universal goodness the superessential divinity has

essentias substituens ad esse adduxit. Est enim hoc omnium causae
et super omnia bonitatis proprium ad communionem suam ea quae
sunt uocare ut unicuique eorum quae sunt ex propria diffinitur
analogia. Omnia igitur participant prouidentiam ex superessentiali
et causalissima diuinitate manantem. Non enim fortassis essent nisi
eorum quae sunt essentiae et principii assumptione. Existentia igitur
omnia esse eius participant—esse enim omnium est super esse
diuinitas—, uiuentia autem eandem super omnem uitam uiuificam
uirtutem, rationalia et intellectualia eandem super omnem et rationem
et intellectum per se perfectam et antepreperfectam sapientiam.’

Audisti summi theologi Ariopagitae Dionysii praeclarissimi
Athenarum episcopi de participatione diuinae essentiae [sententiam
qua apertissime manifestat omnia quae sunt et quae non sunt nihil
aliud [²intelligenda]² praeter diuinae essentiae participationem, ipsam
uero participationem nihil aliud esse praeter eiusdem diuinae essen-
tiae assumptionem. ‘Non enim’, inquit, ‘fortassis essent nisi eorum
quae sunt essentiae et principii assumptione.’ Est igitur participatio
diuinae essentiae assumptio, assumptio uero est sapientiae diuinae
fusio quae est omnium substantia et essentia et quaecumque in eis
naturaliter intelliguntur]. Audi etiam eiusdem de processione dei
per omnia et mansione in se ipso in epistola quam rescripsit Tito
pontifici interroganti quae sapientiae domus, quis crater, et qui cibi
eius et potus. ‘Duplicem’, inquit, ‘aescam diuina sapientia proponit,
unam quidem solidam et manducabilem, alteram uero humidam et
profusam, et in cratere porrigit prouidas suas bonitates. Ipse igitur
crater rotundus dum sit et repandus symbolum est expansae simul
et in omnia circumeuntis sine principio et infinitae horum omnium
prouidentiae. Veruntamen quoniam in omnia proueniens manet in
se ipsa et stat in immutabili naturae similitudine et perfectissima
inremeabiliter se ipsa collocata uniformiter et fixe sic crater stat.
Edificans autem sapientia domum sibi dicitur et in ipsa < . . . > solidas
aescas et potus et cratera proponens sic esse diuina diuinitus symbola
facientibus clarum quia et prouidentia perfectissima est ipse essendi

16–17 *CH* iv. 1; *PG* iii. 177c 14–15.
23–86.8 *op. cit.* ix. 3; *PG* iii. 1109B 6–D 2.

1 *rasura ante* essentias B
7 eius *om.* P
sC *in* R
16 fortassis RB: fortassis P
18 assumptio . . . est RB: assumptio . . . eius P
24 humidam B^cP: umidam RB*
simbolum P
ueruntamen RB: ueruntamen P
32 aescas RB: escas P
5 fortassis RB: fortassis P nisi RB: iis P
11 dionysii RB: dionisii P
14 intelligenda sC *in* R
17 assumptione RB^cP: assumptionem B*
23 *post* potus describentis *erasum* R
26 rotundus *s.l.* B simbolum RB:
28 prouidentiae R^cBP: prouidentia R*
30 sic RB: ut P
31 edificans RB: aedi-
ficans P

brought forth into being the essences of the things that are by sub-
stantiating them. For this is the property of the Cause of all things
and of the Goodness beyond all things: to call beings into com-
munion with Himself to the limit of the capacity of each of the
things that are. All things, therefore, participate in the Providence
which flows forth from the Divinity that is superessential and cause
of all things. For perhaps they would not exist except by taking
upon themselves the being and principle of all things that are.
Therefore all things that exist participate in its being—for the being
of all things is the divinity that is beyond being¹⁶—, while the things
that live (participate) in the same life-giving power that is beyond
life, and rational and intellectual things in the same Wisdom, perfect-
through-itself and more-than-perfect, that is beyond all reason and
intellect.’

You have heard from the highest theologian, Dionysius the Areo-
pagite, most famous Bishop of Athens, on the participation of the
Divine Essence [an opinion in which he most clearly shows that all
things that are and that are not [²are to be understood as]² nothing
else but participation in the Divine Essence, and that that participa-
tion is nothing else but the taking upon themselves of the same
Divine Essence. ‘For’, he says, ‘perhaps they would not exist except
by taking upon themselves the being and principle of the things that
are.’ So their participation in the Divine Essence is their taking of
it upon themselves, and the taking is the effusion of Divine Wisdom
which is of all things the substance and essence and whatever is
understood to be in them naturally]. Hear him also on the procession
of God through all things and His permanence in Himself in the
letter which he wrote in reply to the pontiff Titus who was asking
him what was the House of Wisdom, what her Bowl, and what her
Food and Drink. ‘The Divine Wisdom’, he says, ‘sets forth two sorts
of food, the one solid and edible, the other moist and flowing forth;
and offers in a bowl her providential goods. Now the bowl, being
rotund and having out-curving lips is a symbol of the Providence of
all these things which is at once diffused through all things and
encompasses all things, without beginning and without end. But
since while proceeding into all things it remains in itself and rests
established in the similitude of its nature which is immutable and
most perfect, irreversibly the same and unchanged, so stands the bowl.
But Wisdom is (also) said to be building a house for herself, and to
be setting forth therein both the solid foods and the beverages and
the bowl, from which it is clear to those who interpret the divine
symbols in a godly manner that a perfect providence is the cause
of being and of the well-being of all and proceeds into all things
and comes into being in all things and contains all things, and yet

et bene essendi omnia causalis et in omnia procedit et in omni fit et 645A
 continet omnia et iterum ipse in sese per excellentiam nullum in
 nullo per nullum est sed exaltatur omnibus ipse in se ipso similiter et
 aeternaliter existens et stans et manens et semper secundum eadem
 et sic sic habens et nullo modo extra se ipsum factus neque propria 5
 grauitate et incommutabili mansione et bonitate relictus sed *et* in se
 ipsa totas et perfectissimas prouidentias optime operans et proueniens
 in omnia et manens in se ipso et stans semper motus.'

[Animaduerte quod ait: 'In omnia procedit et in omni fit', quod
 etiam alibi declarat dicens: 'Audendum uero et hoc de ueritate dicere 10
 quia et ipse omnium causalis bono et optimo omnium amore per
 excellentiam amatoriae bonitatis extra se ipsum fit in omnia quae
 sunt prouidentiis et ueluti in bonitate et dilectione et amore fouet et 645B
 exsuperat omnia ab omnibus remotus ad hoc in omnibus deducitur
 secundum mente excedentem superessentialem potentiam inconuer- 15
 sibilemque suam.'

His etiam fauet eiusdem Dionysii sententia quam ex Theologicis
 Commentis sanctissimi Ierothei sumpsit. 'Omnium', inquit, 'causa
 et repletiua Iesu deitas partes uniuersitati consonas saluans et neque
 pars neque totum est et totum et pars ut omne et partem et totum 20
 in semet ipsa coambiens et supereminens et excellens perfecta
 quidem est in imperfectis ut perfectio principalis, imperfecta uero in
 perfectis tanquam superperfecta et anteperfecta, forma formificans in
 informibus tanquam forma principalis, informis in ipsis formis
 tanquam superformis, essentia totius essentiae incontaminata super- 25
 grediens et superessentialiter omni essentia remota, tota principia et
 ordines destinans et omni principio et ordini supercollocata, et men- 645C
 sura est eorum quae sunt et saeculorum et super saecula et ante
 saecula, plena in indigentibus, superplena in multitudinibus, arcana
 ineffabilis super animum super uitam super essentiam supernatura- 30
 liter habet supernaturale, superessentialiter superessentiale.'

Sufficiunt haec ut arbitror bene intelligentibus ad cognoscendum
 quod diuinae bonitatis <in se ipsa> permansio causa omnium incom-
 mutabilis sit, processio uero eius et ineffabilis motus effectus omnium

9-16 Ps.-Dionys. DN iv. 13; PG iii. 712A 12-B 5 .. Max. Conf. 1 *Ambig.* lxvii;
 PG xci. 1413A 12-B 5. 18-31 ii. 10; PG iii. 648C 1-D 6.

2 et iterum RB: erit enim P 3 exaltatur RB: exaltat P 5 sic sic
 RB: sic P 6 et in se ipsa RB^cP: et in ipsa B* 9-31 sC in R
 10 Audendum RBP^c: Audiendum P* 13 ueluti RB: uelut P dilectione RB:
 dilectione P 14 exsuperat omnia R^cB^c: ex super omnia R*B*: exuperat omnia
 P remotus BP: remoto R 17 dionysii RB: dionisii P sententia RB:
 sententiam P 19 Iesu: ihu *codd.* 22-23 in perfectis RB: imperfectis P
 23 superperfecta RB: perfecta P formificans RB: formicans P 29 arcana
 RB: archana P 30 essentiam RB: essentia P 32 arbitror RB^cP
 arbitror B* 34 effectus RB: peffectus P

because of its pre-eminent self-identity it is not anything in any-
 thing through anything, but transcends all things, being and staying
 and remaining both identically and eternally itself in itself, and
 always self-identical and keeping itself so and in no way becoming
 separate from itself or separated from its proper base and immutable
 abode and goodness; but working well in itself its entire and most
 perfect providential acts, both proceeding upon all things and
 abiding in itself and ever at rest (and ever) in motion.'

[Notice what he says: 'proceeds into all things and comes into
 being in all things', and he declares this in another place too, saying:
 'We must also be bold to say this in the interest of truth that He
 Himself Who is the Cause of all things by His noble love of all
 things, throughout the transcendence of His loving-kindness, passes
 beyond Himself by His providential acts towards all things that are,
 and as it were cherishes (them) by His goodness and affection and
 love, and transcends them all (and), separated from all things, yet con-
 descends to be in all things in accordance with His mind-surpassing,
 superessential, and irreversible power.'

These passages are also supported by the opinion of the same
 Dionysius which he took from the Theological Commentaries of the
 most holy Hierotheus: 'The Cause of all things and the perfective
 divinity of Jesus which maintains the parts in harmony with the
 whole and which is neither part nor whole, and (yet) is whole and
 part as it unites in itself every part and whole and transcends and
 excels them, is perfect in what is imperfect, for it is the Principle
 of Perfection, but is imperfect in the perfect, for it is beyond per-
 fection and before perfection; it is the Form that produces forms
 in the formless, for it is the Principle of Form; formless in the
 forms for it is More-than-Form. (It is) the Essence that surpasses
 all the essences without being contaminated by them; and it is
 superessential for it is separated from all essence. It appoints all
 beginnings and all orders, and it is set above every beginning and
 every order. And it is the measure of all the things that are, and of
 duration, (yet is) beyond duration and before duration. It is complete
 in all things that are incomplete, more than complete in multitudes.
 It is secret, ineffable, beyond intellect, beyond life, beyond essence.
 In a mode transcending nature it contains the supernatural, in a
 mode transcending essence it contains the superessential.'

These (passages) are sufficient, as I think, for those of a good under-
 standing to learn that the permanence¹⁷ of the Divine Goodness <in
 itself> is the immutable Cause of all things, while its procession and
 ineffable motion bring about the effects of all things, and furthermore

peragit, porro eius participatio [et assumptio] nil aliud est nisi omnium essentia. Et intentus perspice quod ait: 'Quia et prouidentia perfectissima est ipse essendi et bene essendi omnia causalis.' Non ergo alia est prouidentia omnium et alia causa omnium sed unus atque idem deus et prouidentia perfectissima est omnium et essendi et bene essendi omnia causalis. Quod autem sequitur: 'Et in omnia procedit et in omni fit', hoc est in uniuersitate quam facit, 'et continet omnia', ad soluendam praesentis quaestionis de qua nunc agitur nodositatem in tantum ualet ut nullo alio modo consulta rationis uirtute possit solui ut arbitror. Si enim ipse qui causalis est essendi et bene essendi omnia et in omnia procedit et in omni creatura fit et continet omnia, quid aliud restat nisi ut intelligamus sapientiam dei patris de qua talia praedicantur et causam creatricem omnium esse et in omnibus quae creat creati et fieri et omnia in quibus creatur et fit continere? In omnibus enim quodcunque uere intelligitur esse nihil aliud est nisi sapientiae creatricis multiplex uirtus quae in omnibus subsistit. Si enim intellectu creatricem sapientiam ab omnibus quae creat subtraxeris in nihilum [omnino] redigentur nullaue essentia nulla uita nullus sensus nulla ratio nullus intellectus et omnino nullum bonum remanebit, quod etiam sanctus pater Augustinus in libris Confessionum suarum uidetur intelligere sermonem dirigens ad ipsam ueritatem, diuinam uidelicet sapientiam, 'Et inspexi', inquit, 'caetera intra te et uidi nec omnino esse nec omnino non esse, nec omnino esse quia non sunt quod tu es, nec omnino non esse quia a te sunt', quibus uerbis insinuat omnem creaturam omnino per se consideratam nihil esse, quicquid autem in ea intelligitur subsistere ex participatione creatricis ueritatis subsistit. Si enim omne uerum ex ueritate uerum et sola ueritas permanet, caetera autem mouentur, sola [igitur] ueritas in omnibus ueris subsistit. [Mouentur autem dixi quia per se ipsa non subsistunt sed ad nihilum uergunt, uirtute uero ueritatis prouidae quae in eis subsistit ne ad nihilum ruant prohibentur et stant.]

Si ergo ipsum uerbum dei et omnia facit et in omnibus fit—et hoc ex uerbis praedicti patris Dionysii aliorumque potest approbari—, quid mirum [si] cuncta quae in ipso uerbo intelliguntur subsistere aeterna simul et facta credantur et cognoscantur esse? Quod enim

2-3 p. 84, 33-p. 86. 1 *supra* 6-7 p. 86. 1-2. 22-25 *Conf.* vii. 11. 17.
27-28 *cf.* Aug. *De uera rel.* xxxvi. 66.

1-2 nisi omnium *in ras.* P 3 ipse RB: omnium P 5 prouidentia
omnium: omnium *om.* P 7 in uniuersitate RB*P: in in uniuersitate B^c
11 *lemma* in omni creatura fit et continet omnia et in omnia procedit Rm
14 in quibus: *in s.l.* B 15 continere R^cBP: continere R* 19 intellectus
BP: intellectus R 23 intra RBP 24 omnino esse: esse *om.* B* quod
RB*P: quae B* a *om.* P 28 *post* ex ueritate uerum: est R 29-32 mouentur-
stant sC *in R* 34 dionysii RB: dionysii P aliorumque: -orumque *in ras.* R
(C) 36-p. 90. 2 credantur-facta quae ommissa erant addidit *in marg.* sB

that participation in it [and the assumption (of it)] is nothing else but the essence of all things. And observe carefully how he says, 'That a perfect providence is the cause of being and the well-being of all.' This Providence over all things, then, is not one thing and the Cause of all things another, but one and the same God is both the most perfect Providence over all things and the Cause of the being and of the well-being of all things. But that which follows, 'and proceeds into all things and comes into being in all things', that is, in the totality which it makes, 'and contains all things', so fully succeeds in solving the knottiness of the present question that reason, when consulted, can find no other manner of solving it, as I think. For if He Who is the Cause of the being and of the well-being of all things both proceeds into all things and is made in every creature and contains all things, what else is there for it but that we should understand that the Wisdom of God the Father of which such things are predicated is both the creative Cause of all things and is created and made in all that it creates, and contains all the things in which it is created and made? For in all things whatever is rightly understood to be is nothing else but the manifold power of the creative Wisdom which subsists in all things. For if in your mind you take away the creative Wisdom from all things which it creates they will be reduced to nothing [at all] and there will remain no essence, no life, no sense, no reason, no intellect, and no good at all—which is what St. Augustine also in the books of his Confessions seems to mean when he addresses his speech to the Truth itself, that is, to the Divine Wisdom: 'And I examined', he says, 'the other things within Thee and I saw that they were not altogether being and not altogether not being: not altogether *being* because they are not what Thou art, nor altogether not being because they take their being from Thee.' By these words he maintains that every creature whatsoever considered through itself is nothing, but that whatever in it is understood to subsist subsists by participation in the creative Truth. For if every truth is true by reason of the Truth and only the Truth is permanent while all else moves, [then] in all truths only the Truth subsists. [Now I said 'moves' because (all else) does not subsist through itself but tends towards nothingness; however, by virtue of the provident Truth which subsists in it it is prevented from falling into nothingness but stands fast.]

If then the Word of God itself both makes all things and is made in all things—and this can be proved from the words of the aforesaid Dionysius and others—, what wonder [if] all things which are understood to subsist in the Word itself are believed and known to be at the same time eternal and made? I find no reason why that which is

de causa praedicatur qua ratione non etiam de causatiuis praedicari non inuenio. Omnia igitur quae sunt et aeterna simul et facta non incongrue dicuntur dum in eis fit ipsa sapientia [quae ea facit, et causa in qua et per quam et aeterna et facta sunt in eis aeterna et facta est].

A. Valde miror ac stupefactus ueluti exanimis haereo. His enim rationibus attrahor quoniam ueri similia sunt et sanctorum patrum testimoniis sanctaeque scripturae corroborata, sed iterum nutans retrahor ac mox in tenebras densissimas cogitationum mearum relabor. Non enim acies mentis meae ad praesentis quaestionis altitudinem intuendam penitusque penetrandam idonea. Audiens quippe illud: 'Qui fecisti mundum de materia informi', non aliter cogitabam nisi quia mundus uisibilis et inuisibilis de materia informi quam deus de omnino nihilo ueluti auspitiū quoddam suae operationis creauit factus *narratur* et erat quando totius mundi uniuersitas non erat ac per hoc in primordiis conditionis suae de omnino nihilo in informem processit materiem et consequenter per genera et formas caeterosque numeros naturales ad perfectionem quandam creatori soli cognitam peruenit, nec hoc per morulas temporum factum fuisse a sancto patre Augustino in Examero suo suasum est. Non enim in tempore praecedit infortitas formam sed naturali ordine quo causa *praeuenit* effectum. Nempe uox et uerbum simul ex ore loquentis *prodeunt* et tamen ante[uenit] uox uerbum, non [quidem] tempore sed causa. De uoce enim efficitur uerbum, de uerbo autem nullo modo uox. Ita rerum omnium infortitas et formatio atque perfectio naturali quadam praecessione et sequentia, non autem temporum *interuallis distinctae*, simul et semel de nihilo in essentiam uoluntate creatoris adductae sunt. Et haec erat mea fides meaque quantulacunque intelligentia.

At nunc aliter a te audio quae multum me mouent et ab his quae hactenus tenebam firmiter ut mihi uisum est inuitum reuocant. Praesens enim ratiocinatio ut reor nil aliud uidetur uelle suadere nisi ea quae de nihilo putabam esse facta et nullo modo aeterna—*erat* enim quando non erant ut arbitror ac per hoc acceperant quod non

12 Sap. xi. 18.

19 cf. Aug. *De Gen. ad litt.* i. 15. 29.

3-5 quae—est sC in R 6 post stupefactus: et *erasum* R 7 attrahor
R^cBP: attraho R* ueri R^cBP: uiri R* similia RB: similes P 8 san-
ctaeque R^cBP: et sanctae R* scripturae R^cBP: scriptura R* corroborata RB:
corroboratae P 11 quippe RB: inquit P 12 post informi *nonnulla*
uerba erasa B 13 est RB: *om. P recte* et inuisibilis *s.l. alia manu* B
14 auspitiū RB: auspiciū P 15 *narratur in ras.* R(C) 19 per-
uenit RB: peruenire P 20 augustino BP: agustino R in tempore R^cBP:
tempore R* 21 *praeuenit in ras.* R(C) 22 *prodeunt in ras.* R(C)
23 tempore RB: temporum P 24 nullo RB: nulli P 25 infortitas
RB: formitas P

predicated of the Cause should not also be predicated of the caused. Therefore all things that are are not inappropriately said to be both all eternal together and made, if there is made in them that very Wisdom [which makes them, and the Cause in which and through which they are both eternal and made is (itself) in them eternal and made].

A. I am indeed bewildered and struck dumb as a dead man with stupefaction. For although I am attracted to these arguments because they seem true and are corroborated by the evidences of the Holy Fathers and of Holy Scripture, nevertheless I draw back in hesitation and am rapidly overwhelmed by the thick clouds of my thoughts. My mind is not keen enough to consider and rightly investigate the profundity of the present problem. For when I heard that 'Who madest the world out of formless matter', I used to think nothing else but that the world, (both) visible and invisible, having been made out of the formless matter which God created out of nothing at all as a kind of augury of His action *is being described*, and that there was (a time) when the totality of the whole world was not, and therefore in the beginnings of its creation it proceeded out of nothing at all into formless matter, and thereafter, through the genera and species and the individuals as well, it arrived at a certain perfection known to its Creator alone; and that this (process) was not distributed over periods of time is shown by the Holy Father Augustine in his Hexaameron. For it is not in time that formlessness precedes form but in the natural order in which the cause *comes before* the effect. For sound and speech *issue* together from the mouth of the speaker, and yet sound [comes] before speech, [though] not by time but by cause. For speech is made of sound and certainly not sound of speech. Thus the formlessness and the formation of all things and their perfection, *distinguished* by a kind of natural precedence and sequence but not by temporal *intervals*, were once for all and at the same time brought forth by the Creator's will out of nothing into essence. And this was my belief and my understanding, such as it was.

But now I hear differently from you things which disturb me greatly and turn me reluctantly from what I hitherto firmly held (to be true) as I thought. For the present line of reasoning, as I think, seeks to teach nothing else but that those things which I used to think were made from nothing and were certainly not eternal—for *there was* (a time) when they were not, as I think, and thus they had

26 sequentia *glossae* ablatiuum et id est consecutione C in B temporum—*di-*
stinctae R^c(C)BP: tempore R* 27 adductae R^cBP: adducta R* 28 mea
RB: in ea P 29 his R^cBP: is R* 31 enim BP: etenim R 32 erat
in ras. R(C)

habuerant—aeterna simul et facta esse, quod ualde contrarium
opinor, et merito. Nam [haec] sibimet uidentur opponi, aeterna
factis et facta aeternis. Quae enim aeterna sunt nunquam incipiunt
esse, nunquam desinunt subsistere et non erat quando non erant
quia semper erant, quae uero facta sunt principium facturae suae
acceperunt—inchoauerunt enim esse—quia erat quando non erant
et desinent esse quod inchoauerunt habere. Vera *siquidem* ratione
consulta omne quod incipit [temporaliter] esse non sinitur semper
permanere, necesse *quidem est* ad finem *uergere in quo cogitur quod tem-*
pore incipit esse perire [—et nemo estimet me uelle suadere reditum
[²ad nihilum]² eorum quae temporaliter ex materia per generationem
in mundo fiunt—hoc enim summum fieret malum—solutionem uero
eorum in ea ex quibus componuntur et in quibus subsistunt dico.
Nam et humana corpora caeterorumque animalium dum soluuntur
perire dicuntur, non tamen ad nihilum rediguntur sed in catholica
elementa reuertuntur—], et hoc generaliter de uniuersitate huius
mundi uisibilis intelligitur, nec incongrue. Nam quoniam principium
essendi accepit essentiae suae *terminum ineuitabiliter* accepturus est.
Sicut enim erat quando non erat ita erit quando non erit, psalmista
testante aeternoque conditori rerum proclamante: ‘Opera manuum
tuarum sunt caeli. Ipsi peribunt, tu autem permanebis. Et omnes
sicut uestimentum ueterescent et sicut opertorium mutabis eos et
mutabuntur, tu autem idem ipse es et anni tui non deficient.’ Ipse
etiam conditor omnium, ‘Caelum’, inquit, ‘et terra transibunt, uerba
autem mea non transient.’ Si autem maxima *spatio* pulcherrima[que]
sublimi[tate siderum, purissima subtilitate naturae, statu astrorum
consita, cursu <planontarum> armonica, luminis semper plena] pars
mundi peritura sit teste scriptura, nunquid putandum interiores
partes ac multo inferiores permansuras? Melioribus enim intereun-
tibus inferiora non interire impossibile est et dum aufertur quod
continet quod continetur manere uera non sinit ratio.

Hoc autem dicimus ad differentiam eorum quae aeterna sunt ab

20–23 Ps. ci. 25–27.

24–25 Mt. xxiv. 35.

1 post esse rasura R
C in R ante nam ponunt BP
erat R^cBP: erant R*
6 erat R^cBP: erant R*
R(C)
B^c aestimet RB*P
R. psalmista R^cB: palmista R*: psalmiste P
R^cB: aeterno**que—proclamante R*: aeternum conditorem rerum proclamans
P
quit om. P
pulcherrimaque P
2 opino R^cBP: opin*or R*
3 lemma corpora animalium non ad nichil redi-
guntur sed in catholica resoluuntur Rm
5 uero RB: autem P
7 siquidem in ras. R(C)
9–10 uergere—incipit in ras. R(C)
12 fieret in ras. B
18 terminum ineuitabiliter in
ras. R(C) ineuitabiliter B: ineuitabiliter R: inuitabiliter P
19 enim om.
20 aeternoque—proclamante
21 tu autem BP: tua ait R
25 spatio in ras. R(C)
26 post siderum et R
27 consita RB*P: condita B*
4 esse R^cBP: et R* non s.l. B
suae R^cBP: sue R*
9 quidem est in ras.
10 incipit s.l. B estimet
24 in-

received what they had not (previously) possessed—are at the same
time eternal and made, which I think to be surely a contradiction,
and reasonably so; for [these] seem to be opposed to each other:
eternal things to things that are made, and things that are made to
eternal things. For things that are eternal never begin to be, never
cease to subsist, and there was not a time when they were not,
because they always were; but things which are made have received
a beginning of their making—for they began to be—because there
was a time when they were not, and they will lose the being which
they began to possess. For, if right reason be consulted, nothing
which begins [in time] to be is permitted to endure for ever, but it
is necessary that it *should tend* towards the end *in which that which has*
a beginning of its being *in time is compelled* to perish. [And let no one
suppose that I mean to teach the return [²to nothing]² of the things
which in time come into being in the world from matter through
generation—for this would be the utmost evil—but I mean their
dissolution into those things out of which they were composed and
in which they subsist. For even the bodies of men and of the other
animals when they suffer dissolution are said to perish, although they
are not reduced to nothing but return to the universal elements from
which all things are made.] And this is understood generally of the
totality of this visible world, and not unreasonably. For since it
received a beginning of its being, so it will *inevitably* receive *an end*
of its essence. For as there was (a time) when it was not, so there will
be (a time) when it will not be, as the Psalmist testifies when he cries
to the eternal Creator of things, ‘The heavens are the works of Thy
hands. They shall perish but Thou shalt endure. And they shall all
grow old as a garment and Thou shalt change them as a covering
and they shall be changed, but Thou Thyself art the same and Thy
years shall not fail.’ Also the Creator of all things Himself says,
‘Heaven and earth shall pass away but My words shall not pass
away.’ But if that part of the world which is greatest *in extent* [and]
most beautiful [by reason of the sublimity of the stars, most pure by
reason of the subtlety of its nature, sown with the fixed stars, har-
monious by reason of the course <of the planets>, ever filled with
light] were to perish, according to Scripture, is it to be supposed
that the parts that are within it and that are much inferior to it will
remain? For when the better things pass away it is impossible that
the inferior things should not pass away, and when that which con-
tains is removed right reason does not allow that that which is
contained should endure.

But these things we say with reference to the difference of the

28 peritura RBP^c: paeritura P*
qua R*

31 sinit R^cBP: suadet R*

32 quae R^cBP:

his quae sunt facta. Non enim parua distantia est inter ea quae nec incipiunt esse nec desinunt et ea quae inchoant esse et non possunt semper manere. Non igitur sine causa acies mentis minus talia intelligentium repercutitur quando ei aeterna esse facta et facta aeterna suadetur. Nam non facile crediderim te consentire his qui uolunt intelligere multa ex his quae facta sunt, immo pene omnia, semper permansura ac per hoc futura esse aeterna. Verbi gratia, uniuersitas ista quae constat ex caelo et terra quatuor elementis in speciem orbis absoluti conglobata mundique nomine uocitata et de nihilo facta est ut aiunt *et* aeternaliter mansura praeter quasdam suas particulas, hoc est corruptibilia corpora generationi et corruptioni subiecta quae negare non possunt peritura, caelum uero cum suis sideribus semper fore siue uolubile sit siue moueri desinat. In hoc [nanque] sensus eorum uariatur, quibusdam affirmantibus statum mutabilium futurum, quibusdam uero naturalem motum elementorum semper non cessaturum, illi quidem sequentes quod scriptum est: 'Erunt omnia quieta', et hoc de statu mutabilium intelligentes, illi uero, 'Concentum caeli quis dormire faciet?', de aeterno mutabilium motu dictum esse accipientes. Armonia siquidem caelestis sine motu aetherae sphaerae omniumque siderum quomodo poterit concinere cum musica semper in motu sit quemadmodum geometria in statu? Terrenam quoque molem suam propriam quantitatem semper habituram indubitanter affirmant sequentes quod scriptum est: 'Generatio uenit, generatio uadit, terra uero in aeternum stat', eo excepto quod superficies eius undique planabitur ut pulchrior quam nunc est efficiatur ac ueluti noua quadam partium equalitate renouata non ut intereat quod nunc est sed ut mutata in melius quantitas eius et aequalitas permaneat, quod etiam de caelo uolunt intelligi, hoc est quod eius pulchritudo in qua nunc sensibus corporeis arridet in fine mundi cumulabitur absque ullo globatae suae figurae stellataeque picturae interitu quoniam scriptum est, ut aiunt, 'Erit caelum nouum et terra noua' [—caelos autem perituros non de superioribus mundi partibus uerum de spatiis huius aeris infra lunam intelligunt ut quemadmodum in diluuiio uersa sunt in aquam ita in mundi fine uertantur in flammam—], omnium uero animalium et fructum

17 II Par. xiv. 7. 18 Iob xxxviii. 37. 24 Eccl. i. 4. 31–32 Apoc. xxi. 1.

3 manere R^cBP: permanere R* 4 aeterna esse: eter*na esse R* rasura post esse facta R aeterna suadetur BP: eterna suadetur R 6 his R^cBP: is R* 7 permansura RB: mansura P 8 ista quae R^cBP: istaque R* quatuor RB: quattuor P 10 et deest R*B* 11 generationi R^cBP: generatione R* 12 subiecta quae RB^cP: subiectaque B* 14 glossa de hac opinione etiam in quinto libro disputatum est BP: quinto B: v P 18 faciet R^cBP: faciat R* 20 post aetherae rasura R 29 pulchritudo RB: pulchritudo P 30 post mundi ut P 32 terra: t- s.l. R 35 fructum RBP^c: fructicum P*

things that are eternal from the things that are made. For there is no small difference between those things which neither begin nor cease to be and those which begin to be and cannot endure for ever. Therefore it is not without reason that the perspicacity of those whose (capacity for) understanding such things is limited is repelled when they are told that eternal things are made and made things eternal. For I should not find it easy to believe that you would agree with those who try to convince themselves that many of the things that are made, nay, almost all of them, will endure for ever and thus are destined to be eternal. For instance, this universe which consists of heaven and earth, assembled out of the four elements into the form of a perfect sphere and called by the name of 'world' is both made out of nothing, as they say, and shall endure eternally, with the exception of some of its lesser parts, namely, the corruptible bodies, which are subject to (the processes of) coming into being and passing away, which they cannot deny will perish, whereas the heaven with its stars shall be for ever, whether it continues to revolve or ceases from movement. [For] in this their opinion varies, some affirming that there will be a coming to rest of the things that are in motion, others that the natural motion of the elements will not ever cease; the former abide by the text, 'All things shall be in quietness', which they apply to the coming to rest of mutable things, the latter, 'Who shall cause the concert of heaven to sleep?' which they take to refer to the eternal motion of mutable things. For how can there be celestial harmony without motion of the ethereal sphere and all the stars, when music is ever in motion as geometry is ever at rest?¹⁸ Moreover, they unhesitantly declare that the earthly mass will always possess its proper quantity, following the text, 'A generation comes, a generation goes, but earth remains for ever', with the exception that its outward appearance is everywhere in flux so that it may become more beautiful than it now is, and it is renewed as though by a new equalization of its parts, not so that that which now is shall perish but so that its quality and equality remains, changed into something better; and this they think should be applied to the heaven also, that is, that its beauty, which is now apparent to the bodily senses, shall at the end of the world be concentrated without any loss of its global shape or ornament of stars, since it is written, according to them, 'There shall be a new heaven and a new earth. [For they consider the passing away of the heavens to refer not to the upper parts of the world but to the expanses of this air (which lie) beneath the moon, so that, as in the Flood they were whelmed in water, so in the end of the world they will be changed into flame.] But that

herbarumque generationem et incrementa et decremēta cunctorum
 quae intra circulum lunae continentur uicissitudinem cessaturam non
 solum non denegant uerum etiam affirmant. Spatia item aeris et
 aetheris distribuenda fore arbitrantur, aetheris quidem in aeternam
 possessionem beatorum angelorum hominumque sibi similibus, aeris
 uero inferioris circa terram undique diffusi in aeternum carcerem
 aeternasque flammās localiter uisibiliterque arsuras torquendo dia-
 bolo cum membris suis, hoc est apostatis angelis similibusque sibi
 hominibus impiis, ac per hoc quoniam omnem creaturam localem et
 temporalem et esse et futuram esse cogitant loca et tempora, hoc est
 mundi spatia motumque eius morularum interuallis distinctum,
 semper esse mansura non dubitant.

His atque huius modi falsis opinionibus conantur asserere ea
 quae non erant [et inchoauerunt esse] et facta simul et aeterna [dici]
 posse quia semper in eodem statu in quo temporaliter creata sunt
 manebunt et quae principio non carent fine carere arbitrantur, ita ut
 et facta sint quia esse inchoauere et aeterna quia non desinent sub-
 sistere. Verumtamen neque talibus opinionibus quas uera deridet
 ratio te assentire aestimarim neque talem aeternitatem uel ut uerius
 dicam semiaeternitatem praedictis tuis rationibus suasisse neque sic
 et facta simul et aeterna docuisse, sed altiori naturarum contuitu
 ultra humanos opiniones modo quodam adhuc nobis incognito
 diuinorum archanorum adita penetrare te sentio [uestigia patrum qui
 talia scrutati sunt altius sequendo].

Aiunt enim naturam huius mundi semper mansuram quia incor-
 poreā est et incorruptibilis, caetera uero quibus constat peritura, hoc
 est omne quod in eo est compositum, et quia in eo nullum <sensibile>
 corpus est quod non sit compositum et omne compositum soluetur in
 ea ex quibus componitur: totus igitur mundus iste uisibilis corporeus
 compositus soluetur, sola simplici natura manente].

N. Falsis ratiocinationibus humanarum opinionum longe a ueritate
 distantium quondam me deceptum esse negare non possum quia
 deceptus sum—his enim omnibus aut paene omnibus rudis iam
 assensum praebui, quadam similitudine ueri carnalibusque sensibus
 ut multis euenit seductus—, nunc uero sanctorum patrum uestigia

1 herbarumque RB: arborumque P post generationem lineae tres et semis
 erasae B 2 uicissitudinem RB: uicissitudinem P cessaturam RBP^c: incessa-
 turam P* 3 affirmant RB: adfirmant P 4 fere RBP: fore T6 recte
 9 quoniam om. P localem RBP^c: locales P* 15 post sunt semper RB*
 22 quodam RBP: quod R* 27 eo est: -o s.l. R 27-28 et quia-compo-
 situm om. P 28 et omne compositum quae omissa erant in marg. scripsit SB
 34 lemma intelligibilem mundum mansurum uisibilem et compositum periturum Rm

the generation of animals and fruits and herbs, and the increase and
 decrease of all things that are contained within the orbit of the moon,
 shall abandon their variableness they not only do not deny, but even
 affirm. Moreover, they think that the expanses of air and of ether
 are destined to be allotted, (those) of the ether to the eternal posses-
 sion of the blessed angels and men who resemble them, (those) of
 the lower air, which is diffused all about the earth, to the eternal
 prison-house and the eternal flames whose burning is the local and
 visible torment of the devil and his members, that is, the apostate
 angels, and the impious men who resemble them, and thus, since
 they hold that every creature in place and time both is and shall be,
 they do not doubt but that places and times, that is, the expanses of
 the world and its motion which is marked by intervals and delays,
 shall endure for ever.

By these and similar false opinions they attempt to establish that
 the things that were not [and began to be] can [be said] to be at the
 same time both made and eternal, because they shall always abide
 in the same state in which they were created in time; and they think
 that those things that are not without a beginning are without an
 end, so that they are both made, because they began to be, and
 eternal, because they shall not cease to subsist. But neither would I
 suppose that you assent to such opinions, which right reason ridi-
 cules, nor that such was the eternity, or, to speak more truly, semi-
 eternity, which you intended by the arguments you have just put
 forward nor that it is thus that you thought that (things) are both
 made and eternal, but I perceive that it was from a more profound
 observation of natures that you penetrate beyond human opinions
 by some means unknown to us to the depths of the Divine Mysteries
 [by following in the footsteps of the Fathers who have examined
 these things more profoundly].

For they say that the nature of this world shall remain for ever
 because it is incorporeal and incorruptible, whereas the other things
 of which it consists shall pass away, that is, everything in it which
 is composite; and because there is in it no <sensibile> body which is
 not composite, and every composite shall be resolved into those
 things from which it is composed, therefore the whole of this visible,
 corporeal, composite world shall be resolved, and only its simple
 nature remain].

N. I cannot deny that I was at one time deceived by the false
 reasonings of human opinions that are far from the truth,¹⁹ for
 deceived I was. For whilst still uninstructed I gave assent to all
 these, or almost all, seduced by some likeness of the truth, and by
 the carnal senses, as happens to many. But now, following in the
 footsteps of the Holy Fathers, and recalled from my errors and those

sequens diuini luminis radio ab erroribus meis et aliorum me reuo- 650A
cante inque uiam rectam ducente paululum pedem retraho. Diuina
siquidem clementia ueritatem pie atque humiliter quaerentes in
tenebris ignorantiae non sinit errare inque foueas falsarum opinionum
cadere et in eis perire. Nulla enim peior mors est quam ueritatis 5
ignorantia, nulla uorago profundior quam falsa pro ueris approbare,
quod proprium est erroris. Ex his enim turpissima et abhominabilia
monstra in humanis cogitationibus solent fingi quas dum carnalis
anima ueluti uera et amat et sequitur dorsum conuertens uero lumini
umbrasque fugaces comprehendere uolens et non ualens in bara- 10
thrum miseriae consueuit ruere.

oratio Hinc assiduo debemus orare ac dicere: Deus nostra salus atque 650B
redemptio qui dedisti naturam, largire et gratias, praetende lumen
tuum in umbris ignorantiae palpitantibus quaerentibusque te.
Reuoca nos ab erroribus. Porrige dexteram tuam infirmis non ualentibus 15
te sine peruenire ad te. Ostende te ipsum his qui nil petunt
praeter te. Rumpe nubes uanarum fantasiarum quae mentis aciem non
sinunt intueri te eo modo quo te inuisibilem uideri permittis deside-
rantibus uidere faciem tuam, quietem suam, finem suum ultra quem
nil appetunt quia ultra nihil est, summum bonum superessentiale. 20

Sed ad residuum *sententiae* tuae gressus dirige.

A. Quid restat nisi quod me ualde mouet proferre, hoc est quomodo
omnia aeterna et facta sunt, quomodo principio ac fine carentia prin- 650C
cipio ac fine circumscribuntur? Haec enim inter se inuicem luctantur
et quomodo sibi conueniunt nisi a te mihi fuerit suasum ignoro, 25
siquidem solum deum ANAPXON, hoc est carentem principio,
aestimabam esse.—Ipse enim principium omnium et finis est nullo
principio inchoans nullo fine conclusus,—caetera uero inchoari et
ad finem suum proprium unumquodque tendere ac per hoc non
aeterna *sed* facta. Et his omnibus incomparabiliter altius et mirabilius 30
mihi uidetur quod sancti Dionysii Ariopagitae auctoritate utens
asseris, ipsum uidelicet deum et omnium factorem esse et in omnibus
factum—hoc enim adhuc inauditum et incognitum non solum mihi
sed et multis ac paene omnibus. Nam si sic est, quis non confestim 650D
erumpat in hanc uocem et proclamet: Deus itaque omnia est et 35
omnia deus! quod monstrosum aestimabitur etiam his qui putantur
esse sapientes, multiplici rerum uisibilium et inuisibilium uarietate

2-3 Cf. Aug. De qu. animae xiv. 24. 17 cf. Aug. De Trin. viii. 2. 3.

4 ignorantiae RB: errantiae P inque RB: in quo P 7 abhominabilia
RB: abominabilia P 8 quas RB: quae P 9 lumini RB:P: luminis B*
12 lemma B: oratio pro ***** Rm 14 quaerentibusque: -que s.l. B
19 uidere: -dere in ras. R(C) 21 sententiae: senten- in ras. R(C) 22 lemma
quomodo principio et fine carentia principio et fine circumscribuntur et omnium
quomodo intelliguntur (lacuna) -tiam aritmetice et naturam monade Rm
24 circumscribuntur RB: circumscribuntur P inuicem s.l. R 28 inchoari

of others by the ray of the Divine Light, and brought into the right
way, I retract a little. For the Divine Clemency does not permit those
who seek the truth in devotion and humility to stray or to fall into
the pits of false opinions and therein perish. For there is no worse
death than ignorance of the truth, no deeper pitfall than taking the
false for the true, which is the property of error. For from these the
basest and foulest monsters are wont to be fabricated in human
thoughts, and when the carnal soul loves and pursues these as
though they were real, turning its back upon the true Light and
desiring but unable to embrace fleeting shadows, it is wont to
plunge into the depth of misery. Therefore this should be our
constant prayer:

O God, our salvation and redemption, Who bestowed nature, A Prayer
grant also graces: Send forth Thy light upon those who grope in
the shadows of ignorance in search of Thee; Recall us from our
errors; Stretch forth Thy right hand to us feeble ones who with-
out Thee cannot reach Thee; Show Thyself to those who seek for
nothing but Thee; Shatter the clouds of empty phantasies which
prevent the glance of the mind from beholding Thee in the way in
which Thou grantest Thine invisible self to be seen by those who
desire to look upon Thy face, their resting place, their end beyond
which they seek for nothing for there is nothing beyond, their
superessential Supreme Good.

But go on to the rest of your opinion.

A. What is left but to declare what particularly worries me, namely,
how all things are eternal and made, how those things which are
without beginning and end are limited by beginning and end. For
these are in mutual conflict, and how they should be reconciled I do
not know if you do not tell me; for I thought that only God is
ἀναρχος, that is, without beginning—for He is the Beginning and the
End which arises out of no beginning and concludes in no end—
whereas all other things begin and tend each to its proper end, and
therefore are not eternal *but* made. And incomparably more profound
and wonderful than all this seems to me the assertion you made on the
authority of St. Dionysius the Areopagite, namely, that God Him-
self is both the Maker of all things and is made in all things; for this
was never heard or known before either by me or by many, or by
nearly all. For if this is the case, who will not at once break out
and exclaim in these words: God is all things and all things
God? 20 But this will be considered monstrous even by those who
are regarded as wise when the manifold variety of things visible and

RB: inchoare P 30 sed in ras. R(C) post facta rasura R 34 post
omnibus rasura R

considerata. Deus autem unum est. Et nisi haec exemplis rerum animo comprehensibilium suaseris nil aliud relinquatur nisi ut uel mota solummodo non autem discussa *praetermittantur*—quod sine 651A
mentis meae dolore fieri non poterit. Qui enim in tenebris spississimis 5
constituti ortum lucis futurae sperant non omnino tristitia oppri-
muntur, sin autem lux quam sperant ab eis auferatur non solum in
tenebris uerum etiam in multa poena resident, ablato ab eis bono quod
sperauerant—, uel ut omnia quae a te de talibus dicta sunt ab his qui
minus intelligunt omnino falsa esse iudicentur et in pristinas opiniones
quas nec adhuc uolunt deserere ueluti ueras his contemptis re- 10
labantur. Proinde naturalibus exemplis quibus [nisi] nimia stultitia
excaecatus nemo resistit primo ratiocinationis uia incipienda est.

N. Num peritus es artis arithmeticae?

A. Peritus ni fallor. Eam nanque ab infantia didici.

N. Diffini igitur [eam] aperte ac breuiter. 15

diffinitio
arithmeticae

A. Arithmetica est numerorum scientia non quos sed secundum
quos numeramus.

N. Cautae ac uigilanter arithmeticae diffinisti. Nam si simplici- 651B
ter diffinires arithmeticae numerorum scientiam omnes numeros
generaliter comprehenderes ac per hoc diffinitio non staret. Non 20
enim disputat ars illa de omni genere numerorum sed eos tantum
numeros considerat quos in sola scientia et intellectu nouit esse et
secundum quos caetera numerorum *ge[ne]ra* numerantur. *Nam non*
numeros animalium fruticum herbarum aliorumque corporum seu
rerum ad scientiam arithmeticae artis pertinere sapientes dicunt sed 25
solos intellectuales inuisibiles incorporales in sola scientia constitutos
in nullo uero subiecto [〈praeter se〉 substantialiter] positos arithme-
ticae attribuunt.

Siquidem non ita in scientia uel intellectu uel ratione uel memoria 651C
uel sensibus uel figuris perspiciuntur ut substantialiter unum sint 30
ipsi cum his in quibus uidentur. Propriam nanque substantiam possi-
dent se ipsos. Nam si eiusdem substantiae essent non secundum eos
sed de eis scientia et intellectus et ratio iudicarent. Ars autem et index
id ipsum esse non possunt. Hoc enim de solo deo uerbo recte dicitur
quia et index est et ars sui patris.] 35

Vigilanter itaque ut dixi a te additum est: 'non quos sed secundum
quos numeramus'. Eos siquidem in nullo subiecto corporeo uel

35 Cf. 64. 13-14 *supra*.

3 solummodo R^cB^cP: solummoda R^{*B}* praetermittantur R^c(C)BP: permit-
tantur R^{*} 4 spississimis R^cB^cP: spissimis R^{*B}* 5 sperant R^cBP:
sperantes R^{*} 7 eis: -s *in ras.* R(C) 11 nisi *deest* R^{*P} 16 lemma BP:
exempla totius pene arithmetice et de perfectione senarii et de eternitate numerorum
Rm 23 nam non B^c(C)P: non enim RB^{*} 24 fruticum R^c(C)B:
fructuum R^{*P} 27 praeter se B: praeter ea P 29 siquidem B^c(C)P: nam RB^{*}
32 eos *infra lin.* R 34 enim RBP^c: esse P^{*} 36 additum RB: additum P

invisible is considered—for God is one—, and unless you support
these arguments by illustrations from things which the mind can
comprehend there is no alternative but either *to pass over* subjects
which have been merely raised without being discussed—which
could not be done without my mind regretting it; for those who,
being plunged in thickest darkness, hope for the rising of the light
to come are not completely overwhelmed by sorrow; but if the light
they hope for is taken away from them they will sit not only in
darkness but in great torment, for the good which they had hoped
for is taken away from them—, or everything that you have said
about these things is to be judged by those of limited understanding
to be altogether false, and for them to relapse into their former
opinions, which they were already abandoning only with reluctance,
as being true, and rejecting these. Therefore the path of reasoning
must start from illustrations drawn from nature, which no one
[unless] blinded by excessive folly rejects.

N. Are you versed in the art of arithmetic?

11

A. Unless I deceive myself I am. For I have learnt it from my
infancy.

N. Define [it], then, clearly and briefly.

A. Arithmetic is the science of numbers, not of those which we
count, but of those by which we count. Definition of
arithmetic

N. Cautiously and observantly have you defined arithmetic. For
if you simply defined arithmetic as the science of numbers you would
include all numbers in general, and so the definition would not
stand. For that art does not treat of every sort of numbers but only
takes into account those numbers which it knows to be by science
alone and by intellect, and by which the other sorts of numbers are
counted. *For* the wise say that it is *not* the numbers of animals, fruits,
crops, and other bodies or things that belong to the science of arith-
metic, but they assign to arithmetic only the intellectual, invisible,
incorporeal (numbers) which are constituted in the science alone but
reside in no subject [substantially 〈except themselves〉].

[For they are not perceived in the science or by the intellect or by
the reason or by the memory or by the senses or by diagrams so as
themselves to be one with those things in association with which they
are seen. For they possess their proper substance (namely) themselves.
For if they were of the same substance, the science and the intellect
and the reason would not be judging by them but about them. But
the art and the model cannot be the same thing. This can only be
said of God the Word, Who is both the model and the art of His
Father.

Observantly, then, as I said, did you add: 'Not of those which
we count but of those by which we count.' For in no corporeal or

incorporeo inspicimus sed ultra omne subiectum solo intellectu in
sapientia et scientia cernuntur suae diuinae naturae excellentia ab 651D
omnibus quae secundum eos numerantur absoluti.

A. Haec saepe cogitavi et ad purum ut arbitror perspexi.

N. Estine [igitur] ars illa naturalis? 5

A. Etiam, [et] nulla naturalior. Siquidem non solum aliarum trium
matheseos sequentium se partium, hoc est geometricae musicae 652A
astrologiae, immobile subsistit fundamentum primordialisque causa
atque principium uerum etiam omnium rerum uisibilium et inuisi- 10
bilibium infinita multitudo iuxta regulas numerorum quas arithmetica
contemplatur substantiam accipit, teste primo ipsius artis repertore
Pithagora summo philosopho qui intellectuales numeros substantias
rerum omnium uisibilium et inuisibilium esse certis rationibus ad-
firmat. Nec hoc scriptura sancta denegat quae ait omnia in mensura
et numero et pondere facta esse. 15

N. Itaque si naturalia quaeris exempla praedictae artis immo etiam
numerorum quos ipsa comprehendit naturam regulasque diligenter
inspice ut ad eorum quae tibi luctantia inter se sibi que obpugnantia
putantur notitiam deo duce peruenias.

A. Exempla arithmeticae libenter accipio. Ea nanque nec fallit 20
nec fallitur. Quoniam enim saepe minus intelligentes in ipsa fallantur
non artis culpa sed incaute de ea tractantium iudicanda est habitudo. 652B

N. Numerorum itaque quorum scientia arithmetica est monada
esse principium non dubitas ut opinor.

A. Quisquis in hoc haesitat arithmeticus non est. Est enim princi- 25
pium et medium et finis omnium numerorum monas, [id est] unitas
omniumque terminorum totum et pars et omnis quantitas.

N. Dic itaque: Num omnes numeri quos ratio quantum uult
multiplicare potest causaliter in monade sunt et aeternaliter?

A. Non aliter uera docet ratio. In ea enim causaliter sunt quia 30
omnium numerorum subsistit principium et ibi omnes unum sunt
indiuiduum simpliciter, hoc est uniuersaliter et multipliciter sola
ratione, non autem actu et opere, neque unum ex multis cumulatam
sed unum sua et simplici et multiplici singularitate praeditum ita ut 34
et omnes numeri in ea sint simul et simpliciter secundum causam et 652C

14-15 Sap. xi. 21.

1 omne RB: omnem P 2 suae R^cBP: sua R* 3 numerantur R^cBP:
nummerantur R* 5 Estine RB^c: Istine B*: Estne P 7 matheseos
R^cBP: mathes eos R* sequentium: seque- in ras. B geometricae BP: geome-
triae R 9 atque BP: adque R 10 iuxta: -x- s.l. R arithme-
tica R^cBP: aritmetica R* 12 pithagora R^cBP: pitagora R* 19 peruenias
R^cBP: peruenies R* 21 post ipsa non erasum R 25 post arithmeticus
rasura R glossa termini uocantur numeri P 26 unitas R^cBP: unitus
R* 27 pars R^cBP: finis R* 28 glossa AĒ r1 cišši C in R omnes RB: omnis
P 29 potest bis scriptum B* et s.l. B 33 actu R^cBP: auctu R*

incorporeal subject do we see them, but beyond every subject by the
intellect alone in wisdom and science are they discerned, separated
by the excellence of their divine nature from all the things which
are counted by them.

A. This I have often thought about, and have come to see it
clearly, as I think.

N. Is that art natural [then]?

A. Yes, [and] nothing could be more natural. For not only does
it subsist as the immutable basis and primordial cause and principle
of the other three branches of mathematics, namely, geometry,
music, astronomy, but also the infinite multitude of all things
visible and invisible assumes its substance according to the rules of
numbers which arithmetic contemplates, as the supreme philosopher
Pythagoras, the first inventor of this art, testifies when he gives good
reason for asserting that the intellectual numbers are the substances
of all things visible and invisible. Nor does Holy Scripture deny this,
for it says that all things have been made in measure and number and
weight.

N. If then you seek for natural examples of the aforementioned art,
and indeed of the numbers which it contains, look carefully at its
nature and its rules so that under the guidance of God you may
arrive at the knowledge of those things which seem to you to be in
conflict among themselves and to be irreconcilable with one another.

A. I freely accept the examples of arithmetic. For it neither
deceives nor is deceived. For although the less intelligent are often
deceived in it, that is to be judged not as a fault in the art but as the
disposition of those who treat it incautiously.

N. You are not, then, in doubt, as I think, that of the numbers of
which arithmetic is the science the Monad is the beginning?

A. No one who doubts that is an arithmetician. For the Monad,
[that is] unity, is the beginning and the middle and the end of all
numbers, and the whole and the part and every quantity of all terms.

N. Tell me, then: Are all numbers, which the reason can multiply
at will, causally and eternally in the Monad?

A. True reason does not teach otherwise. For they are in it causally
because it subsists as the beginning of all numbers, and in it all are
one and simply indivisible, that is, in a universal and multiple mode,
in the reason only, but not in act and operation; nor is the one an
aggregate of many, but one deriving from its singularity (which is)
both simple and multiple, so that both all numbers are in it all at
once and simple, as in their cause, and it itself is understood (to be)

post multis rasura R cumulatam R^cBP: cumulatim R* 34 et simplici: et
om. P et simplici s.l. B ut om. P 35 omnes RB^cP: omnis B*

ipsa in omnibus multipliciter ineffabili distributione intelligatur secundum substantiam. Ipsa est enim omnium numerorum causa et substantia et dum statum immutabilem suae naturae non deserit se ipsam in omnes multipliciter diffundit; aeternaliter uero in ea subsistunt quoniam in ea esse temporaliter non incipiunt. Nam non erat unitas multiplici[bus] omnium numerorum rationibus [in quibus subsistunt] carens. Quis autem pure intelligentium monada dixerit inchoasse cognoscens eam in infinitum tendere? Quomodo enim potest fieri infinita progressio a finito principio? Infinitum enim ab infinito procedit [a finito uero nil infinitum].

[Et si quis dixerit: Quomodo hoc stare potest cum etiam in ipsis numeris multa infinita a finitis inchoantia uideamus, ex binario siquidem qui finitus numerus est omnes duplices nascuntur et in infinitum protenduntur, similiter a ternario finito omnes triplices initium sumunt et finem multiplicationis suae nesciunt, et ut breuiter dicam nullus numerus est suis quantitatibus finitus seu solis monadibus a quo multiplex quidam in infinitum non profluat, huic respondendum: Omnes isti numeri partibus suis finiti ex quibus multiplices procedunt in infinitum in ipsa monade ubi omnes unum sunt finiti sunt. Proinde aut in monade esse negabit omnes numeros et in suis multiplicationibus extra eam finitos esse affirmabit, aut si hoc affirmare non poterit uera ratione resistente necessario fatebitur omnes numeros partibus suis finitos in monade infinitos subsistere <et> uniformiter aeternos. Siquidem non ubi fons apparet ibi aqua incipit esse sed aliunde per occultos poros sensibusque infinitos longe ante manat priusquam in fonte appareat ac per hoc quemadmodum abusive dicitur fons ubi primo uisibiliter surgit—longe enim ante erat in secretis terrae siue oceani ubi se inuisibiliter latebat, latex enim a latendo in uenis terrae dicitur—, ita et numeri quorum multiplicatio siue aliae proportiones in infinitum profluunt non ab ipsis finitis numeris qui primum contemplanti animo apparent sed ab ipsis rationibus aeternis et infinitis in quibus causaliter subsistunt originem ducunt. In monade autem sunt, in monade ergo infiniti sunt, ex qua infinitus omnis numerorum cursus procedit et in quam desinit.]

Et ut maiori argumento utamur unitatem nunquam inchoasse affirmantes diligenter animaduerte. Si unitas quae a Grecis dicitur monas omnium numerorum principium est et medium et finis—ab

1 distributione BP: distribucione R 3 suae: -a- s.l. R 4 diffundit R^cBP: diffundat R* 6-7 in quibus subsistunt sC in R 8 quomodo R^cBP: quoniam R* 9-10 ab infinito RBP^c: a finito P* 11-35 et si quis—desinit sC in R 13 finitus RB: finitur P 13-14 in infinitum R^cB^cP: infinitum R*B* 16 quantitatibus: glossa glo id est partibus et membris B(C)P 21 affirmabit B^cP: affirmauit RB* 22 poterit R^cBP: poterint R* 29 numeri RB: numero P 30 siue RB: sicut P 36 lemma BP animaduerte in ras. R 38 monas BP: MONAC R

in them all multiplied by an ineffable distribution, as their substance. For it is the cause and the substance of all numbers, and while it does not relinquish the stability of its own nature it pours itself out as multiplicity into all; and they subsist in it eternally because their beginning in it is not in time. For there was not (ever) unity without the manifold reasons of all the numbers. For who among men of clear intelligence would say that the Monad had had a beginning when he knows that it extends into infinity? For how can an infinite progression arise out of a finite beginning? For the infinite proceeds from the infinite [but nothing infinite from the finite].

[And if anyone should say, How can this hold good when even among the numbers themselves we see many infinities beginning from finites, for from the dyad, which is a finite number, all doubles derive and extend to infinity; similarly from the finite triad all triples take their origin and know no end to their multiplication, and, to speak briefly, there is no number, limited by its factors or merely by its units, from which some multiple does not flow forth to infinity, he must be answered as follows: All these numbers, finite in their parts, from which the multiples proceed into infinity are infinite in that Monad where all are one. Therefore he will either be denying that all numbers are in the Monad and will be affirming that they are finite in their multiplication from it, or if in the teeth of true reason he will not be able to affirm this he will be forced to profess that all numbers finite in their parts subsist as infinite <and> uniformly eternal in the Monad. For it is not where the source appears that the water begins to be, but it flows from somewhere much further afield through channels that are hidden and indefinable to the senses before it appears at the source, and therefore the place where it first rises to view is wrongly called the source, since for a long time previously it existed in hidden places of earth or ocean where it concealed itself from sight, for it is called 'latex' from the fact that it is latent in the veins of the earth. In the same way too the numbers, whose multiplication or other proportions flow into infinity, take their origin not from these finite numbers which are the first to appear to the mind which contemplates them, but from those eternal and infinite reasons in which they causally subsist. But they are in the Monad; in the Monad, therefore, they are infinite, and from it every infinite progression of numbers proceeds and in it ends.]

And to use a stronger argument, consider carefully those who affirm that unity never had a beginning. If unity, which the Greeks call the Monad, is the beginning and middle and end of all numbers

That the *Monas* is not only the beginning but the middle and end of all numbers

ipsa siquidem procedunt, per ipsam mouentur, ipsam petunt, in 653c
 ipsam desinunt, et nemo sapientum ambigit quod ita sit—, non alia
 erit unitas ex qua numeri profluunt et per quam mouentur et alia quam
 petunt et in quam finiuntur sed una atque eadem *quia est* et princi-
 pium et medium et finis. Proinde numeri a suo progredientes principio 5
 non aliunde nisi a suo fine progrediuntur—non enim aliud est eorum
 principium et aliud finis sed una atque eadem unitas—ac per hoc
 necessario conficitur ut si in infinitum protenduntur finem ab infinito
 principio protendi incipiunt. Finis autem infinitus est omnium 10
 numerorum unitas. Eadem igitur est omnium numerorum infinitum
 principium et si omnes numeri aeternaliter et incommutabiliter in 653D
 principio suo subsistunt in fine suo aeternaliter et incommutabiliter
 subsistere necessarium et quemadmodum non erit finis sine desinen-
 tibus in eum ita non erat principium sine inchoantibus ab eo actu
 et operatione intelligentiae proficisci. Aeternaliter ergo in monade 15
 omnes numeri subsistunt et dum ab ea profluunt in ea esse non
 desinunt quoniam statum suum naturalem desere[re] non possunt.
 Nam siue multiplicentur siue resoluantur ab ea ueniunt et in eam 654A
 redeunt secundum regulas disciplinae quae eorum rationes intuetur.
 At si ita est nemo nisi impudens contradicet aeternos in unitate 20
 numeros suis rationibus subsistere et si quis intentus inspexerit ipsas
 rationes sempiternas esse non dubitabit.

N. Arithmeticae disciplinae non ignarum te esse perspicio. Hac-
 tenus enim quicquid a te de ipsa prolatum est uera ratio praedicat 25
 ac sic et non aliter esse confirmat. Sed ut firmiter de numerorum
 aeternitate immonade perdoceas eorum rationes quas aeternas atque
 immutabiles asseris esse breuiter edissere atque aperte.

A. Prima progressio numerorum est a monade et multiplicationis
 auspiciis ΔΥΑC, id est binarius, secunda ΤΠΙΑC ternarius, tertia 654B
 post quaternarius, deinde omnes termini suis sedibus constituti. Et
 est quidem binarius omnis paritatis origo sub intellectum cadentis, 31
 ternarius uero imparitatis, ex quibus, paritate dico et imparitate,
 omnes species numerorum procreantur siue simplices sint siue com-
 positae [—simplices sunt par et impar, compositae quae de his
 duobus constituuntur, pariter par, pariter impar, impariter par]. 35

1 in s.l. R 4 quia est in ras. R(C) 6 suo RB: sua P 8 con-
 ficitur R(C)BP: conficit R* in infinitum B^cP: infinitum R: infinitum ex
 infinito B* 9 incipiunt *codd.: lege incipiant* 15 proficisci R^cB: pro-
 ficisci ex proficisci R*: om. P in s.l. R 19 intuetur BP: intuetur R 20 impu-
 dens RB: impudens P 21 post subsistere *rasura* R inspexerit R^cBP:
 inspexerit R* 23 Arithmeticae BP: Eritmetihcae R 25 et non aliter
 RB: aeternaliter P 26 immonade RB: in monade P 27 immutabiles
 RB: immutabiles P 28 Prima RB^cP: Primo B* est RB: eam P mul-
 tiplicationis RB: multiplicationes P 29 binarius: -a- in ras. R(C) ΤΠΙΑC
 R^cB^cP: ΤΠΙΑC R*B* 30 post RB: ΤΕΤΡΑC P post deinde *rasura*
 B constituti BP: constituitur R 31 omnis RB^cP: omnes B* cadentis:

—for from it they proceed, through it they move, towards it they
 tend, in it they come to an end, and none of the wise doubt that this
 is so—, it will not be one unity from which the numbers proceed and
 through which they move and another towards which they tend and in
 which they come to an end, but one and the same *that is* both begin-
 ning and middle and end. Therefore, numbers which proceed from
 their beginning proceed from nowhere else than their end—for their
 beginning is not one thing and their end another, but they are one
 and the same unity—, and therefore it must be concluded that if
 they extend to an infinite end their extension must begin from an
 infinite beginning. But the infinite end of all numbers is unity;
 therefore the infinite beginning of all numbers is the same, and if
 all numbers eternally and immutably subsist in their beginning, they
 must necessarily subsist eternally and immutably in their end, and
 as there will be no end without things coming to an end in it, so
 there was no beginning without things beginning to proceed from
 it by act and operation of the intelligence. Therefore all numbers
 subsist eternally in the Monad and while they flow forth from it they
 do not cease to be in it since they cannot abandon their natural state.
 For whether by multiplication or by division they proceed from it
 and return to it in accordance with the rules of the art which con-
 sider their reasons. But if this is so, no one who is not shameless
 will deny that the numbers eternal in unity subsist in their reasons,
 and anyone who considers carefully will not doubt but that the
 reasons themselves are eternal.

N. I see that you are not ignorant of the art of arithmetic. For what
 has been said by you so far true reason proclaims and confirms that
 it is thus and not otherwise. But in order to establish on a firmer
 basis your doctrine of the eternity of the numbers in the Monad, give
 a brief and clear account of their reasons, which you assert to be
 eternal and immutable.

A. The first progression of the numbers is from the Monad; and
 the first multiplication is Δυάς, that is, the number two,²¹ the second
 Τριάς, the number three, the third thereafter the number four, then
 all the terms, each established in its own place. And the number two
 is the source of all parity which falls within (the view of) the intellect,
 but the number three is the source of all disparity. And from these,
 I mean from parity and disparity, all kinds of numbers are generated
 whether simple or composite. [The simple are the even and the odd,
 the composite those that are made up of both these, the evenly even,
 the evenly odd, the oddly even.²²]

-tis in ras. R 32 imparita *** (*lacuna 12 fere litterarum*)tis B
 numerorum *rasura* R procreantur RB: procreant P sint s.l. R

Videsne quantum impossibile est hunc numerorum progressionis ordinem aliter fieri aut in alium modum moueri? Nullus enim alius numerus naturali ordine constitutus primae processionis ab unitate obtinet locum nisi binarius nec secundae nisi ternarius nec tertiae nisi quaternarius et unusquisque numerus suam sedem naturalem 5 possidet quam nullus numerus praeter ipsum cuius locus est occupare sinitur. In ipsa uero unitate simul omnes numeri sunt et nullus alium praecedat uel sequatur quoniam omnes unum sunt. Neque tamen naturalem suum ordinem quo modo in suis multiplicationibus continentur immutabiliter haberent *si non ipsarum* 10 aeternaliter immutabilis causa in unitate praecederet. Similiter de duplis quorum princeps est binarius et triplis quos praecedat ternarius et quadruplis qui ex quaternario incipiunt omnibusque multiplicium speciebus intelligendum quod unaquaeque earum a proprio suo principio inchoat et *in* infinitum tendit. Duplex autem proportio seu triplex seu quadruplex seu alia talium proportionum in unitate specialiter atque distincte non intelligitur siquidem in ea omnes 15 multiplices et simul sunt et unum sunt et unum multiplex et simplex, simplex quidem natura, multiplex uero rationibus secundum quas ordinem suum in multiplicationibus immutabilem accipiunt. Quid 20 dicam de mirabili atque diuina superparticularium et superpartientium et multiplicium superparticularium et multiplicium superpartientium constitutione et proportione quas *singulatim* species ab unitate accipiunt? Quid de proportionalitatibus quas in proportionibus inque differentiis terminorum contemplamur in quibus 25 ineffabilis atque diuinae uirtutis est constantia ut nullus sapientiae secreta penetrans eas non aeternas esse contendat? Si enim recta diffinitio est ueri quae dicit: Verum est quod semper manet, quod autem semper manet aeternum est, ratio[cinatio]nes numerorum uerae sunt quia semper immutabiliterque manent ac per hoc aeternae 30 sunt, de quibus quisquis diligenter scire desiderat magnifici Boetii de Mathesi libros intentus legat.

Item de numerorum aeternitate in principio suo, id est in monade, breuissimum accipe argumentum: Si unitas numerorum est unitas, nunquam erat unitas sine numeris quorum est unitas. Item si 35 numeri ex monade ueluti ex quodam fonte inexhausto profluunt et in eam quantumcunque multiplicentur desinunt, non ab ea quidem

6 possidet R^cBP: possidet R* 7 sinitur RB: finitur P 8 alium RB^cP: alius B* 9 modo om. P 10 si non ipsarum in ras. B(C) post si non *rasura* R ipsarum B^c(C): ipsius RB*: ipsorum P 13 quadruplis: -l- s.l. B(C) 14 proprio R^cBP: proprio R* 15 in R^cB^c(C)P: om. R*B* 21 superparticularium R^cBP: superparticulario R* 23 quas singulatim: -as singulatim in ras. R(C) singulatim RB: singillatim P ab BP: ali R 24 post quid etiam *erasum* R 26 atque RBP^c: aetque P* 27 penetrans RB^cP: penetrans B* contendat R^cBP: contendit R* enim RB: autem P 28 diffinitio R^cBP:

Do you see how impossible it is that this order of the progression of the numbers could be otherwise, or could be changed into a different mode? For no other number constituted in the natural order occupies the place of the first procession from unity except the number two, nor the second place except the number three, nor the third except the number four, and every number occupies its natural place which no number save that whose place it is is permitted to take. But in unity itself all numbers are at once together and no number precedes or follows another since all are one. And yet they would not immutably possess their natural order by means of which they are contained in their multiplications if their own eternally immutable cause in unity did not precede. Similarly in the case of doubles, which have the number two at their head, and of triples which the number three precedes, and of quadruples which start from the number four, and of all kinds of multiples, it must be understood that each of those starts from its proper beginning and tends towards infinity. But the double or the triple or the quadruple proportion or any other such proportion is not discerned specifically and distinctly in the unity, for in it all multiples are at once and are one, and are one multiple and simple: simple by nature, multiple by the reasons by which they receive their immutable order in their multiplications. What shall I say of the marvellous and divine constitution and proportion of the superparticulars²³ and the superpartients²⁴ and of the multiple superparticulars and multiple superpartients, which the species receive individually from the unity? What of the proportionalities which we contemplate in the proportions and differences of the terms, in which the ineffable and divine power is so constant that no one who penetrates the secrets of wisdom contends that they are not eternal? For if that is a right definition of the true which says, the true is that which abides for ever, and if what abides for ever is eternal, the reasons of the numbers are true because they abide for ever and immutably, and therefore they are eternal; and if anyone diligently wishes to know of these things let him carefully read the books of the great Boethius on Mathematics.

Again, on the subject of the eternity of the numbers in their beginning, that is, the Monad, here is a very brief argument: If unity is a unity of numbers, there never was unity without the numbers of which it is the unity. Also, if the numbers flow forth from the Monad as from some inexhaustible source and, however much they are multiplied, come to an end in it, they would surely not be flowing

diffinitio R* 28 quod(2)-manet om. P 29 ratiocinationes B: ratiociones R*: ratiocinationes R^c: rationes P post ratiocinationes *erasum est uerae sunt in R* 30 quia R^cBP: qua R immutabiliterque R^cBP: immutabiliterque R* manent R^cBP: manerent R*

profluerent si ante eorum fluxum in ea causaliter non subsisterent, nec in eam desinere appetere si non in ea suas causas aeternaliter permanere naturali motu cognoscerent ad quas semper redire non cessant per eosdem gradus quibus ab eadem profluxerant analiticis regulis per quas omnis inaequalitas ad aequalitatem reuocatur. Analiticas autem regulas in fronte secundi tractatus *Matheseos* magnifici Boetii studiosus quisque talium mirabili naturarum indagatione reperiet. Si autem quis dixerit et unitatem numerorum et ipsos numeros simul esse inseparabiliter quoniam inter ea quae simul et inseparabiliter sunt non incongrue connumerantur, non negandum, immo etiam fatendum. Sed non ideo aeterna esse principioque carere credendum uel intelligendum. Multa enim sunt quae simul incipiunt esse, non tamen ideo <simul> aeternaliter coguntur subsistere. Nam et materies et forma, et uox et uerbum, simul incipiunt, simul desinunt, nec tamen aeterna sunt. Si enim aeterna essent nec inciperent nec desinerent esse, et multa id genus.

de aeternitate
numerorum

Respondendum: senarius numerus ab unitate et multiplicatione aliorum numerorum non secluditur, praesertim cum solus in cardinalibus, hoc est in primo uersu numerorum ab uno usque decem, perfectus sit. Suis nanque partibus perficitur, sexta uidelicet et tertia et dimidia. Sexta quidem unum est, tertia duo, dimidia tria, quae simul compactae senariam perficiunt quantitatem. Vnum siquidem et duo et tria sex fiunt.

Est et alia ratio quae miro modo senarii numeri perfectionem insinuat qua primum uersum numerorum suis partibus ordinate constitutis perficit. Sexta pars eius unum, primum numerorum obtinet locum, tertia duo, secundum, dimidia tria, tertium, dimidia et sexta quae sunt tria et unum, quartum, dimidia et tertia quae sunt tria et duo, quintum, partes eius omnes simul coniunctae quae sunt unum duo tria, sextum, se ipsum uidelicet, complent, totus cum sua sexta, hoc est sex et unum, septimum, totus cum sua tertia, hoc est sex et duo, octauum, totus cum sua dimidia, nonum, sex et tria, quibus si unum addatur in quo omnium numerorum finis constituitur denaria quantitas perficietur. Si ergo perfectus iste numerus, senarius uidelicet, in unitate numerorum constituitur uideat qui dicit eum aeternum non esse cum in ipso omnium conditor opera sua perfecit—ubi notandum quod non ideo senarius numerus perfectus

14 Cf. 90. 19 *supra*. 36 cf. Aug. *De Gen. ad litt.* iv. 7. 14.

1 subsisterent P: subsisterant RB: substiterant A 5 reuocatur R^c(C)BP: reuocat R* analiticas RB^cP: analiticis B* 6 matheseos R^c(C)BP: mathe**** R* 11 aeterna: glossa glo id est unitatem et numeros BsP: glo sP: P deest B 14 post incipiunt rasura R 16 lemma B: de unitate numerorum 17 post aliorum rasura R praesertim B: praesertim RP 20 dimidia R^cBP: dimidia R* 21 compactae RB: cumpacte P senariam RB: sanarium P 26-27 dimidia et BP: dimediae et R 29 duo tria sextum: duo tria sex-*in ras.* B 33-34 denaria-constituitur om. P 36 quod non ideo RB: in eo opera sua condidit P

forth from it if before their flowing forth they had not subsisted in it as in their cause; nor would they seek their end in it if they did not know by their natural motion that there were not eternally abiding in it their causes towards which they never desist from returning through the same stages by which they had flowed forth from it by the rules of analysis by which every inequality is recalled to equality. Now the rules of analysis will be found at the beginning of the second treatise on *Mathematics* of the great Boethius by any student who pursues the marvellous investigation of such natures. But if someone should say that both the unity of the numbers and the numbers themselves are inseparably one, since they are suitably reckoned among the things that are inseparably one, this should not be denied, indeed, it should be admitted. But it should not therefore be believed or understood that they are eternal and without beginning. For there are many things which begin simultaneously to be and yet are not for that reason bound to subsist forever <simultaneously>. For both matter and form, and voice and word begin simultaneously (and) end simultaneously, and yet they are not eternal. For if they were eternal they would neither begin nor cease to be, and much else of that sort.

Let our reply be: The number six is not excluded from the unity and multiplication of the other numbers, especially as, alone among the cardinals, that is, among the first series of numbers from one to ten, it is perfect. For it is perfected by its parts, namely, the sixth and the third and the half. For the sixth is one, the third is two, the half is three, and these added together perfect the quantity of six. For one and two and three make six.

Concerning
the eternity
of numbers

There is another reason which in a wonderful way demonstrates the perfection of the number six according to which it perfects by its parts, when set in order, the first series of numbers. Its sixth part, one, occupies the first place of the numbers, its third, two, the second, its half, three, the third, its half and its sixth, which are three and one, the fourth, its half and its third, which are three and two, the fifth, all its parts added together, which are one two three, complete the sixth, itself that is, its whole and its sixth, that is six and one, the seventh, its whole with its third, that is six and two, the eighth, its whole with its half the ninth, six and three, to which if one be added, in which the end of all numbers is constituted, the quantity of ten will be perfected. If, therefore, that perfect number, namely the number six, is constituted in the unity of the numbers, let him take care who says that it is not eternal, for in it the Creator of all things perfected His works. But here it must be noted that the number six is not perfect because in it God concluded all things

est quoniam in eo deus cuncta quae creare uoluit consummauit sed
ideo in eo opera sua condidit ut perfectione numeri operum suorum
perfectionem significaret. Hoc igitur maximum ac diuinissimum
exemplar in quo fecit deus opera sua nunquid credibile aut ueri
simile est temporaliter inchoasse dum in eo non solum quae in
temporibus sunt uerum et ipsa tempora et quae ultra tempora subsistunt
ab opifice omnium constituta sunt? Proinde nemo sanum sapiens de
aeternitate numerorum dubitarit solius senarii numeri argumento
utens, nam quod de aeternitate illius intelligitur de aliorum similiter
perennitate intelligendum. Siquidem non de solo senario, de uniuersitate
uero generaliter omnium numerorum dictum est: 'Omnia in
mensura et numero et pondere' fecit deus. At si loca et tempora inter
omnia quae deus fecit connumerantur necessario intellectuales numeri
in sola scientia substituti loca et tempora naturae suae perpetuitate
praecedunt et inter ea quae simul et aeterna et facta sunt computantur,
aeterna quidem sunt in monade, in multiplicationibus uero suis facta.

N. De aeternitate numerorum in monade satis est disputatum.
Quomodo autem fiunt et ubi et unde ualde necessarium est inuestigare.
Eorum nanque argumento conamur asserere omnia quae a deo sunt aeterna
simul et facta esse.

A. Aeternitatem monadis omniumque numerorum in ea quantum
ualeo exposui. Quomodo autem intellectuales numeri secundum quos
omnia quae numerari possunt numerantur fiunt et ubi et unde tuum
est explanare. Hoc autem dico sciens facilius eorum aeternitatem
quam facturam et quaeri posse et inueniri et suaderi.

N. De me bene ut uideo aestimas quando mihi difficiliora quaerenda
inuenienda suadenda committis. Veruntamen meum est quaerere,
inuenire uero illius solius est qui illuminat abscondita tenebrarum.
Suadere quoque eiusdem est quia potest [solus] aperire sensum
quaerentium et intellectum. Quid enim prodest exterior suasio si non
sit interior illuminatio? Itaque quod paulo ante a te dictum est,
aeterna quidem in monade, in multiplicationibus uero suis facta,
huius quaestionis praelibamen esse arbitror et si intellexisti quod
dixisti superflue quaeris quod intelligis, sin uero quaerendum est.

12-13 Sap. xi. 21.

1 uoluit RB^cP: uolunt B* 2 in eo RB: omnia P 3 perfectionem
om. P 4 nunquid RB: numquid P 4-5 ueri simile R^cBP: uerissime
le R* 8 dubitarit RB: dubitant P 13 connumerantur R^cBP: con-
nu**merantur R* 14 loca et tempora: glossa interlin. acussatiuum C in B
et s.l. R 19 quomodo R^cBP: quoniam R* 20 nanque BP: namque R
22 post ea rasura R 27 uideo R^cBP: uidetur R* difficiliora R^cB: difficiora
R*: deficiolor P quaerenda RB: quaerendi P 28 committis BP: committis
R ueruntamen R^cB: ueruntamen R*P 29 illuminat RB^cP: illuminat B*

which He wished to create, but He created His works in it because
by the perfection of the number the perfection of His works should
be revealed. Is it, then, credible or likely that this most mighty and
divine exemplar in which God made His works had a temporal
beginning, when in it not only the things which are in times but also
the times themselves and the things which subsist beyond the times
were constituted by the Creator of all things? Therefore no man of
sound wisdom would have any doubt about the eternity of the
numbers if he made use of the argument concerning the number six
only, for what is understood about its eternity must similarly be
understood of the perenniality of the others. For not of the number
six alone but generally of the totality of all the numbers was it said,
God made 'all things in measure and number and weight'. But if
places and times are counted among all the things which God made,
the intellectual numbers subsisting in their science alone necessarily
precede the places and times in the perpetuity of their nature and
are reckoned among the things which are at the same time eternal
and made; they are eternal in the Monad, but made in their multi-
plications.

N. Of the eternity of the numbers in the Monad enough has been
said. But it is necessary to investigate how they are made and where
and from what. For by arguing from them we are trying to establish
that all things that are from God are at the same time eternal and
made.

A. The eternity of the Monad and of all numbers in it I have ex-
pounded to the best of my ability. But how the intellectual numbers
after which all things that can be numbered are numbered are made
and where and from what is for you to explain. But I say this in the
knowledge that it is easier for their eternity than for their being
made to be able to be sought and found and demonstrated.

N. You have a high opinion of me, as I see, since you assign to
me the things that are harder to seek and find and demonstrate.
However, it is my part to seek, but to find is His alone Who illumines
the hidden places of darkness. His also is the demonstration because
He [alone] can open the sense of those who seek and the intellect. For
of what use is a demonstration from without if there is not illumina-
tion within? Therefore what was said by you just now, 'eternal in the
Monad but made in their multiplications', provides, I think, a fore-
taste of this question, and if you understood what you said it is
superfluous for you to seek what you understand, but if not, it must
be sought for.

30 quoque R*BP: erasum R^c quia R^c(C)BP: qui R* 32 a te om. P
34 huius BP: Vius R*: HVius R^c praelibamen RB: praelibamur P 35 dixisti
R^cBP: dixisti R*

A. Omnino uideo numeros non nisi in multiplicationibus suis posse fieri. Nam in monade aeterni sunt. Quomodo autem uel ubi uel unde fiunt adhuc non uideo ideoque horum cognitionem te aperire postulo.

N. Omnes numeros causaliter, hoc est ui et potestate, in monade semper esse non dubitamus.

A. Hinc dubitare minus [est] intelligentium.

N. Monada autem in sapientia et scientia aeternaliter subsistere intelligis ut arbitror.

A. Si aliter sentio ab ipsius monadis uera cognitione alienus sum.

N. Non alios reris ut opinor numeros in monade ui et potestate constitutos et alios actu et opere in genera et species intelligibilium numerorum sed eosdem profuentes.

A. Non alios, eosdem uero, sed aliter.

N. Dic quaesso quomodo aliter.

A. In monade quidem ui et potestate, in generibus uero et formis actu et opere.

N. Recte respondisti. Num ergo uides numeros eosdem ibi aeternos esse ubi ui et potestate causaliter sunt, hoc est in monade, ubi uero actu et opere intelliguntur ibi factos esse?

A. Nimium acceleras. Pedetemptim ratiocinationis ingredienda est uia ne quid incaute temereque statuamus. Prius itaque est quaerendum quid sit uis et quid potestas numerorum in monade eorundemque quid sit actus et quid operatio in generibus et formis.

N. Vis est ut aestimo substantialis eorum uirtus qua aeternaliter et immutabiliter in monade subsistunt, potestas uero est possibilitas eis insita qua in genera et species possunt multiplicari et intellectibus manifesti fieri certis terminorum distinctionibus quantitatum diuersitatibus interuallis differentiarum proportionum proportionalitatumque mirabili aequalitate et insolubili consonantia. Actus est motus animi procedentium numerorum ex monade in diuersa genera inque species differentes multiplicationem contemplantis in se ipso et in se ipsis priusquam in fantasias cogitationis ueniant, hoc est simpliciter <in> incorporea natura omni imagine carente purissimo intellectus oculo ipsos numeros supra omnem quantitatem et qualitatem et loca et tempora considerantis, et ut breuiter diffiniam: Actus est motus animi purissimos in sua natura numeros absque ulla

de ui et potestate numerorum

de actu et opere numerorum

2 aeterni R^cB^cP: aeternae R^{*B}* quomodo R^cBP: quoniam R^{*} 3 lemma
 quomodo fiant numeri et ubi et unde Rm adhuc R^cBP: aduc R^{*} co-
 gnitionem BP: cognitionem R^c: constitutionem R^{*} 6 post esse rasura R
 11 numeros in monade RBP^c: in monade numeros P* 13 post numerorum
 rasura s.l. R 14 lemma quid sit ui et potestate actu et opere et a solo deo
 numeros creari Rm 18 Recte: -cte in ras. R(C) ergo R^cBP: ego R^{*} ibi
 RB^cP: tibi B* 20 esse om. P 21 pedetemptim R^cB: pedetemptim R^{*P}
 25 lemma BP: ui B: uim P qua RB: quae P 28 manifesti fieri RB^c(C)P:
 manifestari B* 29 proportionum RB^cP: proportionu B* 31 lemma BP

A. I fully see that the numbers cannot be made save in their 12
 multiplications. For in the Monad they are eternal. But how or where
 or from what they become I do not yet see, and it is for that reason
 that I ask you to reveal the knowledge of these things.

N. That all numbers are for ever in the Monad causally, that is,
 potentially, we do not doubt.

A. To doubt of this [is] the mark of the less intelligent.

N. But you understand, as I think, that the Monad subsists
 eternally in wisdom and knowledge.

A. If I think otherwise I am a stranger to true knowledge of the
 Monad itself.

N. You think, as I believe, that the numbers that are constituted
 potentially in the Monad are not other than those that flow forth
 actually into the genera and species of the intelligible numbers, but
 the same.

A. They are not other but the same, though in a different mode.

N. Tell me, pray, how in a different mode?

A. They are in the Monad potentially, but in the genera and forms
 actually.

N. You have answered correctly. Do you then see that the same
 numbers are eternal there where they are potentially in their cause,
 that is, in the Monad, but where they are understood to be actually,
 there they are made?

A. You go too quickly. The path of reasoning must be trodden
 step by step lest we arrive at conclusions that are hasty and rash.
 Thus it must first be asked what is the 'force' and what is the 'power'
 of the numbers in the Monad and what is their 'act' and what their
 'operation' in the genera and forms.

N. 'Force' is, as I think, the substantial virtue by which they
 subsist eternally and immutably in the Monad, while 'power' is the
 possibility, innate in them, by which they are able to be multiplied
 and become manifest to intellects by certain terminological distinc-
 tions, quantitative diversities, differential intervals, (and) the wonder-
 ful equality and indissoluble harmony of proportion and propor-
 tionalities. Act is the motion of the mind in contemplating in itself
 and in them the multiplication of the numbers as they proceed from
 the Monad into the diverse genera and different species before they
 reach the phantasies of cogitation, that is, in considering with the
 eye of the intellect beyond all quantity and quality and places and
 times the numbers themselves <in> the simplicity of their incorporeal
 nature which lacks all imagery; and, to give a brief definition: Act
 is the motion of the mind in regarding without any imagery the
 numbers under the most pure aspect of their nature. Operation, on

Concerning
 the force and
 power of
 numbers

Concerning
 the act and
 operation of
 numbers

imaginatione intuentis. Opus uero est eiusdem animi motus purissi-
 mos numeros quos in se ipso considerat phantasiis ueluti quibusdam
 corporibus increasatos memoriae commendantis ibique eos ordinantis 658A
 eorumque rationes facilius tractantis forasque quibusdam signis
 corporalium sensuum significatos in aliorum notitiam tradentis. [Et 5
 ne me existimes uelle suadere ipsos numeros ab intellectu uel
 ratione multiplicari [et creari]² et non ab ipso omnium conditore
 multiplicatore ordinatore. Si enim ab ullo creato intellectu
 multiplicationem suam numeri primum paterentur non eis diuina et
 ineffabilis immutabilitas et armonia rationum inesset. Proinde non 10
 ideo intellectus intellectuales numeros creare putandus est quia in se
 ipsos contemplatur—ab uno autem creatore omnium in intellectibus
 siue humanis siue angelicis fieri credendum est, a quo etiam in
 monade aeternaliter substituti sunt—per intellectus uero in notionem 658B
 descendunt.] Nam quemadmodum, ut exemplo utamur, consilium 16
 quoddam seu qualiscunque ars naturalis dum in secretissimis intelle-
 ctualis naturae sinibus continetur simul est et unum quoddam simplex
 sine partibus seu diuisionibus sine quantitate seu qualitate sine loco
 sine tempore et omnino omnibus accidentibus absolutum ac uix soli
 intellectui cognitum—non enim intellectus naturalium artium factor 20
 est sed inuentor, non [tamen] extra se sed intra se eas inuenit—, dum
 uero ipsa ars ab archanis suis in quibus simul est in animo in quo
 est in rationem intelligibili progressionem incipit descendere mox
 paulatim suas occultas regulas apertis diuisionibus atque differentiis 25
 inchoat aperire, adhuc tamen purissimas omnique imaginatione 658C
 alienas—et haec processio prima artis ab ipsa scientia in qua primitus
 subsistit per intellectum in rationem ipsius intellectus actu perficitur:
 omne siquidem quod ex secretis naturae in rationem prouenit per
 intellectus actionem accedit—, iterum autem ueluti secundo descensu
 eadem ars ex ratione in memoriam descendens paulatim apertius in 30
 phantasiis ueluti in quibusdam formis se ipsam luculentius declarat,
 tertio uero descensu ad corporales sensus defunditur ubi *sensibili-*
bus signis uirtutem suam per genera et species omnesque diuisiones
 suas et subdivisiones et partitiones exerit—ita intellectuales numeri
 ex monade se defundunt ut in animo quodam modo splendescant, 35
 deinde ex animo in rationem profluentes apertius se patefaciunt, mox 658D
 de ratione in memoriam decurrentes phantasticas ex ipsius memoriae

5-14 et ne-substituti sunt sC in R 11 creare RB: create P 12 in
 om. P* 14-15 per-descendunt C in R 14 intellectus RB: intellectum P
 uero RB: ab ea P notionem RB: notione P 16 secretissimis RB: se
 certissimis P 21 sed intra se om. P 28 prouenit RB: peruenit P
 30 lemma processio intellectualium numerorum a monade in animum. ab animo
 in rationem. a ratione in memoriam deinde in sensus. postremo in figuris Rm
 32 defunditur R^cBP: se defundit R* sensibilibus in ras. R(C) 33 signis
 BP: figuris in ras. R(C) species: -es in ras. R(C)

the other hand, is the motion of the same mind when the pure numbers
 which it considers in itself it consigns to the memory, embodied as
 it were by certain corporeal phantasies, and sets them in order there
 and deals with their reasons more easily; and conveys them, made
 significant to the corporeal senses,²⁵ to the knowledge of others. [And
 do not think that I mean that the numbers themselves are multiplied
 [and created]² by the intellect or reason and not by the Creator and
 Multiplier and Ordainer of all things Himself. For if the numbers
 suffered their first multiplication at the hands of any created intellect
 there would not be in them the immutability and harmony of their
 reasons. Therefore, it is not to be thought that the intellect creates
 the intellectual numbers because it contemplates them in itself—it is,
 however, to be believed that by the one Creator of all things they
 were made in the intellects whether human or angelic, and it is by
 Him also that they are eternally established in the Monad—but
 they descend through the intellects into knowledge.] For just as, to
 give an illustration, some project or some art in nature, while it is
 contained within the most hidden recesses of the intellectual nature,²⁶
 is all together and a simple unity without parts or divisions, without
 quantity or quality, without place or time, and altogether free from
 all accidents and barely known to the intellect alone—for the intellect
 is not the maker but the discoverer of the arts of nature, [though] it
 does not discover them outside itself but within itself—but when that
 art begins to descend by an intelligible progress into the reason from
 its secret places in which it is all one in the mind in which it is, soon
 it gradually begins to reveal by evident divisions and differences its
 hidden structure, though as yet in a most pure form free from all
 imagery—and this initial process of the art out of that science in
 which it originally subsists is directed by the act of the intellect
 itself through the intellect to the reason: for everything which
 comes forth from the hidden places of nature into the reason comes
 through the action of the intellect—, but then again, by a second
 descent, as it were, the same art, descending from the reason into the
 memory, gradually declares itself more openly in phantasies (and),
 as it were, more distinct in certain forms; but in a third descent it is
 poured down upon the corporeal senses, where by sensible signs it
 exhibits its power by means of genera and species and all its divisions
 and subdivisions and particulars—so the intellectual numbers stream
 down from the Monad so that they somehow may shine forth in the
 mind, then by flowing forth from the mind into the reason they
 reveal themselves more openly; next, descending from the reason
 into the memory they receive from the nature of the memory itself

natura excipiunt apparitiones in quibus uirtutes multiplicium suarum formarum inquisitoribus suis luculenter aperiunt, [deinde in sensus, postremo in figuras].

de diuersis
gradibus
discensionis
numerorum

Num igitur uidēs tria illa quae quaesieras, quomodo et ubi et unde? Unde quidem? A monade. Ubi? In intellectu. Quomodo? Diuersis gradibus: primum, a semet ipsis in intellectum, ab intellectu in rationem, ex ratione in memoriam, ex memoria in sensus corporeos, et si necesse est propter utilitatem discensionum extremo gradu a sensibus ad uisibiles figuras descendunt.

A. Plane clarissimeque uideo.

N. Itaque non te latet ut opinor numeros et aeternos esse et factos: aeternos quidem in monade, factos uero multipliciter [in suis descensionibus], primo uidelicet in intellectu contemplantium se in semet ipsis fiunt, qui modus faciendi longe a sensibus remotus est. Fieri enim dicuntur in notitia se intelligentium. Nam in monade dum sint ineffabili sua unitate omnem superant intellectum, eo solo [diuino uidelicet intellectu] *excepto quem nil ubique latet* [ipse est enim intellectus omnium, immo omnia]. Non enim de ipsa monade quae est causa sola et creatrix omnium uisibilium et inuisibilium nunc agitur sed de illa creata monade in qua omnes numeri causaliter uniformiter rationabiliter ac semper subsistunt et ex qua multiformiter erumpunt. Secundo uero in ratione fiunt in qua fieri propterea dicuntur quia in ea manifestius se ostendunt, adhuc tamen per se ipsos [absque ullo fantastico colore]. Deinde in memoria ac sensibus in fantasiis quibusdam efficiuntur.

de fantasia et
fantasmate

Ipsae autem fantasiae aut de natura memoriae [hoc est de ea parte animae quae formandis imaginibus est attributa] aut extrinsecus ex superficie corporum per sensus exteriores sumuntur. Sed quae extrinsecus ueniunt fantasiae proprie appellantur, quae uero ex memoria fantasmata. Verbi gratia fantasia est imago quam de certo corpore [seu colore seu spatio] *a me uiso* per sensum uidentem assumptam memoriae infigo, fantasma uero est imago illa quam fingo de aliquo nunquam a me uiso, quae falsa non immerito dicitur imago quoniam illud quod cogito aut paenitus non est aut si est non ita est sicut imaginio.

Ubi notandum si sanctum sequimur Augustinum quod fantasma
17-18 Cf. 58. 3 sq. supra.

4 lemma BP: discensionis B: descensionis P 5 in om. R*P 6 primum
s.l. R intellectum RB^c: intellectu B*P ab intellectu RB: in intellectum P
10 clarissimeque RB: clarissimaeque P 12 lemma aliam esse monadem omnium
creatricem. aliam omnium numerorum causam creatam Rm 13 se om. P
14 a sensibus remotus est C in R. 15 nam in ras. R(C) 16 unitate:
uni- in ras. B 17 excepto-latet in ras. R(C) 19 et RB: ei P 20 creata
s.l. R 21 post multiformiter s siue f erasum R 24 fantasiis RB^c: fantasias
B*: phantasiis P 26 lemma BP 26-28 Ipsae-sumuntur om. P 26-27 hoc-
attributa sC in R 28 superficie: s- s.l. R 31 seu-spacio sC in R
a me uiso in ras. R(sC) 31 assumptam BP: assumptam R meae:

phantasmal appearances in which they clearly reveal the powers of their multiple forms to those that inquire into them, [then into the senses, lastly into figures²⁷].

Do you then see the three things which you had searched for, the How, and the Where, and the Whence? From the Monad. Where? In the intellect. How? By different stages: first they descend from themselves into the intellect; from the intellect into the reason; from the reason into the memory; from the memory into the corporeal senses; and, if it is required for the benefit of students, by a final stage from the senses into visible figures.

A. Plainly and most clearly do I see.

N. So you are not unaware, as I think, that the numbers are both eternal and made: eternal in the Monad, but made in the multiplicity [in their descents], first, that is, they are made in the intellect of those who contemplate them in themselves, a mode of making which is far removed from the senses. For they are said to be made in the knowledge of those who understand them. For as long as they are in the Monad they surpass by their ineffable unity all understanding, except for that alone [namely the Divine Understanding] from which nothing is anywhere hid [for He is the understanding of all things, indeed is all things]. For I am not now concerned with that Monad which is the sole Cause and Creator of all things visible and invisible but with that created Monad in which all the numbers subsist causally, uniformly, reasonably, and for ever, and from which they break forth into multiplicity. But secondly they are made in the reason, in which they are said to be made because in it they manifest themselves more clearly, though still through themselves [without any colour of phantasy]. Thereafter they are made in the memory and senses in certain phantasies.

Now these phantasies are acquired either from the nature of the memory [that is, from that part of the soul which is given over to the forming of images] or extrinsically from the surface of bodies by means of the external senses. But those which come extrinsically are phantasies properly so called, while those from the memory (are) phantasms. For instance, the image which through my sense of sight I take from a certain body [or colour or space] *seen by me* and implanted in my memory is a phantasy, while that image which I fashion from something never seen by me is a phantasm, and this is not unjustly called a false image because that which I regard either altogether does not exist or, if it does, is not as I imagine it.

And here it must be noted, if we follow Saint Augustine's teaching,

-ae in ras. R(C) 32 aliquo R^cBP: aliqo R* 33 immerito B: inmerito RP
34 cogito R^cBP: cognito R* paenitus RB: penitus P imagino RB: imago P
35 sanctum: scm RB; secundū P

Concerning
the divers
degrees of
the descent
of the num-
bers.

Concerning
phantasy and
phantasm

non aliunde nisi ex fantasia nascitur. Est enim ut ipse ait imago imaginis, hoc est imago ex alia imagine nascens. [Verbi gratia solis cotidie orientis phantasiam habeo quam de disciformi ipsius specie accepi et iterum ad similitudinem ipsius phantasiae solares imagines mille in memoria fingo maiores uel minores iuxta cogitationis meae arbitrium. Ac per hoc falsae sunt quia nil ueri imitantur.] Nam Greci aliter quid sit phantasma intelligunt. Dicunt enim notitiam quae in animo est de sensibilibus naturis per fantasias earum susceptam phantasma esse.

A. Dupliciter ergo factos numeros in monade aeternaliter substitutos asseris ni fallor. Aut enim in animo et ratione sola ac simplici intelligentia fiunt puri per se omnique imaginatione absoluti apparentes, aut in memoria sensuque corporeo quibusdam imaginatio-nibus incrassati ac ueluti ex quadam et in quadam materia facti.

N. Ita est. Sed quod addidisti 'ex quadam et in quadam materia facti' non satis acute perspexisti. Phantasiae nanque quas de memoria in memoria uel sensu de sensibili accipiunt ut in eis appareant non ex quadam materia fiunt sed ex incorporalibus incorporales nascuntur. Non enim ex materia corporalium rerum efficiuntur sed ex specie quae procul dubio incorporea est et ex coloribus qui non corpora sed circa corpora intelliguntur, ac per hoc nil est conuenientius ac naturalius quam ut intellectuales numeri in rebus incorporeis et ex incorporalibus sumptis uirtutem suam ostendant et modo quodam ineffabili in generationem sensibilem facti procedant. Perspectisque rerum rationibus non temere quis dixerit ipsas phantasias in quibus numeri se interioribus numerantium oculis patefaciunt non aliunde nisi ab ipsis intelligibilibus numeris prouenire. Nam si numerositas formarum sensibilibus in quibus materia continetur ut sensibus possit percipi—siquidem per se ipsam inuisibilis est atque informis—ab intellectualibus numeris originem ducit, et ex ipsa, formarum uidelicet numerositate, per corporeos sensus memoria phantasiis conformatur, nil aliud restat nisi ut intelligamus numeros intellectuales ex monade duplici modo fluere et in memoria factos acie mentis multiplicari diuidi comparari colligi uniri. Aut enim ut praediximus per intellectum in rationem et ex ratione in memoriam

1 Aug. *De musica* vi. 11. 32.

2-6 uerbi-imitantur sC in R 3 phantasiam RB: fantasiam P disci-
formi RB*P: disci formi B* 4 phantasiae RB: fantasiae P 8 post
naturis quae erasum R 10 factos s.l. R 11-13 aut-apparentes quae omissa
erant scripsit ad calc. sR 15-16 N.-facti om. P 16 phantasiae B*(C)P:
phantasias RB* 17 de sensibili s.l. R 19 specie R*BP: speciae R*
24 perspectisque R*B*P: perspectis R*: perfectisque B* 25 temere B:
timere P 31 numerositate B: numerositatem P 32 ut om. P 33 facti
codd.: lege factos 35 colligi s.l. B

that the phantasm comes from no other source but from the phantasy. For it is, as he says, an image of an image, that is, an image which is born of another image. [For instance, I have a phantasy of the sun which rises every day, which I have received from its disc-shaped appearance and I am repeatedly fashioning in my memory thousands of solar images in the likeness of that phantasy, greater or smaller according to the decision of my thought. And therefore they are false for they imitate nothing that is true.] For the Greeks have a different understanding of what a phantasm is. For they say that the phantasm is the knowledge which the mind has of sensible natures which it has acquired through the phantasies of them.

A. You say, then, unless I am mistaken, that the numbers that are eternally established in the Monad are made in two ways. For either they are made simply by the intellect alone in the mind and in the reason, where they appear purely through themselves without any imagery; or in the memory and corporeal sense, where they are embodied in certain images and made, as it were, out of and in a kind of matter.

N. Thus it is. But in adding, 'out of and in a kind of matter', you have not seen clearly enough. For the phantasies which they receive from the memory in the memory or from the sensible in the sense so as to be able to appear in them are not made from some matter but, incorporeal, are born of incorporeals. For they are not made from the matter of corporeal things but from the appearance which without doubt is incorporeal and from colours which are understood to be not bodies but about bodies; and therefore nothing is more suitable or natural than that the intellectual numbers should reveal their virtue in things that are incorporeal and derive from what is incorporeal and by some ineffable means should be made and proceed into sensible generation. And taking into account the reasons of things, one could safely say that those phantasies in which the numbers reveal themselves to the inner eyes of those who number issue from no other source but from the intelligible numbers themselves. For if the numerousness of the sensible forms in which matter is contained so as to be perceptible to the senses—for through itself it is invisible and formless—takes its origin from the intellectual numbers, and from it, that is, from the numerousness of the forms, through the corporeal senses, the memory takes on form from the phantasies, there is nothing for it but that we should understand that there are two ways in which the intellectual numbers flow forth from the Monad and after being made in the memory are multiplied, divided, compared, brought together, united by the keenness of the mind. For either, as we said above, they descend through the intellect into the reason and from the reason into the memory; or they flow

descendunt, aut per species rerum uisibilium in sensus corporeos iterumque ex ipsis in eandem memoriam confluunt, in qua phantasticas accipientes formas fiunt interioribusque sensibus succumbunt, ac per hoc quoquo modo numeri patiantur perspicere non aliunde nisi a semet ipsis apparitionis suae occasionem percipiunt. Proinde et in monade aeterni sunt et a se ipsis in quacunque naturae parte apparuerint facti, hoc est siue in intellectu siue in ratione absque ullis imaginationibus, siue in memoria ex speciebus rerum sensibilibus formata phantasias quasdam in quibus appareant ueluti facti de se ipsis facientes.

A. De numeris satis est actum. His enim argumentis conficitur *clareque* intelligitur ubi aeterni sunt et ubi et quomodo patiuntur fieri ut non immerito perspiciamus eos et aeternos esse et factos. Sed quorsum haec tendant intentus expecto. Non enim propter se ipsa sed propter aliud quid suadendum introducta sunt.

N. Miror cur tam cito oblitus es tui. Num paulo ante postulasti me naturalia exempla quibus possem te *introducere* ad intelligentiam eorum de quibus disputabamus, id est quomodo omnia quae ex deo sunt et aeterna simul et facta sunt, et maxime quomodo deus ipse et factor omnium est et in omnibus fit? Haec est enim summa totius nostrae praesentis ratiocinationis.

A. Iam in me ipsum redeo. Nam difficultate praedictorum et adhuc incognita mihi rerum theoria stupefactus sicut multis euenit in ecstasi factus sum. Quis enim rudium et nondum sublimissimum sophiae uerticem ascendentium talia cogitans mentis secessum non patitur, aeternam numerorum a creatore omnium in monade audiens conditionem eorundemque processionem in genera et species in quibus fieri dicuntur quoniam in eis ab intellectibus patiuntur intelligi, deinde in naturam rationabilem secundam ueluti procreationem quoniam in ea suas uirtutes manifestius propagant, deinde in memoria sensibusque phantasias, immo etiam theofanias, accipientes—[omne enim quod ex natura rerum in memoria formatur occasiones ex deo habere non est dubitandum]—, quodam modo fieri non de alia materia sed de semet ipsis facti? [Nunc uero ueluti expergefactus in me ipsum rediens interiorisque luminis radium luculentius perspicens ea quae a te dicta sunt cognoscere incipio. Conaris enim ut opinor suadere omnes numeros ex monade ueluti ex quodam fonte manantes instar duorum fluminum ex una uena

1 species BP^c: speciocias P* 4 perspicere non B: perspicies P 6-7 apparuerint B: apparuerunt P 7 in om. P 11 est om. P 14 quorsum B^cP: quorum B* 15 aliud B: illud P 18 glossa EKCTACIC MENTIC EXCESSVS P 22 difficultate B: difficultatem P 23 sicut B: sum P 24 ecstasi B: astasim P 26 aeternam B: aeterna P 29 secundam om. P 31 phantasias B^cP: phantasiis B* theofanias RB: theophanias P 36 perspicens BP^c: perspicies P*

together through the forms of visible things into the corporeal senses and again from them into the same memory, in which they are made by receiving shapes of phantasy and become accessible to the inner senses, and therefore by whichever way the numbers become perceptible, they perceive the occasion for their appearance nowhere but in themselves. So they are both eternal in the Monad and made by themselves in whatsoever part of nature they have appeared, that is, whether in the intellect or in the reason without any imagery, or are, as it were, made by making out of themselves certain phantasies in which they can appear in the memory formed from the forms of sensible things.

A. Concerning numbers enough has been said. For by these arguments it is established and *clearly* understood wherein they are eternal and wherein and how they become made, so that not without reason we see that they are both eternal and made. But I am eager to learn where this is leading. For this has been introduced not for its own sake but for the sake of teaching something else.

N. I am surprised that you have so quickly forgotten your own words. Did you not just now ask me for some examples from nature to bring you to an understanding of the things we were discussing, that is, how all things which are from God are at the same time both eternal and made, and especially how God Himself is both the Maker of all things and is made in all things? For this is the main point of all our present reasoning.

A. Now I recall them. For baffled by the difficulty of the preceding discussion and by a theory of things that was hitherto unknown to me, I fell into an abstraction, as happens to many people. For who among the uninstructed and those who are not set upon the path to the highest peak of wisdom, in pondering such things does not suffer an eclipse of his mental faculties when he hears of the eternal creation of the numbers by the Creator of all things in the Monad; and of their procession into the genera and species in which they are said to be made because in them they become understood by intellects; then of their second birth, so to speak, in the rational nature, for in it they show forth their powers more clearly; then, by taking to themselves phantasies, nay, rather, theophanies [for it is not to be doubted that everything that is formed from nature in the memory takes its occasions from God], they are somehow made in the memory and the senses, made not from any matter but from themselves? [But now as a sleeper awakened I recall my words, and looking with a clearer eye upon the ray of the inner light I begin to understand what you have said. For you are trying, as I think, to teach that all numbers, issuing from the Monad as from a source, flow forth like two rivers rising from a single spring and separated into

surgentium profluere inque duos alueos segregatos, quorum unus
per interiores poros naturae, hoc est per intellectum et rationem, alter
uero per exteriores uisibilium rerum species decurrit et per sensus,
donec simul in memoriam confluant in qua multipliciter formantur.]

Sed quomodo res incorporeae et non solum a sensibus uerum etiam
ex memoria omnique imaginatione prae nimia suae naturae excellen-
tia remotae in memoria sensibusue, hoc est [in] imaginibus uisibili-
busque figuris, ueluti quibusdam corporibus possunt apparere non
satis uideo.

N. [Hoc uno exemplo totum te intelligere censeo. Ita enim ut
dixisti ex monade numeri manant et in memoriam confluant. De eo
autem quod non satis uides accipe quod sentio:] Spiritualium rerum
natura non ita contemplationibus mentis succumbit ut per singula
de his quae de ea uel in ea uel per eam peraguntur rationem reddamus.
Multae enim in ea solent apparere quae non secundum cognitae [uel
incognitae] ipsius leges sed ultra omnem legem diuina uoluntate
quae nulla lege concluditur—est enim lex legum et ratio rationum—
mirabili et ineffabili modo fiunt. Quis enim rationem potest reddere
si interrogatus fuerit quomodo anima Mosi uisibiliter apparuit
quando transformatio domini facta est? Non enim audiendi sunt hi
qui putant eum ad tempus in corpore resurrexisse ut simul cum Elia
in monte uisibiliter non per se sed in suo corpore appareret et iterum
ad sepulchrum rediisse. Quis ergo dicturus est qua ratione anima
incorporea et inuisibilis uisibiliter ac ueluti corporaliter uisa est cum
nec in suo corpore nec in aliqua materia sensibili [seu aliunde assum-
pta] apparuit? Sed quadam ineffabili uirtute soli deo cognita in-
uisibilis spiritus quasi uisibilis per se factus est. Quid dicturus es de
anima prophetae Samuel? Quomodo uisibiliter locuta est Saul?
Nam et ipse sicut apostoli in spiritu raptus talia uidit. Siquidem credendi
non sunt qui dicunt non ipsum sed aliquod figmentum in simili-
tudine ipsius apparuisse, indignum iudicantes animam sanctam in-
cantationibus pythonissae ab inferis reuocari, non animaduertentes
diuinam prouidentiam non minus per immundos quam per mundos
spiritus naturam rerum administrare. Constat autem animam Samuel
per se ipsam quasi uisibiliter non in corpore nec in aliqua similitudine
consulenti eam regi prophetasse. Et si forte alicui hoc uidetur in-
credibile uel dubium legat sanctum Augustinum in libro de cura
defunctorum.

37–38 i.e. Aug. *De cura pro mortuis gerenda* xv. 18; PL xl. 606.

5 res: glossa interlin. .i. numeri C in B 11 numeri RB: numero P 19 anima
mosi uisibiliter RB: in spiritu moyses apostolis in spiritualis uisionis montem, hoc
est altitudinem, raptus P 22 appareret B: apparet P 24 uisibiliter ac B:
inuisibilibus apostolorum spiritibus P 28 uisibiliter B: inuisibiliter tanquam
uisibilis P 32 pythonissae R(C)B: phytonissae P 34 samuel B: samuhel
P 35 non om. P 36 consulenti eam regi B: consulenti eam regis animae P

two channels, of which one descends through the inner channels of
nature, that is, through the intellect and the reason, but the other
through the outward forms of visible things and the senses, until they
flow together into the memory in which they are formed as many.]

But how things that are incorporeal and remote by reason of the
excessive excellence of their nature not only from the senses but
even from the memory and from all imagery can become manifest
in the memory or the senses, that is, in images and in visible figures
as if they were kinds of bodies I do not sufficiently see.

N. [From this one example I think that you can understand the
whole. For it is just as you have said: the numbers flow from the
Monad and come together in the memory. But as to your not seeing
sufficiently, here is my opinion:] The nature of spiritual things does
not fall within the contemplations of the mind in such a way that we
may render an itemized account of the things which are done from
it or in it or through it. For many things are wont to appear in it
which occur in a marvellous and ineffable way not according to its
known [or unknown] laws but beyond all law by the Divine Will
which is limited by no law; for it is the Law of laws and the Reason
of reasons. For who can give an account, if he were asked, of how
the soul of Moses was visibly manifest when the Transfiguration of
the Lord took place? For no attention must be paid to those who
think that he was resurrected in the body for the occasion so that
with Elias he made his visible appearance on the mountain not
through himself but in his body, and then went back again to the
sepulchre. Who, then, is going to say how an incorporeal and in-
visible soul was visibly and, as it were, corporeally seen when it did
not appear in its body or in any sensible matter [or by being trans-
ported from somewhere else]? But by some ineffable power known
only to God invisible spirit is made through itself as though visible.
What are you going to say of the soul of the prophet Samuel? How
did it speak visibly to Saul? For he too, like the Apostles, saw such things
when he was caught up in the Spirit. For no credence must be given
to those who say that it was not himself, but some figment in his
similitude, that appeared, deeming it unworthy that a holy soul
should be summoned from the lower regions by the spells of a
pythoness, not perceiving that the Divine Providence administers
things through impure no less than through pure spirits. But it is
agreed that the soul of Samuel through itself as though visibly, not
in the body nor under some sort of similitude, prophesied to the
king who consulted it. And if perchance this should seem incredible
or doubtful to anyone, let him read St. Augustine in the Book on the
Care of the Dead.

Nos autem ad manifestissima naturae exempla recurramus de quibus nemo recte philosophantium contendit.

A. Dic quaeso quae sunt illa.

662c

N. Formas rerum incorporeas esse sapientes dicunt. Eandem quoque sententiam de coloribus proferunt. Eos enim incorporeos esse uera ratione consulta pronuntiant.

A. Quisquis inde dubitat inter philosophos locum non habet.

N. Si ergo formae atque colores in numero rerum incorporalium computantur qua ratione sensibus corporeis succumbunt profer si potes. Omne enim quod per oculos sentitur non aliter nisi in forma colorata sentiri potest.

A. Formas et colores per se apparere non posse aestimo, in quadam uero materia sibi subiecta apparent.

N. Miror ualde cur tam longe a philosophia recedis.

A. Nescio ubi.

15

N. Non te sentis errasse quando dixisti formas et colores per se non posse sensibus succumbere nisi in aliqua materia, cum ipsa materia carens forma atque colore omnino inuisibilis sit et incorporea? Ac per hoc necesse est rationem reddas quomodo formae et colores dum incorporeae naturae sint in materia per se ipsam considerata, hoc est sine forma atque colore incorporali, possunt sensibus succumbere. Proinde rationabilius diceris materiam informem in coloribus ac formis quam formas atque colores in materia sensibiliter apparere.

662D

20

663A

A. Nunc me errasse non denego falsae ratiocinationis consuetudine deceptus et iam quid agam penitus ignoro.

25

quomodo
corpora ex
incorporeis
efficiuntur

N. Recordarisne quid de ipsa materia in primo libro inter nos est confectum ubi ex intelligibilium rerum coitu ipsam fieri disputauimus? Quantitates siquidem et qualitates dum per se sint incorporeae sunt, in unum [uero] coeuntes informem efficiunt materiam quae adiectis formis coloribusque incorporeis in diuersa corpora mouetur.

30

A. Recordor sane.

N. Ex rebus itaque incorporalibus corpora nascuntur.

A. Negare non possum. Praedictis enim rationibus collectum est.

663B

N. Corpora ergo non de nihilo sed de aliquo fiunt? Non enim quis dixerit praedictas eorum occasiones nihil esse, hoc est quantitates et qualitates formas uel species colores interualla longitudinis latitudinis altitudinis et cum his loca et tempora, quae si abstraxeris, corpora

35

27 i. 58-61, pp. 170, 7-176, 3.

3 quaeso RB: quae~~s~~o P 5 proferunt B: profert P 7 philosophos B:
philosophos P 9 corporeis RB: corporis P 18 post omnino esse
erasum B 21 incorporali possunt B: corporali non possunt P*: incorporali non
possunt P^c 23 coloribus RBP^c: cororibus P* 27 lemma BP 31 mouetur
BP^c: mouentur P*

But let us return to the most obvious examples from nature, about which none of those who practise philosophy rightly is in disagreement.

A. Tell me, pray, what those are.

N. The wise say that the shapes of things are incorporeal. And they give the same opinion about the colours. For after consulting true reason they declare that they are incorporeal.

14

A. Whoever is in doubt here has no place among the philosophers.

N. If, then, shapes and colours are counted among the number of incorporeal things, tell me if you can how they are subject to the corporeal senses. For everything that is perceived through the eyes cannot otherwise be perceived save in coloured shape.

A. I think that shapes and colours cannot appear through themselves, but appear in some matter which has been subjected to them.

N. I am considerably surprised that you come so far short of philosophy.

A. I do not know in what.

N. Do you not see that you were wrong to say that shapes and colours cannot be subject to the senses through themselves but in some matter, when matter itself if it lacks shape and colour is entirely invisible and incorporeal? And therefore it is necessary for you to give an explanation how shapes and colours, although they are invisible natures, can be subject to the senses when they are considered in matter through itself, that is, without shape and incorporeal colour. Therefore it would be more reasonable for you to say that formless matter becomes manifest in colours and shapes than that shapes and colours become sensibly manifest in matter.

A. I do not deny now that I was wrong, deceived by a habit of false reasoning; and what I am to do now I simply do not know.

N. Do you remember what we agreed about matter itself in the first book when we discussed its being made from the coming together of intelligible things? For quantities and qualities, although through themselves they are incorporeal, [yet] when they come together they produce formless matter, which by the addition of incorporeal shapes and colours moves into various bodies.

How bodies
are made
from incor-
poreal things

A. Certainly I remember.

N. So bodies are born from bodiless things?

A. I cannot say no, for it was deduced from reasons stated before.

N. Bodies, then, are made not from nothing but from something? For one would not say that the above-mentioned occasions of them were nothing, namely the quantities and qualities, shapes or species, the colours, the dimensions of length, breadth, height, and together with these the places and times, which if you withdraw, there will

[corpora] non erunt, si ea coniunxeris mox efficiuntur siue catholica ut sunt quattuor mundi maxima corpora siue propria specialissimisque rebus distributa quae cuncta ex quattuor simplicibus elementis componi non negabis ut opinor, quoniam in ea resoluuntur.

A. Non negabo. Sed illa elementa per se simplicia suaque compositione omnium corporum effectiua de nihilo esse facta dixerim.

de nihilo

N. Quid ergo dicturus es de causis primordialibus de quibus multa diximus? Quaerendum est enim quare causae dicuntur si in effectus suos non procedunt. Siquidem si omnia corpora ex elementis, elementa uero de nihilo, illorum causa uidebitur esse nihil, non autem ipsae primordiales causae quas deus pater in uerbo suo fecit, et si ita, non nihil erit nihil, sed erit causa. At si fuerit causa melior erit his quorum causa est, et necessario sequetur ut aut uerbum dei nihil sit, in quo pater omnia fecit—quod per priuationem impium dicere uidebitur [negatio enim uerbi per excellentiam naturae, non autem per priuationem substantiae in theologia reperitur]—aut extra uerbum causa quaedam ponetur quae nihil dicitur, de qua deus omnia fecit et in qua omnia priusquam fierent constituit. Aliter enim causa non est. Et si ita est qua ratione dicitur nihil non uideo. Prius siquidem dixerim [eam] esse omnia quam nihil. In causa nanque omnia quorum causa est causaliter et primordialiter subsistunt.

A. Cogor fateri quattuor mundi huius elementa in primordialibus causis subsistere. Non enim quorundam sed uniuersaliter omnium uisibilium et inuisibilium causae sunt, et nihil in ordine naturarum omnium sensu seu ratione seu intellectu percipitur quod non ab eis procedat et in eis causaliter subsistat.

N. Sane intelligis. Proinde ni fallor non negabis omnia corpora composita et solubilia quae naturarum omnium extremum obtinent locum de aliquo esse, non autem de nihilo.

A. Non negabo. Ex qualitatibus enim et quantitibus simplicium et inuisibilium corporum sensibusque incomprehensibilium efficiuntur quae propterea elementa uocantur quoniam ex illorum concursu omnia corpora componi naturarum inquisitores aiunt, et in ea solui et in eis saluari. Catholica quoque solent appellari, id est uniuersalia. Ex ipsis siquidem propria singulorum corpora fiunt. Iterum elementa non de nihilo facta sed ex primordialibus causis procedere fateor,

1 erunt B: esse P 2 quattuor B: iiii^{or} P 6 compositione BP^c: compositane P* 8 lemma BP Quid BP^c: Quod P* 11 non B^cP: nos B* 12 ipsae B: ipse P 16 uidebitur RB^cP: uidetur B* 21 dixerim B: dixerunt P 25 in RP: cancellatum B naturarum RB: naturalium P 27 procedat B: procedit P 29 naturarum B: natura rerum P 32 incomprehensibilium: glossa interlin. .i. quae sensibus comprehendi non possunt C in B 34 inquisitores: -ores in ras. B 36 fiunt RB^cP: finiunt B*

be no bodies; if you combine, bodies are at once made either universal as are the four greatest bodies of the world, or particular and distributed among the individuals, all of which you will not, I think, deny are composed from the four simple elements, since into them they are resolved again.

A. I will not deny it. But I would say that these elements which are simple in themselves and by their composition make all bodies are made from nothing.

N. What then are you going to say of the primordial causes of which we have spoken much? For it must be asked why they are called causes if they do not proceed into their effects. For if all bodies (come) from the elements but the elements from nothing, their cause will seem to be nothing and not those primordial causes which God the Father made in His Word: and if so, nothing will not be nothing, but it will be a cause. But if it is a cause it will be better than the things of which it is the cause, and it will necessarily follow either that the Word of God, in which the Father made all things, is nothing—which, in the sense of privation, will seem an impious thing to say [for negation of the Word in the sense of transcendence of nature, though not in the sense of privation, is found in Scripture]—, or that some cause other than the Word be supposed which is called 'Nothing', from which God made all things and in which He established all things before they were made. For otherwise it is not a cause. And if this is so, I do not see why it is called 'Nothing'. For I would sooner say that [it] is all things than nothing. For in the cause all things of which it is the cause causally and primordially subsist.

Concerning nothing

A. I am forced to admit that the four elements of this world subsist in the primordial causes. For they are the causes not of some but universally of all things visible and invisible, and nothing in the order of all the natures is perceived by the sense or reason or intellect that does not proceed from them and causally subsist in them.

N. You understand clearly. Therefore, unless I am mistaken, you will not deny that all composite and corruptible bodies, which occupy the lowest place in all the natures, are from something, not from nothing.

A. I will not deny it. For they are made from the qualities and quantities of the simple, invisible, and insensible bodies which are called elements for the reason that from their concourse the investigators of nature say that all bodies are composed, and into them are resolved, and in them are preserved. They are also commonly called catholic, that is, universal. For from them *are made* the proper bodies of the individuals. Again, I admit that the elements are not made from nothing but come from the primordial causes, and none of the

quas primordiales causas simul et semel in uerbo dei factas nullus fidelium dubitat, audiens prophetam dicentem deo: 'Omnia in sapientia fecisti', frontemque sanctae scripturae aspiciens qua scriptum est: 'In principio fecit deus [caelum et] terram.'

N. Restat ergo ut quaeramus de ipsis primordialibus causis utrum in uerbo dei de nihilo sunt factae an semper in eo erant. Et si semper in eo erant non erat quando non erant, sicut illud uerbum 'in quo erant' non erat quando non erat. Et si semper in eo uerbo erant quomodo in ipso de nihilo factae sunt? Non enim rationi conuenit ea quae semper erant de nihilo fieri inchoasse. Et si quis dixerit illud nihil de quo factae sunt semper erat et semper de eo factae sunt, quaeretur ab illo ubi semper erat [illud] nihil de quo factae sunt [semper erat et semper de eo factae sunt quaeretur ab eo ubi semper erat illud nihil]: utrum in uerbo dei in quo omnia subsistunt, an per se extra uerbum. Si responderit 'in uerbo semper erat', opponetur ei: Non ergo nihil sed magnum aliquid erat—omnia siquidem quae in uerbo dei subsistunt uere et naturaliter subsistunt—et in ordine primordialium causarum connumerabitur quod nihil putabitur et de quo omnia facta creduntur. Si uero extra uerbum per se putauerit nihil duo principia sibi inuicem aduersa sicut unus Manachiorum aestimabitur fingere. Multi siquidem saecularium philosophorum informem materiem coaeternam deo esse putauerunt, de qua omnia opera sua fecit, quam materiem propterea nihil dicebant quia priusquam formas et species a deo acciperet in nullo apparebat, ac ueluti penitus nihil. Quicquid enim omnino caret forma et specie non immerito potest uocari nihil. Quas omnes delusiones lux ueritatis expulit, ab uno principio omnia esse praedicans et nil in natura rerum uisibilium et inuisibilium inueniri quoquo modo generationis in speciem propriam erumpat quod in uerbo dei unigenito aeternaliter non constat substitui, in quo omnia unum sunt, ipsumque deum pronuntians nullam materiam seu causam uniuersitatis a se conditae in sua sapientia extrinsecus accepisse quia extra illum nihil est, uel intra se non coessentiale sibi re—[subaudi a superioribus nihil]—perisse de quo faceret in sapientia sua quae fieri uoluit.

Proinde non datur locus nihilo nec extra nec intra deum, et tamen de nihilo omnia fecisse non in unum creditur. Ac per hoc nil aliud datur intelligi dum audimus omnia de nihilo creari nisi quia erat

2-3 Ps. ciii. 24. 4 Gen. i. 1. 29-30 cf. 42. 30-32 supra.

3 qua B^cP: quia B* 7 erat RB^cP: erant B* 9-11 non enim—factae sunt om. P 16 magnum aliquid RB^cP: aliquid magnum B* 18 connumerabitur RB: connumeratur P putabitur RBP 20 manachiorum B: monachorum P 22 esse B: rem P 27 nil B: nihil P 33 reperisse: glossa quam in textu inclusit P subaudi a superioribus nihil C in B 34 uoluit B^cP: uolunt B* 35 proinde B: prouide P 36 nil B^cP: nihil B*

faithful doubts but that these primordial causes are made at once and all together in the Word of God, when he hears the Prophet saying to God, 'Thou madest all things in Thy Wisdom', and when he looks at the beginning of Holy Scripture where it is written, 'In the Beginning God made [heaven and] earth.'

N. It remains for us, then, to inquire about the primordial causes themselves, whether they are made out of nothing in the Word of God, or were always in it. And if they were always in it there was not (a time) when they were not, just as there was not (a time) when the Word in which they were was not. And if they were always in that Word, how were they made in it out of nothing? For it does not accord with reason that those things which always were began to be made out of nothing. And if one should say that that nothing out of which they were made always was and that they were always made from it, it will be asked of him where [that] nothing always was out of which they were made: whether in the Word of God in which all things subsist, or in itself, apart from the Word. If he answers, 'It was always in the Word', it will be objected to him: Then it was not nothing but very much something—for all things which subsist in the Word of God subsist truly and naturally—and there will be included in the order of the primordial causes that which was thought nothing, and from which all things are believed to be made. But if he thinks that the 'Nothing' is in itself other than the Word, he will be understood to be fabricating, like one of the Manichaeans, two mutually adverse principles. For many of the pagan philosophers have thought that formless matter is co-eternal with God, and that out of it He made all His works, and this matter they called nothing because before it received from God forms and species it was manifested in no thing, and was as it were nothing. For whatever entirely lacks form and species can not unreasonably be called nothing. But the light of truth has banished all these delusions, asserting that all things come from one principle, and that nothing is found in the nature of things visible and invisible, by whatever kind of generation it breaks out into its proper form, which is not generally agreed to subsist eternally in the only begotten Word of God, in Whom all things are one, and proclaiming that God did not receive from any external source any matter or cause for the creation of the universe in His wisdom, for external to Himself there is nothing; nor find internal to Himself anything not coessential with Himself from which to make in His wisdom the things that He wished to be made.

Therefore no place is provided for nothing either external or internal to God; and yet the belief that He made all things out of nothing is not vain. And therefore there is nothing else to be understood,

quando non erant, ideoque non incongrue dicimus semper erant
semper non erant et non erat quando non erant et quando non erant
erat. Siquidem semper erant in uerbo dei causaliter ui et potestate
[factam] ultra omnia loca et tempora ultra omnem generationem
localiter et temporaliter <factam>, ultra omnem formam et speciem
sensu et intellectu cognitam, ultra omnem qualitatem et quantitatem
caeteraque accidentia per quae substantia uniuscuiusque creaturae
intelligitur esse, non autem quid sit. Et semper non erant; priusquam
enim per generationem in formas et species loca et tempora inque
omnia accidentia quae aeternae eorum subsistentiae in uerbo dei
incommutabiliter substitutae accidunt profluerent, non erant in
generatione, non erant localiter nec temporaliter nec in propriis
formis speciebusque quibus accidentia contingunt. Ac per hoc non
irrationabiliter de eis praedicatur 'non erat quando non erant' quia
semper in uerbo dei subsistunt in quo nec esse incipiunt—infinita
est enim aeternitas—, et 'erat quando non erant', temporaliter enim
inchoauerunt per generationem esse quod non erant, hoc est in
formis et speciebus apparere.

Proinde si quis naturam rerum intentus perspexerit nulla creatura
sensibus seu intellectibus succumbens reperietur de qua ueraciter
dici non possit semper erat et est et erit et semper non erat nec est
nec erit. Siquidem incommutabiliter et erat et est et erit ipsa prima
constitutio in sapientia dei per primordiales causas, sed quia ipsa
constitutio soli deo cognita est, omnem uero sensum et intellectum
totius creaturae superat a nulloque adhuc intellectu creato cognosci
potest quid sit, incipit per generationem temporaliter accipere quan-
titates et qualitates in quibus ueluti quibusdam uestimentis aperta
potest manifestare quia est, non [autem] quid sit. Inchoat ergo
quodammodo esse non in quantum in causis primordialibus subsistit,
sed in quantum ex causis temporalibus accipit [apparere]—causas
autem temporales dico qualitates et quantitates et caetera quae sub-
stantiis accidunt temporaliter per generationem—et ideo de eis
dicitur 'erat quando non erant'. Non enim semper in accidentibus
apparebant. Eadem ratione et nunc dicuntur esse et sunt et uere ac
semper futura sunt [in quantum in suis causis subsistunt], in quan-
tum uero in accidentibus quae eis extrinsecus contingunt dicuntur
esse, nec [tamen] uere nec semper sunt. Soluentur enim in ea ex
quibus assumpta sunt in quibus uere et semper erunt, quando omnis

1-2 ideoque—non erat quando non erant om. P 4 et tempora bis scriptum
B* 7 caeteraque B: ceteraque P 12 generatione B: generationem P
nec temporaliter om. P 14-15 quia—incipiunt om. P 20 reperietur B:
repperietur P 21-22 et semper—et est et erit ad calc. sB 21 post non (2)
rasura B 24 omnem uero B: omnemque P 28 manifestare B: mani-
festari P 31 caetera B: cetera P 36 contingunt B: contigunt P dicun-
tur RB*P: dicunt B* 38 uere et in ras. B(C)

when we hear that all things are created out of nothing, but that
there was (a time) when they were not, and therefore we are not
unreasonable in saying: 'They were always; they were not always',
and 'there was not (a time) when they were not, and there was (a
time) when they were not'. For they were always as causes in the
Word of God potentially, beyond all places and times, beyond all
generation <made> in place and time, beyond all form and species
known to sense and intellect, beyond all quality and quantity and
the other accidents by means of which it is understood of the sub-
stance of any creature that it is, though not what it is; and they
were not always, because before they flowed forth through genera-
tion into forms and species, places and times, and into all the acci-
dents that accrue to their eternal substance which is immutably
substantiated in the Word of God, they were not in generation, they
were not in place or time nor in their proper forms and species to
which accidents occur. And therefore it is not unreasonably predi-
cated of them, 'There was not (a time) when they were not', because
they subsist always in the Word of God, in Whom they do not have
a beginning of their being—for eternity is infinite—; and 'there was
(a time) when they were not' because in time they began through
generation to be that which they were not, that is, to become manifest
in forms and species.

Therefore anyone who looks carefully at the nature of things will
find no creature susceptible to senses or intellects about which it
cannot be truly said: 'It always was and is and shall be, and it was
not always nor is nor shall be.' For that first establishment in the
Wisdom of God through the primordial causes immutably was and
is and shall be; but because that establishment is known only to God
and surpasses every sense and intellect of the universal creature, and
by no intellect hitherto created can it yet be known what it is, it
begins through generation in time to receive quantities and qualities
in which, in a kind of garments, it can show openly²⁸ that it is [though]
not what it is. So it somehow begins to be, not in respect of its sub-
sistence in the primordial causes, but in respect of receiving [mani-
festation] from temporal causes—now, by temporal causes I mean
qualities and quantities and the other things which in time through
generation attach themselves to substances as accidents—, and there-
fore it is said of them, 'There was (a time) when they were not'. For
they were not always manifesting themselves in accidents. For the
same reason they are said now to be and they are and truly and
always shall be [in respect of their subsistence in their causes], while
in respect of the accidents which come to them from an external
source they are said to be [but] neither truly nor always are; for they
will be resolved into the things from which they were taken, and in

substantia ab omnibus corruptibilibus accidentibus purgabitur et ab omnibus quae ad statum suae propriae naturae non attinent absoluteur, solis naturalibus uirtutibus decora insolubili simplicitate, et in his qui boni sunt donis gratiae ornata, aeternae beatitudinis contemplationibus ultra omnem naturam et suam glorificata inque ipsum 5 deum conuersa deusque non natura sed gratia facta.

His itaque rationibus consideratis quis nisi nimium tardus aut 666B nimium contentiosus non concedat omnia quae ex deo sunt et aeterna simul esse et facta?

A. Haec mihi perplane suasa sunt. Non tamen omnis ambiguitas 10 ex me adhuc repulsa est. Quod enim dixisti, propterea omnia quae ex deo sunt et aeterna et facta sunt quia in uerbo dei aeterna sunt, et, ut ait sanctus Augustinus, non facta substantialiter existentia, temporaliter uero per generationem in formis et speciebus et accidentibus facta, sublata omni ambiguitate perspicio; quoniam uero scriptum 15 est 'In principio fecit deus caelum et terram', et 'Omnia in sapientia fecisti' cogor fateri omnia in uerbo dei et aeterna et facta esse— [omnia dico uisibilia et inuisibilia temporalia et aeterna omnes primordiales causas cum omnibus effectibus suis quibus ordo saeculorum localiter et temporaliter peragitur et mundus iste uisibilis 20 impletur]. Sed quomodo potest hoc rationi conuenire ad purum non ualeo perspicere.

N. Putasne igitur me docere uoluisse omnia in quantum aeterna sunt in uerbo dei unigenito aeterna esse, in quantum uero facta sunt extra uerbum facta esse? Non enim aestimas rationibus ueritatis 25 conuenire uniuersitatem conditae naturae in uerbo et aeternam simul et factam.

A. Non putabam te sic docuisse. Non enim aestimo ullum recte philosophantium putare totius uniuersitatis partem in uerbo dei aeternam subsistere, partem extra uerbum temporaliter factam. Nam 30 neque sinit nos talia cogitare sancta scriptura quae dicit in psalmo: 'Omnia in sapientia fecisti', in genesi: 'In principio fecit deus caelum et terram'—Apostolus, 'In quo', inquit, 'creata sunt omnia quae sunt in caelis et quae in terra siue uisibilia siue inuisibilia siue throni siue dominationes siue principatus siue potestates. Omnia ex 35 ipso et per ipsum et in ipsum creata sunt'—in euangelio: 'Omnia per ipsum facta sunt et sine ipso factum est nihil'; neque ratio extra 667A uerbum nihil ualet reperire substantialiter aut secundum accidens.

13-14 Cf. 74. 24-27 supra. 16 Gen. i. 1. 16-17 Ps. ciii. 24. 32 Ibid. 32-33 Gen. i. 1. 33-36 Col. i. 16. 36-37 In. i. 3.

8-9 et aeterna: et om. P 11 enim B: autem P 14 formis B: formas P 16 teram B^c: ceteram B*: terram P 19 effectibus B^c(C)P: affectibus RB* 20-21 peragitur-impletur om. P 21 conuenire: -uenire in ras. B(C) 38 nihil B: quicquid P melius

these they shall truly and always be, when every substance shall be purged of its corruptible accidents and freed from all things which do not pertain to the state of its proper nature, its indissoluble simplicity decked solely with its natural powers and, in the case of those who are good men, adorned with the gifts of grace, glorified beyond every nature and their own by contemplations of eternal blessedness, and changed into God Himself, and made God not by nature but by grace.

So, after considering these reasonings, who but the excessively 16 stupid or excessively contentious would not grant that all things which are from God are both eternal at once and made?

A. You have explained these things to me most clearly. But every doubt is not yet expelled from me. For what you said about all things that are from God being both eternal and made for the reason that in the Word of God they are eternal and, as St. Augustine says, not made (but) substantially existing, but in time through generation in forms and species and accidents (they are) made I see without any doubt; but since it is written, 'In the Beginning God made heaven and earth', and, 'Thou madest all things in Thy Wisdom', I am forced to declare that in the Word of God all things are both eternal and made—[By all things I mean the visible and the invisible, the temporal and the eternal, all the primordial causes with all their effects by which the succession of the centuries is accomplished in place and time and this visible world is fulfilled.] But how this accords with reason I cannot clearly see.

N. Do you then suppose that I wished to teach that all things in so far as they are eternal are eternal in the only begotten Word of God, but in so far as they are made are made apart from the Word? For you do not think it accords with the reasons of truth that the universe of created nature should be in the Word of God both eternal and made.

A. I did not suppose that that was what you taught. For I do not think that anyone of those who practise true philosophy thinks that of the whole universe part subsists eternally in the Word of God, part is made in time outside the Word. For neither are we permitted to think in this way by Holy Scripture, which says in the psalm, 'Thou madest all things in Thy Wisdom', in Genesis, 'In the Beginning God made heaven and earth',—the Apostle says, 'In Whom are created all things which are in heaven and which are on earth, whether visible or invisible, whether Thrones or Dominations or Principalities or Powers, all things were created from Him and through Him and to Him',—in the Gospel, 'All things were made through Him and without Him was made nothing'; nor can reason find a 'nothing' outside the Word either as substance or as accident. For she cries:

Clamat enim: Omnia quae sunt et quae non sunt—non secundum priuationem dico sed secundum excellentiam—in uerbo comprehenduntur, et sunt in eo et non sunt. Sunt quidem quae intellectuseu sensu *colliguntur*, non sunt uero quae omnem sensum et intellectum superant. Quod autem omnia in uerbo dei et aeterna simul et facta sunt 5 Iohannes theologus hauriens de pectore sapientiae aeternas intelligentiae aquas ac ueridicas testatur dicens: 'Quod factum est in ipso uita erat', siue quis secundum Augustinum sic distingatur: Quod factum est localiter et temporaliter, in ipso uita erat—non enim credendum est aut ullo modo aestimandum de sollertissimo ueritatis inquisitore propterea euangelium uoluisse sic distingere ut insinuaret quod 667B factum est localiter et temporaliter non in uerbo sed ueluti extra uerbum factum fuisse, cum idem ipse, sanctus uidelicet Augustinus, manifestissime doceat et loca et tempora cum his quae in eis facta sunt in uerbo dei aeternaliter esse facta, intelligens ueraciter Apostolum 15 dicentem de uerbo: 'In quo creata sunt omnia quae sunt in caelis et quae in terra siue uisibilia siue inuisibilia'; ac per hoc si loca et tempora cum omnibus quae in eis continentur in numero uisibilium sunt, id est sensibilibus, omnia autem uisibilia teste Apostolo in uerbo sint creata, loca igitur et tempora et omnia quae in eis sunt in 20 uerbo creata sunt—siue simpliciter praedictam euangelistae sententiam secundum alios quis pronuntiauerit dicens: Quod factum est in ipso. Ac sic distinxit ueluti ab alio commate incipiens: Vita erat— [sic enim Graecorum codices inuenimus distinctos],—ut intelligamus: 25 quod factum est in ipso temporaliter et localiter per generationem uita erat aeternaliter per rationem, hoc est per in primordialibus causis omnium conditionem.

N. Non ergo dubitas omnes omnium causas causarumque omnes effectus in uerbo aeterna esse et facta, nec me aliter docere aestimas.

A. De aeternitate omnium deque eorum creatione in uerbo neque 30 dubito neque aliter te docere puto. Sed solummodo quaero quomodo in uerbo patri coaeterno omnia aeterna sunt simul et facta. Non enim ut arbitror rationi conuenit ut facta sint aeterna et aeterna facta. Nulla siquidem differentia uidebitur esse inter aeternitatem uniuersitatis 667D in uerbo et creationem [si aeternitas est creata et creatio aeterna]. 35

N. Miror ac ualde moueor quare quaeris rationem in his in quibus omnis ratio deficit, aut intellectum in his quae omnem superant intellectum. Num aestimas diuinae sapientiae propositum intellectibus 668A

7-8 In. i. 3. 8-9 In Ioann. i. 16. 16-17 Col. i. 16. 16 cf. Aug. De Gen. ad litt. v. 14. 31.

18 continentur R^cB: continer P 23 sic B: si P 28 causarumque: -que s.l. .R(?C) 29 post uerbo et erasum R 30-31 neque dubito RB: nec dubito P 34 uidebitur R^cBP: uidetur R* 35 si-aeterna addidit ad finem lineae C in R 38 num RB: nam P

All things that are and that are not—I do not mean by priuation but by transcendence—are comprehended in the Word, and in it they are and are not: what things are grasped by the intellect or sense are; what transcend all sense and intellect are not. But that all things are in the Word of God at the same time both eternal and made John the Theologian, who drew from the breast of Wisdom the eternal and veracious waters of understanding, testifies when he says, 'That which is made in Him was Life',²⁹ whether the division is made according to Augustine thus: What is made in place and time was Life in Him—for it is not to be believed or in any way supposed of this most subtle inquirer into truth that his reason for wanting to divide the passage in this way was to assert that what was made in place and time was not in the Word but, as it were, apart from the Word, when he himself, that is, Augustine, most clearly teaches that both places and times together with the things that are made in them are eternally made in the Word of God, having a true understanding of the Apostle when he says of the Word, 'In Whom are created all things that are in the heavens and that are in the earth, whether visible or invisible'; and therefore if places and times with all the things that are contained in them are in the number of visible, that is, sensible things, and all visible things are, on the Apostle's testimony, created in the Word, then places and times and all things that are in them are created in the Word—; or one interprets the said sentence of the evangelist simply, as others do, and say: 'That which was made in Him', and thus divide as though beginning a fresh phrase, 'was Life' [for we find that the Greek codices make the division so], so that we understand: 'What was made in Him in time and place through generation was life in eternity through its reason, that is, through its creation in the primordial causes of all things.'

N. You do not doubt, then, that all the causes of all things, and all the effects of the causes, are in the Word eternal and made, and you do not think that I was teaching anything else?

A. Concerning the eternity of all things and their creation in the Word I neither doubt nor think that you were teaching anything else. I only inquire how all things are at the same time eternal and made in the Word Who is eternal with the Father. For it does not, as I think, accord with reason that made things shall be eternal or eternal things made. For there will seem to be no difference between the eternity of the Universe in the Word and its creation [if eternity is created and creation eternal].

N. I am surprised and very much disturbed that you should seek for reason where all reason fails, or understanding where all understanding is surpassed. Do you suppose that the purpose of the

aut humanis aut angelicis posse fieri manifestum dum legis mystica illa animalia alis suis et uultus uelare et pedes, hoc est altitudinem diuinae uirtutis intueri timentia super omnem conditam naturam et profunditatem [ipsius] in his quae per eam et in ea et de ea facta sunt? [Non tamen desinunt uolare sursum uersus; quaerunt enim semper quantum possunt diuina gratia subleuata suaeque naturae subtilitate ea quae supra se sunt in infinitum appetentia. Vbi autem deficiunt reuerenter uultus suos, hoc est contemplationis aciem, diuino radio repercussi defendunt, et ab introitu incomprehensibilium mysteriorum suos theologicos pedes, hoc est intellectuales ingressus, retrahunt ne quid incaute uel temere de ineffabilibus omnemque intellectum superantibus praesumant.]

Si ergo purissimi intellectus quorum symbola praedictis animalibus theologia praemisit, inter quod et uerbum nulla medietas est praeter omnium rerum causas primordiales, excelsitudinem diuinae claritatis super omnia fussaequae in omnia uirtutis et sapientiae a summo usque deorsum attingentis a fine usque ad finem, hoc est ab initio intellectualis creaturae usque ad uermiculum, pertimescunt inspicere cognoscentes naturae suae capacitatem ad haec consideranda non sufficere, quid nos adhuc carne grauati de diuina prouidentia et operatione rationem reddere conamur, ubi sola diuina uoluntas cogitanda est quae operatur omnia prout uult quia omnipotens est, et naturales rationes occultas et inuestigabiles inserit omnibus quia omnium supernaturalis ratio est, qua nihil secretius nihil praesentius, difficile ubi sit, difficilius ubi non sit, lux ineffabilis omnibus intellectualibus oculis semper praesens et a nullo intellectu cognoscitur quid sit, per omnia difussa in infinitum et fit in omnibus omnia et in nullo nullum?

[Quod autem dixi 'inter quos et uerbum nulla medietas est praeter omnium rerum causas' propterea addidi ne quis aestimet caelestes essentias immediatas esse, hoc est nullam medietatem inter se et causam omnium habere. Quamuis enim dicantur angeli quasi eggigi, hoc est iuxta ipsum deum constituti—ΕΓΓΥC siquidem graece dicitur iuxta—, non tamen ita credendi sunt facti ut non eorum causae in uerbo sint conditae. Nulla enim creatura est cuius causa

1-2 Is. vi. 2. 16-17 cf. Sap. viii. 1.

2 alis RB^cP: alii B* 5-12 non tamen—praesumant sC in R 5 non RB: nec P 6-7 diuina gratia—ea quae RB: diuinae gratiae uehimine suaeque naturae subtilitate subleuata et quae P 8 reuerenter RB: reuerentur P 9 repercussi RB: repercussos P defendunt RB: abscondunt P 13 symbola RB: simbola P 14 praemisit B^cP: praemissit RB* 16-17 attingentes B^c: attingentis R^c: attingentis R*: attingent P 19 lemma et quod inter angelos et deum nulla medietas est praeter omnium rerum causas Rm 22 est om. P 24 supernaturalis R^cBP: supernaturalium R* qua R^cB: quia R*P*: quin P^c 26 oculis RB: oculi P 27 difussa RB: diffusa P 31 immediatas RB:

Divine Wisdom can be made manifest to the understanding either of men or of angels when you read that those mystical living creatures veiled with their wings both their faces and their feet, fearing, that is, to look upon what is above every created nature, the height of the Divine Power and [its] depth in those things which are made through it and in it and from it? [Yet they do not cease to fly aloft; for lifted up by divine grace and by the subtlety of their nature they ever look, in so far as they are able, for the things which are above them, pursuing their search to infinity. But at the point where they fail they reverently shield their faces, that is to say, the thrust of their contemplation, beaten back by the divine radiance, and withdraw their scriptural feet, that is, their intellectual advances, from entering upon the incomprehensible mysteries, lest they should incautiously or rashly commit some act of presumption against what is ineffable and passes all understanding.]

If, then, the purest intelligences whose symbols Scripture has placed before us in these living creatures, between whom and the Word there is no intermediary save the primordial causes of all things, fear to look upon the height of the divine brightness above all things and of the Power which pervades all things and of the Wisdom which reaches from the highest to the lowest from end to end, that is, from where the intellectual creature begins as far as the worm, since they know that the capacity of their nature is not adequate to contemplate these things, how should we, still weighed down by the flesh, try to explain the Divine Providence and Act, where only the Divine Will is to be contemplated, which activates all things as it wills because it is omnipotent and implants in all things the natural reasons which are hidden and inscrutable because its reason surpasses all natures, and nothing is more hidden than it, nothing more present, difficult as to where it is, more difficult as to where it is not, an ineffable light ever present to the intellectual eyes of all and known to no intellect as to what it is, diffused through all things to infinity, is made both all things in all things and nothing in nothing?

[Now, as to my saying, 'between whom and the Word there is no intermediary' the reason why I added 'save the causes of all things', was lest anyone should suppose that the celestial essences are immediate, that is, that they have no intermediary between themselves and the Cause of all things. For although they are called 'angels' as being 'eggigi',³⁰ that is, constituted next after God—for εγγυς means 'next after' in Greek—, it is not to be believed that they were made in such a way that their causes are not created in the Word. For

immediatas P 33 ΕΓΓΥC RB: essus P 34 credendi RB: credi P 35 sint s.l. R

facta non praecedat in uerbo, secundum quam substituitur ut sit et ordinatur ut pulchre sit et custoditur ut aeternaliter sit, et manifestatur seu sensibus seu intellectibus ad materiam laudis ipsius unius causae ex qua et in qua et per quam et ad quam condita est.]

Credamus itaque et quantum datur mentis acie intueamur omnia uisibilia et inuisibilia aeterna et temporalia illudque aeternum et tempus et loca et spatia et omnia quae dicuntur secundum substantiam et accidens, generaliterque dicendum quaecunquē uniuersitas totius creaturae continet, in uerbo dei unigenito et aeterna simul et facta esse, et neque aeternitatem in eis praecedere facturam neque facturam praecedere aeternitatem. Siquidem eorum aeternitas facta est et conditio aeterna in dispensatione uerbi. Nam et cuncta quae uidentur in ordine saeculorum temporibus et locis per generationem oriri simul et semel aeternaliter in uerbo dei facta sunt. Neque enim credendum est tunc inchoasse fieri quando in mundo sentiuntur oriri. Semper enim fuerunt in uerbo dei substantialiter, ortusque eorum [ratio] et occasus in ordine temporum atque locorum per generationem, hoc est per accidentium assumptionem, semper in uerbo dei erat, in quo quae futura sunt iam facta. Siquidem diuina sapientia circumscribit tempora, et omnia quae in natura rerum temporaliter oriuntur in ipsa praecedunt et subsistunt aeternaliter. Ipsa est enim mensura omnium sine mensura et numerus sine numero et pondus, id est ordo, sine pondere. Et ipsa est tempus et saeculum, ipsa est praeterita et praesentia et futura. Ideoque a Grecis ETTEKEINA uocatur quia omnia tempora in se creat et circumscribit dum super omnia tempora sit aeternitate sua, omnia interualla praecedens ambiens concludens.

Nam et de his quae naturali cursu in ordine temporum annuatim fieri sentimus rationem reddere nemo potest. Quis enim uim seminum cogitans quomodo per numeros locorum et temporum in uarias species animalium fruticum herbarum erumpunt cur et quomodo dicere praesumat aut eorum occasiones ad purum dinoscere prauealeat, et non continuo pronuntiet: Haec omnia diuinis legibus omnem sensum et intellectum superantibus attribuenda sunt, nullisque coniecturis animi inquirendum cur sic uel sic et quomodo sic uel sic et non aliter debent ordinem temporum implere et ex

23 Cf. 58. 17-18 supra.

8 spatia RB^cP: spacia B* 10 et aeterna: et om. P 12 facta RB: condita P
14-18 saeculorum—in ordine om. P 21 circumscribit RB: circumscribit P
26 ETTEKEINA codd.: glossa glo deus a grecis ETTEKEINA uocatur quia praeterita et futura in ipso subsistunt et ipse est et in ipsum terminantur. ideoque propter facilitatem intelligendi saepe ETTEKEINA summitas omnium interpretatur B(C)P: ETTEKEIVA B: ETTEKAINA P: quamuis proprie praeterita et futura addidit P circumscribit RB: circumscribit P 28 concludens BP: concludens R 29 quae bis scripsit P
32 fruticum RB: fruticum P 35 attribuenda sunt RB: attribuendas P

there is no creature whose cause, made in the Word, does not precede it, and which is not substantiated by it so that it may be, nor ordered by it so that it may be beautiful, nor preserved by it so that it may be eternal,³¹ nor manifested either to the senses or intellects so that it may provide matter for praise of that one Cause from which and in which and through which and for which it was established.]

Let us, then, believe and, so far as it is given us, contemplate with the keenness of our mind how all things visible and invisible, eternal and temporal, and the eternal itself and time itself, and places and extensions and all things which are spoken of as substance and accident, and, to speak generally, whatever the totality of the whole creature contains, are at the same time eternal and made in the only begotten Word of God, and that in them neither does their eternity precede their making nor their making precede their eternity. For in the dispensation of the Word their eternity is made and their making is eternal. For even all things which are seen to arise through generation at times and places in the order of the centuries were made all together and at once eternally in the Word of God. For it is not to be believed that the moment of their beginning to be made is when they are perceived to arise in the world. For they were always in the Word substantially, and the [reason] of their rising and setting in the order of times and places through generation, that is, through the assumption of accidents, was always in the Word of God, in Whom the things that are to come are already made. For the Divine Wisdom circumscribes times, and all things that arise temporally in the nature of things have a prior existence in it and subsist in it eternally. For it is of all things the measure without measure and number without number and weight, that is order, without weight. And it is time and age, it is the past and the present and the future. And it is called by the Greeks *ἐπέκεινα*, because it creates in itself and circumscribes all times, while in its eternity it is above all times, preceding, surrounding, enclosing all intervals.

For even of those things we see being made each year in their natural course in the order of times none can give an account. For who, contemplating the force of the seeds, how according to the numbers of places and times they burst forth into the various species of animals, fruits, and crops, presumes to say how or why, or succeeds in giving a clear account of their occasions, and does not at once exclaim: All these things are to be attributed to the divine laws which surpass all sense and intellect, and it is not to be explored by any conjectures of the mind why it is thus or thus and how it is thus

inuisibilibus causis in ui seminum simul constitutis non simul sed temporum interuallis et locorum in formas sensibiles procedere, quasi non aliter fieri possent si diuinae uoluntati aliter fieri uideretur quae nulla lege constringitur? Nam et saepe contra consuetum naturae cursum multa solent fieri ut nobis ostendatur quod diuina prouidentia non uno sed multiplici modo atque infinito potest omnia administrare.

Si itaque nulli intellectui cognita est uniuersitatis in diuinis legibus administratio, cui rationabilium uel intellectualium potest fieri perspicua eiusdem uniuersitatis in uerbo dei aeterna conditio, in quo omnia et aeterna simul et facta esse nemo fidelium debet ignorare quamuis non intelligat qua ratione aeterna sunt facta et facta sunt aeterna? Hoc enim soli uerbo in quo et facta sunt et aeterna cognitum est.

A. De conditione uniuersitatis in uerbo et de aeternitate rationem non quaero. Nemo enim potest dicere quo modo aeterna et facta sunt. [Modum nanque conditionis rerum in uerbo nulla creatura rationalis seu intellectualis potest cognoscere. Soli siquidem gnosticae uirtuti patet.] Qua uero ratione compellimur fateri aeterna esse facta in uerbo dei quaero si potest inueniri. Non enim de primordialium causarum multiplicibus effectibus in rebus uisibilibus et inuisibilibus nunc agitur, in quibus omnia facta esse nemo sapientum dubitat. Eo nanque modo praesens quaestio solui posse uideretur si quis posset ueris rationibus docere omnia in quantum in uerbo dei subsistunt in principiis suis in tantum aeterna esse intelligenda sunt; in quantum uero in effectus suos siue intelligibiles siue sensibiles in ordine temporum per generationem procedunt in tantum facta sunt, ita ut eorum aeternitas in uerbo dei praecederet eorum conditionem in ordine saeculorum siue inuisibilem super nos siue uisibilem secundum nos mundum implentes.

Iam uero quoniam talia fateri uera nos non sinit ratio—clamat enim et uerissime clamat non solum primordiales causas uerum etiam earum effectus et loca et tempora et essentias et substantias, hoc est genera generalissima et generales formas et species specialissimas per indiuiduos numeros, cum omnibus accidentibus suis naturalibus et, ut simpliciter dicam, omne quod est in uniuersitate rerum conditarum siue sensu siue intellectu humano uel angelico comprehendatur, siue omnem sensum omnemque mentis aciem

2 formas RBP^c: formis P* 5 multa RB: multo P 16 quo modo R^cBP:
quoniam R* 17-19 sC in R 18 rationalis RB: rationabilis P 24 posset
RB: possit P 29 uisibilem RB: inuisibilem P 31 lemma BP: creatura B^cP:
creatara B* aeterna B: et aeterna P 36 omne RB: omni P

or thus and not otherwise that they fulfil the order of times and out of the invisible causes that are constituted all together in the force of the seeds proceed not all together but at intervals of times and places into the sensible forms, as though they could not be made otherwise if their being made otherwise seemed good to the Divine Will, which is constrained by no law? For indeed it often happens that many things are done contrary to the customary course of nature so that we may be shown that the Divine Providence can administer all things not in one way but in infinitely many.

If, then, the administration of the universe in the divine laws is known to no intellect, to which of the rational or intellectual beings can it happen to perceive the eternal establishment of the same universe in the Word of God, in Whom none of the faithful ought to be unaware that all things are at once both eternal and made, even if he does not understand how eternal things are made and made things eternal? For this is known only to the Word, in Whom they are both made and eternal.

A. I do not ask for the reason of the establishment of the universe in the Word and of its eternity, for no one can say how things that are eternal are also made. [For no rational or intellectual creature can know the manner of the creation of things in the Word since it is revealed to the Gnostic Power alone.] But I do ask for the reason why we are compelled to profess that eternal things are made in the Word of God, if it can be found. For it is not now a question of the multiple effects of the primordial causes in visible and invisible things, for none of the wise doubts that all things are made in these. For in that way the present question would seem to be soluble provided one could give sound reasons for teaching that in so far as all things subsist in their principles in the Word of God they must on that account be understood to be eternal; but in so far as they proceed through generation into their effects, whether intelligible or sensible, in the order of times they are on that account made, so that their eternity in the Word would precede their establishment in the order of the ages, fulfilling the invisible world above us and the visible world about us.

But now, since true reason does not permit us to profess such things—for it declares, and most truly declares, that not only the primordial causes but also their effects and places and times and essences and substances, that is, the most generic genera and the general forms and the most specific species in the individuals, with all their natural accidents, and, to speak simply, everything in the totality of created things which is comprehended either by sense or by intellect whether human or angelic, or which surpasses all sense and all the mind's keenness and yet is created, is in the Word of God

That every creature is at the same time eternal and made

excedat et tamen conditum est, in uerbo dei et semel et simul aeternum et factum esse, et nunquam erant aeterna et non facta, neque facta et non aeterna—, nil aliud relinquitur nisi ut quaeratur non quomodo sunt aeterna et facta sed qua ratione dicuntur et facta et aeterna.

N. Facta dicuntur iuxta sanctae scripturae auctoritatem pronuntiantis, ut eisdem exemplis utamur; 'In principio fecit deus caelum et terram'; 'Omnia in sapientia fecisti'; 'Omnia per ipsum facta sunt'; 'In quo creata sunt omnia quae sunt in caelis et quae in terra siue uisibilia siue inuisibilia', et multa huius modi. Modum autem et rationem conditionis omnium in uerbo dei dicat qui potest, me nescire fateor. Nec me pudet nescire audiens Apostolum deo dicentem: 'Qui solus habes immortalitatem et lucem habitas inaccessibilem', presertim quasi de longe praesentis negotii finem considerans. Ad hoc enim praesens ratiocinatio, immo uero ipsa ratio, perducet ut intelligamus non solum in dei uerbo omnia et aeterna et facta esse uerum etiam ipsum omnia facere et in omnibus fieri simplici mentis acie, ut ait sanctus Maximus, 'per rationes quae in existentibus sunt ad causale', uerbum uidelicet, 'efferentes intellectum et ipsi soli utpote congreganti omnia quae ex ipso sunt et attrahenti alligantes, rationibus per singula existentium ordinate utendo, non iam confuse sed praeclare credentes solum deum proprie esse relictum ex diligenti quae est ad ea quae sunt intentione et essentiam [et] existentium et motum et differentium discretionem et continentiam insolubilem mixtorum et fundamentum immutabile positorum et omnis simpliciter utcunque intellectae essentiae et motionis et differentiae mixturaeque et positionis causalem'.

Ac per hoc si dei uerbum solummodo relinquitur essentia existentium et motus et differentium discretio et continentia insolubilis mixtorum, hoc est compositorum, et fundamentum immutabile positorum, hoc est ad immutabilem habitum peruenientium, et uncunque intellectae essentiae et motus et discretionis et compositionis et habitudinis causa, quid aliud restat intelligi nisi ipsum omnia in omnibus fieri? Quomodo autem aut qua ratione dei uerbum in omnibus quae in eo facta sunt fit mentis nostrae aciem fugit, nec

7 sq. Gen. i. 1. 8 Ps. ciii. 24. 8 In. i. 3. 9 sq. Col. i. 16.
13-14 1 Tim. vi. 16. 18-27 1 Ambig. vi. 19; PG xci, 1137A 2-14.

1-2 aeternum et factum esse R^cBP: aeterni et facta sunt R* 2 erant RB^cP:
erat B* 4 dicuntur RB: docetur P 6-7 pronuntiantis B^cP: pronuntian-
tis RB* 7 eisdem RB: eisdem P 11 dicat RB: dicit P 13 habes
RB*: habet B^cP habitas RB*: habitat B^cP 14 presertim RB: praesertim P
15 ad hoc RB: adhuc P 21 confuse RB: confusae P 22 proprie RB: propriae
P 26-27 mixturaeque RB: myxturaeque P 29 continentia BP: continenta R
30 compositorum BP: compositorum R 30-31 positorum B^cP: possitorum
RB* 34 aut RB: et P

once and all together both eternal and made, and was never eternal without being made nor made without being eternal—, nothing is left but to ask, not how they are eternal and made, but why they are said to be both made and eternal.

N. They are said to be made on the authority of Holy Scripture which declares, to use the same examples, 'In the beginning God made heaven and earth'; 'Thou madest all things in Thy Wisdom'; 'All things were made through Him'; 'In Whom are created all things which are in the heavens and which are in the earth whether visible or invisible', and many similar passages. But of the manner and reason of the establishment of all things in the Word let him speak who can; myself, I confess I do not know. But I am not ashamed not to know when I hear the Apostle saying to God, 'Who alone possesseth immortality, and dwellest in inaccessible light', especially when from afar I look to the end of our present business. For the purpose of our present reasoning, and indeed of reason itself, is to bring us to the understanding that not only are all things both eternal and made in the Word of God but also, by a single thrust of the mind, that He makes all things and is made in all things, as St. Maximus says: 'Carrying the intellect through the reasons that are in the things that exist to their Causal Principle', that is to say, the Word, 'and binding it to Him alone as to the One Who gathers together all things that are from Himself and draws them to Him, making orderly use of the reasons through the individuals of the things that exist, no longer confusedly, but clearly believing that only God is left as true being after the diligent inquiry which is (directed) towards the things that are, and (that He is) the Being of the things that exist and their Motion and the Distinction of things that differ, and the indissoluble Continuity of things that are mingled, and the immutable Base of things that are set in position, and, in a word, the Causal Principle of all intellectual being whatsoever and of motion and of difference and of mingling and of position.'

And therefore if only the Word of God is left as the Being of the things that exist and their Motion and the Distinction of things that differ, and the indissoluble Continuity of things that are mingled, that is, of things that are composite, and the immutable Base of things that are set in position, that is, of things that attain to immutable habit; and the Cause of all intellectual being whatsoever and of motion and of difference and of composition and of habit, what else is to be understood than that He is made all things in all things? But how or why the Word of God is made in all things which

mirum cum in rebus sensibilibus nemo potest dicere quomodo uis seminalis incorporea in species uisibiles *formasque* in uarios colores in diuersas odorum suauitates erumpens fit sensibus manifesta et in rebus facta, et dum fit manifesta non desinat esse occulta, et siue manifesta sit siue occulta naturalibus suis uirtutibus nunquam deseritur, tota in totis tota in se ipsa, nec crescit dum uidetur multiplicari nec minuitur dum putatur in paucitatem contrahi, sed in eodem statu suae naturae immutabiliter permanet. [Non enim *minus* est in uno grano tritici uerbi gratia quam in multis messibus sub eodem genere multiplicatis et, quod est mirabilius, nec in uno grano toto maior est quam in particula ipsius grani. Multiplex enim in uno est et una in multiplicibus.]

Si uero quis dixerit uim seminum non per se ipsam sed in aliqua materia, hoc est in umore, pateferi <ac per hoc ipsa fit quod apparet sed in uno quod apparet agit ut sic appareat non de se ipsa sed de aliqua materia operationes suas peragens>, respondendum: Si in specie apparet et fit, estne species materia dum manifesta ratio clamat quicquid manet in materia per speciem *manere dum* per se ipsam instabilis et informis ac pene nihil sit? Si in coloribus, num color materia *est* cum constat eos circa materiem, immo etiam circa speciem intelligi? Si [in] odorum suauitatibus, num odor materia *est* cum qualitas olfaciendi sensum afficiens ab his qui talia tractant esse dicatur, qualitas autem incorporea est? Similiter de caeteris qualitatibus in quibus uirtus seminum solet apparere dicendum. Si autem praedicta omnia incorporalia sunt corporibus adherentia et in semet ipsis extra corpora intellecta, quis nisi insipiens dixerit uim seminum incorporalem corporalis materiae ad apparitionem suam indigere? Ablata siquidem specie omnique qualitate et quantitate uirtus seminalis in nuda materia nullo modo potest seu fieri seu sentiri. <Quid si ipsa materies in qua putatur apparere et agere ex qualitatibus incorporalibus originem ducere probatur? Nonne conficitur non aliunde uim seminum accipere illa in quibus operatur sed a se ipsa et in se ipsa, hoc est in naturalibus suis uirtutibus, ita ut mirabili modo fiat et faciat, et materia sui et operatio et operatrix?>

Inconcussa itaque auctoritas diuinae scripturae nos compellit

2 uisibiles formasque: -s formasque *in ras.* R(C): *post* uisibiles *rasura* B: formasque *s.l.* B 4 occulta BP: occulta R 5 occulta RB: occulta P 6 crescit dum RB: *crescendum* P 7 *lemma* BP 8-12 non enim-multiplicibus *sC in R* 8 minus B^c(C)P: minor RB* 11 maior est RB: maiorem P 13 uim RB: cum P 14 umore BP: humore R 14-16 ac-peragens *sC in B* 14-15 ac-sic *nunc deest* B 15 apparet *conieci*: appare P 17 estine R: est Ine BP: Ine *in ras. alia manu* B 18 *post* clamat *rasura* R manere dum: -ere dum *in ras.* R(C) 19 instabilis RB*P: stabilis B* pene RB: poene P 20 materia est: -a est *in ras.* R(C) 22 est *in ras.* R(C) 23 caeteris RB: ceteris P 25 adherentia BP: adhaerentia R 29 potest *om.* P 34 sui B: sua P 35 *post* scripturae ex diuina scriptura R *fortasse retinendum*

are made in Him eludes the sharpness of our mind—no wonder, for (even) in sensible things no one can say how the incorporeal seminal force,³² breaking out into visible species *and forms*, into various colours, into the different sweetnesses of odours, becomes manifest to the senses and is made in things, and while it becomes manifest it does not cease to be hidden, and whether it be manifest or hidden it is never abandoned by its natural powers, whole in the whole of them, whole in itself, nor does it become greater when it seems to be multiplied, nor less when it is thought to contract into a small number, but immutably remains in the same state of its nature. [For it is not *less* in one grain of wheat, for example, than in many harvests multiplied under the same genus and, what is more remarkable, neither is it greater in the whole of that one grain than in a particle of that grain. For it is multiple in the one and one in the multiple.]

But if one should say that the seminal force is revealed not through itself but in some matter, that is, in fluid <and so it is made that which is manifest, but acts upon the one which is manifest so that it becomes manifest not by performing its operations upon itself but upon some matter>, the reply must be: If it becomes manifest and is made in a form, is the form matter, when reason clearly proclaims that whatever is permanent in matter is permanent through its form, *whereas* (matter) through itself is unstable and without form and almost nothing? If in colours, *is* the colour matter, when it is agreed that they are understood in relation to matter, and even, in relation to species? If [in] the sweetnesses of odours, *is* odour matter, when it is said by those who concern themselves in such things to be a quality that affects the sense of smell—but quality is incorporeal? The same must be said of the other qualities in which the seminal force is wont to become manifest. But if all the aforesaid are incorporeal things adhering to bodies, and in themselves understood to be external to bodies, who but a fool would say that the incorporeal seminal force requires corporeal matter in order to become manifest? For if form and every quality and quantity be removed the seminal power can by no means be either made or perceived in naked matter. <What if the matter itself, in which it is thought to become manifest and active, is shown to derive its origin from incorporeal qualities? Would it not follow that the seminal force receives the things in which it operates from nowhere else but from itself, that is, in its natural powers, so that in a wonderful way matter, operation, and operator is made and makes?>

So the unshakable authority of Holy Scripture compels us to

That the seminal force is made a body although it is incorporeal

de eo quod uis seminum efficitur corpus dum sit incorporea

de aeternitate
uniuersitatis
in uerbo dei

credere totius creaturae uniuersitatem in uerbo dei conditam esse ipsiusque conditionis rationem omnes intellectus superare solique uerbo in quo condita sunt <omnia> cognitam esse. Si uero uis audire quid de uniuersitatis aeternitate in uerbo dei sentio ad haec quae sequuntur intentus esto.

A. Presto sum.

N. Num arbitraris uerbum dei in quo facta sunt omnia uidisse omnia quae in eo facta sunt?

A. Arbitror sane. Quamuis enim diuina operatio [in] qua condita sunt omnia tripliciter, sancta scriptura perhibente, a theologis consideretur—pater enim facit, in filio fiunt, spiritu sancto distribuuntur—, una tamen atque eadem summae sanctaeque trinitatis est operatio. Quod enim pater facit et filius facit et spiritus sanctus facit, et quod in filio factum est in patre et spiritu sancto factum est. Siquidem si filius in patre est omne quod in filio factum est in patre [esse necesse] est. Nam rationi non conuenit ut intelligamus filium ipsum solum in patre, ea uero quae pater in filio facit in patre non esse. Similiter quod spiritus sanctus nutrit et distribuit a patre et filio nutritur et distribuitur. [N.] Si itaque filius facit quae in eo facta sunt, nunquid credendum est fecisse quae non uidit? [A.] Vidisse ergo eum quae fecit et in eo facta sunt arbitror.

N. Recte arbitraris. Dic itaque quomodo uidit, utrum sensu corporeo an intellectu.

quomodo
deus uidet ea
quae fecit

A. Nec sensu dixerim nec intellectu deum uidisse quae fecit. Sensu siquidem corporeo caret qui incorporeus est, nec proprie intellectus dicitur qui superat omnem intellectum—intellectus tamen per metaforam dicitur sicut et animus, a creatura uidelicet ad creatorem, quoniam totius intellectus et animi causa est et conditor—non ergo per creaturam uidet siue corpoream [siue incorpoream] qui nullius creaturae instrumenti indiget ad ea uidenda quae uult facere. ‘Non enim esse’, ut ait Maximus, ‘possibile est’—sicut ostendit ratio—‘eum qui est super ea quae sunt per ea quae sunt ea quae sunt accipere, sed sicut suas uoluntates cognoscere eum dicimus ea quae sunt, addentes etiam ex causa rationem. Si enim uoluntate omnia fecit et nulla contradicit ratio, cognoscere autem suam uoluntatem

31–33 Pantaenus *ap. Max. Conf. 1 Ambig. iii*; PG xci. 1085B 3–5. 33 *cf. p. 150, 3 infra*; Clem. Alex. *frg. 48 ap. Max. Conf. loc. cit. B 5–12.*

2 ipsiusque B^c(C)P: ipsius uero RB* 2 lemma diuinam bonitatem semper uidisse quae faciendae causale et quod non alia uidit et alia fecit nam semper uidit faciendae fecit. et omnia quae semper uidit semper fecit nunc processit uisio operatione quae coaeterna est et de simplicitate diuina naturae Rm condita RB^cP; cogdita B* 3 lemma BP: aeternitate B^cP: alternitate B* 4 sentio om. P 5 sequuntur R*B: sequuntur R^cP 6 Presto P: Praesto RP 7 uidisse RB: fecisse P 10 a RB: ad P 10–11 consideretur RB: consederetur P 16 esse necesse sC in R nam in ras. R non s.l. R 17 solum s.l. R 21 ergo

believe that the universe of the whole creature is established in the Word of God, and that the reason for its establishment surpasses all intellects and is known only to the Word in Whom <all things> are established. But if you wish to hear what I think about the eternity of the universe in the Word of God, be attentive to what follows.

A. I am ready.

N. Do you think that the Word of God, in Whom all things are made, saw all things that are made in Him?

A. Certainly I think so. For although the Divine Operation [in] which all things were established is considered by the theologians under a triple mode, as Scripture allows—for the Father makes, in the Son they are made, by the Holy Spirit they are distributed—yet it is one and the same operation of the Most High and Holy Trinity. For that which the Father makes both the Son makes and the Holy Spirit makes, and that which is made in the Son is made in the Father and in the Holy Spirit. For if the Son is in the Father it is [necessary] that everything which is made in the Son [be] in the Father. For it does not accord with reason that we should understand that only the Son Himself is in the Father, but that the things which the Father makes in the Son are not in the Father. Similarly that which the Holy Spirit nurtures and distributes is nurtured and distributed by the Father and the Son. If, then, the Son makes the things that are made in Him, is it to be believed that He made what He did not see? Therefore I think that He saw the things that He made and that were made in Him.

N. You think rightly. Tell me, then; how did He see? By corporeal sense or by intellect?

A. I would not say that it was by sense or by intellect that God saw the things that He made. For He Who is incorporeal is without corporeal sense, and He Who passes all intellect cannot be called intellect—although He is called Intellect, as also Mind, by metaphor, namely, from the creature to the Creator because He is the Cause and Creator of the whole of intellect and mind—; therefore He does not see by means of the creature whether corporeal [or incorporeal], for He does not need any creature as an instrument to see what He wishes to make. ‘For’, as Maximus says, ‘it cannot be’—as reason shows—‘that He Who is above all things that are apprehends the things that are by means of the things that are, but we say³³ that it is as His volitions that He knows the things that are, adding also the reason from the cause. For if He made all things by His Will—and no reason contradicts this—and it is right and proper to say that

om. P quae RB: quem P 26 lemma BP: uidet B: uidit P superat R^cBP: superant R* 28 causa est RB: causae P 29 post creaturam rasura P siue incorpoream sC in R 32 per ea quae sunt om. P ea quae sunt (3) s.l. B

Concerning
the eternity
of the uni-
verse in the
Word of God

How God
sees the
things that
He has made

deum semper pium dicere et iustum est, unumquodque uero eorum quae facta sunt uolens fecit; igitur ut suas uoluntates deus cognoscit ea quae sunt quoniam et uolens ea quae sunt fecit.'

N. Quemadmodum igitur deus suas uoluntates uidet, ita et ea quae fecit uidet.

A. Ita quidem et non aliter. Non autem [ut insipientes autumant] per sensum sensibilia neque per intellectum intelligibilia sed quemadmodum suas uoluntates ita sensibilia et intelligibilia uidet.

de diuinis
uoluntatibus

N. Plane ac pure intelligis. Sed dicas flagito utrum aliud sunt diuinae uoluntates quas deus uidet et aliud facta quae ut suas uoluntates uidet.

A. Non sum idoneus qui huic propositioni satis *recteque* respondeam. Coartor enim undique. Nam si dixerō 'aliud', mox dicturus eris: Non ergo ut suas uoluntates deus uidet quae fecit. In diuersis enim naturaue differentibus una ac simplex uisio fieri non potest. Et concludes: Diuina autem uisio simplex est et una et uniformis. Igitur si aliud est dei uoluntas et aliud quod fecit, non ut uoluntatem suam uidet quod fecit.

Si autem dixerō 'non aliud', necessario sequetur: Voluntas igitur dei factum eius est et uoluntates suas fecit et quae fecit uoluntates suae sunt. Vna enim eademque et simplex diuina uisio cogit unum et id ipsum esse omne quod uidet. Videt autem ut suas uoluntates quae fecit. Vnum igitur et id ipsum sunt diuinae uoluntates et quae deus fecit. Ea siquidem unificat simplex diuina uisio quae omnia uidet unum et unum omnia. Et si hoc datum fuerit uereor ne forte me compellas unum e duobus fateri: aut uidelicet segregari uoluntatem dei a deo et adiungi creaturae ita ut aliud sit deus et aliud sua uoluntas, hoc est ut deus sit factor, uoluntas autem eius facta; aut, si hoc non sinit uera ratio dicere, necessario fatebor et deum et uoluntates suas et omnia quae fecit unum et id ipsum esse, ac sine mora ratiocinationis uirtute cogente concludetur: Deus igitur se ipsum fecit, si non extra eius naturam suae uoluntates sunt et non aliter uidet suas uoluntates et aliter quae fecit, sed ut suas uoluntates uidet quae fecit. Et si ita est, quis de aeternitate omnium quae facta sunt in deo dubitarit quando non solum facta et aeterna uerum etiam deus esse intelliguntur?

N. Cautissime ac uigilantissime rationis iter ingrederis, ac per hoc

6-8 Cf. Clem. Alex. *frg.* 48 *ap.* Max. Conf. *loc. cit.* B 2-3.

6 et om. P ut-autumant sC in R 10 lemma BP 11 uoluntates:
-es in ras. R(C) 12 idoneus: -on- s.l. R recteque: -teque in ras. B(C)
13 nam s.l. R 14 non RB: nunc P 18 uidet RB: uideo P 26 segregari
R*BP: segregare R* 27 adiungi R*BP: adiungere R* 28 deus sit RB:
sit deus P 33 sed: -d s.l. R

God ever knows His own Will, while every one of the things that are made He willingly made; then it is as His volitions that God knows the things that are because it is also by His volition that He made the things that are.'

N. Therefore, as God sees His volitions, so He also sees the things that He made?

A. So it is and not otherwise. But He does not [as the foolish assert] see the sensibles by means of sense nor the intelligibles by means of intellect, but as (He sees) His volitions, so He sees the sensibles and the intelligibles.

N. You understand plainly and clearly. But I beg you to say whether the divine volitions which God sees are one thing and the made things which He sees are another.

Concerning
the Divine
Volitions

A. I am not equipped to answer this question adequately *and correctly*. For I am hampered on all sides. For if I say, 'another', you will quickly reply: Then it is not as His volitions that God sees what He has made, for there cannot be one simple vision of things which are diverse and different in nature, and you will conclude: But the Divine Vision is simple and one and uniform. Therefore, if the Will of God is one thing and what He had made another, it is not as His volition that He sees what He has made.

If, on the other hand, I say, 'not other', the conclusion will necessarily be: The Will of God is something that He has made, and He has made His volitions and what He has made are His volitions. For the one and the same and simple Divine Vision requires that everything that He sees is one and the same. But He sees as His volitions the things that He has made. Therefore the divine volitions and the things which God has made are one and the same. For the simple Divine Vision which sees all things as one and one as all things unifies them. And if this be granted I fear that you may compel me to profess one of two things, namely, either that the Will of God is separate from God and attached to the creature, so that God is one thing and His Will another, that is to say, that God is the Maker while His Will is the made; or, if true reason forbids (me) to say this, I shall have to profess that God and His volitions and all the things that He has made are one and the same, and without delay the conclusion, forced on by the power of reason, will be: Then God made Himself, if His volitions are not external to Himself and He does not see His volitions in one way and the things that He has made in another, but sees the things that He has made as His volitions. And if that is the case, who will have any doubt about the eternity of the things that are made in God, when they are understood to be not only made and eternal, but God Himself?

N. Most cautiously and circumspectly do you proceed along the

si pure intelligis sine ulla ambiguitate ita et non aliter esse quae dixisti in suadenda aeternitate omnium quae in uerbo dei facta sunt amplius laborare necessarium non esse uideo.

A. Derides me ut arbitror dum mecum liberaliter agis, hoc est dum libertati arbitrii mei concedis eligere quid uelit et tenere quod uult, et non ueris rationibus exigis me concludere quid de talibus remota omni falsitate credendum et intelligendum est. Si enim per me ipsum pure intelligerem ea quae dixi, non fortassis uererer apertam sententiam de diuinis uoluntatibus et de his quae facta sunt proferre, num unum et id ipsum sint necne. Veritus sum autem me ipsum cognoscens non satis idoneum ad haec discutienda incedere.

N. Gradatim ergo ingredi ne in aliquo fallaris ut quodcunque concesseris stabili mentis habitu obtineas.

A. Precede. Sequar.

N. Quamuis ut opinor de uoluntate dei dubites, seu de uoluntatibus seu de ineffabili diuinae unitatis multiplicitate—deus est enim unum multiplex in se ipso—, utrum ad *summae* bonitatis simplicem naturam pertineant ut non aliud praeter ipsam sint annon, deum tamen nunquam suis uoluntatibus caruisse non dubitas.

A. Hinc dubitare insipientissimum est. Omne siquidem quod habet semper et immutabiliter habet quoniam nihil ei accidit, ideoque aut nunquam habuit suas uoluntates aut, si habet, semper eas habuisse nullo modo dubitandum.

N. Deus itaque semper uoluntates suas habuit easque semper uidit. Non enim latere eum potuit quod habuit.

A. Et habuit et uidit. Deum nanque uoluntatibus suis caruisse aut semper eas non habuisse aut non uidisse dementium est aestimare.

N. Diuinae ergo uoluntates aeternae sunt quoniam ipse cuius uoluntates sunt aeternus est.

A. Omnino hoc concesserim.

N. Quid igitur? num et ea quae uoluit semper habuit et semper uidit? Clare quidem intelligis ut reor deo nihil esse futurum dum omnia tempora intra se ipsum concludat et omnia *quae in eis sunt*. Omnium quippe principium et medium et finis est et ambitus et cursus et recursus.

A. Nihil deo futurum esse non ambigo.

N. Omnia itaque quae [facere] uoluit in suis uoluntatibus semper habuit. Non enim in eo praecedat uelle [id] quod uult [fieri]. Ipsius

5 libertati RB: liberati P 8 fortassis RB: fortassis P 10 post num rasura
R 12 Gradatim: G- in ras. R ut in ras. R(C): et P 13 habitu R^{BP}:
habito R* 14 Precede R^B: Precedet R*: Praecede P 17 summae in ras.
R(C) 18 post pertineant rasura R 19 nunquam R^{BP}: numquam R*
23 post dubitandum est erasum R 33 quae in eis in ras. R(C)

road of reason, and therefore if you clearly understand without any doubt that what you have said is so and not otherwise, I see that there is no need to toil any more in urging the eternity of all things which are made in the Word of God.

A. You are teasing me, as I think, in treating me lightly, that is, in allowing the freedom of my will to choose what it wishes and hold to what it wishes without asking me to show by sound reasons what, with all error removed, is to be believed and understood about such things. For if by myself I had a clear understanding of what I have said, perhaps I should not fear to offer a frank opinion concerning the Divine Volitions and concerning the things that are made, as to whether they are one and the same or not. But I was afraid because I knew that I was not sufficiently equipped to enter upon this discussion.

N. Go carefully, then, lest you err at any point, so that whatever you agree to you retain as a habit firmly established in your mind.

A. Proceed. I will follow.

N. Although, as I think, you have doubts about the Will of God, whether about His volitions or about the ineffable multiplicity of the Divine Unity—for God is a multiple unity in Himself—, as to whether they belong to the simple nature of the Most High Goodness so as not to be anything but it, or whether they do not, yet you do not doubt but that God was not at any time without His volitions.

A. To doubt this would be very foolish. For everything that He has He has always and immutably, for nothing is an accident to Him, and therefore either He never had His volitions or, if He has them, there must be no doubt at all but that He has always had them.

N. God, then, has always had His volitions and always beheld them. For what He had could not be concealed from Him.

A. He both had and beheld. For it would be madness to suppose that God was without His volitions, or that He has not always had them and beheld them.

N. The Divine Volitions, then, are eternal, since He Whose volitions they are is eternal.

A. I grant this unreservedly.

N. Well, then; the things that He has willed, did He not always have them and always behold them? Indeed, you clearly understand, I believe, that for God nothing is future since He includes within Himself all times and all *that is in them*. For of all things He is the Beginning and the Middle and the End, and their limit and their circuit and their going forth and their return.

A. That nothing for God is future I do not doubt.

N. Therefore all things which He has willed [to make] He always had in His volitions. For in Him the will does not precede [that]

[enim] uoluntati coaeternum est. Siquidem non expectat fieri quod uult quasi futurum cui omnia praesentia sunt, cuius uoluntas causa omnium est et uisio [et] effectus et perfectio. Fit enim nulla mora interposita quod uidet faciendum.

de eo quod omnia quae facta sunt in deo deus sunt
 At si uoluntas eius uisio eius est et uisio uoluntas, omne quod uult subtracto omni interuallo fit; at si omne quod uult fieri et faciendum uidet, et non extra se [est quod] uult et uidet sed in se, nihilque in ipso est quod ipse non sit, sequitur ut omne quod uidet et uult coaeternum ei intelligatur si uoluntas illius et uisio et essentia unum est. 675B 6

A. Cogis iam nos fateri omnia quaecunque aeterna et facta dicuntur deum esse. Si enim diuina uoluntas diuinaque uisio essentialis est [et] aeterna, [et non] aliud est ei esse aliud uelle aliud uidere sed unum et id ipsum superessentiale, et omne quodcunque intra uoluntatem et uisionem suam comprehendit non aliud praeter ipsum ratio sinit intelligi—simplex siquidem natura intra se non patitur esse quod ipsa non sit—, restat sine ulla controuersia unum deum omnia in omnibus esse fateri. Et si ita est, de aeternitate omnium quae in deo sunt, immo etiam quae deus sunt, nemo pie philosophantium debet ignorare. Adhuc tamen non satis uideo quomodo diuina natura extra quam nihil est et intra quam subsistunt omnia nihil intra se recipit esse quod sibi coessentialia non sit. 10 15 675C 20

quomodo omnia quae intra deum sunt coessentialia sibi sunt
 N. De eo quod nulla natura subsistat praeter deum et creaturam non dubitare te crediderim, immo etiam satis uidere te uideo. Nam quod dixisti de diuina natura extra quam nihil est, ita intelligis ut arbitror creatricem [quidem] naturam nihil extra se sinere quia extra eam nihil potest [esse], totum uero quod creauit et creat intra se ipsam continere, ita tamen ut aliud sit ipsa quia superessentialis est et aliud quod in se creat. Nam se ipsam creare non tibi ueri simile uidetur. 25 675D

A. Totam conceptionem [cogitationem] cogitationis meae de deo et creatura perspexisti. Firmiter enim atque inconcuse teneo nullam naturam uel creatam uel non creatam extra deum subsistere et nullo modo esse, omne uero quod subsistit siue creatum siue non creatum intra ipsum contineri. Ac per hoc totius uniuersitatis plenitudinem *his* ueluti duabus partibus concludi, hoc est deo et creatura, hactenus tenebam. Sed nunc iterum fides mea uidetur nutare praedictis rationationibus infirmata. 30 676A 36

12 Cf. *De praed.* 10–12; 54–56 (Madec) 17–18 cf. *Aug. De ord.* ii. 9. 26.
 2 uoluntas RB: uoluntatis P 3 nulla RB: ulla P 5 lemma BP
 omne RB: omnem P 6 omne RB: omnem P 9 ei RB: et P
 10 Cogis in ras. R 12 ei om. P id s.l. R 14 post uisionem rasura R
 16 post restat rasura P 18 sunt immo RB: summo P 22 lemma BP:
 coessentialia BP coessentialia P 26 creauit R^cBP: creuit R* et RB: ut P
 28 in se om. P 30 Totam RB: Totum P 32 uel creatam uel non creatam
 RB: non creatam uel creatam P 35 his in ras. R(C) hactenus RB: ac-
 tenus P 36 nutare RB^cP: mitare B*

which He wills [to be made]. [For] it is coeternal with His Will. For He does not wait for the making of that which He wills as though it were future to Him, to Whom all things are present, Whose will is the Cause of all things, and Whose beholding is their effect and their perfection. For without any intervening delay is made that of which He beholds the making.

But if His Will is His beholding and His beholding His Will, everything that He wills is made, without any interval; but if of everything He wills to be made He also beholds the making, and if what He wills and beholds is not external to Himself but within Himself, and there is nothing within Him which is not Himself, it follows that everything that He beholds and wills should be understood as coeternal with Him, if His Will and His beholding and His Essence are one.

A. Now you compel us to declare that all things that are called eternal and made are God. For if the Divine Will and the divine beholding is essential [and] eternal, [and] in Him to be is not one thing, to will another, to behold another, but one and the same superessential, and reason allows that whatever He comprehends within His Will and His beholding is understood as nothing other than Himself—for a simple nature does not allow within itself that which is not itself—the declaration that the One God is all things in all things abides without any dispute. And if this is so, no one who practises philosophy devoutly ought to be ignorant of the eternity of all things which are in God, indeed are God. But as yet I do not satisfactorily see how the Divine Nature, outside of which there is nothing and within which all things subsist, does not admit within itself a being that is not coessential with itself.

N. That no nature subsists but God and the creature I should believe that you do not doubt—indeed, I see that you see it satisfactorily. For what you said of the Divine Nature, that outside it there is nothing, so you understand, as I think, that [while] the Creative Nature permits nothing outside itself because outside it nothing can [be], yet everything which it has created and creates it contains within itself, but in such a way that it itself is other, because it is superessential, than what it creates within itself. For that it should create itself does not seem to you likely to be probable.³⁴

A. You have perfectly understood what my thought has conceived about God and the creature. For I firmly and unshakeably hold that no nature, whether created or not created, subsists or is in any way external to God, but that everything that subsists, whether created or not created, is contained within Him. And that therefore the fullness of the whole universe is included within *these*, as in two parts, namely, God and the creature, was what I held hitherto. But now again my faith seems to waver, weakened by the foregoing reasonings.

That all things that are made in God are God

How all things that are within God are coessential to Him

N. Fidem tuam stabilitam esse ueraque ratione munitam uideo saltem in hoc, extra deum nihil esse credens.

A. Ita ut dicis. Illud enim purissime contemplor.

N. Diligentius itaque et perspicacius mentis aciem circa ea quae intra deum esse credis circunfer.

A. Intra deum nihil aliud esse sentio praeter se ipsum et ab ipso conditam naturam.

N. In deo ergo uidetes quod deus non est.

A. Video; ex deo tamen creatum.

N. Quid itaque tibi uidetur? Num deus omnia quae fecit antequam fierent uidit?

A. Eum uidisse omnia quae uoluit facere priusquam fierent existimarim.

N. Ea ergo uidit quae facere uoluit et non alia uidit nisi ea quae fecit et ea quae fecit priusquam faceret uidit?

A. Ita teneo.

N. Dic quaeso quae sunt illa quae deus antequam fierent uidit? *Quomodo enim* creaturam uidit quae adhuc non [erat] facta? [et] si nec aliud praeter creaturam uidit—Omne enim quod est aut deus aut creatura est—, quid uidit? Proinde aut se ipsum uidit antequam faceret omne quod fecit, aut creaturam uidit quae adhuc non est creata. [Quomodo autem uidit quod adhuc non erat? Si uero [erat] et ideo uisum est quia erat, profecto erat ante creaturam quod creatura non erat. Si autem solus deus <et sibi coessentialis> ante omnem creaturam sinitur esse nil aliud praecessit creaturam quod deus uideret antequam faceret creaturam nisi aut ipse aut aeterna in se et coaeterna sibi *natura*.] Confectum est *autem* inter nos deum uidisse quae facienda erant. Non enim ignorans fecit aut non prouidens [quod facere uoluit].

A. Septum me undique uideo nullamque fugiendi uiam <mihi> remanere. Nam si dixerō deum in se ipso uidisse quae facienda erant cogar fateri se ipsum uidisse, quia adhuc non erat creatura quam uideret nec aliud erat ante omnem creaturam quod praeter se ipsum uidere posset; ac per hoc si omnia quae facienda erant in se ipso uidit priusquam fierent necessario se ipsum uidisse uera docebit ratio, et ipse erit omnia quae fecit si ea quae uidit in se ipso fecit, et erit factor et factura. Si autem dixerō creaturam uidit faciendam

1 ueraque om. P 2 saltem RB: salutem P 3 dicis R^cBP: dicas R*
4 perspicacius RB: perspicacius P 5-6 esse-nihil om. P 17 quaeso RB: quaeso P
18 quomodo enim in ras. R(C) 22-23 quomodo-proflecto erat C in R 22 si uero BP: sinero R 23 quia RB^cP: quoa B*
23-27 ante creaturam-sibi natura (creatura) sC in R 25 nil RB: non P
27 coaeterna RB^cP: coaeternam B* natura B^cP: creatura RB* autem B^cP: enim RB*
29 quod facere uoluit sC 30 uideo nullamque RBP^c: uideor ullaque P*

N. I see that your faith stands firm and is fortified by true reason at least in this: my belief that outside God there is nothing.

A. It is as you say. That I see very clearly.

N. Bring then the keenness of your mind more diligently and perceptively to bear upon the things that you believe to be within God.

A. I see that within God there is nothing but Himself and the nature created by Him.

N. Then you see in God that which is not God?

A. I do; but it is created from God.

N. How, then, does it seem to you? Did God see all things that He has made before they were made?

A. I should think that He saw all things that He willed to make before they were made.

N. So He saw the things which He willed to make, and He did not see other than the things which He has made, and the things which He has made He saw before He made them?

A. So I believe.

N. Say, please, what are those things which God saw before they were made? *For how* did He see a creature which [was] not made? [And] if He did not see other than a creature—for everything that is is either God or creature—, what did He see? Therefore, either He saw Himself before He made everything that He made, or He saw a creature which was not yet created. [But how did He see what as yet was not? Or if [it was], and was therefore seen because it was, then before the creature there was that which was not a creature. But if only God <and what is coessential with Him> is allowed to exist before every creature, nothing else that God saw before He made the creature preceded the creature except either Himself or a nature which is eternal in Him and coeternal with Him.] But it has been agreed between us that God saw the things that were to be made. For it was not in ignorance or without providence that He made [that which He willed to make].

A. I see that I am hedged about on all sides and that there is left <for me> no way of escape. For if I say that God saw in Himself the things that were to be made I shall be forced to declare that He saw Himself, for there was not yet a creature for Him to see, nor was there, before every creature, anything else but Himself that He could see; and therefore if He saw in Himself all things that were to be made before they were made, true reason will necessarily teach that He saw Himself, and He will be all the things that He made if He made the things which He saw in Himself, and He will be the Maker and the things that will be made. If, on the other hand, I say, 'He

priusquam fieret dicturus eris: Erat ergo creatura antequam fieret. Si enim deus uidit eam antequam fieret illud uere substantialiter erat quod deus in ea uidit priusquam fieret. Non enim deus uidet falsa dum sit incommutabilis ueritas et omne quod in ea est uerum et incommutabile est, et si deus in semet ipso uidit creaturam priusquam 5 fieret semper uidit quod uidit; non enim accidit ei uidere quod uidet quando non aliud est ei esse et aliud uidere; ipsius nanque simplex 677A natura est. Si autem semper uidit quod uidit semper erat quod uidit ac per hoc aeternum esse necesse est [quod uidit], et si creaturam uidit quae adhuc non erat, et erat quod uidit—omne enim quod deus 10 uidet uerum et aeternum est—nil aliud relinquitur nisi ut intelligamus creaturam fuisse in deo priusquam fieret in se ipsa, duplexque de creatura dabitur intellectus: unus quidem considerat aeternitatem ipsius in diuina cognitione in qua omnia uere et substantialiter permanent, alter *temporalem* conditionem ipsius ueluti postmodum in se 15 ipsa. Et si ita est rationis consequentia compellet unum e duobus eligere [ut] aut eandem creaturam meliorem se ipsa et inferiorem 677B dicamus, meliorem quidem quantum in deo aeternaliter substitit, inferiorem uero quantum in se ipsa creata est et creatio illius non in deo sed ueluti extra deum *in se ipsa* aestimabitur, et erit contrarium 20 scripturae quae dicit: 'Omnia in sapientia fecisti'; aut non eandem naturam esse quae aeternaliter in cognitione dei erat et quae ueluti postmodum in se ipsa condita est, ac per hoc non ea quae facta sunt antequam fierent uidit sed solummodo quae aeterna sunt in se ipso uidit; et si quis hoc dederit catholicae fidelium professioni uidebitur 25 resistere; sancta siquidem sophia non alia profitetur deum in se ipso priusquam fierent uidisse et alia postmodum in se ipsis fecisse, sed eadem aeternaliter uisa et aeternaliter facta, et hoc totum in deo et nihil extra deum. Si autem aliud est diuinae bonitatis natura et aliud 677C quod uidit faciendum et fecit et in se ipso uidit et fecit diuinae naturae 30 simplicitas interrumpetur quando aliud in ipsa intelligitur quod ipsa non sit, quod omnino impossibile est. Si uero non aliud est diuina bonitas et aliud quod in se ipsa uidit faciendum, sed una atque eadem est natura cuius inuolabilis est simplicitas et inseparabilis unitas, profecto dabitur omnia ubique deum esse et totum in toto et facto- 35 rem et factum et uidentem et uisum et locum -- et essentia omnium et

21 Ps. ciii. 24.

2 Si-fieret om. P
 11 uidet RB: uidit P et RB^c(C)P: deest B*
 R 15 alter R^cB^cP: aliter R*(?)B*
 17 inferiorem R^cBP: inferiora R* 18 substitit RB: substitit P 20 in se ipsa aes *in ras.* R
 21 eandem RB: eadem P 26 alia RB: aliter P
 33 una RB: uita P eadem RB: eodem P 34 post inseparabilis est *erasum* B

saw the nature that was to be made before it was made', you will say, 'Then there was a creature before it was made.' For if God saw it before it was made, that was a true substance which God saw in it before it was made. For God does not see the things that are false since the Truth is immutable and everything that is in it is true and immutable, and if God saw the creature in Himself before it was made He has always seen what He saw; for it is not an accident in Him to see what He sees, since it is not one thing for Him to be and another to see; for His is a simple nature. But if He has always seen what He saw, what He has seen always was, and therefore [what He has seen] must be eternal, and if He saw the creature which as yet was not, and what He saw was—for everything that God sees is true and eternal—there is nothing else left for us to understand but that the creature was in God before it was made in Him, and that 'creature' can be understood in two ways, the one relating it to its eternity in the Divine Knowledge, in which all things truly and substantially abide, the other to its *temporal* establishment which was, as it were, subsequent in itself. And if this is so, the logical consequence will compel the choice of one of two alternatives [so that] either we say that the same creature is better than itself and inferior: better in so far as it has eternally subsisted in God, but inferior in so far as it is created in itself and its creation will be thought to be not in God but as though external to God *in itself*, and it will contradict Scripture which says, 'Thou madest all things in Thy Wisdom'; or that it is not the same nature that was eternally in the knowledge of God, and that was established so to speak subsequently, as it were, in itself, and therefore it was not those things that were made that He saw before they were made but only the things that are eternal that He saw in Himself; and anyone who has admitted that will be seen to be resisting the catholic profession of the faithful; for Holy Wisdom declares that the things which God saw in Himself before they were made are not other than the things that He subsequently made in themselves, but that the same things are eternally seen and eternally made, and all this in God and nothing external to God. But if the nature of the Divine Goodness is one thing and what it sees to be made and did make, and saw and made in itself, is another, the simplicity of the Divine Nature will be broken when there is understood to be in it that which it is not, which is altogether impossible. If on the other hand the Divine Nature is not other than that of which it sees the making in itself, but they are one and the same nature whose simplicity is inviolable and whose unity is indivisible, it will at once be admitted that God is all things everywhere, and wholly in the whole, and the Maker and the made and the Seer and the seen, and the place and the

substantia et accidens et, ut simpliciter dicam, omne quod uere est et non est, superessentialis in essentiis supersubstantialis in substantiis super omnem creaturam creator et intra omnem creaturam creatus et infra omnem creaturam subsistens, a se ipso esse incipiens et per se ipsum se ipsum mouens et ad se ipsum motus et in se ipso quiescens, per genera et species in se ipso in infinitum multiplicatus, simplicitatem suae naturae non deserens et multiplicationis suae infinitatem in se ipsum reuocans, in ipso enim omnia unum sunt.

N. Nunc uideo te perpure inspicere de quibus uidebaris dubitare et nec ulterius titubabis ut arbitror fateri omnia et facta [et] aeterna esse et omne quod in eis uere intelligitur subsistere nil aliud praeter ineffabilem diuinae bonitatis esse naturam. [Ipsa est enim substantialia bonum et nemo bonus nisi solus deus.]

de aeterna
conditione
omnium in
deo

Restat igitur de aeterna conditione omnium in deo tractare quantum diuinae uirtutis radius aciem nostrae mentis in diuina mysteria permiserit ascendere.

ΑΝΑΚΕΦΑΛΑΙΩΣΙC

A. Restat quidem et iam ordo disputationis exigit. Prius tamen uelim te breuiter colligere totum quod de praesenti quaestione hactenus inter nos est confectum.

N. Ad purum ut opinor deduximus diuinam bonitatem uidisse et semper uidisse ea quae facienda erant.

A. Hoc peractum est.

N. Et non alia uidit et alia fecit sed ea quae semper uidit facienda fecit.

A. Similiter datum est.

N. Et omnia quae semper uidit semper fecit. Non enim in eo praecedit uisio operationem quoniam coaeterna est uisioni operatio—presertim dum non aliud [ei] sit uidere et aliud operari sed ipsius uisio ipsius operatio. Videt enim operando et uidendo operatur.

A. Hoc quoque assumptum est.

N. De simplicitate diuinae naturae discussum quod non in ea uere ac proprie intelligitur quod ab ea alienum sit ut non ei coessentialia, et quoniam omnia uere ac proprie intra eam intelliguntur esse—nil enim extra eam subsistit—conclusum est ipsam solam uere ac proprie in omnibus esse et nihil uere ac proprie esse quod ipsa non sit.

A. Conclusum.

N. Proinde non duo a se ipsis distantia debemus intelligere deum

8 Cf. 42. 30–32 supra.

12–13 Luc. xviii. 19.

10 titubabis RB: titubamus P
11 lemma BP omne RB: omnem P
16 permiserit R*B^c: permissit R^cB*P
17 et iam R^cB: etiam R*: om. P
18 lemma BP 22 est RB: om. P 28 dum RB: om. P 32 proprie R^cBP: propriae R*
32–33 intelligitur—proprie om. sed postea addidit ad caput paginae sB
34 eam RB: eum P conclusum est RB: conclusionem P
35 proprie R^cBP: propriae R* 36 conclusum RB: conclusio P

essence of all things and their substance and their accident and, to speak simply, everything that truly is and is not, superessential in essences, supersubstantial in substances, the Creator above every creature, created within all creation and subsisting below all creations taking the beginning of being from Himself and moving Himself through Himself, and moved towards Himself, and in Himself taking His rest, multiplied in Himself through genera and species to infinity, not abandoning the simplicity of His nature but calling back the infinity of His multiplicity into Himself, for in Him all things are one.

N. Now I see that you have a thoroughly clear view of the things of which you seemed to be in doubt, and you will no longer waver, as I think, in your assertion that all things are both made [and] eternal, and that everything that is understood truly to subsist in them is nothing else but the ineffable nature of the Divine Goodness. [For He is the substantial Good, and no one is good save God alone.]

Concerning
the eternal
establishment of all
things in
God

It remains, then, to treat of the eternal creation of all things in God, in so far as the ray of the Divine Power shall permit the keenness of our minds to ascend into the Divine Mysteries.

A. It does indeed remain, and the order of our discourse now requires it. But first I should like you briefly to recapitulate the whole of what has so far been agreed between us on the present question.

Recapitulation

N. We have clearly deduced, as I think, that the Divine Goodness saw and always has seen those things that were to be made.

A. This was concluded.

N. And the things that He saw were not other than the things that He made, but the things He saw were to be made were the things that He made.

A. This was granted likewise.

N. And all the things which He has always seen He has always made. For in Him the sight does not precede His act, since the act is co-eternal with the sight—especially as [for Him] it is not one thing to see and another to act, but His sight is His act. For He sees by acting and by seeing He acts.

A. This also was accepted.

N. Concerning the simplicity of the Divine Nature we said that that is not to be truly and properly understood in it which is alien from it as not co-essential with it; and since all things are truly and properly understood to be within it—for nothing subsists outside it—it was concluded that it alone is truly and properly in all things, and that nothing truly and properly is what it itself is not.

A. It was.

N. It follows that we ought not to understand God and the

et creaturam sed unum et id ipsum. Nam et creatura in deo est subsistens et deus in creatura mirabili et ineffabili modo creatur se ipsum manifestans, inuisibilis uisibilem se faciens et incomprehensibilis comprehensibilem et occultus apertum et incognitus cognitum et forma ac specie carens formosum ac speciosum et superessentialis essentialem et supernaturalis naturalem et simplex compositum et accidentibus liber accidentibus subiectum [et accidens] et infinitus finitum et incircumscriptus circumscriptum et super-temporalis temporalem et omnia creans in omnibus creatum et factor omnium factus in omnibus et aeternus cepit esse et immobilis mouetur in omnia et fit in omnibus omnia. Neque hoc de incarnatione uerbi et inhumanatione dico, sed de summae bonitatis quae unitas est et trinitas ineffabili condescensione in ea quae sunt ut sint, immo ut ipsa in omnibus a summo usque deorsum sit semper aeterna semper facta, a se ipsa in se ipsa aeterna a se ipsa in se ipsa facta. Et dum sit aeterna non desinit esse facta et facta non desinit esse aeterna, et de se ipsa se ipsam facit. Non enim indiget alterius materiae quae ipsa non sit in qua se ipsam facit. Alioqui impotens uideretur et in se ipso imperfectus si aliunde acciperet apparitionis et perfectionis suae auxilium. A se igitur ipso deus accipit theophaniarum suarum, hoc est diuinarum apparitionum, occasiones quoniam ex ipso et per ipsum et in ipso et ad ipsum sunt omnia. Ac per hoc et ipsa materies de qua legitur mundum fecisse ab ipso et in ipso est et ipse in ea est quantum intelligitur ea esse.

Quomodo
Moses et
Samuel
uisibiliter
apparuerunt
corporibus
non receptis

Nec hoc mirum cum nos exempla scripturae de talibus doceant. Si enim animae Moysi et Samuhelis dum sint natura inuisibiles et incorporeales uisibiles ac ueluti corporales non in aliqua extrinsecus assumpta materia sed per se ipsas nulla medietate interposita ad perpetranda mysteria non phantastice sed ueraciter aliorum mentibus apostolorum dico et Saul apparuerunt, quid nos prohibet tali miraculo manucti ad altiora diuinae uirtutis ascendere ut intelligamus eam et super omnia esse et in omnibus fieri, non aliunde accipien^{tem}, ut diximus, materiem aut de nihilo facien^{tem} in qua fit et manifestam se facit?

Satis de uirtute seminum disputatum est quae dum per se ipsam inuisibilis et incomprehensibilis sit in infinitas formas ac species se ipsam multiplicat sensibusque corporeis succumbit, quae omnem

25-26 Cf. 124. 37-38 *supra*.

1 et in ras. R(C) 5 ac RB: & P 10 cepit R^cB: incept R^{*}: coepit P
12 inhumanatione RB: humanatione P 20 igitur ipso RB: ipso igitur P
25 lemma BP: samuel B: samuhel P nos RB: hoc P 26 lemma De anima
Moisi et Samuelis Rm 30 post manucti sunt erasum R 31 eam
RB^cP: eo B^{*} 32 accipiens RB: accipietis P: lege accipientem 33 faciens
codd.: lege facientem

creature as two things distinct from one another, but as one and the same. For both the creature, by subsisting, is in God; and God, by manifesting Himself, in a marvellous and ineffable manner creates Himself in the creature, the invisible making Himself visible and the incomprehensible comprehensible and the hidden revealed and the unknown known and being without form and species formed and specific and the superessential essential and the supernatural natural and the simple composite and the accident-free subject to accident [and accident] and the infinite finite and the uncircumscribed circumscribed and the supratemporal temporal and the Creator of all things created in all things and the Maker of all things made in all things, and eternal He begins to be, and immobile He moves into all things and becomes in all things all things. And I am not here speaking of the Incarnation of the Word and His taking of manhood on Himself, but of the ineffable descent of the Supreme Goodness, which is Unity and Trinity, into the things that are so as to make them be, indeed, so as itself to be, in all things from the highest to the lowest, ever eternal, ever made, by itself in itself eternal, by itself in itself made. And while it is eternal it does not cease to be made, and made it does not cease to be eternal, and out of itself it makes itself, for it does not require some other matter which is not itself in which to make itself. Otherwise it would seem to be impotent and imperfect in itself if it were to receive from some other source an aid to its manifestation and perfection. So it is from Himself that God takes the occasions of His theophanies, that is, of the divine apparitions, since all things are from Him and through Him and in Him and for Him. And therefore even that matter from which it is read that He made the world is from Him and in Him, and He is in it in so far as it is understood to have being.

Nor is this remarkable, since the Scriptures show us examples of such things. For if the souls of Moses and Samuel, although they are by nature invisible and incorporeal, appeared for the purpose of penetrating mysteries, not in imagination but in truth to the minds of others, I mean of the Apostles and of Saul, visible and as it were corporeal, not by means of some matter that had been taken from without but by themselves without any intermediary, what prevents us, encouraged by such a miracle, from ascending to higher levels of the Divine Power so as to understand that it is both above all things and is made in all things, not, as we have said, by taking from elsewhere or making out of nothing the matter in which it is made and in which it makes itself manifest?

We have already said enough about the seminal power, which, while by itself it is invisible and incomprehensible, multiplies itself into infinite forms and species, and though it eludes all the

How Moses
and Samuel
appeared
visibly with-
out assuming
bodies

mentis aciem dum quaeritur effugit. Proinde nullus locus conceditur nihilo illi, hoc est priuationi totius habitudinis atque essentiae, de quo omnia putantur ab his qui minus intelligunt facta fuisse, nescientes quid eo nomine sancta significat theologia.

A. Miror quomodo quae nunc a te dicta sunt quamuis multis inuia et ab his qui philosophari uidentur remota uerissima tamen esse uera proclamat ratio, et auctoritas sanctae scripturae id ipsum dum intentionius consideratur suadet et praedicat. Dicit enim: 'In principio fecit deus caelum et terram', hoc est: Deus pater in deo filio uniuersitatem totius creaturae uisibilis et inuisibilis condidit. Et quid in principio *de se genito*, in uerbo suo, *sapientia sua*, pater conderet quod ipse filius non esset? Alioqui non in ipso conderet sed extra ipsum quod aliunde accepit aut de nihilo fecit. Aut quomodo pateretur fieri in se uerbum quod sibi consubstantialia non esset? Non enim lux sinit in se tenebras <aliunde acceptas> nec ueritas recipit in se nisi uerum. Non autem potest esse uerum quod non erat semper aeternum, aeternum autem non est quod ex priuatione totius aeternitatis atque essentiae factum est. Aut quid aliud faceret pater in sua sapientia nisi ipsam sapientiam? Ait enim propheta: 'Omnia in sapientia fecisti.' Vim uerborum intueri. Nunquid quasi in aliquo loco seu spatio quoddam edificium fecit deus in sua sapientia non ut ipsa substantialiter fieret omnia sed solummodo contineret omnia et quasi aliud in alio in sapientia fierent omnia? Non sic docet ratio sed sic: 'Omnia in sapientia fecisti', hoc est: Sapientiam tuam omnia fecisti. Nam et sol iste uisibilis dum per se ipsum simplex ignis sit nullamque compositionem ab his quae sibi consubstantialia non sunt recipiat, omnium tamen sensibilibus naturam in se continet et comprehendit non ut aliud praeter se ipsum in se contineat sed ipse substantialiter est omne quod in se continet. Omnium nanque uisibilium substantia in ipso est creata. Non enim omnia corpora in quibus flagrat ueluti in alimonia sua consumeret si non prius eorum subsistentiae occasiones praestaret.

Solem nunc dico ipsam incomprehensibilem uirtutem quae diffunditur per totum hunc uisibilem mundum, quae propterea ignis dicitur quia intus in omnibus agitur, cuius fons maximus est corpus illud aetherium solis nomine appellatum, in quo et per quod manifestissimas

8-9 Gen. i. 1.

19-20, 24 Ps. ciii. 24.

1 locus RB^cP: locum B* 2 habitudinis RB: habitu diuinis P 4 nescientes R: nec scientes BP 5 lemma Quomodo intelligitur omnia in sapientia fecisti Rm 11 de se genito B^c(C)P: suo RB* sapientia sua B^c(C)P: unigenito RB* 12 in om. P conderet RB: condiderit P 15 nec ueritas in ras. R(C) nisi uerum B^c(C)P: figmentum RB* 20 Vim RB: Cum P nunquid R^cBP: nun**quid R* 23 alio RBP^c: alia P* 26 consubstantialia RB^cP: consubstantia B* 28 aliud R^cBP: aliud R* 28-29 sed-continet om. sed postea addidit in marg. sP 29 nanque R^cB: nanquae R*: namque P

keenness of the mind when it is sought becomes subject to the bodily senses. Therefore there is no place for that nothing, that is the privation of all habit and essence, from which all things are thought by those of limited understanding who do not know what Holy Theology means by that name, to have been made.

A. I am amazed how, although the things which have now been said by you are stumbling-blocks to many and are far removed from those who seem to philosophize, yet true reason declares them to be very true, and the authority of Holy Scripture when it is more carefully considered teaches and preaches the same. For it says, 'In the Beginning God made heaven and earth', that is, In God the Son God the Father established the universe of the whole creature visible and invisible. And what would the Father establish in the Beginning *that was begotten of Him*, in His Word, His Wisdom, that was not the Son Himself? Otherwise He would be establishing, not in Him but outside Him, something that He received from elsewhere or made out of nothing. Or how would the Word suffer to be made within Himself something that was not consubstantial with Himself? For light does not permit within itself darkness <that it has received from elsewhere> nor truth receive within itself anything *but what is true*. But that cannot be true which was not always eternal, nor that eternal which is made from the privation of all eternity and essence. Or what else would the Father make in His Wisdom but that Wisdom itself? For the Prophet says, 'Thou madest all things in Wisdom.' Note the force of the words. Was it as though in some place or space that God built a kind of house in His Wisdom not in order that it should be made all things substantially, but merely that it should contain all things and that all things were made in Wisdom as one thing in another? Not so does reason teach, but as follows: 'Thou madest all things in Wisdom', that is, Thou madest Thy Wisdom all things. For even this visible sun, although in itself it is simple fire and receives no composition from things which are not consubstantial with itself, yet contains within itself and comprehends the nature of all sensible things, not that it contains within itself anything other than itself, but itself is substantially everything that it contains in itself. For the substance of all visible things is created in it. For it would not consume as its sustenance all bodies in which it burns if it did not first furnish the occasions of their subsistence.

By the sun I here mean that incomprehensible power which is diffused through the whole of this visible world, which is called fire for that reason that it acts within in all things, of which the principal source is that ethereal body which is called by the name of 'sun', in

31 consumeret R^cBP: consumeret R* 33 lemma Quare dicitur ignis et de natura solis Rm 33-34 diffunditur R^cBP: difunditur R* 36 solis RB: solus P

operationis suae uirtutes manifestat, lucem dico et calorem. Caetera uero omnia corpora quae nascuntur in mundo et nutriuntur occultissimis suis operationibus administrat et fit ubique totus et de se ipso in se ipso in omnibus factus, erumpens in omnia uisibiliter, consumens omnia in se ipsum inuisibiliter. Hinc non immerito dicit scriptura: 'Girans girando uadit spiritus et in locum suum reuertitur.' Spiritus enim igneus eximia suae naturae subtilitate lustrat omnia et fit in omnibus omnia et in se ipsum reuertitur, quoniam omnium uisibilium fons substantialis et origo est ideoque a Grecis ΦΟΕΤΟΝ appellatur, hoc est reuertens. Lustratis siquidem omnibus et uisibiliter et inuisibiliter mundanis corporibus in se ipsum redit et in se ipsum omnia reuocat quae ab ipso principium generationis suae accipiunt. Hinc etiam sancti theologi superessentialem diuinam et informem essentiam ut ait sanctus Dionysius in igne saepe describunt tanquam habente multas diuinae, si fas dicere, proprietatis quantum in uisibilibus imagines.

Quid autem eo nomine quod est nihilum sancta significat theologia explanari a te peto.

De nihilo per excellentiam

N. Ineffabilem et incomprehensibilem diuinam bonitatis inaccessibilemque claritatem omnibus intellectibus siue humanis siue angelicis incognitam—superessentialis est enim et supernaturalis—eo nomine significatam crediderim, quae dum per se ipsam cogitatur neque est neque erat neque erit—in nullo enim intelligitur existentium quia superat omnia—, dum uero per condensationem quandam ineffabilem in ea quae sunt mentis obtutibus inspicitur ipsa sola inuenitur in omnibus esse et est et erat et erit. Dum ergo incomprehensibilis intelligitur per excellentiam nihilum non immerito uocatur, at uero in suis theophaniis incipiens apparere ueluti ex nihilo in aliquid dicitur procedere, et quae proprie super omnem essentiam existimatur proprie quoque in omni essentia cognoscitur ideoque omnis uisibilis et inuisibilis creatura theophania, id est diuina apparitio, potest appellari. Omnis siquidem ordo naturarum a summo usque deorsum, hoc est ex celestibus essentiis usque ad extrema mundi huius uisibilis corpora, in quantum occultius intelligitur in tantum diuinam claritati appropinquare uidetur.

Proinde a theologia caelestium uirtutum inaccessibilis claritas saepe nominatur tenebrositas. Nec mirum cum et ipsa summa

6 Eccl. i. 6.

14 CH xv. 2; PG iii. 329A 9–12.

1 operationis R^cBP: operationes R* 3 occultissimis R^cBP: occultissimis R* totus RB: totius P 5 consumens R^cBP: consummens R* inuisibiliter RB: uisibiliter P 7–8 Spiritus—reuertitur om. P 10 siquidem in ras. R(C) 14 dionysius RB: dionysius P 16 imagines RB: imaginibus P 17 lemma De nihilo R(C) uide infra est om. P 19 lemma BP uide supra 20 lemma Quare diuina bonitas nichilum uocatur et quomodo intelligatur (sic) tenebre

which and through which it manifests the most evident powers of its operation, I mean light and heat. But it administers all the other bodies which are born and nourished in the world by its most hidden operations and is made in its totality everywhere, and from itself in itself it is made in all things, breaking out into all things visibly, consuming all things into itself invisibly. Hence it is not unwarrantably that Scripture says, 'Gyrating in a gyre the spirit goes forth and returns into its own place.' For the fiery spirit because of the exceeding subtlety of its nature traverses all things and is made all things in all things, and returns into itself, since it is the substantial source and origin of all visible things and for that reason is called by the Greeks φοιτῶν, that is to say, 'The Returning One'. For, after traversing all the bodies of the world both visibly and invisibly it returns into itself and calls back into itself all things which receive the beginning of their generation from it. Hence also the holy theologians often represent the superessential divine and formless essence, as St. Dionysius says, by fire, for it images the divine property, if one may say so, visibly in many ways.

But I beg you to explain what Holy Theology means by that name of 'Nothing'.

N. I should believe that by that name is signified the ineffable and incomprehensible and inaccessible brilliance of the Divine Goodness which is unknown to all intellects whether human or angelic—for it is superessential and supernatural—, which while it is contemplated in itself neither is nor was nor shall be, for it is understood to be in none of the things that exist because it surpasses all things, but when, by a certain ineffable descent into the things that are, it is beheld by the mind's eye, it alone is found to be in all things, and it is and was and shall be. Therefore so long as it is understood to be incomprehensible by reason of its transcendence it is not unreasonably called 'Nothing', but when it begins to appear in its theophanies it is said to proceed, as it were, out of nothing into something, and that which is properly thought of as beyond all essence is also properly known in all essence, and therefore every visible and invisible creature can be called a theophany, that is, a divine apparition. For every order of natures from the highest to the lowest, that is, from the celestial essences to the last bodies of this visible world, the more secretly it is understood, the closer it is seen to approach the divine brilliance.

Hence the inaccessible brilliance of the celestial powers is often called by theology darkness. Nor is this surprising when even the

eius etiam et lumen eius quare informis materia dicatur Rm 22 crediderim R^c(C)BP: credo R* 26 inuenitur in omnibus RB: in omnibus inuenitur P 28 incipiens: ens s. parere eras. R 29 proprie RB^cP: propriae B* 33 essentiis RB: excellentiis P

Concerning 'Nothing' through transcendence

sapientia cui appropinquant saepissime tenebrarum uocabulo significetur. Audi Psalmistam: 'Sicut tenebrae eius ita et lumen eius', ac si aperte diceret: tantus est diuinae bonitatis splendor ut non immerito uolentibus eum contemplari et non ualentibus uertetur in tenebras. Solus enim, ut ait Apostolus, 'inaccessibilem possidet 5 lucem'.

In quantum uero longius ordo rerum deorsum descendit in tantum contemplantium obtutibus manifestius se aperit, ideoque formae ac species rerum sensibilibus manifestarum theophaniarum nomen accipiunt. Diuina igitur bonitas quae propterea nihilum dicitur 10 quoniam ultra omnia quae sunt et quae non sunt in nulla essentia inuenitur ex negatione omnium essentiarum in affirmationem totius uniuersitatis essentiae a se ipsa in se ipsam descendit ueluti ex nihilo 681C in aliquid, ex inessentialitate in essentialitatem, ex informitate in formas innumerabiles et species. Prima siquidem ipsius progressio 15 in *primordiales causas* in quibus fit ueluti informis quaedam materia a scriptura dicitur, materia quidem quia initium est essentiae rerum, informis uero quia informitati diuinae sapientiae proxima est.

Diuina autem sapientia informis recte dicitur quia ad nullam formam superiorem se ad formationem suam conuertitur. Est enim 20 omnium formarum infinitum exemplar, et dum descendit in diuersas uisibilibus et inuisibilibus formas ad se ipsam ueluti ad formationem 681D suam respicit. Proinde diuina bonitas super omnia considerata dicitur non esse et omnino nihil esse, in omnibus uero et est et dicitur esse quoniam totius uniuersitatis essentia est et substantia et genus et 25 species et quantitas et qualitas et omnium copula et situs et habitus et locus et tempus et actio et passio et omne quodcumque in omni 682A creatura et circa omnem creaturam a qualicumque intellectu potest intelligi. Et quisquis intentus sancti Dionysii uerba inspexerit haec ita se habere inueniet, ex quibus nunc pauca inserere non incongruum 30 uidetur et quae in prioribus nostrae sermocinationis processionibus ex ipso accepimus iterum repetere necessarium iudicamus.

'Age', inquit, 'optimum ut uere et existentium omnium substantificum laudemus. ΩΝ'—sic enim ipse Dionysius uocat deum—'totius 35 esse secundum uirtutem superessentialem est substituens causa et creator existentis subsistentiae substantiae essentiae naturae, principium

2 Ps. cxxxviii. 12. 5-6 cf. 1 Tim. vi. 16. 17 Gen. i. 2. 33-170.17 DN v. 4-5; PG iii. 817C 2-820A 9.

2 Sicut BP: Quia R: lege Quia sicut 8 contemplantium RB: contemplantium P 10 nihilum R^{BP}: nihil R* 14 lemma BP 16 in primordiales causas B^(C)P: in ea R: in omnia B* 17 lemma De materia informi R(C) initium RB: intrium P 26 quantitas et qualitas RB: qualitas et quantitas P 29 gl. marg. in libro de diuinis nominibus P dionysii RB: dionysii P 32 ipso RB: ipsa P 34 gl. marg. Glo<ssa> ΩΝ uocatur deus interpretatur autem proprie enas qui est P Dionysius deest RB*

most high Wisdom itself, which is what they approach, is very often signified by the word 'Darkness'. Hear the Psalmist: 'As His darkness so also is His light', as though he were saying openly; so great is the splendour of the Divine Goodness that, not unreasonably for those who desire to contemplate it and cannot, it shall be turned into darkness. For He alone, as the Apostle says 'possesseth the inaccessible light'.

But the further the order of things descends downwards, the more manifestly does it reveal itself to the eyes of those who contemplate it, and therefore the forms and species of sensible things receive the name of 'manifest theophanies'. Therefore the Divine Goodness which is called 'Nothing' for the reason that, beyond all things that are and that are not, it is found in no essence, descends from the negation of all essences into the affirmation of the essence of the whole universe; from itself into itself, as though from nothing into something, from non-essentiality into essentiality, from formlessness into innumerable forms and species. For its first progression *into the primordial causes* in which it is made is spoken of by Scripture as formless matter: matter because it is the beginning of the essence of things; formless because it comes nearest to the formlessness of the Divine Wisdom.

Now the Divine Wisdom is rightly called formless because it does not turn to any form above itself for its formation. For it is of all forms the undefined exemplar, and while it descends into the various forms of things visible and invisible it looks back to itself as to its formation. Therefore the Divine Goodness, regarded as above all things, is said not to be, and to be absolutely nothing, but in all things it both is and is said to be, because it is the Essence of the whole universe and its substance and its genus and its species and its quantity and its quality and the bond between all things and its position and habit and place and time and action and passion and everything whatsoever that can be understood by whatever sort of intellect in every creature and about every creature. And whosoever shall look carefully into the words of St. Dionysius will find that this is their meaning; and it does not seem inappropriate to introduce a few of them here, and we consider that it is necessary to repeat again the teaching we took from him in the earlier stages of our discourse.³⁵

'Come', he says, 'let us praise the Good as Him Who truly (exists), and the Maker of the substance of all things that exist: ὄν'—for so Dionysius himself calls God—'is by virtue of His superessential power the substantiating Cause and Creator of all that exists, of existence, of subsistence, of substance, of essence, of nature, the principle and the measure of ages, and the essentiality of times and

Concerning the progressions of the Most High Good into all things

et mensura saeculorum et temporum essentialitas et aeternitas existentium, tempus factorum, esse utcunque factis. Ex eo qui est aeternum et essentia et ΩΝ et tempus et generatio et factum in existenti essentialitas et utcunque subsistentia et substantia. Etenim deus nondum est ΩΝ sed simpliciter et incircumfinite totum in se ipso coambiens . . . Proinde et rex dicitur saeculorum tanquam in semet ipso et circa se ipsum totius esse et existentis substitutor et neque erat neque erit neque factus est neque fit nec fiet. Magis autem neque est sed ipse est esse existentibus et non existentia solum sed id ipsum esse existentium ex ante-aeternaliter existente.'

'Ipse enim est saeculum saeculorum subsistens ante saecula . . . quia omnibus existentibus et saeculis esse ex prouidente [est] et omne quidem saeculum et tempus ex ipso, totius saeculi et temporis et omnis utcunque existentis qui est ante [omnia] ΩΝ principium et causa et omnia ipsum participant et a nullo existentium recedit et ipse est ante omnia et omnia in se constituit. Et simpliciter, si quid utcunque est in ante-existente et est et intelligitur et saluatur.'

Et paulo post, post primordialium causarum explanationem, addit dicens: 'Esse autem ipsum existentibus omnibus nunquam deseritur. Ipsum uero esse ex ante-existente et ab ipso est esse et principium et mensura ante essentiam ΩΝ et non ipse esse et eum habet esse et ΩΝ et existentis et saeculi et omnium substantificum principium et medietas et consummatio et propterea ab eloquiis ipse uere ante ΩΝ iuxta omnem existentium intelligentiam multiplicatur et quod erat in ipso et quod est et quod erit et quod factum est et fit et fiet proprie laudatur. Haec enim omnia diuinitus intelligentibus secundum omnem excogitationem ipsum superessentialiter esse significant et ubique existentium causalem. Etenim neque quidem est hoc, hoc autem non est; neque ibi quidem est, ibi autem non est; sed omnia est ut causalis omnium, et in ipso omnia principia omnes conclusiones omnia existentia coambiens et praehabens et super omnia est ut ante omnia superessentialiter super ΩΝ.'

Quisquis horum uerborum uirtutem perspexerit nil aliud reperiet suadere, immo etiam pronuntiare, nisi ipsum deum omnium factorem esse et in omnibus factum; et dum super omnia quaeritur in nulla essentia inuenitur—nondum enim est esse—, dum uero in omnibus intelligitur nil in eis nisi solus ipse subsistit; et 'neque est

19-32 Ps.-Dionys. DN v. 8; PG iii. 821D 9-824B 4. 37-p. 172.1 Ps.-Dionys. DN v. 8; PG iii. 824D 14-15.

5 incircumfinite R: incircumfinitae BP 7 et (1) om. P 10 id deest R
16 quid B^cP: quis RB* 17 est (1) s. l. B 18 post (2) om. P 19 deseritur RB: deserit P 21 essentiam RB: essentia P 23 eloquiis RB: eloquis P 25 et quod est et q in ras. R 27 omnem RB: omnium P
significant RBP^c: significatur P*

the eternity³⁶ of things that exist, the time of things that are made, the being of whatever is made. From that which is (derive) eternity and essence and ὦν and time and becoming and that which is made, the essentiality in that which exists and whatever it has of subsistence and substance. For God is not yet ὦν, but He Who simply and Himself uncircumscribed embraces the whole in Himself. Therefore He is also called the King of Ages as substantiator of the whole of being and of what exists in Himself and about Himself; and He neither was nor shall be nor has become nor becomes nor shall become, nor indeed is; but He Himself is the being for the things that exist, and (he is) not only the things that exist but the very being of things that exist from Him Who exists before all ages.

For He is the age of ages, subsisting before the ages.' . . . For the being for the existents and the ages' [is] 'from Him Who foresees, and while every age and time (is) from Him, He Who is the Pre-ὦν (is) of all age and time and every existent whatsoever the Beginning and the Cause; and all things participate in Him, and from nothing of the things that exist does He withdraw Himself. And He is before all things, and has constituted all things in Himself. And in short, whatever is in any way, both is and is understood and is preserved in the Pre-Existent.'

And a little later, after an explanation of the primordial causes, he adds the words: 'But being itself is never bereft of all things that exist. Being itself, indeed, is from the Pre-Existent; and from it is being; and ὦν (is) the beginning and measure before essence and is not itself being; and being possesses it; and ὦν is the substantiating beginning and middle and end both of that which exists and of age and of all things; and therefore by the Oracles He Who is in truth Pre-ὦν is multiplied in every notion of the things that exist, and in Him is properly celebrated what was and what is and what shall be and what has become and what becomes and what shall become. For all these things signify to those who have a knowledge of the divine that it is superessentially in every notion, and the Cause of existent things everywhere. For neither is He this but not that; nor here but not there; but He is all things as the Cause of all things, embracing and holding beforehand all beginnings, all endings, all existent things, and He is above all things as the Super-ὦν which is superessentially before all things.'

Whoever looks into the meaning of these words will find that they teach, indeed proclaim, nothing else but that God is the Maker of all things and is made in all things; and when He is looked for above all things He is found in no essence—for as yet there is no essence—, but when He is understood in all things nothing in them subsists but Himself alone; and 'neither is He this', as he says, 'but not that', but

I hoc', ut ait ille, 'hoc autem non est' sed omnia est. Proinde ex super-
 II essentialitate suae naturae in qua dicitur non esse primum descen-
 III dens in primordialibus causis a se ipso creatur et fit principium omnis
 5 essentialitatis omnis uitae omnis intelligentiae et omnium quae in primor-
 683B dialibus causis gnostica considerat theoria, deinde ex primordialibus
 causis quae medietatem quandam inter deum et creaturam obtinent,
 hoc est inter illam ineffabilem superessentialitatem super omnem
 intellectum et manifestam substantialiter naturam puris animis con-
 spicuum, descendens in effectibus ipsarum fit et manifeste in theo-
 10 phaniis suis aperitur, deinde per multiplices effectuum formas usque
 ad extremum totius naturae ordinem quo corpora continentur proce-
 dit, ac sic ordinate in omnia proueniens facit omnia et fit in omnibus
 omnia, et in se ipsum redit reuocans in se omnia, et dum in omnibus
 fit super omnia esse non desinit, ac sic de nihilo facit omnia, de sua
 uidelicet superessentialitate producit essentias, de superuitalitate 15
 uitas, de superintellectualitate intellectus, de negatione omnium quae
 sunt et quae non sunt affirmationes omnium quae sunt et quae non
 sunt.

De eo quod superessen-
 tialis bonitas
 negatio et
 affirmatio
 omnium fit

Et hoc manifestissime docet omnium reditus in causam ex qua 683C
 praecesserunt quando omnia conuertentur in deum sicut aer in 20
 lucem, quando erit deus omnia in omnibus. Non quod etiam nunc
 non sit deus omnia in omnibus sed quod post praeuaricationem
 humanae naturae et expulsionem de sede paradisi, hoc est de alti-
 tudine spiritualis uitae et ex cognitione clarissimae sapientiae in
 profundissimas ignorantiae tenebras detrusae, nemo nisi diuina 25
 gratia illuminatus et in diuinorum mysteriorum altitudinem cum
 Paulo raptus quomodo deus omnia in omnibus est uerae intelligentiae
 contuitu potest perspicere, nube carnalium cogitationum uariarum-
 que phantasiarum caligine interposita mentisque acie irrationabili 683D
 libus passionibus infirmata et ex splendoribus perspicuae ueritatis
 30 repercusa consuetisque corporalibus umbris contenta. Non enim
 credendum est de caelestibus essentiis quae nunquam aeternae bea-
 titudinis statum deseruere aliud aliquid in uniuersa creatura praeter
 ipsum deum cognoscere. Siquidem in deo et in primordialibus
 causis super omnem sensum et intellectum omnia perspiciunt omni- 35
 bus naturae operibus ad cognoscendam ueritatem non indigentes,
 sola autem ineffabili gratia eterni luminis fruente ad quam uisionem 684A

21 I Cor. xv. 28. 27 cf. II Cor. xii. 4. 28-29 cf. 98.17 supra

1,5, 10 I, II, III in marg. RB 2 dicitur RB: deus P 6 quandam
 om. P obtinent BP: optinent R 7 omnem s.l. B 8 manifestam RB:
 manifestum P 10 aperitur RB: aperieter P 15 superuitalitate: ta s.l. B
 19 lemma BP reditus RB: reditur P 20 praecesserunt RB: processerunt P
 melius 26 illuminatus RB: illuminatur P 27 quomodo RB: quando
 P 27 uerae RB: uere P 29 mentisque: que s.l. B 30 per-

He is all. Therefore, descending first from the superessentiality of
 His Nature, in which He is said not to be, He is created by Himself
 in the primordial causes and becomes the beginning of all essence,
 of all life, of all intelligence, and of all things which the gnostic
 contemplation³⁷ considers in the primordial causes; then, descending
 from the primordial causes which occupy a kind of intermediate
 position between God and the creature, that is, between that in-
 effable superessentiality which surpasses all understanding and the
 substantially manifest nature which is visible to pure minds, He is
 made in their effects and is openly revealed in His theophanies; then
 He proceeds through the manifold forms of the effects to the lowest
 order of the whole of nature, in which bodies are contained; and
 thus going forth into all things in order He makes all things and is
 made all in all things, and returns into Himself, calling all things
 back into Himself, and while He is made in all things He does not
 cease to be above all things and thus makes all things from nothing,
 that is, He produces from His Superessentiality essences, from His
 Supervitality lives, from His Superintellectuality intellects, from the
 negation of all things which are and which are not the affirmations of
 all things which are and which are not.

And this is very clearly shown by the return of all things into the
 Cause from which they proceeded, when all things shall be con-
 verted into God as the air into light, when God shall be all in all.
 Not that even now God is not all in all, but after the sin of human
 nature and its expulsion from the abode of paradise, when, that is, it
 was thrust down from the height of the spiritual life and knowledge
 of the most clear wisdom into the deepest darkness of ignorance, no
 one unless illuminated by Divine Grace and rapt with Paul into the
 height of the Divine Mysteries can see with the sight of true under-
 standing how God is all in all, for there intervenes the cloud of
 fleshly thoughts and the darkness of variegated phantasies, and the
 keenness of the mind is weakened by the irrational passions, and is
 turned back from the splendours of clear truth and is held in the
 grasp of the bodily shadows to which it has become accustomed.
 For it is not to be believed of the celestial essences which have never
 abandoned the condition of eternal bliss that they know any other
 thing in the universal creature except God Himself. For in God and
 in the primordial causes they behold all things beyond every sense
 and intellect, since they do not require all the works of nature in
 order to see the truth, but use only the ineffable grace of the eternal
 light, and it was to bring human nature back to this vision that the

spicuae BP: perspicue R 31 repercusa RB: repercussa P 33 creatura
 BP: creaturae R praeter RB: propter P 34 lemma de caelestibus essentiis quae
 statum suum non deseruerunt Rm 35 lemma Et cur incarnatus sit filius dei Rm

That the
 Superessen-
 tial Goodness
 is made the
 negation and
 affirmation
 of all things

humanam naturam reducere dei uerbum incarnatum descendit, ipsam prius lapsam quam ad pristinum statum reuocaret accipiens, delictorum uulnera sanans, falsarum phantasiarum umbras extinguens, oculos mentis aperiens, se ipsum in omnibus his qui digni sunt tali uisione manifestans.

A. Haec ardua ualde sunt et a sensibus corporalia et uisibilia cogitantium remota. His uero qui supra uisibilia et temporalia spiritualiter in cognitionem ueritatis ascendunt uerissime et lucidissime clarescunt. Quis enim carnaliter uiuentium clarumque sapientiae lucem cernere nolentium talia audiens non continuo erumpat et proclamet: 'Insaniunt qui haec dicunt. Quomodo enim super omnia deus inuisibilis incorporealis incorruptibilis potest a se ipso descendere et se ipsum in omnibus creare ut sit omnia in omnibus et usque ad extremas huius mundi uisibilis turpitudines et corruptiones uilissimasque formas et species procedere ut ipse etiam in eis sit si omnia in omnibus est?' ignorans qui haec dicit nullam turpitudinem in uniuersitate totius creaturae posse esse, nullam malitiam ei nocere nullo errore falli uel seduci—quod enim partim contingit in toto fieri deus non sinit, cuius uniuersitatis nec turpitudine turpis est nec malitia nocet nec error errat. Turpiter quidem et maligne uiuentibus et a ueritate errantibus turpia honesta, mala bona, errantia recta, praua iusta putantur esse, quorum turpitudine et malitia et errore sublatis omnia pie intelligentibus pura perfecta impolluta ualde bona omni errore carentia remanent—et non cogitans quod sancta pronuntiat scriptura: 'Omne datum optimum et omne donum perfectum desursum est descendens a patre luminum', dati quidem uocabulo omnium rerum substantiales constitutiones, doni uero uirtutes quibus ornatur uniuersa natura declarans, et hoc totum, substantia uidelicet et uirtus, descendit a patre luminum, hoc est ex fonte omnium bonorum deo, qui in omnia quae sunt et quae non sunt profluens in omnibus fit, sine quo nihil esse potest. Sed ut opinor satis de nihilo de quo omnia deus fecit actum est.

N. Sat profecto sed cursim repetendum. Neque haec dicimus illorum sensum refutantes qui de nihilo quo totius habitudinis priuatio significatur deum omnia fecisse arbitrantur, non autem de nihilo quo superessentialitas et supernaturalitas diuinae bonitatis a theologis innuitur, in theolo[g]icis siquidem regulis ad inuestigandam diuinae naturae sublimitatem et incomprehensibilitatem plus

25-26 Iac. i. 17.

2 accipiens RB: accipietis P 6 et a RB: ita P 9 clarumque RB: datamque P 11 proclamet RB: clamet P 13 se RB^c(C)P: om. B* 14 extremas R^cBP: extremus R* uisibilis conieci: uisibiles codd. 26 dati RBP^c: data P* 30 in om. P 37 lemma BP: repetitio B: petitio P theologicis R^c(C)B^c(C)P: theoloicis R*B*

Incarnate Word of God descended, taking it upon Himself after it had fallen in order that He might recall it to its former state, healing the wounds of transgressions, sweeping away the shadows of false phantasies, opening the eyes of the mind, showing Himself in all things to those who are worthy of such a vision.

A. These matters are difficult indeed, and far removed from the senses of those who ponder corporeal and visible things. However, for those who ascend in the spirit above visible and temporal things into the knowledge of the truth they become manifest as very clear and very true. For which of those who live a carnal life and are unwilling to look upon the clear light of wisdom hearing such things would not at once break out and exclaim: 'They are mad who say such things. For how can the invisible, incorporeal, incorruptible God above all things descend from Himself and create Himself in all things so as to be all things in all things, and proceed as far as the lowest infamies and corruptions and the basest forms and species of this visible world so as to be Himself even in them, if He is all in all?' not knowing—he who says these things—that there can be no infamy in the universe of the whole creature, that no evil can harm it, that by no error can it be deceived or led astray—for that which affects it in part God does not permit to happen in the whole, for of its totality neither is the infamy infamous nor the evil harmful nor the error erroneous (true, to those who live an infamous or wicked life and who stray from the truth the honourable seems infamous, the good evil, the straight ways crooked, the righteous wicked; but when their infamy and evil and error are removed, they remain to those of pious understanding all that is pure, perfect, untarnished, truly good, free from all error)—and not thinking of what Holy Scripture declares: 'Every good gift and every perfect grace comes down from the Father of Lights', declaring by the word 'gift' the substantial constitutions of all things, and by 'grace' the virtues with which the universal nature is adorned; and this whole, namely substance and virtue, descends from the Father of Lights, that is, from the spring of all good things, God, Who, flowing forth into all things that are and that are not, is made in all things, without Whom there can be nothing. But, as I think, enough has been said concerning the Nothing from which God has made all things.

N. Enough surely but we must make a rapid recapitulation. By saying these things we are not refuting the interpretation of those who think that it was from the nothing by which is meant that privation of all possession that God made all things, and not from the Nothing by which is meant by the theologians the Superessentiality and Supernaturality of the Divine Goodness. For according to the

A recapitulation of the same things

negationis quam affirmationis uirtus ualet, quam si quis intentus in-
spexerit non mirabitur eo uocabulo quod est nihilum saepe in scri- 685A
pturis ipsum deum uocari.

[A. Nec ego miror cognoscens plus negationes quam affirmationes
diuinae cognitioni teste sancto Dionysio coaptari posse. 5

N. Non negabis ut opinor cuncta quae de nihilo facta esse scriptura
testatur unam quandam naturam communem omnibus cuius parti-
cipatione subsistunt secundum uniuscuiusque proportionem possi-
dere?

A. Hoc negare risu est dignum. Credimus nanque et intelligimus 10
deum simul et semel communem omnium rerum naturam creasse ex
cuius participatione fiunt omnia.

N. Putasne illam naturam de nihilo esse factam?

A. Non solum puto uerum etiam firmiter teneo non aliunde nisi
de nihilo productam. 15

N. Diffini illam naturam quid sit.

A. Non possum. Res enim adhuc infinita omniumque communis 685B
nec certis formis adhuc distincta uel speciebus quomodo diffiniri
possit non uideo.

N. Quid si quis summae sanctaeque auctoritatis tibi suaderet illam 20
naturam non aliud esse praeter dei uerbum, dixissesne eam de nihilo
factam esse—de illo nihilo dico quod priuationem totius essentiae et
substantiae et qualitatis significat?

A. Nequaquam. Quis enim dixerit dei uerbum de nihilo esse
factum dum sit omnium de nihilo faciens? Sed quis ille qui uerbum 25
dei naturam omnium esse non timuit dicere?

N. Audi sanctum Basilium in octaua omelia in Genesim: 'Neque
enim', inquit, 'quando audiuit terra: Germinet herbam foeni et
lignum fructiferum, occultum habens foenum produxit neque pal- 685C
mam aut quercum aut cypressum ante conspectum uisceribus suis 30

5 Cf. CH ii. 3; PG iii. 141A 2-7; DN xiii. 3; PG iii. 981B. 27-178.3 Hex.
viii; PG xxix. 164C.

1 si quis RB: sique P 3 gl. interlin. ∞ quere hoc signum ad finem capi-
tis (?) quaternionis Rm uide infra 4 Haec quae nunc ad finem quaternionis
quam ad lacunam R suppleuit sRm inueniuntur ad marg. f. 211v. lin. 7 ut signum ∞
insinuat pertinent, ubi haud dubium est quin a C scripta fuerint. Vide supra ∞
in marg. Rm A AvrB: Δ Cam: om. Rm; lacuna P Nec RB: Haec P ego
RB: ergo P post affirmationes congrue Avr: congruere s.l. Cam 5 dionysio
B; dionysio AvrRm: dyonysio CamP: Dionys. in marg. rec. man. Cam coaptari
AvrCamBP: captari Rm 6 N B: D-C R: lacuna P negabis AvrCamB: negabit
Rm: negaris P 7 communem om. Rm 10 A AvrRmB: Δ Cam: lacuna P
risu est dignum RmCamB: risum est dignum P: dignum est risu Avr 12 fiunt
RmBP: sunt AvrCam 13 N B: D-C R: lacuna P nihilo BP: nichilo R
14 A RmB: Δ AvrCam: lacuna P nisi s.l. Avr 15 nihilo BP: nichilo R
16 N B: D-C R: lacuna P 17 A RB: lacuna P infinita AvrRmBP: distincta
Cam 18 nec RmBP: ne AvrCam uel s.l. P 20 lemma natura omnium

rules of theology the power of negation is stronger than that of
affirmation for investigating the sublimity and incomprehensibility
of the Divine Nature; and anyone who looks into it closely will not
be surprised that often in the Scriptures God Himself is called by
that name of Nothing.³⁸

[A. Nor am I surprised, knowing on the authority of St. Dionysius
that negations are more apt for divine knowledge than affirmations.³⁹

N. You will not deny, as I think, that all things that Scripture
avers to have been made from nothing possess a single nature com-
mon to all, by participation in which they subsist each in its due
proportion?

A. To deny this would be ridiculous. For we believe and under-
stand that God has created all together and at once the common
nature of all things by participation in which (nature) all things are
made.

N. Do you think that that nature was made out of nothing?

A. I not only think but firmly maintain that it was produced from
nowhere else but from nothing.

N. Define what that nature is.

A. I cannot. For I do not see how a thing which is as yet infinite
and common to all and not yet distinguished by any sure form or
species can be defined.

N. How if someone of most high and holy authority were to 21
persuade you that that nature was nothing else than the Word of
God? Would you have said that it was made from nothing?—I mean
from that nothing that means the privation of the whole of essence
and substance and quality?

A. Certainly not. For who would say that the Word of God was
made from nothing seeing that it is that which makes all things from
nothing? But who is he who was not afraid to say that the Word of
God is the nature of all things?

N. Listen to St. Basil in the Eighth Homily on Genesis: 'For
neither', he says, 'when the earth heard, Let it bring forth the grow-
ing grass and the fruit-bearing tree, did it produce grass which it held
hidden, nor did it bring out to the surface palm or oak or cypress
which, before (coming into) sight, were hidden in its womb. But

dei uerbum esse AvrCam: omnium s.l. Avr xxi in marg. Avr N B: D-C R:
lacuna P tibi RB: ubi P 21 xxi in marg. Cam uide supra eam RB: tam P
21-22 nichilo... nichilo R: nihilo... nihilo BP 22 dico AvrCamBP: om. Rm
23 qualitatis RB^oP: qualitates B* 24 A AvrRmB: Δ Cam: lacuna P nichilo
R: nihilo BP 25 omnium AvrCamBP: omnia Rm 27 N B: D-C R: lacuna P
sanctum RB: enim P bas in marg. rec. man. Cam 28 foeni BP: feni R
29 xvii in marg. rec. man. Cam foenum BP: fenum R 30 cypressum
AvrCamP: cupressum Rm: cypresum B

occulta eduxit in superficiem sed diuinum uerbum natura est eorum quae facta sunt. Producat: non quod habet depromat sed quod non habet creet, deo donante operationis uirtutem.'

Intende quam fiducialiter pronuntiauit naturam omnium quae facta sunt dei uerbum esse ac nulla tibi suspicio surrepat existimandi quod aliud sit dei uerbum aliud eius praeceptum. Id ipsum nanque in eo est et esse et omnia esse iubere. Essendo enim ipsum fiunt omnia quoniam ipsum omnia est. Et ut certius cognoscas dei uerbum et naturam omnium esse et consubstantiale patri ante omnia et in omnibus quae in eo facta sunt creatum audi Ecclesiasten: 'Sapientiam dei', inquit, 'praecedentem omnia quis inuestigauit?'—ecce coaeternitatem patri et coessentialitatem. Et continuo sequitur: 'Primo omnium creata est sapientia'—ecce in creaturis factum. Audi euangelium: 'Quod factum est in ipso uita erat.' Nam quod alibi in Salomone legitur: 'Dominus creauit me in initio uiarum suarum', alii de incarnatione uerbi, alii de natiuitate eius ex patre accipiunt quorum sensus credibilior mihi uidetur.]

De his autem qui de eo nihilo quod totius essentiae priuationem significat uel absentiam mundum factum fuisse arbitrantur quid dicam ignoro. Non enim uideo quare non considerant oppositorum naturam. *Siquidem* priuatio[nem] non potest esse ubi non est habitus essentiae. Priuatio nanque habitudinis est priuatio, ac per hoc ubi non praecedit habitus non sequitur priuatio. Quomodo ergo dicunt de priuatione mundum factum esse? *Si enim* hoc uerum esset constaret ipsum mundum habitudinem quandam habuisse priusquam fieret. *At si sic* quomodo habitudinis suae priuationem pateretur dum iam non erat aut si erat non de priuatione sui erat? Si uero nullo modo erat priusquam fieret omni habitudine caruisse nemo sapientum dubitat. *At si omni* habitudine caruit quomodo [de] priuatione habitudinis suae fieri potuit quam numquam habuit?

Eadem ratio est de absentia. Absentia nanque est rei cuiusdam praesentis uel praesens fieri ualentis a sensibus ablatio. Si ergo mundus de absentia factus est praecessit aliqua natura cuius habitudinis

11 Eccles. i. 3. 13 Eccles. i. 4. 14 In. i. 3-4. 15 Prou. viii. 22.

1 occulta RB: occultam P 2 non om. Rm: s.l. Cam 5 dei uerbum BP: uerbum dei R: uerbum s.l. Rm: dei ex domini Rm ac RmBP: ut AvrCam tibi suspicio AvrCamBP: suspicio tibi Rm suspicio RmCamBP: suspitio AvrB* subrepat RB*: surrepat B*(C)P 7 est et esse RB: esse est P 8 fiunt omnia AvrCamBP: omnia fiunt Rm 9 consubstantiale B^c: consubstantialem RB*P 11 Sapientiam . . . praecedentem RB: Sapientia . . . praecedente P dei inquit RmBP: inquit dei AvrCam 14 ipso RmCamBP: Christo Avr 15 in Avr^cCam^c: om. Avr*RmCam*BP 16 natiuitate RB: natiuitatem P 17 michi R: mihi BP 18 lemma Contra eos qui de nichilo quod est priuatio conditus (sic) putant omnis facta (sic) esse Rm 18-19 priuationem significat uel absentiam RB: negationem significat uel habitudinis eius priuationem P 21 Siquidem in ras. R(C) 22 nanque R*BP: Nam R* 23 ergo in ras. R 24 Si enim in ras. R(C) 26 At

the Divine Word is the nature of the things that are made. Let it bring forth: not, Let it bring out what it holds, but, What it does not hold let it create, God granting the power for the operation.'

Notice how faithfully he has declared that the nature of all things that have been made is the Word of God and let no suggestion steal upon you of thinking that the Word of God is one thing and His command another. For in Him both being and commanding all things to be are the same thing. For by being all things become it since it is all things. And that you may the better know that the Word of God is both the nature of all things and consubstantial with the Father before all things and is created in all things that are made in it, listen to Ecclesiastes: 'Who', he asks, 'has investigated the Wisdom of God which precedes all things?'—there you have the coeternity and coessentiality with the Father—and goes straight on to say: 'Wisdom was created first of all things'—there you have it made among the creatures. Listen to the Gospel: 'That which was made in Him was Life.' For what is read elsewhere in Solomon, 'The Lord created me in the beginning of His ways', some accept as a reference to the Incarnation of the Word, others, whose interpretation seems to me the more credible, to His begetting by the Father.]

But concerning those who think that the world was made from that nothing which means the privation or absence of the whole of essence I do not know what to say. For I do not see why they do not bethink them of the nature of opposites. For it is impossible that there should be privation where there is not possession of essence. For privation is the privation of possession, and therefore where possession does not precede privation does not follow. How, then, do they say that the world was made from privation? For if this were true it would be agreed that the world had some possession before it was made. *But if so*, how would it come to suffer the privation of its possession at a time when it was not or, if it was, did not derive its being from the privation of itself? But if it was not at all before it was made, none of the wise doubts but that it lacked all possession. But if it lacked all possession, how could it be made [from] the privation of a possession which it never possessed?

It is the same case with absence. For absence is the removal from the senses of some thing which was present or could become present. If, therefore, the world was made from absence, there was before it some nature such that from the privation of the possession of it or the absence of its essence there arose the occasion for the establishment of

si sic in ras. R(C) At ex Ac B 30 potuit RB: potuerit P 31 Eadem-absentia RB: Eadem ratio est de essentiae negatione P Quaternionem ex R perditam suppleuit Rm. Vide supra 176 31-32 Absentia-ablatio RB: est enim negatio rei existentis uel fieri ualentis perfecta absentia P 33 absentia CamBP: essentia AvrRm

priuatio uel essentiae absentia condendi mundi occasio facta est, et ipsa natura aut deus aut creatura erat, et si deus, cogentur fateri ex diuinae naturae priuatione habitudinis uel essentiae absentia mundum factum fuisse, si uero creatura, necessario aut uisibilis aut inuisibilis erat; si uisibilis, alium mundum uisibilem praecessisse debemus credere, si inuisibilis, qua ratione cogimur concedere de inuisibilis naturae absentia mundum istum factum fuisse aut etiam penitus ullum mundum praecessisse? Si uero uniuersitatem totius uisibilis et inuisibilis naturae de nihilo factam esse uera docet ratio nullamque naturam praeter ipsum deum praecessisse, quomodo de absentia uel priuatione rerum quae nunquam erant mundus factus est non intelligo.

Si uero quis dixerit neque priuationem habitudinis neque absentiam alicuius praesentiae nihili nomine significari sed uniuersalem totius habitudinis et essentiae uel substantiae uel accidentis et simpliciter omnium quae dici et intelligi possunt negationem, concludetur sic: Eo igitur uocabulo deum uocari necesse est qui solus negatione omnium quae sunt proprie innuitur quia super omne quod dicitur et intelligitur exaltatur, qui nullum eorum quae sunt et quae non sunt est, qui melius nesciendo scitur. Ac per hoc inter nos qui uidebatur dissentire conueniet.

Si autem responderit: Neque illam negationem dico nihilo significari qua negatur deus esse quid eorum quae sunt, sed illam quae negat deum et creaturam, necessario fatebitur quod negare conabatur, hoc est de negatione priuatiua dei et creaturae mundum factum esse. Mundus siquidem de materia informi factus est, materia informis de omnino nihilo, ac per hoc et mundus de omnino nihilo. Non enim ut opinor audebit dicere omne quod est aut deus aut creatura est aut nec deus nec creatura. Nam si dixerit, inter eos qui dicunt materiam deo coaeternam esse computabitur, de qua deus mundum fecisse ab eis putabatur. At si omne quod est aut deus aut creatura est—et nemo sanum sapiens aestimarit mundum de negatione dei et creaturae factum—relinquitur sola illa negatio ad causam mundi faciendi quae ablatione totius creaturae super omne quod dicitur et intelligitur deum exaltans nihil eorum quae sunt et quae non sunt eum esse pronuntiat.

Est etiam maximum de hac ratione argumentum: Si duo quaedam

20 Cf. Aug., *De ord.* ii. 44. 26–27 cf. 66.23–24 *supra*.

4–7 si uero—factum fuisse *om.* P 5 praecessisse B: praecessisse R 7 etiam BP: eam R 8 ullum B^cP: *deest* RB* praecessisse B: praecessisse RP 9 nihilo BP: nichilo R esse RmBP: fuisse AvrCam 10 praecessisse B praecessisse RP: 13–14 absentiam RB: dissentiam P 14 praesentiae RB: essentiae P ni(c)hili RmB: nichilo AvrCam: nihil P 17 negatione RB: negatio P 18 omne RB: omnem P 20–21 inter nos qui uidebatur RB: inter nos et illum qui

the world; and that nature was either God or creature; and if God, they will be forced to admit that the world was made from the privation of possessing the Divine Nature or the absence of its essence; but if creature, it was necessarily either visible or invisible; if visible, we ought to believe that another visible world preceded; if invisible, what reason compels us to admit that this world has been made from the absence of an invisible nature, or even that any world preceded it at all? But if true reason teaches that the universe of the whole visible and invisible nature was made from nothing, and that no nature but God Himself preceded it, how the world was made from the absence or deprivation of things that never were I do not understand.

But if one should say that neither deprivation of possession nor the absence of some presence is meant by the name 'Nothing', but the total negation of possession and essence or of substance or of accident or, in a word, of all things that can be said or understood, the conclusion will be this: So that is the name by which it is necessary to call God, Who alone is what is properly meant by the negation of all things that are, because He is exalted above everything that is said or understood, Who is none of the things that are and are not, Who by not knowing is the better known. And so agreement will be reached between us, who seemed to disagree.

But if he should answer: Nor do I say that by 'Nothing' is meant that negation by which God is said not to be anything of the things that are, but that which negates God and creature, he will of necessity be admitting what he was trying to deny, namely, that it is from the privative negation of God and creature that the world has been made. For the world is made from formless matter, formless matter from nothing at all, and therefore the world also from nothing at all. For he will not, as I think, dare to say that everything that is is either God or creature or neither God nor creature. For if he does, he will be counted among those who say that matter, from which they think God made the world, is coeternal with God. But if everything that is is either God or creature—for no one who is truly wise would reckon that the world is made from the negation of God and the creature—there is left for the cause of the making of the world only that negation which by discarding the whole creature and exalting God above everything that is said or understood declares Him to be nothing of those things which are and which are not.

There is also a very good argument in support of this reasoning: uidebantur P 22 nihilo BP: nichilo R 25 priuatiua RB: uel priuatione P dei *om.* R 27 nihilo (1) BP: nichilo R nihilo (2) BP: nichilo R 28 quod est RB: quidem P 29 aut *om.* P 34 quae ablatione RB: qua ablatione P omne RB: omnem P 35 nihil BP: nichil R 37 etiam BP: enim R hac RB: hoc P

sunt deus et creatura, aut ab uno principio sunt ac per hoc eiusdem naturae—non enim ex principio uno nascuntur contraria secundum naturam, sui nanque principii naturam attrahunt;—aut per se duo principia sunt sibimet aduersa—nam si consubstantialia, non sunt duo sed unum, si autem deus et creatura, non sunt duo sed unum et unum—; aut aequalia sunt et nullum ex altero. Si enim duo, ex uno nasci necesse est. Si autem deus ex nullo, creatura uero ex deo, erit unum ex altero et non sunt aequalia. Vnum nanque ab aequali sibi uno non gignitur. At si creatura ex deo, erit deus causa, creatura autem effectus. Si autem nil aliud est effectus nisi causa facta, sequitur deum causam in effectibus suis fieri. Non enim ex causa in effectus suos procedit quod a sui natura alienum sit. Siquidem in calorem et in lucem nil aliud nisi ipsa uis ignea erumpit.

Si autem quis dixerit unum aequale sibi unum gignit—nam et deus pater dum sit unum aequale sibi unum deum filium gignit—cognoscat se nimium errare. Summa siquidem sancta trinitas non est unum et unum et unum sed simplex et indiuiduum unum in tribus inseparabilibus substantiis, et illud unum multiplex uirtute est, non numero, et non aliquid unum est sed uniuersaliter et infinite unum, et super omne unum quod dici uel intelligi potest. Vno ergo ab uno, non unum ab uno, filius a patre. Sed contra eos qui dogmatizant nunc nobis sermo non est. Hoc tantum proposuimus quantum uires suppetebant inuestigare quid eo nomine quod est nihilum de quo deus creditur fecisse mundum significatur.

A. Quisquis de constitutione mundi rationem reddere desiderat suis sequacibus eligat quid suadeat. Nos autem nostrae ratiocinationis iter teneamus, et quoniam prope modum inter nos est confectum omnia ex deo et deum in omnibus esse et non aliunde nisi ex ipso facta esse—quoniam ex ipso et per ipsum et in ipso facta sunt omnia—, quomodo quadripertita totius naturae discretio deo conueniat plane ac breuiter recapitules flagito.

In disputationibus nanque et maxime de obscuris rebus multum ualet ANAKEΦΑΛΕΟCIC, hoc est recapitulatio. Breuiter enim

2 principio uno AvrCamBP: uno principio Rm nascuntur s.l. Rm 4 si
 consubstantialia RmCamB^oP: sicut substantialia AvrB^o 5 et (2) AvrCamBP:
 aut Rm 7 deus AvrCamBP: deum Rm 9 At si—causa RmBP: At si
 creatura ex deo erit, erit deus causa AvrCam 11 causam RmBP: om. AvrCam
 12 a RB^c: ad B^o: om. P in (2) RB: om. P 14 quis RmCamBP: om. Avr
 15 unum deum RB: om. P 16 nimium RB: ni mirum P 17 sed
 AvrCamBP: et Rm in ante indiuiduum erasum B 19 aliquid RB: aliquid P
 sed RB: sub P 23 nihilum BP: nichilum R 24 significatur RBP^c: significat
 ut P^o 25 A Avr BP: D RmCam 26 quid AvrCamBP: quod Rm 27 lemma
 xxiii Recapitulatio quomodo quadripertita naturae discretio deo conueniat AvrCam:
 Recapitulati—conueniat et testimonium Augustini de Socrate Rm 29 sunt
 AvrCamBP: facit Rm 32 In maiusculis litteris nouum paragraphum incipit in
 AvrCam de obscuris rebus RmBP: de rebus obscuris AvrCam 33 lem-
 ma B ANAKEΦΑΛΕΟCIC RBP^c: ANAKEΦΑΛΕΟCIC P^o

If God and the creature are two, either they derive from one principle and are therefore of the same nature—for from one principle there are not born things that are contrary by nature, for they draw upon the nature of their principle—; or they are of themselves two principles opposed to one another—for if consubstantial they are not two but one, but if they are God and creature they are not two but one and one—or they are equal and not one from the other. For if they are two they must necessarily be born of one. But if God (is) from nothing, but the creature from God, one will come from the other and they are not equal. For a one is not born of a one that is equal to itself. But if the creature (is) from God, God will be the Cause, but the creature the effect. But if an effect is nothing else but a made cause, it follows that God the Cause is made in His effects. For nothing proceeds from a cause into its effects that is foreign to its nature. For what breaks out into heat and light is nothing else but the fiery force itself.

But if someone should say that the One begets a one equal to itself—for even God the Father, while being one, begets a One equal to Himself, God the Son—, let him know that he has fallen into gross error. For the most high Holy Trinity is not one and one and one but a simple and indivisible One in three inseparable Substances, and that One is multiple in power, not in number, and not any one, but universally and infinitely One, and above every one that can be said or understood. Therefore the Son (is) from the Father (as) ‘uno’ from ‘uno’, not as ‘unum’ from ‘uno’. But our present discourse is not an attack on the dogmatizers. This alone is what we set ourselves to investigate, in so far as our resources allowed us: What is meant by the name ‘Nothing’ from which we believe that God made the world?

A. Let whoever wishes to give an account of the establishment of the world propound to his followers whatever teaching he likes; for our part, let us keep to the track of our reasoning, and since it is more or less agreed between us that all things are from God and that God is in all things and that they were made from nowhere but from Him—since from Him and through Him and in Him all things are made—I beg you to give a clear and brief summary of the way in which the fourfold division of nature is applicable to God.

For in disputations, and especially when they deal with obscure matters, an ἀνακεφαλαίωσις, that is, a recapitulation, is of great value. For it recalls to the memory all that has been said before in

aperteque praedicta omnia in memoriam reuocat mentisque obtutibus cuncta quae acta sunt simul manifestat.

N. De deo ut opinor inter nos conuenerat quod totius uniuersitatis conditae principium sit et medium et finis—non quod aliud eius sit esse principium aliud medium aliud finis—haec enim tria in ipso unum sunt—sed quod theologicae contemplationis triplex motus sit. Aliter enim mouetur intellectus siue humanus siue angelicus considerans principium omnium deum esse, aliter cognoscens omnia in ipso et per ipsum esse ueluti in quadam medietate, aliter contemplatur finem omnium in deo esse et deum, quem omnia appetunt et in quo quiescunt et uiuunt. Cui sensui fauet sanctus Augustinus in octauo de ciuitate dei tertio capitulo de Socrate philosopho disputans. 'Nolebat', inquit, 'inmundos terrenis cupiditatibus animos se extendere in diuina conari, quando quidem ab eis causas rerum uidebat inquiri quas primas atque summas non nisi in unius ac summi dei uoluntate esse credebatur. Vnde non eas putabat nisi mundata mente posse comprehendere, et ideo purgandae bonis moribus uitae censebat instandum ut deprimentibus libidinibus exoneratus animus naturali uigore in aeterna se attolleret naturamque incorporei et incommutabilis luminis ubi causae omnium factarum naturarum stabiliter uiuunt intelligentiae puritate conspiceret.'

A. Perplane conuenerat quia ratio approbabat.

N. Dum ergo de diuina natura pure percipimus quod omnium principium sit et causa—est enim ANAPXOC et ANETION, hoc est sine principio et sine causa, siquidem nil praecedit quod ei principii uel causae proportionem obtineat, ipsa uero omnium quorum causa et principium est naturam creat—non immerito eam dicimus creatricem naturam et non creatam; creat nanque et a nullo creari patitur. Eandem uero, diuinam scilicet naturam, finem omnium esse, ultra quem nihil et in quo omnia aeternaliter subsistunt et uniuersaliter deus sunt, cognoscentes, neque creatam neque creatricem rite uocamus, non creatam quidem quia a nullo creatur, neque creatricem quia iam desinit creare, omnibus in suas aeternas rationes in quibus

12–13 Aug. De ciu. Dei viii. 3.

2 manifestat BP: manifesta sunt R 3 N BP: C—C R 4 conditae B: condite RP eius B: ei RP eius (ei) sit AvrCamBP: sit ei Rm 9 medietate RB: medietatem P 13 philosopho AvrCamBP: philosopho Rm 13 lemma B: Augustinus de Socrate P inmundos BP: in mundo Rm*: in mundos Avr Rm^c: in inmundos Cam 13–14 cupiditatibus AvrCamBP: cupiditatibus Rm 16 post Vnde et P eas RBP*: eos P^c 19 exoneratus RB: exoneratur P 22 A RmBP: Δ AvrCam Perplane BP: Plane R approbabat B: approbat *al. codd.* 23 lemma BP: post deo solo P N et A omissa inseruit B N B^cP: C—C R de *s.l.* B 24 ANAPXOC BP: anarchos AvrCam: anapXOC Rm ANETION AvrCamB: AΩ—C etion *ex* AΩ—C ation Rm: ANETION P 25 principio RB: principium P ei AvrCamBP: eius Rm 28 creari patitur Cam BP: creatur Avr: creari potest Rm 29 diuinam scilicet AvrCamBP: scilicet diuinam Rm 29 *gl.* omnia sunt id quod deus est *in marg.* Cam 30 nihil

brevity and clarity, and displays to the mind's eye in a single view all that has been done.

N. Concerning God we had agreed, as I think, that of the whole established universe He is the Beginning and the Middle and the End—not that His being the Beginning is one thing, His being the Middle another, and His being the End another, for these three in Him are one—but because in theological contemplation there is a triple movement. For the intellect, whether human or angelic, is moved in one way when it considers that God is the Beginning of all things, in another way when it recognizes that all things are in Him and through Him as in a kind of medium, in another it contemplates the fact that the end of all things is in God and is God, for all things seek Him and find in Him their rest and their life. This interpretation is favoured by St. Augustine in the third chapter of the eighth book of the City of God where he is discussing the philosopher Socrates. 'He was unwilling', he says, 'that minds tarnished by earthly desires should attempt to reach up to divine things, when he saw that they were inquiring into the causes of things, which he believed to be first and highest and nowhere but in the will of the One and supreme God. Wherefore he thought that they could be comprehended by none but a purified mind, and therefore he urged that the good demeanour of a purified life should be insisted upon so that the mind, relieved of the burden of oppressive lusts, might raise itself by its natural strength to eternal things and with purity and understanding behold the nature of the incorporeal and immutable light in which the causes of all created natures live in stability.'

A. Most surely we agreed, for reason approved it.

N. So when we have a clear perception of the Divine Nature as the Beginning and Cause of all things—for He is *ἀναρχος* and *ἀναίτιος*, that is, without beginning and without cause, for before Him there is nothing to stand in relation to Him as beginning or cause, but He Himself creates the nature of all things of which He is the Cause and Beginning—we not inappropriately call that Nature creative and not created; for it creates and suffers itself to be created by none. But when we recognize the same Nature, namely the Divine, to be the End of all things beyond which nothing and in which all things eternally subsist and are universally God, we rightly call it neither created nor creative: not created because it is created by none, nor creative because here it no longer creates, for all things have been converted into their eternal reasons in which they shall and do

BP: nichil R 31 creatam AvrCamBP: creaturam Rm 32 neque *ad terminum lineae addidit* Avr

De Socrate

De eo quod quadripertita naturae consideratio in deo intelligitur

Concerning Socrates

That the fourfold consideration of nature is understood in God

aeternaliter manebunt et manent conuersis, appellatione quoque creaturae significari desistentibus. Deus enim omnia in omnibus erit et omnis creatura obumbrabitur, in deum uidelicet conuersa, sicut astra sole oriente. Videsne ergo qua ratione unam eandemque naturam, diuinam uidelicet, iuxta considerationem principii non creatam sed creatricem, iuxta uero finis speculationem nec creatam nec creatricem possumus appellare.

A. Satis uideo quid uis. Dic quod restat.

N. Rationem medietatis restare solummodo arbitror, quae duplici modo contemplatoribus suis arripet, primo quidem quando et creati et creare conspicitur diuina natura—creatur enim a se ipsa in primordialibus causis, ac per hoc se ipsum creat, hoc est in suis theophaniis accipit apparere ex occultissimis naturae suae sinibus uolens emergere in quibus et sibi ipsi incognita, hoc est in nullo se cognoscit quia infinita est et supernaturalis et superessentialis et super omne quod potest intelligi et non potest, descendens uero in principii rerum ac ueluti se ipsam creans se ipsam in aliquo inchoat nosse—, secundo uero dum in extremis effectibus primordialium causarum perspicitur in quibus creati tantummodo, non autem creare recte praedicatur. Creatur enim descendens in extremos effectus ultra quos nil creat, ideoque dicitur creati solummodo et non creare. Non enim ultra extremos effectus descendit quo et creati et creare uideretur.

Creatur ergo et creat in primordialibus causis, in earum uero effectibus creatur et non creat. Nec immerito, quoniam in ipsis finem descensionis suae, hoc est apparitionis suae, constituit, atque ideo omnis creatura corporalis atque uisibilis sensibusque succumbens extremum diuinae naturae uestigium non incongrue solet in scripturis appellari, quod omnis contemplatiuus animus ueluti quidam Moses ascendens in summitatem theoriae permittitur inspicere et quod adhuc uix a sapientibus animis potest ad purum dinosci, fumigationibus terrenarum phantasiarum strepitibusque mutabilium nec non coruscationibus subito nascentium subitoque transeuntium impediens. Paucissimorum nanque terrenis cogitationibus penitus remotorum uirtute et scientia purgatorum est deum in his uisibilibus creaturis cognoscere sicut Abraham patriarcha ex conuersione siderum cognouit lege naturali duce caeterique sancti patres ante legem scriptam et in lege quemadmodum Moses in rubo et in montis

31 Cf. 98. 17. *supra*. 35–36 Gen. xv. 5. 37 Exod. iii. 2; xix. 3.

4 lemma quod dei natura iuxta quandam considerationem nec creatrix nec creata sit Cam ratione RB: rationem P 6–7 iuxta—creatricem om. Rm 7 appellare RB: appellari P 8 A AvrRmB^cP (*uide ad 184.23*): Δ Cam quod RmBP: quid AvrCam 9 N BP: ∩—C R 12–13 theophaniis RB^cP: teophanis B* 14–15 in nullo est *bis scripta* Avr 17 se ipsam (2) RmCam*BP: om. AvrCam^c nosse BP: esse R 20 ultra RB: ultro P 21 nil RB: nihil P 25 descensionis RB^cP: discensionis B* 27 diuinae om. Avr 29 moyses BP:

remain eternally, and cease also to be called by the name of creature. For God shall be all in all, and every creature shall be overshadowed, that is, converted to God, as the stars when the sun arises. Do you then see how we are able to call one and the same nature, namely the Divine, not created but creative when we consider it as the Beginning, but neither created nor creative when we regard it as the end?

A. I see what you mean well enough. Say what remains.

N. I think there remains only the relation of Middle, which appears to its observers under a double mode, first when the Divine Nature is seen to be created and to create—for it is created by itself in the primordial causes, and therefore creates itself, that is, allows itself to appear in its theophanies, willing to emerge from the most hidden recesses of its nature in which it is unknown even to itself, that is, it knows itself in nothing because it is infinite and supernatural and superessential and beyond everything that can and cannot be understood; but, descending into the principles of things and, as it were, creating itself, it begins to know itself in something—; secondly when it is seen in the lowest effects of the primordial causes, in which it is correctly said of it that it is created only, but does not create. For it is created by descending into the lowest effects, beyond which it creates nothing, and is therefore said only to be created, and not to create. For it does not descend beyond the lowest effects by which it would be seen both to be created and to create.

So it is created and creates in the primordial causes, but in their effects it is created and does not create, and not unreasonably, seeing that in these it has set the end of its descent, that is, of its appearing, and therefore every creature, corporeal and visible and subject to the senses, is wont to be called in Scripture not inappropriately the last trace of the Divine Nature, and this every contemplative mind, like a Moses ascending to the peak of contemplation, is permitted to penetrate, and as yet it can scarcely be fully discerned by wise minds owing to the distraction of the vapours of earthly phantasies and the thunderings and lightnings of mutable things which are suddenly born and suddenly pass away. For it is for very few, wholly detached from earthly thoughts and purged by virtue and knowledge, to know God in these visible creatures as the patriarch Abraham knew Him from the revolutions of the stars, with the natural law for his guide, and as the other holy fathers before the Law was written down, and under the Law, as Moses in the Bush and on the summit of the

moyses R 31 terrenarum phantasiarum RmBP: phantasiarum terrenarum AvrCam 32 non RmCamBP: num Avr coruscationibus BP: choruscationibus AvrRmCam^c: chorouscantibus Cam* 33 terrenis B^cP: terrenisque RB* 34 est om. P his AvrCamBP: hiiis Rm 35 patriarcha om. AvrCam 36 siderum AvrCamB^cP: syderum Rm: siderim B* 37 moyses BP: moyses Avr: moyses Rm rubo RmCamBP: rubro Avr

cacumine, Apostoli dein post legem sub gratia cum Christo per uisibilia simbola in diuina misteria introducti sunt: 'Vestimenta' enim 'eius candida sicut nix' uisibilem creaturam in qua et per quam dei uerbum quod in omnibus subsistit intelligitur significabant. Audi Apostolum dicentem: 'Inuisibilia eius a creatura mundi per ea quae facta sunt intellecta conspiciuntur. Sempiterna quoque eius uirtus et aeternitas.'

A. Quadripertitam uniuersalis naturae diuisionem nunc clarissime uideo et de deo et in deo esse indubitanter intelligendam cognosco. Proinde finita hac quaestione de nihilo et ad purum ut opinor deducta, ad considerationem tertiae partis uniuersae naturae de qua praedicatur creari solummodo et non creare redeundum esse censeo. Ita enim nostrum promittit propositum. Quamuis quidem aliae quaestiones introductae sunt, ipsa tamen principalem materiam tertio libro praestetit. Eius nanque gratia diligentius inuestigandae incidens aliarum propositionum theoria inserta est.

N. Recte censes tempusque postulat. Sed prius de senaria quantitate dierum intelligibilium in qua deus opera sua fecisse legitur si quod promissimus implere debemus breuiter dicendum, partim quidem sanctorum patrum intellectus sequentes, partim quod in animo uenit ab eo qui illuminat nostras tenebras et quaerit se in scripturis suis quaeri et inueniri non celantes. Infinitus siquidem conditor sanctae scripturae in mentibus prophetarum spiritus sanctus infinitos in ea constituit intellectus, ideoque nullius expositoris sensus sensum alterius aufert, dum modo ut sane fidei catholicaeque professioni conueniat quod quisque dicat, siue aliunde accipiens siue in se ipso, a deo tamen illuminatus, inueniens.

A. Praecede quo uis ordine meque attrahe. Te enim sequar ut sensum aliorum seu tuum in talibus cognoscam et quod uera ratio, quae in omnibus et quaerit ueritatem et inuenit, edoceat eligam— non quia iam ueraces intellectus discernere a fallacibus idoneus sim, sed quod similia ueri dissimilibus praepone consulta ueritate non temere ausim.

N. Temere quoque et inconsiderate nil uelim approbare. Primordialium itaque causarum uisibilium et inuisibilium simul et semel conditionem diuinus propheta Moses breuiter scribens dicendo 'In

2-3 Mt. xvii. 2. 5-7 Rom. i. 20. 17-18 cf. 110. 37 supra. 32 cf. 82. 9 supra. 36-190, 1 Gen. i. 1.

1 dein CamBP: deinde AvrRm 1-2 per uisibilia-introducti sunt RB: per inuisibilia simbola quassi uisibilia in diuina mysteria introducti sunt. Hoc autem dico quia in spiritu apostoli transformationem domini uiderunt (domini s.l.) P 2 simbola AvrB: symbola RmCamP misteria AvrRmB: mysteria CamP 6 et om. P 10 nihilo BP: nichilo R 12 creare RB: creature P 13 post quamuis enim AvrCam 14 lemma ***** ergo facta Rm ipsa tamen RB: ipsum nomen P 15 praestetit BP: praestitit R 17 lemma De primo die quo facta est lux RmCam N BP: C-C R 19 promissimus B: promissimus al. codd.

Mount, then the Apostles after the Law were brought under Grace with Christ through visible symbols to the Divine Mysteries. For 'His vestures white as snow' signified the visible creature, in which and through which the Word of God, Who subsists in all things, is understood. Listen to the Apostle when he says: 'His invisible (attributes) have been visible from the creation of the world through the understanding of the things that have been made. Also his power and eternity⁴⁰ are everlasting.'

A. The fourfold division of universal nature I now most clearly see, and I recognize that it must be understood as both from God and in God. Therefore, now that we have dealt with the question of 'Nothing' and, as I think, reached a firm conclusion, I consider that we should return to the discussion of the third part of universal nature, of which it is said that it is created only and does not create. For this is what we expect from the matter proposed. Indeed, although other questions have been introduced, this was to have been the chief topic of the third book. For it was for the sake of investigating it more thoroughly that the incidental contemplation of other questions was inserted.

N. You consider rightly, and the time has come for it. But first we ought to speak about the sixfold quantity of intelligible days in which it is read that God made His works, if we are to carry out our promise fully, partly by following the interpretation of the Holy Fathers, partly by not concealing what comes into our minds from Him Who lightens our darkness and seeks to be sought and found in His Scriptures. For the Holy Spirit Who is the infinite founder of Holy Scripture established therein infinite meanings, and therefore no commentator's interpretation displaces another's, provided only that what each says is plainly consistent with the Faith and with the Catholic Creed, whether he receives it from another, or finds it in himself, albeit enlightened by God.

A. Proceed in what order you wish and take me along with you. For I shall follow you to learn in these matters the interpretation of others or of yourself, and shall choose what true reason, which in all things both seeks the truth and finds it, may instruct—not that I am yet qualified to distinguish true interpretations from false, but it would not be rash in me to dare to prefer, after consulting the truth, the likelier to the less likely.

N. I would not approve anything rash or ill-considered. So the divine prophet Moses, in briefly writing of the establishment all together and the same time of the primordial causes of things visible

partim RBP^c: partem P* 21 post uenit ut Rm 24 nullius RB: nullus P 28 A AvrRmBP: Δ Cam meque RBP^c: me P* 29 sensum AvrCamBP: sensuum Rm seu BP: siue R 32 quod RB: quid P ueritate s.l. Avr 34 lemma BP N BP: C-C R 36 moyses BP: moyses Avr: moyses RmCam breuiter om. Rm

Concerning
the Works of
the Six Days

principio fecit deus caelum et terram', earumque occultam in 690D
 diuino consilio incomprehensibilemque magnificentiam priusquam in
 formas speciesque profluerent inanis terrae et uacuae aut inuisibilis et
 incompositae, tenebrarum quoque super abyssum uocabulis signifi- 5
 cans, inchoationem quoque procreationis praeconditarum causarum in
 effectus suos appellatione spiritus qui fouebat aquas uel ferebatur
 super aquas insinuans, ad mysticam senarii numeri uirtutem explican- 691A
 dam descendit inquiens: 'Et dixit deus, Fiat lux, et facta est lux.' In
 his autem uerbis multiplex sanctorum patrum intellectus reperitur,
 quorum alii quidem angelicae et intellectualis caelestis essentiae 10
 creationem in hoc loco sanctae scripturae significatam esse decernunt,
 alii uero uisibilis huius lucis naturam, hoc est ignem, incompre-
 hensibilem adhuc et inuisibilem creatam, quae postmodum ueluti in
 suis fontibus emergens in corporibus aetheriis refulsit ac ueluti spatia
 trium dierum occulto meatu abyssum superficiei terrae undique ut 15
 aiunt superfusam lustrando peregit.

Quod autem lucis uocabulo ignea natura adhuc inuisibilis et
 occulta appellata sit nulli mirum debet uideri cognoscenti sanctam 691B
 scripturam causarum nomine effectus et effectuum causas appellare
 solere. Effectus autem igneae naturae lux est. Ignea igitur natura in 20
 primordio rerum condita nomine lucis postmodum ab ea procesurae
 et adhuc in ea latentis non incongrue appellata est, quamuis quidam
 primitiuam lucem fulsisse continuo arbitrentur, contra quos satis a
 sancto Augustino est actum. Quod autem sequitur, 'Et uidit deus
 lucem quod esset bona, et diuisit lucem a tenebris appellauitque 25
 lucem diem et tenebras noctem, et factum est uespere et mane dies
 unus', de simplici laude corporeae lucis deque temporalibus inter-
 uallis quibus circa tellurem lux et umbra uicissitudines suas peragunt
 dictum esse existimant qui naturam lucis corporeae conditam fuisse 691C
 arbitrantur quando dictum est: 'Et dixit deus, Fiat lux, et facta est 30
 lux.' Nam quia in aequinoctio uernali prima mundi conditio creditur
 fuisse, in quo sol aequis spatiis et supra terram et sub terra moratur,
 xii uidelicet horis aequinoctialibus, propterea putant dictum esse:
 'Diuisit deus lucem a tenebris', ac si aperte diceretur: Totum unius

2-3 Gen. i. 2. 6-7 Gen. i. 2. 8 Gen. i. 3. 10-11 cf. Aug. De Gen.
 ad litt. i. 3. 7; De Gen. lib. imp. v. 21; De ciu. Dei. xii. 5. 1. 12 cf. De Gen.
 ad litt. i. 11. 23. 23-24 De ciu. Dei xi. 32; De Gen. ad litt. i. 11. 23-12. 24.
 24-26 Gen. i. 4-5. 30-31 Gen. i. 3. 34 Gen. i. 4.

3 profluerent AvrRmCamBP: profluent Cam* inuisibilis RP: inuisibiles
 B 5 inchoationem RmCamBP: inchoationem Avr 6 spiritus
 om. Rm 7 mysticam AvrB: mysticam RmCamP 8 deus om. P
 est om. Avr. 9 reperitur B^cP: repperitur RB* 10 Aug(ustinus) in
 marg. sBsP 11 hoc om. RmCam* 12 Basil(ius) in marg. sBsP
 15 occulto RP: oculo B 21 procesurae BP: processurae R 23 fulsisse
 AvrCamB: fulsisse P: fuisse Rm 24 Aug(ustinus) in marg. rec. man. Cam
 Quod RBP^c: Quid P* 25 post diuisit deus erasum B appellauitque:

and invisible by the words, 'In the Beginning God made heaven and
 earth', and in signifying by the words 'empty and void' or 'invisible
 and incomposite earth' and 'darkness over the abyss' their grandeur
 hidden in the Divine Will and incomprehensible before they flowed
 forth into forms and species, also indicating the beginning of the
 propagation of the pre-established causes into their effects by the
 name of the Spirit which fomented the waters or was borne above
 the waters, comes down to the interpretation of the mystical power
 of the number six, saying, 'And God said, Let there be light, and
 light was made.' Now in these words is found a great variety of
 interpretations by the Holy Fathers, some of whom see the creation
 of the angelic and intellectual celestial essence to be signified in this
 text of Holy Scripture, but others the creation of the nature of the
 visible light, that is, fire, as yet incomprehensible and invisible,
 which later, as though emerging from its sources, shone forth in the
 etherial bodies and, its course being hidden, as it were, for the
 space of three days, by traversing the abyss of the surface of the
 earth, made it, as they say, steeped in light throughout.

Now, that by the word 'light' is named the fiery nature as yet
 invisible and hidden ought to surprise no one who knows that Holy
 Scripture is wont to call effects by the names of their causes, and
 causes (by the names) of their effects. Now the effect of the fiery
 nature is light; so it is not inappropriate that the fiery nature which
 was created in the beginning of things should be called by the name
 of the light which was later to proceed from it but till then was
 concealed within it, although some think that the primitive light
 began to shine at once,—but against these sufficient action has been
 taken by St. Augustine. But what follows, 'And God saw the light
 that it was good, and He divided the light from the darkness and
 called the light day and the darkness night, and it was made evening
 and morning, one day', they take to have been said with reference
 simply to the corporeal light and the intervals of time in which light
 and shade alternate about the earth, and they think that the nature
 of the corporeal light was established when it was said, 'And God
 said, Let there be light, and light was made.' For because it is
 believed that the world was first established at the Spring Equinox,
 in which the Sun remains for an equal length of time above the
 earth as below, namely for twelve equinoctial hours, they think it
 was for that reason that it was said, 'God divided the light from the
 darkness', as though it were explicitly said: He divided the whole

que om. Rm 26 diem in ras. Rm 30 est (2) om. Rm 31-32 lemma Quare
 Prima natura lucis de***t pñu et *** obscurae creaturae species Rm 32 sol
 RB: sal P terram om. AvrCam 33 xii AvrRmBP: duodecim Cam uidelicet
 RB^cP: uedelicet B*

diei spatium quod xxiiii horis peragitur aequa partitione inter diem diuisit et noctem.

Qui uero conditionem angelicae naturae creatione lucis significatam rectius autumant sanctum Augustinum sequentes diuisionem lucis a tenebris aut discretionem informis materiae et formatae creaturae intelligunt ut nomine lucis perfectio formae, tenebrarum uero informatitatis confusio accipiatur, aut duplicem caelestium essentiarum theoriam. Aliter nanque consideratur creatura in rationibus suis aeternis in deo secundum quas condita est et aliter in se ipsa sub deo in quantum creatura est, et prima consideratio lucis uocabulo, secunda uero tenebrarum significatur. Vt enim lux praecedat tenebras dignitate ita claritas aeternarum rationum secundum quas omnis creatura facta est praepositur obscuritati creaturae per se ipsam consideratae, ideoque appellauit deus lucem diem, splendorem uidelicet diuinarum rationum, tenebras uero noctem, hoc est obscuriorem in se ipsa creatae naturae speciem.

Quod autem sequitur, 'Factumque est uespere et mane dies unus', finem peractae operationis et inchoationem sequentis significare uolunt. Mane enim, id est inchoatio sequentis operationis finis est praecedentis et praecedentis terminus initium est sequentis, ideoque dies unus uel primus finitus uespere cuius mane, hoc est initium, in lucis conditione praecesserat.

Haec breuiter ab aliis accepimus. Nos autem primordialium causarum conditionem siue uisibilium siue inuisibilium in factura caeli et terrae in principio, earumque in effectus suos processiones in his uerbis sanctae scripturae, 'Fiat lux', et cetera, uolentes intelligere dicimus creatione lucis processionem primordialium causarum in suos effectus significari.

alia theoria Nam si ipsas primordiales causas propter incomprehensibilitatem naturae suae incognitamque omni intellectui altitudinem tenebrarum caligine, hoc est profundae ignorantiae densitate, superfluas scriptura perhibet cum dicitur: 'Et tenebrae erant super abyssum', quid mirum si declaratio illarum in effectibus suis per formas et species lucis nomine praedicaretur per hoc: 'Et dixit deus, Fiat lux, et facta est lux', ueluti quis diceret: Primordiales causas in se ipsis inconspicuas omnemque intellectum obumbrantes iussit deus in formas

4 Cf. Aug. *De ciu. Dei* xi. 23; *De Gen. ad litt.* i. 17. 34; iv. 22. 39. 8 cf. 74. 32-33 *supra*. 17 Gen. i. 5. 26 Gen. i. 3 32 Gen. i. 2. 34-35 Gen. i. 3.

1 xxiiii AvrRmBP: uiginti quatuor Cam 4 Aug<ustinus> in marg. rec. man.
Cam 7 essentiarum RBP: essentia P* 13 obscuritati AvrRmCam^cB^cP:
obscuritate Cam*B* ipsam RB: ipsum P 17 sequitur s.l. Rm factum-
que RB: factum P 21 lemma xxv melior intellectus et ***** lucis quam (?)
tenebrarum Rm 22 praecesserat B: praecesserat RP 23 lemma melior
intellectus creationis caeli et terrae Cam 25 procesiones B: processiones RP:
27 procesionem B: processionem RP 29 lemma BP 32 abyssum Rm

duration of the one day, which is completed in twenty-four hours, by an equal partition between day and night.

But those who, following St. Augustine, more correctly think that the establishment of the angelic nature is signified by the creation of light, understand the division of the light from the darkness either as the distinction between formless matter and the formed creature, so that the name of light is taken for the perfection of form, but that of darkness for the confusion of formlessness; or as a twofold contemplation of the celestial essences. For in one way the creature is considered in its eternal reasons in God in accordance with which it is established, and in another way in itself under God inasmuch as it is a creature; and the first consideration is signified by the word 'Light', but the second by 'Darkness'. For as light goes before darkness in rank, so the brightness of the eternal reasons in accordance with which every creature is made is preferred to the obscurity of the creature considered in itself; and therefore God called the light day, that is, the splendour of the divine reasons, but the darkness night, that is, the obscurer form of the nature created in itself.

But what follows, 'And there was made evening and morning, one day', they interpret as signifying the end of the created work and the beginning of the work to follow. For the morning, that is, the beginning of the work to follow is the end of the preceding and the end of the preceding is the beginning of the following. And therefore the one or first day is ended by the evening, whose morning, that is, beginning, had gone before in the creation of light.

This, in brief, is what we have received from others. But we, who consider that the establishment of the primordial causes of things whether visible or invisible is to be understood in the making of heaven and earth, and their processions into their effects in those words of Holy Scripture, 'Let there be light', etc., say that by the creation of light is signified the procession of the primordial causes into their effects.⁴¹

For if Scripture, in saying, 'And there was darkness over the abyss', allows that the primordial causes themselves because of the incomprehensibility of their nature and their profundity that no understanding can know are overcast with a cloud of darkness, that is, with the density of profound ignorance, what wonder if the clarification of them in their effects through forms and species be given the name of light in these words, 'And God said, Let there be light, and light was made', as though one were to say, God commanded the primordial causes, which are in themselves invisible and which darken all understanding, to go forth into clear forms and the

CamBP: abissum Avr 33 illarum ex illorum P 35 est om. Avr quis ex
quamuis B 36 iussit RP: iusit B

perspicuas speciesque intelligibiles et sensibiles uisibilium et inuisibilium prodire. Non enim solus deus uerum etiam omnium rerum principia tenebrarum uocabulo teste sancto Dionysio solet in eloquiis appellari propter incomprehensibilem infinitatem.

Processio uero eius per principia in creaturas uisibiles et inuisibiles, 5 suas dico theophanias, claritatis nomine meruit significari. In ipsis enim quodam modo patitur intelligi qui omnem superat intellectum. 'Fiat', ergo, 'lux', inquit deus, hoc est: Procedant primordiales causae ex incomprehensibilibus naturae suae secretis in formas ac species comprehensibiles intellectibusque contemplantium se mani- 10 festas, 'et facta est lux', deo uidelicet uolente et dicente obscuritas primordialium causarum in formas ac species processit apertas. 692D

'Et diuisit deus lucem a tenebris', hoc est: Segregauit notitiam effectuum ab obscuritate suarum principalium causarum. Diuisio quippe lucis a tenebris est discretio rerum per formas ac species 15 apparentium a principiis suis in quibus omnem superant intellectum, ideoque praedixit: 'Et uidit deus lucem quia esset bona', hoc est: Placuit deo originales causas ante omnem creaturam ultra omnem 693A intellectum conditas intellectibus siue humanis siue angelicis luce quadam intelligentiae superfusas manifestari; 'appellauitque lucem 20 diem et tenebras noctem', hoc est: Contemplantibus animis praestitit manifestationem uisibilium et inuisibilium per formas et species diem appellare, eorum uero in principiis suis incomprehensibilem altitudinem omnique condito intellectui incognitam uocare noctem. 25 'Factumque est uespere at mane dies unus.' Quamuis enim inter obscuritatem causarum et claritatem effectuum diuisio intelligatur ac differentia, unus tamen idemque dies est, hoc est unus eorum intellectus. Non enim alia creatura intelligitur in causis facta, alia in effectibus causarum condita, sed una eademque in rationibus aeternis 693B ueluti in quibusdam tenebris secretissimae sapientiae omnique 30 intellectu remotae facta et in processionibus rationum in effectus intellectibus succumbens ueluti in quadam die perfectae notitiae manifestata.

Haec autem de operibus primi intelligibilis diei congrua ut opinor intelligentiarum proportionalitate addidi non ut meum sensum ueluti 35 ex me ipso repertum aliorum intellectibus uelim praeferre—quod absit!—sed considerans ueris contemplationibus non admodum

3 Cf. MT i. 1; PG iii. 997AB. 8 Gen. i. 3. 11 Gen. i. 3. 13 Gen. i. 4. 17 Gen. i. 4. 20-21 Gen. i. 5. 25 Gen. i. 5.

3 dionysio B; dionisio AvrRmP; dyonisio Cam Dion<ysius> in marg. rec. man. Cam 5 Processio RB^cP; Procesio B* in s.l. Avr 12 ac RmCamBP: a Avr 13 deus om. Rm 16 apparentium BP; apparentum R 17 quia AvrCamBP: quod Rm 21-22 praestitit B; praestitit RP 26 effectuum R: affectuum BP

intelligible and sensible species of things visible and invisible. For not only God but the principles of all things as well are, according to St. Dionysius, wont to be called in the Oracles by the name of darkness on account of their incomprehensible infinity.

But His procession through the principles into the creatures visible and invisible, I mean His theophanies, is appropriately signified by the name of brightness. For in them He Who passes all understanding suffers Himself to be in a kind of way understood. So 'Let there be light', says God, that is: Let the primordial causes proceed from the incomprehensible hiding-places of their nature into forms and species comprehensible and manifest to the understandings of those who contemplate them, 'and light was made', that is, by the will and utterance of God the obscurity of the primordial causes proceeded into revealed forms and species.

'And God divided the light from the darkness', that is: He separated the knowledge of the effects from the obscurity of their principal causes. For the dividing of the light from the darkness is the distinguishing of things which appear through forms and species from their principles in which they pass all understanding, and that was why he said earlier, 'And God saw the light because it was good', that is: It pleased God that the original causes established before every creature beyond every intellect should be overspread with a light of intelligence and manifested to the intellects whether human or angelic; 'and He called the light day and the darkness night', that is: He preferred to name the manifestation through forms and species of things visible and invisible to the minds which contemplate them day, but to call the transcendence in their principles, incomprehensible and unknown to every created intellect, night. 'And there was made evening and morning, one day.' For although between the obscurity of the causes and the brightness of the effects a division and a difference is understood, yet it is one and the same day, that is, they have one meaning. For it is not understood that one creature is made in the causes, another established in the effects of the causes, but one and the same is made, in the eternal reasons as though in a darkness of the wisdom most secret and removed from every intellect, and subject to intellects in the processions of the reasons into their effects, as though revealed in a day of perfect knowledge.

Now I have added these words concerning the works of the first intelligible day, tempered, as I think, to the capacity of intelligences, not in order to set my interpretation, as though it were something I had discovered from myself, over the interpretations of others—far be that (from me)!—but out of the consideration that they do not much conflict with true contemplations, and that they are appropriate

resistere primordialiumque causarum in effectus suos profusionibus de quibus nunc agimus conuenire.

A. De operibus sex primorum dierum quoniam multi et grece et latine multa exposuere breuiter et succincte nunc disputandum est, et quod de prima luce a te dictum est uidetur mihi sufficere. Siue enim conditionem huius lucis corporeae substantialiter in igne ut sancto Basilio uidetur, siue caelestium uirtutum formationem ut sancto Augustino, siue primordialium causarum in effectus suos generalem processionem significet, qualemcunque horum intellectuum quis obtinuerit non longe a ueritate distabit.

N. Transeamus igitur ad secundi diei considerationem. Ac prius dicendum quod de allegoricis intellectibus moralium interpretationum nulla nunc nobis intentio est, sed de sola rerum factarum creatione secundum historiam pauca disserere deo duce conamur.

A. Nec hoc quaero. Satis enim a sanctis patribus de talium allegoria est actum.

N. 'Dixit quoque deus, Fiat firmamentum in medio aquarum et diuidat aquas ab aquis. Et fecit deus firmamentum.' De firmamento omnes unanimiter consentiunt quod non aliud eo nomine nisi hoc caelum uisibile significatur. Alii tamen extremam illam spheram uolubilem undique totum mundum ambientem chorisque astrorum ornata solummodo, alii totum spatium ultra lunam ubi planetarum corpora et cursus esse creduntur cum ipso extremo ambitu siderum, alii totum inane quod circa terram uoluitur, hoc est aera et aethera sublimissimamque speram, uno uocabulo firmamenti comprehendere autumant; non enim alibi legitur ut aiunt aeris et aetheris conditio.

Quare autem tali nomine uocatur prout unicuique uisum est ita exposuit. Alii quidem propter sustentationem superiorum aquarum ueluti supra illud corporales aquae sint, alii quia choris siderum sustinet ueluti quaedam ponderosa corpora, alii quia totum uisibilem mundum intra se contineat ac firmet, nec desunt qui spatium corpulentioris huius aeris eo nomine proprie uocari uolunt eo quod nubes pluuias imbres niues grandines omneque quod ex terrenis

7 Bas. Hex. ii. 7. 8 Aug. De Gen. ad litt. i. 3. 7 sq., cf. 190. 10-12 supra. 11-14 cf. Aug. De Gen. ad litt. i. 17. 34. 17-18 Gen. i. 6. 28 cf. Bas. Hex. iii; Greg.-Nyss., In Hex. PG xlv. 64A-65A; cf. Aug. De Gen. ad litt. ii. 10.

3 A AvrRmBP: Δ Cam 7 Basil<ius> in marg. rec. man. Cam 8-9 lemma xxvi De secundo die. Quid sit firmamentum RmCam: xxvi deest Cam sed uide infra secundo Rm: ii° Cam 9 significet R: significat BP horum RBP: horam P intellectuum RmBP: intellectum AvrCam 10 obtinuerit AvrRmBP: optinuerit Cam 11 xxvi in marg. Cam (uide supra) lemma xxvi De secundo die quid sit firmamentum Avr (uide supra) N BP: ∩-C R considerationem RB: conditionem P 12 interpretationum RmCamBP: temptationum Avr 13 intentio RmCamBP: temptatio Avr 14 historiam AvrRmP: hystoriam Cam: istoriam B conamur RB: conamus P 15 A AvrRmBP: Δ Cam talium CamBP: talibus AvrRm 17 N BP: ∩-C R 19 omnes RB: omnis P

to the outpourings of the primordial causes into their effects, which we are now discussing.

A. Since many have given many explanations both in Greek and in Latin of the works of the first six days,⁴² our present discourse must be brief and succinct, and what has been said by you concerning the first light seems to me sufficient. For whether, as St. Basil thought, it signifies the creation of this corporeal light substantially in fire, or, as St. Augustine thought, the formation of the heavenly powers, or the general procession of the primordial causes into their effects, which ever of these opinions one chooses, one will not be far from the truth.

N. Let us pass, then, to the consideration of the Second Day. And first it must be said that we have at the moment no intention concerning the allegorical sense⁴³ of moral interpretations,⁴⁴ but are attempting, under God's guidance, to say a few things about only the creation of made things according to the historical sense.

A. Nor do I want that. For enough has been said by the Holy Fathers about the allegorical sense of such things.

N. 'God said also, Let there be a firmament in the midst of the waters and let it divide the waters from the waters. And God made the firmament.' Concerning the firmament all are unanimously agreed that nothing else is meant by that name but this visible heaven. But some affirm that only that outermost revolving sphere which encompasses the whole world about and is adorned with the harmonious motions of the stars is included under the one word 'firmament', others the whole space beyond the moon where the bodies and the orbits of the planets are believed to be, together with the outermost circle of the stars; others the whole void that revolves about the earth, that is, the air and the ether and the most sublime sphere; for they say that the establishment of the air and the ether is not mentioned anywhere else.

But as to why it is called by such a name, each has explained as he saw fit; some that it is because it sustains the upper waters, as though above it there were corporeal waters; others, because it sustains the harmonious motions of the stars, as though those were bodies possessing weight; others, because it contains within itself and holds firm the whole visible world; nor are there lacking those who believe that the space of this heavier air is properly called by

unanimiter RB: unianimiter P 20 spheram RmCamBP: sphearram (e s.l.) Avr 21 chorisque RB: chorumque P 22 ubi in ras. Cam 23 creduntur RB: credantur P siderum CamBP: syderum Rm: dierum Avr 24 inane ex inani B 25 speram AvrCamB: spheram RmP 27 est ita RmBP: ita est AvrCam 30 sustinet RmB: sustinent AvrCam: sustinuit P corpora RmCamBP: corpus Avr 32 corpulentioris RmBP: corpolentioris AvrCam 33 imbres AvrCamBP: ymbres Rm

uaporibus in eo nascitur firma quadam suae naturae corpulentia sustineat quantum sustinere potest ac ueluti totum ex parte caetera spatia leuioris et superioris uisibilis naturae ab eo denominari. Horum uero quis rectius intelligat legentium arbitrio deiudicandum committo, mihi autem greci nominis quod est CTEPEOMA considerata uirtute tale uocabulum uidetur meruisse eo quod in eo totius corporalis creaturae situs stet ac terminetur. Ultra nanque firmamentum nil sensibile uel corporeum uel locale uel temporale intelligitur esse. Omnium siquidem uisibilium finis in ipso firmatur. CTEPEOMA enim dicitur quasi CTEPH AMA, hoc est solida simul, in ipso quidem omnia solida, hoc est corporalia, simul terminantur et stant.

De aquis autem in quarum medio firmamentum fieri deus dixit non satis reperio quid dicam—non quod me latuerit quid multi sanctorum patrum de ipsis senserint. Sanctus siquidem Basilius in Examero suo uelle uidetur aquas illas abyssi nomine uocatas undique circa terram diffusas rarissimasque ac tenuissimas, super quas prius erant tenebrae ac deinde spiritus dei superferebatur et in quibus primitiua lux ueluti trium dierum spatii girans informem adhuc terrenam molem resplenduit densatasque tertia die et congregatas in locum unum ut appareret arida in hoc loco significari et in earum medio deum dixisse firmamentum fieri; cui omnino sensui sanctus Augustinus refragatur. Nec tamen de ipsis aquis intra quas deus firmamentum fecit satis rationem reddidit. Aliorum nanque opiniones introducens quid ipse intellexit qua occasione ignoro non aperuit. Eos autem caeteris praeponit qui spatia huius aeris quae sunt inter aquas marinas et fluuiales infra se positas et illas in nubibus supra se suspensas firmamenti nomine uocari contendunt. Nullius itaque sensu refutato quid de his aquis senserim paucis si libet rationibus explicabo.

A. Libet quidem ac ualde est necessarium. De hac enim quaestione adhuc quod mihi satis uideretur a nullo est sensum.

N. Totius itaque conditae naturae trinam diuisionem esse arbitror. Omne enim quod creatum est aut omnino corpus est aut omnino

14 *Hex.* ii–iv. 23–24 *cf. Aug. De ciu. Dei xi.* 34; *De Gen. ad litt.* ii. 4.7–59.

1 quadam CamBP: quedam AvrRm: tamen P corpulentia RB: corpulenta P
3 denominari RB: determinari P 4 deiudicandum BP: diiudicandum R
5 mihi BP: michi R 9 CTEPEOMA R: CTPEOMA B: EΓEPEOMA P
10 CTEPH AMA B: CTEPEAMA RP 12–13 deus—reperio in *ras.* P
13 reperio RmBP: repperio AvrCam quid *om.* Avr 14 senserint RBP^c:
senserunt P* Basil(ius) in *margin. rec. man.* Cam 16 rarissimasque
RmCamBP: rarissimasque Avr ac BP: et R 17 ac B^cP: *deest* RB* 19 et
BP: *deest* R 20 appareret AvrCamBP: apparet Rm earum RB: *erasum* P
21 deum RB: *om.* P 22 Aug(ustinus) in *margin. rec. man.* Cam 26 sunt
RmCamBP: sint Avr aquas RB: *om.* P fluuiales RmCamBP: fluiales
Avr 30 A AvrRmBP: Δ Cam necessarium RB: necessarius P enim *om.* P

that name because it sustains as far as it can by some firm corporeity of its nature clouds, rains, showers, snows, hail, and everything that is born in it from earthly vapours, and that the other regions of the lighter and higher parts of visible nature are named after it, as a whole named after a part. But as to which of these has the more correct understanding I leave it to the judgement of those who read them; but to me, bearing in mind the meaning of the Greek name *στερέωμα*, such a word seems to have been appropriate for the reason that in it the place for the whole corporeal nature is situated and bounded. For beyond the firmament there is understood to be nothing sensible, or corporeal, or spatial, or temporal. For the limit of all visible things stands firm in it. For *στερέωμα* is for *στερη αμα*, that is, 'solid things together', for in it all solid, that is corporeal, things have their common boundary and stability.

Now, concerning the waters in the midst of which God said that the firmament should be made, I do not find anything satisfactory to say—not that I am ignorant of what many of the Fathers have thought of them. Thus St. Basil seems to imply in his Hexaemeron that what is meant here are those waters called by the name of 'abyss' and diffused around about the world, most rarefied and refined, above which there was at first darkness and then the Spirit of God was borne above them, and in which the first light, revolving as it were for the space of three days, shone upon this earthly mass when it was still without form, and which on the third day were condensed and gathered together in one place so that the dry land might appear; and that it was in the midst of these waters that God said that the firmament should be made. But with this interpretation St. Augustine wholly disagrees, though without giving a satisfactory account of those waters between which God made the firmament. For in mentioning the opinions of others he did not reveal his own; why, I do not know. But he prefers to the rest those who argue that it is the regions of this air, which are between the waters and seas and rivers situated below them and those which are suspended in the clouds above them, which are called by the name of firmament. So, without refuting the interpretation of any, I shall give you a briefly reasoned exposition, if you wish, of my own opinion about the waters.

A. Certainly I wish it, and it is most necessary. For on this question no opinion has so far been given by anyone which has seemed satisfactory to me.

N. I think, then, that the whole of created nature is divided into three parts. For everything that is created is either wholly body or

32 *lemma* BP N BP: C–C R Totius RB: Totus P 33 *lemma* Omne quod creatum est aut omnino corpus aut omnino spiritus aut medium Rm enim *s.l.* B

Concerning the Firmament in the midst of the Waters

spiritus aut aliquod medium quod nec omnino corpus est nec omnino spiritus, sed quadam medietatis et extremitatum ratione ex spirituali omnino natura ueluti ex una extremitate et superiori, et ex altera, hoc est ex omnino corporea <et inferiori> proportionaliter in se recipit unde proprie et connaturaliter extremitatibus suis subsistit. Proinde si quis intentus inspexerit in hac ternaria proportionalitate hunc mundum constitutum intelliget. Siquidem in quantum in rationibus suis in quibus aeternaliter et constitutus est et essentialiter subsistit consideratus non solum spiritualis uerum etiam omnino spiritus cognoscitur—nemo enim recte philosophantium rationes corporeae naturae spirituales, immo etiam spiritus esse negarit—, dum uero extremae ipsius deorsum uersus inspiciuntur partes, hoc est omnia ista corpora ex catholicis elementis composita, maxime etiam terrena et aquatica, quae et generationi et corruptioni obnoxia sunt, nil aliud in eis inuenitur praeter corpus omnino et corporeum. At si quis simplicium elementorum naturam intueatur luce clarius quandam proportionabilem medietatem inueniet qua nec omnino corpus sunt—quamuis eorum corruptione naturalia corpora subsistant et coitu—nec omnino corporeae naturae expertia dum ab eis omnia corpora profluant et in ea iterum resoluantur. Et iterum alteri superiori quidem extremitati comparata nec omnino spiritus sunt quoniam non omnino corporea extremitate absoluta, nec omnino non spiritus cum ex rationibus omnino spiritualibus subsistentiae suae occasiones suscipiant. Non irrationabiliter itaque diximus hunc mundum extremitates quasdam a se inuicem penitus discretas et medietates in quibus uniuersitatis ipsius concors armonia coniungitur possidere. Ponamus igitur inferiores huius mundi partes ueluti inferiores aquas—nec immerito dum totum quod in hoc mundo nascitur umore crescit atque nutritur. Vmida siquidem qualitate corporibus sublata absque mora tabescunt et decrescunt et pene ad nihilum rediguntur. Nam et caelestia corpora feruentissima et ignea umida aquarum natura nutriris sapientes mundi affirmant, quod nec scripturae sanctae expositores denegant—spirituales uero omnium uisibilium rationes superiorum aquarum nomine appellari ratio edocet.

1-2 aut aliquod—spiritus *om.* Avr 2 medietatis AvrRm^cCamBP: medietatem Rm^{*} medietatis et *s.l.* Rm extremitatum *ex* extremitate Rm 3 natura AvrCamBP: creatura Rm^{*}: nature Rm^c superiori RB: superiora P 7 constitutum Avr^cRmCamBP: constitutum Avr^{*} 8 aeternaliter et constitutus est et *om.* Avr 9 consideratus B^c: consideratur RB^{*}P 11 negarit RBP^c: negaret P^{*} 12 partes RB: partes P 13 corpora RmCamBP: corporea Avr catholicis AvrCamBP: catholicis Rm elementis BP: elementis R 14 *xx* quid su (*sic*) *in marg.* Rm 16 elementorum BP: elementorum R 17 quandam RmCamBP: quanta Avr medietatem RmCamBP: medietate Avr 19 corporeae RmCamBP: corpore Avr 21 comparata AvrCamB: comparat Rm: esse parata P 24 suscipiant BP: accipiant R itaque RmCam^cBP: itaque Avr: ita Cam^{*} 24-25 mundum RmCamBP: modus Avr 29 umore BP:

wholly spirit or something intermediate which is neither wholly body nor wholly spirit, but which by a kind of relationship between the middle and the extremes receives into itself an equal share from the nature that is wholly spiritual, as from an upper extreme, and from the other, that is, from the nature that is wholly corporeal, from which it takes its proper subsistence which is connatural with those of the extremes. Therefore, if one looks carefully he will understand that this world is constituted upon this triple proportionality. For in so far as it is regarded in its reasons in which it is both eternally constituted and essentially subsists it is recognized not only as spiritual but also as altogether spirit—for none of those who practise philosophy correctly would deny that the reasons of corporeal nature are spiritual and indeed spirit—, but when its lowest parts from the top down are regarded, that is, all those bodies composed of the universal elements, especially the earthly and the watery, which are susceptible both to coming into being and passing away, nothing is found in them but what is altogether body and bodily. But anyone who should observe the nature of the simple elements will discover, clearer than light, a certain proportionate mediation whereby they are neither altogether body—although it is by their breaking up and coming together that natural bodies subsist—nor altogether without corporeal nature since from them all bodies flow forth and are resolved into them again; and again, in relation to the other, upper, extreme, they are not altogether spirit since they are not altogether detached from the corporeal extreme, and not altogether not spirit since they receive the occasions of their existence from reasons which are altogether spiritual. Not without reason, then, did we say that this world possesses certain extremes which are totally distinct from each other, and intermediaries in which the concordant harmony of this universe is knit together. Let us then take the lower waters for the lower parts of this world—not inappropriately, for everything which is born into this world obtains its growth and nourishment from water.⁴⁵ For when the moist quality is removed from bodies they wither at once and decline and are reduced almost to nothing. For the natural philosophers⁴⁶ affirm that even the celestial bodies which are the most enflamed and fiery are nourished by the moist nature of water, and the commentators of Holy Scripture do not deny this either⁴⁷—, whereas reason teaches that it is the spiritual reasons of all visible things that are called by the name of the upper waters. For it is from

humore R Vmida BP: humida R 30 nihilum BP: nihilum R 31 umida BP: humida R 32-33 scripturae sanctae RmBP: sanctae scripturae AvrCam 34 superiorum *ex* superiorum Cam

Ex ipsis enim omnia elementa siue simplicia siue composita ueluti ex quibusdam magnis fontibus defluunt indeque intelligibili quadam uirtute rigata administrantur. Nec hoc silet scriptura clamans: 'Et aquae quae super caelos sunt laudant nomen domini.' Quamuis enim hoc de caelestibus uirtutibus quis intelligit, praedicto sensui non 5 repugnet dum sit diuinorum eloquiorum multiplex interpretatio.

Proinde harum aquarum in medio dixit deus fieri firmamentum, hoc est simplicium elementorum naturam quae quantum uisibilia corpora superat tantum ab inuisibilibus [eorum] rationibus superatur quantumque a superioribus suscipit tantum inferioribus distribuit, 10 quantum uero ab inferioribus recipit tantum superioribus restituit referens eis omne quod ab eis defluxit, quam prophetico spiritu 696B legislator admonitus firmamentum appellauit.

Abyssum nanque intelligibilium rationum super se positarum firma et inseparabili sua simplicitate fulcit, fluxum uero mutabilium 15 corporum et maxime arida et umida qualitate compositorum dum temporali uicissitudine resoluantur in se ipsam retrahit inque sua uniuersali soliditate ne pereant custodit. Neque hoc ignorant qui philosophiae studiis imbuti transfusionem naturarum in se ipsas cognoscunt. [Causae quidem enim in elementa, elementa in corpora 20 descendunt. Soluta corpora per elementa in causas suas resiliunt. Ipsa etiam corpora in se inuicem transeunt. In diluuiio aer uersus est in aquam iterumque reuersa est aqua in aera.]

Dixit itaque deus: 'Fiat firmamentum in medio aquarum',—hoc 696C est: Fiat soliditas simplicium elementorum inter profunditatem 25 rationum suarum et mutabilem fluxum corporum eorum[dem] concursu compositorum,—'et diuidat aquas ab aquis', hoc est: Corpora composita locis dispersa temporibus mutabilia generationi et corruptioni distributa discernat a simplicibus rationibus locorum temporumque uarietate carentibus generatione et corruptione liberis 30 immutabili lege stabilitis. [Inter simplicitatem autem causarum et elementorum talis est differentia, quod illa causarum quidem absque locorum et temporum natura intelligitur, ista uero locis temporibusque carere non potest—in eis enim continetur—et quod illa omnibus

3-4 Ps. cxlviii. 4-5. 24 Gen. i. 6. 27 Gen. i. 6.

1 ipsis RmCamBP: istis Avr 2 defluunt RBP^c: defluant P* 4 laudant RB: laudent P 5 Verte et in ueires (?) in marg. Ad sensui desinit lacuna quam suppleuerunt ff. 212-217 R (uide supra 179). In f. 217r nihil aliud scriptum est
11 recipit RB^cP: receptit B* 15 inseparabili RB: inseparabilis P 16 compositorum R^cBP: compositarum R* 18 ignorant RB: ignorare P 20 cognoscunt RBP^c: cognoscant P* 23 iterumque RB: iterum P 26 eorumdem B^cP: eorumdem B*R^c(C): eorum R* 27 lemma Quod generale ad speciale sit et conditione sex dierum et quid sit color et igne siderum non calere Rm
29 lemma De colore planetarum Rm 32 est ex erat B

them that all the elements whether simple or in composition flow forth as from certain mighty springs, and moistened by a certain intelligible virtue reach their disposition. Nor is Scripture silent, but declares: 'And the waters that are above the heavens praise the Name of the Lord.' For although⁴⁸ someone understands this to refer to the Heavenly Powers, this should not conflict with the interpretation given above, for the ways of interpreting the Divine Oracles are manifold.⁴⁹

So God said that in the midst of these waters was made the firmament, that is, the nature of the simple elements which transcends the visible bodies by as much as it is surpassed by [their] reasons, and as much as it receives from the natures that are above it, so much it distributes to those that are below, while as much as it takes back from those that are below, so much it restores to those that are above, returning to them everything that flowed down from them; and it is this that the Lawgiver, at the prompting of the Spirit of prophecy, called the firmament.

For by its firm and indivisible simplicity it supports the abyss of the intelligible reasons, but draws back into itself the flux of mutable bodies, and especially those that are composed of the dry and the moist qualities when with the passage of time they are dissolved, and within its universal solidity keeps them from perishing. And this is a fact of which those who, by steeping themselves in philosophical studies, have gained an understanding of the transfusion of natures into one another are not unaware. [For the causes descend into the elements, the elements into bodies. When bodies are dissolved they rebound again through the elements into their causes. Bodies themselves also pass into one another. In a flood air is turned into water and water returns again into air.]

So God said, 'Let there be a firmament in the midst of the waters', that is: Let there be the solidity of the simple elements between the profundity of their reasons and the mutability of the bodies that are composed by the coming together of the same; 'and let it divide the waters from the waters', that is: let it distinguish the composite bodies, extended in places, mutable in times, disposed for coming into being and passing away, from the simple reasons, without variation of times and places, free from coming into being and passing away, fixed by an immutable law. [Now, between the simplicity of the causes and that of the elements there is this difference: that that of the causes is understood apart from the nature of places and times, while this cannot be without places and times since it is contained within them; and that that is always free from all accidents, this

accidentibus absoluta semper sit, ista aliquando accidentia recipit, aliquando deponit—deponit quidem in uniuersalibus, in particularibus recipit.] 696D

Generaliter autem in omnibus sex primorum dierum operibus intelligendum est ubicunque scriptura commemorat: 'Dixit deus, 5 Fiat lux, Fiat firmamentum', et cetera in reliquis diebus primordialium causarum [specialem] conditionem significari [quarum uniuersaliter creatio nomine caeli et terrae praemissa est], ubicunque 697A uero: 'Et facta est lux, et fecit deus firmamentum, et factum est ita', earundem primordialium causarum in effectus suos per genera et 10 species procesionem.

'Vocauitque deus firmamentum caelum.' Iuxta romanae linguae ETOYMOΛOΓIAN caelum dicitur a pictura siderum quasi caelati instar ut Plinio placet, iuxta uero grecam proprietatem OYPANOC quasi OPOC ANΩ, hoc est uisio desuper. Merito ergo firmamentum 15 uniuersalium elimentorum OYPANOC, id est caelum, appellatur quoniam omnem compositam corporeamque creaturam altitudine naturae supereminet.

Sunt qui tenuissimas aquas supra firmamentum, hoc est supra choros siderum, esse putant. Sed eos refellit et ratio ponderum et 20 ordo elimentorum. Alii uero uaporabiles aquas ac paene incorporeas 697B supra caelum argumentantur ex pallore stellarum. Dicunt enim stellae frigidas esse atque ideo pallidas. Frigiditas autem non est ut aiunt ubi aquarum substantia deest, minus considerantes quod dicunt. Nam et ubi ignis est substantialiter, ibi et frigiditas. Siquidem 25 cristallum dum sit frigidae naturae, carere tamen ignea uirtute quae omnia penetrat corpora nullus sapiens dixerit. Ignea itaque uis ubi ardet calor est, ubi non ardet frigus est, et non ardet nisi materia sit in qua ardeat et quam consumat, ideo[que] solares radii per aetheria spatia diffusi non ardent. In subtilissima enim ac spirituali natura 30 ardendi materiem non reperiunt. Descendentes autem ad corpulenti 697C aeris spatia ueluti quadam materia operationis inuenta flagrare incipiunt, et in quantum ad crassiora corpora proueniunt in tantum uim suam ardendo exercent in his quae caloris uirtute soluuntur uel solui possunt. Dum uero sursum uersus in extrema mundi interualla 35 tenuissima spiritualique naturae proxima eriguntur non inuenientes

5-6 Gen. i. 6. 9 Gen. i. 3, 7. 12 Gen. i. 8. 14 Varro ap. Plin. N.H. ii. 8. 19-20 cf. Aug. De Gen. ad litt. ii. 1; De ciu. Dei xiii. 17; xxii. 11.

1 absoluta R^cBP: soluta R* 1-2 aliquando B^cP: aliquod RB* 6 post diebus rasura RB 11 procesionem RB: processionem P 12 deus ex dum B 13 ETOYMOΛOΓIAN R^cB: ETYMOΛOΓIAN R*: ETOYMOΛOΓIAN P caelati RP: celati ex celata B 15 OPOC ANΩ RB: OPWC ANΩ P 20 refellit RB: refellet P 23 lemma BP frigiditas RBP^c: frigitas P* 26 dum om. P 28 ardet: ar- in ras. R(C) calor est RB: calorem P 29 post

sometimes receives accidents, sometimes avoids them: it avoids them in the universals, it receives them in the particulars.]

But generally in all the works of the first six days it is to be understood that wherever Scripture relates, 'God said, Let there be light, let there be firmament', and so on for the remaining days, there is signified the [special] establishment of the primordial causes [of which the general creation was previously set forth under the name of heaven and earth]; but wherever 'And there was light, and God made the firmament, and it was made so', the procession of the same primordial causes into their effects through the genera and species.

'And God called the firmament heaven.' According to the *ἐτυμολογία* of the Roman tongue, *caelum* is so called from the picture of the stars like an engraving as Pliny holds, but according to the proper meaning of the Greek word *οὐρανός* as though *ορος ανω*, that is, 'the sight from above'. Rightly then is the firmament of the universal elements called *οὐρανός*, that is, 'heaven', since it excels by the loftiness of its nature every composite and corporeal creature.

There are those who think that there are extremely rarefied waters above the firmament, that is, above the company of the stars. But they are refuted both by consideration of the weights and by the order of the elements. Others on the other hand argue from the paleness of the stars that there are vaporized and almost incorporeal waters above the heavens. For they say that the stars are cold, and that is why they are pale. For, as they affirm, there is no coldness where the substance of waters is absent, not considering carefully enough what they are saying. For even where fire is present in substance, there also (is) coldness. For although crystal is of a cold nature, yet no wise man would say that it lacks the fiery power, which penetrates into all bodies. So where the fiery force burns it is heat, where it does not burn it is cold; and it does not burn unless there is matter in which it may burn and which it may consume. [And] that is why the rays of the sun when they are diffused through the ethereal regions do not burn. For in the most subtle and spiritual nature they find no matter to burn. When, however, they descend into the regions of the corporeal air, they find a kind of matter on which to work, and begin to blaze, and the more they go forth into denser bodies, the more they exercise their force of burning in those things which are or can be destroyed by the power of heat. But when they rise upwards into the uppermost regions of the world which are closest to the most rarefied and spiritual nature, not finding any matter for kindling, they produce no heat, and display only the

consumat atque *erasum* R post per rasura R 31 Descendentes R^cBP: Discendentes R* 32 flagrare: r (1) s.l. B in s.l. R

Why the Stars are pale and cold

Cur stellae pallidae et frigidae

materiem flagrandi nullum calorem gignunt, illuminationis tantum operationem ostendentes, ideoque aetheria ac pura et spiritualia corpora caelestia ibidem constituta lucida sunt semper, caloris autem expertia. Ac per hoc et frigida et pallida esse creduntur.

Proinde planeta illa Saturni nomine uocata quoniam choris siderum 5
De sole uicina est frigida et pallida dicitur esse, solare autem corpus dum
medium mundi [spatium] possidet—quantum siquidem ut aiunt 697D
philosophi a terra ad solem interualli est, tantum a sole ad sidera—
medietatem quandam intelligitur obtinere. Ab inferioribus enim
naturis corpulentiam quandam, a superioribus uero spiritualementem 10
subtilitatem ad subsistentiam sui recipit, ac ueluti contrarias utriusque
mundi partis, superioris uidelicet et inferioris, in se colligit quali- 698A
tates, quarum contentione ueluti quadam stathera ponderatum
naturalem suum situm non sinitur deserere, grauitate quidem in-
ferioris partis superius ascendere, leuitate uero superioris inferius 15
inclinari non permittente. Proinde splendidi caloris uidetur esse, qui
color medius est inter pallidum et rubeum, partem quidem ex palli-
ditate frigidorum siderum supra, partem uero ex rubedine calidorum
corporum infra, in contemperantiam sui splendoris accipiens. Plane- 20
tae uero quae circa eum uoluuntur mutant colores secundum quali-
tates spatiorum in quibus discurrunt, Iouem dico et Martem, Venerem
et Mercurium, quae semper circulos suos circa solem peragunt sicut
Plato in Timeo edocet, atque ideo dum supra solem sunt claros
ostendunt uultus, dum uero infra rubeos.

Non igitur pallor siderum cogit nos intelligere aquae elementum 698B
ullo modo supra caelum esse dum ipsa palliditas ex caloris absentia 26
nascatur. Sed quoniam de his longum est exponere quicquid ratio
exigit naturae redeamus ad propositum.

'Et factum est uespere et mane dies unus.' Eadem interpretatio 30
est quam et in primi diei consummatione praediximus—quamuis
enim alia contemplatio sit spiritualium mundi rationum in primor-
dialibus causis, alia in simplicibus et uniuersalibus elementis, alia in
compositis particularibusque corporibus, unus tamen idemque intel-
lectus est totius mundi uniuersitatis—, et haec expositio in residuis 35
diebus obseruanda est ubicunque interponitur 'Et factum est uespere
et mane dies unus'. Sat de secunda die quantum breuitas exigit est
dictum.

5 Cf. Aug. *De Gen. ad litt.* ii. 5. 9. 8 cf. Macr. *In somn. Scip.* i. 19, 1; Isid. *Etym.* viii. 11, 53. 23 cf. n. 52. 29 Gen. i. 8.

6 lemma BP 7 a sole RB: solem P 10 corpulentiam RB: corpulen-
tiam R 13 stathera RB^c: statera B*P ponderatum R: ponderatus B:
ponderatur P 14-15 inferioris P: inferiores RB 16 inclinari R^cBP: incinari
R* 19 sui RB: suis P 20-21 qualitates RB: qualitatem P 21 II
in marg. Rm 24 infra RB: instar P 26 ex s.l. R

operation of illumination, and therefore the ethereal and pure and spiritual heavenly bodies which are established in those regions are always shining, but are without heat. And hence they are believed to be both cold and pale.

Therefore that planet which is called by the name of Saturn, since it is in the neighbourhood of the harmonious motions of the stars, is said to be cold and pale, whereas the body of the Sun, since it possesses the middle [region] of the world—for, as the philosophers affirm,⁵⁰ the distance from the earth to the Sun is the same as that from the Sun to the stars—is understood to occupy a kind of midway position. For it receives for its subsistence a kind of corporeality from the natures that are below it, but a spiritual subtlety from those that are above it, and draws together into itself as it were contrary qualities from each part of the world, namely the upper and the lower, whose tension, like some balanced pair of scales, does not allow it to abandon its natural situation, permitting it neither to rise upwards because of the weight of the lower part, nor to sink downwards because of the lightness of the upper. Therefore it is seen to be of shining heat and this colour is intermediate between pale and ruddy since it receives into the even temper of its own brightness a part of the paleness of the cold stars above and a part of the ruddiness of the hot bodies below. But the planets which revolve about it change their colours in accordance with the qualities of the regions they are traversing, I mean Jupiter and Mars, Venus and Mercury, which always pursue their orbits around the Sun,⁵¹ as Plato teaches in the *Timaeus*;⁵² and therefore when they are above the sun they show a bright face, but when below a ruddy face.

So the paleness of the stars does not compel us to understand that the element of water is in any way above the heaven, since that paleness comes from absence of heat. But since it would take a long time to expound everything which reason deduces from nature concerning these matters, let us return to our purpose.

'And there was made evening and morning, one day.' The interpretation is the same as we gave above for the conclusion of the first day—for although the contemplation of the spiritual reasons of the world is other in the primordial causes than in the simple and universal elements, and other again in composite and particularized bodies, there is one and the same understanding of the universe of the whole world, and this explanation is to be accepted in the case of the remaining days wherever 'And there was made evening and morning, one day' is introduced. Enough has been said, considering the brevity that is required, concerning the second day.

29 unus BP: secundus R 30 et s.l. R 31 sit RB: est P 36 secunda RB: secundo P

A. Sat plane ac uerisimile quamuis multis ac paene omnibus 698c
ignotum.

N. Sequitur ergo ut de tertia die strictim dicamus. 'Dixit autem
deus, Congregentur aquae quae sub caelo sunt in locum unum et
appareat arida, factumque est ita.' De congregatione aquarum in 5
locum unum opinio illa quam *plurimi* expositores huius *scripturae a*
sancto Basilio Caesariae Capadotiae antistite sumptam sequuntur
omnibus nota est, quoniam cogitantibus [eam] facillima occurrit,
quae infinitam aquarum undique circa molem terrae adhuc informem 10
et inuisibilem diffusarum spatia aeris et aetheris adhuc implentium
et primitiuae lucis ambitu splendentium tenuissimam ac ueluti
uaporalem quantitatem tertia die in unum locum congregatam
autumat, in cuius medio firmamentum factum fuisse secunda die 698d
credit, super quod superiorem aquarum partem suspendi putat,
inferiores autem praedictae abyssi diffusiones in unum collectas, hoc 15
est *intra conclusi* suis litoribus oceani ambitum *congregatas* ut appare-
ret arida locusque aeri et aetheri daretur. Sed haec opinio consulta
ueritate multis rationibus *uidetur titubare* et *inconsequens* omnino 699A
falsisque imaginationibus resultans. Non enim credimus sanctum
Augustinum sequentes neque ueritati conuenire iudicamus molem 20
illam terream primo omnium fuisse creatam uel illam abyssum undi-
que circa eam diffusam deindeque firmamentum in medio aquarum
factum, deinde inferiorum aquarum sub caelo remanentium in unum
locum collectionem, neque ullum horum localiter temporaliterue 25
aliud praecessisse. Siquidem haec omnia caeterarumque uisibilium
rerum natura simul et semel condita sunt suis temporibus et locis
[ordinata et constituta] nulliusque eorum generatio in formas et
species quantitates et qualitates generationem alterius temporalibus
morulis praecoccupauit sed simul ex aeternis suis rationibus in quibus
essentialiter subsistunt in uerbo dei unumquodque secundum genus 699B
et speciem suam numerosque indiuiduos processere. Senaria nanque
sex primorum dierum quantitas et intelligibilis diuisio de causis con-
ditarum rerum deque primo earum impetu simul in primam mundi
huius constitutionem intelligitur, et quod semel et simul a creatore
factum est senarii numeri perfectione a spiritu sancto per prophetam 35
distinguitur [non tempore sed intelligibili distinctione] ut per numeri

3-5 Gen. i. 9. 7 cf. Bas. Hex. iii. 5; PG xxix. 64bc. 17-18 cf. 82. 9
supra. 20 cf. Aug. De Gen. ad litt. ii. 11. 24 sq. 35 cf. 110. 37 *supra.*

1 lemma De tertia die et congregationem aquarum Rm 3 III in marg. Rm
6 plurimi in ras. R(C): pulcherrimi P 6-7 scripturae a sancto in ras. R(C)
capodotiae B 9 quae: -uae in ras. R(C) 13 autumat RB^c: autumant B*P
14 suspendi: s (2) s.l. B 16 intra conclusi B^c(C)P: inter inclusi RB* con-
gregatas: gregatas in ras. R(C) 17 opinio RB: opiniorum P 18 uidetur
titubare in ras. R(C) inconsequens: sequens in ras. R(C) 25 praecessisse
RB: praecessisse P 28 qualitates ex quantitates R 29 morulis ex morulas

A. Enough surely, and likely to be true, although to many, and
indeed to almost all, unknown.

N. It follows, then, that we should speak briefly about the third
day. 'But God said, Let the waters that are under the heaven be
gathered together into one place, and let the dry land appear, and
so it was done.' Concerning the gathering together of the waters into
one place the opinion which *most* commentators of this *passage of*
Scripture adopt, and which they have taken *from St.* Basil the prelate
of Caesarea in Cappadocia, is known to all, for it seems to all who
think [upon it] the easiest: *that which* affirms that on the third day
a very rarefied and almost vaporous quantity of waters, which without
limit were diffused all about the as yet formless and invisible mass of
the earth, which up to now filled the spaces of the air and the ether,
and which glowed in the embrace of the primitive light, was gathered
together into one place. He believes that the firmament had been
made in its midst on the second day, and thinks that above it the
upper part of the waters was suspended, but the lower diffusions of
the above-mentioned abyss were collected into one, that is, were
gathered *within* the bounds of the ocean which encloses them by its
shores, so that the dry land might appear and a place might be
provided for the air and the ether. But this opinion, if the truth be
consulted, appears shaky and inconsistent for many reasons and to
be based on altogether false fancies. For we follow St. Augustine in
not believing or judging that it is in accordance with the truth that
that earthly mass was created before everything else, or that that
abyss was diffused all about it and that then the firmament was made
in the midst of the waters, then the waters that remained below the
heaven were collected into one place, or that any of these things
came before any other in place or in time. For all these things and
the nature of the rest of the visible things were established all
together and at once [ordained and constituted] for their own times
and places, and in no case did the generation of any one of them into
forms and species, quantities and qualities, precede by temporal
intervals the generation of any other, but that they proceeded simul-
taneously, each according to its genus and species and indivisible
particulars, from their eternal reasons in which they subsist as
essences in the Word of God. For the sixfold quantity of the six
first days and their intelligible division is understood to refer to the
causes of established things and of their first downrush simultane-
ously into the initial constitution of this world; and that which was
made at once and all together by the Creator is distinguished, in the
perfection of the number six, [not by a temporal but by an intelligible

P 31 processere B^cP: procesere RB* 32 quantitas RB: quantitatis P
34 semel et simul RB: simul et semel P 35 per om. P

uirtutem diuinae operationis *perfectio* indicaretur. [Hic nanque numerus suis partibus impletur nec totum partes superat nec partes totum.] Vt enim uox praecedat uerbum non tempore sed causa—de uoce siquidem fit uerbum ueluti de quadam materia informi corpus quoddam formatum—sic de causis adhuc incognitis ac ueluti uisibilibus formis carentibus omnium rerum uisibilium conditio nullis temporum spatiis uel locorum interpositis simul in formas numerosque locorum et temporum producta est, et qui de materia informi mundum fecit quemadmodum non aliunde accepit materiem de qua faceret sed a se et in se ipso [et accepit et fecit], ita neque loca extra se quaesiuit in quibus faceret neque tempora spectauit quorum interuallis opus suum perageret, sed in se ipso omnia fecit, qui locus omnium est et tempus temporum et saeculum saeculorum, qui simul operatus est. Omnia enim in momento oculi facta sunt. Nam et ea quae per cursus temporum distincta generationem acceperunt et accipiunt et acceptura sunt simul et semel in ipso facta sunt in quo et praeterita et praesentia et futura simul et semel et unum sunt.

Praedicta *itaque* opinione repulsa, quaeritur quales aquae erant sub caelo quae congregatae sunt in locum unum et quis est locus ille unus. Aquae siquidem sensibiles quae uulgari uocabulo maris uel abyssi uel oceani appellantur mox ut ex occultis suis causis eruperant in sua propria specie et quantitate et qualitate in loco suo, hoc est inter terram et aera hunc terrae proximum, apparuere litoribus suis cinctae, partim in gremiis telluris ueluti in quibusdam poris magni cuiuspiam corporis occulte discurrentes, partim superficiem eius aperte contegentes, et in quibus locis dispersae fuerant quando unum proprium non habebant in *quem* postmodum coartatae terminos diffinitos non transgrediuntur. Quattuor etenim principalia mundi huius corpora ex quattuor simplicibus elementis composita, terram dico *et* aquam, aera et aethera, cum omnibus quae in eis et de eis facta sunt simul et semel species suas acceperunt et loca et numeros et tempora et interualla et differentias et proprietates mensuras quoque et pondera et omne quod in eis sentitur uel sensum superat et intelligitur uel intellectum fugit. Sed si quis de talibus fysicas reddiderit rationes qui[a] sensu corporeo comprehendere non possunt ab his

3 Cf. Aug. *De Gen. ad litt.* i. 15.29.

1 *perfectio in ras.* R(C) 3 *post non rasura* R tempore RB: temporum P
 4 *informi R^cBP: in forma R** 8 *qui de RB: quidem* P
 17 *futura ex futura* R simul *s.l.* B 18 *Praedicta RB: Producta* P
 itaque R^c(C)BP: qua R* 21 *oceani RB: oceani* P mox RB^cP: *om.* B*
 24 *partim RB: partem* P poris R^cB: temporis R*: corporis P 25 *discurrentes* R^cBP: *discurrentes* R*
 27 *quem: em in ras.* R(C) 30 *et (1)*
in ras. R(C) 34 *fysicas R^cBP: fysicas* R* 35 *quia R^c(C)BP: qui* R*
 corporeo *bis scriptum* P his: *h- s.l.* R

division] by the Holy Spirit through the Prophet so that through the power of that number the perfection of the divine work might be indicated. [For this number is completed by its parts, nor does its whole exceed the parts nor the parts the whole.] For as the voice precedes the word not temporally but causally—for the word is made from the voice as a formed body is made from formless matter—so from causes as yet unknown and, so to speak, lacking visible shape, the establishment of all visible things, without the intervention of intervals of times or places, is simultaneously brought forth into the forms and numbers of places and times, and as He Who made the world from formless matter did not take the matter from which He made it from elsewhere, but from Himself and in Himself [both took it and made it], so He neither sought for places outside Himself in which to make nor looked for times within the intervals of which He might carry out His work, but in Himself He made all things, and He is the Place of all things and the Time of times and the Age of ages, Whose operations are simultaneous. For all things were made in the twinkling of an eye. For even those things which have received and do receive and shall receive their generation at distinct intervals along the paths of times are made at once and all together in Him in Whom both past and present and future are at once and all together and one.

Having, then, rejected the aforesaid opinion, we ask of what kind were the waters under heaven which were gathered together into one place, and what is that one place. For the sensible waters which are commonly called by the name of sea or abyss or ocean, as soon as they had gushed forth from their hidden causes, made their appearance in their proper form and quantity and quality in their place, that is, between earth and this air which adjoins the earth, bound within their shores, some flowing secretly in different directions in the bowels of the earth as in the veins of some great body, some covering openly its surface, and in the places where they had been dispersed when they did not have one place proper to themselves, to which having later become attached, they do not overstep the defined limits. For the four principal bodies of the world composed from the four simple elements, I mean earth *and* water, air and ether, with all the things that are made in them and from them at once and all together received their forms and places and individualities and times and extensions and differences and properties, their measures also and their weights and everything which in them is perceived or surpasses the sense and is understood or eludes the understanding. But if anyone offers physical reasons for these things, because they cannot be comprehended by the corporeal sense by those who only consider sensible things, he will [either] be treated

qui solummodo sensibilia cogitant [aut] spernetur tanquam nihil dicat aut alligore putabitur, nescientes naturam ex motibus [suis] discernere. Physica siquidem substantiales naturae rationes, Ethica uero rationabiles ipsius uel irrationabiles motus considerat.

A. Edissere quaeso quodcunque de hac questione soluenda uidetur tibi uerisimile neminemque uerearis quoquo modo ferat, siue non intelligat quod dicas luce ueritatis repercussus, siue spernat ueneno inuidiae corruptus, siue ueterum opinionum zelo contentiosus.

N. Post narrationem mundanae constitutionis, extremarum uidelicet ipsius partium sibi inuicem disparium, incorporalium dico rationum simpliciumque secundum quas est conditus, et compositorum corporum generationi et corruptioni locis quoque temporibusque obnoxiorum, quae quidem extremitates aquarum uocabulo propter causas praedictas appellatae sunt, medietatisque quattuor elementorum quae firmamenti caeliue nomen accepere, ad contemplationem infimae eiusdem partis omnium, scilicet corruptibilium corporum, profetica intentio uidetur descendere ueluti ad tertiam naturae conditae theoriam. Primo siquidem generaliter primordialium causarum in suos effectus processionem ex incognitis archanisque naturae sinibus quasi quibusdam tenebris in lucem formarum multiplicium perspicuam intellectibusque contemplantium uel sensibus manifestam expressit, deinde secundo contuitu triforem mundi conditionem, in rationibus uidelicet et uniuersalibus elementis inque corporibus particularibus atque compositis considerans ad ipsorum solubilitatem et corruptibilitatem corporum, quae infimum totius creaturae obtinent locum, speculationem peruenit.

Quoniam igitur omnium corporum ex quattuor simplicium elementorum coitu compositorum ex maximis usque ad minima peruenientium triplex consideratio est—aliter enim in eis materia inspicitur, aliter forma et species quae materiae adiecta omne solidum atque sensibile corpus efficit—sola siquidem materia carens specie nullum corpus peragit quia per se informis est, adiecta uero specie corpus perfectum fit—, [aliter essentia et substantialis forma quae ueluti fundamentum immobile formatam suffert et continet materiam]—, necessarium erat *substantialem formam* ex materia [formata] rationabili contuitu segregare. Maxima autem corpora dixi terram aquam

2 alligore RB: inalligore P 3 discernere in ras. B Physica RP: Phisica B 4 irrationabiles RB: irrationales P 5 quaeso R^cB: quaeso R*P questione RB: questio P 8 corruptus RB: cur ruptas P 14 medietatisque R^cB^cP: medietatesque R*B* quattuor RB: iiii^{or} P 15 accipere RB: accipere P 16 infimae RB: infinitae P 17 profetica RB: prophetica P 19 causarum RB: causarium P 20 sinibus RB: finibus P 23 elementis B^cP: elementis RB* 25 infimum R^cBP: infimum R* 26 obtinent RB: obtinet P 27 quattuor RB: iiii^o P 27–28 elementorum R^cBP: elementorum R* 31–32 efficit—corpus om. P 35 substantialem formam in ras. R(C) post formam et habet R

with contempt as though he were talking nonsense or will be thought to be speaking allegorically because they do not know how to distinguish nature from [its] motions. For physics considers the substantial reasons of nature, but ethics her motions whether they be rational or irrational.

A. Pray expound whatever seems to you likely to be true concerning the question to be solved without fear of anyone, whatever his attitude may be, whether dazzled by the light of truth he does not understand what you say, or consumed with the poison of envy he treats you with contempt, or is disposed to quarrel with you out of zeal for his former opinions.

N. After the account of the constitution of the world, that is, of its two extreme parts which are dissimilar from each other, I mean of the incorporeal and simple reasons after which it was established, and the composite bodies which are subject to coming into being and passing away and to places and to times—extremities which for reasons already given are called by the name of waters—and of the mediation of the four elements which have received the name of firmament or heaven, the attention of the Prophet seems to descend to the consideration of the same lowest part of all things, namely, of perishable bodies, as though to a third contemplation of established nature. For first he gave a general description of the procession of the primordial causes into their effects from the unknown and hidden recesses of nature as though from a kind of darkness into the light of the manifold forms, clear and manifest to the intellects or senses of those who contemplate them, then, considering in a second observation the threefold establishment of the world, namely, in its reasons, in the universal elements, and in the particular and composite bodies, he arrived at the contemplation of the soluble and perishable bodies themselves which occupy the lowest place of the whole creature.

Since, then, all bodies which are composed from the coming together of the four simple elements, extending from the greatest to the smallest, are considered in three ways—for the matter in them is regarded in one way, the form and species which by being attached to matter produces every solid and sensible body in another—for matter by itself without form produces no body because by itself it is formless, though with the addition of form it becomes a perfect body—, [in another the essence and substantial form which, like an immovable foundation, supports and contains the formed matter], it was necessary to distinguish logically *substantial form* from the [formed] matter. Now, by the greatest bodies I meant earth, water,

aera aetheraque caelumque, in quibus innumerabilis minorum cor- 701B
 porum et mediorum et minimorum quantitas multiplicatur, quae
 tamen omnia *hoc* est maxima et media et minima, ex quattuor puris-
 simis simplicissimis inuisibilibusque per se elementis constituuntur
 quoniam in ea resoluuntur. Nullum enim elementum per se corporeo 5
 sensu attingitur. Si ergo ut praedictis rationibus demonstratum est
 quattuor illa pura elementa firmamenti uel caeli uocabulo a scriptura
 [propter] suae naturae simplicem uirtutem meruerunt appellari, ni-
 mirum omnia corpora ab eis et sub eis ineffabili eorum coitu consti-
 tuta aquarum sub caelo positarum possunt nomine comprehendi. 10
 Nec inmerito. Nam non solum mutabilia sunt, uerum etiam genera-
 tionem et corruptionem subiecta. Etenim illa quae caelestia uel aethera 701C
 dicuntur [corpora] quamuis spiritualia et incorruptibilia uideantur
 esse, necessario tamen quoniam per generationem et compositionem
 inchoauerunt fieri ad finem suae solutionis et corruptionis peruenient. 15
 Si autem caelestia corpora necessariam sui solutionem expectant,
 ueritate dicente: 'Caelum et terra peribunt', item Psalmista: 'Opera
 manuum tuarum sunt caeli. Ipsi peribunt', et similia sanctae scriptu-
 rae [testimonia], quid de infimis mundi corporibus est aestimandum
 quae cotidie nascuntur atque soluuntur? 20

Itaque si in omni corpore siue caelesti siue terreno siue aquatili et
 instabilis inundatio materiae informis perspicitur—*ita enim diffinitur:*
Materia est mutabilitas rerum mutabilium capax omnium forma- 701D
rum, instabilitasque mutabilis formae qua ipsa materia specificata for-
matur—ipsa nanque est qualitatiua forma quae adiuncta materiae 25
 corpus efficit—*qualitatiuam quidem* formam dico illam quae ex quali-
 tate sumpta et quantitate sensibus corporeis apparet materiaeque
 instabilitati adhaerens cum ipsa semper fluctuat generationem et 702A
 corruptionem patiens incrementa et detrimenta per quantitates et
 qualitates recipit multisque ac uariis differentiis quae extrinsecus ex 30
 qualitate locorum aerum umorum ciborum similibusque occasionum
 accidunt succumbit—nonne ueri simile uidetur rectaeque rationi
 conueniens, ut ipsa mutabilitas materiae cum ipsa forma qualitatiua
 quae ei adhaerens eundem aestum assiduae fluctuationis *turbidae-*
que patitur aquarum sub caelo simplicium elementorum positarum 35

17 Marc. xiii. 31.

17-18 Ps. ci. 25 sq.

23 cf. Aug. Conf. vii. 6.6

1 minorum RB: aliorum P 3 hoc R^c(C)BP: haec R* 8 simplicem
 R^cBP: simplici R* 9 ab eis *bis scriptum* P coitu RB^cP: contuitu B*
 12 uel *om.* P 13 incorruptibilia B^cP: in incorruptibilia RB* 17 dicente:
 dic *in ras.* R(C) terra BP: terram R 22 inundatio *in ras.* R(C) *ita in ras.*
 R(C) 22-23 diffinitur—*muta in ras.* R(C) 23 capax RB: corporum P
 24 mutabilis R^cBP: immutabilis R* 25 ipsa nanque est *in ras.* R(C) ad-
 iuncta RB: adiecta P 26 quidem: -dem *in ras.* R(C) 27 post sensibus
rasura R apparet RB^cP: apparent B* 28 post adhaerens *rasura* R et

air, and ether, and heaven,⁵³ in which there is multiplied an innumer-
 able quantity of smaller and medium-sized and minute bodies; but
 all of them, *that* is, the greatest and medium-sized and the small-
 est, are constituted out of the four most pure and most simple
 elements, which are invisible in themselves, because they are dis-
 solved into them. For no element by itself is reached by the corporeal
 sense. If, then, as has been demonstrated by the reasons given above,
 those four pure elements were worthy to be called by Scripture by
 the name of firmament or heaven [on account of] the simple power
 of their nature, it is not surprising that all bodies which are consti-
 tuted from them and below them by their coming together should
 be signified by the name of the waters that are placed under the
 heaven. Not inappropriately; for they are not only mutable but are
 subject to coming into being and passing away. For even those
 [bodies] which are called celestial or ethereal, although they seem
 to be spiritual and imperishable, yet shall necessarily come to their
 end in dissolution and decay because they came into being through
 generation and composition. But if the celestial bodies await a
 necessary dissolution, since Truth says, 'Heaven and earth shall pass
 away', and the Psalmist, 'The heavens are the work of Thy hands.
 They shall pass away', and like [testimonies] in Holy Scripture,
 what must we think of the lowest bodies of the world, which are
 born and perish every day?

So if in every body whether heavenly or earthly or watery is also
 observed the inconstant flux of formless matter—for it is *defined*
thus: Matter is the mutability of mutable things capacious of all
 forms, the instability of the mutable form by which the matter itself
 is specified and formed—for it is the qualitative form which, when
 combining with matter, produces body—now, by qualitative form
 I mean that which by the quality and quantity it assumes becomes
 apparent to the corporeal senses and which, clinging to the instability
 of matter, is always in flux along with matter and undergoes coming
 into being and passing away, and through its qualities and quantities
 receives increases and decreases and succumbs to the many and
 various vicissitudes which come upon it from without from the
 quality of places, airs, waters, victuals, and similar chances—does it
 not seem likely and to accord with right reason that that mutability
 of matter with that qualitative form which, cleaving to it, endures
 the same storm of incessant *and turbulent* inconstancy, should be
 signified by the figurative name of the waters that lie beneath the

ante generationem *erasum* R 30 recipit: t *in ras.* R(C) 32 succumbit
 RB: succumbit P 33 ut *om.* P ipsa mutabilitas RB: ipsam mutabili-
 tatem P 34 ei RB: a P 34-35 turbidaeque *in ras.* R(C) 35 posita-
 rum RBP^c: positarum P*

tropico nomine significari; substantialis uero forma uel species in genere suo incommutabiliter subsistens et nullo modo cum corpore ex materia et qualitativa forma composito mutabilitatem patitur—non enim cum corpore *incipit* [quamuis in corpore nascatur], *sine* quo per se ipsam in genere suo essentialiter permanet, neque cum eo corrumpitur quoniam omnis essentia et uirtus et operatio cum corruptibilibus et mutabilibus nec corrumpi nec mutari possunt, propriis naturae subsidiis <solidata>—aridae, hoc est terrae, uocabulo non incongrue appellatur?

De arida et aquis
‘Congregentur’ ergo ‘aquae quae sub caelo sunt in locum unum et appareat arida.’ Nisi enim contemplatiuus animus fluctuantem materiae adhaerentisque ei formae instabilitatem ueluti quosdam aestuantes fluctus in unum intelligentiae locum—unus nanque intellectus est materiae et adhaerentis ei formae, quoniam unum corpus efficiunt—prius colligat, forma illa substantialis naturali soliditate suae naturae semper stabilis mentis oculis apparere non poterit. Vt enim diffusio aquarum telluris soliditatem, ne sensibus corporeis appareat, cooperit, ita corruptibilium corporum mutabilitas et innumerabilis multiplicatio subsistentis eis formae stabilitatem ab intellectualibus oculis naturas rerum contemplantibus aufert, ne per se ipsam a corporibus discreta consideretur perspicua; et quemadmodum recedentibus aquis inque alueum suum undique collecte cumulatis litora longe lateque nuda ac sicca solidaque patescunt, sic instabilitate corruptibilium rerum mentis contuitu ab incorruptibilibus naturis uno contemplationis tenore segregata mox formarum [substantialium] et specierum immutabilis pulcherrimaque soliditas in generibus suis animi obtutibus aridet.

Arida autem dicitur substantialium formarum stabilitas. Nec immerito, quoniam nuda et absoluta est omnium accidentium operimento. Omnis enim forma et species in generali simplicitate qua subsistit considerata accidentium concursu omnino est libera, corpora uero quibus subsistunt omnium accidentium capacia sunt.

De substantiali forma
De forma autem substantiali semperque permanenti deque ipsa mutabili ex qualitate et quantitate materiae copulata in primo libro satis ut opinor est actum, et nunc breuiter de isdem repetendum, ne ulla ambiguitas legentibus relinquatur. Substantialis forma est ipsa cuius participatione omnis indiuidua species formatur, et est una in

10–11 Gen. i. 9. 34 i. 52–53, pp. 154–160.32.

2 et *codd.*: lege quae 4 *incipit in ras.* R(C) *sine in ras.* R 8 *solidata* R*B^c(C)P: *erasum* R^c: *om.* B* 9 *appellatur: tur in ras.* R 10 *lemma* BP: et *aquis om.* P 14 et *adhaerentis* BP: *adherentisque* R 26 *pulcherrimaque* RB: *pulcherrimaque* P 28 *dicitur s.l.* B 29–31 *operimento-accidentium om.* P 31 *concurso* RB: *cursu* P 32 *uero in ras.* R(C) 33 *lemma* BP: *Quid sit stabilis substantia et omnium dissimilitudo* Rm

heaven of the simple elements; while the substantial form or species which immutably subsists in its genus and never experiences the mutability of the body which is composed of matter and qualitative form—for the substantial form does not *begin* with the body [although it is born in the body], *without* which it abides as an essence by itself in its genus, nor does it perish with the body, since no essence and power and operation can undergo either the destruction or change of destructible and changeable things <being consolidated> by the proper supports of its nature—is not inappropriately called by the word ‘dry’, that is, earth?

So ‘let the waters which are under the earth be gathered together into one place and let the dry land appear’; for unless the contemplating mind first assembles the fluctuating inconstancy of matter and the form attached to it, like turbulent waves, into one place in the intelligence—for matter and the form attached to it can be combined under a single meaning since they produce a single body—that substantial form which is always stable by reason of the natural firmness of its nature will not become apparent to the mind’s eye. For as the diffusion of the waters covers the earth so that it is not apparent to the corporeal senses, so the mutability and innumerable multiplicity of perishable bodies conceals the stability of the form which underlies them from the intellectual observation which contemplates the nature of things so that it is not considered by itself, clearly distinct from the bodies; and as when the waters recede and are collected from all sides into their beds the shores begin to appear far and wide, bare and dry and solid, so when the inconstancy of perishable things is separated by the mind’s observation from the imperishable natures in uninterrupted contemplation, soon the immutable and most beautiful firmness of the [substantial] forms and species will become manifest in their genera to the mind’s gaze.

Now, by dry land is meant the stability of the substantial forms; not inappropriately, since it is bare and free from the covering of all the accidents. For every form and species considered in the simplicity of the genus in which it subsists is altogether free from the encountering of accidents, while the bodies which they underlie are capable of receiving all accidents.

But concerning the substantial and ever-abiding form and concerning that which is mutable because of its association with the quality and quantity of matter, enough has been said in the First Book, as I think, and now a brief review of them must be made so that no doubt may remain in the readers. The substantial form is that by participation in which every indivisible species is formed,

Concerning the Dry Land and the Waters

Concerning the Substantial Form

omnibus et omnes in una, et nec multiplicatur in multiplicatis nec
minuitur in retractis. Non enim maior est forma illa uerbi gratia
quae dicitur homo in infinita humanae naturae per indiuiduas species
multiplicatione quam in illo uno et primo homine qui primus parti-
ceps illius factus est, nec minor in illo erat quam in omnibus quorum
5 corpora ex illo multiplicantur, sed in omnibus una eademque est et
in omnibus [tota] aequaliter, in nullis ullam uarietatem uel dissimili-
tudinem recipiens. Eadem ratio est in omnibus substantialibus for-
703B mis; in equo in boue in leone caeterisque animalibus; in surculis
quoque et herbis similis regula constituitur. 10

De forma
materiali

Forma uero illa materiae adhaerens ad constitutionem corporis
uaria semper atque mutabilis inque diuersas differentias secundum
accidens dispersa. Non enim ex naturalibus causis uisibilium for-
marum multiplex differentia procedit in una eademque substantiali
15 forma, sed extrinsecus euenit. Hominum siquidem inter se dissimili-
tudo in uultu in quantitate et qualitate singulorum corporum, morum
quoque et conuersationum uarietas non ex humana natura, quae una
eademque est in omnibus in quibus est et sibi semper simillima
703C nullam uarietatem recipiens, sed ex his quae circa eam intelliguntur
conti[n]git, ex locis uidelicet temporibusque ex generatione ex quan-
titate et qualitate alimoniorum regionum rerum in quibus quisque
20 nascitur et, ut uniuersaliter dicam, ex omnibus quae circa substan-
tiam intelliguntur et non ipsa substantia sunt. Ipsa enim simplex et
uniformis est nullisque uarietatibus seu compositionibus obnoxia.

Quisquis ergo actu rationis omnia quaecunque extrinsecus circa
25 propriam substantiam singularum formarum, [hoc est circa indiui-
duas et specialissimas species uniuscuiusque formae, uerbi causa
hominis equi bouis piscis uolatilis herbarum lignorum] intelliguntur
703D uel sentiuntur mutabilia ueluti quadam multarum aquarum inunda-
tione semper fluctuantia ab ipsa intima substantia circa quam uolu-
untur, dum sit ipsa incommutabili suae naturae tenore stabilita,
30 segregare potuerit inque unum locum congregauerit, hoc est unius
eiusdemque diffinitionis ambitu concluderit, dicens: Omne quodcun-
que circa propriam substantiam uel intelligitur uel sentitur uarium et
mutabile est eamque inundationibus suis cooperit, ut uix ad purum
704A dinosci quid sit ualeat, ipse aquas quae sub caelo sunt diuinis ad-
monitionibus in unum locum iubetur congregare, ut appareat arida,
36 hoc est ut occulta substantialis forma circa quam accidentium fluctus
exaestuuant intellectualibus oculis naturas rerum discernentibus clare
perluceat. De eo autem quod omnium rerum quae diffiniri possunt
40

1 omnes RB: omnis P 9 equo BP: aequo R 11 lemma BP 16 cor-
porum RB: temporum P morum RB: minimum P 20-21 quantitate et quali-
tate RB: qualitate et quantitate P 25 lemma Certior intelligentia quae sit
congregatio aquarum quid arida quid mare quid uisio Rm 29 post mutabilia
sicut erasum R 31 tenore RB: tenere P 35 cooperit RBP^c: coeperit P

and it is one in all and they are all in the one, and neither is it multi-
plied in things that are multiplied nor diminished in their reduction.
For that form, for example, which is called 'man' is no greater in the
infinite multiplication of human nature into its indivisible species
than in that unique and first man who became the first to partake of
it, nor was it less in him than in all whose bodies are multiplied out
of him, but in all it is one and the same and in all it is equally [whole],
and in none does it admit any variation or dissimilarity. The case is
the same with all substantial forms; in horse, in ox, in lion, and in
the other animals, in trees also and in crops a like rule is established.

But that form which is joined to matter so as to constitute body
(is) always varying and changeable and dispersed among diverse
differences by accident. For it is not from natural causes that the
manifold differences of visible forms proceed in one and the same
substantial form, but they come from without. For the dissimilarity
of men one from another in feature, size, and quality of their several
bodies, and the variety of custom and conduct result not from human
nature, which is one and the same in all in whom it exists, and is
always most like itself and admits no variety, but from the things
which are understood about it, namely from places and times, from
generation, from the quantity and quality of their diets, their habitats,
the conditions under which each is born, and, to speak generally,
from all things which are understood about the substance and are
not the substance itself.⁵⁴ For that is simple and uniform and is
susceptible to no variations or compositions.

Concerning
the Material
Form

Whosoever therefore by the operation of reason can separate all
28 external things whatsoever that are understood or perceived about
the proper substance of the individual forms [that is, about the
indivisible and most specific species of each form, for instance, of
man, of horse, of ox, of fish, of bird, of crops, of trees], which are
changeable and always in flux as though by some flood of many
waters, from that inward substance itself about which they revolve
while itself is firmly fixed [in the unchangeable tenor of its nature,
and gathers them together into one place, that is, includes them
within the bounds of one and the same definition, saying, 'Everything
which is either understood or perceived about its proper substance
is varying and changing and covers it over with its waves so that it
can scarcely be distinguished what it is'; is being commanded by
divine admonitions to gather the waters which are under the heaven
together into one place so that the dry land may appear, that is, so
that the hidden substantial form about which the waves of the
accidents are in turmoil may clearly appear before the gaze of the
intellects which discern the nature of things. But on the subject that
for all things that can be defined there is a common place or proper

locus sit communis eorum uel propria diffinitio in primo libro satis ut opinor disputatum est.

'Et uocauit deus aridam terram congregationesque aquarum appellauit maria.' Vocabulorum geminatione in operibus trium primordialium dierum—in prima uidelicet appellauit lucem diem et tenebras noctem, in secunda uocauit deus firmamentum caelum, in tertia uocauit deus aridam terram congregationesque aquarum appellauit maria—duplicem totius creaturae speculationem significari arbitror. Aliter enim in causis, aliter in effectibus una eademque res theoriae speculationibus intimatur.

De dei
uisione

'Et uidit deus quod esset bonum.' Visio dei totius uniuersitatis est conditio. Non enim aliud est ei uidere et aliud facere, sed uisio illius uoluntas eius est et uoluntas operatio. Merito autem omne quod uidit deus bonum est. Diuina siquidem bonitas bonorum omnium causa est, immo etiam omnia bona ipsa est. Nullum enim per se bonum est, sed in quantum bonum est participatione illius boni quod per se solummodo substantiale bonum est bonum est. 'Nemo' enim 'bonus nisi solus deus.' 'Vidit' ergo 'deus quod esset bonum', hoc est: Vidit se ipsum in omnibus bonum. Non enim deus uidet nisi se ipsum [quia extra ipsum nihil est et omne quod in ipso est ipse est] simplexque uisio ipsius est, et a nullo alio formatur ipsa nisi a se ipso.

'Et ait: Germinet terra herbam uirentem et facientem semen et lignum pomiferum faciens fructum iuxta genus suum cuius semen in ipso sit super terram.' Virtutem herbarum lignorumque in primordialibus causis conditam per haec uerba propheta commemorat, quae uirtus uis seminum a sanctis patribus solet appellari, in qua species illa animae quae dicitur nutritiua et auctiua operationem suam exercet, generationem uidelicet seminum administrans et quae genita sunt nutriens incrementaque eis per numeros locorum et temporum distribuens et, quoniam omne quod in natura rerum uisibiliter apparet non aliunde nisi ex occultis naturalis et substantialis formae sinibus, quam aridae uel terrae uocabulo significatam praediximus, originales causas generationis suae recipit, propterea scriptum est: 'Germinet terra herbam uirentem', et caetera, ac si aperte diceretur: Vis seminalis herbarum et lignorum, quae in intimis substantiarum rationibus causaliter creata est, in formas et species sensibiles per generationem procedat, quae processio primordialium causarum in

1 i. 27-42, pp. 110.6-130.6. 3-4 Gen. i. 10. 9 cf. 74. 32-33 supra.
11 Gen. i. 10. 17-18 Luc. xviii. 19. 18 Gen. i. 10. 22-24 Gen. i.
11. 34 Gen. i. 11.

5 primo *codd.*: lege prima 6 in (1) *om.* P secunda BBP^c: secundo P*
11 lemma BP: dei *om.* P esset RB^cP: est B* 13 eius *s.l.* R eius *ex non* P
19 uidet RB: uidit P 20-21 ipsum-ipso: ipso *ad finem cum ipso ad initium*
confuso omnia ab ipso ad ipso repetit P, sed in repetitione uisu pro uisio (lin. 21)
habet 22 lemma Quid germinatio est terram herba nutricem et cetera Rm

definition there has been enough discussion, as I think, in the First Book.

'And God called the dry land earth and the gatherings of the waters He named seas.' By the duplication of words in the works of the three primordial days, as on the first He called the light day and the darkness night, on the second God called the firmament heaven, on the third God called the dry land earth and the gathering together of the waters seas, is signified, I think, the twofold way of regarding the whole creature. For one and the same thing is made known by the investigations of contemplation in one way in its causes, in another way in its effects.⁵⁵

'And God saw that it was good.' God's seeing is the creation of the whole universe. For for Him it is not one thing to see and another to do, but His seeing is His Will and His Will is His operation. But it is right that everything that God sees is good. For the Divine Goodness is the cause of all good things, nay indeed, is itself all good things. For nothing is good in itself, but in so far as it is good it is good by participation in that Good which alone is substantial good in itself. For 'no one is good save God alone'. So 'God saw that it was good', that is: He saw Himself (as) the Good in all things. For God sees nothing but Himself [because outside Himself there is nothing and everything that is within Him is Himself] and His seeing is simple, and *it* is formed from nothing else than from Himself.

Concerning
God's Vision

'And He said, Let the earth bring forth the flourishing and seed-bearing vegetation and the fruit-tree bearing fruit after its kind, and let the seed in it be over the earth.' In these words the Prophet records the creation of the power of the crops and the trees in their primordial causes, and this power is usually named by the Holy Fathers the force of the seeds, in which that species of soul which is called the nutritive and auctive exerts its operation, namely by administering the generation of the seeds and by nourishing the things that are generated and by bestowing upon them growth through the numbers of places and times. And, because everything that makes a visible appearance in the nature of things receives the original causes of its generation from nowhere else but from the hidden recesses of the natural and substantial form which we said above was signified by the word 'dry land' or 'earth', it is therefore written: 'Let the earth bring forth flourishing vegetation', etc., as though it were openly said: Let the seminal force of crops and trees, which is causally created in the inward reasons of substances, proceed through generation into sensible forms and species; and this procession of the primordial causes into their effects is set forth in the

24 post in semet *erasum* B 27 auctiua RB: actiua P 29 numeros R^cBP:
numeras R* 32 sinibus RB: finibus P 33 recipit RB: recepit P

effectus suos sequentibus scripturae uerbis explanatur: 'Et factum est ita, et protulit terra herbam uirentem et ferentem semen iuxta genus suum lignumque faciens fructum et habens unumquodque semen[tem] secundum speciem suam.' Videsne quemadmodum diuina scriptura genera et species manifestissime declarat, in quibus causaliter et inuisibiliter subsistunt quaecunque per generationem in quantitatibus et qualitatibus in notitiam corporalium sensuum erumpunt?

Si cui autem uidetur quod ista explanatio quam de tribus primis diebus iuxta uires intentionis nostrae protulimus non secundum istoriam sit, sed secundum leges allegoriae, intentus perspiciat quadriformem sophiae diuisionem.

de quadri-
formi sophiae
diuisione

Et est quidem prima ΠΡΑΚΤΙΚΗ, actiua; secunda ΦΥΣΙΚΗ, naturalis; tertia ΘΕΟΛΟΓΙΑ, quae de deo disputat; quarta ΛΟΓΙΚΗ, rationalis, quae ostendit quibus regulis de unaquaque trium aliarum sophiae partium disputandum. Quarum una uirtutes quibus subplantantur uitia penitusque eradicantur inuestigat; altera rationes naturarum siue in causis siue in effectibus; tertia quid de una omnium causa quae deus est pie debeat aestimari; quomodo autem et uirtus et natura et deus rationabiliter quaeritur, quarta ut diximus edocet diligenterque considerat. Cui praedictarum sophiae partium narrationem *istoricam* de conditione rerum adiungere debeat, et si non penitus philosophiae expertus est, non alicui nisi physicae copulabit. Et si ita est, intueatur quid a nobis allegorice dictum, et, ut opinor, non inueniet. In prima siquidem die primordialium causarum generaliter in effectus suos sensibus uel intellectibus comprehensibilem processionem conditione lucis significatam diximus. [Quod autem primordiales causae rerum omnium substantiae sint in diuina sapientia substitutae testis est sanctus Ambrosius in Examerone suo dicens: 'Aduertit uir plenus prudentiae', Moses uidelicet, 'quod uisibilem et inuisibilem substantiam et causas rerum mens sola diuina contineat']; in secunda triformem mundi huius constitutionem, ex rationibus uidelicet suis simplicibusque elementis corporibusque compositis perfectam, aquarum uocabulo firmamentique in medio earum facti non incongrue ut *reor* descriptam existimauimus; tertiam uero mundi huius considerationem in segregatione eorum quae in eo mutabilia sunt ab his quae naturae suae subsidiis custodita

1-4 Gen. i. 11-12. 10-11 cf. 196.11-14 *supra*. 30-32 Ambr. *Hex.* i. 2, 7.

2 terra *in ras.* B 4 sementem *codd.* 11 istoriam RB: historiam P
13 lemma BP: quadriformia P: Quod explanatio trium dierum fisicae sit non allegoriae Rm quadriformem RB: quadriformae P 13 ΠΡΑΚΤΙΚΗ RB:
ΛΠΡΑΚΤΙΚΗ P ΦΥΣΙΚΗ RB: ΦΥΤΙΚΗ P 14 naturalis *ex* naturalis R ΛΟ-
ΓΙΚΗ RB: ΛΟΠΙΚΗ P 18 quid de una *ex* quidem a R 21 considerat RP:
consideret B 22 *istoricam* R(C)B: *historicam* P: *istoria* R* 24 *post*

words of Scripture which follow: 'And so it was done, and the earth brought forth the flourishing and seed-bearing vegetation after its kind and the fruit-bearing tree and each thing that possesses seed after its species.' You see how the divine Scripture reveals most clearly the genera and the species in which there subsist causally and invisibly whatever things break forth through generation in quantities and qualities into the knowledge of the corporeal senses?

But if it seems to anyone that this account which we have given to the best of our ability of the three first days is not in accordance with history but with the laws of allegory,⁵⁶ let him carefully consider the fourfold division of wisdom.⁵⁷

And first is *πρακτική*, practical; second *φυσική*, natural; third *θεολογία*, which discusses God; fourth *λογική*, rational, which shows by what laws each of the other three parts of wisdom should be discussed. One investigates the virtues by means of which the vices are replaced and are entirely eradicated; the second the reasons of natures whether in their causes or their effects; the third what should piously be thought of the Cause of all things, Who is God; but how to conduct a rational inquiry into virtue and nature and God is, as we have said, what the fourth teaches and carefully considers. To this (division) of the four aforesaid parts of wisdom he ought to apply the historical account of the establishment of things, and if he is not entirely ignorant of philosophy, he will attach it to none but the physical. And if this is so, let him look for anything that has been said by us by way of allegory and, as I think, he will not find it. For in the case of the first day we said that the procession, comprehensible to senses and intellects, of the primordial causes into their effects is signified in general by the creation of light. [Now, that the primordial causes of all things are substances established in Divine Wisdom St. Ambrose is witness when he says in his Hexameron, 'The man who is full of knowledge', Moses, that is, 'observes that the substance of things visible and invisible and the causes of things are contained in the Mind of God alone'.] In the case of the second we decided, not inappropriately as *I think*, that the triple constitution of this world, made up, that is, of its reasons, and of the incomposite elements, and of the composite bodies, is described by the word 'waters', and the firmament that was made in the midst of them; but we judged that the third consideration of this world, consisting in the separation of the things that are mutable in it from those which, protected by the support of their own nature, remain immutably in

29
Concerning
the fourfold
division of
Wisdom

dictum est *erasum* R 25 prima R^cBP: primordia R* 27 processionem
B^cP: procesionem RB* a *ante* conditione *erasum* R 30 Aduertit RB:
Animaduertit P 35 *reor in ras.* R(C) 36-37 eorum quae RB: eorumque P
37-224.1 custodita—statu *om.* P

incommutabiliter in eodem permanent [statu] constitutam, hoc est
in discretione omnium mutabilium accidentium rationabili contuitu
ab immutabili substantialium formarum soliditate, aquarum congrega-
tione terraeque apparitione diuinam scripturam insinuasse arbitrati
sumus.

Nec inmerito, quoniam frequentissimus diuinorum eloquiorum
usus est uisibilium rerum significatiuis uocibus inuisibilium rerum
naturales subsistentias rationesque ad exercitationem pie philoso-
phantium significare. Nec mirum cum saepissime spiritualium et
inuisibilium rerum nominibus corporales sensibilesque asuescat
innuere, cuius reciprocae metaforae dum sint multa exempla et in-
numerabilia praesenti negotio cumulare, omnibusque in diuina scri-
ptura exercitatis manifestissima, longum uidetur atque superfluum.

Paucis tamen exemplis utamur: 'Quod natum est ex carne caro
est'—hic totus homo originali peccato nascens carnis nomine
uocatur—, 'et quod natum est ex spiritu spiritus est'—totus homo
ex regeneratione in Christo renascens uocabulo spiritus exprimitur.
Et si quis dixerit: Non totus homo ex carne nascitur sed sola hominis
caro, respondebo: Non igitur totus homo ex spiritu nascitur sed sola
anima, et si ita est sequitur gratiam baptismatis corporibus non
prodesse. Si autem totus homo, anima uidelicet et corpus, in Christo
renascitur et spiritus efficitur, necessario totus homo in Adam ex
carne nascitur et caro est, ac sic concluditur et carnem appellari
spiritum et spiritum carnem. Verbum dei uocatur caro et caro
uerbum, et similia in quibus simul et CYNEKΔOXH intelligitur et
ΜΕΤΑΦΟΡΑ.

ΑΝΑΚΕΦΑ-
ΛΙΟΙC

Non ergo allegorizauimus dum nomine lucis species rerum uisibiles
et intelligibiles, tenebrarum uero significatione causas substantiales
omnem sensum et intellectum superantes in mente diuina aeter-
naliter substitutas diuinam scripturam insinuasse diximus, aquarum
uero et firmamenti in medio earum symbolicis appellationibus huius
mundi uisibilis triplicem substitutionem, in causis uidelicet suis quas
sanctus Ambrosius substantias rerum uisibilium in mente diuina
praeconditas appellat, et in uniuersalibus elementis quae Graeci
catholica CTOIXIA uocant, eo quod sibi inuicem conueniant et
concinant—[CTOIXIOCIC enim est ΔΙΑΤΥΠΟCIC, hoc est confor-
matio: illorum nanque concursu omnia corpora uisibilia conficiun-
tur, ideoque Athenienses CTOIXIA litteras appellant quarum coitu

14-16 In. iii. 6.

33-34 cf. 222.30-32 supra.

8-9 philosophantium BP: phýlosophantium R 11 innuere ex innumere R
reciprocae B^c: reiprocae RB^{*}: retprocae P 12-13 omnibusque—manifestissima
R^cBP: cum omnibus—manifestissima sint R^{*} 12 omnibusque R^cB: mani-
busque P 15 Hic BP: hic R 17 regeneratione R^cB: regeratione R^{*}:
regeneratio P 18 Hic BP: hic R 17 regeneratione R^cB: regeratione R^{*}:
regeneratio P 18 Hic BP: hic R 22 in adam RB:

the same [state], that is, in the distinction which a logical observation
draws between all the mutable accidents and the immutable solidity
of the substantial forms, was what the divine Scripture intended by
the gathering together of the waters and the appearing of the earth.

Not unreasonably; for it is a very common practice of the Holy
Oracles to signify by words which signify visible things the natural
existences and reasons of invisible things, to exercise devout philo-
sophers. Nor is this surprising; for very often they are in the habit
of denoting corporeal and sensible things by the names of the
spiritual and invisible. But to load the present discussion with
examples of this reciprocity of metaphor, since they are many and
innumerable and very well known to those who are practised in
Holy Scripture, would be a long and superfluous task.

Nevertheless, let us use a few examples: 'That which is born of
flesh is flesh'—here the whole man born in original sin is called by
the name of flesh—'and that which is born of the spirit is spirit'—
the whole man reborn by regeneration in Christ is expressed by the
word 'spirit'. And if anyone shall say, Not the whole man is born of
flesh but only the flesh of man, I shall reply: Then not the whole
man is born of the spirit but only the soul, and if so it follows that
the grace of baptism is of no benefit to bodies. But if the whole man,
namely, soul and body, is reborn in Christ and is made spirit, the
whole man necessarily is born in Adam of the flesh and is flesh, and
so it is concluded both that flesh is called spirit and spirit flesh. The
Word of God is called flesh, and flesh the Word, and (there are)
similar cases in which there is understood both *συνεκδοχή* and
μεταφορά.

So we did not use allegory when we said that Holy Scripture meant
by the name of light the visible and intelligible forms of things, but
by the expression 'darkness' the substantial causes which surpass all
sense and intellect and are eternally substantiated in the Divine
Mind; and by the symbolic names of the waters and the firmament
in their midst the triple establishment of this visible world, that is,
in its causes, which St. Ambrose calls the substances of visible things
precreated in the Divine Mind, and in the general elements which
the Greeks call the universal *στοιχεία* because they fit and chime with
one another [for *στοιχέωσις* is *διατύπωσις*, that is, conformation;
for by their coming together all visible bodies are made, and there-
fore the Athenians call letters *στοιχεία* because by their coming

Ανακεφα-
λαίωσις

eandem P 25 CYNEKΔOXH RB: CYNEKΛEXH P 26 ΜΕΤΑΦΟΡΑ BP:
ΜΕΤΟΦΟΡΑ R 26 lemma B (deest P) 31 firmamenti RB:
firmamento P earum R: aquarum BP 35 CTOIXIA RB: ΠΟΧΙΑ P
36 concinant RB: concinnant P CTOIXIOCIC BP: CTOIXIÓCIC R est in
ras. R(C) 36-37 conformatio RB: confirmatio P 37 concursu RB: cumcursus
(sic) P 38 litteras R^cB: litteram R^{*}: litterarum P

articulata uox perficitur]—, nec immerito. Dum enim uiritim con- 706D
siderantur pura et a se inuicem segregata uidentur esse contraria—
[Frigus siquidem calori, umiditas siccitati contradicit]—, dum uero
in se inuicem miscentur omnium rerum uisibilium armonia quadam
mirabili atque ineffabili compositiones efficiunt—[Re nanque uero 5
non elementorum substantiae sed qualitates dissentiunt]—, quas, 707A
uidelicet compositiones, quoniam solui et in ea quorum coitu effi-
ciuntur redire possunt aquarum quae sub caelo sunt uocabulo
congruentissime propheta significauit. Quoniam uero harum rerum
uisibilium corporeis sensibus subiectarum duple speculatio est— 10
aliter enim in eis subiectas et immutabiles subsistentias, quibus
proprie subsistunt, aliter accidentia, quae augeri et minui patiuntur
instabilique motu semper uariari non desinunt speculamur—, neces-
sarium erat mutabilia ab immutabilibus segregari, hoc est accidentia
a substantiis intellectuali diiudicatione discerni et mutabilia quidem 15
ueluti instabilium aquarum ac semper fluctuantium, immutabilia
uero suaeque naturae stabilitate subsistentia solidae telluris aridaeque
uocabulo significari. In his ergo omnibus nulla allegoria sed nuda 707B
solummodo physica consideratio tractatur mutuatis sensibilium
nominibus ad significanda inuisibilia frequentissimo diuinae scriptu- 20
rae usu.

Sed ne rursus sancti patris Basilii reuerentissimos uideamur sper-
nere intellectus, quid de hoc senserit quantum mihi datur intelligi
breuiter intimabo. In quarta omelia in Genesim, 'Congregentur', 25
inquit, 'aquae in congregationem unam. Ne influens aqua recipientes
se regiones superfundens crescensque semper et alias ex aliis implens
omnem contigua includeret epirum iussa est congregari in congrega-
tionem unam, ac per hoc saepe fluctuans ex uentis mare et in altitudinem
maximam subleuans fluctibus mox ut litora tetigerit in spumam
soluens impetum reuertitur. An me non timebitis, dicit dominus, 707C
ponentem terminum mari arenam?—infirmissimo omnium sablone 31
uidelicet uolentiae inuecti' maris 'refrenantur. Alioqui quid pro-
hiberet rubrum mare omnem Aegyptum dum sit humilior intrare
et cooperire Aegypto pelagus incumbens, si non praecepto esset
creatoris impeditum? Nam quia humilior est rubro mari Aegyptus 35

24–228. 13, Bas. Hex. iv. 3; PG xxix. 84B sq.

1 uiritim RB*P: uiritim B^c 3 umiditas RB: humiditas P siccitati
R^cBP: siccitati R* 5 Re B: rê R(C): Ré P 9 propheta BP: profeta R
11 subsistentias RBP^c: substantias P* 12 accidentia RB: accedentia P
22 lemma Sentencia sancti basilii de congregatione aquarum Rm reuerentissimos
RB: reuerentissimus P 24 genesim RB: genesi P 26 crescensque RP:
crescensque B 27 epirum R: épirum BP 30 timebitis RB: timebis P
dicit RB*P: dicat B* 31 arenam RB: harenam P 32 Alioqui RB: Alioquin P
35 lemma Qui uoluerunt coniungere egiptum et indicum mare Rm est om. P*

together the articulated word is perfected]. Not unreasonably; for
although they are considered severally in their purity and distinct
from one another they appear to be contraries [for cold is the contra-
diction of heat, moisture of dryness], but when they mingle with
one another they bring about by a kind of marvellous and inexplicable
harmony the compositions of all visible things [for actually it is not
the substances of the elements that are in discord but their qualities],
and these, namely the compositions, because they can be dissolved
and reduced to those things by whose coming together they were
brought about, are most appropriately typified by the Prophet in the
phrase, 'the waters that are under the heaven'. But since there are
two ways of regarding these visible beings which are subject to the
corporeal senses—for in one way we consider in them their sustaining
and immutable substances in which they have their proper being,
in another the accidents which are susceptible to increase and
decrease and continuously undergo the incessant change of their
restless motion—, it was necessary by intellectual discrimination to
draw a distinction between the mutable and the immutable, that is,
between the accidents and the substances, and to typify the mutable
as waters which are, as it were, never resting and always in flux, the
immutable as the solid and dry land which subsists by virtue of the
stability of its nature. Therefore in all these instances we are not
treating of allegory but only of the bare physical consideration,
adapting the names of sensible things to signify invisible things in
accordance with a very well-established usage of Divine Scripture.

But that we should not once again seem to be holding in contempt
the most venerable interpretations of the Holy Father Basil, I will
briefly report what his opinion was in so far as it is given me to
understand it. In his fourth Homily on Genesis he says: 'Let the
waters be gathered together in one gathering. Lest the water should
flow in and submerge the regions that receive it and, continuously
rising, flood one region after another and whelm the whole of the
adjoining continent, it is commanded to gather itself into one
gathering; and this is why, when the sea is often swollen by the winds
and raises its waves to their highest pitch, just as it reaches the
shore, its force is broken and it falls back in spray. Wilt thou not
fear Me, said the Lord, Who have set the sand as a boundary to the
sea?—for it is by the weakest of all things, namely sand, that the
violent invasions' of the sea 'are restrained. What otherwise would
prevent the Red Sea from overrunning the whole of Egypt which is
at a lower level, and from joining the sea which borders on Egypt
if it were not restrained by the Creator's decree? For since Egypt
is at a lower level than the Red Sea some who wished to make an
artificial link between the Egyptian Sea and the Indian, in which

quidam uolentes opere sibi inuicem pelagos coniungere Aegyptium et Indicum in quo rubrum est mare, propter hoc prohibiti sunt conatibus, et primus inchoans Seso(s)tris Aegyptius ac postea uolens perficere Darius Medus.

'Haec a me dicta sunt ut intelligamus praecepti uirtutem, Congregentur aquae in congregationem unam, hoc est: Nulla a se ipsa recedat sed in prima collectione congregata permaneat. Deinde dicens, Congregentur aquae in congregationem unam, ostendit tibi quia multae erant per multos modos segregatae aquae. Iuga nanque montium, profunda uallium irrigua aquarum collectionem habebant, et adhuc campi multi et planities nil maximorum pelagorum magnitudinis indigentes, et sulci multi et conualles secundum alias et alias figuras, caua omnia undarum tunc plena coniuncta sunt ipso diuino praecepto ad unam congregationem undique aquae collectae.'

His atque huius modi uerbis praedicti auctoris aperte suadetur ob hanc causam multitudines aquarum ubique per caua et plana terrarum diffusas in congregationem unam diuino praecepto fuisse collectas, ne totam terrae superficiem inundationum suarum cumulationibus cooperirent et ut ad usus humanae habitationis appareret arida herbis arboribusque decorata, diuersis animalium formis copiosa, amplissimis oceani diuersorumque pelagorum litoribus cincta et ab impetu fluctuantis maris arenosis obi[e]cibus diuinae iusionis uirtute roboratis munita. Diuini siquidem praecepti uigore ualidissimus undarum furor refrenatur et repercutitur ne plana terrarum et humiliora se loca obruant. Haec autem ut dixi subiungere uolui, ne forte quis diceret: Quare gloriosissimi sanctae scripturae expositoris sensum omnino praeterire ausi sumus?

A. Prouide cauteque. Non enim debemus diuinorum patrum intellectus ullo modo neglegere seu annullare, praesertim cum non nos lateat eos saepissime simpliciter disputasse capacitatem audientium non satis idoneam ad profundissimos spiritualis uirtutis naturalium rationum percipiendos intellectus praeuidentes; atque ideo non temere dixerim ut opinor deiferum Basilium superna gratia illuminatum simplicius exposuisse sex primorum dierum intelligibilium operationes quam intellexerat, sermonem simplicitati auditorum coaptans. Siquidem omiliariter ad populum locutus est et quod

5-6, 8 Gen. i. 9.

1 quidam RB^cP: quadam B* aegyptium BP: aegyptium R 2-3 conatibus R^cBP: conationibus R* 3 sesotris *codd.* 8 congregentur RB: congreg P 10 habebant RB: habent P 11 multi *s.l.* R 13 plena RB: plana P ipso *conieci*: ipsius RB*: ipsis P: ipsi*s B^c 14 aquae collectae RB: aquis collectis P 19 humanae RB: hámanae P 21 diuersorumque RB: diuersarumque P 22 arenosisRB: harenosis P obiecibus B^c(C): obicibus RB*: obtutibus P iusionis R^cB*: uisionis R*B^cP 23 munita R^cBP: munitio R* uigore R^cBP:

the Red Sea is situated, were prevented from their efforts by this, both Sesotris the Egyptian who made a start with it, and later Darius the Mede when he attempted to complete it.

'I have said this in order that we may understand the power of the decree, Let the waters be gathered together in one gathering, that is: Let no (gathering) go back upon itself, but let it remain gathered together in the first gathering. Then He who said, 'Let the waters be gathered together in one gathering', has shown you that there were many waters separated in many ways. For the peaks of the mountains with their deep well-watered gullies had their gathering of water, and moreover many plains and level spaces (in no way smaller than the greatest oceans) and many hollows and valleys of one shape or another, all of them then receptacles filled with water,—all (their waters) were brought together by the divine command into one gathering of water collected from everywhere.'

By these and similar words of this author it is clearly shown that the masses of water everywhere diffused in hollow places and in the lowlands of the earth were gathered together in one gathering by the divine decree for this reason, that they should not by the piling up of their inundations cover the whole surface of the earth, but that the dry land adorned with plants and trees and rich in the different kinds of animals and girt with the most wide shores of ocean and the different seas and protected from the force of the flood tide by the sandy barriers made strong by the power of the divine ordinance should appear for the purpose of human habitation. For by the might of the divine decree the most forceful fury of the waves is bridled and repulsed from overflowing the lowlands of the earth and the places that are at a lower level than themselves. But as I said, I wished to add this to prevent anyone from saying: Why have we dared to ignore totally a famous commentator of Holy Scripture?

A. It was a wise precaution. For on no account ought we to neglect or reject the interpretations of the Holy Fathers, especially as we are not unaware that very often they put their arguments in simple terms to suit the understanding of their hearers when it is not capable of grasping the profundities of the natural reasons upon which the spiritual meaning is based; and therefore I think I should not be speaking rashly when I say that the divine Basil was illuminated by grace from on high when he adopted a simpler explanation of the operations of the six first intelligible days than that by which he himself understood them, for he was accommodating his discourse to the simplicity of his audience. For he spoke as a preacher before

uigor*e R* 28 lemma basilius et alii non sunt reprehendendi quod simpliciter intellexerunt quod spirituale exposuerunt Rm A RB: lacuna P 30 eos RB: res P 35 intellexerat R^cBP: intellexerunt R*

simul et semel a deo factum fuisse altius *cognouerat* ueluti temporum
 morulis dispartitum propter eos quorum sensus moras temporum
 locorumque distantias superare *nescierat* exposuit, quod et ipse sub-
 limissimus prophetarum Moses fecisse dinoscitur. Non enim semel
 et simul potuit narrare quae semel et simul deus potuit facere. Siqui-
 dem et nos qui adhuc in tenebris ignorantiae palpe[*b*]rantes lucem
 ueritatis conamur aspicere non omne quod simul mente conspiciamus
 uerbis explanare simul ualemus. Omnis nanque ars in animo sapien-
 tis uniuersaliter formata diuersis litterarum et syllabarum dictionum-
 que temporalibus morulis necessario particulariter ordinateque in
 aures discentium diffunditur. Non ergo praedictum patrem debemus
 arbitrari simpliciter intellexisse quod simpliciter uidetur exposuisse.
 Quis enim audebit diuinum luminare reprehendere dum nesciat
 quantum in se ipso potuit lucere lumenque suum minus capaci-
 bus temperanter uoluit distribuere? Neque enim facile crediderim
 magnum praeconem sapientiae plenissimum uirtute intellexisse aut
 cogitasse innormem molem telluris tenebrosam infinita adhuc abyssi
 inundatione undique coopertam per moras temporum prius fuisse
 conditam ac postea peracto duorum dierum spatio per interualla
 temporum transactorum ueluti inchoante tertia luce denudatam
 abyssu illa qua tegebatur in congregationem unam collecta. Haec
 enim omnia et caetera quae de sex primordialium dierum operibus
 diuina scriptura commemorat simul et semel diuino praecepto absque
 ullis temporalibus interuallis suis rationibus secundum quas condita
 sunt distincta et facta fuisse et in species suas producta beatissimus
 perspexerit, ut arbitror, Basilus.

[An aliud ex uerbis ipsius in nona omelia Exameri sui intelli-
 gendum? 'Intellige', inquit, 'uerbum dei per creaturam currens tunc
 incipiens et usque nunc operans et in finem perueniens donec mun-
 dus consummetur, utque sphaera cum ab aliquo impellitur, si pro-
 cliuium quodam accipiatur et propria conformatione et commoditate
 regionis fertur in proclium nec prius stans quam aequabilitas cam-
 porum ipsam suscipiat, sic natura existentium uno praecepto mota
 in generatione et corruptione creaturam plane percurrit generum
 consequentias per similitudinem saluans donec ad ipsum descen-
 dat finem. Equum quidem equi facit successorem, leonem leonis,

27-232.2 ix. Bas. Hex. ix. 2; PG xxix. 189bc.

1 cognouerat: cognou- in ras. R(C) 3 nescierat: -ierat in ras. R(C)
 6 palpebrantes R^c(C)BP: palperantes R* 8 ualemus R^cBP: ualeamus R*
 9 formata RB: firmata P 11 praedictum s.l. R 13 reprehendere RB:
 resplendere P 15 temperanter RB: temporanter P Neque enim RB: Nam
 non P 17 innormem R^cB^cP: inornem (sic) R*B* 26 ut arbitror R^cB^cP:
 deest R*B* 31 quodam s.l. R 32 regionis RB^cP: regionum B* 35 con-
 sequentias R^cBP: consequentiis R*

his congregation, and for the sake of those whose understanding
 could not penetrate beyond conceiving events as disposed in space
 and time, he expounded, what in a profounder sense he knew to
 have been performed by God as a single and instantaneous act, as
 though it were spread over a succession of temporal intervals; as
 Moses, the greatest of the prophets, is himself understood to have
 done. For he could not narrate instantaneously what God did instan-
 taneously. Neither can we when, groping in the darkness of our
 ignorance, we attempt to behold the light of truth, express in words
 instantaneously everything which in our minds we perceive instan-
 taneously. For every science which in the mind of the wise man is
 formed as a whole can be communicated to the ears of his hearers
 only by being divided into parts and ordered in words and syllables
 and sentences which follow one another in temporal succession.
 Therefore we ought not to believe that the simplicity of the language
 which the father used in his exposition reflects a simplicity in his
 understanding. For who will be so bold as to rebuke one of the
 luminaries of theology when he does not know how much of the light
 he retained within himself and how much he wished to mete out to
 the less proficient? Nor would I find it easy to believe that this great
 teacher, so full of the power of wisdom, would have understood or
 considered that the enormous mass of the earth remained shrouded
 on all sides by the infinite floods of the abyss for any interval of time
 after its first creation and then, after the space of two temporal days
 had passed, was at the beginning of the third day stripped, as it were,
 of the abyss which was covering it, being collected together into a
 gathering. For the most blessed Basil would have clearly seen, as I
 think, that all these things, and everything else which the divine
 Scripture relates concerning the operations of the six primordial
 days are distinguished by the reasons in accordance with which they
 were established and accomplished simultaneously, without any
 temporal interval, by the divine decree, and brought forth into their
 species.

[Should we understand any differently his teaching in the Ninth
 Homily of his Hexaemeron? 'Understand', he says, 'the Word of God
 running through creation, setting forth at that moment and operating
 until now and reaching to the end, when the world will be consum-
 mated, and as a ball when it is propelled by someone, if it is received
 by a downward slope, and by suitable conformation and convenience
 of the ground, rolls downhill and does not come to rest until the
 levelness of the plains receives it, so the nature of existing things,
 moved by one decree, runs through the creation that consists in
 generation and decay, preserving the sequences of kinds by means
 of likeness until it reaches the limit of its descent. For it makes horse

aquilam aquilae, et unumquodque animalium consequenter successionibus conseruatum usque consummationem uniuersitatis admittit.' [²Intuere uim similitudinis. Verbum dei, inquit, per omnia ab initio creaturae usque ad finem uniuersitatis semper operans et mouens 5 unam naturam eorum quae sunt simul et semel factam mouet in genera et species, quae currens ueluti in proclium quoddam uoluta non desinet donec ad finem uniuersitatis ueluti ad quandam quietem perueniat. Vnum igitur dei uerbum est. Vno precepto unam existentium naturam fieri iussit quam simul et semel et condidit et in species 10 proprias produxit. Vt enim uno precepto, repetito tamen sexies a theologo, naturam omnium simul creauit, ita ipsa natura simul in omnes coepit currere creaturas nec ulla alteram locorum seu temporum numeris seu spatiis praecessit.]²]

N. Iuste recteque magnum uirum praedicas nec aliter de ipso est 15 sentiendum. Pulchre igitur segregata mutabilitate accidentium stabilitate substantiae multiplex ipsius uis per diuersas species uisibiliter erumpens herbarum lignorumque significationibus insinuat. Omnis enim species in genere et omne genus in substantia naturaliter 20 continetur. Item omnis substantia per genera in formas speciesque proprias uim suam exserit, et hoc totum uita illa quae in seminibus operatur diuini precepti uirtute iusa administrat. Ideo[que] herbas lignaque animalia fixa in loco fysici non irrationabiliter appellant. Sunt enim animalia corpora locorum et temporum interuallis crescentia suisque locis in quibus crescunt fixa. 25

Et notandum quod quemadmodum aquarum collectio per se stare non potest nisi mole terrae sustineatur siue interius per occultos 30 poros siue exterius per apertas inundationes discurrens siue stagnis lacubusque stans ita accidentium inundatio non nisi in subiecta substantia consistere praeualet siue in occultis subiecti sinibus lateant ut sunt qualitates et quantitates causaliter siue foras erumpant et in aliqua materia appareant ut sunt moles corporeae diuersis coloribus superfusae, siue stabilia sint ut species atque figurae, quae adiectae mutabilitati materiae uisibilia efficiunt corpora statu quodam speciali conformata et in unum colligunt, ne subito soluantur inque fluxus 35 suae mutabilitatis speciem qua continentur deserentia labantur et

De eo quod
accidentia
sine substan-
tia stare non
possunt

6 mouet RB: mouit P 9 est om. P 15 N RB: lacuna P 16 muta-
bilitate RB: multitudine P 18 significationibus R^cBP: significatione R*
22 iusa R^cB: uisa R*P 23 fysici RB^cP: fysici B* 24 corpora RB^cP:
corpori B* et om. P 26 lemma B (deest P) 27 occultos BP: oculos R
30 subiecti RB*: subiectis B^cP 33 siue R^cBP: si R* post ut sunt erasum
R 35 gl. interlin. ad fluxus pertinens accusatiu(um) C in B

the successor of horse, lion of lion, eagle of eagle, and sends forth each of the animals protected by continuity of succession until the end of the universe.' [²Consider the force of the simile. The Word of God, he says, ever in act and in motion, runs through all things from the beginning of creation to the end of the universe. For by one decree He makes together and at once one nature of things and moves it into genera and species like a ball which rolls down a slope and does not stop until it comes, as it were, to rest at the end of the universe. So the Word of God is one; by one decree it ordains the coming into being of the one nature of existing things which it both established and simultaneously led forth into its proper forms. For as it was by one decree, albeit repeated six times by the Theologian, that He created simultaneously the nature of all things, so that nature simultaneously begins to flow into all creatures, and no creature is prior to any other by any spatial or temporal number or interval.]²]

N. Justly and rightly do you call him a great man, and we must not think of him as anything else. So, when the mutability of the accidents is beautifully distinguished from the stability of substance, the multiple power of the latter when it breaks out visibly into the diverse species is typified by the crops and trees. For it is in accordance with nature that every species is contained within its genus, and every genus within substance. Moreover, every substance disseminates its power through the genera into their proper forms and species. And the whole of this is administered, in accordance with the divine decree, by the life which operates in the seeds. [And] so it is not unreasonable that the natural philosophers should call plants and trees animals fixed in place. For they are animate bodies which increase through the intervals of places and times but remain fixed in the places in which they grow.

And be it noted that as the gathering together of the waters cannot stand by itself unless it is sustained by the mass of the earth, whether it flows within through hidden channels or without through exposed floods, or remains stagnant in ponds and lakes, so the flood of accidents cannot be held except when it is sustained by substance, whether they remain concealed in the recesses of the subject as in the case of qualities and quantities in their causal relations or break forth so as to become manifest in some matter as in the case of corporeal masses which are decked in various colours, or remain stable like the forms and shapes which when attached to the mutability of matter produce visible bodies appropriate to their particular conditions, and gather together so as not to be suddenly dissolved and, abandoning the form which contains them, fall away and flow back into their mutability. But let us not linger more over such

That acci-
dents cannot
remain static
without
substance

refluent. Sed ne in talibus diutius immoremur ad quartam mundanae constitutionis transeamus speculationem.

A. Series disputationis ita exigit. Nam si per singula quaecunque de talibus et quaerenda et soluenda sunt quis inuestigare uoluerit, prius ei tempus deficiet quam ad finem omnium quae tractanda sunt et ad purum discutienda ualeat peruenire.

N. Peracta itaque duarum inferiorum uisibilis huius mundi partium, terrae uidelicet et aquae, formationis narratione, immo etiam simul ac semel absque ullis temporalibus morulis diuino praecepto in generibus suis et speciebus formatarum, locis quoque certisque finibus circumsriptarum speculatione mox ad superiorum partium, aeris dico et ignis, constitutionem diuinus cosmografus mentis intuitum conuertit dicens: 'Dixit autem deus: Fiant luminaria in firmamento caeli et diuidant diem ac noctem et sint in signa et tempora et dies et annos et luceant in firmamento caeli et inluminent terram, et factum est ita.' Audisti conditionem generalem omnium luminarium caelestis firmamenti in primordialibus causis ante omnem diem et tempus et locum. Audi eorundem processionem in effectus suos in species proprias multiplicatam locorum interuallis discretam, temporum curriculis uolubilem, motu stabili statuque mobili compactam. 'Fecitque deus duo magna luminaria, luminare maius, ut praeesset diei, et luminare minus, ut praeesset nocti, et stellas' et caetera quae de operibus quartae lucis *scriptura commemorat. De firmamento dum de secunda die* tractabamus, quae nobis uerisimilia uisa sunt exposuimus. Non enim ut opinor aliud firmamentum secundo die est factum in medio aquarum et aliud in quo quarto die facta est series caelestium luminarium. Siquidem si aliud esset fortassis scriptura non sileret, sed diceret: Fiant luminaria et firmamentum caeli, sicut dixit 'Fiat firmamentum in medio aquarum', Nunc autem quoniam non dixit: Fiat firmamentum, sed: 'Fiant luminaria in firmamento', clare datur intelligi unum idipsumque esse firmamentum quod secunda die in medio factum est aquarum et in quo postmodum non spatio temporis, sed distantia prophetae uisionis, siderea luminaria condita sunt.

Cum igitur tria corpora maxima mundi sint, ut philosophi perhibent, quorum unum infimum mediumque totius mundi instar centri

13-16 Gen. i. 14-15. 21-22 Gen. i. 16. 29 Gen. i. 6. 30-31 Gen. i. 14.

2 transeamus RB: transtranseamus P 3 lemma de quarto die fiant luminaria et secundum (?) de firmamento et de natura iiii^{or} elementorum. duo esse actiua duo passiuua uel duo masculina duo feminina Rm 7 N RB: lacuna P duarum RB: duorum P 9 ullis RB^cP: ullius B* 11 speculatione RB*: speculationem B^cP 12 cosmografus RB: cosmographus P 13 IIII in marg. R 17 caelestis RB^cP: caelestium B* 20 motu R^cBP: motum R* 23 operibus

matters, but turn to the fourth consideration of the constitution of the world.

A. So the order of our discussion requires. For if anyone wishes to investigate every single problem that such matters suggest for inquiry and solution, his time will run out before he can reach the end of all the things that would need to be discussed and thoroughly examined.

N. After the account, then, of the formation of the two inferior parts of the visible world, namely earth and water, and the consideration of their instantaneous formation without any temporal interval by the divine decree in their genera and species, and of their restriction to fixed places and within fixed boundaries, had been set forth, the divine Cosmographer at once turns the attention of his mind to the constitution of the superior parts, I mean air and fire, of which he says: 'And God said, Let there be luminaries in the firmament of heaven and let them divide the day and the night and let them be for signs and times and days and years and let them shine in the firmament of heaven and illuminate the earth, and it was done.' You have heard the general establishment of all the luminaries of the firmament of heaven in the primordial causes before every day and time and place; hear the procession of the same into their effects, multiplied into their proper forms, dispersed at spatial intervals, revolving in their temporal courses, linked together by their stable motion and mobile stability. 'And God made two great luminaries, the greater luminary to preside over the day and the lesser luminary to preside over the night, and the stars', and the other things which *Scripture records* about the operations of the fourth day. *About the firmament* we gave what seemed to us a likely account *when* we were speaking of *the second day*. For the firmament which was created in the midst of the waters was not other, as I think, than that in which the series of celestial luminaries was created on the fourth day. For if it were another, Scripture would not perhaps have refrained from mentioning it but would have said: Let there be luminaries and a firmament of heaven, as it said 'Let there be a firmament in the midst of the waters'. Since, however, it did not say, Let there be a firmament, but 'Let there be luminaries in the firmament', it is plain to see that the firmament which on the second day was created in the midst of the waters and that in which the stellar luminaries were subsequently, not in time but in the disposition of the prophetic vision established, is one and the same.

Since, then, according to the philosophers, there are three very great bodies in the world, of which one, the lowest and middle part of

R^cBP: coperibus R* 23-24 scriptura-die in ras. R(C) 32 secunda RB: secundo P

cin irculo seu sphaera aridam uel terram diuina uocauit auctoritas, segregacione aquarum tegentium se specificatam herbarum lignorumque pulcherrima uarietate coopertam siue quis simpliciori sensu uisibilem hanc molem in medio mundi positam oceani limbo circuncinctam terrae aquarumque uocabulis significatam siue altiori intellectu substantiae ab accidentibus diiudicationem intellexerit, herbarum uero et lignorum nominationibus siue haec ornamenta sensibilia, quibus aestiuis temporibus terrena uestitur superficies uel seminum erumpentia telluri radicitus fixa umore nutrita et corpulentia, siue intelligibiles species ex intimis naturalibusque substantiae sinibus procedentes instar herbarum lignorumque de terra nascentium perceperit—aliter nanque in omni sensibili corpore quantitatis molem qualitibus suis subiectam corporeis sensibus consideramus, aliter inuisibilem substantiam speciesque proprias in ipsa subsistentes mentis acie intelligimus—secundum quas rerum omnium uisibilium [et inuisibilium] numerositas multiplicatur, uniuersalitas colligitur, proprietates custoditur—ad aliorum duorum maximorum mundi corporum theoriam prophetica intentio conuersa est.

'Fiant luminaria', inquit, 'in firmamento caeli.' Recordaris ut opinor de hoc nomine firmamenti in medio aquarum constitutum dum de eo tractabamus nostri intellectus?

A. Recordor sane, si non me fallit memoria. Conuenerat quidem inter nos nil probabilius eo nomine significari quam quattuor simplicium elementorum uniuersitatem, quae dum per se purissima sint et incomprehensibilia omni corporeo sensu et ubique uniuersaliter diffusa, inuisibili suo meatu proportionalique coitu in se inuicem omnia corpora sensibilia perficiunt, siue caelestia sint siue aerea siue aquatica siue terrena siue maxima sint siue minima siue media et, ut uniuersaliter dicam, tota caelestis sphaera et omnia quae in ea et intra eam a summo usque deorsum continentur eorum concursu facta sunt et quicquid in ordine saeculorum uicissitudine rerum corruptibilium nascitur ab ipsis procedit et in ipsa resoluitur. Haec autem uocantur a grecis ΠΥΡ ΑΗΡ ΙΔΩΡ ΓΗ, hoc est ignis aer aqua terra, ex nominibus maximorum corporum quae ex eis componuntur denominata.

Vbi notandum quod non ex coitu substantialium elementorum, dum sint incorruptibilia et insolubilia, sed ex eorum qualitibus sibi

19 Gen. i. 14.

1 seu: u s.l. P uel om. P 3 coopertam RB^cP: coopertum B* 4-5 circuncinctam BP: circuncinctam R 9 umore R^cBP: humore R* 9-10 corpulentia RB: corpulentia P 11 sinibus RB: finibus P 12 sensibili s.l. B 17 custoditur RB^cP: custoditi B* 22 A RB: lacuna P 28 sint s.l. B 30 concursu RB: concursus P facta RB: nota P 31 sunt in ras. R(C) 31 uicissitudine RB: uicissitudine P 32 ab ex ap P 36 lemma B 37 eorum om. P

the whole world, like the centre of a circle or sphere, is called by the divine authority 'dry land' or 'earth', specified by its separation from the waters which cover it and adorned with the most fair variety of plants and trees, whether one shall understand the words 'earth' and 'waters' in their simpler sense as signifying this visible mass which is situated in the world surrounded by the girdle of ocean, or in their profounder meaning which distinguishes substance from accidents, and the terms 'plants' and 'trees' as these sensible adornments in which in summer time the surface of the earth is clad, which by the force of their seeds burst forth on to the earth to which they are attached by their roots, nourished and fattened by moisture, or see them for the intelligible forms which proceed from the inner and natural recesses of substance as plants and trees grow out of the earth—for in every sensible body we have one way of regarding with the corporeal senses the mass of its quantity which forms the base of its qualities, another of understanding with the keen mind its invisible substance and the proper species which subsist in it—in accordance with which the numbers of all visible [and invisible] things are multiplied, their universality brought together, their individuality preserved—the Prophet turns his attention to the consideration of the other two very great bodies of the world.

'Let there be luminaries', he says, 'in the firmament of heaven.' You remember, as I think, what we took this expression 'firmament established in the midst of the waters' to mean when we were discussing it?

A. I remember it clearly, unless my powers of recollection fail me. For we agreed that nothing was more likely than that this expression signified the universality of the four simple elements, which in themselves are most pure and incomprehensible to every bodily sense and are universally diffused throughout all things; but when by their invisible motion they join together in the right proportions they make all the sensible bodies, both celestial and aerial and watery and earthly, both the very great and the very small and those of intermediate size and, to speak in general terms, the whole sphere of heaven, and all things that are contained in it and within it from the highest to the lowest are made from their concurrence, and whatever comes into being in the succession of the ages by the changes of corruptible things proceeds from them and is resolved into them. Now these are called by the Greeks πῦρ, ἀήρ, ὕδωρ, γῆ, that is, Fire, Air, Water, Earth, after the names of the very great bodies which are composed from them.

And here it must be noted that sensible bodies are not formed from the coming together of the substances of the elements, for these

That composite bodies are formed from the qualities of simple bodies

inuicem proportionaliter copulatis corpora sensibilia conficiuntur. Qualitates autem quattuor elementorum notissimae sunt quattuor: caliditas umiditas frigiditas siccitas, ex quibus omnia corpora materialia adiectis formis componi fysica perhibet theoria, quarum quidem actiuas esse duas philosophi dicunt caliditatem et frigiditatem, passiuasque duas, umiditatem et ariditatem. Dum enim caliditas umiditati et frigiditas ariditati naturali quodam coitu miscentur, omnia quae in terra et mari nascuntur procreationem accipiunt, quod etiam poeta intelligebat dicens:

Tunc pater omnipotens foecundis imbris aether
coniugis in gremium late descendit.

Patrem siquidem igneam qualitatem, quae est caliditas, foecundos uero imbres aquaticam, quae est frigiditas, appellauit, coniugis [uero] gremium fertilitatem umiditatis, quae est qualitas aeris propria, et ariditatis, quae est terrae qualitativa proprietates, uocando unius ueluti uxoris nominatione terram cum sibi proximiori et corpulentiori aere significauit. Hinc colligitur, ut duae qualitates actiuae sibi inuicem contrariae, caliditatem dico et frigiditatem, duabus passiuis sibimet oppositis, umiditati uidelicet et ariditati, copulatae occasionem omnibus in terra et in aquis nascentibus praebeant generationis et incrementorum. Et ne quis miretur frigiditatem, dum sit proprie aquarum, de superioribus huius aeris partibus ueluti in gremium terrena ariditatis descendere, cognoscat aquas in nubibus suspensas frigidiores esse marinis fluuiialibusque fluentis. Si autem ad haec quis dixerit: Quare ergo multi philosophorum teste sancto Augustino affirmant ignem et aera agere, aquam uero et terram pati, si aqua frigida ariditati terrae mixta in seminibus agit et non patitur, huic satis est respondere aquam frigidam esse et umidam; sed umiditatem ab aere, frigiditatem uero a se ipsa recipiens ea qualitate quam ex uicino sibi elemento suscipit actum calidi patitur, ea uero quae sua est semper in seminibus agit. [Quis enim naturalium rationum peritus ignorat solam sinceram caliditatem absque aliquo frigiditatis temperamento aut solam sinceramque frigiditatem sine quadam caliditatis mixtura cuiusdam corporis nullam generationem agere aut ex sola umiditate seu sola ariditate sine utriusque contemperantia nullum corpus naturali passione nasci?] In his *tamen* in quibus mundanae

10-11 Virg. *Georg.* ii. 325 sq. 26-27 cf. Aug. *De Gen. ad. litt.* iii. 10. 14; vii. 19. 25.

2 quattuor (1) RB: iiii^{or} P quattuor (2) RB: iiii^{or} P 3 siccitas RB*P: siccitas B^c
4-5 *gl. marg.* Notandum quod philosophorum quidam frigiditatem aeri quidam aquae distribuunt, et e contrario umiditatem quidam aquae quidam aeri C in B
4 perhibet: h s.l. R 5 post duas *rasura* B 7 umiditati RB: humiditati P
gl. interlin. ad miscentur *pertinens* *erata* C in B 10 foecundis B^c: faecundis R
R: fecundis B*P 11 late *codd.*: laetae *Virg.* 12 foecundos BP: faecundos R
14 umiditatis RB: umiditas P 15 ariditatis RB: hereditatis P 16-17 corpulent-

are indestructible and indissoluble, but from their qualities when these are mixed in due proportion. Now, it is very well known that the qualities of the elements are four: heat, moisture, cold, dryness; and it is from these that natural philosophy declares that all material bodies, with the addition of forms, are composed. And the philosophers say that two of these, heat and cold, are active, and two, moisture and dryness, passive. For when by a certain natural coming together heat mingles with moisture and cold with dryness there takes place the procreation of all things that are born on land or in the sea, as also the Poet meant when he said, 'The Ether the almighty father descended into the lap of his consort in widespread fertilizing showers'; for he gave the name of 'father' to the fiery quality which is heat, and 'fertilizing showers' to the watery quality, which is coldness, and 'the lap of the consort' to the fertilizing property of moisture which is the quality proper to air, and by calling dryness, which is the quality proper to earth, by the name of his one wife he signified the earth with the grosser part of the air which is contiguous to it. From this it follows that the two active qualities, heat I mean and coldness, which are contrary to one another, when they are joined with the two passive qualities, that is, moisture and dryness, which are opposite to one another, bring about the birth and growth of all things that are born in land and on water. And if anyone finds it strange that coldness, although it is the property of water, descends from the higher parts of this air into the lap of the dryness of earth, let him understand that the waters that are suspended in the clouds are colder than those of the seas and the running rivers. But if anyone should dispute this and ask, Why then do many philosophers, as St. Augustine testifies, assert that fire and air are active but water and earth passive, if water, being cold, when mingled with the dryness of earth, is the active and not the passive element in the seeds, he can be given the sufficient answer that water is cold and moist, but it derives the moisture from the air while the coldness it derives from itself; and it is the quality which it takes from its neighbouring element that is subject to the action of the hot, whereas that quality which is its own is always in act in the seeds. [For which of those who are well versed in the reasons of nature does not know that neither pure heat alone, without any admixture of coldness, nor pure coldness alone, without some mingling of heat, effects the generation of any body; or that no body can be brought to birth by natural passion either from moisture alone or from dryness alone unless each is tempered with the other?] *But* it is clearly not

tiori RB: corpulentiori P 26 affirmant B^c(C): adfirmant RB*P 32 sinceram
RB: sinceramque P 34 mixtura ex mixturae R 35 umiditate R^cBP:
humiditate R*

philosophiae studium exercetur longius immorari non ualde est
necessarium. Proinde paucis his de quattuor qualitatibus quattuor
uniuersalium elementorum praelibatis quae quoniam medietatem
quandam inter primordiales causas et composita corpora obtinent
firmamenti nomen acceperunt ad luminarium quae in ipso constituta
sunt expositionem properandum uideo.

N. Recte uides. Si ergo nomine firmamenti quattuor simplicissima
uniuersalissimaque mundi elementa uocantur, quid tibi uidetur? Num
illa quattuor ubique in omnia corpora siue aetherea siue aerea siue
aquatica siue terrena diffunduntur connexa, ita ut nullum sensibile
corpus possit reperiri quod illorum omnium careat concursu, an
quaedam ex quibusdam, non autem omnia ex omnibus confluunt?

A. Huic quaestioni facillimum est satisfacere quoniam <a> mundi
philosophis quaesita est et rationabiliter inuenta. Aiunt enim intra
ambitum mundi huius sensibilis nullum corpus interuallis longi-
tudinis latitudinis altitudinis dimensum posse fieri in quo quattuor
elementorum natura quamuis inuisibiliter non ualeat intelligi. Nam
sicut omne quod sensus corporeus in eis attingit non aliunde nisi ex
qualitatum quattuor elementorum confluxu in se inuicem suae con-
stitutionis materiem recipit ita omne quod in eisdem, in quantum
corporum sunt, rationabilis inuestigatio inuenit nil aliud est praeter
ipsorum simplicium et inseparabilium elementorum uniformiter
conuentum. Ideo autem additum est 'in quantum corpora sunt', ne
quis existimaret nos substantias rerum seu genera seu species seu
illam uitam quae omnia corpora in quibus motus uitalis cognoscitur
et animare et nutrire perhibetur in hoc loco tetigisse uel tractasse. Haec
enim ultra omnem uniuersaliter corpoream naturam et sunt et intelli-
guntur, et sine quibus nulla corporea natura siue incomprehensibilis
sit sensibus corporeis ut sunt quattuor illa elementa de quibus nunc
agitur siue comprehensibilis ut sunt diuersarum qualitatum materia-
lium rerum sensibilem constitutionem praestantium conuentus.

Quamuis itaque qualitatum quaedam quidem in quibusdam cor-
poribus plus, quaedam uero minus sensibus appareant, synodus
tamen ipsorum catholicorum elementorum una eademque unifor-
miter commensurabilis in omnibus est. Mens siquidem diuina
examinationem totius mundani corporis inter duas extremitates sibi
inuicem e contrario oppositas equali lance librauit, inter grauitatem

2 quattuor . . . quattuor RB: iiiⁱor . . . iiiⁱor P 7 lemma Nullum corpus
per se sit in quo iiiⁱor elementorum natura non contineatur Rm N RB: lacuna P
7, 19 quattuor RB: iiiⁱor P 9 aetherea RB: aetheria P 11 reperiri B^cP:
repperiri RB* 13 A RB: lacuna P 17 gl. marg. glo<ssa> Omne quod in
corporibus sentitur ex qualitatibus, omne uero quod intelligitur ex ipsis elementis
constituitur C in B 24 substantias R^cBP: substantiam R* 26 perhibetur:
h s.l. R (cf. 238. 4 supra) 29 quattuor RB: iiiⁱor P 30-31 materialium RBP^c:
in laterialium P 36 examinationem ex examinationem R

necessary to delay longer over these matters, which are the province of
mundane philosophy. Therefore having made these few introductory
remarks concerning the four qualities of the four universal elements
which, since they occupy a position intermediate between the
primordial causes and composite bodies, were given the name of
firmament, I see that we must now hasten on to the explanation of
the luminaries that are constituted in it.

N. You see correctly. If, then, the four most simple and most
universal elements of the world are called by the name of firmament,
what do you think? Are those four, in their diffusion everywhere
throughout all bodies, whether ethereal or aerial or watery or earthly,
so connected with one another that it is impossible to find any
sensible body in which the confluence of all of them is absent, or do
some flow together from some but not all from all?

A. This question is very easily answered, for it has been raised by
the natural philosophers and has been reasonably solved. For they
say that within the circuit of the sensible world there can be no body
extended in the dimensions of length, breadth, (and) height in which
the nature of the four elements cannot be understood even if it is
not visibly manifest. For as everything in them which is perceptible
to the bodily sense receives the matter for its constitution from no
other source than the mutual concurrence of the qualities of the four
elements, so a rational investigation finds that everything in them,
in so far as they are bodies, is nothing else but the coming together
in a single form of the same simple and indivisible elements. Now,
I inserted the words, 'in so far as they are bodies', lest anyone should
suppose that we were here touching upon or treating of the sub-
stances of things or their genera or species or that vital principle
which is said to animate and nourish all bodies in which vital motion
is recognized. For these things are, and are understood to be, outside
the whole sphere of corporeal nature, and are the things without
which there can be no corporeal nature either of those things which
are incomprehensible to the corporeal senses, such as those four
elements we are now discussing, or those which are comprehensible,
as are the concourses of the various qualities which effect the visible
constitution of material things.

Thus, although some of the qualities are more evident in certain
bodies than others, yet there is one and the same assemblage of the
universal elements, measurable together as a single form, in all. For
the Divine Mind held an impartial balance between two diametrically
opposed extremes when he weighed the body of the whole world—
I mean between heaviness and lightness, between which all the

dico et leuitatem, inter quas omnis medietas uisibilium corporum ponderata est. Proinde omnia corpora in quantum grauitatem participant in tantum terrenarum qualitatum capacia sunt, hoc est soliditatis et stabilitatis, in quantum uero ex leuitate attrahunt in tantum qualitates caelestes participant, inanitatem dico et mutabilitatem, media autem, quae simili libramine extremitates attingunt, aequali participatione illarum qualitates possident. In omnibus autem quattuor elementorum uniuersalium unus idemque motus est et status et capacitas et possessio.

N. Probabiliter responsum est. In hoc enim omnes fysici consentiunt. Ubique igitur sunt per totum sensibilem mundum aequali mensuratione atque concursu quattuor purissima elementa firmiter uocabulo diuina auctoritate appellata.

A. Iam datum est et ratione inuentum. Grecorum quoque nominum interpretatio testis est. Siquidem ΠΥΡ, ignis, propterea dicitur, ut arbitror, quia per poros, hoc est occultos meatus, omnia penetrat. Nullum enim corpus est ex quo ignis excuti non ualeat collisione quadam attractus. Nam et attritus undarum scintillat, nec omnino current, si caliditatis expertes essent. Quid dicam de coloribus, qui ex lucis natura absque dubio procedunt? Nonne omnibus corporibus superfusos esse uidemus? Aer nominatur, id est spiritus, quia per omnia spirat. Nulla nanque sensibilis natura est quam subtilissimus aer penetrare non possit, quod ex odoribus ac sonis possumus argumentari. Non enim inuenies corpus quod quendam odorem olfacientibus aut quendam sonum pulsantibus non reddat. ΙΔΩΡ uocatur, id est aqua, quasi ΕΙΔΩC ΟΡΟΜΕΝΟΝ, hoc est species uisa. Nulla siquidem corporea res est ex cuius superficie attritu quodam leuigata imago quaedam resultare non ualeat. ΑΧΘΟC appellatur terra ex grauitate. Non enim corpus est quod proportione sui ponderis naturalem suum locum non appetat siue in medium mundi siue in extrema uergatur. Nec hunc sensum refutat illud aliud nomen [terrae] quod est ΓΗ, quod proprie [uallem significat]. Siquidem uniuscuiusque creaturae est uallis locus in quo propria sua diffinitione circumscribitur. Cum ergo aliquod corpus perspexeris, si in eo coloris lucem senseris subesse igneum, si sonum seu spontaneum seu artificialem subesse aerium, si ex plana superficie natura seu arte quandam imaginem resultare subesse aquaticum—ubi enim non resultat, ibi non est defectus naturae sed industriae—, ubi

1 medietas RB: constitutio P 3 lemma B 4 attrahunt BP: adtrahunt R
6 attingunt B^cP: adtingunt RB* 7-8 quattuor RB: iiii^{or} P 8 unus ex
unius R 9 possessio RB*P: possessio B^c 10 N RB: lacuna P fysici B^cP:
fycici RB* 11 lemma B 12 quattuor RB: iiii^{or} P 14 A RB: lacuna P
18 scintillat RB: sintillat P 19 si caliditatis RB: sualiditatis P Quid RBP*
Quod P^c 20 natura R^cBP: naturali R* 21 nominatur RB^cP: nominatus B*
26 ΕΙΔΩC ΟΡΟΜΕΝΟΝ RB: ΕΙΛΩC ΟΡΟΜΕΝΟΝ P 27 res: r s.l. B

visible bodies of moderate weight are suspended.⁵⁸ Therefore all bodies, to the extent that they participate in heaviness, are receptive of the earthly qualities, namely solidity and stability, but to the extent that they draw upon lightness, participate in the celestial qualities, I mean emptiness and mutability; while the intermediate bodies which hold the balance between the two extremes possess these qualities in equal proportion. Now, in all of the four universal elements there is one and the same motion and stability and receptivity and possessiveness.

N. Well answered. For all the physicists agree in this. Therefore the four very pure elements which are called by the divine authority by the name of 'firmament' are everywhere throughout the whole sensible world in equal measure and concourse.

A. It has already been granted, and proved by reason. To this too the meaning of the Greek names is witness. For πῦρ, fire, is so called, as I think, because it penetrates all things through their pores, that is, their hidden channels. For there is no body from which fire cannot be struck when drawn forth from some kind of collision. For even the friction of the waves emits sparks, nor would they run at all if they were without heat. What shall I say of colours, which without doubt proceed from the nature of light? Do we not see that they cover the surfaces of all bodies? Air, that is, breath, is (so) called because it breathes through all things. For there is no sensible nature which the very subtle air cannot penetrate; which we can prove from smells and sounds. For you will not find a body which does not give back some smell to those that smell it or some sound to those that strike it. ὕδωρ, that is, water, is (so) called as it were εἶδος ὁρώμενον, that is 'seen form'. For there is no corporeal thing from whose surface when polished by some friction some image cannot be reflected. Earth is called ἄχθος from its weight. For there is not a body which does not seek its natural place by the measure of its weight, whether it verges towards the centre of the world or towards the extremes. Nor is this interpretation contradicted by that other name [for earth] which is γῆ, for literally this [means 'valley']. For the valley of every creature is the place to which it is confined by its proper definition. So when you look at any body, if you perceive in it the light of colour understand the presence of fire; if sound, whether natural or artificial, the presence of air; if some image reflected whether naturally or artificially from a flat surface, the presence of the watery element—for when it is not reflected from it, the fault lies with effort, not with its nature—; where (you see) any

28 ΑΧΘΟC B: ΑΧΕΟC P 29 non enim RB: nullum P 32 ΓΗ RB: TH P
33 diffinitione RB^cP: diffusionem B* 34 aliquod RB^cP: aliquo B* 35 sonum
RB^cP: somnum B* 36 plana RB^cP: plara B*

That the diversity of bodies depends on the diversity of their participation in qualities

That the simple elements are distributed in equal measure in the sensible world

aliquem appetitum naturalis stationis sursum uersus seu deorsum subesse terrenum intellige elimentum, multaue alia argumenta sunt naturalia quibus quattuor elimentorum inseparabilis concursus in omnibus compositis corporibus semper et ubique indubitanter cognoscitur.

N. Quae a te dicta sunt rata mihi uerique similia uidentur. Quod ergo scriptum est: 'Dixit autem deus, Fiant luminaria in firmamento caeli', ita intelligere debemus ac si aperte diceretur: Fiant siderea corpora clara lucidaque in quattuor elimentis ubique diffusis eorum qualitatibus composita. Etenim aliter in eis subiecta corpora suis spatiis collocata intelliguntur, aliter claritas ab eis per uniuersa mundi climata ubique refulgens. Siquidem aliud est album, aliud albedo, nec id ipsum est clarum et claritas. Vnum nanque subiectum, aliud accidens. Diuino itaque praecepto quo imperatum est, 'Fiant luminaria in firmamento caeli', uehicula lucis, ut ait sanctus Basilius, quibus circa mundi ambitum certis temporum interuallis ueheretur facta sunt.

Et uide quam prouide loquitur scriptura. Non dixit: Fiat luminare maius et luminare minus, sed: 'Fiant luminaria.' Generaliter enim omnium caelestium corporum lucentium super terram conditionem expressit, quorum quaedam quidem non longe a terra statuta sunt, ut luna, quae centum uiginti sex milibus stadiorum teste Pithagora telluris mole exaltatur in altum ideoque uicina terris appellatur, in cuius umbram saepe incedens solari luce deserta defectum luminis patitur (illudque spatium quo luna distat a terra tonum philosophi, hoc est spatium cum rationabili quantitate, uocant—duobus siquidem modis armoniae uocum periti tonos dicunt: nam et diastemata, hoc est sonorum interualla, et analogias, hoc est eorum proportiones, tonos appellant)—, quaedam uero in medio mundi, ut sol omnesque planetae quae circa eum uoluuntur, quaedam in superioribus mundi partibus, ut sunt fixi astrorum chori.

A. De circulis deque interstitiis caelestium lucidissimorumque corporum multiplex uariaque sapientum mundi opinio est et ad nullam certam rationem, quantum mihi uidetur, deducta, ideoque quaesso si quid de talibus uerisimile aut rationi conueniens tibi uisum est explanare non differas.

N. In longum nos mittis cum uideas ad reliqua quae de operibus

7 sq. Gen. i. 14. 14-15 Gen. i. 14. 15 Hex. vi. 2; PG xxix. 121B.
19 Gen. i. 14. 22 cf. Plin. N.H. ii. 21.

3 quattuor RB: iiii^{or} P 8 diceretur RB: dicere P 9 quattuor RB: iiii^{or} P
13 nec RB: non P 15 uehicula RB: uehicula P 22 centum
uiginti sex RB: cxxvi P pithagora RB: pythagora P 25 spatium RB^cP:
spatio B* 32 deque RB^cP: decus B* 33 opinio est RB: opinionem P
35 post si rasura B

tendency towards stability, whether erect or prone, the presence of the earthly element; and there are many other proofs in nature by which the inseparable concourse of the four elements in all composite bodies always and everywhere is recognized without any doubt.

N. What you have said seems to me to be reasonable and likely. Therefore that which is written, But 'God said, Let there be luminaries in the firmament of heaven', we ought to understand in such a way as though it were openly said, Let there be stellar bodies, clear and bright, in the four elements that are diffused everywhere, (and let them be) composed from their qualities. For the subject bodies in them, occupying their allotted places, mean one thing, the brightness that shines from them everywhere throughout all the zones of the world means another. For the white object is one thing, the whiteness another nor are the bright and brightness the same; the one is the subject, the other accident. Therefore, by the divine decree by which it was commanded, 'Let there be luminaries in the firmament of heaven', the vehicles of light, as St. Basil calls them, by which it might be carried about the circuit of the world at given intervals of time, were made.

And see how providentially Scripture speaks. It did not say, Let there be a greater luminary and a lesser luminary, but, 'Let there be luminaries.' For it had a general expression for the establishment of all the celestial bodies that shine down upon the earth, of which while some are set at no great distance from the earth, like the moon which, according to Pythagoras, is 126,000 stades above the mass of the earth,⁵⁹ and is therefore said to be in the earth's vicinity and often by entering its shadow (and) being bereft of the light of the sun, suffers a loss of brilliance (and that interval which separates the moon from the earth the philosophers⁶⁰ call a tone, that is, interval with proportionate quantity; for those who are learned in the harmony of sounds speak of tones in two ways: for they call tones both the 'diastemata', that is, the intervals of sound, and the 'analogiae', that is, their proportional relations)—others (are set) in the midst of the universe, such as the sun and all the planets that revolve about him; others at the outermost parts of the universe, as are the choirs of the fixed stars.

A. Concerning the orbits and intervals between the celestial and very brilliant bodies the opinions of the natural philosophers are many and varied and have never been surely reconciled as far as I can see; and therefore if you have any view about such things which is likely and conformable to reason, do not delay in explaining it to me.

N. You are leading us on a long journey when you know that we

sex dierum dicenda sunt potius properandum, huiusque libri prolixitas terminum exigat, praesertim dum uix de talibus quae nunc exigis ulla opinio sit ratione subnixa uel ab ullo philosophorum plene deprompta—non quod illi ut arbitror non intellexerint—alioqui non recte fysici [aut philosophi] appellarentur—sed quod nullus illorum quos adhuc legimus pure et indubitanter horum rationes satis reddere uideatur. Verumtamen ex his quae ipsi [sparsim] scripserunt certisque argumentationibus rerum experimento approbauerunt de telluris lunaeque interstitiis quiddam uerisimile tibi aperire non negarim.

Lunam nanque centum uiginti sex milibus stadiorum a terra distare ex ipsius eclypsi absque ullo errore <ut aiunt> exploratum est. Vmbram siquidem terrae quam noctem uocant circulum lunae attingere ipsa prodit natura. Globus enim illius detrimentum suae lucis non pateretur, si solari radio in regionem umbrae incidens non priuaretur, ac per hoc subtracta omni ambiguitate conficitur tanto spatio lunam a terra elongari quanto interuallo noctis umbram ratio docet protendi. Protenditur autem noctis umbra usque ad lunae circulum: nox igitur centum uiginti sex milibus stadiorum in altum erigi manifesta docet ratio. Quo autem argumento centum uiginti sex milibus stadiorum lunam a terra distare indubitanter approbari possit, diligentioris inquisitionis indiget.

A. Plane. Adhuc enim de hac quaestione nulla mihi ratio satisfaciens refulsit.

N. Intentus itaque perspice quae mihi uerisimilia de his uidentur [a philosophis inuenta]. Ex gnomonica [quippe], hoc est horologica, speculatione praedictum spatium et quaesitum subtiliter ab eis est et absque ulla ambiguitate repertum, quorum doctissimus in omni geometrica et astrologica supputatione Eratostenes traditur fuisse. Scaphia quidem dicuntur rotunda ex aere uasa quae horarum ductus stili in medio fundo siti proceritate discriminant, qui stilus gnomon appellatur, a quo ueluti quodam centro lineae ducuntur in extrema scaphiorum, quae lineae totum horologii ambitum in uiginti quattuor spatia discriminant, hoc est in uiginti quattuor horarum morulas, quibus totius celestis sphaerae amplitudo circa terra conuoluitur, donec

26–27 Cf. Mart. Cap. De nupt. vi. 296.1 (Dick). 28–29 cf. *ibid.* pp. 295.20–296.1. 30–32 *ibid.* pp. 296.1–4.

3 ulla R^cBP: ullam R* 4 illi R^cBP: illum R* intellexerint R^cBP: intellexerunt R* 5 recte ex rectae P illorum in ras. B 8 approbauerunt RB^cP: aprobauerunt B* 11 lemma quantum luna distet a terra Rm centum uiginti sex RB: cxxvi P 14 enim in ras. R(C) 15 regionem in ras. R 19 centum uiginti sex RB: cxxvi P 20 docet ratio in ras. R(C) centum uiginti sex RB: cxxvi P 22 possit R^cB: posse R*P 23 nulla RB: nulla ex nullo P* nullo P^c 27 subtiliter ab eis in ras. R(C) 29 astro-

should rather hurry on to what remains to be said of the operations of the six days, and when the time has come to put an end to this long book—furthermore, you are inquiring into matters concerning which there exists hardly any opinion based on reason or fully enunciated by any of the philosophers—not, as I think, because they did not understand (it)—in that case it would not be right to call them physicists [or philosophers]—but because none of those whom we have read up to now seems to give, clearly and without uncertainty, a satisfactory account of the reasons of these matters. But I shall not refuse to reveal to you something which is likely from what they have written [(though) sparingly] and demonstrated by sound arguments (and) practical experiment concerning the distance between the earth and the moon.

For it has been calculated from (observation of) the moon's eclipse without any error <as they say> that the moon is distant 126,000 stades from the earth. For the earth's shadow, which they call night, nature herself extends far enough to reach the moon. For her orb would not suffer the loss of its light if it did not pass within the area of the shadow which thus deprives her of the sun's radiance, and so it is deduced without any ambiguity that the distance of the moon from the earth is equal to what reason teaches us is the length of the shadow of night. Now the shadow of the night extends as far as the circle of the moon; therefore plain reason teaches that the night is projected 126,000 stades upward. But a more careful investigation is required to place beyond doubt the grounds on which it is argued that the moon is distant 126,000 stades from the earth.

A. Just so; for as yet no satisfactory reason has shed any light on this question for me.

N. Observe carefully, then, [the findings of the philosophers] which seem likely to me to be true concerning these matters. [For] from readings taken from the gnomon, that is, sundial, they both inquired after this distance with subtlety and discovered it with certainty; of whom the most learned in every geometrical and astronomical calculation is said to have been Eratosthenes.⁶¹ Now, scaphia are circular vessels of bronze which indicate the passage of hours from the height of a rod that is set up in the midst of their base. This rod is called a gnomon, and from it as centre lines are drawn to the rims of the vessels, and these lines divide the whole circle of the sundial into twenty-four segments, that is to say, into the twenty-four intervals of hourly duration through which the circumference of the whole celestial sphere revolves about the earth until it returns

logica RB: astroloica P 30 quidem in ras. R(C) 33 horologii RB: orologii P uiginti quattuor RB: xxiiii P 34 uiginti quattuor R: xx^{tl} quattuor B: xxiiii P

ad eundem situm naturalis orizontis quem pridie tenuerat revertatur. Prefatus itaque Eratostenes motum umbrae stili per spatia horologii diligenter animaduertens aperte intellexit unam eandemque rationem esse in motu umbrae per horarum interualla circa horologii stilum ^{716D} [inque <aequi> noctis circuitu per earundem horarum spatia circa ⁵ telluris ambitum] in tantum, ut omne quod in uasis horoscopi [hoc est signiferi] perspicitur simili speculatione de motu caelestium corporum intelligatur. Vernali itaque equinoctio umbrae stili prolixitas mediam gnomonis mensuram efficit in Meroe insula Nili et Siene ciuitate Aegypti. Ipsa autem medietas stili diametros est totius amb- ^{717A} bitus horologii, ac per hoc et umbra [stili in aequinoctio] diametros ¹¹ est et stili et horologii et, quia omnis diametros [ab ipsa] sphaera seu circulo cuius diametros est duplo superatur, necessario umbra stili circuli duplicis rationem reddit. Duplo enim uincitur ab ipso circulo seu sphaera, cuius medietas constituitur. Nam et denarii numeri ¹⁵ ueluti cuiusdam circuli quinarius diametrus est. Hac itaque ratione horologii perspicue intellecta uir sagacis ingenii Eratostenes ambitum totius terrae subtili indagine requisiiuit. Ac primum quidem cognouit ambitum aequinoctialis circuli, qui totum orbem terrarum totamque caelestem spheram in duas aequales secat partes, trecentis sexaginta ²⁰ partibus compleri, quarum duodecimam portionem, hoc est triginta partes, duabus horis oriri seu occidere [seu de loco per quem mouentur recedere] ^{717B} indubitanter intellexit. Itaque quod umbra in horologio sensui indicat, hoc caelestium corporum incessabilem motum efficere ratio probat. Non enim umbra stili per horologica interualla ²⁵ moueretur, si non aetherium corpus cum sideribus suis circa terram circunouleretur. Quod ergo ualet moles terrae in medio mundi, hoc ualet stilus in medio horologii et quemadmodum umbra stili circa se ipsum per ambitum scaphii circumducitur, ita nox, quae est umbra terrae, circa ipsam terram undique ³⁰ per spatia aeris lunam a terra segregantis circunuehitur. Sol autem idem de corporibus et terrae et stili umbram iacit, qui quidem sicut in aequinoctio meridiano tempore in illis partibus orbis terrarum ^{717C} quae aequinoctiali circulo appropinquant, in Meroe dico et Syenne, umbram gnomonis facit tantae proceritatis, ut diametrum ipsius, hoc ³⁵

1 orizontis RB: orozontis P 2 motum RB: totum P horologii ex
horologica B 4 post motu rasura RB motu RB: motum P 5 inque
noctis R^(C)BP: noctisque R^(C) 7 motu RB: mota P 8 equinoctio
RB: aequinoctii (sic) P 9 post efficit rasura R 10 gl. marg. glo(ssa) Ex
hoc apparet quod stili longitudo et ambitus horologii eiusdem mensurae sint B(C)P
11 aequinoctio RB: aequinoctii P 12 et stili et horologii R^(C)BP: horologii R*
post horologii rasura R 15 denarii numeri ex denario numero 21 trecentis
sexaginta RB: cccetis lx P duodecimam RB: xiimam P 22 oriri ex horiri
P 23 indubitanter intellexit R^(C)BP: non dubitari R* 25 probat
C: prodat RB 26 moueretur R^(C)B: *oueretur R*: mouerentur P si non in ras.
R(C) 27 circa terram ex circiter R post terram rasura in R 33 aequi-

to the position of the natural horizon which it held on the previous day. Therefore the aforesaid Eratosthenes by careful observation of the movement of the rod's shadow through the segments of the sundial came to a clear understanding that the movement of the shadow through the hourly intervals about the rod of the sundial was proportionate [to the circuit of the night through the same hourly intervals about the earth's circumference], so that whatever is observed in the vessels of the sundial [which represents the sky] by analogous contemplation may be understood of the motion of the heavenly bodies. Thus, at the Vernal Equinox the length of the rod's shadow is equal to half the length of the gnomon⁶² on Meroe, which is an island in the Nile, and at Syene, a city of Egypt. But the diameter of the whole circle of the sundial is also equal to half (the length of) the rod, and therefore both the shadow [of the rod at the Equinox] is (equal in length to) the diameter of the sundial; and, because every diameter is doubled by [the very] sphere or circle of which it is the diameter, the shadow of the rod must describe a circle that is double (its own length). For it is doubled by the very circle or sphere of which it constitutes the centre. For of the number ten also the number five is, as it were, a kind of diameter of a circle. So, having clearly understood the principle of the sundial, Eratosthenes, a man of cunning ingenuity, calculated by subtle investigation the circumference of the whole earth. And first he recognized that the circumference of the equinoctial circle, which divides the whole of the globe of the earth and the whole sphere of heaven into two equal parts, is made up of 360 sections, of which he satisfied himself beyond doubt that a twelfth part, that is every 30 sections, takes two hours to rise or to set [or to vacate the region through which it moves]. Thus, what the shadow indicates to the sense on the sundial reason shows to be the effect of the unceasing motion of the celestial bodies; for the shadow of the rod would not pass through the intervals of the sundial if the ethereal body with its stars did not revolve about the earth. So that which the earth's mass accomplishes in the midst of the universe the rod accomplishes in the midst of the sundial, and as the rod's shadow is carried about itself around the circuit of the scaphium, so night, which is earth's shadow, is borne about the earth itself around through the aerial spaces which separate the moon from the earth. Now, it is the same sun which casts the shadow from the body of the earth and from the body of the rod; as at midday at the time of the equinox in those parts of the habitable globe which are close to the equator, I mean on Meroe and at Syene, it throws from the gnomon a shadow of such length as to attain to its diameter, that is, to

noctio RB: aequinoctii P meridiano tempore R^(C)BP: meridi R* 34 ap-
propinquant RB: adpropinquant P syenne RB: sienne P

est medietatem, seu paulo plus possit attingere, ita ex omni mole telluris ubique umbram protendit, ut ad circulum lunae seu paulo superius exaltetur, quod ipsius lunae probat defectus. Si enim aliquotiens umbra terrae ultra lunarem circulum non extenderetur, non fortassis solaris lucis casum ipsa luna *pateretur*. Nam, ut aiunt philosophi, lunaris circuli centrum terra est, quamvis aliquando in signo tauri altius paululum elongari ab ea aestimetur, ubi altissima AÏC, hoc est altitudo, sui circuli putatur esse, [ideoque non inaequalitates sui ambitus circa terram, uerum umbrae altitudo causa eclypseos eius aestimanda est].

Eratostenes igitur umbrae terrae altitudinem ex gnomonis ad umbram suam comparatione inuestigans cognoscensque non ultra ipsam terrae diametron exaltari—tanta enim altitudo noctis est quanta spisitudo telluris intra aequinoctialem circulum mensuratae—, prius ambitum terrae quaesiuit, ut ex eo diametrum posset inuenire—amplitudine siquidem circuli seu sphaerae reperta facile est lineam quae diuidit in partes aequales incunctanter dinoscere—, proinde per geometricos regis Ptholomei quanta portio telluris esset inter Meroen et Syennen certus effectus per similitudinem umbrae meridiano tempore aequinoctialis diei in septingentis stadiis unam partem inuenit compertam, quam trecenties sexagies, hoc est per longitudinem aequinoctialis circuli, multiplicans absque ullo errore amplitudinem totius telluris in ducentis quinquaginta duobus milibus stadiorum repperit. Septingenta nanque stadia tricenties sexagies multiplicata ducenta quinquaginta duo milia stadiorum colligunt, quem numerum aequaliter diuidens medietatem illius, hoc est centum uiginti sex milia stadiorum, in diametro telluris inque lunae ac terrae intercapedine intellexerat esse.

Et uide quantum perfecti numeri in his omnibus uigent, senarius uidelicet et septinarius et octonarius, in quibus maxima simphonia musicae naturaliter constituitur, quae diapason uocatur. Habet enim octo sonos, septem spatia, sex tonos. Senarius nanque numerus per se ipsum multiplicatus, id est sex sexies, triginta sex efficit, quo numero si septem milia multiplicaueris, inuenies totius orbis ambitum. Siquidem septem milia tricies sexies aut triginta sex septies multiplicata ducenta quinquaginta duo milia stadiorum faciunt, quo numero totius telluris amplitudo includitur. Si autem senarium sui

3 exaltetur *ex* exaltitur R 5 solaris: is *in ras.* R(C) pateretur *in ras.*
R(C): *ex* pateret B 6 est *om.* P 8 inaequalitates RB: inaequalitas P
11 gnomonis RB: gnominis P 12 comparatione: *post* gnomonis *rasura* R
com- *in ras.* R 13 noctis RB: montis P 14 mensuratae R(C)BP: mensurata R*
17 *post* quae *rasura* R 18 regis R^cBP: regius R* ptholomei RB: ptholomei P
20 septingentis RB: dccis P 21 lemma P trecenties sexagies RB: cccies lxxies P per *ex pro* B 22 multiplicans RB: multiplicatis P
23 ducentis quinquaginta RB: cctis Ita P 24 Septingenta . .

half (its length), or a little further, so it subtends everywhere from the whole earth's mass a shadow of such length as to reach the orbit of the moon or a little beyond, a fact which is proved by the eclipse of the moon herself. For if the earth's shadow did not sometimes extend beyond the lunar orbit, the moon herself *would* not perhaps *suffer* the loss of the sun's light. For the centre of the moon's orbit is the earth, so the philosophers say, although it is sometimes thought to increase its distance from the earth in the sign Taurus, where the zenith of its *áphis*, that is, its altitude, is thought to be [and therefore it should not be thought that eclipses are caused by irregularities in its orbit around the earth, but by the length of the shadow].

Therefore Eratosthenes, after investigating the altitude of the earth's shadow by comparing the gnomon to its shadow and finding that it does not exceed the earth's diameter—for the depth of the night is equal to the girth of the earth when this is measured on the equator—first sought out the earth's circumference so that from it he could calculate its diameter—for once you know the circumference of a circle or a sphere it is easy to calculate accurately the line which divides it into equal parts—, then having learnt from King Ptolemy's geometricians⁶³ the size of the portion of the earth's surface between Meroe and Syene, he deduced, from the fact that at the time of the equinox the shadow at noon was similar (at both places), that a single segment measured 700 stades. Multiplying this by 360, that is, by the length of the equator, he calculated without any mistake that the circumference of the whole earth is 252,000 stades. For 700 stades multiplied by 360 gives 252,000 stades; and by dividing this number into two equal parts he found the half of it, that is, 126,000 stades in the diameter of the earth⁶⁴ and in the distance from the earth to the moon.

And note the prevalence in all these calculations of the perfect numbers,⁶⁵ namely 6 and 7 and 8, which by nature constitute the chief symphonic proportion of music which is called the diapason. For this has eight notes, seven intervals, and six tones. For the number six multiplied by itself, that is six times six, makes, 36, which if you multiply it by 7 thousand gives you the circumference of the whole earth. For 36 times 7 thousand or 7 (thousand) times 36 makes 252,000 stades, the number which comprises the girth of the whole earth. But if you multiply 6 by the length of its diameter, which is 3,

tricenties sexagies RB: Dccta . . . cccies lxxies P 25 ducenta quinquaginta duo RB: ccta Ita ii P 26-27 centum uiginti sex RB: cxxvi P 27 milia *om.* P
28 intercapedine RB: intercapedane P 30 uidelicet *in ras.* R(C) septinarius RB: septenarius P *post* septinarius *duo lineae erasae* C (?) *in* R octonarius *ex* octonarium R 32 nanque *in ras.* R 34 septem RB^c: se*ptem B*: vii P milia *om.* P
35 septem RB: vii P milia *om.* P triginta sex RB: xxxvi P
36 ducenta quinquaginta duo RB: cclii P milia stadiorum *om.* P
37 Si *in ras.* B

The circumference of the earth

diametri, quae est ternarius, quantitate multiplicaueris, decem et octo numeri summam conficies, per quam septem milia stadiorum multiplicata diametrum totius terrae consummant. Septem siquidem milia decies et octies seu decem et octo septies centum *uiginti* sex milia fiunt, qui numerus [stadiorum] et terrae diametrum et lunae atque telluris intercapedinem *collocat*.

Proinde non irrationabiliter lunae terraeque intercapedo totiusque telluris complexio toni proportione [contineri] a philosophis pronuntiatur. Quattuordecim nanque milia stadiorum decies et octies ducenta quinquaginta duo milia faciunt, ambitum uidelicet terrae. Diametrum uero eius lunaeque ab ea distantiam vii milia stadiorum decies et octies multiplicata peragunt. X autem et viii comparati ad x et vi, quos bis viii mensurant, toni obtinent proportionem. Maior enim numerus totum *minorem* colligit octauamque eius partem, quae est binarius. Nam quemadmodum nouem ad octo proportione epogdoi ita x et viii ad x et vi armonicis speculationibus coaptantur. Omnis siquidem numerus maior minorem se [et] octauam minoris partem *habens epogdoos in numeris*, in musicis uero tonus uocatur.

His ergo rationibus et orbis ambitus eiusque diametros et spatium quo luna distat a terra et noctis altitudo incunctanter comprehensa sunt. Si autem quaeras cur et Plinius Secundus et Ptolomeus in geografico suo, ut Martianus scribit, non plus quam quingenta stadia singulis partibus distribuunt, qui numerus tricenties sexagies multiplicatus ambitum telluris iuxta Eratostenis supputationem comprehendere non poterit, non mihi facile occurrit quid respondeam. Si enim dixero Eratostenem plus terrae magnitudinem, Plinium uero et Ptolomeum minus existimasse, non uidebitur uerisimile quod inter summos auctores [mundanae sapientiae] tanta dissonantia sit, ut alii amplitudinem terrae ducentis quinquaginta duobus milibus stadiorum, alii centum octuaginta argumententur amplecti—quingenta siquidem stadia tricenties sexagies centum octuaginta milia stadiorum faciunt—qui numeri a se inuicem discrepant septuaginta duobus milibus stadiorum—, praesertim cum praedicti sapientes sollertissimique naturarum inquisitores in numero partium aequinoctialis seu zodiaci circuli consentiant. Omnes enim unanimiter tricentas sexaginta pronuntiant.

Si dixero minora stadia hunc, Eratostenem dico, mensurasse ac

22 Mart. Cap. De nupt. vi. 301. 3.

1-2 decem et octo RB: xviii P 2 septem RB: vii P milia om. P
3 consummant RP: consumant B 4 decem et octo RB: xviii P centum
uiginti sex R^cB: cxxvi P uiginti in ras. R(C) 5 milia om. P fiunt RB:
faciunt P 6 collocat in ras. R(C) 7 totiusque: -us- in ras. R(C) 11 ea
RB: eo P vii RP: vii^{tem} B milia om. P 12 viii BP: octo R 13 viii RB:
octo P 14 minorem: in in ras. R(C) 16 epogdoi RB: ΕΡΟΓΙΟ P et

you will get the sum of the number 18, and if that is multiplied by 7 thousand it gives the earth's diameter. For 18 times 7 thousand or 7 (thousand) times 18 makes a hundred (and) *twenty* six thousand, the number [of stades] which *gives* both the diameter of the earth and the interval between the moon and the earth.

Moreover it is not unreasonably declared by the philosophers that the interval between the moon and the earth and the girth of the whole earth [are contained] in the proportion of a tone. For 18 times 14,000 stades makes 252,000, namely, the circumference of the earth, while 7,000 stades multiplied by 18 gives the earth's diameter and its distance from the moon. But the ratio of 10+8 to 10+6, which is twice 8, gives one tone, for the greater number contains the lesser plus the eighth of it, which is 2. For according to the theory of harmony 10+8 stands in the same ratio to 10+6 as 9 to 8, namely the epogdoos. For every greater number *which contains* a lesser [plus] the eighth part of the lesser is called *in arithmetic* an epogdoos, in music a tone.

So within these ratios are contained the circumference of the globe, its diameter, and the distance from the earth to the moon and the depth of the night. But if you ask why both Pliny Secundus and Ptolemy in his geographical (work), as Martianus writes, assign no more than 500 stades to each degree, a number which if multiplied by 360 will not be able to contain the circumference of the earth as calculated by Eratosthenes, I do not find it easy to answer your question. For should I admit that Eratosthenes gave a greater measurement of the size of the earth, but Pliny and Ptolemy a smaller, it will not seem probable that there should be so serious a disagreement among the highest authorities [in natural philosophy] that some should maintain that the girth of the earth is contained within 252 thousand stades, others within 180—for 360 times 500 stades gives 180,000 stades—figures which differ from one another by 72,000 stades; especially as those wise and most careful inquirers into nature are in agreement as to the number of degrees in the equinoctial or zodiacal circle; for all say unanimously 360.

Should I say that he, I mean Eratosthenes, used a shorter stade

... et s.l. P 18 habens in ras. R(C) os in numeris in ras. R(C) tonus
RB: tonos P 21 plinius RB: plenius P 22 quingenta R^cB^c: quin-
quaginta R*B*: dti (sic) P 23 tricenties RB: trecenties P 24 erato-
stenis RB^cP: erostenis B*: eratostenes P 26 plinium uero RB: pliniumue P
27 et ptolemeum om. P 28 sit ut RB: sicut P 29 ducentis quinquaginta RB:
cctis I P 30 post stadiorum: Praesertim cum praedicti sapientes sollertissimi-
que naturarum inquisitores P centum octuaginta R: centum nonaginta B: clxxxta
P argumententur RB: argumentantur P 30-31 quingenta RP: quinquaginta
B 31 centum octuaginta RB: clxxx P milia om. P 32 septuaginta
RB: lxx P 34 sollertissimique RP: sollertissimaeque B 35 zodiaci RB:
zodiaci P

per hoc maiorem numerum singulis partibus dedisse, illos uero maiora ideoque pauciora, quomodo hoc probabile iudicabitur? Nam utrique stadium centum uiginti quinque passibus mensurari confirmant. Mihi itaque uidetur inaequalitatis huius causa quantitatis passuum inaequalitatem substituisse. Fieri enim potuit, ut duos mensores, quorum unus statura maior, alter minor, maioribus minoribusque passibus stadium unum mensurare indeque stadia maiora minoraue in mensura unius partis computari. Quisnam non crediderit Herculem, quem primum iuxta Olimpum montem stadium ferunt mensurasse, maioribus incomparabiliter passibus et pedibus mensuram stadio dedisse quam caeteri qui post eum stadia mensurabant? Nam ex quantitate stadii, quod ipse primus mensurauerat, passuum gressuumque eius ac pedum magnitudo, ex pedum uero amplitudine totius staturae illius altitudo est.

Quid ergo mirum, si una eademque unius eiusdemque partis intercapedo et quingenta simul et septingenta stadia capiat et unumquodque stadium eodem numero passuum et gressuum pedumque computari, ipsos autem passus et gressus et pedes non eiusdem quantitatis esse, in quibusdam quidem maiores, in quibusdam minores, ita ut maioribus mensurata stadia quingenta, minoribus uero septingenta unum id ipsumque unius partis spatium impleret?

Habet autem stadium iuxta grecam supputationem iugera sex, cubitos centum, passus cxxv, gressus ducentos quadraginta, ulnas quadringentas, pedes sescentos. Verum amplitudine terrenae molis noctisque altitudine quae eiusdem mensurae est, cuius etiam telluris diametrus, rationabili argumentatione repertis, ambitus lunaris circuli prompte quaerentibus occurrit. Triplicata siquidem noctis altitudine circuli lunaris diametrum efficit. Centum nanque uiginti sex milia stadiorum tertio repetita tricenta septuaginta octo milia faciunt. Est igitur lunaris circuitus diametros in milibus stadiorum tricentis septuaginta octo. Si autem diametrum multiplicaueris erit totius circuli ambitus in septingentis quinquaginta et sex milibus stadiorum.

ambitus
lunaris kykli

De mensura autem lunaris corporis multorum uaria opinio est. Multi enim dicunt globum lunae telluris amplitudini aequalem esse et hoc argumentantur ex eclypsi solis, putantes lunam solares radios ab omni terra auferre posse. Sed aequinoctiali circulo appropinquantes

35-36 Cf. Mart. Cap. *De nupt.* viii. 452. 1-2.

3 centum uiginti quinque RB: cxxv P uiginti ex uiginta B passibus RP:
pasibus B 4 uidetur BP: uidet R 5 passuum RB: passuum P sub-
stitisse RB: substitisse P 7 indeque RB: Itadeque P 10 passibus RP:
pasibus B 16 quingenta RB^cP: quinquaginta B* 17 passuum RB^cP:
pasuum B* 18 passus RB^cP: pasus B* et (2) RB: ac P 20 mensurata
RB: mensura P 22 lemma Haec (?) omnia mensuratum Rm 23 centum
RB: c P ducentos quadraginta RB: cctos xl P ulnas BP: culnas P 24 ses-
centos RB: dctos P 27-28 altitudine RB: altitudo P melius 28 Centum

for his measure and thus allowed a greater number of stades for each degree, while they (used) a longer (stade), and therefore (allowed) a smaller number, how shall we reasonably account for this? For both sides confirm that a stade measures 125 paces. Therefore my own view is that the cause of this disagreement resides in the difference in the length of the pace. For it could happen that two surveyors, one of taller, the other of shorter stature, would pace out a stade by longer or shorter paces respectively, so that the one would calculate the measure of a single degree by a greater number of stades, the other by a less.⁶⁶ For who would not believe that Hercules, who is traditionally said to have been the first to have paced out the stade on Mount Olympus, gave it a measure based on paces and feet which were incomparably greater than those of others who measured the stade after him? For the length of the stade which he was the first to have measured would depend on the length of his paces and steps and feet, and the size of his feet would depend on the height of his whole stature.

Why then should it be strange if one and the same interval consisting of one and the same degree should at the same time receive a measure of 500 stades and of 700 stades, and that while in each case the stade is measured by the same number of paces and steps and feet, the paces and steps and feet are not themselves of the same length, but are longer in some, shorter in others, so that when the stades are measured by the longer 500 will complete the space of one degree, when by the shorter, one and the same space of one degree will contain 700?

Now, on the Greek reckoning the stade has 6 acres, 100 cubits, 125 paces, 240 steps, 400 ells, 600 feet. But when the girth of the earth's mass and the depth of the night, which has the same measurement as the earth's diameter, have been found by reasonable argument, the circumference of the moon's orbit can be quickly discovered by those who seek it; for the depth of the night multiplied by 3 gives the diameter of the lunar orbit.⁶⁷ For 3 times 126,000 stades makes 378,000. Therefore the diameter of the lunar orbit is 378,000 stades. Now, if you multiply (by two) the diameter you will get the circumference of the whole circle as 756,000 stades.

The circum-
ference of
the circle of
the Moon.

Now, concerning the measurement of the moon's body there is a wide variety of opinion. Thus, many say that the globe of the moon is equal in size to that of the earth, and this they seek to prove from the eclipse of the Sun, because they think that the moon can obscure

... uiginti sex RB: c . . . xxvi P 29 tricenta septuaginta octo RB: cccia
lxxviii P faciunt om. P 30 lemma P circuitus RB: circulus P tricentis
B: tricenos R: cctis P 31 septuaginta octo RB: lxxviii P multiplicaueris
RB: duplicaueris P 32 septingentis quinquaginta et sex RB: dccis l et vi P
33 opinio est RB: opinione P 36 appropinquantes RB: adpropinquantes P

de magnitudine lunae, ut Martianus scribit, uerisimiliora tradunt
et ex defectu solis rationabiliter approbant. Dicunt enim umbram
lunae momento solaris defectus duodeuicesimam telluris partem
occultare, et quia omne corpus triplici umbra sua, quam metaliter
iacit, maius est lunae corpus sextam terrae partem in ampli-
tudine sua habere colligunt, ac per hoc quoniam duodeuicesima,
hoc est octaua decima, totius terrae portio est in quattuordecem
milibus stadiorum, sequitur, ut ipsa octaua decima pars triplicata
amplitudinem lunaris globi perficiat. Quattuordecem autem ter ducta
quadragesima duo faciunt. Quadragesima igitur duo milia stadiorum
amplitudinem lunae comprehendunt. Tot enim milia stadiorum
sextam terrae obtinent partem. Quadragesima nanque duo milia sexies
uel sex milia quadragies bis ducenta quinquaginta duo milia stadi-
orum cumulant.

Et miraberis senarii numeri et septinarii reciproca uirtute lunae
atque telluris amplitudinem comprehendere. Septem siquidem sexies
uel sex septies quadraginta duo, lunae uidelicet globum, et iterum
xlii sexies cclii, terrae scilicet spatium, in giro amplexantur, hosque
omnes numeros in milibus stadiorum computari ratio indicauit ad
cumulum perfectissimae naturalium mundi corporum constitutionis
manifestandum. Omnis siquidem perfectionis cubica solidaque mille-
narii numeri conformatio significatrix est. Status itaque naturae
senario, motus septinario, utriusque autem immutabilis ratio mille-
nario significatur. Est enim rerum omnium status mobilis et motus
stabilis aeternis rationibus perfectissime constitutus.

Nec sine ratione philosophi haec omnia stadiis metiebantur.
Quinarius nanque numerus ANAKATACTIKOC est, hoc est in
se ipsum rediens. Quotiescunque multiplicaueris per se ipsum
quinarium, in se ipsum redire necesse est. Primus itaque quinarii
cubicus motus stadium perficit quinquies quinquies cxxv
passus, ac per hoc non irrationabiliter et motus mundanorum
corporum et status eo numero colligitur, qui et cubicus est et uolubilis
et in se ipsum reuertens.

Haec de spatiis inferiorum mundi partium diximus magnorum
philosophorum ratiocinationes secuti, non affirmantes incunctanter
ita se habere, sed quae ueri similia certisque regulis propinquiora
uisa sunt proferentes tuis petitionibus satisfaciendi molimine.

1 tradunt R^c(C): tendunt R*B*: intendunt B^cP 2 et RB: ut P defectu
RP: defecto B 4 occultare¹ B^c(C)P: occultari RB* 7 quattuor-
decemRB: xiiii x (sic) P 8 octaua decima RB: xviii P 9 Quattuor-
decem RB: xiiii P 10 quadragesima duo RB: xlii P Quadragesima . . .
duo RB: xl . . . ii P milia om. P 12 Quadragesima . . . duo RB: xl . . . ii P
milia om. P 13 sex RB: vi P milia om. (bis) P ducenta quinquaginta
duo RB: octa llii P 15 septinarii RB: septenarii P 17 sex om.
P quadragesima duo RB: xlii P 20 perfectissimae RB: perfectissime

the Sun's rays from the whole earth. But those who are positioned
near the equator, as Martianus writes, give a more likely account
and a rational proof of it from the eclipse of the Sun. For they say
that at the moment of the solar eclipse the moon's shadow covers an
eighteenth part of the earth, and because every body is greater than
the triple cone-shaped shadow that it casts, they calculate that the
body of the moon contains within its amplitude a sixth part of the
earth, and therefore, since the eighteenth part of the earth is 14,000
stades, it follows that that eighteenth part multiplied by 3 gives the
amplitude of the lunar globe. Now 14 multiplied by 3 makes 42;
therefore 42,000 stades comprise the amplitude of the moon. For
that amount of thousands of stades gives a sixth part of the earth.
For 6 times 42,000 or 42 times 6,000 amounts to 252,000 stades.

And you will remark how the amplitudes of the moon and of the
earth are contained within the reciprocal values of the numbers 6 and
7. For 6 times 7 or 7 times 6 encompasses 42, that is, the globe of the
moon; and again 6 times 42 (encompasses) 252, that is, the extent of
the earth, and reason has shown that all these numbers, counted in
thousands of stades, clearly reveal the sum of the most perfect
constitution of the natural bodies of the world. For the conformation
of the number thousand as a solid cube is the symbol of all perfection.
Therefore the stability of nature is signified by the number 6, its
mobility by the number 7, and the constant ratio between the two
by the thousand. For the mobile stability and stable mobility of all
things is most perfectly established by eternal ratios.

Nor is it without reason that the philosophers measured all these
things in stades. For the number 5 is ἀνακαταστικός, that is,
returning upon itself. For whenever you multiply 5 by itself it must
return upon itself. Therefore the first cubic motion of 5, 5 times 5
times 5, completes the stade as 125 paces, and therefore it is not
unreasonable to gather both the mobility and stability of mundane
bodies from that number, which is at the same time cubic, rotatory,
and returning upon itself.

In what we have said about the distances of the lower parts of the
world we have been following the reasonings of the great philo-
sophers without unhesitatingly affirming that things are as they
say, but setting forth those which seem most likely to be so and more
in accordance with known factors in an endeavour to satisfy your
inquiries.

P naturalium RB: naturaliter P mundi RB: munda P 21 siquidem
R^c: equidem R*B^cP 22 conformatio RB: formatio P 25 constitutus RB:
constituitur P 27 ANAKATAETAKTIKOC est B^c(C): ANAKATACTIKOC
RB*: ANAKATACTIKOC est P 30 cubicus RB: cubitus P 31 passus
RP: pasus B 32 cubicus RB: cybicus P est et RB: esse P

A. Mihi sufficiunt quae a te de talibus prolata sunt. Caeterum cui haec uel non satis rata uel non satis insinuata uidentur alios aliorum quaerat intellectus. Multipliciter enim ex diuersis auctoribus mundanae constitutionis ratio tractata est. Verum quia de magnitudine deque interuallis inferiorum mundi corporum, lunae dico ac terrae, quae rationi conuenire inspiciuntur inuestigata sunt, de spatiis aethereis quaedam breuiter uelim audire. Ea siquidem aut sola aut maxime in speculationibus diuinae in quarta intelligibili die operationis discutienda nemo ambigit.

N. Nimium moramur in quarto die.

A. Minus eruditibus discereque cupientibus naturamque rerum inuestigantibus, si forte hanc nostram disputationem lecturi fuerint, non nimis uidebitur, ut arbitror, praesertim cum rationi non conueniat de inferioribus mundi partibus quaedam rationabiliter tractari, superiores uero omnino intactas relinqui.

N. Iamdudum inter nos confectum est de solari globo medio libramine grauissimae leuissimaeque naturae circulari motu per mediam signiferi lineam circa inferiora mundi spatia aeternaliter ferri.

A. Confectum plane certisque rationibus suasum, nec naturae situs aliter fieri sinit.

N. De magnitudine ipsius neque saecularium litterarum eruditi neque diuinarum scripturarum expositores certam diffinitionem proferri permittunt. Nam et Plinius Secundus in Naturali Istoriam et sanctus Basilius in Exameron suo magnitudinem solis omnino prohibent diffiniri. Non enim umbra eius est cuius argumento experiretur, quantae sit magnitudinis,—nam neque telluris lunaeue amplitudo inueniretur, nisi umbra earum metaliter iacta certis demensionibus extenderetur—ac per hoc corpus solare quoniam nullam umbram in infinitum progredi sinit, sed pro rationibus corporum quorum umbrae sunt certis demensionibus concludit suae magnitudinis infinitatem manifestissime aperit.

A. Nec hoc quaero neque ab aliquo quaerendum existimo. Non enim oculorum coniectura praeualet, ubi ratio sedem argumenti non habet. Quanto autem spatio a terra elongatur iuxta philosophorum existimationem exponas postulo.

N. Primus enim omnium philosophorum, ut aiunt, Pithagoras interstitium terrae ac lunae in milibus stadiorum centum uiginti sex

24 Cf. Plin. *N.H.* ii. 23, 21, 85.

25 Bas. *Hex.* vi. 10; PG xxix. 141AB.

6 rationi RB^cP: ratio B* 7 aethereis RP: aetheriis B Ea RB^cP:
Et B* 11 A s.l. R 13 nimis R^cB^cP: minus R*B* 13-14 con-
ueniat ex conueniat R 14 quaedam rationabiliter om. P 22 saecularium
RB: specularium P 24 secundus RB: secundum P in om. P istoria RB:
historia P 25-26 prohibent RB^cP: perhibent B* 27 nam neque RB:

A. What you set forth about them does satisfy me. Let him who thinks it not sufficiently reasoned or expounded seek from others other interpretations. For the proportional principle on which the world is constituted has been discussed by various authorities in many different ways. But now that we have examined what is reasonably seen to be truth concerning the sizes and distances of the lower bodies, I mean of the moon and the earth, I should like to hear a brief account of the ethereal regions. For no one doubts that these are the sole or principal subjects for contemplation in the divine operation on the fourth intelligible day.

N. We linger too long over the Fourth Day.

A. It will not seem too long, I think, to those who are less instructed and who are anxious to learn and who are studying natural science, should they perchance read our discussion—especially as it is not reasonable to give a rational account of the lower parts of the world while completely ignoring the higher.

N. Concerning the globe of the Sun (which holds) the balance between the heaviest and the lightest nature we have already agreed that it is eternally carried in a circular motion around the lower regions of the world along the celestial equator.

A. We have indeed, and gave sound reasons for it, and the disposition of nature does not allow it to be otherwise.

N. Concerning its size neither the masters of profane letters nor the commentators of the divine Scriptures allow a certain answer to be given. For both Pliny Secundus in his Natural History and St. Basil in his Hexameron absolutely forbid the size of the Sun to be given. For it has no shadow from which its size can be found by argument—for we should not have been able to find out the size either of the earth or of the moon if they spread no shadows which could be actually measured—and thereby the Sun's body, since it *permits* no shadow to extend to infinity but limits (them) to fixed dimensions proportionate to the bodies of which they are the shadows, shows very plainly that its (own) size is infinite.

A. I do not question this either, and I do not think that anyone should question it. For a conjecture based on ocular observation does not serve where reason does not have a basis for argument. But I would ask you to expound what the philosophers think about its distance from the earth.

N. The first of all philosophers, as they say, Pythagoras gave as the interval between the earth and the moon 126,000 stades; and

neque enim P 28 inueniretur BP: inuenisetur R iacta B: iecta R:
iactata P 30 sinit in ras. R(C) 33 aliquo RB: alio P 37 pithagoras
R^cB^c: pitagoras R*: phitagoras B*: pythagoras P 38 centum uiginti sex RB:
cxxvi P

prodidit, quod postmodum, ut diximus, Eratostenes ex umbra terrae lunaeque defectu incunctanter approbavit. Cuius interstitii duplici proportione solem a luna in altum elongari idem Pithagoras fertur tradidisse, sed qua ratione illud existimauerit multorum diuersa sententia est.

Veruntamen quoniam ipse iuxta rationes musicas totius mundi fabricam et uolui et mensurari certis argumentationibus conatus est asserere, quod nec diuina negat scriptura dicens: '[Et] concentum caeli quis dormire faciet?', possumus explorare non aliam ob causam hoc dixisse, nisi ut ostenderet in spatiis siderum musicorum diastematum rationabiles proportiones. Proinde in medio totius spatii quod est a terra usque ad sublimissimam spheram qua omnia sensibilia circumscribuntur solis ambitum cognoscens unam diapason a terra ad solem, alteram a sole usque ad extremum mundi ambitum non irrationabiliter existimauit.

Diapason autem dupli proportione modulatur. Vt ergo in diatonico genere, uerbi gratia in armonia sonorum, bis diapason ex bis duplo coaptata, [prima quidem <diapason>] a principali principalium usque ad MECHN, id est mediam, secunda uero ex MECHC usque ad NETHN ΥΠΕΡΒΟΛΕΩΝ, hoc est ultimam excellentium, protenditur, ita et totum spatium a terra ad solem *diapason ratione coaptatur—medium quippe sol obtinet locum—, et a sole ad duodecim sidera, hoc est ad extimum stellarum motum, alia diapason coniungitur, ideoque rationibus armoniae quae dicitur bis diapason interuallum a terra ad spheram constitutum esse arbitratus est, ac per hoc conficitur, ut diametros terrae tertio multiplicata terrae solisque intercapedini quemadmodum et lunaris circuli diametro aequalis sit. Proinde et in diametro lunaris circuli inque terrae ac solis interstitio unum et id ipsum spatium mensurabitur. In utroque enim milia stadiorum ccc septuaginta octo computantur. Itaque duplicato hoc numero intercapedinem terrae extimaeque sphaerae reperies in milibus stadiorum septingentis quinquaginta sex, et miraberis naturae concordiam. Quot enim milia stadiorum sunt in longitudine[m] lunaris circuli tot*

1 p. 246.11–29. 8–9 Iob xviii. 37.

1 prodidit ex perdidit R 3 idem RB: id est P pithagoras RB: pythagoras P 4 lemma quod iusta (sic) rationes musicas interualla planetarum metiri Rm 6 VeruntamenRB: Veruntamen P 8 concentum B^cP: c*centum R*: cŷcentum R^c: cocentum B* 10 musicorum ex musicarum B 17–25 bis diapason—arbitratus est: *textus sic euolutus est*: bis diapason, a principali principalium usque ad MECHN, id est mediam, secunda uero ex MECHC usque ad NETHN ΥΠΕΡΒΟΛΕΩΝ, hoc est ultimam excellentium, protenditur, ita et totum spatium a terra ad solem et a sole ad duodecim sidera, hoc est ad extimum stellarum motum rationibus armoniae, quae dicitur duplex diapason, in qua dupli proportione constitutum esse arbitratus est R*: bis diapason ex bis duplo coaptatur, prima quidem a principali principalium usque—protenditur, ita et totum spatium ad solem (medium quippe) et a sole ad duodecim sidera—arbitratus est R^cB*(?): *ut in*

this was later surely demonstrated from the earth's shadow and the lunar eclipse by Eratosthenes, as we have said. The same Pythagoras is said to have taught that the distance from the Sun to the moon is equal to twice this interval, but as to why he thought that, opinion is divided among many.

However, since he attempted to affirm by sure proofs that the structure of the whole world both rotates and is measured in accordance with musical proportions, which the divine scripture does not deny either, for it says, '[And] who will put to sleep the concert of heaven?', we can speculate that he said it for no other reason than to demonstrate in the intervals between the stars the rational proportions of the diastemata⁶⁸ of music. Thus, finding that the solar orbit is at the centre of the whole space that extends from the earth to the highest sphere by which all the sensibles are circumscribed, he not unreasonably thought that from earth to Sun was one diapason and from the Sun to the uttermost bound of the world was another.

Now, the modulation of the diapason is in the proportion of 2 to 1. As therefore in the diatonic scale, for example in the harmony of sounds, the double diapason is attuned to the product of twice (the proportion of) 2 to 1, [the first <diapason>] from the principal of principals to the μέση, that is, the middle, the second from the μέση to the νήτη ὑπερβολαίων, that is, the highest note of the tetrachord, so also the whole space from the earth to the Sun is attuned to the proportion of the diapason—for the Sun occupies the central position—and from the Sun to the twelve constellations, that is, to the outermost revolution of the stars, is joined by another diapason, and therefore following calculations of what they call harmony he thought that the distance from the earth to the sphere constitutes a double diapason, and thus it was concluded that three times the diameter of the earth is equal to the interval between the earth and the sun, as it is to the diameter of the lunar orbit. Thus the diameter of the lunar orbit measures the same as the interval between the earth and the Sun. For in both cases it is 378,000 stades. Therefore by multiplying this number by 2 you will get 756,000 stades for the interval between the earth and the outermost sphere, and you will remark the harmony of nature. For as many thousands of stades as are in the length of the

recepto textu B^cP 17–18 ex bis duplo coaptatur deest R*B* 19 ad om. P MECHC RB: MECHN P 20 NETHN ΥΠΕΡΒΟΛΕΩΝ RB: NETHNYTHPBOΛΕΩΝ P 21–25 diapason—arbitratus est in ras. et in marg. s. marginalia erasa B(C) 22 medium quippe s.l. R duodecim R^c(C): duodecem R*B: xii P 23 extimum RB^c(C): extremum P motum s.l. B^c(C) 24–25 quae—constitutum esse B^c(C)P: quae dicitur duplex diapason in qua dupli proportione constitutum esse RB* (?) 28 inque ex in quae B interstitio ex institutio R 29–30 ccc septuaginta octo RB: ccclxxviii P 31 reperies B^cP: repperies RB* 32 septingentis quinquaginta sex RB: dclvi P 33 longitudinem RB: multitudine P: lege longitudine

sunt in altitudine a terra usque ad signa spatii. In utrisque nanque septingenta quinquaginta sex milia stadiorum colliguntur. 722D

Si uero solaris circuli diametrum uis cognoscere, telluris diametrum cxxvi milia stadiorum septies multiplicabis et habebis dcccclxxxii milia stadiorum in diametro solaris giri, quo numero bis ducto ipsius giri longitudo colligetur in milibus stadiorum mille milies dclxxiiii milia. [At si quaesieris] diametrum totius sphaerae caelestis tali reperies argumento: Longitudinem lunaris giri, hoc est dclxvi milia stadiorum, duplicabis, addes etiam diametrum terrae, cxxvi milia stadiorum, et colliges diametrum sphaerae in milibus stadiorum mille milies dxxxviii [milia], quo numero bis facto ambitus totius mundi existimatur comprehendi [in milibus stadiorum mille milies ter, superadiectis etiam duocentis septuaginta sex milibus stadiorum, ut senarii numeri perfectione totus mundus concludatur].

Hactenus de argumentationibus philosophicis mundi spatia inuestigantibus. Si cui uero haec superflua uidentur, cum sanctae scripturae testimoniis nec roborentur nec tradita sint, non nos reprehendat. Nam et ille non potest approbare haec ita non esse sicut non possumus affirmare ita esse.

Et quamuis in diuinis scripturis de talibus mundanorum corporum dimensionibus magnitudinum et interuallorum nil diffinitum reperitur [—Ecclesiastes enim 'Altitudinem', inquit, 'caeli et latitudinem terrae et profundum abyssi quis mensus est?', ubi plus allegoriam quam istoriam intelligendam existimarim, non enim mundum istum ultra intelligentiam rationabilis naturae constitutum dixerim, cum propter eam factus sit—], diuina tamen auctoritas rationes rerum uisibilium et inuisibilium non solum non prohibet, uerum etiam hortatur inuestigari. 'Inuisibilia enim eius', ait apostolus, 'a creatura mundi per ea quae facta sunt intellecta conspiciuntur.' Non paruus itaque gradus est sed magnus et ualde utilis sensibilium rerum notitia ad intelligibilium intelligentiam. Vt enim per sensum peruenitur ad intellectum ita per creaturam reditur ad deum. Nam non sicut irrationabilia animalia solam superficiem rerum uisibilium oportet nos intueri, uerum etiam de his quae corporeo sensu percipimus rationem reddere debemus. Acutius uidet aquila speciem solis, acutius uidet sapiens homo situm illius et motum per loca et tempora.

22–23 Ecclus. i. 3.

28–29 Rom. i. 20.

2 septingenta quinquaginta sex RB: dccta lvi P milia om. P 4 milia om. P 5 milia om. P 7 milia om. P 8 reperies RB^cP: repperies B* 8–9 milia stadiorum R: milia stadiis B: om. P 9 addes R^cB: adde R*: addis P 9 cxxvi R^cB^cP: cxvi R^cB* milia om. P 11 dxxxviii in ras. R(C)B(C) milia R(C): in ras. B(C): om. P numero bis R: -o in ras. B(C): numerabis P facto RBP*: ficto P^c 13 superadiectis etiam R(C): insuper etiam adiectis BP 13 duocentis (sic) septuaginta sex R: cclxxvi B(C)P milibus om. P 15 hac-

lunar orbit so many are there in the depth of the space between the earth and the Signs. For in both there are 756,000 stades.

But if you wish to know the diameter of the solar orbit, you will, by multiplying the diameter of the earth, 126,000 stades, by 7, get 882,000 stades as the diameter of the circle of the Sun, and if you double this number, the circumference of the same circle will amount in thousands of stades to 1,764,000 stades. [But if you require] the diameter of the whole sphere of heaven you will find it by this calculation: Double the circumference of the lunar circle, i.e. 756,000 stades, and add the diameter of the earth, 126,000 stades, and you will get the diameter of the sphere to be, in thousands of stades, 1,638 [thousands],⁶⁹ and by multiplying this number by 2 the circumference of the whole universe is reckoned to be contained [in thousands of stades, 3,276,000 stades, so that the whole world is contained in the perfection of the number six].

So much for the philosophical arguments that investigate the cosmic distances. But if these seem to anyone superfluous since they are not ratified or transmitted by the testimonies of Holy Scripture, let him not rebuke us. For neither can he prove that these things are not so, just as we cannot confirm that they are.

And although nothing definite is found in the divine Scriptures concerning such measurements of the sizes and distances of the bodies of the world ['For who', asks Ecclesiastes, 'has measured the height of heaven and the breadth of the earth and the depth of the abyss?' which I think we should understand in an allegorical rather than an historical sense, for I would not say that the constitution of this world lies outside the understanding of the rational nature when it was for (that nature's) sake that it was created], yet the Divine Authority not only does not prohibit the investigation of the reasons of things visible and invisible, but even encourages it. For, says the Apostle, 'from the creation of the world His invisible things are seen, being understood from the things that have been made'. Therefore it is no small step but a great and indeed profitable one from the knowledge of the sensibles to the understanding of the intelligibles. For as through sense we arrive at understanding, so through the creature we return to God. For we ought not like irrational animals look only on the surface of visible things but also give a rational account of the things which we perceive by the corporeal sense. The eagle sees more clearly the form of the Sun; the wise man sees more clearly its position and motion through places and times.

tenus RB: Actenus P 17 sint R^cBP: sunt R* 17–18 reprehendat R^cBP: reprehendit R* 18 approbare RB: aproprobare P 19 possumus ex possum B affirmare RB: adfirmare P 21–22 reperiatur B^cP: repperiatur RB* 22 altitudinem: t (1) s.l. R inquit s.l. R 23 abyssi RB: abyssi P quis s.l. R 28 ait in ras. R(C) 32 Nam non in ras. R(C)

[Quid si homo non peccaret inque similitudinem iumentorum caderet? Num possessionis suae mundi huius profecto terminos ignoraret, quos naturae legibus iustissime regeret? Oportebat enim alium angelum esse, qui in creaturis sensibilibus deum laudaret, qui nec post delictum naturae dignitatem omnino perdidit. Manet enim in eo rationalis motus, quo rerum notitiam appetit et neque falli uult quamuis in multis fallatur, non tamen in omnibus.]

De uesti-
mentis
domini

Et si duo uestimenta Christi sunt tempore transformationis ipsius candida sicut nix, diuinorum uidelicet eloquiorum littera et uisibilium rerum species sensibilis, cur iubemur unum uestimentum diligenter tangere, ut eum cuius uestimentum est mereamur inuenire, alterum uero, id est creaturam uisibilem, prohibemur inquirere, et quomodo et quibus rationibus contextum *sit* non satis uideo. Nam et Abraham non per litteras scripturae, quae nondum confecta fuerat, uerum conuersione siderum deum cognouit. An forte simpliciter sicut et cetera animalia solas species siderum aspiciebat, non autem rationes eorum intelligere poterat? Non temere hoc de magno et sapienti theologo ausim dicere.

Et si quis nobis in culpam reputauerit quod philosophicis rationationibus usi sumus, uideat populum dei Aegypto fugientem eiusque diuino consilio [admonitum] spolia ferentem ipsisque spoliis inreprehensibiliter utentem, praesertim cum et ipsi mundanae sapientiae periti non in hoc reprehensibiles facti sunt, quasi in rationibus uisibilis creaturae errarint, sed quia auctorem ipsius creaturae non satis ultra eam quaesierint [cum creatorem ex creatura deberent inuenire, quod solus Plato legitur fecisse].

Si uero praefatae mundanorum corporum eorumque interstitionum dimensiones propterea incredibiles alicui uidentur, quoniam ipsa [corpora] maioris amplitudinis esse cogitantur a multis quam ut praedictis stadiorum numeris possint comprehendi, intentus legat arcae Noe mensuras—tricentorum cubitorum erat longitudo, quinquaginta cubitorum latitudo, triginta cubitorum altitudo—et uideat quomodo in tam paruo spatio cubitorum ex omnibus animantibus mundis septena et septena, ex inmundis uero duo et duo poterant *comprehendi* cum alimoniis suis, insuper etiam Noe cum filiis et uxoribus—praesertim *si* ipse cubitus teste sancto Augustino quo et arca Noe et arca testamenti et tabernaculum [caeteraque Veteris

8-9 Mt. xvii. 2. 19-20 cf. Aug. *De doct. Chr.* ii. 40. 60-61. 26 cf. Aug. *De ciu. Dei* viii. 4. 31-32 Gen. vi. 14. 33-34 Gen. vii. 2. 36 Aug. *De ciu. Dei* xv. 27. 3; *Qu. in Hept.* i. 4.

2 possessionis RB*P: possessionis B^c profecto ex profecto B 5 dignitatem ex dignitatum B 6 notitiam R^cP: notiam R*B 7 fallatur ex fallat B 8 lemma sB 13 sit R^c(C)BP: est R* 19 quis RB: quae P 21 consilio R^cB^cP: concilio R*B* admonitum BP: admonitus R(C) 23 periti RB: perit P 24 errarint-creaturae om. R*: ad calc. *suppleuit* sR errarint RB*: errarunt B^c: errarent P 25 quaesierint: ae in ras. R(C) 27 lemma

[Suppose man had not sinned or been degraded to the likeness of the beasts; would he then be ignorant of the boundaries of this world (that is) his possession which he would most righteously govern according to the laws of nature? For he who even after his fall did not entirely lose the dignity of his nature should have been another angel to praise God in His sensible creatures. For there remains in him an impulse of the reason to seek the knowledge of things and to be unwilling to fall into error, although he does so in many things, yet not in all.]

And if Christ at the time of His Transfiguration wore two vestures white as snow, namely the letter of the Divine Oracles and the sensible appearance of visible things, why we should be encouraged diligently to touch the one in order to be worthy to find Him Whose vesture it is, and forbidden to inquire about the other, namely the visible creature, how and by what reasons it *is* woven, I do not clearly see. For even Abraham knew God not through the letters of Scripture, which had not yet been composed, but by the revolutions of the stars. Was he simply regarding the appearances only of the stars as other animals do, without being able to understand their reasons? I should not have the temerity to say this of the great and wise theologian.

And if any should blame us for using philosophical arguments, let him consider God's people when they were fleeing from Egypt and [following] the divine counsel took spoils with them and were not reprehended for using those spoils—especially as those who are skilled in natural science are reprehended not because their reasoning about the visible creature is at fault, but because they have not sufficiently penetrated beyond it to its Author [for they ought to have discovered the Creator from the creature, which only Plato did].

But if anyone finds it impossible to accept the measurements we have given for the bodies of the world and their distances from one another because those [bodies] are thought by many to be of a larger size than can be contained within the above-mentioned numbers of stades, let him read attentively the measurements of Noah's Ark—its length was 300 cubits, its breadth was 50 cubits, its height 30 cubits—and see how in so small a space of cubits could *be contained* seven pairs of each of the clean animals and two pairs of each of the unclean with their provender, and in addition Noah with his sons and their wives—especially *if*, as St. Augustine says, that cubit by which both the Ark of Noah and the Ark of the Testament and the Tabernacle [and the other mystical objects of the Old Testament]

Quae cubita archa noe uel archa testamenti (*sic*) dimensa sicut et quae mensura sit palmi et quomodo dicitur geometricis quid dimensum sit et quid sit radius geometricalis Rm 30 possint RB: possit P 31 tricentorum RB: cecentorum P 31-32 quinquaginta RB: L P 32 triginta RB: xxx P 34 et RP: ex B 35 comprehendi in ras. R(C) alimoniis: i (2) s.l. R 36 si R^c(C)BP: cum R*

Concerning
the Lord's
Vestures

Testamenti mystica opera] mensurata sunt non amplius quam duarum palmarum semis mensuram obtinuerit [ipsaque palma summitate pollicis usque ad summitatem minimi mensurabatur]. Plus ergo tenet diuina uirtus et naturarum ratio quam quod machinatur humana cogitatio.

Et ne uideamur ad diuinae uirtutis miracula confugere tanquam non ualentes rationibus naturae quod suademus affirmare, non aliter cogitas ut arbitror terram in medio mundanae sphaerae positam quam uides centrum in fundo cuiusdam circuli seu globi. Imum siquidem mediumque in creaturis obtinet locum.

A. Non aliter, una uero eademque ratione.

N. Nec alio modo partes signiferi deduci ad terram nisi eo quo lineae in circulo ad centrum.

A. Aequali lege.

N. Et quamuis non eiusdem spatii sint in signifero et in tellure, idem tamen ductus [rationabilium linearum], eadem partes a summo usque deorsum.

A. Prorsus.

N. Quod autem de partibus intelligitur id ipsum de stadiis aestimandum non negas?

A. Immo assero.

N. In quantum ergo seu partes seu stadia centro terrae appropinquant in tantum angustiores latitudinis sunt. E contrario autem in quantum elongantur a terra in tantum propagantur spatia.

A. Non aliter circularis sinit figura.

N. Quid igitur tibi uidetur de mensoribus terrae per partes et stadia caeteraque interualla, quos Graeci *geometricos* uocant? Num arbitraris eos terram mensurasse pedibus aut passibus cubitoue seu [si]milibus [mensuris]?

A. Non facile hoc crediderim fieri posse in tanta diuersitate montium et uallium. [Nam] et camporum planities tantae aequalitatis non est, ut simili progressu possit mensurari. [Terra siquidem non solum grauitate ponderis, uerum etiam causa inaequalitatis partium suarum infimum in naturis possidet locum. Similitudo nanque partium facit ordinem elementorum. Similiora enim sibi suis partibus altiora sunt etiam suis sedibus.]

N. Fortassis ergo corporeo uisu?

A. Ne id quidem. Fallit enim sensus eiusque iudicio nihil est committendum. Exterior siquidem sensus quamuis rationi non renuntiat, nisi quod extrinsecus patitur, interioris tamen iudicium de

7 affirmare RB: adfirmare P 11 uero om. P 12 ad ex ac B 13 centrum ex terram R 16 ductus RB: duesse P 19-20 aestimandum: ndum in ras. R(C) 22-23 appropinquant RB: adpropinquant P 23 angustiores RB: angustioris P melius 24 circularis sinit RB: circularissime P 26 geometricos R(C)BP:

are measured did not exceed $2\frac{1}{2}$ palms [and the palm was the measure from the tip of the thumb to the tip of the little finger]. So the power of God and the basic principles of nature are more capacious than what human thought contrives.

And lest we should seem to be taking refuge in the miracles of the divine power from our inability to support our statements on reasons (drawn) from nature, I suppose you think of the earth as poised at the centre of the sphere of the world not otherwise than you see the centre at the base of some circle or globe. For the earth holds both the lowest and the middle place amongst creatures.

A. Not otherwise, but in the same way.

N. Nor the degrees of the celestial equator drawn to the earth otherwise than as lines drawn from the circumference to the centre.

A. The principle (is) the same (in both cases).

N. And although they are not of the same size on the earth as on the celestial equator, yet the direction [of the notional lines] is the same, and (the number of) the degrees is the same from end to end?

A. Absolutely.

N. You do not deny that what is understood of the degrees must equally apply to the stades?

A. On the contrary, I affirm it.

N. Then the nearer the degrees or the stades approach the centre of the earth the narrower they become, while on the other hand the further they move away from the earth the greater do the intervals (between them) become.

A. The figure of the circle does not permit otherwise.

N. What, then, do you think of those who measure the earth in degrees and stades and other intervals, those whom the Greeks call *geometricians*? Do you think they measured the earth foot by foot or pace by pace or by the cubit or [si]milar [measures]?

A. I should not believe that that could be easily done because of such great irregularities of mountains and valleys. [For] even the flatness of the plains is not so even that it can be measured by taking strides of equal length. [For it is because of the irregularity of its parts as well as the heaviness of its weight that the earth occupies the lowest place in nature; for the order of the elements depends on the similarity of their parts; the more like they are in their parts the higher they are in their stations.]

N. Then perhaps by the bodily eye?

A. Not even that. For sense is prone to error, and nothing should be entrusted to its judgement. For although the exterior sense does not conflict with reason except that it is affected from without, the

geometriam R* 27-28 seu similibus mensuris R(C)BP: seu milibus R* 37 Fortassis RB: Fortassis P

his quae per corpus recipit saepissime fallitur, fractum in aqua remum, duplicem lunam seu candelam seu aliud quid per praeuaricationem sensus, hoc est per radiorum qui ex pupillis oculorum sparguntur segregationem, geminatum existimans.

N. Quomodo ergo metiebantur?

De virga
geometrica

A. Virga [prius] ut aiunt geometrica quam Graeci radium uocant, quae quinque passus cubico motu multiplicans, hoc est quinquies quinque quinquies, unum stadium mensurabat. Vno autem stadio reperto facile erat multa stadia per plana Aegypti, quae mater talium demensionum dicitur, inuenire.

N. Quomodo praeter Aegyptum terrae partes tanta inaequalitate ad mensurandum difficiles explorabant?

A. Non, ut aiunt, pedibus neque radiis, sed sola rationis argumentatione, horologiis uidelicet ex umbrarum similitudine singularum partium intercapedinem incunctanter inuenientes. Tantum nanque una pars, hoc est cotidianus solis in signifero progressus, in terra patet quantum similitudo umbrarum horologii obtinet.

N. Latitudinem ergo partium et stadiorum ex mensura qua terram attingunt colligebant?

A. Nec sic existimabant, sed primum altissimos montes mensurantes quot milibus stadiorum ex terrae planitie in altum erigerentur, uerbi gratia Olimpum, cuius uerticem x stadiis autumant sublimari, Pindum, Rodopen, Acroceraunia, Athlantem, ueluti lineam quandam rationabili ductu de summitatibus montium in aeris spatia porrectorum extendere inchoabant, eamque aequali semper a terra interuallo instar rotundissimi circuli circumferentes, donec ad eundem locum quo coeperat perueniret, aequis undique spatiis telluris ambitum montis contuitu perspexere.

N. Dimensiones geometricas talibus argumentis ita primo repertas non contradixerim, ac per hoc stadia illa quae prope terram ueluti angusta putabantur paulatim iuxta montium altitudinem telluris superficie elongata non iam stricta et ad amplitudinem terrenae molis ambiendam incommoda. Sed dum sint eadem et iuxta terram et ab ea longius praedictis spatiis remota, irrationabilium cogitationum falsa imaginatione abiecta <ad mensuram terrae> sufficiunt. Hinc est quod et Plinius amplitudinem terrae ducta rationabili linea geografica

1 fractum RB: fractum P 5 metiebantur ex metiebantur R 6 lemma
sB 7 cubico RB: cubito P 16 signifero RB: signiferi P progressus ex
pergressus B 20 sed ex sat B 21 quot RB: quod P planitie RB: plani-
tiam P*: planitiam P^c 27 coeperant R^cBP: ceperant R*

judgement of the interior (sense),⁷⁰ on the other hand, is very often deceived concerning the things which it receives through the body, thinking that the oar in the water is broken, (or that the single) moon or lamp or some other (source of light) is two because a deviation of the sense, that is, a splitting of the rays that are scattered from the pupil of the eye, (makes them see) double.

N. How used they to measure, then?

A. [First], they say, by the geometrical rod which the Greeks call a spoke; this, by giving the cube of five paces, that is, by multiplying five by five by five, measured one stade. Now, once they had found one stade it was easy to find many stades on the plains of Egypt, which is said to be the motherland of such measurements.⁷¹

N. How did they manage elsewhere than in Egypt, where measurement would be difficult because of the unevenness of the ground?

A. Not, they say, by foot-rules or measuring-rods but by logical argument alone, that is, by means of sundials, infallibly calculating the interval of each degree from the similarity of the shadows. For one degree, that is, one day's journey of the Sun along the zodiacal circle, takes up as much space on the earth as the similarity of shadows on the sundial takes.

N. So they deduced the width of the degrees and stades by measuring them where they reach the earth?

A. No, that is not what they thought either, but first they measured by how many thousands of stades the highest mountains rise above the surface of the earth, for instance Olympus, whose peak they reckon to be 10 stades high, Pindus, Rhodope, Acroceraunia, Atlas; then they conceived as it were a line drawn by the reason beginning from the summits of the mountains, that extend into the regions of the air, and carried it round like the most perfect of circles, everywhere equidistant from the earth, until they had brought it back to the point from which it began, and thus from regarding the mountains obtained a clear knowledge of the circumference of the earth as level everywhere.

N. That the geometrical measurements were first discovered by such reasoning I would not deny, and it was from these that they came to see that those stades which are close to the earth are, as it were, narrow, but that as they are removed further and further away from the earth's surface towards the mountain tops they are no longer confined and no longer inadequate for encompassing the earth's mass. But as they are the same whether close to the earth or removed further from it by the aforesaid distance they suffice <for measuring the earth> if the false imaginings of irrational thought are excluded. Hence also Pliny's view that the amplitude of the earth can be measured by a rational line (drawn) by geographical theory

Concerning
the geometri-
cal rod

speculatione per cacumina altissimorum montium mensurari existimat. Aliter enim circularis dimensio telluris non proueniet.

A. Sat de his est actum.

N. Redeamus itaque ad scripturam.

A. Tempus inuitat.

N. 'Fiant', inquit, 'luminaria in firmamento caeli et diuidant diem ac noctem', ac si plane diceretur: Luminaria quae in firmamento caeli facta sunt diuidant inter se diem ac noctem, quod Psalmista declarat dicens: 'Qui fecit luminaria magna, solem in potestatem diei, lunam et stellas in potestatem noctis'—non quod dies et nox semper non sint circa ambitum telluris, sed quod ubicunque sol praesens est, semper illuminandi potestatem habet, ubi autem absens est, lunae stellarumque splendor umbrarum caliginem, ne omnino animalium obtutibus impenetrabilis sit, raram lucubremque facit.

'Et sint in signa et tempora et dies et annos.' Signa intelligimus in hoc loco non sidera sed praesagia quaedam futurae serenitatis seu tempestatis, quae maxime ex coloribus caelestium luminarium solent habere experimentum. Tempora autem uocat generaliter cursus et reditus siderum certis morarum interuallis ad eundem motum situmque locorum diuina prouidentia reuocatos naturali dierum annorumque reuolutione.

'Et luceant in firmamento caeli', siquidem nullum sidus defectum sui luminis patitur, sed semper omnia in aethereis spatiis absque ulla obumbratione refulgent excepto lunae globo, qui quando in regionem umbrae descendit solari radio desertus uidetur obscurari. Propterea ait: 'Et luceant in firmamento caeli et illuminent terram, et factum est ita', in causis uidelicet originalibus, ex quibus in species proprias et quantitates et interualla et motus et splendores procesere. Propterea sequitur causarum in species procesio.

'Fecitque deus duo magna luminaria, luminare maius ut praeesset diei', solem uidelicet cuius praesentia diem efficit, 'et luminare minus'—lunam dicit, cuius et quantitas et lux incomparabiliter a sole superatur—, 'ut praeesset nocti'. Luna siquidem ab octaua usque ad uicesimam secundam aut totam noctem circa plenilunium in aequinoctiis aut partem eius caeteris temporibus illuminat. Quoniam uero dum sit in coitu solis aut hinc inde propinquis partibus noctis tenebras luce sua penetrare non sinitur, succurrunt stellae, quarum

6-7 Gen. i. 14. 9-10 Ps. cxxxv, 7-9. 15 Gen. i. 14. 15-16 cf. Aug. *De Gen. ad Litt.* ii. 14. 29. 22 Gen. i. 15. 26-27 Gen. i. 15. 30-33 Gen. i. 16.

1 cacumina RB: cacucumina P 6 lemma Quid sit *lucere* super terram Rm 7 diceretur RB: diceret P 13 ne RB: nec P 20 prouidentia ex prudentia R 28 procesere RB: processere P 29 Propterea RB: Proinde P in *s.l.* P procesio RB: processio P 30 praeesset RB: praeescent P 34 plenilunium: 1(1) *s.l.* B

through the peaks of the highest mountains. For there is no other way of obtaining the circular dimension of the earth.

A. Enough has been said about these matters.

N. Let us return, then, to Scripture.

A. It is high time.

N. 'Let there be', he says, 'luminaries in the firmament of heaven and let them divide the day from the night', as though it were said in plain language, Let the luminaries which were made in the firmament of heaven divide day and night between them, as the Psalmist makes clear when he says, 'Who made great luminaries, the Sun to rule over the day, the moon and the stars to rule over the night'—not that day and night do not always exist about the circuit of the earth, but the Sun wherever it is present always has the power of giving light, but where it is absent the brightness of the moon and stars makes the darkness of the shadows thin and lightgiving lest it should be wholly impenetrable to the eyes of the animals.

'And let them be for signs and seasons and days and years.' Here we understand 'signs' not in the sense of constellations but as certain presages of good or bad weather to come which are wont to derive their value as tests from the colours of the heavenly luminaries, while by 'seasons' he means the courses of the constellations in general, and their returns at certain fixed intervals of time to (take up) the same journey again at the same place, recalled by the Divine Providence in the natural revolution of days and years.⁷²

'And let them shine in the firmament of heaven'; for no star suffers the eclipse of its light but all shine continuously in the ethereal regions without any overshadowing, except the globe of the moon which, when it descends into the region of the shadow, is abandoned by the Sun's rays and seems to be obscured. Therefore he says, 'And let them shine in the firmament of heaven and let them shed light on the earth, and it was made so', that is to say, (Let them shine) in their original causes from which they have proceeded into their proper species and quantities and intervals and motions and brightnesses. So now there follows the procession of the causes into the species.

'And God made two great luminaries, a greater luminary to preside over the day', that is, the Sun whose presence produces the day, 'and a lesser luminary'—he means the moon whose size and light are incomparably less than those of the Sun—'to preside over the night'. For from the 8th to the 22nd day the moon shines all night at the time of the full moon at the equinox and for part of the night at other times. But since, when it is in the Sun's embrace or near him on one side or the other, it is prevented from penetrating with its light the darkness, it gains help from the stars whose brightness attenuates

claritate umbrarum densitas rarescit. Propterea dixit: 'Et luminare
 minus, ut praeeset nocti, et stellas, et posuit eas', stellas uidelicet, ^{727A}
 'in firmamento caeli', ac si dixisset: Fixit eas in firmamento caeli. De
 choris nanque siderum hoc dictum intelligimus, qui quamuis cum
 mundo uoluantur, fixi tamen in eisdem sedibus semper permanent, et ⁵
 si stante mundo chori siderum solummodo circumuehantur, ut quidam
 philosophorum uolunt, ordo autem ac series stellarum stabilisque
 positio non transmutatur. 'Vt lucent super terram.' Naturae ordinem
 pulchre describit scriptura. Quamuis enim caelestia luminaria sub
 terris lucere humana opinione putentur, rerum tamen ratio incun- ¹⁰
 ctanter edocet nullam naturam terra inferiorem posse esse. Medium
 siquidem infimumque totius mundanae constitutionis obtinet locum,
 ac per hoc nulla corporea creatura infra eam intelligitur. Proinde omnia ^{727B}
 mundi spatia et corpora quae circa terram undique sunt siue mobilia
 sint siue stantia, supra eam naturaliter creata sunt ideoque ait: 'Vt ¹⁵
 lucent super terram.' Vbicunque enim luxerint siue infra orizontem
 in inferiori hemispherio, ut humanus existimat usus, siue supra ori-
 zontem in superiori hemispherio, quod ideo superius dicitur quia in eo
 sidera hominibus apparent, naturali rerum situ super terram lucent.

'Et praeesent diei et nocti.' Hoc superius expositum est. ²⁰

'Et diuiderent lucem a tenebris', id est, ut segregarent noctem et
 diem, ut sole apparente dies esset, luna uero et stellis nox. Et notan-
 dum quod diuisio ista lucis atque tenebrarum non in ipsis luminariis
 sit, sed in terra habitantibus. Illa enim semper lucent et semper eis ^{727C}
 dies est nullamque noctem patiuntur; sedes nanque eorum absque ²⁵
 ulla intermissione et sua et solari luce resplendent, nec minus interdiu
 quam noctu claritatis suae gratiam mundo distribuunt. Terrenis ita-
 que habitatoribus quibus per uicisitudines dies noctesque proueni-
 unt caelestia luminaria lucem diuidunt a tenebris. Assidua nanque
 circunuolutione circa telluris ambitum alibi lucem prestant, alibi ³⁰
 auferunt. Vt enim nil aliud est dies nisi lucis praesentia ita nil aliud
 nox praeter ipsius absentiam ideoque etiam lucidissima nox quoniam
 non omnino tenebras expellit noctis nomen non amittit.

Sed iam quantum breuitas exigit de quarta die satis est dictum, ³⁴
 ideoque de operibus quintae intelligibilis lucis quaedam dicenda sunt. ^{727D}

1-3 Gen. i. 16-17. 8 Gen. i. 17. 15-16 Gen. i. 17. 20 Gen. i. 18.
 21 Gen. i. 18.

4-5 *gl. in marg.* per ipateticos dicit P 5 uoluantur RB: uoluuntur P per-
 manent RB: manent P 6 chori RB: soli P ut *om.* P 7 autem RB: tamen P
 9 pulchre RB: pulchrae P 11 terra RB: terrae P 12 obtinet *ex* obtinere P
 17 hemispherio RB: hemispherio P 17-18 ut-hemispherio *om.* B*: *ad calc.*
addidit sB 17 humanus RB: humanis P 18 in (1) *om.* P superiori RB: in-
 feriori P 21 tenebris *ex* tenebras P 27 gratiam RB: gratiae P distri-
 buentia R^(C)BP: distribuunt R* 28 uicisitudines RB: uicissitudines P
 34 quarta RB: iiiii^{ia} P

the thickness of the shadows, he therefore said, 'and a lesser luminary
 to preside over the night, and the stars; and he placed them', the
 stars, that is, 'in the firmament of heaven', as though he had said,
 He fixed them in the firmament of heaven. For we understand this to
 refer to the choirs of the constellations, which although they revolve
 with the world yet ever remain fixed in the same (relative) positions;
 and if the world is at rest and only the choirs of the constellations
 revolve, as some of the philosophers contend,⁷³ yet the order and
 range of the stars and their stable relative position remain un-
 changed. 'That they might shed light on the earth.' It is a beautiful
 description that Scripture gives of nature. For although men think
 that the heavenly luminaries shine beneath the earth, yet the reason
 of nature surely teaches that no nature can be lower than the earth;
 for it occupies the central and lowest place in the whole constitution
 of the world, and hence it is understood that there is no corporeal
 creature below it. Therefore all regions and bodies of the world
 which encompass the earth on every side, whether in motion or at
 rest, are naturally created above it, and that is why he said, 'That
 they might shed light on the earth'. For wherever they should shine,
 whether below the horizon in the lower hemisphere, as men cus-
 tomarily think, or above the horizon in the upper hemisphere, which
 is called 'upper' because in it the stars are visible to men, in the
 natural order of things they shine over the earth.

'And might preside over day and night.' This was explained above.

'And might divide the light from the darkness', that is, that they
 might separate night and day so that when the Sun appears it should
 be day, but when the moon and stars, night. And it is to be noted
 that that division of light and dark is not in the luminaries them-
 selves but is for those who inhabit the earth. For (the luminaries) are
 always shining and for them it is always day and they suffer no
 night; for their abodes are incessantly illumined by their own light
 and that of the Sun, and no less by day than by night do they shed
 the grace of their brightness upon the world. Therefore it is for the
 inhabitants of the earth whom day and night alternately visit that the
 heavenly luminaries divide the light from the dark. For by their
 incessant revolution about the circle of the earth in one place they
 bestow light, in another take it away. For just as day is nothing else
 but the presence of light, so night is nothing else but its absence,
 and therefore a very bright night does not lose the name of night
 either since it does not altogether banish darkness.

But now, as much has been said of the Fourth Day as the need
 for brevity allows, and something must be said of the Fifth Intel-
 ligible Light.

A. Ita consequens ordo rerum [ex]petit.

N. 'Dixit etiam deus: Producant aquae reptile animae uiuentis et uolabile super terram sub firmamento caeli.' Praedictis quattuor diebus conditionis naturarum nulla commemoratio animae legitur neque simpliciter tantum et absolute neque cum additamento uiuentis, et cur hoc non immerito quaeritur. Denique de hac rerum theoria diuersa multorum sententia est. Sunt enim qui dicunt elementa huius mundi, caelum dico cum suis astris aetheraque cum planetis, aera cum suis nubibus uentorumque spiritibus, fulgoribus etiam caeterisque perturbationibus, aquam quoque motumque ipsius fluctiuagum, terram similiter cum omnibus herbis arboribusque non solum anima, uerum etiam omni specie uitae omnino carere ideoque, ut aiunt, in operibus quattuor primorum dierum nullius animae seu uitae significatio introducitur. Plato uero philosophorum summus et qui circa eum sunt non solum generalem mundi uitam asserunt, uerum etiam nullam speciem corporibus adherentem neque ullum corpus uita priuari fatentur ipsamque uitam seu generalem seu specialem uocare animam fiducialiter ausi sunt, quorum sententiae summi expositores diuinae scripturae fauent, herbas et ligna cunctaque de terra orientia uiuere affirmantes. Neque aliter rerum natura sinit. Si enim nulla materia est quae sine specie corpus efficiat et nulla species sine substantia propria subsistit, nulla autem substantia uitali motu, qui eam contineat et subsistere faciat, expers esse potest—omne enim quod naturaliter mouetur ex uita quadam motus sui principium sumit—, necessario sequitur, ut omnis creatura aut per se ipsam uita sit aut uitae particeps et quodam modo uiuens, siue in ea motus uitae manifeste appareat siue non appareat *ueruntamen* latenter administrari [per] uitam species ipsa sensibilis indicat. [Audi Augustinum in libro De uera religione: 'Si quaeritur', inquit, 'quis instituerit corpus, ille quaeratur qui est omnium speciosissimus. Omnis enim species ab illo est. Quis est autem hic nisi unus deus, una ueritas, una salus omnium et prima atque summa essentia, ex qua est omne quicquid est in quantum est? Quia in quantum est, quicquid est bonum est, et ideo ex deo non est mors. Non enim deus mortem fecit nec laetatur in perditione uiuorum, quoniam summa essentia esse fecit omne quod est, unde et essentia dicitur. Mors autem non esse cogit quicquid moritur. Nam si ea quae moriuntur paenitus morerentur, ad nihilum sine dubio peruenirent. Sed tantum

2-3 Gen. i. 20. 29-276. I Aug. *De uera rel.* ii. 21-22.

2 lemma de quinta die et de uita generalis secundum Platonem Rm v in marg.
R 3 quattuor RB: iiii^{or} 6 theoria ex theoriae R 10 post aquam rasura
R 10-11 fluctiuagum: -i- s.l. R 13 quattuor RB: iiii^{or} P 16 lemma BP
nullam RB: nullum P 23 uitali motu RB: uitalis motus P 27 manifeste:
e (2) in ras. R(C) ueruntamen: uerun- in ras. R(C) 29 A<ugustinus> in

A. This is what the logical order of things requires.

N. 'God also said, Let the waters produce the creeping thing of living soul and the thing that flies above the earth under the firmament of heaven.' Throughout the four days of the creation of natures that have already been discussed we read of no mention of the soul either simply and absolutely or with the qualification 'living', and it is not inappropriate to ask why. Indeed, concerning this contemplation of nature there is a wide variety of opinion. For there are those who say that the elements of this world, I mean the heaven with its stars, and the ether with its planets, the air with its clouds and breaths of wind and lightnings and other disturbances, the water also and its flowing motion, likewise the earth with all its plants and trees, are not only without soul but also without any kind of life at all, and that, so they say, is the reason why nothing is introduced in the operations of the first Four Days to represent soul or life. But Plato, the greatest of philosophers, and his sectaries not only affirm a general life of the world, but also declare that there is no form attached to bodies nor any body that is deprived of life; and that life, whether general or special, they confidently dare to call soul; and the great commentators of the divine Scripture support their opinion, affirming that plants and trees and all things that grow out of the earth are alive. Nor does the nature of things permit it to be otherwise. For if there is no matter which without form produces body, and no form subsists without its proper substance, and no substance can be without the vital motion which contains it and causes its subsistence—for everything which is naturally moved receives the source of its motion from some life—, it necessarily follows that every creature is either Life-through-itself or participates in life and is somehow alive, whether the vital motion is clearly apparent in it or is not apparent but the sensible species itself shows that it is hiddenly governed [through] life. [Hear what St. Augustine says in his book On True Religion: 'If', he says, 'we wish to know who has instituted the body, let us look for him who is most endowed with form. For every form derives from him. And who is this but the One God, the One Truth, the One Salvation of all, and the first and highest Essence from which comes everything that is in so far as it is? For in so far as it is, whatever is is good, and therefore death is not of God. For God did not create death, nor does He rejoice in the destruction of the living since, as Highest Essence, He made to be everything that is, and that is why He is also called Essence. But death compels everything that dies not to be. For if the things that die were to die absolutely, they would undoubtedly come to nothing.

marg. P 29-276.1 sC in R 36 esse om. P 38 morerentur RB:
morerentur P peruenirent RB: perueniret P

That no body
can be with-
out life

moriuntur quanto minus essentiae participant', quod breuius ita dici potest: Tanto magis moriuntur quanto minus sunt. Corpus autem minus est quam uita quaelibet, quoniam quantulumcunque manet in specie per uitam manet, siue qua unumquodque animal siue qua uniuersa natura mundi administratur.]

Vt enim nullum corpus est quod propria specie non continetur, ita nulla species est quae cuiuspiam uitae uirtute non regitur. Proinde si omnia corpora naturaliter constituta quadam specie uitae administrantur omnisque species genus suum appetit, omne autem genus generalissima substantia originem ducit, omnem speciem uitae quae diuersorum corporum numerositatem continet ad generalissimam quandam uitam recurrere necesse est, cuius participatione specificatur.

Haec autem generalissima uita a sapientibus mundi uniuersalissima anima totum quod inter caelestis sphaerae ambitum comprehenditur per species suas ministrans uocatur, diuinae uero sophiae speculatores communem uitam appellant, quae dum sit particeps illius unius uitae quae per se substantialis est omnisque uitae fons et creatrix suis diuisionibus uisibilium et inuisibilium uitas iuxta diuinam ordinationem distribuit quemadmodum sol iste sensibus notus radios suos ubique defundit. Non tamen ita uita in omnia peruenit sicut solares radii. Illi siquidem non omnia penetrant. Interiora etenim multorum corporum non transeunt. Vitae uero nulla creatura seu sensibilis seu intelligibilis expers esse potest. Nam et corpora quae nostris sensibus uidentur ueluti mortua non omnino uita relinquuntur. Vt enim illorum compositio atque formatio administratione propriae uitae ita etiam solutio et informitas et reditus in ea ex quibus deducta sunt eiusdem obsequio peragitur. Semina siquidem terrae commendata nisi prius moriantur non reuiuiscunt et mors eorum solutio materiae et speciei est eademque uita quae uiuificat uim seminum et per uim semina, priusquam soluantur, in solutione non deserit, sed eis semper adhaeret, immo etiam ea soluit moxque nulla mora interstante uiuificare, hoc est in eandem speciem reuocare, incipit. Vbi enim esset illa uita solutionis corporis tempore nisi in ipso soluto? Vt enim illa cum compacto non compagitur ita cum soluto non soluitur neque cum renascente renascitur, nec plus

2 tanto BP: tantum R 4 per uitam RB: perditam P 7 uirtute ex uirtutem R 8-10 administrantur-uitae om. R*: in marg. add. R^c 14 uniuersalissima R^c(C)BP: generalissima R* 20 ordinationem: -ati- s.l. B notus RB: motus P 21 uita s.l. R 22 penetrant R^c(C)BP: penetrant R* interiora etenim R^c(C)BP: Nam interiora R* 23 Vitae RB: uita P
24 lemma Corpora quae nostris sensibus uidentur mori non omnino uita relinquuntur Rm 27 solutio om. R*: in marg. addidit R^c quibus ex quibus R
28 obsequio ex obsequia B 30 materiae et speciei est in ras. R(C) 30-31 uim seminum et per uim semina in ras. R(C) 35 illa RB: ulla P compacto RB: compacta P

But they die only to the extent that they participate less in being.' This can be said more briefly as follows: They die the more the less they are. Now, the body is less than any life since in so far as it remains in its form it is through life that it does so, whether that by which each individual animal (is governed) or that by which the whole nature of the world is governed.]

For as there is no body which is not contained within its proper species, so there is no species which is not controlled by the power of some life. Therefore, if all bodies which are naturally constituted are governed by some species of life, and every species seeks its own genus while every genus takes its origin from universal substance, it must be that every species of life which contains the numerousness of the various bodies returns to an universal life, by participation in which it is a species.

Now, this universal life is called by the natural philosophers the Universal Soul which through its species controls the totality which is contained within the orbit of the heavenly sphere, while those who contemplate the Divine Sophia call it the common life,⁷⁴ which, while it participates in that one Life which is substantial in itself and is the fountain and creator of all life, by its division into things visible and invisible distributes lives in accordance with the Divine Ordinance, as this Sun which is known to the senses pours forth its rays on all around. But the way in which life reaches all things is not the same as that in which the rays of the Sun do; for these do not penetrate all things, since there are many bodies into the interiors of which they do not enter. But no creature, whether sensible or intelligible, can be without life. For even the bodies which appear to our senses as dead are not entirely abandoned by life. For just as their composition and formation were accomplished by the administration of their proper life, so also is their dissolution and unforming and return into the things from which they originated subject to the obedience of the same. Seeds which are committed to the earth will not put on life again unless they first die; and their death is the separation of matter and form; and that life which quickens the seminal force and through the seminal force does not abandon them until they are resolved into dissolution, but ever cleaves to them, is indeed that life which dissolves them; and at once, without any delay, begins to quicken them, that is, to call them back again to the same form. For where would that life be at the time of the body's dissolution but in the body that is undergoing dissolution? For as it formed no part of the composition, so it is not dissolved with the dissolution, nor reborn with that which is reborn, nor does it flourish more in the

uegitat totum simul coniunctum quam in partes disiunctum neque maior, id est potentior, in toto quam in parte nec minor, hoc est impotentior, in parte quam in toto. Eiusdem nanque regiminis [est] in cunctis.

Ipsa etiam solutio, quae mors corporis dicitur, nostris sensibus [et materiae] solutio est, non ipsi naturae, quae inseparabilis est in se ipsa et simul semper est nec spatiis locorum et temporum segregatur. Homo siquidem non desinit esse [homo].

De eo quod si semper homo est semper anima et corpus
 Homo autem corpus et anima est. Si autem semper homo, semper igitur anima et corpus, et quamuis partes hominis a se inuicem segregentur—anima enim deserit usitatum post generationem sui corporis regimen, qua deserente corpus soluitur partesque illius propriis elementorum sedibus redduntur—, naturali tamen ratione et partes ad totum referri non desinunt semper et inseparabiliter et totum ad partes. Relationis siquidem ratio nunquam potest perire. Proinde quod corporeo sensui uidetur segregari altiori rerum speculatione semper simul et inseparabiliter subsistere necesse est. Nam et corpus humanum siue uiuum siue mortuum corpus hominis est. Similiter anima humana siue corpus suum simul collectum regat siue in partes dissolutum, ut uidetur sensibus, regere desinat, anima tamen hominis esse non cessat ac per hoc datur intelligi altiori rerum intimatione non minus eam administrare corpus per elementa dispersum quam una compagine membrorum coniunctum, quod uera ratio indubitanter edocet. Si enim anima spiritus est per se omni corporea crassitudine carens, ipsa quoque elementa in quae corpus soluitur, quantum per se simpliciter subsistunt, spirituali naturae proxima sunt, quid mirum, si incorporea anima partes corporis sui in proximis sibi naturis custoditas rexit? Facilius enim similia sibi quam dissimilia potest attingere. Dissimilia autem sunt sibi crassa et corruptibilia corpora, similia uero tenuissima et nullo modo corruptioni obnoxia. Non enim credendum est corporeas partes ex compagine spissi corporis dissolutas in ipsis elementis in quibus saluantur crassitudinem suam non deserere et non in ipsorum elementorum leuissimas spiritualesque qualitates transire, non ut penitus non corpora, sed ut spiritualia corpora sicut et ipsa sint elementa, quod etiam uiuentis adhuc corporis argumento promptissime uales approbare. Partium siquidem ipsius quaedam quidem ponderosae sunt et in crassitudinem densatae, ut sunt ossa carnes nerui quoque

2-3 in toto—impotentior s.l. R 9 lemma BP 15 lemma erasum B
 19 collectum BP: correctum R 20 marginalia erasa B 24 lemma BP:
 quod P: quo B 25 quae RB: qua P 28 lemma Quod corpora dissoluta in
 spirituales leuissimasque qualitates transire Rm 35 corpora (1) RB: corporea
 P ut om. P 36 gl. marg. Sicut corpus dissolutum est et spiritus Rm

whole when it is joined together than when it is divided into parts, nor greater, that is, mightier, in the whole than in the part, nor less, that is, weaker, in the part than in the whole. For [it exerts] the same control over all things.

Again, that dissolution which is called the death of the body is a dissolution for our senses [and for matter], not for our very nature, which is indivisible in itself and is always everywhere the same nor is ever separated from itself by intervals of place and time. For man does not cease to be [man].

Now, man is body and soul; but if he is always man, then he is always soul and body, and although the parts of man may be separated from one another—for soul abandons the control of the body which it had assumed after its generation, and the body, deserted by it, is dissolved and its parts return each to its proper place among the elements—yet by the reason of nature neither do the parts cease to be always inseparably related to the whole nor the whole to the parts. For the reason of their relation can never cease to be. Thus, what to the corporeal sense seems to be separated, must on a higher view of things always subsist as it was inseparably. For indeed the human body, whether alive or dead, is the body of a man. Similarly the human soul, whether it is controlling its body as gathered together in an unity or ceases to control it—as it appears to the senses—as dissolved into its parts, yet does not cease to be the soul of a man, and therefore, in this deeper insight into things, we are given to understand that it continues to govern a body distributed among the elements no less than one which is bound together in the structural unity of its members, as right reason undeniably teaches. For if the soul is a spirit which in itself is free of all corporeal grossness, and the elements also into which the body is resolved are, in so far as they subsist simply in themselves, closely akin to the spiritual nature, why should it surprise us if the incorporeal soul should control the parts of its body preserved in natures akin to itself? For it can attain to the things that are more like itself more easily than to those that are unlike. Now, the things that are unlike itself are the gross and corruptible bodies, while the things that are like it are those which are most subtle and by no means susceptible to corruption. For it is not to be believed that when the corporeal parts which composed the solid body are dissolved into those elements in which they are preserved, they do not shed their grossness and do not pass into the lightest and most spiritual qualities of the elements themselves—not that they cease altogether to be bodies, but they become as spiritual bodies as are the elements themselves. And this you can very readily prove from the example of the body when it is still alive. For some of its parts are heavy and thick with

That if man is always man he is always soul and body

That the soul is more able to control what is like it than what is unlike it

ac uenae, omnes etiam umores, quibus moles tota irrigatur et nutritur et fabricatur—haec enim omnia ex aquatili terrenaque qualitate in constitutionem corporis sumuntur—; quaedam uero leuissimae nulloque grauitatis seu crassitudinis pondere impeditae, quaquauersum prout anima iusserit nulla mora interstante confestim perueniunt, ut est uisus et auditus, quas partes corporis esse ex igne et aere deductas nemo recte philosophantium abnegarit. Est enim ut ait sanctus Augustinus luminosum aliquid in oculis, aereum quiddam mobile et sonorum in auribus.

de uisu et auditu
 Visus siquidem est lux quaedam ex cordis igne primum nascens deindeque in summitatem uerticis ascendens, in eam uidelicet partem quae a Grecis dicitur ΜΗΝΙΚΑ, a Latinis uero membranula, qua cerebrum et ambitur et custoditur, per quosdam poros ad supercilia pupillosque oculorum deriuata, unde uelocissimo impetu solarium radiorum instar foras prosiliens prius propinqua loca et corpora seu longissime constituta tanta uelocitate attingit quam palpebra oculorum et tautonis supercilia.

Auditus quoque est subtilissimus quidam tinnitus, qui ex pulmonum spiritu primo procedens sursumque in praedictam capitis partem consurgens per suos occultos meatus in aurium cocleas diffusus foras erumpit uicinisque partibus aeris seu longius positus se miscens quicquid in eo sonuerit absque ulla tarditate recipere festinat.

Has itaque partes corporis subtilissimas spiritualibusque naturis uicinas, quamuis ex interioribus spissae molis originem attrahant, foras tamen in tantum porriguntur, ut longe extra eam aestimentur separari. Extenditur enim uisus ad recipiendas uisibilia rerum colorabiles species, extenditur auditus ad uocum seu aliorum sonituum percussione aeris erumpentium prosodias, quas formas coloresque uocum dicimus in se imaginandas. Caeteri enim tres sensus intra terminos corporis contineri uidentur, quamuis olfaciendi sensus foris protendi non incongrue, ut arbitror, existimetur.

Hoc autem totum in se ipsa simplex omnique corporali quantitate localibusque spatiis anima carens in corpore quod regit sua praesentia peragit et, dum ipsa nullo loco contineatur, locales tamen partes sui corporis ubicumque sint uiuificat atque gubernat. Non enim cumulo carnalium membrorum localiter concluditur nec cum sensibus foras

7–11 Cf. Aug. *De Gen. ad litt.* iii. 4. 6; vii. 13. 20 sq.; *De musica*, iv. 5. 10.

1 umores RB^c: humores B*P irrigatur RB: irrogatur P 2 aquatili RB: aquali P 4 impeditae R^cBP: impeditae R* 5 lemma de natura sensuum Rm prout anima RB: pro intima P perueniunt RB: proueniunt P 6 esse om. P 7 abnegarit RB: abnegaret P 9 sonorum R^c: serenum R*BP 10 lemma BP 11 lemma de sensibus R(C) deindeque RB'P: deinde B* 12 ΜΗΝΙΚΑ RB: ΜΕΝΙΚΑ P 13 poros RB: porros P 16 longissime: e in ras. R(C) 17 tautonis R^c: tautones R*BP gl. interlin. ad tautones pertinens .i. pili palpe-

grossness, like bones, flesh, the sinews also and the veins; also the humours which irrigate the whole bulk and nourish it and build it up—for all these are taken into the constitution of the body from the watery and earthly qualities—; but some are most light and are hampered by no weight of gravity or grossness, and whithersoever they are directed by the soul are immediately there without a moment's delay, like vision and hearing, which none of those who are sound philosophers would deny to be parts of the body deriving from fire and air. For, as St. Augustine says, there is a luminous quality in the eyes, an aerial, mobile, sonorous quality in the ears.

For sight is a kind of light which first rises out of the fire in the heart and then ascends to the highest part of the head (namely to that part which is called by the Greeks *μηνικη*⁷⁵ but by the Latins 'membranula', by which the brain is surrounded and protected), having passed through certain channels to the eyebrows and the pupils of the eyes, whence in a very swift rush it leaps forth like the rays of the Sun and reaches with such speed the places and bodies that are near or stand very far off before the eyelids and the brows.

Again, hearing is a certain very subtle ringing which first issues forth from the *breathing* of the lungs and rises upwards to the same part of the head through its own hidden paths and, poured into the spirals of the ears, bursts forth and, mingling with the parts of the air which are close to it or further away, hastens to receive without any delay whatever resounds in it.

These parts of the body, then, which are most subtle and akin to spiritual natures, although they take their origin from the inner recesses of the thick bulk, extend so far beyond it that they are thought to lie far outside it. For sight reaches out to grasp the coloured forms of visible things, and hearing to reproduce in itself the accents of voices or other sounds which erupt from the impact with the air and which we call the forms and colours of voices. For the other three senses are seen to be contained within the limits of the body, although the sense of smell is considered to extend beyond them, not unreasonably as I think.

Now, all this is accomplished by the soul, which in itself is simple and is without corporeal quantity or spatial extension, in the body which it controls by its presence, and while it is itself contained in no locality it brings to life and controls the localized parts of its body wherever they may be. For it is not in a local sense that it is contained in the mass of the fleshly members, nor in a local sense that it is

brarum B(C) 19 spiritu in ras. R(C) 23–24 has . . . subtilissimas . . . uicinas *codd.*: lege hae . . . subtilissimae . . . uicinae 28 gl. interlin. ad prosodias pertinens .i. accentus B(C) 30 uidentur: uident in ras. R(C) 31 protendi non RB: protenditur P 35 Non RB: Nam P

Concerning sight and hearing

porrectis localiter porrigitur. Adest autem potentialiter ad recipiendas phantasias quae in sensuum suorum instrumentis, ubicunque sint, formantur, quo argumento naturalis uirtutis ipsius et illocalitatis magnitudo cognoscitur. Vno siquidem eodemque temporis momento et siderum in radiis oculorum per aethera sparsis et uocum in auditu per aera diffuso et odorum in olfactu seu intra corpus seu extra et saporum in gustu, in tactu quoque omnium quae tactui accidunt fantasias, hoc est imagines, primum quidem nullis temporum morulis mirabili celeritate ex corporalibus numeris in sensualibus formatas sentit, per occurrentes recipit, per progressores introducit, per recordabiles memoriae commendat, per rationabiles ordinat, per intellectuales approbat aut improbat secundum regulas diuinorum numerorum qui supra eam sunt, quorum exemplaria perspicit et de numeris intra se ipsam constitutis iudicat deque corporalibus et sensualibus, qui utriusque extra se sunt. Octo siquidem numerorum ordines ratio inuenit, quorum primus et summus est supra intellectum in aeternis causis, secundum quem discernit anima rationalis omnia, sicut ait apostolus: 'Spiritualis homo iudicat omnia. Ipse autem a nemine iudicatur.' Duo quoque omnino et extra et infra animam sunt, quorum quidem unus et extremus in corporibus est, ex quibus corporei sensus formantur in quibus fantasiae fiunt, alter in ipsis corporeis sensibus formatur et ipse est phantasiarum primus ordo in instrumentis sensuum constitutus, in oculis dico et auribus caeterisque sensuum sedibus. In ipsa uero anima quinque numeri computantur naturaliter insiti: occurrentes, qui primi occurrunt fantasias easque recipiunt; post hos progressores ac ueluti duces quidam ad urbem memoriae, ad quam dum fantasiae peruenerint a recordabilibus introducuntur; deinde rationabiles per urbem distribuunt prout intellectuales iusserint. Turma siquidem fantastica ueniens per uisum specialiter in memoria possidet locum. Similiter per auditum caeterosque sensus intrantes suis sedibus in eadem urbe recipiuntur. De quibus omnibus quisquis plenius scire desiderat legat magnum Augustinum in sexto De musica et in libris confessionum magnumque Gregorium Nyseum in Sermone de Imagine.

Quid ergo mirum, si anima rationalis post solutionem corporis sui

18-19 I Cor. ii. 15. 33 cf. Aug. De musica, vi. 6. 16 sq., Conf. x. 12. 19. 34 cf. De hom. opif. x; PG xlii. 152B sq.

3 formantur RB: formatur P illocalitatis B^c(C): inlocalitatis R: localitatis B*: allocalitatis P 5 post et (1) rasura R 6 aera RB: aerea P 8 lemma de corporalibus nostris et reliquis R(C) fantasias RB: phantasias P quidem RB^cP: siquidem B* 8 nullis temporum morulis: is temporum morulis in ras. R(C) 9 lemma Qui sint numeri recordabiles qui occurrentes qui progressores (sic) et cetera Rm 21-22 in quibus-formatur om. P 23 constitutus ex constitutis B 25-26 fantasiis RB: phantasiis P 28 introducuntur RB: introducuntur P 29 intellectuales RB: intellectualis P fantastica RB: phantastica P

projected outside them with the projected senses. But in a potential sense it is present to receive the phantasies which are everywhere formed in the instruments of its senses; and by this reasoning we come to know how great is its natural power and placelessness. For at one and the same moment of time it perceives the phantasies, that is, the images, of the stars in the light from the eyes which is radiated through the ether, and of voices by the sense of hearing which is diffused through the air, and of odours by the sense of smell whether within or without the body, and of flavours by the sense of taste, and of all things which can be felt by the sense of touch; having perceived these phantasies, first formed with marvellous rapidity without any temporal interval from the corporeal numbers in the sensible, it receives them through the numbers that meet, introduces them through the numbers that advance, commends them to the memory through the recordable numbers, orders them through the rational numbers, and, according to the rules of the divine numbers which are above it, acknowledges or rejects them through the intellectual numbers. Contemplating their exemplars it forms judgements both about the numbers which are constituted within itself and about the corporeal and sensible numbers both of which are outside it.⁷⁶

For reason has discovered eight orders of numbers, of which the first and highest is above the understanding among the eternal causes, and is that by which the rational soul discerns all things, as the Apostle says: 'Spiritual man judges all things; but he himself is judged by no man.' Two others are entirely without and beneath the soul, of which one, the most remote, is in the bodies from which are formed the corporeal senses in which the phantasies come into being, while the other is formed in the corporeal senses themselves, and this is the first order of phantasies to be constituted in the instruments of the senses, I mean in the eyes and ears and other seats of the senses. But within the soul itself five numbers are reckoned to be naturally established: the numbers that meet, which are the first to encounter the phantasies and receive them; after these the numbers that advance, which are like guides to the city of the memory, to which the phantasies, when they have arrived there, are introduced by the recordable numbers; then the rational numbers distribute them about the city as the intellectual numbers have ordained. For the phantasies which come as a crowd through sight especially have a place in the memory. In like manner those that enter by way of hearing and the other senses are received into their places of residence in the same city. But whoever wishes for further knowledge of all these things should read the great Augustine in the sixth book of his 'De musica', and in the books of his Confessions and the great Gregory of Nyssa in his 'Discourse on the Image'.

Concerning the eight orders of numbers distinguished by reason

in partibus eius per elementa diffusis aliquid agat occulta naturali 732B
 administratione omnique corporeo sensu remota, quandoquidem et
 in uiuente adhuc corpore simulque collecto, quantum sensibus
 uidetur, non solum in cumulo membrorum, uerum etiam in sensibus
 longe ab ipso porrectis regiminis sui uirtutem exercet? 5

de generali uita Sed redeamus ad generalissimae uitae considerationem, cuius
 manifestandae potestatis in corporibus gratia haec introducta sunt
 de rationabili uita, non autem de omni uita quaecumque corpus
 administrat. Hoc autem dico propter irrationabilium animalium
 animas, de quibus [multorum] uaria sententia est. Alii nanque dicunt 10
 eas post corporis interitum uiuere, alii uero cum corporibus interire
nec diutius manere, de qua quaestione pauca paulo post dicemus. 732C

de intellectu- ali et ratio- nali uita quidem uita angelis *hominibusque* distributa est, sed in angelis ueluti 15
specialis significationis causa intellectualis dicitur, in hominibus uero
 rationalis, ueruntamen consulta ueritate et in angelis et in hominibus
 intellectualis et rationalis *est*, ideoque communiter de eis praedicatur
 uita intellectualis et rationalis. Ad differentiam tamen relinquitur, ut
 ipsa uita intellectus in angelis, in hominibus anima uocitetur. Non 20
 enim alia ratio mihi occurrit quae prohibeat angelicam uitam animam
 uocari rationalem quemadmodum non prohibet humanam rationalem
 intellectum, praesertim dum angeli caelestia sua corpora in quibus 732D
 saepe apparent possident ac per hoc, si corpora habere perhibentur,
 quid obstat, ne illorum uita anima dicatur ignoro, nisi sola ut praediximus,
 uocabulorum differentia, quomodo et angelos ad imaginem 25
 dei factos non dubitamus. Vbi enim est ratio et intellectus, ibi
 imaginem dei deesse nullo modo crediderim, solum tamen hominem
 ad imaginem dei factum manifeste perhibet scriptura. De Platone
 sileo, ne uidear sectam illius sequi, qui diffinit angelos esse animalia 30
 rationabilia immortalia. Ad differentiam ergo humanae naturae ab
 angelica substantia relictae sunt hae significationes, anima [uidelicet] 733A
 rationalis et imago dei.

de irrationa- bili uita Irrationabilis autem uita diuiditur in eam quae sensum partici-
 pat inque eam quae eo caret, et una quidem omnibus animalibus 35
 sentiendi uirtutem habentibus distribuitur, altera uero omni sensu

17 Cf. 82. 9 *supra*. 29-31 cf. Calc. In Tim. cxxxii-cxxxiv; Mart. Cap.
 Annot., p. 67, 26 (Lutz).

3 in om. P 4 uidetur RB: uidere P 5 regiminis RB: regionis P
 6 lemma BP: species uitae de generalissima uita et si angeli dicuntur animalia et
 utrum habent corpora et si ad imaginem dei facti sunt Rm 8 rationabili ex
 rationibus P 12 nec diutius manere in ras. R(C) de RB: da P 13 lemma
 de generalissima uita R(C) 14 et rationalis in ras. B lemma BP 15 homi-
 nibusque R(C)BP: et hominibus R* 16 specialis in ras. R(C) 18 est

Why, then, should we be surprised if the rational soul after the
 dissolution of its body into its parts diffused among the elements
 should continue its activity by a natural control concealed and
 removed from every bodily sense, seeing that even when the body is
 still alive and gathered into an unity, in so far as is perceptible to the
 senses, it exerts the power of its authority over it not only in the mass
 of its members but also in the senses that extend far beyond it?

But let us return to the consideration of Universal Life, of which 37
 the demonstration of the power over bodies prompted us to introduce
 these remarks about the rational life, though not about every life
 that controls the body—now, this I say bearing in mind the souls of
 the irrational animals, concerning which there is a [wide] variety of
 opinion. For some say that they survive the death of the body, others
 that they die with the body *and do not remain after it*, a question
 about which we shall have a little to say later. So of Universal Life
 the first and main division is by that differentiation which separates
 the rational life from the irrational; and the rational life is distributed
 between angels and men, but whereas in angels it is called intellectual
 as though for a *special* meaning, in men it is called rational—although
 in actual fact the truth is that in both angels and men it is both
 intellectual and rational; and therefore intellectual and rational life
 is predicated of both as a common form. The statement that life
 itself is called intellect in angels, soul in men, is retained so as to
 distinguish between them. For I can think of no other reason why
 the angelic life should not be called rational soul or the rational soul
 of man intellect, especially as angels possess heavenly bodies of their
 own in which they often manifest themselves; and thus, if it is
 recognized that they have bodies, why their life should not be called
 soul I do not know, unless it be merely, as we said above, in
 order to draw a verbal distinction—for that angels also are made in
 the Image of God we do not doubt; and where there are reason and
 intellect I should not believe that the Image of God is absent, 38
 although Scripture clearly says only of man that he is made in the
 Image of God. I say nothing of Plato lest I should be thought to be
 one of his sectaries, but he defines the angels as rational immortal
 animals. And thus we are left with these terms by which this human
 nature is differentiated from the angelic substance, [namely] rational
 soul and image of God.

Now, the irrational life is divided into that which participates in
 sense and that which is without sense; and the one is distributed
 among all animals which possess the power of perceiving, the other

in ras. R(C) 22 non s.l. R 26 lemma BP angelos RB: angelis P
 28 hominem: em in ras. B 30 sectam RB: factam P 34 lemma BP

37
 Concerning
 Universal
 Life

Concerning
 the Intellect-
 ual and the
 Rational Life

That angels
 are made in
 the Image of
 God

Concerning
 the irrational
 life

caentibus [materiis], quae species uitae herbarum lignorumque domi-
nari perhibetur et infra quam nullam speciem uitae ratio inuenit.

Proinde creatae uitae quattuor differentiae in quattuor species
colliguntur: intellectualis in angelis, [rationalis in hominibus, sen-
sualis in bestiis, insensualis] in germinibus caeterisque corporibus, 5
in quibus sola species uestigium uitae manifestat, ut sunt quattuor
mundi elimenta siue simplicia sint per se siue composita, terram dico, 733B
aquam et aera aetheraque. Ac per hoc non immerito dicitur homo
creaturarum omnium officina quoniam in ipso uniuersa[li]s creatura
continetur. Intelligit [quidem] ut angelus, ratiocinatur ut homo, 10
sentit ut animal [irrationale], uiuit ut germen, corpore animaue
subsistit [nullius creaturae expers]. Extra haec [enim] nullam
creaturam inuenis.

de eo quod
angeli non
sentiunt

Sed fortassis quis dixerit haec omnia in angelo quoque contineri.
Cui respondeo sensum animalibus distributum non posse subsistere 15
nisi in corpore ex quattuor elimentis constituto. Non enim erit
uisus ubi non est ignis neque auditus, si aer desit. Vmore subtracto
nec olfactus remanebit nec gustus. Terrae absentia totum abstrahit
tactum. Corpora uero angelica simplicia spiritualiaque sunt omnique 733C
exteriori sensu carentia. Non enim sensibilibus rerum notitiam per
fantasias corporum accipiunt, sed omnem corporalem creaturam in 21
causis suis spiritualibus spiritualiter perspiciunt, quemadmodum
uisuri sumus cum ad aequalitatem naturae eorum transmutabimur.
Sensu itaque corporeo carent angeli quia super ipsum sunt ac per
hoc totius irrationabilis uitae expertes siue sensualis siue omni sensu 25
priuatae. Compositis corruptibilibusque corporibus non grauantur.
Proinde multa reperies in homine quae nequaquam natura recipit
angelica, non autem subsistit in angelo seu in alia creatura quod
naturaliter homini non insit.

Et ne dicas: Si ergo omnis species uitae in homine est, non unam 30
sed multas et a se differentes uitas continet habens irrationalem et 733D
rationalem, sensualem simul et germinalem, intueri diligentius
humanae animae potentias, quae dum sit unius eiusdemque subsisten-
tiae et uirtutis et operationis in omnibus simul corporibus humanis
[et] generaliter et in singulis specialiter, cunctos [tamen] uitales 35
motus administrationesque in corpore suo intra seu extra potest
peragere. Siquidem ultra corporeos sensus et ratiocinatur et intelligit
ut angelica uita, in sensibus corporeis sentiendi uim exercet simili-
tudine irrationabilium suam rationabilitatem non deserens, nutrit 734A

4 rationalis R(C)B: rationabilis P hominibus in ras. P 6 uestigium RB:
uestigiis P 8 lemma quod homo sit omnium creaturarum officina non autem
angelus Rm aera RBP*: aere P^c 10 continetur RB: pertinetur P 11 cor-
pore animaue ex corporea namque 14 lemma B 16 quattuor RB: iiii^o P
enim om. P 19 lemma de corporibus angelicis R(C) 25 sensualis RB:
sensuali P 27 reperies B^cP: repperies RB* 30 lemma de anima R(C)

among [matters] which lack all sense, the kind of life which is held to
rule plants and trees, and below which reason finds no kind of life at all.

Thus by four differentiations created life is brought together into
four species: the intellectual in angels, [the rational in men, the
sensitive in beasts, the insensitive] in plants and in the other bodies,
in which only the form shows a trace of life, as are the four elements
of the world whether as simple in themselves or as composite: earth,
I mean, water and air and ether. And this is why man is not in-
appropriately called the workshop⁷⁷ of all creatures since in him the
universal creature is contained. [For] he has intellect like an angel,
reason like a man, sense like an [irrational] animal, life like a plant,
and subsists in body and soul: [there is no creature that he is with-
out]. [For] outside these you (will) find no creature.

But perhaps someone will say that all these are also contained in
the angel. To him I reply that sense, which is distributed among
animals, cannot subsist except in a body constituted of the four
elements. For there will be no sight where there is not fire nor
hearing if air is absent. If moisture be removed neither smell nor
taste will remain. The absence of earth removes all touch. But the
bodies of angels are simple and spiritual and lack every exterior
sense. For they do not receive the knowledge of sensible things
through the phantasies of bodies, but perceive every corporeal
creature spiritually in its spiritual causes, as we shall when we are
changed into a nature that shall be equal to theirs. Therefore the
angels lack corporeal sense because they are above it; and thus are
removed from all irrational life, whether sensitive or deprived of all
sense. They are not weighed down by composite and corruptible
bodies. So you will find many things in man which the angelic
nature totally rejects, whereas there is nothing in the angel nor in any
other creature which is not naturally present in man.

That angels
do not pos-
sess sense

And lest you should say, If then every species of life is in man he
contains not one but many lives which differ from one another, for
he has the irrational and the rational, and at the same time the sensi-
tive and the germinal, consider more carefully the powers of the
human soul; for while it is of one and the same subsistence and
power and operation in all human bodies at once [and] generally and
in individual human bodies specifically, [yet] it can perform all the
vital motions and administrations of its body whether they are within
or without. For beyond the corporeal senses it both reasons and
understands like the angelic life, within the corporeal senses it
exercises its power of perception in the likeness of irrationals without
abandoning its rationality; it provides nourishment and increase to

omnis RB: omnes P homine ex homini B 31 irrationalem R^cB: irrationa-
bilem R*P 38 ut ex et P

et auget corpus suum ut illa quae sensu caret herbasque ac ligna
penitrat. Vbique in se ipsa tota *et in omnibus tota* totos sensus suos
custodit. In ossibus ergo et unguibus et capillis uim germinalis uitae
aperit, quae partes nostri corporis quoniam aeri peruiuae non sunt
nullum sensum participant, in quinquepartito sensuum instrumento
irrationabili uitae communicat, quae animalium ratione carentium
propria subsistit. In his *omnibus* per se ipsam quamuis saepe irratio-
nabiliter moueatur, ratione [sua] carere natura non sinit. Omne autem
quod potest, praeter has [prae]dictas uirtutes, uiuificandi scilicet
nutriendique ac sentiendi per sensus, siue agat siue patiat, extra
corpus suum agere uel pati recta ratione cognoscitur.

His itaque de diuisionibus deque differentiis generalissimae uitae
praecognitis ad praedictae quaestionis reserationem, quantum datur
nobis intelligi, redeamus, quoniam ipsius occasione haec de generali
anima seu uita interposita sunt.

Est enim quaesitum quare in operibus quattuor primordialium
dierum nullius uitae seu animae commemoratio facta sit, quinto
autem die subito erumpens scriptura, 'Producant', inquit, 'aquae
reptile animae uiuentis', nec simpliciter dicit 'reptile animae' sed
cum additamento 'uiuentis' quasi anima non sit uiuens et est causa,
ut opinor, species illa quam in diuisionibus generalis uitae extimam
posuimus, et merito, quoniam omnis intellectus et rationis experts
esse subtili naturarum indagatione reperitur, ac ueluti nulla uita seu
anima seu uiuens anima sit, siletur a scriptura, ut intelligamus eam
nouissimam et imperfectissimam essentialiter creatae uitae participa-
tionem, ac per hoc plus inter corporales numeros quam inter uitales
connumerandam diuina sanxit auctoritas. Recte igitur in operibus
quattuor dierum, in quibus species caelestium terrestriumque essen-
tiarum ex causis primordialibus producuntur [in apertum] et per-
fectionem suae formationis accipiunt, huius uitalis motus nulla
significatio interposita est. Nam et in tertia die siletur, in qua herbarum
lignorumque germinatio de terra praecipitur, in quibus admini-
strationis suae uirtutem [corporeis sensibus] manifestat, non quod ipsa
species uitae in natura rerum proportionaliter subsistendi locum non
obtineat—non enim parui pendenda est uis illa naturalis quae omnia
quae terrae radicitus inhaerent et ex terra oriuntur secundum infini-
tam numerositatem surculorum herbarumque et nutrit et auget inque

18–19 Gen. i. 20.

1 auget RB: uiget P post illa rasura R 2 et in omnibus tota in ras.
R(C) 7 omnibus in ras. R(C) 13 ad RB: quod P 16 lemma quare
in praedictis diebus nulla mentio uitae uel animae facta sit Rm quattuor RB:
iiii^{or} P 18 erumpens RBP^c: rerum pars P* 21 lemma B: post uitae: uel
anima erasum 22 lemma de insensuali uita R(C) 23 reperitur B^p: rep-
peritur RB* 25 et RB: ac P 27 connumerandam ex connumerandum P

its body as the life that lacks sense and penetrates the plants and
trees. It is everywhere wholly in itself *and, wholly in all things*, it
preserves its senses whole. Thus the force of the germinal life is
revealed in the bones and the nails and hair, for these parts of our
body, being impervious to the air, participate in no sense; in the
five-fold instrument of the senses it communicates with the irrational
life which is proper to the animals that lack reason. In *all* these its
nature does not permit it to be without [its own] reason in itself
although it is often moved irrationally. Everything else that it can
do apart from these powers, namely the powers of bestowing life
and nourishment and perception through the senses, whether it does
or suffers, right reason knows that it does or suffers outside the body.

Now that we have obtained this knowledge concerning the diuisions
and differentiations of Universal Life, let us return to the
solution, to the best of our ability, of the question that was raised
earlier, for it was that which prompted us to insert these remarks
about the general soul or life.

For the question was, Why in the works of the Four Primordial
Days no mention is made of any life or soul, and then on the Fifth
Day Scripture suddenly breaks out and says, 'Let the waters produce
the creeping thing of living soul'; and he does not say, 'The 'creeping
thing of soul' simply, but adds 'living' as though the soul were not
a living thing. And the subject is, as I think, that species which we
placed last among the divisions of the general life, and rightly so,
because a subtle investigation of natures reveals that it is without
any intellect or reason. And it is ignored by Scripture as though it
were no life at all, whether soul or living soul, so that we may under-
stand that it is the last and most imperfect participation in the life
that is created as essence; and therefore the Divine Authority
ordained that it should rather be reckoned among bodily rather than
living numbers. It is right therefore that nothing representing this
vital motion was included among the operations of the Four Days
in which the species of heavenly and terrestrial essences are brought
forth [into the open] from the primordial causes and receive the
perfection of their formation. For even on the Third Day there is no
mention of it, on which the germination of the plants and trees from
the earth is ordained, although in these its power of control is clear
[to the corporeal senses]—not because this species of life does not
have in nature a place for its share of existence—for the natural force
that gives nourishment and increase to all things which cling to the
earth by their roots and rise from out of the earth in the infinite
number of shoots and plants, and brings them forth into their proper

27 diuina s.l. B 28–29 post essentialium et eras. R 30 accipiunt: ac in
ras. R(C) 32 praecipitur RB: percipitur P 36 ex terra RB: extra P

species proprias iuxta singulorum generum similitudinem et naturalem consequentiam florum fructuum seminum per numeros locorum et temporum producit—, uerum quoniam extra corpus nil agere praeualet nec perfectae uitae corporibusque absolutae uirtutem in se manifestat in numeris corporalis naturae potius quam in speciebus *generalis* uitae diuina, ut praediximus, auctoritate deputata est et quoniam ipsa per se, germinalis uidelicet uita, sine altioris uitae, sensualis dico et rationalis, communione potest intelligi, rationalis uero et sensualis absque illa nullum corpus uegetare naturaliter sinuntur, a sancta scriptura reseruata est.

Anima siquidem omni sensu carens motu quoque uitali ueluti omnino carere uidetur ac per hoc anima solummodo dicitur, non autem uiuens anima. Nec hoc mirum. Si enim in infantibus in utero conceptis aut ex utero egredientibus talis anima existimatur ueluti rationis intelligentiaeque omnino expers, cum et rationabilis et intellectualis sit, quamuis rationis et intellectus indicia in recentibus adhuc et imperfectis corporis particulis non possit manifestare, quanto magis anima illa intelligen[tiae uiribus] et rationis et sensus naturaliter *destituta non* immerito animae uiuentis uocabulo non debuit in scriptura significari.

A. Hunc sensum approbo et naturae rerum propheticisque sermonibus conuenire perspicio. Veruntamen quoniam multi sunt qui herbarum lignorumque corporeas moles omnino uitalem motum non habere contendunt dicentes umore quo uirescunt et nulla alia uita uegitari, tuam praedictam de hac re disputationem graui quadam auctoritate uelim roborari, quae aperte pronuntiaret herbas arboresque qualicumque specie uitae administrari.

N. Non te latet, ut opinor, omnium philosophorum de mundo disputantium de hac parte naturae unanimem esse sententiam. Aiunt enim omnia corpora quae intra hunc mundum sensibilem continentur uitali motu contineri siue in statu sint siue in motu.

A. Omnibus philosophantibus aut philosophos legentibus illud notissimum est. Nam et Plato in Timeo et Plinius Secundus in Naturali Istoriam manifestissime [de his] nos edocent.

N. Si itaque sanctorum patrum testimonia quaeris, audi nobilissimum Basilium Caesariae Capadotiae antistitem in septima omelia

33 *Tim.* 77AB. 33-34 *N.H.* xii. 54. 36-292.4 *Hex.* vii. 1; PG xxix. 148C.

2 fructuum RB: fluctuum P 3 uerum *in ras.* R 6 *generalis in ras.* R(C)
 9 illa RB: ulla P 10 reseruata RB: seruata P 11 lemma Quid sit sola
 anima et quid uiuens anima Rm 12 carere uidetur RBP^c: uidere (*sic*) carere P*
 13 hoc mirum RB: hominum P 15 rationabilis R^cBP: rationalis R* 19 de-
 stituta non *in ras.* R(C) 21 lemma Omnia corpora uitali motu contineri secundum Platonem Rm 22 multi sunt RB: multis P 24 umore RB: humore P
 25 uegitari BP: uecigari B praedictam: prae *in ras.* R 27 uitae om. P 28 te

species in the likeness of each genus and in the natural sequence of flower, fruit, and seed disposed throughout individual places and times, is not to be lightly estimated—but because it can achieve nothing outside the body and reveals in itself no power of perfect life existing independently of bodies, it is numbered by the Divine Authority, as we said before, among the individuals of the corporeal nature rather than among the species of the general life; and because in itself it, that is, the germinal life, can be contemplated by the intellect apart from its association with the higher life, I mean the sensitive and rational, while the rational and sensitive are not permitted by nature to animate any body without it, Holy Scripture kept it apart.

For the soul which lacks all sense seems as though it also lacks all vital motion, and therefore is called simply 'soul', but not 'living soul'. Nor is this surprising. For if in infants when they are conceived in the womb or when they are issuing from the womb the soul is reckoned to be such as is altogether without reason and intellect because although it is both rational and intellectual it cannot show the signs of reason and intellect in its bodily parts, which are as yet of recent birth and imperfect, how much more appropriate is it that the soul which is by nature *deprived* [of the powers] of intellect and reason should not have the right to be designated in Scripture by the name of living soul?

A. I accept this interpretation and perceive that it accords with the nature of things and with the Prophet's discourse. But since there are many who contend that the corporeal bulks of plants and trees have no vital motion whatsoever, saying that they are animated by the moisture on which they flourish and by no other life, I should like to have the view of this matter which you have stated above corroborated by some weighty authority who should explicitly pronounce that plants and trees are controlled by some species of life, whatever it may be.

N. You are not, as I think, unaware that the opinion of all the philosophers who discourse about the world is, in respect of this part of nature, unanimous. For they say that all bodies that are contained within the sensible world are contained by a vital motion, whether they are in motion or at rest.

A. To all who practise philosophy or read the philosophers this is very well known. For both Plato in the 'Timaeus' and Pliny Secundus in his 'Natural History' provide us with very clear teaching [on these matters].

N. If, then, you desire the testimonies of the Holy Fathers, hear the noble Basil, Bishop of Caesarea in Cappadocia, in his Seventh

om. P 30 omnia *s.l.* B 32 aut RB: ac P 34 istoria RB: historia P
 nos *in ras.* R(C) 36 omelia BP: onelia P

in Genesim: 'Educant aquae, inquit, reptilia animarum uiuarum. Nunc primum animatum animal creatur. Germina enim et arbores etsi uiuere dicantur propter participationem nutritiuae et auctiuae uirtutis, ast non etiam animalia neque animata sunt.' Gregorius item 735D
 Nyseus qui etiam Nazanzenus uocatur praedicti Basilii germanus 5
 frater in Sermone de Imagine [capitulum viii, 'Docet', inquit, 'ratio in tribus differentiis uitalem animalemque uirtutem considerari: Vna enim quaedam est, quae solummodo incrementum dat et nutrit, et uocatur 'auctiua et nutritoria, quia in augmentum eius quod nutritur 736A
 quicquid conueniens est affert. Ipsa etiam germinalis dicitur et circa 10
 germina consideratur. Necesse est enim etiam in germinibus uitalem quandam uirtutem sensus expertem intelligi. Altera uero praeter hanc species uitae est, quae et hoc habet' quod praedicta possidet, insuper 'etiam per sensum administrare accepit, quae' species 'in natura irrationabilium est. Nam non solum nutrit et auget, sed etiam 15
 sensualem operationem perceptionemque habet. Perfecta uero in corpore uita in rationabili, humana dico, formatur natura et nutritiua est et sensualis et rationem participat et animo ministrat.'

Idem in eodem sermone] xv capitulo, 'Tres', inquit, 'secundum uitalem uirtutem differentias ratio inuenit: Primam quidem nutritiuam sine sensu; secundam uero nutritiuam quidem et sensitiuam et expertem uero rationalis operationis; item tertiam rationabilem et perfectam omnemque uirtutem penetrantem.' 736B
 21

Augustinus in libro De Vera Religione, 'Non sit nobis', inquit, 'religio cultus illius uitae qua dicuntur arbores uiuere, quoniam nullus 25
 sensus in illa est et ex eo genere est ista qua nostri corporis numerositas agitur, qua etiam capilli et ossa uiuunt, quae sine sensu praeciduntur. Hac autem melior est uita sentiens, et tamen uitam bestiarum colere non debemus. Non sit nobis religio uel ipsa perfecta et sapiens anima rationalis siue in ministerio partium stabilita siue in ministerio 30
 uniuersitatis.' Et haec testimonia praedictorum patrum ad ea roboranda quae diximus sufficient, ut opinor.

A. Sufficiunt quidem et ad *alia* transeundum.

N. Vide itaque quam pulchre ingreditur series rerum diuinis ordinata eloquiis. Quinto siquidem die conditionem animalium quinque- 35
 pertito sensu pollentium primum depromit. 736C

6-18 Greg. Nyss. *De hom. opif.* viii; PG xlv. 144D-145A. 19-23 *ibid.* xv. 176C-177A. 24-31 Aug. *De uera rel.* lv. 109-110.

5 nazanzenus RP: nanzanzenus B 9 eius RB: non P 13 quae RB: quia P
 16 perceptionemque RB: perfectionisque P 17 in rationabili RB: irrationabili B*: irrationabili P 18 animo RB: anima P 20 inuenit RB: imponit P
 21 uero *s.l.* B 25 dicuntur RB: dicantur P 27 uiuunt: u (2) *s.l.* B
 30 anima RB: animae P 33 A RB: lacuna P alia *in ras.* R(C)
 34 N RB: lacuna P

Homily on Genesis: 'Let the waters bring forth', he says, 'creeping things of living souls. Now is the animate . . . animal first created. For although plants and trees are said to live because they participate in the nutritive and auctive power, yet they are not also animals or animate.' Again, Gregory of Nyssa, who is also called Nazianzen,⁷⁸ brother germane of the aforesaid Basil, in his Discourse 'On the Image' [in chapter viii, says, 'Reason teaches that the power of life and soul is observed in three different ways. For one is' that which merely bestows increase and nourishment, and is called 'auctive and nutritive because it supplies whatever is required for the increase of that which it nourishes; it is also called plant life and is observed in plants. For it must be understood that even in plants there is a kind of vital power which has no part of sense. But as well as this species of life there is a second which has both this' that the above-mentioned possesses, and in addition 'the function of control through the sense, and this' species 'is found in the nature of the irrationals. For it not only bestows nourishment and increase but also possesses the functions of sensible action and perception. But the perfect life in the body is formed in the rational nature, by which I mean the human; and is nutritive and sensitive and participates in reason and is controlled by the mind.'

The same (Gregory) in the same discourse] in chapter xv says, 'Reason finds three different kinds in the vital power: the first is nutritive without sense; the second is on the one hand nutritive and sensitive [and] but on the other hand has no part in the operation of reason; there is also the third which is rational and perfect and penetrates to every power.'

Augustine in his book 'De uera religione' says, 'Let us not make a religion of the cult of that life by which the trees are said to live since there is in it no sense, and it is of the same kind as that by which the numerousness of our bodies is activated, by which also the hair and the bones live, which are removeable without the sense (perceiving it). But better than this is the sentient life, and yet we ought not to worship the life of beasts; nor should we make a religion even of that perfect and wise rational soul whether as controller of the parts (of the body) or of the whole.' And these testimonies of the aforesaid Fathers are sufficient, as I think, to corroborate what we have said.

A. They are indeed sufficient, and we must pass on to *other matters*.

N. See how beautifully the range of nature develops as ordered by the Divine Oracles. Thus, on the Fifth Day it brings forth for the first time the creation of the animals that are endowed with the five senses.

de irrationabilium anima

Sed de anima omnium irrationabilium animalium non mediocriter moueor, qua ratione plurimi sanctorum patrum cum corporibus eam interire nec diutius permanere posse adfirmant. Basilius quidem in nona omelia in Genesin ait: 'Educat terra animam uiuam. Quare' [inquit] 'terra animam educit? Vt discas differentiam animae pecoris ab anima hominis. [Et] Paulo post cognosces quomodo anima hominis facta est. Nunc autem audi de irrationabilium anima. Quoniam iuxta quod scriptum est omnis animalis anima sanguis eius est, sanguis autem concretus in carnem muta[ri] consuevit. caro uero corrupta in terram resoluitur, consequenter terrena quaedam est anima iumentorum. Educat ergo terra animam uiuentem. Vide consequentiam animae ad sanguinem, sanguinis ad carnem, carnis ad terram, et iterum resoluens per eadem redi a terra in carnem, a carne in sanguinem, a sanguine in animam, et inuenies quia terra est iumentorum anima. Ne existimes antiquiorem esse corporis sui substantiam neque permanentem post carnis solutionem.'

Gregorius quoque Nyseus in Sermone de Imagine sexto decimo capitulo, 'Si autem', inquit, 'quaedam in creatura nutritoria operationem habeant seu iterum quaedam sensitua administrantur potentia, neque illa sensum neque haec intellectum participat.' 'Si uero in anima intellectuali et rationali perfectionem habet, omne quod non ita est aequiuocum quidem animae esse potest, non tamen uere anima, sed quaedam operatio uitalis uocatione animae utens.'

Sed si ita est ut illi uolunt, cur generalis uitae principalis diuisio est in animam rationalem et intellectualem et in animam ratione et intellectu carentem? Quare sub uno genere uitae duae species sibi inuicem contrariae ponuntur? Non enim rationale et irrationale sibi met aduersantur, sed differentiam specierum unius generis expriment.

de eo quod non moritur irrationabilium anima

Vivere autem et mori sibi met omnino opponuntur. Vnum enim habitum significat, alterum priuationem. Habitus autem et priuatio sibi met contradicunt. Si ergo post solutionem corporis una species manet altera perit, quomodo earum genus totum suum seruabit? Vt enim pereunte genere omnis species illius perire necesse est, ita intereuntibus speciebus illarum genus interire ratio cogit. Genus enim in suis speciebus saluatur et species in genere. Si autem formarum seu specierum sub uno genere constitutarum quaedam quidem mori possunt et moriuntur, quaedam uero non possunt mori

4-16 Hex. viii. 2; PG xxix. 165D-168A. 7-8 cf. Leuit. xvii. 11; Deut. xii. 23. 18-20 Greg. Nyss. De hom. opif. xv; PG xlii. 176C. 20-23 ibid. 176D-177A.

1 lemma B: de anima irrationabilium quod si patitur cum corpore perire est necesse. genus cum specie quia sunt uno genere Rm 3 permanere: re s.l. B(C) 4 genesin RB: genesi P 9 concretus in ras. R(C) 13 redi RB: radi P 15 antiquiorem: antiquo in ras. R(C) sui in ras. R(C) 17 sexto decimo R:

But concerning the soul of all the irrational animals I am not a little puzzled why very many of the Holy Fathers assert that it perishes with their bodies and cannot survive them. Thus Basil in his ninth homily on Genesis says, 'Let earth bring forth living soul. Why' [he says] 'does earth bring forth soul? So that you may learn the difference between the soul of the beast and the soul of man.' [And] 'You will learn a little later how the soul of man was made; but now hear of the soul of the irrationals. Since, according to what is written, the soul of every animal is its blood, and blood solidified usually turns into flesh, and flesh when decayed returns to earth, it follows that the soul of beasts is an earthly thing. So, let the earth bring forth living soul. Notice the progress of soul into blood, of blood into flesh, of flesh into the earth; and then returning take the same way back from earth into flesh, from flesh into blood, from blood into soul, and you will find that the soul of beasts is earth. Do not think that it is an older substance than its body or that it remains after the dissolution of the flesh.'

Gregory of Nyssa too in his Discourse 'On the Image', the sixteenth chapter, says, 'Now, if some things in creation have the nutritive function, or again others are controlled by the sensitive power, neither the former participate in sense nor the latter participate⁷⁹ in intellect.' 'But if it possesses perfection in the intellectual and rational soul, everything which is not so may indeed be a homonym of soul, but not truly soul, only a vital function which makes use of the name of soul.'

But if it is as they claim, why is the main division of universal soul into rational and intellectual soul on the one hand, and soul which lacks reason and intellect on the other? Why are two mutually contrary species included under the one genus of life? For rational and irrational are not opposed to one another but (are made to) express a difference of species within the one genus.

But living and dying are opposed to one another absolutely. For the one signifies a possession, the other a privation. But possession and privation are mutually contradictory. If, then, after the dissolution of the body one species survives while the other perishes, how will their genus preserve its integrity? For as, when a genus perishes, every one of its species must perish, so when the species perish reason requires that their genus must perish. For the genus is preserved in its species and the species in their genus. But if of the forms or species which are constituted under one genus some can and do die while others cannot and do not, what are we to say of their genus?

xvi^{mo} B: xvi P 19 habeant RB^cP: habeat B* 20 neque . . . neque ex necque . . . necque R 26 duae RB: duo P 29 lemma B autem: em in ras. R(C) et bis scriptum B 37 non possunt mori RB: nec mori possunt P

39 Concerning the soul of the irrational beings

The soul of irrational beings does not die

nec moriuntur, quid de ipsarum genere dicemus? An et ipsum in quibusdam peribit, in quibusdam non peribit? Non enim integrum potest permanere quod quasdam suas partes patitur perdere, ac per hoc non erit genus, sed generis ruina. Si enim omnium corpore et anima constitutorum unum genus est quod animal dicitur, quoniam
 5 in eo omnia animalia substantialiter subsistunt—nam et homo et leo et bos et equus in ipso unum sunt et substantiale unum—, quomodo illius generis omnes species peribunt, ea sola permanente quae hominibus est distributa? Ac per hoc si una species sola permanerit caeteris intereuntibus, peribit etiam genus, quod nequaquam in una specie stabit. Quemadmodum [enim] una species ullum genus efficit [non uideo]. Cum enim genus multarum formarum seu specierum substantialis unitas [sit, quomodo stabit genus, ubi multarum formarum specierumue substantialis unitas non permanet? Quod autem multae species unum sint in genere] sanctus Dionysius edocet
 15 in capitulo de perfecto et uno dicens: ‘Neque enim est multitudo non participans unius, sed multa quidem in partibus, unum in toto, et multa accidentibus, unum in subiecto, et multa in numero aut uirtutibus, unum specie, et multa speciebus, unum genere.’
 737D 10 738A

Proinde si omnes species in genere unum sunt, quomodo illud unum ex parte peribit ex parte permanebit? Et si illud unum substantiale unum est, quomodo periret, cum in omni creatura haec tria incorruptibiliter sine incremento uel detrimento permaneant: substantia uirtus operatio? Et si omnium animalium corpora quando soluuntur non ad nihilum rediguntur, sed in elementorum qualitates quarum concursu materialiter facta sunt redire naturalis ratio perspicue perhibet, quomodo eorum animae cum profecto sint melioris naturae—qualiscunque enim anima sit meliorem esse omni corpore nemo sapientum denegat—, omnino perire possunt, dum rationi [non] conueniat quod deterius est manere et saluari, quod uero melius corrumpi et perire, et quod compositum est in suis partibus disiunctis custodiri, simplex autem omnique compositione carens dissoluique nequens interimi? Omne autem corpus compositum esse, omnem uero animam simplicem quis sophiae studentium nesciat?
 20 25 738B 30

Et quod his omnibus mirabilius, quare qui irrationabiles animas post solutionem corporis interire asserunt—nec immerito, ut aiunt, quoniam de terra sumptae sunt et in terram resoluuntur—, magnis laudibus irrationabilis animae uirtutem in sensibus exaltant et
 35

16–19 DN xiii. 2; PG iii. 977D 1–980A 5.

1 ipsum ex ipsam P in s.l. R 3 quasdam ex quosdam P 7 post bos rasura R 8 ea om. P 12 Cum R^(C)BP: Cur R* 15 sint R^(C)B^(C)P: s*** B* quoniam ante sanctus erasum R dionysius RB: dionysius P 15–16 edocet—uno RB: in capitulo de perfecto et uno affirmat P 20 genere: re

Will it both perish in some and not perish in others?—for that cannot remain a whole which suffers destruction in some of its parts, and therefore it will not be a genus but the collapse of a genus. For if of all things consisting of body and soul there is one genus which is called animal since in it all animals subsist as substances—for in it both man and lion and ox and horse are one and substantially one—how can it be that all the species of that genus should perish and only that remain which is allotted to man? And therefore, if only one species should survive while the others pass away, the genus also will perish, for it surely will not stand in one species. [For] [I do not see] how one species can make any genus. For since the genus [is] the substantial unity of many forms or species [how will the genus stand when the substantial unity of the many forms or species does not remain? Now, that the many species are one in the genus] is the teaching of St. Dionysius in his chapter on the Perfect and the One where he says, ‘For there is no many that does not participate in the One, but (what is) many in the parts (is) one in the whole; and (what is) many (in) the accidents (is) one in the subject; and (what is) many in number or powers (is) one (in) the species; and (what is) many (in) the species (is) one in the genus.’

Therefore if all species are one in their genus, how should that one in part perish and in part remain? And if that one is a substantial one, how could it perish when in every creature there remain indestructibly and without increase or decrease these three: Substance, Power, Operation? And if the bodies of all animals, when they are dissolved, are not reduced to nothing but, as the natural reason clearly allows, return to the elemental qualities by the concurrence of which they were materially made, how can their souls perish entirely, seeing that they are certainly of a superior nature—for none of the wise deny that any soul is superior to every body—, when it is [not] consistent with reason that what is inferior should remain and be preserved while what is superior is destroyed and perishes, or that what is composite should be kept in its separated parts while what is simple and without any composition and incapable of being dissolved should be destroyed? But who of those who study wisdom does not know that every body is composite while every soul is simple?

And, what is stranger than all this, why do those who assert that irrational souls perish after the dissolution of the body—not unreasonably, as they claim, since they derive from the earth and to the earth return again—exalt with high praises the power of the irrational soul over the senses and prefer it to that of the rational soul in the

s.l. R 21 unum s.l. R 21–22 substantiale ex substantialiter B 27 profecto RB: profecto P 38 irrationabilis R^(C)BP: irrationabilis R*

rationabilis animae in sensibus corporeis uirtuti *praeferunt*? Quis enim hominum acute uidet ut aquila *et* dorca? Quis pollet odorifera 738c
 ui ut canis et, ne longum uideatur de irrationalis animae potentia
 in sensibus singulorum animalium disserere, quid de diuturnitate
 memoriae irrationabilium *est* dicendum? Canis Vlixis per annos 5
 uiginti dominum suum recognouit. Camelus iniuriam a magistris
 patiens multo annorum spatio aptum ultioni suae spectat locum, dum
 sit ipse memor semper *iniuriae*. Tanta castitatis ferunt esse grifum,
 quae dum semel coniugale [consortium] perdiderit, semper casti-
 tatem suam inuiolatam conseruat prioris coniugii memorans, quod 10
 etiam de turture naturarum inquisitores tradunt. De pietate ciconi-
 arum erga parentes Basilius scribit. Patre siquidem senescente et 738D
 prae nimia senectute indumenta plumarum perdente nati undique
 circumstant suisque pennis effouent et escas copiose praeparantes
 etiam in uolatu ualidum prestant auxilium quietum uolatile utrinque 15
 leuantes ac sic illud in omnibus adiuuant.

Hae igitur omnes naturales uirtutes quomodo irrationabili animae
 possent inesse, si terra esset, ut aiunt praedicti patres, de terra orta
 et in terram iterum resoluta aut si uere substantialis anima non esset, 739A
 inuenire non possum. [Et si anima terra est et terra corpus, quomodo 20
 corpus anima uocatur, cum differentia naturali longe a se inuicem
 discrepent? Et si corpus est anima, necessario habebit uitam, quae
 eam uiuificet—nullum siquidem corpus est quod uita et specie careat.
 Alioqui non erit corpus—, ac per hoc erit anima animae seu uita
 uitae.] Sed nemo existimet nos talia dicere ueluti sensum sancto- 25
 rum patrum destruentes, sed potius, quid de his rationabilibus tenen-
 dum pro uiribus nostris quaerentes, hoc est utrum irrationabiles
 animae corporibus solutis intereunt et in terram soluuntur an in
 generibus suis corporum suorum administrationem deserentes 739B
 saluantur, illud ubique quod ueris ratiocinationibus quaesitum et 30
 repertum et conclusum inconcuse tenentes quod omnis uita siue
 anima corpus regnans participatione unius primordialis uitae seu
 animae participatione animam subsistere seu uitam acceperit, quam
 participationem siue in amministrazione corporum *sit* siue non *sit*
 omnino deserere naturalis non sinit ratio. Nullius ergo sensum 35

5 Cf. Aug. *De qu. animae* xxvi. 50; xxviii. 54; *De musica* i. 4. 8. 11–12 *Hex.*
 viii. 5; PG xxix. 176c.

1 lemma de uisu aquilae et dorcae de cane ulixis Rm praefertur: prae in ras.
 R(C) 2 et in ras. R(C) 3 lemma de memoria camelorum Rm potentia ex
 potentiae R 4 sensibus ex singulis P 5 memoriae ex miseriae P annos
 ex annis B 6 uiginti RB: xx P 7 aptum ultioni RB: actum ultionis P
 8 lemma de castitate grifi et turturis Rm ipse R(C): ipsa R*BP memor
 semper RB: semper memor P iniuriae: iniur in ras. R(C) 11 lemma de pie-
 tate ciconiarum Rm 15 in uolatu R: inuiolato B: inuiolati P quietum RB:

senses of the body? For what man has as sharp a vision as the
 eagle *and* the gazelle? Who is endowed with a sense of smell like
 a dog's, and, not to prolong too far this discourse on the power of the
 irrational soul over the senses of individual animals, what must we
 say of the length of memory of the irrationals? Ulysses' dog recog-
 nized his master over twenty years. A camel who has suffered injury
 at the hands of his masters waits for many years for a suitable occasion
 for revenge, mindful all the time of the injury. The griffin, they say,
 is so chaste that when once he has lost his conjugal [mate], mindful
 of his first spouse, he preserves his chastity inviolate, and the same
 thing is related of the turtle dove by those who study natural history.
 Basil describes the piety of storks towards their parents. For when
 the father grows old and through excessive old age begins to lose his
 clothing of feathers, the sons stand around him and shelter him with
 their plumage and prepare abundance of food and also supply strong
 help in flight, raising him on either side in a tranquil flight which
 they support in every way.

Therefore I cannot see how all these natural powers could be
 present in the irrational soul if it were earth, as the above-mentioned
 Fathers say, risen from earth and returning to earth again, or if it
 were not truly substantial soul. [And if the soul is earth, and earth
 a body, how is the body called soul when their natures are so widely
 different? And if the body is a soul it will necessarily have the life
 which enlivens that (soul)—for there is no body which lacks life and
 form; otherwise it would not be a body—, and that would mean that
 it was the soul of soul or life of life.] But let no one think that we say
 such things with the intent of overthrowing the opinions of the
 Holy Fathers, but rather of seeking with all our might a more reason-
 able way of accepting them, by deciding whether irrational souls
 perish when the bodies are dissolved and return to earth or whether,
 while abandoning the control of their bodies, they are preserved in
 their genera, and of holding firmly to that which everywhere is
 sought and found and concluded by sound arguments, namely, that
 every life or soul which controls a body derives its existence as soul
 or life by participation in one primordial life or soul—a participation
 which natural reason does not allow to be wholly abandoned, whether
 it appears in the control of the body or not. Therefore we say these
 things without prejudice to the opinion of any, but to urge those who
 read to look more deeply, and confidently follow, in consulting the

qui enim P 16 leuantes RB: leuiores P 17 irrationabili RB: irrationabilia P
 18 patres R^cB^c(C)P: patris R*B* 19 anima ex animo P 22 si s.l. R
 24 seu s.l. B 25–26 sanctorum RB: suorum P 30 saluantur ex soluantur B
 32 unius RB: cuius P primordialis ex primordiales R 33 participatione
 animam om. P seu uitam om. P 34 sit (1) R^c(C)BP: sint R* sit (2)
 R^c(C)BP: sint R* 35 post sensum rasura R

praeiudicando talia dicimus, sed legentibus suadendo studiosius quaerere et quod de his probabilius uideatur consulta ueritate indubitanter sequi. Verumtamen crediderim sanctos filosoficosque uiros sollertesque in ueraci rerum indagazione huius modi doctrinam publice protulisse propter insipientes homines carni omnino sicut
5
bruta irrationabiliaque animalia deditos, ne sic in carnem caderent
739c
eiusque desideriis seruirent, sed ut tali irrationabilis creaturae uilitate territi ad rationabilis naturae dignitatem, in qua conditi sunt, moribus correctis se erigerent, quod ipse Gregorius in xvi capitulo de Imagine plane aperit. Nam postquam dixit irrationabilem animam
10
non esse uere animam, paulo post subiunxit: 'Discant amatores carnis non ualde uisibilibus secundum sensum alligare intelligentiam, sed in animarum obseruationibus uacare, uera quippe anima in hominibus consideratur, sensus uero etiam in irrationabilibus aequaliter habetur.'

A. Vnusquisque quod uult eligat et quod elegit sequatur, nos autem ad ea quae restant consideranda transeamus.

N. 'Producant aquae reptile animae uiuentis et uolatile super terram sub firmamentum caeli.' Hic quoque subaudi animae uiuentis,
739D
ut intelligas uolatile animae uiuentis. Plus enim animae uiuentis
20
indicia in sensibus uolatilium quam piscium denoscuntur. Nam ut ait Basilius, auditus in piscibus tardus est, uisu obtusiori propter aquam uident, et neque multa memoria in illis est neque phantasia neque consuetudinis cognitio, haec autem omnia non minus in auibus,
740A
immo etiam plus, quam in hominibus pollent.

Merito autem quaeritur quare uolatilia ex aqua producta [dicuntur]. Credibilius nanque uideretur quemadmodum animalia terram habitantia de terra perhibentur creata ita etiam pisces solummodo aquae quidem possessores de aqua, uolatilia uero quae aera tranant de aere quoque creari. Sed huic quaestioni rationabiliter occurritur,
30
si aquarum [natura consideretur, quarum] duae species sunt: Vna quidem marina et fluuiialis crassiorisque qualitatis; altera uero uaporalis et nebulosa leuiorque. Et crassior quidem terrena soliditate fulcitur, leuior uero aera suspenditur *serenitate* donec in crassitudinem uertatur et ponderositatem, quam exilitas eius sustinere non
35
potest. Hinc conficitur naturali consideratione reptilia animae uiuentis, hoc est omnium piscium genera et species ex crassiori aquarum
740B

11-15 Greg. Nyss. *De hom. opif.* xv; PG xlv. 178A.
21-22 *Hex.* viii. 1.165A.

18-19 Gen. i. 20.

26 *ibid.* 2.169A.

1-15 suadendo-habetur in breviori textu eraso R(C) 3 filosoficosque
R(C)B: philosophicosque P 5 publice R(C)B^c(C)P: public* B* 7 ut tali
R(C)B: uitali P creaturae R(C)B^cP: naturae B* 9 se s.l. R(C) xvi R(C)B:
xii P 16 uult RB: uidit P elegit RB: eligit P 19 animae ex anima
P 20 ut intelligas-*uiuentis in marg.* R 21 denoscuntur RB: denoscitur P

truth, what seems to them the more likely explanation of these matters. But I would believe that these holy and philosophical men, and skilled in the accurate investigation of nature, taught publicly in this way for the sake of men who were uninstructed and entirely given up to the flesh like brutes and irrational animals so that they should not be so dominated by the flesh and subservient to its lusts but that, alarmed at such vileness in the irrational creature, they should mend their ways and raise themselves to the dignity of the rational creature in which they were created; and Gregory himself openly admits this in the sixteenth chapter of the 'On the Image'. For after saying that the irrational soul is not truly soul, he adds a little later, 'Let the lovers of the flesh learn not to bind their intelligence to the things that are visible to the sense, but to devote themselves to the observations of souls, because true soul is seen in men whereas the sense is held in common with the irrational (animals).'

A. Let each select what he prefers, and let him abide by what he has selected, but as for us, let us pass on to what remains to be considered.

N. 'Let the waters bring forth the creeping thing of living soul and that which flies over the earth under the firmament of heaven.'
40
Here too understand 'of living soul' to mean 'the flying thing of living soul'. For more of living soul is found in the senses of flying things than in those of the fishes. For according to Basil the sense of hearing is slow in fishes: they see with more blurred vision because of the water, and there is in them neither much memory, nor phantasia nor associative knowledge, while all these things abound in birds no less than in men, nay, more so.

Now, it is rightly asked why the flying things [are said to be] brought forth from water. For it would seem more credible that as the animals which inhabit the earth are said to be created out of the earth, so also the fishes, which alone are the inhabitants of water, should be created from water, but the flying things, which plane through the air, should similarly be created from air. But this question can be reasonably met if [the nature] of waters [is considered, of which] there are two kinds: One is found in seas and rivers and is of a grosser quality; the other in vapours and clouds and of a lighter quality. And the grosser kind is supported by the solidity of the earth, while the lighter is suspended *in the serenity* of the air until it assumes a grossness and heaviness which the thinness (of the air) cannot sustain. Thus it follows, by a natural deduction, that the creeping things of living soul, that is, the genera and species of all

22 auditus RB: auditur P 25 etiam RB: omnia P 29 tranant RB: tiarant P
30 aere RB: aera P huic ex huc R quaestioni RB: quaestio P rationabiliter
RB: naturaliter P 34 serenitate in ras. R(C) 35 uertatur R^c(C)BP: uertetur R*

specie, uolatilia uero similiter in generibus et speciebus suis ex leuiori creari, et quoniam aeris huius qui est inter lunam et terram spatium in duas partes diuiditur, quarum superior serena quidem est nullisque perturbationibus quae ex terrenis aquaticisque uaporibus in aere nascuntur obnoxia, inferior uero umida est et corpolentioris qualitatis motibus uentorum, conglobationibus nubium caeterisque quae ex uicinitate terrae aquarumque efficiuntur accommodata, quicquid ex illa parte aeris umidae aquosaeque qualitatis gignitur ex aere creari non incongruum est credere. Non enim possunt uolatilia hanc partem aeris terris aquisque uicinam transmeare, si aerae naturae omnino essent expertia, iam uero dum in eis et leuitas pennarum et ossuum concauitas et uolitandi facilitas dinoscitur, apertissime datur intelligi non solum ex aqua uerum etiam ex aere creata, quod etiam ex amphibiorum natura facillime perspicitur, quae et in aqua et in aere uel in aqua et in terra uiuunt. Volatilium nanque quaedam sunt quae uicissim et in aere degunt et in aqua, et dum in aqua uiuunt piscium formam, dum uero in aere, uolatilium induuntur, et hoc per sex menses mutata specie faciunt. Sex enim in aqua natitant et sex in aere uolitant et in terram sicut caetera uolatilia descendunt [—et haec species auium gregatim semper siue in aere siue in aqua incedit et luligo appellatur—]; ex quo datur intelligi utriusque elementi, aeris uidelicet et aquae, substantiam [uolatilia] participare. Sunt autem amphibia, hoc est dupliciter uiuentia, in terra et aqua foccae et crocodili multaue similia.

Est etiam aliud argumentum quo conficitur uolatilia ex umido aere facta esse. Spirant enim et respirant ideoque et in terris et in aere habitant, aqua uero suffocantur, cui semper supernatant praeter illa amphibia quae sponte undis se mergunt.

Pisces uero quoniam de aqua ac pene sola spissa creati sunt, quoniam spirare et respirare sicut terrena et aera animalia non possunt, tactu terrae et aeris citissime pereunt. Non tamen spiratione et respiratione omnino priuantur. Nam si penitus priuantur penitus non dormirent, dormiunt autem, ut ait Plinius, pisces. Pulmones igitur spirantes et respirantes habent. Sed ipsum spiritum non ex isto

34 Plin. *N.H.* x. 209 f.

1 uero RB: et P 2 leuiori RB: leuiora P 5 in *ante* inferior *eras*. R
6 conglobationibus P: conglotationibus RB nubium RB: nubiumque P
7 caeterisque quae *om.* P 9 incongruum RB: ei congruum P est *om.* P
10 terris aquisque RB: terras aquamque P 14 *gl. marg. glo(ssa)* amphibium
dicitur omne animal quod aliquando in terra aliquando in aqua uel aere uiuit.
AMΦI enim pro ambo ponitur, BIOC autem uita. AMΦIBION igitur utramque uitam
ducens C in B 15 perspicitur RBP^c: perspicatur P* 20 gregatim R(C)B:
gregium P 21 siue (2) RB: seu P 22 *lemma* de amphibiiis generalis est luligo
foce cocodrillus Rm 24 crocodili RB: corcodrili P 26 *lemma* quod pisces

fishes, are created from the grosser kind of waters, while the flying things, similarly in their genera and species, are created from the lighter, and since the region of the air which lies between the moon and the earth is divided into two parts, of which the upper is serene and subject to none of the disturbances which arise in the air from the earthly and watery vapours, while the lower is moist and of a more solid quality, and accommodated to the motions of the winds, the accumulations of clouds, and the other things which result from the proximity of the earth and of the waters, it is not unreasonable to believe that whatever is born of that part of the air which is of a moist and watery quality is created out of air. For the flying things could not traverse this part of the air which adjoins the lands and waters if they did not partake of the aerial nature at all; but as it is, since there is discovered in them both the lightness of feathers and the hollowness of bones and the faculty of flight we are given most explicitly to understand that they are created not only from water but also from air, something which is also easily seen from the nature of the amphibians which live both in the water and in the air, or in the water and on earth. For there are some flying things which spend part of their time in the air and part in the water, and while they live in the water adopt the form of fishes, but in the air that of birds, and this they do by changing their shape every six months. For for six months they swim about in the water and for six months fly about in the air and descend to the earth like other flying things [and this species of birds always goes about in flocks whether in the air or in the water and is called 'luligo'];⁸⁰ from this we are given to understand that [the flying things] participate in the substance of both elements, that is, of air and of water. But there are amphibians, that is, things that live a double life, on earth and on the water: seals and crocodiles and many similar animals.

There is also another argument to prove that flying things are made from moist air. For they breathe in and out, and therefore dwell both on land and in the air, but in water they are suffocated, and therefore always swim on the surface, save for those amphibians which deliberately plunge beneath the waves.

But fishes, because they are created almost entirely out of thickened water, not being able to breathe in and out like the animals of earth and air, on contact with earth and air very quickly perish. However, they are not entirely deprived of respiration. For if they were absolutely deprived of it they would not sleep. But, as Pliny says, fish do sleep. Therefore they possess lungs which breathe in

dormire et de subtili aere uero de cuius spirare aues qñ spirare et respirare Rm
30 quoniam—sunt RB: de aqua ac pene sola spissa creati P creati ex creata B
32 pereunt ex periuntur B 34 dormirent ex dormire P

corpulentiori aere sed ex illo tenuissimo omniaque corporea penetrante accipiunt.

Quoniam igitur pisces et uolatilia plus caeteris animalibus ex umida natura ac pene sola creari eorum qualitates manifeste declarant —umida nanque sunt et frigida—, propterea ex aquis produci diuina scriptura commemorat.

Et intentus aspice. Non dixit 'deducat aqua' sed 'producant aquae', ut intelligas aquarum, ut diximus duas species esse, crassiorem quidem in pelago et fluminibus, leuiorem uero in aere, ideoque distinxit narrationem dicens: 'Producant aquae.' Deinde subiungit: 'Reptile animae uiuentis et uolatile super terram', ac si aperte diceret: Aquarum una species crassior quidem pisces, altera uero quae leuior est uolatilia [producat], quod etiam ex ipsis corporibus quis potest dinoscere. Pisces siquidem crassiorum corporum ponderositate grauari, uolatilia uero pennarum leuitate in altum subleuari uidemus.

Quod autem ait: 'super terram sub firmamento caeli', aperte significat uolatilium corpora terreno pondere non omnino praegruari, sed super terram in aera, cuius umida qualitate condita sunt, *subuehi*.

'Sub firmamento caeli.' Quoniam subtilitati et spiritualitati simplicium elementorum, quae, sicut exposuimus, firmamenti seu caeli uocabulo diuina significant eloquia nulla species animalium, quemadmodum auium naturali similitudine appropinquat, iure sub firmamento caeli uolatilia fieri iussa sunt, hoc est in uicinia purissimorum ac pene incorporalium elementorum qualitatis. Sub firmamento itaque caeli uolatile creatur, hoc est prope, infra tamen spiritualium corporum leuissimam exilitatem. Hactenus de conditione piscium et uolatilium in primordialibus causis, eorum uero in genera et species processio sequitur.

'Creauitque deus KETH grandia et omnem animam uiuentem' et reliqua. KETOC [hoc est belua] neutri generis est apud Grecos et singularis numeri, pluraliter autem, sicut et caeter[a] apud eos neutralia nomina, A littera terminatur, KETOC KETEA. Deinde per synlemsin duarum syllabarum in una, hoc est E et A in H, KETEA KETH; et duorum accentu[u]m, acuti uidelicet et grauis in unum, id est in circumflexum. KETEA enim in pene ultima acuitur, in

10-11 Gen. i. 20. 17 Gen. i. 20. 21 Gen. i. 20. 31 Gen. i. 21.

1-2 penetrante RB: penetrante P 3 caeteris R: acitris B: ceteris P 4 umida R^cBP: humida R* 7 deducat RB: producat P 10 distinxit BP: distinxit R 13 leuior est RB: leuiorem P 14 crassiorum RB: crassior P 18 post terreno *rasura* B 20 subuehi *in ras.* R(C) 26-27 itaque *om.* P 27 uolatile *ex* uolatilium P 28 corporum R^cBP: corporalium R* 39 processio R^p: procesio R*B 31 KETH R: KETH B: KHTH P 32 KETOC R:

and out. But that breath they derive not from the thicker air but from that most subtle kind which penetrates all corporeal things.

Since, then, fishes and flying things clearly show more than other animals that their qualities are created from the moist nature almost entirely—for they are moist and cold—, for that reason Divine Scripture records that they are produced from the waters.

And observe carefully: he did not say, Let the water bring down, but, Let the waters bring forth, that you may understand that, as we have said, there are two kinds of waters, a grosser kind in the sea and rivers, a lighter in the air, and therefore he brought this distinction into his narrative in the words 'Let the waters bring forth'. Then he adds 'the creeping thing of living soul and the thing that flies over the earth', as though to say openly, [Let] one kind of water, the grosser, [produce] the fishes, the other, which is the lighter, the flying things, which one can also see from their very bodies. For we see that fishes are encumbered by the heaviness of grosser bodies, while the flying things are raised up into the height by the lightness of their feathers.

But in saying, 'above the earth under the firmament of heaven', he clearly signifies that the bodies of the flying things are not at all encumbered by the heaviness of earth, but *are raised* into the air from whose moist quality they are created.

'Under the firmament of heaven.' Since to the fineness and spirituality of the simple elements which, as we have explained, the Divine Oracles signify under the name of firmament or heaven, no other kind of animals shows a nature more similar than do the birds, it is appropriate that the flying things should be ordered to be made under the firmament of heaven, that is, in the vicinity of the quality of the most pure and all but incorporeal elements. Therefore the flying thing is created under the firmament of heaven, that is, close to, but below, the very light thinness of spiritual bodies. So much for the creation of the fishes and flying things in their primordial causes. Their procession into their genera and species follows.

'And God created great *κῆτη* and every living soul' and so forth. *Κητος* [that is, monster] is of the neuter gender with the Greeks, and of the singular number, but in the plural, as in the case of the other neuter nouns with them, it ends in the letter *α*: *κητος, κητεα*. Then there is contraction of the two syllables into one, that is of *ε* and *α* into *η*, *κητεα, κητη*, and of the two accents, namely an acute and a grave, that is, into one, a circumflex. For *κητεα* is accented acutely on the second

KETOC B; KETOC P 34 KETOC KETEA R: KETOC KETEA B: TOKETOC TAKEA P 35 E . . . A *in ras.* R(C) 35-36 KETEA KETH R: KETEA KETH B: KETEA KETH P 36 accentuum R^c(C)BP: accentum R* KETEA RB: KETEA P

ultima uero grauatur, KETH autem in fine circumflectitur. Sed huic libro, ne longius progrediatur, finis est imponendus, ut arbitror, si tibi uidetur.

A. Videtur quidem, et iamdudum si prolixitas rationum non retardaret terminum postulauerat.

5

syllable, but is grave on the last, while κητη carries the circumflex.⁸¹ But we must, as I think, put an end to this book and not prolong it further, if you agree.

A. Indeed I agree. And it would have required an end long since, if the prolixity of the reasoning had not held us back.⁸²

NOTES ON TEXT AND TRANSLATION

1. *nimia . . . claritate obscurantur*: the doctrine of the Divine Dark according to which the inaccessible light is a darkness not from deprivation of light but from excess of it derives from the Ps.-Dionysius, e.g. PG iii. 997B 1-2, 1000C 10, 1001A 4-5, 1025A, B 12-13, 1033B 14, 1073A. His usual term is *γνόφος*, which Eriugena regularly translates *caligo*. See further H.-Ch. Puech, 'La ténèbre mystique chez le ps.-Denys Aréopagite', *Études Carmélitaines*, xxiii. 2 (1938), pp. 33-53; R. Roques, 'Contemplation, Extase, et Ténèbre chez le ps.-Denys', *Dict. de la spiritualité*, ii (1952), 1885-1911.

2. *ex qua . . . in qua . . . per quam . . . ad quam*: Creation is from the Father, as the Efficient Cause and First Division of Nature which is not created but creates; in the Son, the Formal Cause, Who is the plenitude of the primordial causes which constitute the Second Division of Nature which is created and creates; through the Holy Spirit, the Distributor of the divine gifts by means of which each effect is, and is what it is, the Constitutor therefore of the Material Cause and the Third Division of Nature which is created and does not create; and for God as the superessential, supercausative, and imparticipable Fourth Division of Nature which is neither created nor creates and is the Final Cause.

3. *essentialis et superessentialis* relate to *bonitas* and *plus quam bonitas* respectively. In the Cataphatic theology God is essential Goodness, in the Apophatic He is superessential More-than-Goodness. The analogy of the circumference of the circle on which all points are equidistant from the centre is apt to the Cataphatic theology in which the good-through-itself participates in the Essential Goodness which is one among aspects of the Divine which are in reality one. The good-through-itself, therefore, is related to the Divine precisely as are all the other primordial causes. The analogy is not, however, apt to the Apophatic theology. Whereas the Essential Goodness creates or establishes the universe (*uniuersitatis conditae*), of which the causes are the *primordia*, the Superessential More-than-Goodness brings it from non-essence to essence, an act logically prior to creation as Eriugena understands it, and therefore prior to the establishment of the Primordial Causes. Therefore the good-through-itself that is the first participation of the Superessential More-than-Goodness has a corresponding logical priority over the other Primordial Causes which depend for their essence upon being brought into essence. It is in terms of the duality-in-unity of the two theologies that the duality-in-unity of the Good is both the source of the causes and one of them, and this in turn justifies Nutritor in allowing goodness-through-itself the primacy.

4. *simpliciter . . . esse . . . bene esse . . . aeternaliter esse*: the triad which St. Maximus often substitutes for Procession, Conversion, and Permanence; for our being is our creation from God, our well-being is our conversion to God, our eternal being is our permanent abode in God (cf. H. U. von Balthasar, *Liturgie cosmique*, edn. 1 (Paris, 1947), p. 95; I. P. Sheldon-Williams, 'The Greek Christian Platonist Tradition from the Cappadocians to Maximus and Eriugena', *Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early*

Medieval Philosophy (ed. A. H. Armstrong), edn. 1 (Cambridge, 1967), p. 495). *Bene esse* is the necessary link between *esse* and *aeternaliter esse* without which each would be precisely nothing.

5. *omne quod est . . . et participans*. The proposition has a thorough Neoplatonic ring, and might seem to come straight from the pages of Proclus' *Elements of Theology*; Procline too is the insertion between *participans* and *participatum* of the intermediary *participatum simul et participans*, corresponding exactly to the insertion between *νοητός* and *νοερός* of the intermediary *νοητός τε και νοερός* by Proclus in the *Platonic Theology* (iii. 131; iv. 37) and in his commentaries on the *Timaeus*, the *Parmenides*, the *Cratylus*, and, apparently in the lost commentary on the *Phaedrus* (see *In Parm.* 949, 38), and applied by the Ps.-Dionysius to the angels (*CH* 141CD; 144A; 180A; 332B; 333A; *EH* 376B; 397D; 428C; 441D; 473BC; 476B; 477C; 480ABD; *DN* 693B; 700BD; 701AB; 708D; 713B; 821C; 868B; 917A; *MT* 997B; *Epist.* ix. 1108C, 1112A). Also the source is the triad *ἀμέλεκτος, μετεχόμενος, μετέχων* employed by both Proclus and the Ps.-Dionysius. In fact, however, Eriugena's proposition cannot be exactly paralleled in either Proclus or the Ps.-Dionysius. Eriugena excludes the unparticipated since he is speaking here of *omne quod est* which for him, as we know, is not an absolutely exhaustive term since Universal Nature comprises all that is and all that is not (Bk. i, p. 36, 5-6); the unparticipated is 'that which is not'. Eriugena is here referring to the first three of his four divisions of nature: the uncreated Creator, *participatum*; the creative creature or Primordial Causes, *participatum simul et participans*; and the uncreative creature or effects, *participans*. The fourth division neither creates nor is created and is therefore wholly transcendent and imparticipable. The fourth term introduced here, then, *participatio*, is an appropriate general term for the three divisions under discussion here that constitute 'that which is' (cf. p. 52, line 25). Participation is that which is, non-participation is that which is not.

6. *dationum et donationum*: lit., 'acts of giving and donation'. These words are Eriugena's considered translations for *δόσις* and *δώρημα* (less accurately translated *datum* and *donum* in the Vulgate) in James i. 17. Translators and commentators for the most part make no distinction between *δόσις* and *δώρημα*, and perhaps none was intended by St. James or even understood by Dionysius. For the latter, however, as a Neoplatonist, any mention of a *κατάβασις* or *πρόοδος* must involve an *ἀνάβασις* or *ἐπιστροφή*, and he immediately proceeds: 'But every procession (*πρόοδος*) . . . that comes down to us with its gifts . . . converts us (*ἐπιστρέφει*) to the unity and deifying simplicity of the Father who gathers all things together again into one (*συναγωγῶν*)' (*CH* i. 1, PG iii. 120B 7-10). Eriugena, therefore, takes the *datum* to refer to the descent of the gifts, and the *donum* to our conversion to the Giver: *Omne datum optimum, uel, ut expressius de uerbo in uerbum transferatur, omnino datio optima, et omne donum perfectum desursum est descendens a patre luminum. Quae apostolica sententia diuinam dationem ex diuina donatione mirabili discernit differentia* (*Expos.* i. 1, PL cxxii. 127B 11-C 1), and goes on to explain that by the former is meant the creation or substantification (*substitutioni*) of the universal creature (which God saw was *optimum*, 'very good') and by the latter the bestowal of divine grace which brings that good to perfection—for everything that is participates in the Divine Goodness in two ways, of which the first is seen in the establishment of nature, the second in the distribution of grace' (*ibid.*, c 1-6). Eriugena seems to have been the first to make this distinction between *datum* and *donum*; from him it was

adopted by Simon of Tournai and found its way into the *glossa ordinaria* (M. Cappuyns, *Bull. théol. anc. et méd.* i (1929-32), p. 45).

7. *datur esse, donatur bene esse*. The terms *esse* and *bene esse* come from the Ps.-Dionysius: *καὶ τὸ εἶναι καὶ τὸ εἶναι ἔχουσι (ἐκ τῆς ἀγαθότητος)*, but again he does not differentiate between them. It is Eriugena who relates them respectively to the *datum* and *donum*. In doing so he is combining the teaching of Dionysius (as he understands it) with that of St. Maximus, who expressed God's purpose for man's destiny in the form of the triad *τὸ εἶναι-τὸ εἶναι-τὸ ἀεὶ εἶναι* (see Sheldon-Williams, 'St. Maximus the Confessor', in the *Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy*, edn. 1 (Cambridge, 1967), pp. 495-6). *Esse* is the gift of nature, *bene esse* the gift of grace, because it is by grace that man exercises his free will towards *τὸ εἶναι* instead of *τὸ φεῦ εἶναι*, as Maximus puts it.

8. *similiter*: the argument continues from p. 55, 10 before the enlargement.

9. *uirtutem*: Eriugena had a single word, *uirtus*, to designate virtue, moral or otherwise, and power. Hitherto the word has been encountered only in a metaphysical context where 'power' seemed to be the appropriate translation. In the moral context of the preceding lines 'virtue' was the only possible one. The categories of virtue which he here enumerates include both metaphysical and physical and moral concepts. It has been necessary, therefore, to have recourse to both the English terms.

10. *diuina bonitas-faciunt*: this does not mean that the Primordial Causes do not proceed from a single source. The Divine Goodness is the Divine Unity and the intellectual triad Essence-Life-Wisdom is the Divine Trinity, and Unity and Trinity are one. Thus, in the enlargement after this paragraph (p. 58, ll. 1-3) Eriugena speaks of *summae . . . ac trinae soliusque uerae bonitatis . . . simplex multiplicatio et inexhausta diffusio*. For *Bonitas* as the Divine Unity, cf. Bk. i. 13, p. 68, 28-9; Bk. ii. 19, p. 66, 1-2; for the intellectual triad as the Trinity see Bk. i, n. 77, pp. 229-30. But, as we have seen, Goodness, Essence, Life, and Wisdom do not exhaust the Divine Names, and this is taken into account with the words *et omnia quae in fonte omnium sunt*.

11. This enlargement, presumably added after the completion of the whole work, conveniently summarizes most of its principal themes: in the Universal Nature, consisting of that which is not and that which is, that which is not, the universal Goodness which is not because it is superessential, generates a double motion, an internal diffusion into the Trinity, and an external diffusion which, through the Trinity, is the cause of that which is, and in causing it *is* it. What it does not cause, and therefore is not, neither exists nor super-exists, but is simply nothing at all. Secondly, that which is not is totally identified with the unknowable, and that which is with the knowable, so that one can as well say that that which is not causes that which is by knowing it, as that it knows it by causing it. The universal Goodness which is beyond being, and therefore beyond even its own knowledge of itself, by its double motion produces being both for itself and for all things, and therefore knowledge of itself and of all things: it is and knows itself to be the Trinity that is the First Cause of all things; it is and knows itself to be all things because for it to cause and to be and to know are all one. What it does not cause is not and is unknowable because there is nothing to know. But if its knowledge of all things is what all things are, then all things, in so far as they are and are therefore knowable, know it in so far as it is and is knowable. It is this knowledge that creatures have of God by virtue of His essence that is meant by theophany.

The passage shows how thoroughgoing was Eriugena's Neoplatonism. It is also one of the passages that brought upon him the charge of pantheism. His defence would be that to say that God is all things does not exhaust His Nature. He is not only immanent as the Essence of all things; He is also transcendent as the Superessence beyond all things.

12. *fecit*: this is invariably Eriugena's reading; cf. Bk. ii. 20, p. 66, 30; p. 68, 32; p. 76, 12. It was current in Ireland before the eighth century since it forms the opening words of the *Lebor Gabála Éremn*, a work compiled not later than the eighth century (see R. A. S. Macalister's edition, Dublin, 1938, p. 1). A later redaction, preserved in the Book of Ballymote and the Book of Lecan (second text), based on a MS. from which the first folio had been lost, has *creauit* for *fecit* (*ibid.*, p. 52).

13. *causatiua*: *causatiuus* is always passive in Eriugena. It was known in the school of Laon to be the equivalent of *αἰτιατικός*, cf. MS. Laon 444, f. 281^b (*Incipiunt graeca Praesciani de [x]viii partibus et constructione*) ΑΙΤΙΑΤΙΚΟΝ *i. causatiuum* (the accusative case). The corresponding active adjective is *causalis*: cf. Bk. i. 13, p. 74, 6, *Rationabiliter enim per causatiua causalis potest significari*.

14. *Operatio-in regnum*: the opening words rather of the short first chapter of Bede's *De natura rerum*. The fact that Eriugena quotes the opening section twice, both here and in Bk. ii, the term 'primordialibus causis', and the fourfold pattern (though it is not the same as Eriugena's), all suggest that this chapter of Bede was seminal for the development of Eriugena's thought; its influence can also be seen in the opening sentence of what was perhaps the earliest commentary (MS. Brussels Bibl. Roy. 10066-10077, ff. 157^v-158^r) on Boethius' famous and much-studied poem, *O qui perpetua* (*Cons. philos.* iii, metr. 9), at one time thought to be Eriugena's, and certainly based on his teaching (see H. Silvestre, 'Le commentaire inédit de Jean Scot Érigène au mètre ix du livre iii du De consolatione philosophiae de Boèce', *Rev. d'hist. ecclés.* xlvii (1952), pp. 44-122; 'Les commentaires carolingiens sur Prudence—note additionnelle', *Sacris erudiri*, ix (1957), p. [398]; 'La "Consolation" de Boèce et sa tradition littéraire', *Rev. d'hist. ecclés.* lxiv (1969), p. 30; M. Cappuyns, *Bull. de théol. anc. et méd.* vii (1954-7), no. 2510, p. 657; P. Courcelle, *La Consolation de Philosophie dans la tradition littéraire* (Paris, 1967), p. 252. Silvestre's view is preferable to those of Cappuyns and Courcelle).

Eriugena attributes the passage to St. Augustine because Bede sets against it the letters AV by which he normally indicates citations of St. Augustine (W. Jones, 'MSS. of Bede's De nat. rer.', *Isis*, xxvii (1937), pp. 430-40; E. J. Sutcliffe, *Biblica*, vii (1926), pp. 428-39; M. L. W. Laistner, *JTS* xxxiv (1933), pp. 350-4). The passage is in fact based on St. Augustine, *De Gen. ad litt.* vi. 10: *Sed haec aliter in uerbo dei, ubi ista non facta sed aeterna sunt; aliter in elementis mundi, ubi omnia simul facta futura sunt; aliter in rebus quae secundum causas simul creatas non iam simul sed suo quaeque tempore creantur . . . aliter in seminibus*.

15. *creationis*: the *creans* of the MSS cannot be right, and is probably due to the misreading of an abbreviation for *crea(tio)n(i)s*—which probably also explains Gale's *crearis* in his fragmentary edition of Eriugena's translation of the *Ambigua* (p. 14, line 26), silently corrected in PG and PL to *creationis*.

16. *esse enim omnium est super esse diuinitas*. For Eriugena's treatment of this sentence, which he quotes so often, see Appendix II of É. Jeuneau's

edition of Eriugena's *Homélie sur le prologue de Jean* (Sources Chrét. 151, Paris, 1969), pp. 323–6.

17. *permansio*: a word which Eriugena found in St. Augustine, e.g. *De ciu. Dei*, xxii. 1, 2, which he quotes at v. 38, 1006D 7–1007A 15; see especially 1007A 1–2; and which he uses to translate *μονιμότης* in Max. Conf., *I Ambig.* iii, PG xci. 1089A 15 = Eriug., *Vers. Ambig.* 1208D 8–9. But at *I Ambig.* xxvii. 1280C 12–13, he uses the simple form *mansio*. In his version of the Dionysian Epistle which he is discussing here *mansio* translates both *μονιμότης* and *μονή*, but in a context where the two Greek terms are clearly synonymous, PL cxxii. 1191C 2–3 = PG iii. 1109D 4. *Permansio* here represents *μονή* in Iamblichus' triad *μονή-πρόοδος-ἐπιστροφή* which the Ps.-Dionysius frequently employs in common with other Neoplatonists. Cf. Proclus, *In Tim.* ii, pp. 215 sq. Thus Eriugena bestows upon the term a philosophical significance which does not appear in its use by Latin writers.

18. *musica semper in motu . . . geometria in statu*. Ammonius, from whom, through Boethius, the medieval philosophers derived the classification of the sciences (cf. P. Courcelle, *Les Lettres grecques en Occident* (Paris, 1948), pp. 268–9), divided mathematics into the study of continuous and of discontinuous quantity, and the study of continuous quantity into geometry, which studies continuous quantity at rest, and astronomy, which studies it in motion, and the study of discontinuous quantity into music, which studies it in relation, and arithmetic, which studies it absolutely (L. G. Westerink, *Anon. Prolegomena to Platonic Philosophy* (Amsterdam, 1962), p. xxviii). Eriugena puts music in the place of astronomy because he is thinking of the music of the spheres.

19. See, for example, *De praed.* xix. 1, 436C 11–14.

20. *Deus itaque omnia est et omnia deus*. Alumnus' expostulation has been repeated by later critics who would accuse Eriugena of pantheism. But Eriugena's (and Dionysius') opinion is not that all things are in every respect God, but that such being as they have is the participation they have in God; but the God in Whom they participate and Who is their being is beyond being (see Bk. i. 3, p. 38, 26–7; 45, p. 138, 16–17). He only becomes being in the participation of Him by His creatures; cf. n. 11.

21. *Prima progressio-binarius*: 'For the Greeks number connotes plurality, so that the Monad is not a number (Aristotle, *Metaph.* N, 1088^a6) but the first principle of number (*ibid.*, 1016^b18 *et al.*), that from which number starts' (David Ross, *Plato's Theory of Ideas* (Oxford, 1951), pp. 178–9). Hence the Dyad is that out of which, as out of an *ἐκμαγαίον*, all non-prime numbers are produced (Aristotle, *ibid.* 987^b14). Hence the Dyad is the 'beginning of multiplication'. Note, however, that at p. 110, 26 Eriugena calls the Monad *primus numerorum*.

22. *pariter par, pariter impar, impariter par. Pariter impar* and *impariter par* are indistinguishable. One is tempted to read *impar* for *par*, which would give the three types into which the Greeks divided the numbers: 2 and its powers; odd numbers; and the products of two or its powers with an odd number (Aristotle, *Metaph.* 1084^a3–7 = Philolaus, *frg.* 5). But cf. Mart. Cap., *De nupt.* vii. 379. 3–14 (Dick), where he divides the numbers into three categories, the even, the odd (grouped together by Eriugena as 'simple' numbers), and 'the rest', which correspond to Eriugena's 'composite' numbers and are subdivided into the same categories as they. Furthermore, Martianus distinguishes the *ex imparibus pares* (Eriugena's *impariter par*) from the *ex paribus impares* (Eriugena's *pariter impar*): *Qui numeri*

quamuis idem sunt, rationes tamen increscendi diuersas recipiunt (Mart. Cap., *ibid.*, 380. 7–8), which Eriugena or one of his followers glosses correctly in the *Annotationes* as follows: *Aliud est enim utrum ex bis ternis an ex ter binis nascantur vi, ideo diuersas rationes habent* (Iohannis Scotti *Annotationes in Marciannum*, ed. Cora E. Lutz (Cambridge, Mass., 1939), p. 160, 20–1). Six, which is the product of three (its 'ratio') when it is multiplied by two, is *ex impari par*; six, which is the product of two (its 'ratio') when it is multiplied by three, is *ex pari impar*.

23. *superparticularium*: Lewis and Short define *superparticularis numerus* as 'one which contains a number and an aliquot part of it besides', and cite Mart. Cap., *De nupt.* vii. 761, p. 274, 9–17 (Eysenhardt); cf. Nicomachus, *Arithmetica introductio*, ed. R. Hoche, Leipzig (T), 1866, ii. 20.

24. *superpartientium*: '*superpartiens numerus* is one which contains a number and aliquot parts of it besides' (Lewis and Short). Cf. Mart. Cap., *op. cit.* 762.

25. *quibusdam signis corporalium sensuum significatos*, lit., 'signified by signs of the corporeal senses'. The four qualities just described, *uis, potestas, actus, opus*, or, more accurately, the four modes under which number is contemplated, correspond respectively with the One, the Forms, the rational numbers (*i.e.* the abstract numbers of mathematics), and sensible numbers or numerable groups (the things we count, not the things by which we count). The last three are already to be found in Plato, who, in the *Phaedo*, speaks of the Form of Twoness by participation in which all twos are two (*Phaedo* 101B 9–C 9), and in the *Philebus* distinguishes the other two modes from each other (*Philebus*, 56D–57A); and Aristotle shows in the *Metaphysics* that he distinguished the Ideal Numbers from the objects of mathematics, and both from the sensible numbers.

26. *in secretissimis intellectualis naturae sinibus*: cf. Bks. i. 5, p. 42, 18–19; ii. 24, p. 120, 29; 26, p. 132, 14–15; iii. 23, p. 186, 12; iv. 5, 749A 14–15; D 5; v. 36, 970A 1; 981A 5–6; 38, 994A 5–6; B 8; 1013A 13–14; *Expos.* ii. 5, 169A 5; *Comm. in Ioann.* 334D 9; *Hom.* xvii. 5; *De Christi resurrectione carmen*, 4, 1228A 15; Jeaneau, *Hom.* p. 282 n. 2; *Commentaire sur l'évangile de Jean* (Sources Chrét. 180, Paris, 1972), iv. 4 n. 2. The phrase comes from St. Augustine, who, however, contrary to Eriugena, uses the singular: *Vt ea quae secreto naturae sinu abdita continentur erumpant* (*De Trin.* iii. 9, 16, PL xlii. 878). Eriugena knows of a variant for John i. 18 which has the plural for the singular *κόλπον*, and in referring to this passage he usually uses the plural; cf. Bks. ii, 20, p. 74, 20–21: *secretos paternae substantiae sinus*; 33, p. 194, 1 *ex cordae, hoc est ex secretibus sinibus, dei et patris*; iii. 9, p. 78, 36 *ex secretis substantiae suae sinibus*; *Expos.* 246C 11–12 *in secretissimis sui Patris sinibus*. Whatever may have been his reason for this preference, M. Jeaneau (*adnot. ad Hom.* xvii. 5) suggests that it may not be unconnected with his preferring *secreti naturae sinus* to St. Augustine's *secretus naturae sinus*. Basically, in Eriugena's philosophy, St. Augustine's *sinus naturae* is the same as the *sinus Patris* of the Vulgate; if he uses the plural for the one, it is natural that he should use the plural for the other.

27. *deinde-figuras*: the enlargement not only supplies the *tertius descensus* into sense, but adds a fourth, that into the figures and diagrams by which we may represent sensible objects, and a fifth *motus animi* after intellect, reason, imagination, and sense, which we might call symbolization. In the earlier list, as also at Bk. i. 12, p. 64, 22–6, this forms part of the descent into sense. See also below, p. 124, 7. In Bk. ii Eriugena speaks of three

motions only, intellect (*animus*), reason, sense (*sensus interior*) (ii. 23, pp. 106, 9–108, 27), which, following St. Augustine's *De Trinitate*, he relates to the Trinity. Boethius, in his *De Trinitate*, connects them with the three branches of theoretical philosophy: theology, mathematics, physics, respectively. In inserting imagination (or memory) between reason and sense, Eriugena prepares the way, through Hugh of St. Victor, for the elaborations of Boethius' scheme which are a feature of the many commentaries on his *De Trinitate* that appeared in the twelfth century.

28. *aperta*: Gale, and Floss after him, read *operta*, 'as though clad in a kind of garments', which is certainly appealing—for substance, invisible when naked, becomes visible when clothed in the accidents. But all the MSS (including Avranches, of which the Cambridge codex used by Gale is a copy) agree in reading *aperta*, which, if taken adverbially, also makes good sense. Although the accidents do not reveal *what* the substance is, they clearly show *that* it is.

29. *Quod factum—erat*: Eriugena always punctuates in this way, attaching *Quod factum* to what follows rather than to what precedes as in the Vulgate. Usually also, Eriugena makes the 'division' where St. Augustine does, attaching *in ipso* to *uita erat*. The way in which he interprets the text, so read, is clear from Bk. ii. 20, p. 76, 17; cf. *Hom.* ix. 16–30, with Jeaneau's note *ad loc.* 4, p. 241. See note 55.

30. *eggigi*: in his commentary on *CH* iv. 2, PG iii. 180 where Ps.-Dionysius explains the meaning of 'angel', Eriugena had given another fanciful derivation: *Angeli non ergo sine ratione dicuntur quasi aggeni, mutata N littera in A solito cognationis earum litterarum usu, quoniam a uerbo ΕΓΓΙΝΩ quod est 'ingigno' uel 'concipio' deriuatur* (*Expos.* iv. 13, p. 268, 10–12 Don-daine). The new derivation from *ἐγγύς* is probably suggested by *CH* vii. 1, PG iii. 205B 10–11.

31. *substituatur—æternaliter sit*: the three stages which, according to St. Maximus, lead to the perfection of being: τὸ εἶναι, τὸ εἶ (pulchre) εἶναι, τὸ ἀεὶ εἶναι (cf. Max. Conf., *I Ambig.* vi. 3, PG xci. 116A 15–B 4; H. U. von Balthasar, *Liturgie cosmique* (Paris, 1947), p. 95). See note 7.

32. *uis seminalis*: here Eriugena says that we cannot expect to know how or why the Word of God is created in the Second Division of Nature when we cannot even know how the unmanifested, and therefore unmade, *uis seminalis* becomes manifest, and therefore made, in its products; in *Hom.* x. 10 sq. (Jeaneau), he says that if we would know how or why (*si quaeris quomodo uel qua ratione*) the Second Division subsists in the Word, we should, on the principle that 'invisible things are known through the visible' (*Rom.* i. 20; *Hom.* x. 14–15), 'take a lesson from the natural property of the *uis seminalis*' (x. 21–5), no longer, apparently, a mystery. M. Jeaneau pertinently notes on this passage that Eriugena borrowed the analogy from St. Augustine (*De Gen. ad litt.* v. 23; cf. *ibid.* vi. 10; vii. 24; ix. 17, 32; A. Gardeil, *Structure de l'âme et l'expérience mystique*, i, pp. 165–6; Gilson, *Introd. à l'étude de s. Augustin* (edn. 3, Paris, 1949), pp. 268–72), but whereas Eriugena applies it to the primordial causes, St. Augustine had used it to explain the *rationes seminales*; the one uses it to solve a metaphysical problem, the other a cosmological.

33. *sed . . . dicimus*: the adversative particle indicates that there is a change of speaker in the Greek text. Von Balthasar (*Liturgie cosmique*, p. 75 n. 3) supposes that the new speaker is St. Maximus himself, commenting on the previous sentence, which he attributes to οἱ περὶ Πάνταλον probably a

periphrasis for Pantaenus himself (Sherwood, *Earlier Ambigua*, p. 175 n. 70). Stählin, however (*GCS Clem. Alex.* iii (1909), p. lxxv), takes the whole passage which Eriugena quotes here as a citation by St. Maximus, for it is immediately followed by what looks like yet another change of subject introduced by the more emphatic ἐγώ γε οἶμαι which must refer to St. Maximus himself. Therefore, since the whole passage appears to derive from Clement of Alexandria, *De providentia*, iii, p. 224 (Stählin), I take the subject of Φαμὲν to be Clement commenting on a citation from his master Pantaenus.

34. *De eo quod* (p. 154, 22)—*ueri simile uidetur*. Nutritor's summary of Alumnus' difficulty introduces a crucial stage in the development of the argument. At the very start he sets forth his 'division of nature': first, nature herself is divided into that which is not and that which is. Next, these basic categories are in turn each divided: that which is not into God and Primordial Causes (Bk. i. 2, p. 38, 23–5, with n. 15), or the uncreated creative and the created creative; that which is into the created non-creative and the uncreated non-creative. Each of these subdivisions contains a paradox, for how can that which is created (the Primordial Causes) belong to that which is not, or that which is uncreated (the Fourth Division) belong to that which is? The former has now been resolved, for Alumnus has conceded that the Primordial Causes, being the Divine Volitions, are not external to the God Who wills them. The first two subdivisions are thus 'recollected' into the first basic category of that which is not, *creatrix natura*. But he cannot yet concede the same of the effects, *natura creata*, because as yet he only sees *natura creata* as the Third Division, the nature which does not create but is created, not as the whole of 'that which is', in which the Third Division is unified with the Fourth. The *nihilum* out of which the world is created is still for him, as it has been from the start, just nothing at all because it is 'impossible' (Bk. i. 1, p. 36, 26–7; p. 38, 1–2). It is only after the true nature of *nihilum* has been explained that the Fourth Division can be recognized: and only after its recognition that that which is, i.e. *natura creata*, can be understood in its full sense of the unification of the Third and Fourth Divisions; and only then that the two basic categories, that which is not and that which is, or Creator and creature, be 'recollected' into the One Nature which is and is not. The first of these stages, though there have been some anticipatory references to it (e.g. Bk. ii. 2, p. 8, 26–9, and the first chapter of this book), begins at this point.

35. *quae in prioribus—ex ipso accepimus*: Eriugena has not previously quoted this particular passage; but it is curious to notice that Dionysius himself prefaces it with a reference to what has been said previously.

36. *aeternitas*: αἰών, the word translated *saeculum* above. What the Ps.-Dionysius has in mind (though this was not clear to Eriugena) is a triadic relation between the Creator and creation. On the one side the Creator is its beginning and end (ἀρχή and μέτρον), as ὀντότης and αἰών; on the other side creation is αἰῶνες, χρόνοι, τὰ ὄντα. Intermediate between Creator and creation is a condition which in the sensible world is known as 'time' and in the intelligible world as 'aeon'—cf. Gregory Nazianzen, *Orat.* xxxviii. 8; PG xxxvi. 320B. According to the doctrine of the hierarchy of the triads the lowest member of the higher is the highest member of the lower. Thus aeon is both the third member of the creative Triad and the first member of the created triad. Time, which is the principle of the created nature, is a copy of aeon, and aeon-time is the link which unites the two triads, which are already related in their members.

37. *gnostica . . . theoria*: at Bk. ii. 24, p. 122, 3-4, Eriugena says that *gnostica contemplatio* (his usual translation of the Greek *θεωπία*) is the activity by which the soul activates (and therefore creates) her intellect—*intellectus, hoc est principalis animae motus ex intelligibilibus rerum gnostica contemplatione formatus*. At Bk. ii. 23, p. 106, 11-18, the principal or first motion of the soul is said, on the authority of St. Maximus, to surpass the nature of the soul herself and is incapable of interpretation into concepts: by this motion the soul moves about the unknown God, but, because of His excellence, she has no kind of knowledge of Him from the things that are. Thus the 'gnostic contemplation' is an ascent from the kind of knowledge we receive of God and the Primordial Causes through theophanies to the silent and inexpressible contemplation of God and the Primordial Causes themselves. It is the ascent which reciprocates the 'first' descent which Eriugena is discussing here.

38. *nihilum*: this Divine Name is not, of course, scriptural, but Eriugena attributed it to the Ps.-Dionysius, whom he regarded as 'apostolic' and therefore of scriptural authority. Eriugena is probably thinking of the description of *DN* i. 1, PG iii. 588B 12-13, which he translates *causale quidem essendi omnibus, ipsum autem non ON* (PL cxxii. 1113C 11-12).

39. *plus negationes quam affirmationes*: Eriugena introduces, distinguishes, and defines the Apophatic and Cataphatic Theologies early in the First Book (i. 13, p. 74, 1-15; cf. n. 85 *ad loc.*). In that book, and in the first half of Book ii he makes use of the former; but at ch. 30 of the Second Book he turns to the latter (see ii, 30, pp. 166, 21-168, 2), for he there passes from the First Division, God as the Uncreated Creator, to the Second and Third Divisions, God as created, first in the Primordial Causes and then in their effects. Now, before he approaches the Fourth Division, which again is uncreated, he must proclaim the superiority of the Apophatic over the Cataphatic to justify his identification of the primordial Nihil with God. The Apophatic Theology makes its first appearance in Plato (*Republic* 509B; *Parmenides*, 141E), and became through the teaching of Plotinus (*Enn.* v. 5, 13; cf. M. de Gandillac, *Sagesse de Plotin* (Paris, 1952), pp. 149 sq.) and Proclus (especially in his *In Parm.*) a central theme of Neoplatonism, which was related by Philo to scriptural teaching through the Hebraic tradition of the Divine invisibility (Wolfson, *Philo*, ii (1947), pp. 113 sq.), and this was to become the essential theme of Gregory of Nyssa's *Life of Moses* which, itself inspired by Philo, was in its turn to inspire the teaching of the Ps.-Dionysius on the Apophatic Theology.

40. *aeternitas*: throughout the *Periphyseon* Eriugena quotes Rom. i. 20 in this form although in his version of St. Maximus' *Quaestiones ad Thalassium* (*quaest.* xiii) he has *diuinitas*, as in the Vulgate. This is all the stranger since it is on the authority of St. Maximus (though I have not been able to trace the reference) that he identifies *uirtus* with the Son and *aeternitas* with the Holy Spirit on previous occasions when he quotes this verse (Bk. ii. 23, p. 96, 19-21; 31, p. 184, 27-31). In interpreting *θεότης* as *aeternitas* he understands St. Paul to be saying that the visible creation reveals, through the intellect, the mystery of the Trinity. I am indebted to Dr. Paul Meyvaert for the information concerning Eriugena's version of the *Quaestiones ad Thalassium*.

41. *Nos autem-significari*: Eriugena's theory is more elaborate than St. Augustine's since whereas the latter is based on the traditional Platonic triad, God; the Forms; the created universe, Eriugena's is based on the

tetrad of the four divisions of nature, though this is harmonized with a triadic view of the Deity as Beginning, Middle, and End, *i.e.* as the transcendent Cause, as the immanent Being, and as the ultimate Destiny of the universe, by describing the passage of the Transcendent into the Immanent as a *double* descent, in which the primordial causes are the inception, the effects the perfection, of the Creator's self-manifestation and self-creation in the creature. It is these two stages that are symbolized by the creation of heaven and earth, and the creation of light respectively. In the first God declares Himself as First Cause and the principle of causation; in the second as Light, which is the principle of manifestation or theophany. Eriugena's universe is a universe of light. The first marks the passage from the First Division of Nature which is not created to the Second which is created; the second, the creation of light, the passage from the Second to the Third. For although light is a creature it is also creative, for it causes the manifestation, that is, the creation, of all things after itself.

42. *et grece et latine*: as is clear from what follows, Eriugena has in mind the Greek Basil and the Latin Augustine.

43. *allegoricis*. M. É. Jeaneau (*Comm. in Ioann.*, Appendix III, p. 398) points out that *allegoria* and its derivative forms here make their first appearance in Eriugena's writings, expressing the same meaning as *theoria* (of which there are not less than 75 instances in the *Periphyseon* according to Jeaneau) and its Latin equivalents *contemplatio* and *speculatio* (and their derivatives) with which he has been up to now content. For *allegoria* = *theoria* Jeaneau refers to H. de Lubac, *Histoire et esprit; l'intelligence de l'Écriture d'après Origène* (Paris, 1950), pp. 121-5. *Allegoria* is Pauline terminology (Gal. iv. 24), *theoria* Dionysian and Maximian.

44. *moralium interpretationum*: in his *Homily* Eriugena draws an analogy between the four elements of the natural world and the four modes of interpreting the Scriptures, *diuina siquidem scriptura mundus quidam est intelligibilis* (*Hom.* xiv. 5-6 (Jeaneau)). The historical interpretation is the earth, *in medio imoque instar centri*; the ethical interpretation, *moralis intelligentia*, is water; the scientific interpretation, air; the contemplative, *i.e.* allegorical, fire (*ibid.* 14-15). As in the natural world, the two lower 'elements' are distinguished from the two superior (*ibid.* 11-12), and it would seem from the phrase *allegoricis intellectibus moralium interpretationum* that allegory has a special supremacy over the ethical interpretation, corresponding to a special supremacy of the scientific over the historical; it is, in fact, the scientific rather than the historical which he is about to employ now, in spite of what he says.

45. *mediatates . . . aquas, i.e.* the four elements, undifferentiated, which constitute the firmament. That water is the *ἀρχή*, the source of life and of being itself, was a Sumerian belief, and lies at the root not only of the Genesis cosmogony but also of that which seems to have been common to the Indo-European peoples.

46. *Sapientes mundi*: 'those who are wise about the physical universe', contrasted with *scripturae sanctae expositores* in the next line. With regard to the former, Eriugena here probably has in mind those philosophers who, according to St. Augustine (*De Gen. ad litt.* v. 9, no doubt Eriugena's source; *De Gen. ad litt. lib. imperf.* viii. 29), explained the alleged coldness of the planet Saturn (which should be hot because of the rapidity of its rotation) by the cooling effect of the waters above the firmament.

47. *expositores, e.g.* St. Ambrose, St. John Chrysostom.

48. *quis*: Origen (*Hom. in Gen.* i. 2, PG xii. 148A 3-4; cf. J. Garnier, Praef. ad opera s. Basilli, PG xxix, p. clxxxvii), cf. Greg. Nyss., *In Hex.* PG xlv. 84cd.

49. *diuinorum eloquiorum multiplex interpretatio*: cf. p. 188, 22-4 and iv. 5, 749C 6-7. Although in these passages Eriugena says that the ways of interpreting Scripture are manifold and indeed infinite, he normally recognizes four: historical, ethical, scientific, and allegorical. See note 44.

50. *ut aiunt philosophi*, i.e. Pythagoras; see below, pp. 258, 37; 260, 15.

51. *Iouem-peragunt*: the revolution of Mercury and Venus about the Sun, which was the first stage in the development towards the Copernican theory of the solar system, was no doubt suggested to the ancients from their observation that whereas Mars, Jupiter, and Saturn could be at any angular distance from the Sun, Mercury never goes beyond 29° (cf. Bk. ii. 21, p. 78, 33-5) nor Venus beyond 47° whether to the East or to the West (P. Duhem, *Système du monde*, iii, p. 47). Heracleides of Pontus was the first to give expression to the theory (*frag.* 109; cf. Cicero, *In Tim.*, *frag.* xi (12); Calcidius, *In Tim.* cviii-cx, pp. 156, 10-157, 8 (Waszink)), though the close association of the Sun, Mercury, and Venus had already been remarked by Plato (*Tim.* 38D). It is reported by Vitruvius (*De architectura*, ix. 1, 6) and Macrobius, who attributes it to the *Aegyptiorum sollertia* (*In somn. Scip.* i. 19, 5-6, p. 74, 16 (Willis)). The next step was taken by Eriugena who, anticipating Tycho Brahe, extended this heliocentric system to include Mars and Jupiter, an opinion which he here falsely attributes to Plato.

52. *Plato in Timeo*: in the first book of the *Annotationes in Marcianum*, the one of which Eriugena is almost certainly the author, he quotes Calcidius as saying that Plato taught that all the planets revolved about the Sun, and gives this as the explanation of the Sun's midway position (*Annot. in Marc.* 13, 23, p. 22, 20-8 (Lutz)). In fact, in the *Timaeus* all the planets are made to revolve about the earth (*Tim.* 38C), and Calcidius nowhere infers that Plato taught that they revolved about the Sun. But Heracleides may have taught that all the planets were heliocentric (Heath, *History of Greek Mathematics*, i, p. 312; Giovanni Schiaparelli, *Origine del sistema planetario eliocentrico presso i Greci* (1891), p. 61), though this has also been credited to Apollonius of Perge (Heath, *Aristarchus of Samos*, ch. xviii; *Hist. Gk. Math.* i, p. 317).

53. *caelum*, i.e. the firmament, cf. line 7 *firmamenti uel caeli*. The *maxima corpora* (*maxima* connoting not only size but comprehensiveness) are five in number by ancient tradition: the four elements which constitute the earthly bodies, and a fifth, the Quintessence, which is the substance of the heavenly bodies. In Eriugena the Quintessence is replaced by the elemental quality of all the elements, and its name, *aether*, is transferred to the highest of the four elements, that is to say, it is equivalent to fire, though Eriugena usually thinks of it as the upper air. Thus, Eriugena's *maxima corpora* consist of:

1. The Firmament, the common source of all four elements;
2. Ether (or fire or upper air), extending from the firmament to the sphere of the moon;
3. Air, i.e. the lower air of the sublunar region;
- 4 and 5. Water and Earth, the 'downward tending' elements that constitute the solid central globe.

54. *Hominum siquidem inter se dissimilitudo-non ipsa substantia sunt*: Eriugena's anthropology, according to which Adam is a person outside

history in whom all historical men are created, comes from St. Augustine: *adhuc omnes ille unus fuerunt* (*De peccatorum meritis et remissione*, iii. 7, 14; cf. Eriugena, *De praed.* xvi. 3, 419B 1-5; *Periphyseon*, ii. 25, p. 126, 30-33; iv. 12, 799A 9-14; *Comm.* i. 31, 37-40 (Jeauneau) with Jeauneau's note 7).

55. *Aliter enim-intimatur*: É. Jeauneau (*Hom.*, p. 245 n. 6) shows that such passages ultimately derive from St. Augustine, *De Gen. ad litt.* ii. 6, 12: *aliter ergo in illo sunt ea quae per illum facta sunt . . . aliter autem in illo sunt ea quae ipse est*. But although in the early *De praedestinatione* and in the *Homily*, in which because of the nature and the purpose of this work Eriugena for the most part suppresses his own peculiar doctrines (Jeauneau, p. 74), he reproduces St. Augustine's words (*aliter sub illo sunt ea quae per illum facta sunt, aliter in eo sunt ea quae ipsa est in illis*, *De praed.* ix. 6, 393A 6-8=*Hom.* ix. 28-30 Jeauneau), in the *Periphyseon* he replaces the expression *aliter sunt* by such alternatives as *aliter considerantur*, and makes it clear in other ways as well that the difference is not a substantial one, but consists in different modes of contemplation, as is the case with all the 'divisions of nature'. The difference cannot be a substantial one, he explains (p. 66, 4-13 *supra*), because if so the differentiating substance—the 'matter' of the philosophers—would have to be something not created by God; but there is nothing not created by God, not even God Himself, Who creates Himself. This is why he is not concerned to establish the correct punctuation of St. John's statement: *Quod factum est in ipso uita erat. Quod factum est in ipso, uita erat* (rejected by St. Augustine) and *Quod factum est, in ipso uita erat* (accepted by St. Augustine) are both true, for *quod factum est* (the effects) and *uita* (the Primordial Causes) are one in the Logos, cf. pp. 76, 22-6; 136, 1-28; 178, 8-14; Bk. iv, 24, 908A 10-B 1 (wrong punct. in PL). See further, Bk. ii, n. 257, p. 230.

56. *non secundum istoriam . . . sed secundum leges allegoriae*: see note 44.

57. *quadriformem sophiae diuisionem*: in the *De praedestinatione*, i. 1, 358A 4-15, Eriugena gives a different quadripartition of philosophy: *διαρετικῆ* which by division descends from the general to the particular; *ὀριστικῆ*, which by definition reduces facts to their principles; *ἀποδεικτικῆ*, which by induction proceeds from the known to the unknown; *ἀναλυτικῆ*, which reduces composites to simples and species to genera. He described them collectively as a *quadriuium* (*De praed.* i. 2, 358B 4-7) a word first given a philosophical meaning, but a different one, by Boethius at the beginning of his *Institutio mathematica*. There is no sign of Eriugena's *quadriuium* in Aristotle, nor in Boethius, nor in Cassiodorus (Théry, 'Scot Érigène, traducteur de Denys', *Archivium latinitatis medii aevi. Bulletin du Cange*, vi. 2 (Paris, 1931), pp. 221-2). It may have originated in Albinus' division of dialectic into *διαρετικόν, ὀριστικόν, ἐπαγωγικόν, συλλογιστικόν* (*Didasc.* iii. 2), but the actual terms used by Eriugena first appear in Proclus (*Theol. Plat.* i. 9, p. 40, 5-10 (Saffrey-Westerink)).

58. *omnis medietas uisibilium corporum*, lit., 'all the mediation of visible bodies'. He means the intermediate elements of water and air, as is made clear in Bk. i: *Duo uero in medio elementa constituta, aqua uidelicet et aer* (i. 31, p. 116, 19-20). As noted there, Eriugena's principal immediate source for the harmonious distribution of the elements is Greg. Nyss., *De hom. opif.* i. PG xlv. 128c sq.

59. *luna-in altum*: Eriugena found this figure of 126,000 in Pliny, as also the attribution to Pythagoras; but Pliny says nothing of the corroboration by astronomical observation which Eriugena claims for it (p. 246, 11-13).

The same figure is also given by Censorinus (*De die natali*, xiii) and Martianus Capella (*De nupt.* ii. 169–98). The calculations by which Eriugena supports it are introduced at p. 246, 20–2 and brought to their conclusion at p. 250, 28.

60. *philosophi*: Pythagoras again, according to Pliny, *NH* ii. 22, and also Martianus Capella and Censorinus in the passages referred to in the preceding note. Duhem believes (*Système du monde*, ii, p. 14) that Pliny, Martianus Capella, and Censorinus derive from a common source, and that this was Varro, from whom the latter two took much of their astronomy.

61. *Eratostenes*: for this description of Eratosthenes' experiment the common source of Martianus Capella and Eriugena is Pliny *NH* ii. 247 or vi. 171; but the ultimate source is Cleomedes, *De motu circulari corporum caelestium*, i. 10, ed. Hermann Ziegler (Leipzig, 1891), pp. 90–103. Further descriptions of it, probably originating from Eriugena, are to be found in the *Annotationes*, pp. 138–41 (Lutz), and in the annotated diagrams of the Martianus Capella MS. Florence s. Marco Bibl. Laur. 190, s. x–xi.

62. *in Meroe . . . et Sienne . . .*: the two places chosen by Eratosthenes for his experiment were Alexandria (where he studied and eventually became librarian) and Syene. Syene is on the southern confines of Egypt, and regarded by Eratosthenes as lying on the Tropic of Cancer; Meroe is very much further south, 'a great city said to be the capital of the southern Ethiopians' according to Herodotus (ii. 29). Cf. Macrobius: *Syene sub ipso tropico est, Meroe autem tribus milibus octingentis stadiis in perustam a Syene introrsum recedit* (Macr., *In somn. Scip.* ii. 8, 3, p. 121, 26–28 (Willis)).

63. *regis Ptholomei*: i.e. Ptolemy III Euergetes, who recalled Eratosthenes from Athens and attached him to his court at Alexandria.

64. *medietatem-in diametro*: as Duhem says (*Système du monde*, iii, p. 58), it hardly does Eriugena's reputation as a geometrician credit that he should suppose that the diameter of a circle is half the length of its circumference. 'Le nombre de 126,000 stades qu'il (i.e. Pliny) compte de la Terre à la Lune est exactement la moitié du nombre de stades (252,000) qu'Hipparque et ses successeurs, modifiant légèrement le résultat obtenu par Ératosthène, attribuaient au méridien terrestre; qu'il y ait là une simple coïncidence, ce n'est guère vraisemblable; quelque astronome postérieur à Hipparque, pour des raisons qu'il nous est impossible de deviner, aura voulu mettre entre la Terre et la Lune une distance égale à la moitié de la longueur du méridien terrestre; c'est cette évaluation d'une absurdité criante, mais toute récente alors, que Plin a eu la naïveté d'attribuer à Pythagore' (*ibid.* ii, p. 13).

65. Plato's statement in the *Timaeus* (36D) that the Demiurge 'cleft the inner circle (i.e. the Circle of the Other, the world contained within the outer circle of the fixed stars) into seven unequal circles by six intervals in the proportion of the double and the triple, three of each' generated a wealth of commentary upon which Eriugena drew for his theories of 'perfect numbers' both here, and in the alternative and presumably later speculation of *Expos.* vi. 9, pp. 283, 34–284, 11 (Dondaine) and *In Ioann.* vi. 4, 16–60. In a useful note on the latter passage É. Jeauneau (p. 345 n. 4) gives some of the probable intermediaries: Boethius, *De inst. mus.* i. 16, PL lxiii. 1179C–1181C, pp. 201–3 (Friedlein); Calcidius, *In Tim.*, xxxii–xlvi, pp. 81–96 (Waszink); Macrobius, *In somn. Scip.* ii. 1, 14–2, 24, pp. 97, 23–103, 28 (Willis); Mart. Cap., *De nupt.* ix. 950–3, pp. 507, 11–509, 5 (Dick). See also J. Handschin, 'Die Musikanschauung des Johannes Scotus (Eriugena)',

Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte, v (1927), pp. 316–41.

66. *Mihi itaque uidetur-computari*: cf. *Annot.*, p. 141, 4–10 (Lutz). Eriugena supposes that of the three factors involved, two, 360 and 125, are constant, so that variation in the calculation of the length on the ground of a degree must be due to variation in the measure of the third, i.e. the number of paces in a stade. In fact, however, the stade used by Eratosthenes was the Alexandrian stade of 300 cubits equal to 157 m, 50 cms, whereas the Athenian stade of 125 paces equals 185 m (Paul Tannery, *Recherches sur l'histoire de l'astronomie ancienne*, v. 5, pp. 107–8). However, this only reduces the discrepancy without eliminating it altogether. But Ptolemy in his *Geography* was using yet another measure, the philetairian stade equal to 210 m which, introduced by the Ptolemies, had by the time of the Antonines become the official measure throughout the whole Roman Orient (*ibid.* v. 7–8, pp. 109–10). This reduces the discrepancy further. Finally, if we take the finding of Posidonius, also recorded by Cleomedes, in which by an experiment somewhat similar to that of Eratosthenes he calculated the circumference of the earth as 240,000 Eratosthenian stades, it disappears altogether—for 24 Eratosthenian stades are equivalent to 18 philetairian stades.

67. *Triplicata-circuli lunaris diametrum efficit*: the distance from the surface of the earth to the moon, being equal to the earth's diameter, is equal to twice the earth's radius, or twice the distance from the surface of the earth to its centre. Since the centre of the earth is also the centre of the lunar orbit, the radius of that orbit will be equal to three times the radius of the terrestrial globe. Therefore its diameter will be three times the diameter of the earth, or three times the length of the earth's shadow which covers the distance from the earth to the moon.

68. *diastemata*: see p. 244, 27. It is doubtful if this theory goes back to Pythagoras. Theo of Smyrna gives as its originator Alexander of Aetolia, who flourished in the third century B.C. (Theo, *De astron.* xv. pp. 180–93 (Martin); pp. 226–33 (Dupuis)), to be followed by Eratosthenes (*ibid.*), with the difference that Alexander attributed the lowest note to the Earth and the highest to Saturn; for Eratosthenes the earth being immobile emits no sound, so that the lunar orbit produced the lowest note with the sphere of the fixed stars completing the octave. Eriugena, as we shall see, takes the other view of tonality, *analogia*: earth, moon, Sun and fixed stars are a tetrachord, with the Sun as the octave and the fixed stars as the double octave.

69. *mille milies dcxxxviii milia*: *milia* seems to have been added by an oversight, and is rightly discarded by P, leaving 1,638,000; i.e. 13 terrestrial diameters, calculated on the same principle that allows 3 diameters from the centre to the moon and 7 from the centre to the Sun. P. Duhem says (*Système du monde*, iii, p. 59) that these figures agree neither with Pliny nor with Censorinus nor with Martianus Capella; but since these base their theories of the music of the spheres on that of Eratosthenes, for whom the eight orbits correspond to the notes of a single octave, whereas Eriugena adopts the 'Pythagorean' system of the double octave, this is understandable. Even so, it is worth nothing that (a) all agree that the distance from earth to moon constitutes one tone, and (b) that Martianus Capella, whom Eriugena is chiefly following, makes the sum of the tones of an octave to be $6\frac{1}{2}$, exactly the half of Eriugena's total for the double octave.

70. *Exterior . . . sensus . . . interioris . . . iudicium*: judgement, and therefore the possibility of error, lies with the interior sense, not with the exterior which is merely receptive. For the interior and exterior senses see Bk. ii. 23, p. 98, 5–9.

71. *mater . . . demensionum*, a widespread tradition according to Hippolytus (i. 2, 18, p. 8, 21 (Wendland); cf. Porphyry, *Vit. Pyth.* 6) 'Pythagoras learnt of the Egyptians the science of numbers and measures', and Iamblichus says that he lived for 22 years in the Egyptian temples, giving himself up to the study of astronomy, geometry, and the Mysteries (Iamblichus, *Vit. Pyth.* iv. 18–19, p. 12, 27 (Deubner)). According to Paul Masson-Oursel, *La Philosophie en Orient* (fasc. supplémentaire to Bréhier's *Histoire de la philosophie*) (Paris, 1948), the inventions of the Egyptians included the calculation of the solar year of 365¼ days, its division into 12 months related to the 12 signs of the Zodiac, the week of seven days, each allotted to its planet, the division of the day into 24 hours, the sphericity of the universe (but not of the earth), the fiery nature of the stars, the theories of eclipses and epicycles, the four elements—in fact, almost all the constituents of science as known to Eriugena.

72. *dierum annorumque reuolutione*: i.e. the celestial equator and the ecliptic, not hitherto distinguished by Eriugena; but in returning to the scriptural text he is also reverting from the vagueness of Martianus to the precision of St. Basil.

73. *quidam philosophorum*: Peripatetics, who subscribed to the theory of the First Unmoved Mover at the circumference of the world.

74. *communem uitam*: in referring to the theologians' avoidance of the term *uita* in this context Eriugena is reflecting the doubts about the Platonic World Soul felt by many of the Fathers, especially St. Augustine. For him it was a difficult question to which neither authority nor reason supplied any answer (*Retract.* i. 5, 3, correcting *De immort. anim.* xv. 24; *Retract.* i. 11, 4, correcting *De musica*, vi. 14, 43). His final view seems to have been that if there is such a thing as a World Soul it must be a creature (*uitalem creaturam*), and therefore not God: *inuisibilis spiritus, qui tamen etiam ipse creatura esset, id est, non deus sed a deo facta atque insita natura* (*De consensu euangelistarum*, i. 23, 35); and if it occurs in Scripture at all, it is as the *spiritus dei* of Gen. i. 2. Therefore he could not have agreed with Eriugena's identification of the *spiritus dei* with the Holy Spirit (Bk. ii. 20, p. 68, 31–36). But Eriugena, in spite of what he says here, did not have the same scruples as the Fathers in seeing the Holy Spirit in *anima mundi*, nor was it impossible for him that God should in a sense be created (for He creates Himself), nor that the creature should in a sense be God (for the essence of all things is the Divine Superessence).

75. MHNKA: see Bk. i, n. 134, pp. 236–7.

76. *primum quidem—extra se sunt*: this relates to the sense of hearing, and, following St. Augustine, describes the channels by which physical sound is communicated to the intellect. In *De mus.* vi St. Augustine demonstrates this from the example of St. Ambrose's verse *Deus creator omnium* (*Conf.* ix. 12, 32). Being a line of verse it is rhythmic, i.e. it consists of numbers, the numerical relation between the short and long syllables of the iambic line. These numbers exist in the movement of the air which produces the sound (cf. line 6 *per aera diffuso*), the physical sound which we hear when it encounters the ear; as such they are *numeri occurrentes* (line 10), literally numbers that come to meet us. But they also exist in the sense that hears

them, and as such are *numeri sensuales* (line 9). But for them to be heard at all they must be pronounced, and as such they are *numeri progressores* (line 10), numbers that advance from the physical sound to the sense, numbers in the voice that recites them. But if we are to recognize them as making up the first line of St. Ambrose's hymn we must be remembering that hymn, so that the numbers are retained in our memory; as such they are *numeri recordabiles* (line 11), which unlike the others do not disturb the air or strike the ear. Fifthly, and finally, they exist in our critical faculty as canons by which we judge whether the verse has been recited well or ill; these are the *numeri iudiciales*. Cf. St. Augustine, *De mus.* vi. 6, 16: *Vocentur ergo primi iudiciales, secundi progressores, tertii occurrentes, quarti recordabiles, quinti sonores*. Eriugena divides the *sonores* into *corporales* and *sensuales* (line 9), and the *iudiciales* into the *rationales*, which order the numbers that the memory has received through the sense (line 11), and the *intellectuales*, which judge the *sonores* (*corporales* and *sensuales*) by canons which are not their own but the transcendent *diuini numeri* (lines 12–13), i.e. Plato's 'ideal numbers'.

77. *officina*: see Bk. ii, n. 50, pp. 218–19. To the references there given add Greg. Naz., *Orat.* xlv. 7.

78. *Gregorius . . . Nysseus qui etiam Nazanzenus uocatur*: the extent to which Eriugena confused the two Gregories has been exaggerated. Floss's footnote at PL cxxii. 860A 8–13, *Joannes Scotus duos Gregorios, Nazianzenum et Nyssenum, confundit eosque unum eundemque patrem esse autumat*, which he may have meant to apply only to that particular passage, has usually been taken to express the general rule. Cappuyns believed that the confusion begins only at the end of this book, viz. with the present passage (*Jean Scot Érigène*, p. 177), but left the impression that from then on the two Gregories were consistently regarded as one person, which is not true: I retract my statement in n. 392 of Book ii. Normally, and consistently as far as Bk. iv. 12, 800C 4–5, his references to Gregory of Nyssa are accurate and full, if not in their original form, then completed by subsequent additions; apparent inaccuracies in the numbering of the chapters are due to the fact that ch. xii of the *De hom. opif.* (translated by him under the title *De imagine*), is split up into two chapters, xii and xiii in the *De imagine*, and ch. xxii is omitted. The title is usually given, usually in the form *Sermo de imagine*, often with the number of the chapter from which the citation is taken, and the author's name is frequently qualified by *Nysseus* or *Nyssenus* in various forms. The citations from Gregory Nazianzen's work known to Eriugena from Maximus' *Ambigua* are less precise. Although Eriugena divided his translation into chapters (Cappuyns, pp. 168–71), he makes no reference to them in his citations. The reference is usually to *Gregorius theologus*; with one exception (v. 19, 892C 2–3) the epithet *Nazianzenus* and its variants only occur in cases where, as here, there is a confusion between the two Gregories. From iv. 11 (excluding the present isolated passage), a state of confusion does begin to appear. This becomes explicit in the summary at the end of Book iv: 'But I base my reasoning on what seems to me most true in the opinions of the Holy Fathers, Ambrose and Augustine and the venerable Gregory Nazianzen, who is also called Nyssaeus (*qui et Nyssaeus dicitur*), and his expositor, Maximus the monk' (860A 8–13). The assimilation is complete.

79. *participat* for *participant*, perhaps because Eriugena has overlooked the fact that the disjunctive subjects *illa, haec* are each plural. But there is a more serious error, for the Greek is *μετέχοντα*. Eriugena's quotation is not

a complete sentence but the first part of a long conditional sentence which he cuts short in the middle of its protasis. 'If', says St. Gregory, 'some creatures have the nutritive function and others the sensitive, without either participating (*μετέχοντα*) in intellect . . .' ' . . . and if', he goes on to say, 'we deduce from that that there is a plurality of souls, then we are distinguishing the kinds of soul in the wrong way.'

80. *luligo* = *loligo*, *lolligo*, which primarily means a squid; cf. Pliny, *NH* ix. 15. 20. 52; Oppian, *Hal.* i. 427-8 (*Oppiani et Nicandri quae supersunt*, ed. Lahrs 1840 (Didot), p. 49).

81. *KETEA enim-circumflectitur: Errat Magister: nam neque κητεα in penultima acuitur, nec κητη in fine circum flectitur; sed κῆτος pluraliter formatur κήτεα, κήτη*, Floss, *PL* cxxii. 741/742.

82. In all known MSS the book ends in the middle of a page, of which the rest is left blank.