

Dr. H.J. Blumenthal

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Soul and Intellect

Studies in Plotinus and Later Neoplatonism

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PUBLISHER'S NOTE

The articles in this volume, as in all others in the Collected Studies Series, have not been given a new, continuous pagination. In order to avoid confusion, and to facilitate their use where these same studies have been referred to elsewhere, the original pagination has been maintained wherever possible.

Each article has been given a Roman number in order of appearance, as listed in the Contents. This number is repeated on each page and quoted in the index entries.

PREFACE

The articles collected in this volume have been written over a period of some twenty-five years, beginning in 1966 (IV). They have two main foci. The first is the philosophy of Plotinus, and his psychology in particular; most of the earlier articles belong to this group. The second is the work of the ancient commentators on Aristotle, most of whom worked at the end of what we have come to call 'late antiquity'. These articles again concentrate on psychology, looking at the commentators not primarily as expositors of Aristotle but rather as Neoplatonic philosophers. The first article in the collection, previously unpublished, gives a perhaps somewhat impressionistic survey of the whole Neoplatonic period, with special and more detailed emphasis on Plotinus' debt to Plato's *Parmenides*.

Plotinus' psychology was, like the rest of his philosophy, an adaptation and transformation of the Greek philosophical tradition going back to Plato and Aristotle. While it described most of the soul's operations in ways close to those devised by Aristotle in his treatise *On the Soul*, Plotinus' concept of the relation between the soul and its body remained the Platonic one: the two were separate and, in a properly ordered person, the soul was in command. In Aristotle's view only the intellect could be a candidate for separate existence. That was a matter that was problematic for Aristotle. Plotinus, while admitting his unorthodoxy, took the view that the intellect was not only separate from the body, but also transcended the soul and remained above it as part of Intellect itself. That view is one that he may himself have modified – a matter discussed in articles II and V – and was subsequently abandoned by Iamblichus and those who came after him. It also had a bearing on the question of whether or not Plotinus held that there were Platonic Forms of individuals, the subject of study IV which argues that he did not come to a final decision on this question (see additional note at the end of study IV). The majority opinion is now that Plotinus did hold that there were such Forms, but I think it remains uncertain that he did.

While Plotinus was certainly the founder of Neoplatonism, and continued to be held in high esteem by its later exponents, they did not always agree with his philosophical views, a matter to which special attention is devoted in study X (see also VIII and IX). Apart from the matter we have already mentioned, they subscribed to the more elaborate

intelligible hierarchies which were generally accepted, in various forms, by all the later Neoplatonists. Some of the history of this last period is considered in the article on the end of the Academy (XVIII) which goes back to its probable reinstatement by Plutarch, the teacher of Syrianus and Proclus. That article concluded that the exiles probably did not return to Athens. Subsequent work, in the late 1980s, has tended to the view that they, or some of them, settled in Harrān, a view largely based, however, on an otherwise unreliable source and some inferences from the text of Simplicius which are at best questionable (see study I n.34). Also concerned with biography, though in a different way, is the article on Marinus' *Life of Proclus* (study XIII), which is shown to be structured on philosophical principles, with the biographical data adjusted – if not invented – to fit that structure, another manifestation of the Neoplatonists' way of manipulating texts and data to fit their own models. One further article (XI) deals with a pervasive late Neoplatonic concept, theurgy: it concentrates on the origin and meaning of the word rather than the history of the doctrine.

The history of the interpretation of the *De anima* goes back beyond our period. The first major commentary of which we know, but which does not survive, is that of Alexander of Aphrodisias: some of its contents can be reclaimed from the work of his successors. Their attitudes to his work on this and other subjects are examined in study XIV. It is, however, the exposition of the *De anima* in particular that is the centre of attention in the majority of the articles on the commentators. Some others which have not been reprinted here outline the psychological views of Philoponus and Simplicius – or the author of the *De anima* commentary which goes by his name, an attribution now often questioned but not definitively disproved (see e.g. study XVI n.12). Neoplatonic exposition is characterised, to a greater extent than most other kinds, by a concern to find in the work under discussion elements of the philosophy of the commentator. I first argued this in detail in an article which is not included in this collection only because it has recently been reprinted elsewhere ('Neoplatonic elements in the *De anima* commentaries', *Phronesis* 21 (1976) 64–97; reprinted, with Addendum, in R. Sorabji, ed., *Aristotle transformed. The ancient commentators and their influence* (London 1990) 305–24): it is in many ways the basis of several of the later articles reprinted here and has, I think, helped to stimulate current interest in the Neoplatonist commentators on Aristotle. This concern can be found, to a different degree, in all Neoplatonist commentaries, a factor which applies equally to those on Plato and Aristotle: even if they sometimes failed to make it explicit, both philosophers are seen to have arrived at the truth as the Neoplatonists saw it. That goes for other philosophers whom they treated, like Epictetus, so that Simplicius' commentary on

the *Encheiridion* is evidence for his own views no less than those on Aristotle or his intrepretations of the Presocratics. All this does not mean that all the writings of Plato and Aristotle with whom these men dealt are seen exclusively through a distorting mirror. In fact some of the differences between commentators arise precisely from the extent to which some may try to produce explanations consonant with what we might think were the intentions of the author – not that they always succeed.

Most of the articles in this group are concerned with the exposition of Aristotle, but some of the evidence for the development of Neoplatonist psychology is to be found in commentaries on Plato, not least in Proclus' commentary on the *Timaeus*, which gives us many starting points for the exposition of Neoplatonist ideas about the soul – whether or not they are Proclus' own is another matter. That and other Proclus commentaries provide points of comparison with what we can learn about Plutarch's commentary on some or all of the *De anima*, a commentary which appears to have influenced Proclus (see study XII), and thus the whole of the late Neoplatonist psychological tradition. Here we must bear in mind that the Alexandrian commentators had absorbed the work of the Athenians: we know that Ammonius, who seems to have been responsible for the special interest the Alexandrians had in Aristotle, had studied at Athens with Proclus, just as his father Hermias had studied with Proclus' master Syrianus.

In fact the long-current distinction between Athenian and Alexandrian Platonism is no longer tenable. What differences there were are as easily explained in terms of personal interest or the undertaking of tasks yet undone as in terms of different ideological orientations in the two centres. That does not mean that the results of such interests did not produce different kinds of work: one might take Ammonius' concentration on Aristotle as partly the product of his own inclinations and partly a matter of seeing Proclus' Plato commentaries as work that did not need to be done again. That, rather than the alleged agreement not to lecture on Plato, would explain why most of the work that survives from Alexandria is on Aristotle (on these matters see further the article cited in study I n.31). At the same time we must remember that Simplicius, who had been a pupil of Ammonius' at Alexandria was based at Athens, at least until 529. Some of the articles on the commentators should serve to demonstrate the degree of convergence, or overlap, between the philosophers who worked at the two centres.

A few references to work that has appeared since the original articles were written, and the odd full or partial recantation, appear as additions to notes or as separate Addenda at the end of the respective chapter.

This is the place for me to express my personal thanks to all those

editors and publishers who willingly gave permission to reprint articles from their publications. I am particularly grateful to Dr. John Smedley, who first suggested this volume, for his constant helpfulness, and for his patience at a difficult time for me. I should also like to thank Professor John Davies for some timely moral support; Anna, my wife, who helped with the preparation of printable output for study I; Ms. Helena Hurt, co-editor of *Liverpool Classical Monthly*, for reformatting study XI, so that it could fit the parameters of this book; and finally Sylvia Brizell and Pat Sweetingham, secretaries to the Department of Greek at Liverpool and its several reincarnations, for producing from various media the original typescripts of some of these articles before the days when word-processing rules. . .

University of Liverpool
April 1993

H.J. BLUMENTHAL

I

PLATONISM IN LATE ANTIQUITY

The Platonism of late antiquity is, of course, what we now call Neoplatonism. That term is a modern one. 'Neoplatonist' and 'Neoplatonic' first appeared in English and French in the 1830s. All the philosophers whose work comes under this heading thought of themselves simply as Platonists, and the doctrine they were expounding as the Platonic philosophy. For Plotinus, the man normally thought of as the founder of this type of philosophy, all that he might have to say had been said before, though it might not have been set out explicitly, and could be found in the text of Plato (cf. V 1.8.10-14). For Proclus in the 5th century, after two hundred years of this kind of thinking, the same view of what he was doing still stood, as it did for Simplicius and Damascius into the 6th. Thus Proclus, in the preface to his Platonic Theology, could write of his whole enterprise, and that of his Neoplatonic predecessors, as the understanding and exposition of the truths in Plato.[1]

Given our modern views of Plato and Aristotle, as working philosophers whose views developed and whose answers to questions were not always the same, it is important to realise that their ancient interpreters looked at them as creators of fixed systems: though they might recognise that they did not always say the same things about the same questions, they saw such apparent inconsistencies as problems about the relation of disparate statements to an assumed single doctrine rather than about how one different doctrine might relate to another.

Before going on I should perhaps offer some explanations and an apology. The apology is to those who know a great deal, or even a little, about Neoplatonism to whom some of what I shall say is basic common knowledge. The explanations are two.

First, that I am taking late antiquity to start in the 3rd century A.D., following an old Cambridge custom of taking ancient Greek philosophy to have ended with the death of Marcus Aurelius. The second is to say what I am going to do here. It relates to the first. When this view of the limits of classical antiquity still held, the study of Neoplatonism was regarded as rather disreputable, in the English-speaking world at least, and the few apparent exceptions

tend to prove the rule. Thus E.R. Dodds' edition of Proclus' Elements of Theology, still one of the great achievements of Neoplatonic scholarship, and the first modern commentary on a Neoplatonic work, was seen not so much as evidence that there was here a rich field for new scholarly endeavour as an indication of that scholar's eccentricity. The common attitude found its expression in the preface to the first volume of W.K.C. Guthrie's History of Greek Philosophy, where he relegated Neoplatonism to the realms of the unphilosophical and the un-Greek: "with Plotinus and his followers, as well as with their Christian contemporaries, there does seem to enter a new religious spirit which is not fundamentally Greek...": that was in 1962."[2]

What I want to do is to look at some of the characteristics of Neoplatonism , and to see how the picture of this philosophy, or rather group of philosophies, has changed during the last three decades. I think most would now agree it is basically Greek. As to the importance of the religious and soteriological elements in it, which for many of its adherents was rather small in any case, that is arguable, and its significance depends on the extent to which one regards other forms of ancient philosophy as enquiries into how one should live the best life either in relation to one's own society or to the gods which that society recognised. What is important is that most of the Neoplatonic writings we have are clearly philosophical rather than religious or otherwise concerned with the supernatural. I shall therefore take it for granted that we are talking about philosophy, and not any of the other things with which Neoplatonism has sometimes been associated, and which may undoubtedly be found in some of its products.

Let us now return to the beginnings of the new version of Platonism, as it is to be seen in the thought of Plotinus. Of course some of the ingredients of that thought were developed in the interval between him and Plato, but it is to Plotinus that we owe the reworking of these and other ingredients into an original and philosophically coherent whole.

Since we are looking at the development of the picture of Neoplatonism as well as the characteristics of its thought, it is interesting to note that the concept of Plotinus has changed more than once. In what we might call the period of disreputability he was thought of primarily as a mystic, and it was somehow supposed that his experience coloured, not to say, vitiated his philosophy. He then came to be seen as a serious philosopher,

second in antiquity only to Plato and Aristotle, but unlike them, a philosopher with a system rather than the instigator of a series of enquiries many of which led to no clear solution. Now he is starting to look more like his predecessors, a thinker who was often unable to make up his mind on the right answer to some of the questions which he considered over and over again.[3]

The other striking feature of Plotinus' thought, which is by no means peculiar to him, is that much of it is devoted to a quest for solutions to matters that were problematic in Plato . His successors - and I hasten to add that I am using the word primarily in a chronological sense - were concerned in their turn not only with these matters but with some loose ends in the new version of Plato that Plotinus had produced. For these reasons I think it may be worth spending some time on Plotinus himself.

Let us begin by looking at some of the rather obvious problems in Plato. The most important in its consequences was the nature and status of the Good ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας.....ὑπερέχοντος, on the other side of being ...and lying above - or beyond - it (Republic 509B). Most English speaking students of ancient philosophy would have little trouble with this, and interpret it as meaning that the Good was the Form on the far side of the constituents of the world of Ideas, and so furthest from us, but still a Form. Some in other places would take it to mean that it was beyond the other Forms and so not a Form at all. Plotinus and his successors had no doubt that the latter interpretation was the correct one, and so turned the Form of the Good into some-thing that was not a Form at all, but an entity, or rather a non-entity, that transcended all the other Forms and was the source of their existence: the second part of this proposition does, of course, have better warrant in the Republic. It was also identified with the first hypothesis of the Parmenides, for it was assumed by all Neoplatonists that that dialogue contained positive teaching rather than logical exercises, explorations of how Forms or concepts might be combined, or any of the other subjects with which it has at various times been supposed to deal. So clear was this to the Neoplatonists that they eventually came to classify this dialogue, along with the Timaeus, as one of the two containing the highest metaphysical truths. It was not, however, a wholly new idea that the Parmenides could be interpreted along such lines: attempts to extract positive teaching from the earlier hypotheses had been made in the period before Plotinus, notably by the Pythagorean

Moderatus. But now this approach became standard: the points for discussion were the number of hypotheses that could be interpreted in this way, and what the significance of each, particularly those from the fourth onwards, might be: on the first three there was for a time general agreement that they represented the three primary divisions of the Neoplatonic intelligible world, the One, Nous, and Soul.[4]

As for the One, it is strictly indescribable, and its nature can only be indicated by negating descriptions which apply to Intellect, the sphere of Being in Plato's sense, populated therefore by Forms. Some of the indications of its nature which Plotinus used are taken straight from the Parmenides: so, for example, when Plotinus says in various places that the One has no name, and is the object of neither reason, knowledge, sense-perception or opinion, λόγος, ἐπιστήμη, αἴσθησις, δόξα, his words echo Parmenides 142A: it has no name, no reason, no knowledge, no sense-perception, no opinion -the Greek words are the same (cf. e.g. VI 7.41.37f.).[5]

By such and similar means Plotinus was able to offer what he regarded as a satisfactory answer to the request made on several occasions in the Republic that Socrates should provide a description of the Good, a request with which he notoriously never complies, approaching no further than to say that it is a difficult question which had better be postponed. Modern readers of Plato might well ask what the hypotheses of the Parmenides have to do with the Republic, and answer "nothing", but that would not have impressed Plotinus, knowing as he did that Plato had a systematic world picture to which different dialogues all contributed in their different ways. To say that one was simply unrelated to another because it was dealing with a different subject was unacceptable at this stage, though as we shall see it was later to become a principle of interpretation that each dialogue had its own specific purpose. Even then it should not be incompatible with others. All this was greatly helped by the tendency which ran right through Neoplatonism to follow the letter of Plato and Aristotle while making no serious attempt to be guided by the philosophical context of a given text.

A further striking difference between Platonic and Neoplatonic Platonism is the absence of the political, and so of many of the ethical elements, a difference which once caused Plotinus to be labelled a Plato dimidiatus, a Plato reduced by half.[6]

Political structures were of no interest to most of the Platonists who lived under the Roman Empire, or the earlier centuries of its Byzantine continuation. Themistius, who was a prominent member of the Byzantine governing aristocracy, and was one of the few thinkers to stand apart from Neoplatonism, is for that very reason no exception to this rule.[7]

So far we have been talking about the treatment of problems in Plato and we shall, of course, need to say much more about that. But before we continue we must bring in another ingredient in the compound that constitutes Neoplatonism, namely Aristotle. Its importance was already noted by Porphyry who, in a well known remark in the Life of Plotinus (14.4-5) wrote that there are unnoticed Stoic and Peripatetic doctrines present in his works. He goes on to say that the Metaphysics are there in condensed form (ibid. 5-7). The Aristotelian views with which we are particularly concerned just now are those about the nature of the unmoved mover, and the soul and its operations, for these are an essential part of the organization of the Neoplatonists' intelligible world.

The self-thinking supreme principle of Aristotle's world from the Metaphysics, and the notion that the thinking mind is identical with its objects from the De anima, with some refinements made by Alexander, formed the basis of the structure of Plotinus' second hypostasis, or level of being, Intellect. This they did by providing a means by which the components of that structure, namely the individual intellects which were also Platonic Forms, related to each other and formed "parts" of a self-thinking whole.

We can now go back to Plato, to recall some further problems which he left unclear or unsolved. In assessing their relevance we must bear in mind that a Platonic problem was as good a starting point for a Neoplatonic doctrine as was a firm statement of Plato's views. So too was a Platonic answer to a question put for the sake of argument or exploration - like those in the second half of the Parmenides. And in the case of Intellect - Plotinus' Intellect - all three types of Platonic texts contribute.

To start with the Platonic problem, or rather problems. First, there is the well-known passage in the Sophist where Plato is discussing the content of the sphere of being in the fullest sense, τὸ παντελῶς ὄν (248E-249A). That should contain κίνησις, ζώη, ψυχή and φρόνησις: motion, life, soul and intellect, and yet the Forms which must be a part of that sphere - I shall rashly assume that Plato had not abandoned them - must be permanent

and unchanging. Because of the scope that this passage gave for the introduction of life and thought into the intelligible world, it was to be a favourite text for Plotinus and his successors. Further problems offering scope for interesting if Platonically improbable solutions were available in the first part of the Parmenides. The difficulties raised there by Plato himself were serious enough to have led to the rethinking if not to the abandonment of the theory of Ideas. But for Plotinus they offered material for his own philosophy.

We may begin with Plato's first problem, the extent of the world of Forms. Socrates in the Parmenides is unwilling to accept the existence of Forms of things which are trivial or undignified - mud dirt or hair are the examples given - though Parmenides tells him he will learn to accept them when he becomes more of a philosopher. Whether Plato did or did not accept these particular substances as suitable for Forms, there are other doubts about what had Ideal archetypes. Most Platonists accepted Xenocrates' limitation to things that exist in nature, τῶν κατὰ φύσιν ἀεὶ συνεστώτων (fr.30H). Plotinus simply said that everything that exists here in the physical world exists in the Intelligible too, though in a superior mode, and derives its existence from it: ἐκεῖθεν ἦν σύμπαντα ταῦτα καὶ καλλίονως ἐκεῖ (V 8.7.17). The word καλλίονως simply avoids any problems that might be caused by having undignified and worthless objects prefigured in the intelligible world.

Only in one early treatise, which may contain some other ideas that Plotinus dropped later, or even put up only for discussion, and in a rather disjointed chapter of it at that, are various trivial and offensive things excluded. This is the only place where mud and dirt are mentioned, with the suggestion that things of that kind are imperfections, and so not to be sought in Intellect, but rather to belong to Soul and to arise from its inability to produce anything better from matter (V 9.14.7-17) - admittedly a paradox in terms of Plotinus' account of the world. Elsewhere one can find warrant for the inclusion of earth and earthy things, and so of mud (cf. VI 7.11).

Whatever they might be like in this world, the inferior things are present in the higher world in a form appropriate to it. Whether or not each individual object - or person - was also represented there, is a different matter, but I should put it into the category of those questions on which Plotinus did not finally make

up his mind. In any case the apparently simple answer that whatever is here must be there too is not simply a move to avoid facing a Platonic problem. It is a necessary part of a fully monistic system in which everything derives from the One and nothing has an independent existence like the receptacle in Plato's Timaeus. When Nous emerges from the One the kind of Being that is the result of its procession is Form, and not just the form of something, but of everything, with nothing excluded: καὶ εἴδους οὐ τινός, ἀλλὰ παντός, ὡς μὴ ἂν ὑπολιπεῖν τι ἄλλο (V 5. 6.1-4) .

The next problem raised in the Parmenides is participation, but before looking at that it may be helpful to explain why a world whose constituents are Forms is described as Intellect, a description which is unremarkable in a Neoplatonic context, but would clearly have puzzled a classical Platonist. In terms of Platonic loose ends we may begin yet again with a Parmenides problem, namely the one about the difficulties in thinking of the Forms as thoughts, νοήματα, which would be located in souls. It is presented as a possible solution to previous difficulties, but naturally turned down because it would deny to the Forms the self-subsistent status which was essential to them. But if a Form is a νόημα, it cannot be a thought of nothing, so goes the argument, and if it is to be a thought of something, it must be a thought of something that is: it would then be a thought of the one single Idea discernible in its several objects, and that would be the Form. Since for Plato thoughts and their objects are not identical, the original thought could not be a Form after all. A further objection is that if particulars participate in Forms in the way participation is envisaged by Socrates - a reference to Phaedo-type participation - then they too would be thoughts. If they did not there would be thoughts that do not think, νοήματα ἀνόητα. That, Socrates is made to say, would make no sense, and so the proposal is abandoned (132B-C).

If we now return to Plotinus, we find that not only the proposal itself, but some of the consequences which Plato regarded as unacceptable, are taken on board as appropriate to Forms as he conceived them. It is here that the Aristotelian input is most marked. The extent to which the Parmenides problem influenced Plotinus appears most clearly in the treatise "That the intelligibles are not outside the Intellect, and on the Good" (V 5) which discusses both the nature of the contents of Intellect and their

"internal relationship. Whether or not the intelligibles were contained in Intellect, or were outside, had been a matter of controversy, and both positive and negative answers seem to have been given as interpretations of Plato: we have Porphyry's account of how he was converted to Plotinus' view by a fellow student, Amelius (Life 18.10-22). We are not dealing simply with the Middle Platonist notion that the Ideas were the thoughts of God, inter alia because for Plotinus Intellect was not the supreme principle.[8]

The starting points for this discussion are usually taken as the Demiurge's model in the Timaeus and Aristotle's self-thinking Intellect. While the latter is, as we have already indicated, important both here and elsewhere, the section of the Parmenides we have just considered has clearly been one of Plotinus' points of departure. That emerges at the very start of the treatise, where Plotinus asks whether Intellect could think things which do not exist, τὰ μὴ ὄντα, and whether it could be not-intelligizing, πῶς γὰρ ἂν νοῦς ἀνοηταίνων εἴη, an expression which recalls the thoughts which do not think in Parmenides 132C. Plotinus takes the answer to both questions to be negative and says that therefore Intellect must know itself (V 5.1.3-6). It cognizes intelligibles, which must be like itself because if they were not it would be impossible to do so: to cognize what is other and external is characteristic of sense-perception rather than intellection. The kind of ὄντα that are to be found at this level must be νοητά, else they could not be parts of Nous: εἰ δ' ἀνόητα καὶ ἄνευ ζωῆς, τί ὄντα, if they are not intelligible and without life, how can they be beings, asks Plotinus (ibid 37f.). In a later chapter Plotinus spells out that intelligence and being are the same: so we have this one kind of thing, nature, all beings, and truth, μία τοίνυν φύσις αὕτη ἡμῖν, νοῦς, τὰ ὄντα πάντα, ἡ ἀλήθεια (V 5.3.1f.). In an earlier treatise he had already argued that intellect and being entailed each other: εἰ ἄρα ὄν, καὶ νοῦς, καὶ εἰ νοῦς, καὶ ὄν, if there is being, then there is intellect: if intellect, then being (V 6.6.21). Forms are identified with Intellect in other places, most notably in the long discussion of the contents of Intellect in the treatise on "How the multitude of Forms came into being, and the Good" (VI 7, cf. esp. ch 2 passim).

Thus for Plotinus Ideas are indeed thoughts, and since all Ideas are both thoughts and objects of thought all are νοήματα and none of them ἀνόητα. In other words Plotinus has accepted an

identification which was unacceptable in the Parmenides and turned it into a description of essential features of his second hypostasis. In all the places we have just referred to the identity of the contents of Intellect both with the whole and with each other rests on the Aristotelian identity of thought and thinker, as set out in the De anima. It is this which makes sense of the notion that any part of Being, as soon as it is conceived as an object of thought, becomes itself an intellect. One could discuss at some length whether Being or Intellect is prior: the short answer would be that it depends on the context, but the question is only a real one if one considers the procession of the hypostases quasi-chronologically. Otherwise it does not matter. That intellect as a whole is based on the self-thinking nous of the Metaphysics should by now be clear enough. It differs in two ways: in not being the supreme principle, and in having acquired some content for its thinking.

Participation problems raised in the Parmenides are also soluble if one operates with Plotinus' suppositions. Two difficulties about participation are raised. The first is that if each particular participates in the whole of a Form, then that Form will be split up: none of the attempted explanations is accepted. Alternatively, each particular might be thought of as participating in part of a Form rather than the whole of it. In that case paradoxical consequences appear to result: a small particular, for example, would be in possession of a part of smallness smaller than the Idea of smallness itself. Part of Plato's trouble was that he was still inclined to think of immaterial entities as though they had material attributes. Plotinus, who no longer did, was able to think of immaterial entities being omnipresent in the material world. The treatise, split by Porphyry into VI 4 and 5, which he wrote to explore the implications of such omnipresence is now known by a title which may well be taken from the ἀπόριαι of this part of the Parmenides. Admittedly the title is Porphyry's, though Porphyry's claim that Plotinus wrote down no titles and that those of his edition were those by which the treatises were generally known does not exclude that it was originally Plotinus' own.[9] The title is περὶ τοῦ ὂν ἓν καὶ ταὐτὸν ὂν ἅμα πανταχοῦ εἶναι ὅλον, On Being being one and the same at the same time everywhere. The sentence in which Plato expresses the difficulty he sees in participation in whole Forms runs: ἓν ἄρα ὂν καὶ ταὐτὸν ἐν πολλοῖς καὶ χωρὶς οὖσιν ὅλον ἅμα ἔνεσται, so Being is one

and is at the same time present as a whole in many things which are separate (131B): the resemblance is too close to be entirely coincidental. The complete and simultaneous presence of the intelligible applies not only to the contents of Being in the strictest sense, namely the collection of individual beings which constitutes the second hypostasis, but also the larger collection of the same entities existing in a more diffuse form in the third. In fact in this treatise Plotinus is not particularly concerned with differences between these two hypostases, but more interested in the nature of the intelligible as a whole, and as opposed to the sensible. A tendency to blur the distinction between these two hypostases was to be one of the loose ends in Plotinus that was picked up by later Neoplatonists. What is of interest in our present context is that the presence of beings (ὄντα) in a more diffuse form in Soul makes it easier to think of them as omnipresent at the even further diffused level of existence which is the physical world. When a Form is in the individuals it somehow becomes multiple, like the impressions of a single seal. It might also be regarded as analogous to the presence of a single soul in each part of its body - as opposed to a quality like white which is divisible (cf. VI 5.6.1-15). Strictly speaking Plotinus would say that the body, or whatever, was in its soul: here he follows the lead of the Timaeus (34B and 36D) where the world is said to be in its soul, an idea which Plotinus developed into the general principle that a lower kind of being is always in a higher one rather than vice-versa. While closer examination might reveal difficulties in the notion that any one particular is in the Form that makes it what it is, it does make it possible for Plotinus to escape from the problems presented by the splitting of Forms in the Parmenides.[10] A further section of the Timaeus was also helpful here, namely the well-known passage on the ingredients of soul at 35A. The correct interpretation of this passage is, of course, unclear, but what Plotinus found in it included a distinction between what is divisible only in so far as it is distributed around bodies, μένει γὰρ μεθ' ἑαυτῆς ὅλη, περὶ δὲ τὰ σώματά ἐστι μεμερισμένη, which is soul, and what is actually divided in bodies, μεριστή...ἐν τοῖς σώμασι, that is sensible qualities (IV 2.1.73-74). This interpretation of Timaeus 35A is applied to omnipresence as a whole, at IV 2.2.39-42, though there it is clearly at the level of souls. It does however, help to show how Plotinus sees the presence of the intelligible in the sensible world.

In any case the ability to explain how an intelligible entity can be present as a whole in more than one place means that the - arguably unreal - difficulty about pieces of Forms being better representations of some things than the Forms themselves disappears. Let us return for a moment to VI 4-5, where chapter 8 of VI 5 provides some further comment on the whole or part problem. The Idea, writes Plotinus, gives none of itself to matter because it cannot be broken up. Being itself one it has the capacity to inform what is not one with its own unity, and to be present with all of itself in such a way as to inform each individual part of anything with the whole of itself (cf.VI 5.8.35-39). In any case, as he had argued earlier in the treatise, an entity which is immaterial must be exempt from all the πάθη, affections, of the body of which the most important is divisibility: what has no magnitude cannot be divided (VI 4.8.15-22). A further argument depends on the non-spatial nature of the intelligible: what is not in space cannot be divided if division means, as it does, that one part of a thing is in one place and another in another (ibid 33-36).

At this point one might ask how a Form can be present as a whole everywhere without replicating itself, and giving rise to one of the variants of the "third man" problem, the alleged need for an extra Form to account for the relation between the original Form and its descendants. Plotinus' answer would be in terms of the way in which lower entities could partake in, or receive higher ones. The participating one participates to the extent that it can, and takes on as much of that in which it participates as it is able, although the whole is present, ὃ λαβὼν τοσοῦτον ἐδυνήθη λαβεῖν παντὸς παρόντος (VI 4.3.10-11) As much as, τοσοῦτον, is not - it should hardly need saying - a reference to the magnitude of a piece of Form or soul, but of the extent to which it is available to the participating subject.

So far we have been looking primarily at Plotinus' responses to some of the problems raised in the first part of the Parmenides, and these are the most interesting in so far as they show how what had been problems were either explained away or even adopted as positive contributions to parts of Plotinus' own philosophy. But before we go on we should look again at the way in which material from the hypotheses was used to delineate the features of the several hypostases. We have already seen how this worked in the cases of the negations used to speak about the ineffable One. In the same way the second hypothesis will give Plotinus some of the

distinctive characteristics of Intellect, and its appendix, sometimes taken as the third, of Soul. Soul, however, relates to the dialogue much less clearly than Intellect and the One.

The unity of Soul is such that diversity will appear in it, while that of Nous is greater, to the extent of the unity there predominating over the diversity and multiplicity of the individual intellects - or Forms - which are to be found there. Plotinus most often distinguishes Νοῦς (masculine), from Soul which is πολλὰ καὶ μία, many (neuter) and one (feminine), but at V.1.8.23-27 he refers to the Platonic Parmenides distinguishing the first one, which is more properly one, the second which he calls ἓν πολλά, one many, and the third which is ἓν καὶ πολλά, one and many (neuter in both cases). The Parmenides says of the one that is that it is ἓν πολλά, one many, at 144E, in the second hypothesis, while at 155E the "third" talks of a one that is and is many, ἓν...καὶ πολλά The rest and movement in Intellect, perhaps primarily drawn from the Sophist, may also be found in the second hypothesis: this one must be in motion and at rest (145E).

Plotinus did not, of course, write commentaries as such, but an extended discussion of how his intelligible hierarchy related to various texts from Heraclitus to Plato, many of them perversely interpreted, may be found in the treatise "On the three primary hypostases", V 1. That he did not write commentaries was no bar to his works being treated as commentary by his successors, who expressed themselves in that medium more and more as time went on. Not only were they convinced that they were merely expounding the philosophy of Plato: while doing so they were often explaining and, where necessary, reconciling with Plato's doctrines the writings of the Platonist philosopher Aristotle: of that more later.

It is time to move on from Plotinus to the rest of the story: if I have spent so long on Plotinus it is because he produced outlines and guidelines for later Greek philosophy. That is by no means to say that he was followed in every detail. Of course he was not: guidelines were sometimes abandoned, and outlines obscured.[11] The first point to stress - again one well-enough known to those who occupy themselves with the thought of later antiquity - is that the new Platonism was not an undifferentiated mass. It is not so long since that was how it was regarded, and even a pioneering historian like E. Vacherot, who was well enough aware of some of the differences, could lump all the Neoplatonists together under

the heading of École d'Alexandrie,[12] though, to be fair, he did make some attempt to sort them into less comprehensive categories, as did E. Zeller, in different versions of his Geschichte der Philosophie der Griechen, influenced perhaps by Hegelian preconceptions rather than the facts of philosophical history.[13]

Even among those not unfamiliar with the field there was a tendency to think of two kinds of Neoplatonism, a Plotinian- Porphyrian variety and a late and nasty kind beginning with Iamblichus and losing itself in the highly complex structures of Damascius. A further, but as it now turns out, partly misguided attempt to sort later Neoplatonists into groups defined by their approach to philosophical problems as well as the geographical locations in which they studied and taught was made by K. Praechter in a well-known article published in 1910, entitled 'Richtungen und Schulen im Neuplatonismus'.[14] Among others Praechter distinguished a more scholarly from a speculative strain of Neoplatonism, and associated the former with Alexandria, the latter with Athens. The thinkers who most clearly represented these tendencies were Proclus and Damascius at Athens, and the Aristotelian commentators at Alexandria. The first was responsible for an ever increasing complexity and multiplication of entities as well as - one might add - an interest in dubiously philosophical matters, the second for a more sober approach which restrained these inclinations.

This picture was generally accepted and remained current even after H.-D.Saffrey, in an article published in 1954, had demonstrated the extent of the connections between the two centres: not only was there considerable movement between them by persons who studied at one and subsequently taught at the other, but there were even family connections between them.[15] One obvious problem for anyone working within this theoretical framework is - as Praechter realised - what to do about Simplicius, superficially an Alexandrian by virtue of his output, but an Athenian by location and association. Praechter himself, in a Pauly-Wissowa article on Simplicius written nearly twenty years later, sought to distinguish an Alexandrian strain manifested in the commentary on Epictetus' Encheiridion from an Athenian one in the other works. This is a matter to which we must return: let us now go back to the beginning of post-Plotinian Neoplatonism.

The old view of its development, and this includes Praechter's, saw Porphyry not only as the editor of Plotinus' works, but as a

faithful disciple of his master, following him rather closely but admitting, or allowing greater scope to, tendencies which Plotinus had avoided, like the major excursion into allegorical interpretation in the exposition of the Odyssean Cave of the Nymphs in the work of that name.

More recent work on Porphyry has seen him prepared to depart from Plotinus in a reorganisation of the intelligible world which led to the reduction of Plotinus' three hypostases to two, by treating Soul and Intellect as one: even the One and Intellect were not, on this view, as clearly distinguished as they needed to be if they were to be kept clearly apart, as they are not in the Turin fragment of a Parmenides commentary attributed to him by P. Hadot.[16] This so-called telescoping of the hypostases, expounded by A.C. Lloyd in the Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy,[17] was widely accepted, but has been questioned in some subsequent work, which would see Porphyry preserving the Plotinian structure. Another area where Porphyry did move on from Plotinus was in the explanation of the body-soul relation: this was one of the Platonic loose ends which Plotinus had difficulty in tying up, for reasons which are perhaps too obvious to state, namely the difficulty of establishing a satisfactory relation between the incorporeal and the material, an old problem which merely became less obtrusive in Neoplatonism because of its monism. Porphyry's solution was produced by the use of his doctrine of ἀσύγχυτος ἕνωσις, unconfused unification of things that were in fact uncombinable.

That was a doctrine that did not find favour with later Neoplatonists, who preferred the more Platonic notion of some sort of juxtaposition, obscured by some of them by the interposition of extra levels of soul, of which the last was an Aristotelian entelechy.[18] They did, however, adopt and sometimes extend a doctrine that was first taken seriously by Porphyry, that between soul and body there was a quasi-material vehicle, an ὄχημα made of some sort of pneuma. What is interesting from the point of view of the development of Neoplatonism is that both these questions, the body-soul relationship and the distinction, or lack of it, between the hypostases Nous and Soul, were ones on which the answers given by Plotinus were either unclear or conspicuously inadequate - inadequate of course to late Platonists, not to us, who would generally find their solutions even worse. They were therefore questions which presented a challenge to later Neoplatonists in just the same way as problems in Plato had presented a challenge to Plotinus himself.

In two ways Porphyry may be seen as departing from Plotinus, if not necessarily from the Platonic tradition, in directions where later Neoplatonists were to follow. One was in the adoption of Aristotle's categories into the Platonist system: Plotinus himself had rejected them as inappropriate. The other, not unconnected, was the practice of writing commentaries on Aristotle, two of them in addition to the Eisagoge, Introduction, on the Categories itself. In his treatment of Aristotle he also seems to have moved further in the direction of later Neoplatonism, by taking the line that Aristotle and Plato were really expounding the same philosophy in different words: the lost commentary, or part commentary, on Metaphysics Λ would have made it easier to assess both the scope and the practical effects of that hypothesis.

Before continuing it might be useful to say some more about why the relation between Intellect and Soul in Plotinus may be called a "loose-end". The answer is that though Plotinus insisted that there were three hypostases, neither more nor fewer, his treatments of the second and third vary according to context in such a way that one may be equipped with the attributes of the other.[19] Thus when Plotinus is concerned with the structure of his world, they are kept clearly apart. On the other hand, where he is trying to show how all things are present in the Intellect, he will put into it the dynamic aspects of the intelligible which more properly belong in Soul. Conversely, when he is dealing with the transcendence of Soul above the material world he will emphasise the static elements of intelligible being which more properly belong to Nous Lest this seem merely careless or irresponsible, we should note that it arises in part from the difficulty of distinguishing different kinds of immaterial existence, a difficulty which sometimes led Plotinus to say that they differed by Otherness alone.[20] Such untidiness was not acceptable to later Neoplatonists, who felt no inhibitions about multiplying the number of immaterial entities, and levels of immaterial existence, which they admitted to their philosophy.

The most important steps in this direction were taken by Iamblichus. Here again our picture of the development of Neoplatonism has changed. Partly because of the accidents of survival, the credit - or discredit - for these changes tended to be attributed to Proclus. Iamblichus, whose strictly philosophical

work was represented by fragments in Stobaeus and the reports of his successors while productions like the De mysteriis and works on Pythagoras survived, was held responsible for the corruption of Neoplatonism by superstition and occultism. During the last twenty years there has been a process of rehabilitation[21] - in my view it has gone a little too far - and concentration on what we can learn about Iamblichus' interpretation of Plato and Aristotle, and the philosophical views expressed therein, has shown that he was responsible for at least two of the characteristic features of later Neoplatonism, namely the elaboration of the structures of the intelligible world, and the exposition of Neoplatonism in a course where Aristotle was studied as a preliminary to the study of Plato's dialogues, arranged in a fixed curriculum leading to the highest insights of the Parmenides and Timaeus, with each dialogue being assigned a peculiar purpose, as were some of the works of Aristotle. Just how far all the details were worked out by Iamblichus himself is uncertain, but that he provided the initial framework is clear enough. So is the fact that Proclus, however much he may have esteemed him, did not always agree with Iamblichus. Less clear is the extent of the contributions of Proclus' master Syrianus: these are now receiving more attention and looking correspondingly more important.[22]

Even those who have some expertise in Neoplatonism have all too readily thought of Iamblichus as the immediate precursor of Proclus. In fact Iamblichus may have been a student of Porphyry's at the end of the 3rd century: Proclus was not born till the 5th. What happened between them is by no means clear, and such attempts as have been made to trace the philosophical history - for pagans - of the intervening period have been hindered by the lack of surviving works and the paucity of other evidence, particularly for the 4th century.[23]

It may in any case be true that not a great deal happened before the study of Platonism was revived at Athens, probably by the Athenian Plutarch, the son of Nestorius, late in the 4th century or early in the 5th: the case for attributing the revival to him is strong, if not impregnable.[24] At Alexandria, though there was a continuous tradition of, at least, Platonist mathematics, from which emerged Hypatia at the end of the fourth century with her pupils Synesius and probably Hierocles, most of the interesting developments took place later. Many of those involved, and the case of Hierocles is particularly worth noting, had been students

of Plutarch and his Athenian disciples, Syrianus and Proclus, most importantly Ammonius - not, of course, the mysterious Ammonius Saccas, whom I have deliberately left out of this account.[25]

Let us return for the moment to the restructured type of intelligible hierarchy associated with Iamblichus and Proclus, but present in one form or another in most of those who came after Plutarch. We have already referred to its greater degree of elaboration. In it souls and intellects were clearly distinguished, and furthermore divided into different kinds of each, in a framework of triadic structures in which entities were grouped by virtue of participation or lack of it: various orders of gods, all of which could be linked to the Parmenides,[26] were also worked into this system. The highest member of a vertical triad would be distinguished by being unparticipated: the second by participating in the first and being participated in by the third, the third by being merely a participant. The separation of an unparticipated level meant that the aspect of soul or intellect that was to be found there was separate from what came below, notwithstanding the apparently conflicting principle that higher entities acted at a greater distance than lower ones.[27] Thus everything could be kept in its own place, and the demarcation problems that arose in the case of Plotinus' second and third hypostases no longer applied. At the same time horizontal triads formalised the relation between different aspects of a given level of being, a system already prefigured in the more informal discussions in Plotinus, of Being, Life and Thought in the hypostasis Intellect. Here again Porphyry began the more formal and rigid treatment of questions which had been explored without firm conclusions by Plotinus, and one might see this too as a part of the process of tying up loose ends - even if the outcome was a degree of complication that we might think required radical simplification.

That the structures of Proclus were a conscious move towards greater order appears in his comment that Syrianus had cleared up some of the vagueness and confusion of his predecessors: "he set determinate limits to what was undetermined in the speculation of our predecessors, and put the confused state of the various orders into a condition where they could be distinguished intellectually" (Platonic Theology I.10=42.4-20S-W). Similar comments may be found elsewhere. That one might accuse Proclus of causing confusion by having too many entities is another matter. In one respect he had fewer than Iamblichus, for Iamblichus took the

creation of new entities to the highest level, and invented a One above the One, a lead rejected by Proclus but followed later by Damascius.

Another piece of tidying up that should be mentioned here, though it is well-enough known, is the rejection of Plotinus' view that a part of the individual human soul could remain transcendent, either at the level of Soul or Intellect - another point on which Plotinus may not have come to a final decision. This view, which Plotinus admitted to be unorthodox (cf.IV 8.1.1-3), allowed each person a permanent place in the intelligible. Apart from the fact that this broke through the boundaries of the Neoplatonic world, it had other consequences which were regarded as unacceptable by Iamblichus, Plutarch, Syrianus, Proclus, and Simplicius: among their complaints were that it entailed permanent intellection on the one hand, and impeccability on the other.[28] For Iamblichus there is just one text that points in the opposite direction, though it may be a mistake by Simplicius:[29] otherwise there was a wide consensus, which had implications not only for the means by which some Neoplatonists thought one might ascend to the highest levels but also for the interpretation of Aristotle.

The interpretation of Aristotle brings us back to the question of the two schools of Athens and Alexandria: were they the repository of different kinds of Neoplatonism, and if they were how did the Alexandrian kind diverge from the sort of philosophy which we have sketched in relation to Proclus ?

Until about ten years ago it was generally accepted, following Praechter, that the two groups were philosophically different, and that the Alexandrians were distinguished by having a simpler metaphysical system in general, and not believing in a transcendent One in particular. In some cases these characteristics could be attributed to the fact that their works were commentaries, so that they might have been keeping their own views in the background. I think it is now generally accepted that that is not likely to be the correct explanation. Here too views have changed, and the picture of an Alexandrian commentator, of whom Simplicius was taken to be a particularly good example, carefully if somewhat verbosely expounding the text of Aristotle in a basically scholarly way is no longer on display: some fifteen years ago many would have thought that a perfectly reasonable assumption, and one equally valid for most of the commentators. Now that it is coming to be recognised as false even by those without a special

interest in late Neoplatonism, there is a corresponding realization that the personal philosophies which find expression in the commentaries may differ. We shall look briefly at a few examples of such differences, which must serve to cast doubt on the notion of a specifically Alexandrian line. That there was such a line, to be opposed to an Athenian one, is prima facie questionable if one considers the extent of the cross-fertilization between Athens and Alexandria. In any case closer examination of two works which Praechter had put forward as examples of Alexandrian metaphysics, the Encheiridion commentary by Simplicius to which we have already referred, and Hierocles' on the Carmen Aureum, has shown that they are not. Not only is it true that the more complex metaphysics present elsewhere are not always relevant. The existence of a One can be shown to be either implicit or clearly required in some passages of each. That was demonstrated in 1978 by I. Hadot,[30] and in itself invalidates an important part of the till then traditional distinction. It does not, I hasten to add, prove that there were no differences between the two centres, or that Athenian metaphysics was not sometimes more elaborate than Alexandrian: this is still an open question.

With these points in mind let us come back to the man who is generally credited with the responsibility for the Aristotle industry at Alexandria, Ammonius. Ammonius had learnt from the Athenians by two routes: his father Hermias had studied with Syrianus, and he himself with Proclus. He was moreover related to them through his father's marriage to Aidesia, a kinswoman of Syrianus. Further connections of this type may be seen in the careers of Hierocles who, as we have already noticed, was taught by Plutarch, and, in the reverse direction, Simplicius and Damascius who were taught by Ammonius at Alexandria.

Ammonius presents two problems, firstly why he inaugurated the concentration on Aristotle which was to be continued by his pupils, and secondly how much of the vast bulk of commentary he and they produced between them is attributable to him. Since some of the commentaries were published by Philoponus, purportedly based on Ammonius' lectures but in most cases "with some additions of his own", while only two have come down to us under Ammonius' own name, it is not easy to disentangle his views: this also applies to the Metaphysics commentary of Asclepius, and even to those commentaries of Philoponus which have come down under his own name exclusively. A start on this

difficult task has been made, but much remains to be done.[31] It is complicated by the fact that Philoponus will treat Ammonius as a different person from the commentator even in work which is labelled as his. That could, of course, be the fault of the transmission rather than Philoponus, though one wonders if he was not in some cases trying to present a front of Neoplatonic respectability by presenting his own work as that of his master. His disputes with both the dead Proclus and the living Simplicius provide a reason why he might have wished to do so. Though recent work on Philoponus has tended to highlight his individuality, and the influence of Christianity on some of his ideas, it is important to remember that the framework of his thought was a Neoplatonism to most of which both Proclus and Simplicius would have subscribed, even if in his commentaries he did not go as far as Simplicius in seeking to demonstrate the agreement of Plato and Aristotle.

The other question about Ammonius is less complicated, but likewise admits of no clear answer. It had long been believed, since an article by P. Tannery at the end of the last century,[32] that Ammonius and his school devoted themselves to the study of Aristotle as the result of a deal with the ecclesiastical authorities by which they undertook not to teach Plato. The only evidence we have for any sort of deal is a well-known if not well understood remark by Damascius that Ammonius "being disgracefully avaricious and always acting with a view to making money, made an agreement with the person in charge of the dominant view", that is Christianity. In so far as it comes in one of the snippets from the Life of Isidore in Photius (cod.242.292)[33], there is no context. In any case the view that it meant no Plato teaching is merely an inference from the amount of work on Aristotle done at Alexandria. We know that Ammonius himself lectured on the Gorgias at a time almost certainly later than the supposed deal: the date of that is uncertain, and the one most often used - the patriarchate of Athanasius (490-97) - depends on a piece of textual juxtaposition which may or may not be correct. The deal might equally well have had something to do with the conditions under which Christian pupils could attend, or be sent to attend, Ammonius' lectures: no attacks on their religion is a possible ingredient. Or even just a special elementary course ? Whatever the answer the traditional explanation must be regarded as unproven.[34] There are, in any case, other possible explanations for the concentration

on Aristotle, apart from the obvious one that Ammonius might have been particularly interested in the subject. One is that the Alexandrians felt that there was little to add to the Plato commentaries already available, most notably those of Proclus: that did not, however, deter Damascius at Athens, or Olympiodorus in the next generation at Alexandria.

Since we are concerned with differences between individuals, we should not omit the quarrel between Simplicius and Philoponus, both pupils of Ammonius but violently at odds over the eternity of the world and the related question of the quintessence.[35] I do not intend to discuss again the importance or otherwise of Christianity in determining Philoponus' opinions. Suffice it to say that his by then unorthodox view that the world had a beginning in time is a perfectly possible interpretation of the Timaeus, and one that can be taken seriously now: another unsolved problem in Plato.

Philoponus' attack on Proclus in the De Aeternitate Mundi is part of the same dispute. Since it is securely dateable to 529 it has sometimes been seen as either a precipitating cause of the imperial edict of that year forbidding the teaching of philosophy by pagans, or a protective gesture to defend the Alexandrians against it. In view of that possibility the work has often been connected with the question of Ammonius' deal - without good cause.

What about the edict itself ? Everybody once knew that it put an end to Greek Philosophy, at least at Athens. That view survived as a historical fact till the late '60s, when Alan Cameron produced arguments to show not only that pagan Platonism continued afterwards, but that it continued at Athens.[36] That part of his thesis is highly questionable, and it is better to admit that we do not know where the philosophers who left Athens shortly thereafter resumed their activities. The latest candidate, much favoured in France since 1984, is the border city of Harrān, but the case rests primarily on the testimony of an otherwise admittedly unreliable Arabic source, al-Mas`ūdī, and some rather over-confident inferences from references to calendars in Simplicius.[37]

Alexandria continued to be the home of Aristotelian commentators, some of whom wrote on Plato too, and may even have received some of the Athenians. On this note of uncertainty, we must end the story. I do not, of course, claim to have presented an exciting new discovery or new light on a specific problem. What I hope I have done is to show in outline what late antique

Platonism looks like now, and some of the ways in which its appearance has changed. I think one can assert with some confidence that if anyone tries to do the same thing in ten year's time, the picture will have changed again. That is a measure both of the number of unanswered questions and of the rate at which they are now being approached.[38]

NOTES

1. Cf. too In Alc. 227.18-21, where Proclus writes that we must not attribute certain things to the soul, in order that we should be interpreters of Plato and not explain him in accordance with our own views.

2. (Cambridge 1962) 24.

3. Cf. e.g. F.M. Schroeder, Form and Transformation. A study in the philosophy of Plotinus. McGill-Queen's Studies in the History of Ideas 16 (Montreal/Kingston 1992) xi.

4. A history of the question may be found in Proclus, In Parmenidem 1051-64.

5. This and other verbal parallels between the text of Plotinus and Parmenides 137D-145A are set out by H.-R. Schwyzer, 'Plotinus', RE XXI.1 (1951) 553-54.

6. By W. Theiler, 'Plotin zwischen Plato und Stoa', in Les Sources de Plotin. Entretiens Hardt sur l'Antiquité Classique 5 (Vandoeuvres-Geneva 1960) 67.

7. Cf. H.J. Blumenthal, 'Themistius: the last Peripatetic comment-ator on Aristotle ?', in G.W. Bowersock, W. Burkert, M.C.J. Putnam edd., Arktouros. Hellenic Studies presented to Bernard M.W. Knox on the occasion of his 65th birthday (Berlin/New York, 1979) 391-400; reprinted, with revisions, in R. Sorabji, ed., Aristotle transformed. The ancient commentators and their influence (London 1990) 113-123; for another view of Themistius see E.P. Mahoney, 'Neoplatonism, the Greek commentators, and Renaissance Aristotelianism', in D.J. O'Meara, ed., Neoplatonism and Christian Thought. Studies in Neoplatonism: Ancient and Modern 3 (Albany 1982) 169-77 and 264-82, esp. n.1 on pp. 264-66.

8. On the history of this problem before and in Plotinus cf. A.H. Armstrong, 'The background of the doctrine "That the intelligibles are not outside the Intellect"', in Les Sources de Plotin (see n.5) 391-425.

9. Cf. Vita Plotini 4. 17-19.

10. On Plotinus' treatment of this problem from the Parmenides see further F.M. Schroeder, 'The Platonic Parmenides and imitation in Plotinus', Dionysius 2 (1978) 51-73, esp. 52-54.

11. Cf. R.T. Wallis, Neoplatonism (London 1972) 93; H.J. Blumenthal, 'Plotinus in later Platonism', in Neoplatonism and Early Christian Thought (London 1981) 212-22 [see this volume, study X].

12. Histoire critique de l'école d'Alexandrie. 3 vols. (Paris 1846-1851).

13. Vacherot's groups were chronological. Zeller saw Plotinus as thesis, Iamblichus as antithesis and Proclus as synthesis. On the differences between Zeller's view of Neoplatonism and Hegel's see now W.Beierwaltes, 'Der Neuplatonismus in Eduard Zellers Philosophie der Griechen', Annali della Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa. Cl. di Lett. e Filos. Ser. III 19 (1989) 1179-83. To Hegel belongs the credit for having rescued Neoplatonism for serious philosophy, at least in the German-speaking world. Anglophonia lagged a century behind.

14. In Genethliakon C. Robert (Berlin 1910).

15. 'Le chrétien Jean Philopon et la survivance de l'école d'Alexandrie au VI^{e} siècle', Revue des Etudes Grecques 67 (1954) 396-410.

16. 'Fragments d'un commentaire de Porphyre sur le Parménide', Revue des Études Grecques 74 (1961) 410-38; a more sceptical view of the attribution is taken by A. Smith, 'Porphyrian studies since 1913', in W. Haase and H. Temporini, edd., Aufstieg und Niedergang der Römischen Welt II 36.2 (Berlin/New York 1987) 740-41.

17. (Cambridge 1967) 287-93.

18. Cf. e.g. Simplic. In De an. 90.29-91.4.

19. Cf. A.H. Armstrong, 'Eternity, life and movement in Plotinus' accounts of Nous', in P. Hadot and P.-M. Schuhl, edd., Le Néoplaton-isme. Colloques internationaux du CNRS (Paris 1971) 67-74; H.J. Blumenthal, 'Nous and Soul: some problems of demarcation' in Il Neoplatonismo in Oriente e in Occidente. Accademia nazionale dei Lincei: Problemi attuali di scienza e di cultura 198 (Rome 1974) 203-219 [see this volume, study III].

20. Cf. Blumenthal, ibid. 207; J.M. Rist, 'The problem of "otherness" in the Enneads' in Le Néoplatonisme (see n.17), 77-85, associates otherness with motion.

21. Cf. H.J. Blumenthal and E.G. Clark edd., The Divine Iamblichus. Philosopher and Man of Gods (Bristol 1993) introduction and passim.

22. Cf. R. L. Cardullo, 'Siriano nella storiografia filosofica moderna e contemporanea', Siculorum Gymnasium 40 (1987) 71-182.

23. Cf. e.g the introduction to vol.1 of H.-D. Saffrey and L.G. Westerink's edition of the Platonic Theology (Paris 1968) xxxv-xlviii.

24. Cf. my '529 and its sequel: what happened to the Academy', Byzantion 48 (1978) 373-75 [see this volume, study XVIII]. Plutarch's role in the 'school', as well as his place in the Neoplatonic tradition, has now been treated by D.P. Taormina, Plutarco di Atene. L'uno, l'anima, le forme. Symbolon 8 (Catania 1989) 15-55.

25. The evidence for this shadowy figure has been re-examined with great care by H.-R. Schwyzer, 'Ammonios Sakkas, der Lehrer Plotins', Rheinisch-Westfälische Ak. der Wiss. Vorträge G260 (Opladen 1983), a work of over ninety pages, and F.M. Schroeder, 'Ammonius Saccas', in Aufstieg und Niedergang (see n. 14) II 36.1 (New York 1987) 493-526. Both conclude that all our evidence derives from Porphyry and that he tells us nothing about Ammonius' doctrines.

26. Cf. Saffrey and Westerink, loc. cit. (n.21) xv ff., especially the tables on xviiif.

27. Cf. e.g. Proclus, Elements of Theology 56.

28. Cf. e.g. Proclus' Elements of Theology 211 and Timaeus commentary, III.334.3ff., Simplicius, In De an. 6.12ff.

29. In Cat. 191.9-10, where Iamblichus is bracketed with Plotinus.

30. In Le Problème du Néoplatonisme Alexandrin. Hiéroclès et Simplicius (Paris 1978). The traditional view of Hierocles is defended, against Hadot's arguments, by N. Aujoulat, Le Néo-Platonisme alexandrin: Hiéroclès d'Alexandrie. Philosophia Antiqua 45 (Leiden 1986) 53-61.

31. Cf. K. Verrycken, 'The metaphysics of Ammonius son of Hermeias', in Aristotle Transformed (see n.6) 199-231 and 'The development of Philoponus' thought and its chronology', ibid. 233-74.

32. 'Sur la période finale de la philosophie grecque', Revue Philosophique 42 (1896) 226-87.

33. 352a 11-14=VI 53H.

34. On this matter see further my 'John Philoponus: Alexandrian Platonist ?', Hermes 114 (1986) 321-24. P. Chuvin, in his treatment of the end of pagan activity, refers to the 'mystérieux "accord" passé entre Ammonius et le patriarche au dire de Damaskios', Chronique des derniers païens. La disparition du paganisme dans l'empire romain, du règne de Constantin à celui de Justinien (Paris 1990) 140.

35. On this see particularly P. Hoffmann, 'Simplicius' Polemics', in R. Sorabji, ed., Philoponus and the rejection of Aristotelian science (London 1987) 57-83.

36. Cf. 'The last days of the Academy at Athens', Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society n.s.15 (1969) 7-29

37. Cf. M. Tardieu, 'Sābiens coraniques et "Sābiens" de Harrān', Journal Asiatique 274 (1986) 1-44; and 'Les calendriers en usage à Harrān d'après les sources arabes et le commentaire de Simplicius à la Physique d'Aristote' in I. Hadot, ed., Simplicius. Sa vie, son oeuvre, sa survie (Berlin/New York 1987) 40-57, where he

argues from Simplicius' references (In Phys. 874.32ff.) to four different beginnings of the year, that of the Athenians, 'which we use', at the summer equinox, the Asians' at the autumn one, the Romans' the winter and the Arabs' the spring: these were all used at Harrān, therefore Simplicius must be there. Cf. now the judicious remarks of P. Foulkes, 'Where was Simplicius ?', Journal of Hellenic Studies 112 (1992) 143.

38. An earlier version of this paper was given as a lecture to the Hellenic Society. Another article based on the same lecture will appear in the proceedings of the 9th International Congress of Neoplatonic Studies, New Delhi, 29.12.1992-3.1.1993.

II

NOUS AND SOUL IN PLOTINUS: SOME PROBLEMS OF DEMARCATION

That there are certain difficulties about the relation of *Nous* and Soul, and in particular about how they differ cannot have escaped notice. Any serious student of Plotinus must sometimes have become uncomfortably aware that the two hypostases are not as clearly distinct as Plotinus sometimes asserts. But I think the problem is worth a closer inspection than it has so far—to my knowledge—received. Professor Armstrong has remarked that in some passages the distinction may become a little blurred (1). In the paper which he gave at Royaumont last year he attacked the question of the inconsistencies in Plotinus' statements about rest and eternity in *Nous* (2), a question which, as we shall see, is closely related to the subject of this communication. Dr. Schwyzer in his Pauly article has gone so far as to say that when Soul is in the upper world it is in no way different from *Nous* (3). While I would always hesitate to disagree with Dr. Schwyzer, and hope I have not misunderstood him, I think he has overstated the case, and given as Plotinus' view what is perhaps more correctly to be seen as the implication of some of his statements. This is a matter which must be discussed in connection with the texts themselves, but perhaps I may anticipate by saying that, while Plotinus perhaps ought to say that there is no difference, he does undoubtedly make certain distinctions, at least some of the time. These distinctions are more than the simple assertions that there are three distinct hypostases which one might regard as Plotinus' public position and which are generally held to be a correct statement of what he thought.

Let us start, then, with these assertions. While they will be well-known to members of this gathering, I think it is desirable to state a firm starting point before beginning to look at what is a rather fluid situation. Firstly there are three hypostases. We may leave aside the possibility that φύσις

(1) *The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy* ed. A. H. ARMSTRONG (Cambridge 1967), 250.

(2) 'Eternity, Life and Movement in Plotinus' Accounts of Νοῦς', in *Le Néoplatonisme*. Colloques internationaux du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique. Royaumont 9–13. 6.1969 (Paris 1971), 67–74 (here after *Le Néoplatonisme*).

(3) 'Plotinos' *RE* XXI.i (1951), 563.

or the lower part of Soul forms a fourth hypostasis (cfr. V. 2.1.26) (4), since this is no part of Plotinus' usual professed position, and say that there are no more than three. For the same reason we may also say that there are no fewer. Briefly, the attributes of *Nous* and Soul are as follows. *Nous* is εἷς καὶ πολλοί, unity in diversity, while Soul is πολλαὶ καὶ μία (also πολλὴ καὶ μία: VI.9.1.39), diversity in unity (IV.8.3.10–11) (5) *Nous* is eternal and above any form of time (IV.4.1.25 ff.). It is in immediate and permanent contact with the objects which are its contents (V.5.2, V.8.4.32–7). Soul exists always, but is linked with time (III.7.11 2off.), and its thinking involves a progression from object to object: the usual term is διέξοδος (V.8.6.11) (6). In terms of each other Soul is an unfolding of *Nous*, its *logos* or deployment at a lower and more diffuse level (cf. I.1.8.6–8, IV.3.5.9–10). It is causally dependent on *Nous*, and therefore, by Pl's way of thinking, necessarily different: τὸ αἴτιον οὐ ταὐτὸν τῷ αἰτιατῷ (VI.9.6.54–5). Further Soul has duties towards what lies below it, delegated to it by *Nous* which stands aloof. *Nous* is bound to remain at rest and has allowed its son to rule the world: ὁ οὖν θεὸς εἰς τὸ μένειν ὡσαύτως δεδεμένος καὶ συγχωρήσας τῷ παιδὶ τοῦδε τοῦ παντὸς ἄρχειν (V.8.13.1–2).

These descriptions are our base. Before we leave it to discuss how far they in fact apply to *Nous* and Soul, let us look briefly at *Nous* and the One, where we may see signs of the difficulties that affect the lower hypostases. There is not a great deal to say here. But we may recall that, while one of the ways of attempting to indicate the nature of the One is to deny it all the attributes of *Nous*, there are passages which in fact apply to it language normally restricted to *Nous*. One comes at V.1.6.16–19 which probably speaks of the One turning towards itself to produce Nous (7). The most notorious is V.4.2, where the One is said to be νοητόν (line 13). It also has κατανόησις of itself—though Plotinus immediately qualifies this with οἷον συναισθήσει—and we are told that it is ἐν στάσει αἰδίῳ καὶ νοήσει ἑτέρως ἢ κατὰ τὴν νοῦ νοήσιν

(4) On this possible 4th hypostasis cf. ARMSTRONG, *The Architecture of the Intelligible Universe in the Philosophy of Plotinus*. Cambridge Classical Studies 6 (Cambridge 1940), 86 and SCHWYZER, *loc. cit.*, 566.

(5) When Plotinus is talking in terms of the *Parmenides*—the relevant passages are 144 e and 155 e—*Nous* is ἓν πολλά and Soul ἓν καὶ πολλά, V. 1.8.25–6. It is better not to cite this passage as his usual formula as do C. RUTTEN, *Les catégories du monde sensible dans les* Ennéades *de Plotin*. Bibliothèque de la Fac. de Phil. et Lett. de l'Univ. de Liège, clx (Paris 1961), 34–5, and W. BEIERWALTES, *Plotin über Ewigkeit und Zeit* (*Enneade III 7*). Übersetzt, eingeleitet und kommentiert von W. B. Quellen der Philosophie, 3 (Frankfurt/Main 1967), 58.

(6) This chapter with its famous comparison of *Nous* with hieroglyphic writing sets out the difference as clearly as any passage in Plotinus.

(7) This is if one accepts the reading αὐτὸ in line 18 as do HARDER and BRÉHIER but not CILENTO and HENRY–SCHWYZER. The reading is defended by P. HADOT in his review of HENRY–SCHWYZER, vol ii, *Revue de l'Histoire des Religions 164* (1963), 94, and the point is further discussed by him in *Porphyre et Victorinus* (Paris 1968), i. 320, n. 4. Cfr. now SCHWYZER, *Museum Helveticum* 26 (1969) 259 f.

(lines 17–19). These statements have caused much consternation, and have even led some scholars to claim that they represent an early stage of Plotinus' thought where he had not yet arrived at the concept of a One above *Nous* (8). Most would now accept that Plotinus' philosophy was sufficiently fully worked out by the time he began to write to preclude so great a change on so crucial a point (9). It seems less clear, however, that he was saying the same things as he said later (10). Professor Dodds has argued that he was influenced by Numenius' way of talking (11). Now this may well be true, but it does not solve the problem, because the fact that Plotinus is using Numenius' language does not mean that he did not himself hold the views that he expressed in it. After all he does often enough agree with Plato's views when he uses Plato's language. While there is no way of proving the point, it could well be that what we have here is something that most of us will have experienced, the realisation that when we come to write down ideas that had previously seemed clear enough, the expression we first give them is inadequate. We do know that Plotinus did not revise (12). Something of this kind may lie behind Plotinus' aberrant descriptions of the One. If so what he does would not be so very different from the way in which he will restate with a slight change of emphasis, or simply more carefully, and so at first sight differently, what remains basically the same position. And that can more easily be demonstrated. I have discussed elsewhere such a case, which might tempt one to see a development in connection with the faculties of the lower soul. Here Plotinus

(8) ARMSTRONG, *Architecture* 24, agrees with F. HEINEMANN, *Plotin, Forschungen über die plotinische Frage, Plotins Entwicklung und sein System* (Leipzig 1921), 122–3, in seeing such a stage in the first five treatises. With specific reference to V. 4 cf. O. BECKER, *Plotin und das Problem der geistigen Aneignung* (Berlin 1940), 31, and most recently HADOT, *op. cit.*, 325, who thinks that in V. 4.2.13 ff. Plotinus simply identified the intelligible and the One. A slightly different view may be found on p. 483 where HADOT, referring to lines 16–20, says Plotinus conceded the existence in the One of something corresponding to an intellectual activity.

(9) SCHWYZER, *RE* XXI.i, 561–2 and *Les Sources de Plotin. Entretiens sur l'Antiquité classique* (Fondation Hardt) V. 21–9.8.1957 (Vandoeuvres–Geneva 1960), 419–20 thinks the One is only νοητόν to *Nous*, as it is explicitly said to be at V. 6.2.7–9, cfr. too BRÉHIER, V. 81 n. 1. ARMSTRONG, *Architecture*, 74 quotes both passages as evidence for this notion. HENRY, while agreeing with SCHWYZER about the way the One is νοητόν feels the expression to be odd nonetheless, *Sources de Plotin*, 420–1.

(10) On the One as νοητόν see previous note. J. M. RIST, *Plotinus. The Road to Reality* (Cambridge, 1967), 41 ff., tries to show the consistency of this passage with Plotinus' later writings, particularly in respect of the One's self-knowledge, but is perhaps too inclined to iron out the differences. In particular I am not certain that the ὑπερνόησις of VI. 8 [39]. 16.33 is the same as the ἑτέρως ἢ κατὰ τὸν νοῦν νόησις here: the latter may be an echo of the two Numenian νόες. ARMSTRONG, *History*, 238, also takes both as parallel. On self-knowledge there seems to be some room for doubt, cfr. SCHWYZER, *Sources de Plotin*, 374–5, and the discussion following his paper, 'Bewusst und Unbewusst bei Plotin'.

(11) 'Numenius and Ammonius', *Sources de Plotin*, 20.

(12) Cfr. PORPHYRY, *V.P.* 8.

seems to mark off an appetitive faculty (ὀρεκτικόν) in I.1.[53] (ch.5.22–3) which is not to be found in IV.4 [28] (13).

In V.4 (and probably V.1. as well) we have a case where the boundary between two hypostases is not clearly marked, whatever the reason may be. But generally the difference between *Nous* and the One is clear enough. And it is not surprising that this should be so for the One has the advantage of being the first cause, and thereby less liable to confusion with its neighbour. And it has a neighbour on one side only. When we come to *Nous* and Soul the situation is less satisfactory.

Let us start from *Nous*, for the division between hypostases becomes less clear as we descend the scale. I shall not say very much about *Nous* as such, since I have little to add to Professor Armstrong's remarks on the subject,but for two reasons it will be as well to recall his conclusions. In the first place the variations in Plotinus' statements about *Nous* are a manifestation of the same difficulties as those that present themselves with regard to Soul. Secondly the problems involved are, so to speak, the reverse of those we meet when we come to deal with Soul. Starting from the notion of the eternal life of *Nous* Armstrong examined the different ways in which Plotinus talks about it, starting from the conception of it as a life without a history. From this point of view *Nous* is as it should be in what I have called Plotinus' public position. It is changeless, has no past or future, no transition from one condition to another, no process in its self-knowledge, which consists in 'static intuition'. The point is sometimes made by a contrast with the dynamic life of Soul. At other times, however, the importance of the changeless existence of true being is shown by 'raising Soul to the unchanging level'. In the treatises where this happens Plotinus seems to have been 'particularly inclined to minimize the distinction between Intellect and Soul, and to present Soul at its highest as purely noetic' (14). Here matters are perhaps more complicated than Armstrong in his brief reference to these passages implies, and what appears to be the raising of Soul may be a symptom of the uncertain boundary between *Nous* and Soul. So much for static *Nous*. But Armstrong goes on to show that when Plotinus talks about *Nous* in relation to the One it goes through a process of coming-to-be, which may even be caused by τόλμα, and involves an element of potency. All this involves duration, as does the ἔφεσις *Nous* directs to the One (15). Thirdly there are a few passages where the κίνησις in *Nous*—and here κίνησις is normally the μέγιστον γένος of Plato's *Sophist*—seems to be associated with a passage of time. The most conspicuous of these are V.8.3–4 and VI.7.13 where Plotinus talks about *Nous* ἐνεργησάντος δὲ ἀεὶ ἄλλο μετ' ἄλλο καὶ οἷον πλανηθέντος πᾶσαν πλάνην ἀεὶ ἐν αὑτῷ πλανηθέντος (lines 29–30), language which one would

(13) *Plotinus' Psychology. His doctrines of the embodied soul* (The Hague 1971), 40–41.

(14) *Le Néoplatonisme*, 69.

(15) *Ibid.*, 70–72.

expect to find used of Soul but not of *Nous* (16). From all this Armstrong concludes that Plotinus was in fact trying to have it both ways, that he wants a static eternal Intellect and yet wishes it to have a rich and varied inner life. This is to be explained partly at least by a tradition which presented Plotinus with more material than he could accomodate within the structure of his second hypostasis (17).

These explanations are certainly true, but may not contain the whole truth, for it may well be that Plotinus was prone to make only those distinctions most immediately to his purpose, and also that he was to some extent driven into his not entirely satisfactory position by philosophical difficulties which the system he professed could not fail to encounter (18). That this was so will perhaps emerge more clearly when we look at the other side of the coin, Plotinus' difficulties with Soul. Perhaps, though, it would be better not to speak of Plotinus' difficulties because this does not seem to be one of the cases where he was clearly aware that his views did involve problems (19).

Let us begin with a standard description of the hypostasis Soul and its relation to *Nous* from an early treatise, V.1 [10]. Soul comes after *Nous* and is derived from it. It is an image of *Nous* related to it in the same way as the spoken word to that still unspoken within the Soul (V.1.3.4–9). In fact Soul is the *logos* of *Nous* just as *Nous* is that of the One (V.1.6.44–5). *Nous* exalts the soul by being its father and by being present to it (ibid. 3.20–1). But Plotinus immediately goes on to explain the remark about presence with the words οὐδὲν γὰρ μεταξὺ ἢ τὸ ἑτέροις εἶναι, ὡς ἐφεξῆς μέντοι καὶ τὸ δεχόμενον, τὸ δὲ ὡς εἶδος. These words suggest significantly that in the last resort the difference between the two hypostases may be one of definition only. The notion that difference is the only distinction between two or more entities occurs in other cases where Plotinus seems unable to maintain in practice distinctions required by the outline statements he makes about the framework of his system. Thus ἑτερότης is given as the difference between the constituents of *Nous* at IV.3 [27].4.9–10 (20) and 5.6–8, between the souls in the intelligible at VI.4 [22].4.24–6 and between immaterial entities in general at VI.9 [9].8.30–2 (21). And although the last two of these passages contrast ἑτερότης specifically with spatial difference, they are all alike in that Plotinus offers no suggestion as to what the otherness might be. But generally when

(16) *Ibid.*, 72–73.

(17) *Ibid.*, 74.

(18) The philosophical difficulty involved in Plotinus' account of eternal life was brought out in the discussion following ARMSTRONG'S paper by him and Professor LLOYD, *ibid.*, 76.

(19) Though there are some signs that he was, see [209f] below.

(20) Here Plotinus goes on to say that this is inappropriate to souls: he is now talking about souls in the world.

(21) Also between *Nous* and the One. I cannot see this simply as a sign of metaphysical sophistication as R. ARNOU seems to do, 'La séparation par simple alterité dans la "Trinité" plotinienne, *Gregorianum*, II (1930), 187–90.

Plotinus refers explicitly to the *relation* between *Nous* and Soul the subordination is clear enough. And it is just as clear in late treatises as in V. 1. This point is important because, as we shall see, a tendency for the differences to remain in the background, or even to disappear, emerges in the middle period. Yet nowhere is the difference clearer than in the treatise *On Time and Eternity*, III.7 [45]. In a passage which describes both the relation of Soul to *Nous* and the mode of activity proper to each, Plotinus writes that instead of intellectual movement we have that of a part of Soul, instead of stability and permanence process and the activity now of one thing and then of another, instead of no separation a unity of continuity, instead of one unbounded whole an endless succesion, instead of a compact whole that which will be divisible into parts (III.7.11.48–56).

Starting from this set of characteristics of Soul, which we shall treat as the norm, we may go on to examine a number of other passages which do not seem to conform. Before we do so we must, however, be clear what it is that we are talking about. This is, in the first place, Soul as such, Soul independent of both the *cosmos* and the individual, the soul from which all other souls are derived. That this is in fact the true position of the hypostasis Soul, and that it is not to be confused with the world-soul, I have tried to show elsewhere (22), and so do not propose to rehearse the arguments here. We shall however find that world-soul sometimes seems to fill the place of the hypostasis Soul, and that in a number of passages it is not immediately clear which of the two Plotinus is referring to: in some he may be thinking of the hypostasis Soul as it is manifested in the managerial aspects of the world-soul. After all the two are, in theory at least, the same.

Let us first take the various attributes of *Nous* and Soul in turn. If we start with the unity in diversity of *Nous*, which differentiates it from the total unity of the One itself, we shall find that here, while at times he stresses that their mode of being is not the same, Plotinus talks of both *Nous* and Soul in the same way. Just as Anaxagoras' phrase ὁμοῦ πάντα is used to describe the contents of *Nous* (V.9.6.3), so we find it used of Soul as well (VI.4.14.4). Similarly at IV.3.8.20–1 Plotinus, using what one might well take to be *Nous* language, says of the contents of Soul οὐ διέσταται τὰ ὄντα ἀπ' ἀλλήλων. In the first of these passages Pl. has to resort to saying that while Soul has its contents in this way, all together and yet separate, *Nous* has its in the same way but more so: οὕτως οὖν καὶ πολὺ μᾶλλον ὁ νοῦς ἐστιν ὁμοῦ πάντα καὶ ἄυ οὐχ ὁμοῦ, ὅτι ἕκαστον δύναμις ἰδία (V.9.6.7–9). At other times Plotinus will say more explicitly that the contents of Soul are more fully deployed than are those of *Nous* (23).

Closely connected with the unity in diversity of *Nous* is Plotinus' notion of its activity, a thinking that immediately grasps the whole of its object

(22) 'Soul, World-Soul and Individual Soul in Plotinus', in *le Néoplatonisme*, 55–63.

(23) Cfr. the passages cited on p. [2].

without any kind of process or transition, what is generally termed non-discursive thought [24]. This type of thought, νόησις, is to be contrasted with the διάνοια or λογισμός characteristic of Soul, which proceeds by movement from one object to another, a process commonly called διέξοδος or described by expressions like ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο λαβεῖν (V.3.17.23–4). The process stops when the mind enters into that possession of its object which is the mark of νοήσις (cfr. I.3.4.9–20, IV.4.12.5–12). But on closer inspection we find that when Plotinus is concerned to stress the transcendence of Soul as such, as opposed to world-soul or the individual soul, he will deny it just those features of its activity which normally seem to be its peculiar characteristics. So when he is examining the conditions under which soul might have no memory he will say that it has none in the higher world because all things are present and there is there no διέξοδος and no μετάβασις ἀφ' ἑτέρου εἰς ἄλλο (IV.4.1.4–16). Now it is precisely because it is always in possession of its objects that *Nous* has no need of memory (cfr. V.9.5.29–34) Otherwise Soul is ἐν διεξόδῳ . . . ἀιδίῳ (III.7.13.43–4). The exemption from memory is even extended to the world-soul and the souls of the heavenly bodies (IV.4.6–7). The latter may be regarded as on a level with world-soul (cfr. II.1.5.8 ff, II.9.18.30–2) [25]. Discursive thought too is denied to the star souls on the grounds that they neither seek knowledge nor suffer from ἀπορία (IV.4.6.8 ff.). And if this is true of the star souls it must *a fortiori* be true of Soul *tout simple*. And at II.9.2.10 ff., a passage which, though it uses language appropriate to world-soul, is fairly clearly about the hypostasis Soul, Plotinus explicitly states that soul manages body οὐκ ἐκ διανοίας . . . ἀλλὰ τῇ εἰς τὸ πρὸ αὐτῆς θέᾳ.

Now if the hypostasis Soul lacks discursiveness there is nothing in its mode of apprehension which makes it any way different from *Nous*. Plotinus himself is not unaware of this for he writes ψυχῆς δὲ ἔργον τῆς λογικωτέρας νοεῖν μέν, οὐ τὸ νοεῖν δὲ μόνον· τί γᾶρ ἂν καὶ νοῦ διαφέροι; (IV.8.3.21–3). Indeed he seems to have realised on at least one occasion the difficulties into which this situation would lead him, for there is a passage in IV.3.18 where he seems to be trying to have it both ways. He starts from the position that Soul should not have λογισμός before it leaves the intelligible. Λογισμός comes to it when it is in difficulties, filled with anxiety and weaker than it was: to need λογισμός is a diminution of *nous* in respect of self-sufficiency (lines 1–5). But, he goes on, there is a problem, for if soul there has no λογισμός how can souls here have it? He tries to answer this question by positing a kind of potential λογισμός in souls in the intelligible: this comes from *Nous* as an ἐνέργεια ἑστῶσα (lines 7 ff.). What this super-λογισμός could be is

(24) That this expression may mean nothing has recently been argued by LLOYD, 'Non-discursive thought—an enigma of Greek philosophy', *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 70 (1969–70), 261–74.

(25) Cfr. *Le Néoplatonisme*, 59–60.

not at all clear. The expression ἐνέργεια ἑστῶσα would seem to be a negation of everything that is implied by διέξοδος and the other descriptions of discursive thinking in terms of movement or transition. M. Trouillard has drawn attention to this passage and explains it in terms of a kind of pure λογισμός, while he sees a pure motion in IV.4.6–9. They are pure because they are 'the pure flow of the mind and remain within it' [26]. He has certainly put his finger on the difficulty, but for the reason just mentioned his explanation seems to be rather an intensified statement of the problem. At this stage we may recall those passages to which we have already referred, where *Nous*' activity is described in terms usually applied to Soul. Here is the focus of the problem. Soul may have the character of *Nous*, which itself calls for explanation, but at times we find that *Nous* has that of Soul, and when Plotinus tries to suggest a way of describing soul's activity when it is in a noetic condition without simply using the *Nous* language it is hard to see what he can mean. The apparent state of confusion does, however, suggest lines on which an explanation might be sought.

In the passage we have just considered discursive thought is connected with the soul's activities. Here we come to another of the theoretical differences between *Nous* and Soul, namely that Soul may have duties while *Nous* has none. Soul is responsible for the organization of subsequent being. In this capacity it usually manifests itself as world-soul or as the individual souls, but at times it looks as if Plotinus is making no distinction between the hypostasis Soul and the world-soul, or, to put it another way, he may be thinking of the hypostasis in terms of its organizational duties as they appear when it is providing the psychic element in the *cosmos*. An example of this way of thinking is probably to be found in the closing chapters of II.3, where Soul, in direct contact with *Nous*, passes on the soul below itself—that is φύσις—what it receives from *Nous* (II.3.17.15–16). This passage, and a similar one in the next chapter, might lead us to think that the hypostasis and the world-soul are simply the same, but there is enough evidence from elsewhere to show that this is not the case [27], and Plotinus may simply be thinking in terms of the world-soul having that direct access to *Nous* which the individual soul may have, and which would enable *Nous* to perform its demiurgic functions in conjunction with world-soul (cfr. II.3.18.14–16) [28]. If we understand it in this light, we may wonder about the usefulness of the notion of a completely detached soul, a point to which we shall return later. In the present connection it would seem that in so far as the *cosmos* is run by the individual souls, Soul the hypostasis is just as free of duties as *Nous* itself.

Even if Soul has duties, it performs these without being in any way moved. Here Plotinus' vocabulary is very similar to that which he uses of *Nous*. He

(26) 'The logic of attribution in Plotinus', *International Philosphical Quarterly* 1 (1961), 131.

(27) Cfr. *Le Néoplatonisme*, 58.

(28) Cfr. *Le Neoplatonisme*, *ibid.*

will refer to Soul as μένουσα (e.g. IV.3.5.17, cfr. 8.55), a word which one would in the first place associate with *Nous* or the One (III.4.1.1–3, IV.3.13.22–3, IV.4.10.12 (29), V.2.1.17) (30). He will also apply the word to the multiplicity of souls in the intelligible (VI.4.14.11), and it goes almost without saying that any attributes of transcendence applicable to souls in the plural must apply to Soul *qua* hypostasis. At IV.4.2.24–5 he writes ἡ καθαρῶς ἐν τῷ νοητῷ οὖσα ἔχει τὸ ἀμετάβλητον καὶ αὐτή. And while Soul remains unmoved in the same way as *Nous*, its power is unbounded in, as far as Plotinus' words would suggest, the same way as that of its theoretical superior. Both are infinite in that their power is infinite and in that they are not limited by anything outside: ἡ τῇ δυνάμει τὸ ἄπειρον... καὶ αὗται τοίνυν οὐ πέρατι ἀλλοτρίῳ ἐστιν ἑκάστη ὅ ἐστιν (IV.3.8.36–9). Between these phrases Plotinus writes ἐπεὶ καὶ ὁ θεὸς οὐ πεπερασμένος, and ὁ θεός usually means *Nous* or the One, which is probably not the subject of this remark (31). *Nous* is δύναμις πᾶσα, εἰς ἄπειρον μὲν ἰοῦσα, εἰς ἄπειρον δὲ δυναμένη (V.8.9.24–6) (32), and it is not limited (φύσις οὐ πεπερασμένη: VI.5.4.14). Less often Soul seems to be given the same timelessness that *Nous* has, so for example in IV.4.15. Here the souls are described as ἄϊδιοι in a passage where ἀίδιος is contrasted with ἐν χρόνῳ in apparently the same way as αἰών is contrasted with χρόνος. Time comes to be in connection with the activity of the soul. Though it would be easier to think in terms of a distinction between *Nous* being αἰώνιος and Soul being ἀίδιος, such a distinction is not present here. This passage, then, is inconsistent with the clear attachment of time to the soul in III.7 (cfr. ch. 11.20–30) (33), but a necessary concomitant to the denial of memory to soul ἐν τῷ νοητῷ which we find in this part of IV.3–4.

It is in fact, and this should be no surpise, when Plotinus is talking about τὸ νοητόν as a whole that the distinction between *Nous* and Soul is most prone to disappear. A bipartite division of the world into intelligible and sensible being may already be found in IV.8 [6].6.23–8. But the clearest and most striking instance of this tendency to drop the distinction between

(29) Μενόυσης here is almost certainly correct and is to be adopted by HENRY–SCHWYZER in the *editio minor*.

(30) It has almost become a technical term, cf. H. DÖRRIE, ''Υπόστασις. Wort—und Bedeutungsgeschichte', *Nachr. der Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen. Phil–Hist. Kl* (1955), 68–9.

(31) Otherwise RIST, 'Theos and the One in some texts of Plotinus', *Mediaeval Studies, 24* (1962), 172.

(32) Even if τὸ πᾶν should be deleted here, as it is by all editors since KIRCHHOFF, except HENRY–SCHWYZER, the point still stands, for if one may say this of 'parts' of *Nous* one may also say it of the whole. In fact the next sentence supports HENRY–SCHWYZER.

(33) On this passage cfr. BEIERWALTES *ad. loc.* in *Plotin über Ewigkeit und Zeit*. I see no good reason for emending βουλομένης to βουλομένη in line 22, as do KIRCHHOFF, BRÉHIER and THEILER. While this dubious expedient would enable one to argue that the δύναμις οὐχ ἡσυχος of line 21 was not Soul itself, and so resolve part of the inconsistency, it would not help with the rest of the passage.

Nous and Soul is to be found in the treatise VI.4–5 [22–3]. The title of this treatise, περὶ τοῦ ἓν καὶ πρῶτον ἅμα πανταχοῦ εἶναι ὅλον, suggests a discussion of the second hypostasis (34), but its first sentence asks why Soul is present everywhere. In fact the treatise discusses both *Nous* and Soul, and sometimes the two together, moving from one to the other to such an extent that it is not always immediately clear which Plotinus is discussing at any given point. In the second chapter Plotinus begins by contrasting τὸ ἀληθινὸν πᾶν with its imitation, the visible world. He has just been talking about Soul, and announces no change of subject. But his language is such as he will normally use of *Nous*, for example τὸ πᾶν ἐκεῖνο καὶ πρῶτον καὶ ὄν (lines 13 ff.). Yet he immediately (lines 3–4) goes on to talk of the physical world as ὃ δ'ἂν μετὰ τοῦτο ᾖ. Τοῦτο should be Soul rather than *Nous*, for Plotinus will not usually speak of anything other than Soul or the world-soul as μετὰ νοῦν. But what he says would apply equally well to both *Nous* and Soul, and this is true of much else in this treatise. These facts would best be accounted for by the assumption that he is more concerned with the factors common to intelligible being in the wider sense and not always equally concerned to distinguish the two layers of that kind of being. As the opening sentence of VI.4.2 suggests, he is explaining the different modes of existence appropriate to the sensible on the one hand and to the intelligible on the other. This does not, however, mean that Soul and *Nous* are treated as one throughout. We have seen the discussion centred on Soul at the start, and there are other parts of the treatise where he is clearly talking about *Nous*, as in VI.5.8. Moreover, if we fail to recognise such passages, we will be involved in difficulties such as the contradiction which Arnou saw between statements which Plotinus makes in various parts of this treatise about the status of the individual in the intelligible (35). Thus he found that the individual exists there according to VI.4.14, but not according to VI.5.12, a problem which is solved as soon as we recognise that VI.4.14 is about the individual at the level of Soul and VI.5.12 about the individual at the level of *Nous* (36).

The tendency to abandon, or at least to neglect, the *Nous*: Soul distinction may also be found in treatises written not long after, primarily in IV.3–4 [27–8] and to some extent in III.6 [26]. The reasons are not necessarily the same. In the first part of III.6, which could be regarded as preparatory work for the following treatise, Plotinus considers the role of soul, that is here the individual soul, in the affections (πάθη). His aim is to show that any actual changes involved take place in the body, and thus he will stress the ἀπάθεια of the soul. But it may be misleading to say, as does Professor Armstrong, that Plotinus is here 'raising the soul to the unchanging level' and that this

(34) The titles of Plotinus' treatises are not his own, but Porphyry's record of those most commonly used, cfr. *V.P.* 4.16–19.

(35) *Le Désir de Dieu dans la philosophie de Plotin* (Paris 1921), 204–8.

(36) Cfr. BLUMENTHAL 'Did Plotinus believe in Ideas of Individuals', *Phronesis, 11* (1966), 70–3.

illustrates the importance for him of unchanging life (37). As Armstrong himself points out, it is physical change that Plotinus wishes to exclude from the soul. This becomes clearest in the course of III.6.5, where Plotinus deals with the paradoxical question with which the chapter opens, τί οὖν χρὴ ζητεῖν ἀπαθῆ τὴν ψυχὴν ἐκ φιλοσοφίας ποιεῖν μηδὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν πάσχουσαν, by showing that we must make soul which is already ἀπαθής in the sense of physically unchanging ἀπαθής in the sense of free from the evil results of the πάθη as well (38). Moreover the second part of the treatise is about the impassibility of matter, so that we should perhaps view the whole as an exploration of the implications of impassibility. We are certainly not entitled to see his comments on matter as a sign of his regard for the life of intelligible being. But it is probably true that Plotinus is more concerned to show the impassibility of the lowest soul here than anywhere else. The reason which immediately suggests itself is that the area of soul directly involved in the affections is the most likely to be subject to change.

When we come to IV.3–4 the two lines of investigation followed in VI.4–5 and III.6, into the omnipresence of the intelligible and the impassibility of the immaterial respectively, tend to converge. In the sphere of soul it is the higher area of soul that most properly manifests both characteristics, omnipresence and ἀπάθεια. And since in this treatise Plotinus has some difficulty in maintaining the ἀπάθεια of soul—the problem of III.6—while showing how it runs body—an aspect of the problem of VI.4–5—we should not be too astonished to find that he is more concerned to distinguish the more and less impassive parts of the soul than to draw the lines between higher soul and *Nous*. And it is the case that we find more careful distinctions made within the area of the lower soul here than anywhere alse. We need only refer to the care with which he distinguishes the compound of soul and matter which is body, the compound of body and the irradiation from the lower soul, φύσις, which is τὸ τοιόνδε σῶμα, φύσις itself with its range of sub-faculties, the compound of φύσις and σῶμα which is the ζῷον (or κοινόν, σύνθετον, συναμφότερον) and ψυχή in the narrow sense with its faculties (cfr. esp. IV.4.18–21) (39).

Such then are some of the reasons why *Nous* and the hypostasis soul might be treated as one in IV.3–4. What is the evidence? A part of it we have already mentioned in discussing some of the ways in which Soul may be treated as *Nous*. These were the denial of memory (IV.4.1 ff.), timelessness (IV.4.15), lack of discursiveness (IV.4.6). The section on memory, as well as the previous discussion of the memories of the individual soul, which refers to its existence at the level of the hypostasis, speak explicitly of soul ἐν τῷ νοητῷ (IV.3.32.26, IV.4.1.1–2). In addition there are other

(37) Le *Le Néoplatonisme*, 68–9.
(38) Cfr. BLUMENTHAL, *Plotinus' Psychology*, 54–6.
(39) Cfr. *ibid.*, 61–2.

passages where the intelligible seems to be treated as a unit in the same way as it was in VI.4–5, though once again it is not always clear what is going on. We may refer to IV.3.5, where Plotinus on the subject of what happens to the disembodied soul of Socrates says ἢ οὐδὲν ἀπολεῖται τῶν ὄντων· ἐπεὶ κἀκεῖ οἱ νοές οὐκ ἀπολοῦνται (lines 5–6): τὰ ὄντα need not strictly refer to the contents of *Nous*, for the point would be met by Socrates' survival at the level of Soul. The same is true of the remark about νόες (40). We may compare passages where Plotinus says in so many words that νόες exist in Soul (e.g. VI.4.14.2–3). In IV.3–5, however, he does still distinguish levels, for at the end of the chapter he speaks of soul ἡ μένουσα which is a *logos* of *Nous* and the partial *logoi*, that is the individual souls, which derive from it. Shortly afterwards, in chapter 8, ὄντα, is apparently again used generally of the contents of both levels of intelligible being, as is also νοητά (lines 17 ff.). The point at issue here too is the difference between material and immaterial existence. The distinction between *Nous* and Soul is still in theory maintained, for Plotinus goes on to speak of the infinity of Soul later in the chapter, albeit in terms that one would use of *Nous* as well (lines 35 ff.). We must therefore modify what has been said about the character of this treatise, for in these earliest chapters there is no abolition, even if there is some neglect, of the boundaries. But this situation may support our explanation of the position in the central part of the treatise. For the early chapters, 1–8, are devoted to the relations of the individual souls with each other and with the world-soul. Here one would expect comparison with *Nous* and its components, and it would be strange if the division between Soul and *Nous* did not emerge to a greater extent than in those parts of the work where Plotinus is investigating the operation of the embodied soul or the ways in which soul may exist as a transcendent entity. Similarly the distinction reappears later in the treatise where Pl. deals with the relation between the various levels of intelligible being (IV.4.16.17 ff.).

What conclusions may we draw from this by no means complete catalogue of apparently inconsistent statements? Starting from our proposed explanation of what is happening in IV.3–4, we might suggest that the notion of the hypostasis Soul is prominent only under certain conditions. Firstly when Plotinus is setting out formally his three hypostasis system. Thus it figures naturally in V.1 or in the single treatise which we have as III.8, V.8, V.5 and II.9 [30–33] which immediately followed IV.3–5, for example in II.9.1, and perhaps more significantly in V.6 [24], which comes between VI.4–5 and IV.3–4 (cfr. esp. V.6.4.14 ff.). Secondly it appears more or less clearly when Plotinus is discussing the relation between souls. But when he is discussing the relation of intelligible to sensible being, and the operations of soul in the world, either on a cosmic or on an individual scale, then the hypostasis Soul tends to merge with *Nous*. Τὸ νοητὸν, the world-soul and the individual souls are sufficient to provide an explanation of this world, and so we find pas-

(40) On this passage cfr. *Phronesis*, 11 (1966). 68–9.

sages where world-soul seems to be directly dependent on *Nous* (41). Here one might ask why it is Soul rather than *Nous* that sometimes disappears. For this three reasons suggest themselves. Firstly, Plotinus does not normally think of soul having access to the One except through *Nous* (cfr. e.g. VI.8.7.1–2) or being produced directly by the One (42). And since *Nous* is conceived as the One plus a sort of minimal multiplicity this is not unreasonable. So to remove *Nous* would leave an unbridgeable gap in the hierarchy of being. Secondly, the removal of *Nous* would deprive the world of its eternal model, a role which Plotinus always assigns to *Nous* rather than Soul: it is *Nous* which contains the Forms. Thirdly, if *Nous* disappeared, that kind of being would be removed from the system to a far greater extent than is the more diffuse kind by the disappearance of the hypostasis Soul, for Plotinus never suggests that the world could be run without some kind of soul, and that is still represented by world-soul and the individual souls when the hypostasis goes. He will even say that souls in the plural are derived straight from *Nous* at VI.7.23.19–20, where ψυχάς may or may not include the world-soul. Further the world-soul sometimes seems to have the character of purely independent soul as well as soul with a duty. In the difficult and confusing tenth chapter of IV.4, where certain remarks could apply to either *Nous* or the hypostasis Soul, and others to world-soul or the hypostasis, Plotinus seems to be expounding how *Nous* and the world-soul rule the cosmos. For direct rule by *Nous* there is no provision, though it is once mentioned as an alternative to rule through the intermediary of either Soul or some kind of soul in a passage where Plotinus says that in the context it makes no difference (V.8.7.14–16). Rule by τὸ νοητόν, in which Soul may be merged, is a different matter.

Another cause of Soul's tendency to lose its independence, or at other times those characteristics by which its independence may be discerned, may be found in the difficulties that must inevitably arise if one is to describe a number of immaterial existents. In the last resort the difference must be one of definition, and the number of things one may say about each *in itself* is limited. We have already referred to one passage which shows this difficulty clearly (43). Another may be found at V.2.2.18–20 where Plotinus tells us that *Nous* is even less in place that Soul (44). Μιμεῖται δὴ τὸ ἀρχέτυπον πανταχῇ writes Plotinus (V.8.12.15). One might say that it does so too well. For as soon as one tries to define Soul as such, without taking into account the world-soul's care and protection of the *cosmos*, one is reduced to saying that Soul is like *nous* but not quite, or *vice-versa*, or even that it differs by difference alone (45). If soul is freed from concern with what is below and turns towards *Nous*

(41) Cfr. p. [210] above.

(42) But cf. VI. 9 [9].3.10–13, where soul does seem to have direct access.

(43) See above, p. 6.

(44) ἡ δὲ μέχρι νοῦ, οὐ τόπῳ· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐν τόπῳ ἦν· ὁ δὲ νοῦς πολὺ μᾶλλον οὐκ ἐν τόπῳ, ὥστε οὐδὲ αὕτη.

(45) See the passages referred to on p. [207].

it becomes *Nous*: νοῦς γενομένη αὐτὴ θεωρεῖ οἷον νοωθεῖσα καὶ ἐν τόπῳ τῷ νοητῷ γενομένη (VI.7.35.4–5). The individual must strive to attain this condition, the hypostasis Soul has it as part of its nature. One can say, as Plotinus in fact does (I.6.6.16–18), that when Soul is most truly soul it is *Nous*. Such is the case when the transcendent immutability of intelligible being is being stressed. But when Plotinus is concerned with the active and dynamic internal life of *Nous* then the reverse situation applies. The only way in which Plotinus can describe the life of *Nous* is to allow it the process and transition whose exclusion usually marks the difference between the two hypostases. Plotinus had no vocabulary to describe a different sort of life for an intelligible entity from that of Soul. What he needed was perhaps an extra set of words to correspond to the οἷον phrases and the less common ὑπερ-words which he used of the One (46). And whether they could have had any real meaning is not at all clear. A more important factor may have been quite simply that if a form of non-static thinking, namely discursive thought, were applicable to the highest form of being which was not completely exempt from 'change', that is Soul *qua* hypostasis, then this type of activity would necessarily have to apply at the higher level, that of *Nous*, once its absolute unchangeability was abandoned. Hence some of the fluctuations which Professor Armstrong has discussed and which we may now see to be complementary to those we meet when we examine Plotinus' statements about Soul, either in itself or or in so far as it forms a part of one noetic block of Being. Given the similarities between *Nous* and the hypostasis Soul we can understand why they are kept clearly apart only at those times when the relation between hypostases is under discussion. Then the causal dependence of Soul on *Nous* becomes prominent (e.g. V.1.7.42).

We have just mentioned that Plotinus may describe *Nous* by excluding from it the dynamic features of the life of Soul. This is perhaps a more helpful way of looking at the way of thinking behind Plotinus' statements than to think in terms of the ever greater multiplicity into which Plotinus depicts his world as unfolding. If one discounts the personal mystical experience to which Plotinus so rarely refers, a philosopher would have to elaborate the notion of the One by excluding the attributes of *Nous* rather than arrive at *Nous* by splitting up or adding to the One. As a matter of history one could even say that the notion of the One was reached by splitting up *Nous*. However much of a Platonist one may be and however strongly one might insist on the need to explain lower in terms of higher being, one cannot arrive at one's great Platonic truths without going through the process of abstraction from and comparison with the contents of the sensible world (47). And one might say that

(46) ὑπεράγαθός (VI. 9.6.40), ὑπερνόησις (VI. 8.16.33), ὑπερόντως (VI. 8.14.43).

(47) Plotinus himself gives these as ways to knowledge of the One, cf. VI. 7.36.6–8. The method of arriving at the One by abstraction goes back in the Platonic tradition to ALBINUS, *Did.* X = 165.14 ff. HERMANN; cfr. H. WOLFSON, 'Albinus and Plotinus on divine attributes', *Harvard Theological Review*, 45 (1952), 117 ff.

the *via negativa* to the One has already been trodden on the way to the delineation of *Nous* and Soul.

By its nature the One must be determined by what comes below, for its super-essence, if one may use the term, is to be what the others are not. Plotinus more than once stresses that the One is different from all the others (V.3.11.18, V.4.1.5–6). Less clearly motivated by the exigencies of the system, we find a tendency for the individual souls to be determined by what comes below them, though admittedly what is below has been pre-formed by the world-soul acting on matter, But since matter is devoid of all quality (cfr. II.4.14.24, VI.1.27.2), and individual souls and to a large extent the world-soul are theoretically identical, all individual compounds of soul and matter, or soul and body, should be identical too. That they are not is paradoxically due to body, which should have no influence on soul. Body receives as much soul as it can (VI.4.3.10–11). Differences between individuals may be caused not only by body (IV.3.8.5–9) but also by the environment (III.1.5.11 ff., IV.3.7.22–5) (48). And it seems not altogether unreasonable to see the problems about *Nous* and Soul as at least partly caused by these tendencies. If what it is to be *Nous* must be expressed in terms of Soul without removing so many of Soul's attributes that we arrive prematurely at a description of the One there is not much room for manoeuvre.

So far we have considered these problems of demarcation mainly in terms of *Nous* and Soul *qua* hypostases. If we accept that there is some serious doubt as to where the boundaries in the intelligible are we may be less perplexed by certain problems about the higher reaches of the individual soul. One is the question of Ideas of individuals. This is a doctrine for whose adoption by Plotinus there is very little firm evidence. I do not propose to discuss this question again here, but think it safe to say that some of the texts that appear at first sight to support the belief may be seen to refer either definitely, or at least possibly, to individuality at the level of Soul, whose contents are not described as Ideas, or rather vaguely in the intelligible, and so not necessarily in *Nous* itself (49). Definite examples are the passages we have already mentioned in VI.4–5 (50), possible ones that in IV.3.5–6 (51) and also IV.3.12.1 ff. In general we may recall that νόες are often included in the contents of Soul (VI.4.14.2–3). All this suggests that we must view somewhat critically the idea that the undescended part of the individual soul, its *Nous*, is necessarily in the hypostasis *Nous* (52). When Plotinus tells us that not all the soul descends, he may mean that some of it remains at the level of the hypostasis Soul. It would then incidentally, for the reasons that we have mentioned, be a *nous*, but would not be there primarily, as would those entities which have

(48) On this point cfr. BLUMENTHAL, *Le Néoplatonisme*, 60.
(49) Cfr. *Phronesis*, 11 (1966), 61–80.
(50) See above [212] and *Phronesis*, 11 (1966), 70–3.
(51) See above [214] and *Phronesis*, 11 (1966), 68–9.
(52) When Plotinus uses *nous* to refer to the reason this is clearly at a lower level.

the status of Ideas. Thus we should have a sort of step in the intelligible world, with the individual *Nous* at one level below hypostasis *Nous* and its constituents, but at the same height as hypostasis Soul, the completely transcendent area of Soul. The basic statement of Plotinus' view on the the undescended intellect, IV.8.8.1–3, is not incompatible with such a situation. Below this second level of intelligible being would come the second level of the individual soul, namely the reason. Here we may recall the passage where Plotinus talks of it as τὸ μέσον, between that which is always turned upwards and that which is directed to the things here (II.9.2.4 ff.) (53). In the following lines Plotinus actually says that the part of our soul which is not a part is at the level of the world-soul, which works without διάνοια (54). And in this treatise, where Plotinus is defending his system of strictly three hypostases, world-soul tends to be seen as on a level with hypostasis Soul to a greater extent than in other writings.

In this light we may look at certain passages in two late treatises, V.3 [49] and I.1 [53], which look as if they may lower the status of the individual intellect from that which it is usually thought to have enjoyed in certain earlier writings. The picture is not entirely clear, and the problem would be less serious if there were not the difficulties we have discussed about where to draw the line between Soul and *Nous*. At V.3.3.23–6 Plotinus talks of a *nous* which is ours other than that which thinks discursively, and on top of it, but still ours even if we do not count it among the parts of the soul. Here we seem to have the usually accepted standard position. In the next chapter, however, at lines 20 ff., Plotinus seems to envisage self-knowledge taking place when we use a power of the soul above διάνοια—a power which must be our *nous*—and see a *Nous* which is really above us: ἄλλῃ δυνάμει προσχρησάμενοι νοῦν αὖ γινώσκοντα ἑαυτὸν κατοψόμεθα ἢ ἐκεῖνον μεταλαβόντες, ἐπείπερ κἀκεῖνος ἡμέτερος καὶ ἡμεῖς ἐκείνου (55). The ἄλλη δύναμις is probably a power between διάνοια and *Nous* itself, and that would be our *nous* at the level of hypostasis Soul, but here too Plotinus' words could be taken to mean that even a part of *Nous* itself is attached to our soul: then the use of the ἄλλη δύναμις would enable us to see itself as a *nous* which is in fact identical with it. Similar difficulties are presented by other passages in this treatise (56). The situation might once again be that Plotinus is concerned with the contrast between the self-knowledge allowed by that direct grasp of an object identical to the

(53) For the term μέσον cfr. I. 1.11.4.
(54) Here we may compare III. 4.6.21–3: χρὴ γὰρ οἴεσθαι καὶ κόσμον εἶναι ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἡμῶν μὴ μόνον νοητόν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ψυχῆς τῆς κόσμου ὁμοειδῆ διάθεσιν: if the καὶ means ' and furthermore ', then the top part of our soul is here too seen as being on a level with the world-soul. If ψυχῆς τῆς κόσμου ὁμοειδῆ διάθεσιν is to be taken as something additional to the κόσμος νοητός then we seem to have two transcendent layers of the individual soul, parallel with the world-soul and the κόσμος νοητός.
(55) This is part of a question: it is answered in the affirmative.
(56) Other doubtful passages in V. 3 are 4.8–10, 7.25–7, 8.44–8 and 9.7 ff.

subject which may be said to characterize the whole of the intelligible when the differences within it are not being stressed, and the inability of the discursive level to produce such self-knowledge.

We may look at some doubtful passages in I.1 in a similar way. Here Plotinus says that *nous* is common to all because it is indivisible, but that each of us has it as his own: ὅτι ἔχει καὶ ἕκαστος αὐτὸν ὅλον ἐν ψυχῇ τῇ πρώτῃ (I.1.8.3–6). Ψυχῇ τῇ πρώτῃ could mean the hypostasis, and here we may compare the phrase τῇ μὲν πρώτῃ τῇ μετὰ νοῦν in the next treatise (I.7 [54]. 2.6–7), or it could mean the top part of each individual soul: the latter seems less likely, but if it were what Plotinus means then the individual soul would in fact reach up into the hypostasis *Nous*. That is also suggested by I.1.9.13–15. The difficulty of interpreting these two treatises in this respect is crystallized in the last sentence of I.1, μέρος γὰρ καὶ οὗτος (νοῦς) ἡμῶν καὶ πρὸς τοῦτον ἄνιμεν. Professor Theiler thinks that Plotinus is merely exaggerating in calling *nous* a part of us. One could object that if any part of *Nous*, or the intelligible, is in us, then so is the whole, but in so far as Plotinus is discussing what belongs to the individual and what does not he should be more precise. If Theiler is right then the intention of the closing remark would not be inconsistent with what seems to be the meaning of the passage in chapter 8.

On balance then it seems that these two treatises regard our *nous* as being in Soul, but the balance does not tilt very far. It may be that Plotinus' statements are so irritatingly ambiguous just because he was not here particularly interested in making the distinctions we are trying to find. Just as in the passages in V.3 he finds the conditions for self-knowlege in direct intuition and wishes merely to distinguish the kind of thought where they exist from that where they do not, so in I.1 he is basically concerned to define the ζῷον, and so to distinguish what is and what is not part of the sensible man. Any distinctions within the intelligible are less important. But I think that these passages require a more detailed treatment than they can be given here and am prepared to find that my present view of them is inadequate. It is a question that I hope we might discuss. For the moment let it be said that in these discussions of the individual soul we seem to find that Plotinus will be less careful of differences within the intelligible than he would be if he were concerned primarily with these. And so the situation is very similar to that which we found when looking at *Nous* and soul *qua* hypostases. But while this way of looking at some of the problems may be helpful, we should not assume that it will solve them all (58).

(57) *ad loc.* THEILER compares V.3.3.24 ff.

(58) I should like to thank Professor ARMSTRONG for reading and criticizing a draft of this paper.

III

SOUL, WORLD-SOUL AND INDIVIDUAL SOUL IN PLOTINUS

RÉSUMÉ

Plotin affirme que toutes les âmes ne sont qu'une âme ; cette âme unique inclut l'âme du monde et les âmes individuelles. Pourtant toutes les âmes peuvent se comporter de manière différente, en particulier l'âme du monde. Cette situation engendre des incohérences. Le présent exposé est destiné à définir ce que sont exactement ces incohérences, ainsi que leur origine et leur étendue.

Plotin parle peu de la nature des différentes âmes. Au premier abord, on ne voit pas clairement s'il y a deux ou trois sortes d'âmes ; mais on peut finalement constater qu'il y a chez Plotin trois sortes d'âme et que l'âme du monde est différente de l'Ame-hypostase. Les âmes individuelles sont en théorie égales, par leur statut, à l'âme du monde. Plotin ne donne pas d'explication satisfaisante des différences qui existent entre les âmes individuelles ou entre celles-ci et l'âme du monde. Quand il examine les activités des différentes âmes, leur égalité disparaît. Ces différences paraissent résulter du corps. C'est encore une nouvelle incohérence, puisque les différences entre les corps sont produites en premier lieu par l'âme. De la même manière, le corps semble contrôler l'étendue de la descente de l'âme et il ne devrait pas en être ainsi. La supériorité de l'âme du monde sur les âmes individuelles provient du fait qu'elle possède un corps supérieur : de même les caractéristiques des âmes individuelles résultent de différences de corps et de milieu environnant, donc aussi des passions, auxquelles l'âme du monde n'est pas sujette. Le modèle qui régit les relations entre les âmes est le suivant : elles sont unies au sommet, divergent au plan de la raison et de la sensation et, curieusement, se réunissent au point le plus bas.

It is well known that Plotinus frequently asserts that all souls are one, a unity which includes both the world soul and the soul of each individual. It is equally well-known that all these souls can and do behave in different ways in spite of their fundamental unity. In particular the world-soul is very different in its conduct, if not in its essence, from the souls with which it is supposed to be identical. That these two positions are in fact inconsistent must be evident to all students of Plotinus, even though the point has not received much attention. In a way this is not surprising,

since it soon becomes clear that the problem has no solution. I should like to say at the start that I am not going to produce a solution out of the hat. For whatever reasons Plotinus does not provide us with the necessary material.[1] The purpose of this paper is merely to examine what Plotinus does say, to look more closely at the inconsistencies that there are and to consider their extent. There are certain things I do not intend to do. One is to discuss the philosophical validity of Plotinus' claims about the unity and multiplicity of soul. Another is to handle, except incidentally, the problem of the soul's descent, though this is a problem that cannot really be solved unless one can define the differences between souls.

Most discussions of the relations between different kinds of soul on the one hand, and between different souls of one kind on the other, are concerned with what they do rather than what they are. This in itself is significant, because most of what Plotinus says is relevant only to the first of these questions. Though he devotes a certain amount of space to the proposition that all souls are one, he is more concerned with establishing their similarity than defining their differences. When the differences are important, they are either assumed or attributed to what are perhaps improperly described as extraneous influences. To this point we must return at some length later. At this stage it may be desirable to recall one of Plotinus' discussions of the unicity of soul.

The fullest treatments of this question are to be found in IV, 9 and at the start of IV, 3. In IV, 9, which is specifically devoted to our problem, it soon becomes clear that Plotinus is ill at ease, a fact noticed by Harder who said that this treatise has the character of an *apologia*[2]. It is studded with expressions expecting disbelief[3]. The first three chapters urge the view that all souls are one and attempt to dispel two objections, how two individuals can act or perceive differently if their souls are one, and how, if all souls are one, there can be different types of soul. The first is met with the answer that the difference is possible because the two do not share one body or one συναμφότερον. Herein lies an inconsistency which we shall have to consider. Plotinus also compares sensations in different individuals to a perception in one part of an individual which is not shared by the other parts. An appeal to this analogy is also used against the second objection.

In the fourth chapter of this treatise Plotinus takes up the question he had earlier reserved, how all the souls are one. He had mentioned two possibilities. The first was that the souls are one because they come from ἡ τοῦ παντὸς ψυχή (ch. 1, 10-11), the second that the τοῦ παντὸς ψυχή as well as the individual souls come from one soul and are therefore one. These alternatives, which Plotinus here leaves open, raise the question whether ἡ τοῦ παντὸς ψυχή is or is not identical with Ψυχή the third hypostasis. Does Plotinus distinguish two kinds of soul, the individual soul and the ψυχὴ τοῦ παντός or three, the individual soul, the ψυχὴ τοῦ παντός, and ψυχή without qualification? If the answer to this question is two, the individual souls must come from

(1) This was already noticed by ZELLER, *Die Philosophie der Griechen* III.ii³, Leipzig, 1881, p. 542, n. 4.

(2) *Plotins Schriften.* Übersetzt von R. Harder.² I b, Hamburg, 1956, p. 458f.

(3) e.g. οὐκ ἄτοπον οὐδὲ ἀπογνωστέον, 2,20, μὴ δή τις ἀπιστείτω, 5,7. Cf. the talk of παραμυθία and πειθώ in a similar context at VI, 5, 11, 5-7.

the ψυχὴ τοῦ παντός, which will then be coextensive with the hypostasis. If the answer is three, we shall have to ask how they are related. Is there then a straight line of descent from the hypostasis through the ψυχὴ τοῦ παντός to the individual souls, or are these and the ψυχὴ τοῦ παντός directly descended from the hypostasis?

Since the second question is merely hypothetical if the answer to the first is two and not three, we must deal with that first. Let us return to IV, 9, 4 where the problem is well illustrated. There Plotinus speaks of one and the same soul being in the many bodies, and before this one that is in the many another that is not, from which derives the one that is in the many: τοῦτο δέ ἐστι τὸ μίαν καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν ἐν πολλοῖς σώμασι ψυχὴν ὑπάρχειν καὶ πρὸ ταύτης τῆς μιᾶς τῆς ἐν πολλοῖς ἄλλην αὖ εἶναι μὴ ἐν πολλοῖς, ἀφ' ἧς ἡ ἐν πολλοῖς μία (IV, 9, 4, 15-18). This and other similar references to many souls being derived from one (e.g. IV, 8, 3, 11-12; III, 9, 3, 4-5) do not specify what that one is, nor do they make it clear whether the world soul is to be included in the multitude. As it stands our text allows the possibility that the source of the many souls is either the world soul or the hypostasis itself. If the two are identical then, of course there is no problem.

Now a glance at the relevant texts might easily give the impression that the world soul and the hypostasis are in fact the same. This was the view of Zeller, and others have followed him.[1] If they are right, then ψυχὴ τοῦ παντός must refer to both and be that soul from which the other souls come. But there are texts where Plotinus refers to the world soul as the sister of the individual souls (IV, 3, 6, 13; II, 9, 18, 16). These might arouse suspicion, since if the world soul and the hypostasis are identical, we shall be left with a position where the world soul is both parent and sister of the other souls, for in our passage from IV, 9 and its parallels it would have to be their parent. Matters are not helped by the fact that the contexts in which the term ἡ τοῦ παντὸς ψυχή, or its equivalent ἡ τοῦ ὅλου ψυχή, are used do not always delimit its reference. But there are some which do. Let us look at a passage where ἡ τοῦ παντὸς ψυχή must refer not to the hypostasis, but to a world soul which has another form of soul above it. In IV, 4, 32, talking about how the components of the world ζῷον are parts, Plotinus says ὅσον δὲ καὶ ψυχῆς τοῦ παντὸς μετέχει, κατὰ τοσοῦτον καὶ ταύτῃ · καὶ τὰ μὲν μόνης ταύτης μετέχοντα κατὰ πᾶν ἐστι μέρη, ὅσα δὲ καὶ ἄλλης, ταύτῃ ἔχει τὸ μὴ μέρη πάντη εἶναι (ll. 8-11). Here ἄλλης must signify a soul other than and higher than that which is described as ψυχὴ τοῦ παντός. This higher soul can only be the hypostasis. The same conclusion may be drawn from a remark early in IV, 3 about the difficulties that occur εἰ μή τις τὸ μὲν ἓν στήσειεν ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ μὴ πίπτον εἰς σῶμα, εἶτ' ἐξ ἐκείνου τὰς πάσας, τήν τε τοῦ ὅλου καὶ τὰς ἄλλας (IV, 3, 4, 14-16). It is clear from the context that the ἕν referred to here is a unity which is soul. This must be the hypostasis, so here too ἡ τοῦ ὅλου ψυχή is thought of as being derived from rather than identical with it. Since the point might be made that ἡ τοῦ ὅλου ψυχή is not necessarily the same thing as ἡ τοῦ παντὸς ψυχή, it may be as well to state explicitly that the two terms do refer to the same entity. We may safely conclude that we are dealing with three types of soul rather than two, and that it is the world soul that is called ἡ τοῦ παντὸς ψυχή.

(1) *Op. cit.*, p. 538. Cf. most recently J. M. RIST, *Plotinus. The Road to Reality*, Cambridge, 1967, p. 113.

Before we go on to deal with our second question, the one about the relations between these three types of soul, it may be worth considering briefly why ψυχὴ τοῦ παντός might be identified with ψυχή *tout court*. In the first place there are passages which suggest that the world soul comes next after Νοῦς in the hierarchy of being. Thus we may read νοῦς δὴ ψυχῇ δίδωσι τῇ τοῦ παντός, ψυχὴ δὲ παρ' αὐτῆς ἡ μετὰ νοῦν τῇ μετ' αὐτὴν ἐλλάμπουσα καὶ τυποῦσα (II, 3, 17, 15-16). Here there is no intermediary between Νοῦς and what is called ψυχὴ τοῦ παντός. The same is true of a passage in the following chapter, at II, 3, 18, 9ff. The contexts are similar and provide us with a likely explanation of the apparent inconsistency. In both cases Plotinus is discussing the demiurgic functions of soul and intellect: in chapter 18 Νοῦς is actually called δημιουργός. Hence what matters is the chain of command between Νοῦς and the lower manifestations of Soul which Plotinus elsewhere calls φύσις. The world soul, like the soul of the individual, has direct access to Νοῦς in certain circumstances, and the translation of what is in Νοῦς into the creation of our world is a case where such access is likely to be emphasised. But we should not infer that the access of any entity to higher forms of being means that other forms of being may not exist between. After all the possibility of mystic union for the individual does not imply the abolition of Νοῦς. Here is one starting point for the view that ψυχὴ τοῦ παντός and the hypostasis are identical. Another might be found in those passages which show that the world soul is not preoccupied with the world (e.g. IV, 3, 12, 8ff.). One of these does actually treat all soul and the world soul as one: ἡ μὲν ὅλη καὶ ὅλου ... κοσμεῖ ὑπερέχουσα ἀπόνως (IV, 8, 8, 13-14).

Plotinus' strict position is that the hypostasis and ψυχὴ τοῦ παντός are not the same. But we should perhaps allow that, while ψυχὴ τοῦ παντός always refers to the world soul, it may not always have the same upper limits. So in the demiurgic passages which we have considered Plotinus could have been thinking of the hypostasis in so far as it is manifested in the world soul. Further there is no need to conclude from the fact that Plotinus does distinguish the hypostasis Soul and world soul that we are to envisage a series of five hypostases, the One, Νοῦς, Soul, World Soul, and its lower part which may or may not be called φύσις. The point is that, when Plotinus is making the kind of distinctions we have been discussing, he is not abandoning the view that all souls are ultimately one. This totality of soul is referred to by the terms πᾶσα ψυχή and ὅλη ψυχή (IV, 3, 6, 12 and III, 2, 4, 10-11).

We must now turn to the relation between our three types of soul. The second alternative which Plotinus mentioned in IV, 9, 4, namely that both world soul and the individual souls come from one soul, would give us a triangular relationship with the hypostasis at the apex of the triangle and all other forms of soul distributed along the base. Further evidence for this model may be seen in Plotinus' description of the world soul as ὁμοειδής with the individual souls (V, 1, 2, 44; IV, 3, 6, 1). Such a relation is also suggested by those passages which refer to the world soul as the sister of the individual souls. However a closer inspection of these passages shows that the world soul is at least a senior sister. The exact status of the individual souls will emerge more clearly from a consideration of their functions. As far as their nature is concerned Plotinus tells us virtually nothing. Both world soul and the individual souls seem to be such as they because they are either world soul or

particular individual souls. If we ask why one part of Soul should be world soul rather than the others, the answer would appear to be simply that the one part is world soul whereas the others are individual souls. It is probably because there is no precise definition of the difference between various souls on the same level and because the differences are left to emerge from their activities that the world soul does appear to be higher than its theoretical peers. The same is true of the differences between various individual souls. Usually their individuality does not seem to be part of their definition. When it is, it arises from their dependence on an Idea of the individual (cf. V, 7, 1), and Plotinus does not normally take such Ideas into account. He was by no means certain that they existed.[1] Otherwise Plotinus does not seem to have had any satisfactory explanation of how souls are both a unity and a number of discrete individuals. When he is talking about the souls in the intelligible, he will accept that they differ by otherness (ἑτερότης, VI, 4 [22] 4, 24-6), but when later he is concerned with souls in the world, he will reject the idea as being appropriate only to Νοῦς (IV, 3 [27] 4, 9-14). One cannot help feeling that his efforts to provide an explanation are in the end unsuccessful because there was none with which he himself could be satisfied.[2] The position is reminiscent of Plato's reluctance to describe the Form of the Good, at least in the dialogues.[3] What Plotinus gives us is an analogy between the souls and the different powers of one individual soul (IV, 9, 2), and the oft repeated statement that soul is indivisibly divided (cf. esp. IV, 1 and IV, 2 *passim*). The second requires further explanation. The first is inadequate. While it may explain why you and I do not have the same affections and perceptions, it can hardly, as Plotinus intends it to, explain why you are good while I am bad (IV, 9 [8] 2, 21-4). The single souls may be the basis of different physical functions in the several parts of one organism, but these various parts do not have contradictory moral qualities. When Plotinus returns to this question of good and evil later, the answer that emerges is that the difference depends on the extent of one's association with the body (VI, 4 [22] 15, 17 ff.).

This kind of answer is typical of what happens when Plotinus discusses differences between souls or proceeds on the assumption that they exist. In theory, as we have just seen, the world soul is on a level with the individual souls with which it is identical. As soon as Plotinus begins to talk about what the souls do, their equality begins to disappear. Interestingly the pattern is not, as one might expect, one of divergence from the top. The souls do in a sense reunite when they reach their lower limits. But before examining this pattern let us look at the differences that result from the different tasks assigned to world soul and the individual souls.

In the first place the world soul is in control of what Plotinus regards as a stable and worthy body, the κόσμος (IV, 8, 2, 6 ff.). In this respect the star souls are to be

(1) On this question see H. J. BLUMENTHAL, 'Did Plotinus believe in Ideas of Individuals?', *Phronesis*, t. 11, 1966, p. 61-80. For another view see RIST, 'Forms of Individuals in Plotinus', *Classical Quarterly* n.s. t. 13, 1963, p. 223-31 and *op. cit.* (p. 57, n. 1) p. 111 and 255, n. 9.

(2) That Plotinus was well aware of the difficulty is indicated by his appeal to divine aid, θεὸν συλλήπτορα ... παρακαλέσαντες, at IV, 9, 4, 6-7. We may compare his reference to the Muses when confronted with another daunting problem, the origin of time (III, 7, 11, 6-11).

(3) E.g. *Rep.*, 506 *d-e*.

grouped with the world soul rather than the other individual souls (cf. II, 1, 5, 8 ff.). They share the world soul's immunity from disturbance (II, 9, 18, 30-2). Here we come to one of the major inconsistencies in Plotinus' treatment of soul. For him bodies are not mere matter, but matter informed by soul (IV, 7, 1, 8-10). The soul that is responsible for this information is the world soul. It marks out the ground for the individual souls (VI, 7, 7, 8 ff.) and prepares bodies to be their homes: αἱ δὴ ἤδη ὄντος (sc. σώματος) οἷον ἀδελφῆς ψυχῆς ἀρχούσης μοίρας διέλαχον, οἷον προπαρασκευασάσης ταύτης αὐταῖς οἰκήσεις (IV, 3, 6, 13-15; cf. II, 9, 8, 15-16). From this we would expect all bodies at least within a species to be similar at this stage. Such differences as there are should only reflect the contents of Νοῦς. And yet we are often told that it is the body or the συναμφότερον, the compound of body and the lower level of soul, that determines the nature of the individual. And not only bodies but the environment that has been produced by irradiations (ἐλλάμψεις) from the very same world soul that has produced the bodies (cf. III, 1, 5, 11 ff., IV, 3, 7, 22-5). Moreover soul does not always enforce its authority even on matter (II, 3, 12, 9-11). The same sort of difficulty is involved in the idea that souls differ in proportion to body's capacity to receive them. While all soul is present everywhere, each thing that receives it can receive only a certain amount: ὁ λαβὼν τοσοῦτον ἐδυνήθη λαβεῖν, παντὸς παρόντος (VI, 4, 3, 10-11, cf. *ib.* 15, 3-6). Thus the way in which a body is besouled depends on differences in the bodies although they have originally been preformed by illumination from the same source. What all this means is that by not being able to explain the differences between souls intrinsically, Plotinus has allowed himself to arrive at a position that is doubly inconsistent. Doubly because in the first place he admits that body determines the type of soul a living being is to receive and secondly because he has made the differences in body arise from a combination of undifferentiated matter and at best partly differentiated irradiations from soul. Further as we have seen, it is the world soul, which is basically the same as the individual souls, that has prepared the ground for the differences.

These difficulties may also be observed when Plotinus discusses the descent of the soul, or at least the depth of that descent. Here again it is, in the last resort, the nature of the body concerned that is the controlling variable. For it is the body as much as any inherent differences in the souls that initially determines how far they will go: κάτεισι δὲ εἰς ἕτοιμον ἑκάστη καθ' ὁμοίωσιν τῆς διαθέσεως · ἐκεῖ γάρ, ᾧ ἂν ὁμοιωθεῖσα ᾖ, φέρεται, ἡ μὲν εἰς ἄνθρωπον, ἡ δὲ εἰς ζῷον ἄλλη ἄλλο (IV, 3, 12, 37-9). As the immediately preceeding words show this also holds within the same natural kinds. And each soul will mould itself to fit its recipient (VI, 7, 7, 13-15). Another factor contributing to the position may have been that, if Plotinus had put all the differences in soul, he would have had to say that some souls were essentially evil. There is an exception to the general rule that body plays a large part in determining what happens to the soul. It is the idea that the nature of a soul depends on its former lives in general (III, 4, 2, 11 ff.; IV, 3, 8, 5-9) and its memories in particular (IV, 4, 3, 3-6). Plotinus believed in reincarnation no less than did Plato.[1] It followed that former lives could influence the soul. But at a theoretical first incarnation this last influence

(1) Cf. A. N. M. Rich, 'Reincarnation in Plotinus', *Mnemosyne*, ser. 4,10, 1957, p. 232-8.

would not be applicable. Nor does it apply to the world soul because its duties are always the same and may be seen as an ever-present unity (IV, 4, 9 ff.). The same is true of the star souls, which here again are to be classed with world soul even though they are in fact individual souls (cf. IV, 4, 6 ff.).

In any case the differences which result from memory are or may be the result of factors external to the soul. Once again we have no intrinsic difference. Only the world soul is, more or less by definition, exempt from outside influence. Some explanation may be found in the suggestion that it is free of all those passions whose opposites are the virtues because there is nothing outside it which could be a threat or an attraction (I, 2, 1, 10-13, cf. II, 9, 18, 24-7). Unlike the individual souls it does not descend, that is associate closely with body (cf. e.g. III, 4, 4, 4-7) although like them it has a series of reflections extending downwards as far as soul can go. Plotinus will usually say that it governs the world from above with no difficulty : ὑπερέχουσα ἀπόνως (IV, 8, 8, 14). In such contexts the world soul is not in body. There is one passage where it is, namely II, 9, 18, 20 ff., where the individual souls are said to have the ability to live in their bodies in a way closely resembling that in which the world soul lives in its. It may be that we can attribute this statement to overenthusiasm on Plotinus' part in the peculiar context. He is after all in this treatise concerned to stress the value of the physical world against the Gnostics and may in the chapter in question be allowing himself to be carried away by rhetoric. But the point seems to be simply that the best souls are virtually not in their bodies at all, so that to adduce the world soul's presence "in" its body as an ideal involves only a slight inaccuracy. The remark need not be inconsistent with Plotinus' usual position. Being outside body absolves the world soul from any alteration through association with body, but also means that it cannot acquire individual characteristics from those additions or accretions — προσθήκαι — which become attached to other souls on their descent (VI, 4, 6, 4-5).

The causes of this descent are a subject on their own, but one point should be mentioned.[1] This is that in so far as the world soul as well as the individual souls are involved in creation and separation from the intelligible world, both are on the same footing. They wish to be their own masters (V, 1, 1, 3-5, III, 7, 11, 15-17).[2] World soul and the individual souls thus become separate in the same way and at the same point. From here we may look at the pattern of their relation.

At the top all souls are together in the totality of soul, distinct but not separate (VI, 4, 14 *passim*). Separation is a function of body (VI, 4, 8, 12-17). Without it the souls are related in much the same way as the parts of Νοῦς (IV, 3, 5, 15-16; cf. V, 9, 6, 8-9). And in so far as they are turned towards Νοῦς that is just what they are. It is characteristic of world soul to retain this orientation (II, 3, 18, 9-10). With the individual soul, though it does have that higher part always above to which it may turn, the orientation is not permanent. Since world soul is theoretically equivalent to the individual soul and since it extends downwards just as far, it is

(1) For a recent discussion see Rist, *Plotinus. The Road to Reality*, ch. 9.

(2) Rist argues that Plotinus does not mean the same thing in these two texts—the first about individual souls, the second about world soul—because the context is different *ib.* p. 257, n. 3. I cannot follow this argument.

interesting to speculate whether Plotinus made his confessedly bold and idiosyncratic claim that the individual soul has a part which never descends primarily in order to retain the parallelism between the two types of soul. That there were other reasons to commend such a view is not be denied.[1] The question, to which unfortunately there can be no answer, is merely whether the theoretical equivalence of souls was his starting point. The way in which Plotinus could think of the world as parallel to the individual is well illustrated by a passage where he splits the κόσμος as well as the individual into two, a part composed of body and a kind of soul attached to it, and another, the true self in the individual, the disembodied world soul in the κόσμος (II, 3, 9, 30-4). The same tendency may explain why we have the curious discussion about the earth having sense perception in IV, 4, 22 ff.

At the level of the embodied soul, that is in the range of faculties from the discursive reason downwards, the souls are considered to be at their most separate and individual. Here the identity of distinct individuals that characterises the intelligible world is gone. Instead we have a multiplicity of formally identical individuals dependent on the appropriate Idea (VI, 5, 6, 7-11)[2]. It is at the level of αἴσθησις that Plotinus is most anxious that his doctrine of the soul's unicity should not be incompatible with the separate existence of individuals (cf. IV, 9, 2). Here we are concerned with differences between souls whose multiplicity stands in contrast to the singleness of the world soul. Two other groups of differences, to a large extent related, serve to show the divergence between world soul and the individual souls, namely those caused by body and the environment, which we have already mentioned, and those caused by the affections. In theory, all souls are free from affections (ἀπαθεῖς). The world soul remains so. The individual souls do not. Differences in the environment will affect the body and this can, as we have seen, affect the constitution of the individual. Moral behaviour and one's susceptibility to the affections are related to the composition of the body : καὶ σφοδρότεραι δὲ αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι κράσει τοιᾷδε σωμάτων, ἄλλαι δὲ ἄλλων (I, 8, 8, 30-1; cf. IV, 4, 31, 39-42). If the soul gives in to its body's constitution, it will be forced to desire or be angry (III, 1, 8, 15-16). In general the soul will be subject to affections if it associates closely with the body (IV, 7, 10, 7-11). In the first instance the informed body (τοίονδε σῶμα) and the compound formed by this and the lower phase of soul called φύσις are the subject of the affections, which are transmitted upwards by the sensitive and imaginative faculties (IV, 8, 8, 9-11, IV, 4, 17, 11-14). But it can happen that the whole soul will be affected by excessive attention to the needs of the lower parts (cf. IV, 4, 17, 20 ff.). The upper soul must therefore avoid taking more than the necessary interest in the activities of the lower (I, 2, 5). Thus the individual soul is subject to the circumstances in which it works and liable to deteriorate. So in its case Plotinus cannot maintain in practice the doctrine that the soul is ἀπαθής[3]. With the world soul it is quite otherwise. Its attention is always directed upwards and

(1) It provided an easy explanation of how men could know the Forms and made Plato's doctrine of *anamnesis* unnecessary.

(2) On the meaning of this passage see *Phronesis*, t. 11, 1966, p. 71-3.

(3) These matters will be discussed more fully in a forthcoming book.

its work does not affect it (cf. IV, 8, 2, 42 ff.). The ideal for the individual soul is to join the world soul in tranquil administration (IV, 3, 12, 8-12).

All this might suggest that the world soul and the individual souls are furthest apart in their lowest reaches, but curiously this is not the case, or at least not always. Sometimes Plotinus will regard the lowest part of the soul, that part assuring life and growth (τὸ φυτικόν), as part of a vertical section which is the individual soul. He will tell us that, when the already ensouled entity which is body comes closer to soul it becomes a living body, and the trace of soul which it now receives brings the beginning of the affections (VI, 4, 15, 8-17). The additional soul that body here receives must be the φυτικόν : any possibility that it is a higher form of soul is ruled out by the statement that it is only now that the body becomes a *living* body. So this passage would appear to conflict with the view that we receive the lower parts of the soul from the universe, parts to which we oppose another higher kind of soul (IV, 3, 7, 25-8, cf. II, 2, 2, 3-5). This opposition is of course the resistance to the affections that Plotinus so often talks about, and the centre of these affections is that very φυτικόν which we receive from the world and thus from its soul (cf. IV, 4, 28 *passim*). The apparent inconsistency may be explained if we do not forget that Plotinus maintains that all souls are one. When in IV, 9, 3, he is discussing how all the various levels of soul which may be distinguished and can exist without each other will unite when separated from body, he remarks τὸ δὲ θρεπτικόν, εἰ ἐκ τοῦ ὅλου, ἔχει καὶ ἐκείνης, namely world soul: τὸ θρεπτικόν is clearly the same as τὸ φυτικόν which he has just listed with the other faculties that reunite. The point seems to be that reunion is not really applicable to this part because it was never really individualised, for he proceeds to pose and answer the question why it does not come from our soul. The answer is that this is « because the object of τροφή is a part of the whole, a part that is sentient in a passive way, whereas the sensation that makes distinctions in alliance with reason belongs to the individual: this (the faculty of sensation) the soul does not need to use to form what already has its formation from the whole" (*ib.* 25-8)[1]. Here what is allocated to our soul and what is not depends on the view that our bodies as such are parts of the world as a whole, and our individuality only begins above them. At other times, when Plotinus is analysing the functions of an individual (cf. esp. IV, 4, 18 ff. and 28), he will speak of the faculties closely linked with the body as part of the individual, not unreasonably since the body does after all belong to us. He is merely considering the same data from different standpoints.

So the souls that diverged at the top have converged again at the bottom. In a way we have come full circle. We have seen that Plotinus' statements about the unity of souls may at times be unsatisfactory. But when we reach the point where that unity might be most completely lost, we find that it will explain what would otherwise be a serious inconsistency about our lower soul. It is interesting to reflect that many of the problems that do arise might not have arisen, had Plotinus always accepted that the basis of individuation is to be found in Forms. At this point Plotinus may have been a better Platonist than his own best interests required.[2]

(1) ὅτι τὸ τρεφόμενον μέρος τοῦ ὅλου, ὃ καὶ παθητικῶς αἰσθητικόν, ἡ δὲ αἴσθησις ἡ κρίνουσα μετὰ νοῦ ἑκάστου, ἧ οὐδὲν ἔδει πλάττειν τὸ ὑπὸ τοῦ ὅλου τὴν πλάσιν ἔχον.

(2) I should like to thank Professor A. H. Armstrong for reading and commenting on a draft of this paper.

IV

Did Plotinus believe in Ideas of Individuals?[1]

Plotinus generally says that we exist at the level of the discursive reason, the summit of the sensible man. Here the "we", the ἡμεῖς, is normally to be found. The ἡμεῖς however, can also have a place in the intelligible world. Since it is thus mobile[2], it cannot be the ultimate basis of the individual's existence or personality. To find this basis we must look at the transcendent area of the soul, and see how far up the scale of intelligible being man's individuality can be traced. Does the individual exist as such only at the level of Ψυχή, or can he be found in the world of Νοῦς as well?

Since the contents of Νοῦς are Forms, this question is equivalent to asking whether or not Plotinus believed in Ideas of individuals as well as of species. This at first sight is a question that can only present itself with reference to the period before he apparently decided finally that the undescended part of the soul reaches only as far as Ψυχή, as he seems to have done in his latest treatises.[3] But it does not necessarily follow that the existence of Forms of particulars is incompatible with the demotion of the individual's νοῦς. It remains possible that Plotinus could even at this stage have thought in terms of some further transcendent principle of the individual's being, a Form that would not be a part of his structure, but on whose existence that structure would nevertheless depend. Like the One, though of course in a different way, it might transcend the highest part of the individual, and yet be essential to his existence.

Unfortunately the evidence as to Plotinus' views about Forms of particulars does not seem to admit a clear answer. We have one treatise which states clearly that there are such Forms (V. 7), and two passages

[1] I should like to thank Professors A. H. Armstrong, D. M. MacKinnon, and J. M. Rist, and Miss A. N. M. Rich for comments on earlier versions of this paper

[2] On this mobility cf. J. Trouillard, *La Purification Plotinienne* (Paris, 1955) pp. 26-7 and E. R. Dodds, *Les Sources de Plotin*. Fondation Hardt. Entretiens sur l'Antiquité Classique V (Vandœuvres-Geneva 1960) pp. 385-6.

[3] cf. A. H. Armstrong and R. A. Markus, *Christian Faith and Greek Philosophy* (London, 1960) p. 57 and Armstrong, 'Salvation, Plotinian and Christian', *Downside Review* n.s. 75 (1957) p. 132 and n. 11. On the passage to which Armstrong refers in n. 11 cf. pp. 69-70 below and n. 18.

that may support it (IV.3.5 and IV.3.12 *init.*). On the other hand we have what seems to be an equally clear denial in V.9.12, and another in VI.5.8. There are also a number of texts whose interpretation seems to leave sufficient doubt for it to be unsafe to rely on any one of them for a definite answer. But several of these do seem to go against the view that there are Ideas of individuals.

This last group of texts is late, so that if they are to be taken as precluding the existence of Forms of particulars, any suggestion that the difficulties can be accounted for by a development in Plotinus' views must be discounted. It would be unlikely in any case. But even without this group of texts the distribution of those clear statements which we have mentioned already virtually forbids such an explanation. V. 7 is the eighteenth, V. 9 the fifth, and VI. 5 the twenty-third treatise, so that the acceptance of Ideas of individuals (V. 7) is inconveniently sandwiched between two denials. It might still just be possible to argue that V. 7 [18] and VI. 5 [23] are sufficiently close together for it not to be altogether unreasonable to suggest that at this period Plotinus was still uncertain of his revised answer to the question.[4] But the reappearance of the doctrine in IV. 3 [27], if it does reappear there, and more particularly its disappearance later, would make such a suggestion, speculative in any case, extremely difficult. It would then be necessary to propose a period of doubt running from V. 7 to IV. 3, and then a reversion to the original point of view.

This would seem to be carrying speculation too far. We can do no more than examine the evidence at our disposal. But before going on to the texts themselves, it might be helpful to consider what, on general grounds, Plotinus' doctrine might be expected to be. Here there would seem to be good reasons why Ideas of individuals should figure in his system. Some explanation of individuation must be given. Is it form or matter that is the basis of differences between the members of a single species? If, as Aristotle held, it is matter, there is no need to look further. The introduction of formal principles of individual characteristics would clearly be unnecessary. But matter should not be the cause responsible, for it has no powers or attributes in its own right. It is completely devoid of form, ἄποιος (IV.7.3.8), ἄμορφος (VI.1.27.2), ἀνείδεος (II.5.4.12), and mere στέρησις (II.4.14.24). Form

[4] VI.5 is really the continuation of VI.4[22]. The intervening treatises are I.2 and I.3, neither very long, and the mere fragment that is IV.1.

is merely reflected on to it from above, and has no effect on the nature of the matter, which retains nothing of what it temporarily receives (cf. III.6.14.24ff.). These features of matter might lead us to think that form should be responsible for all differences, and not merely for specific ones.

In Plato's philosophy, with its greater gulf between the intelligible and sensible worlds, these characteristics of matter, or rather its complete lack of any characterization, should perhaps have led to a belief in Ideas of particulars.[5] At first sight this conclusion suggests itself in Plotinus' case too. But in his system formal principles exist at various stages of diffusion. The One, the cause of all form, but itself completely lacking any form, contains all else in potency, in an indistinguishable unity. In Νοῦς there is a unity that is at the same time a multiplicity, although there are no real divisions. In Ψυχή the components are more fully separate, though unity is still maintained. This same deployment of an original unity, which has produced Νοῦς and Ψυχή, leads finally to the genuine multiplicity of the sensible world. Such progressive explication of higher principles might be thought to make it unnecessary to assume the actual existence of formal principles of particulars at the level of Νοῦς. On the other hand it does not follow that anything comes into existence which has not in some way existed already, and, on the principle that all that is here must be in the intelligible world as well – ἐκεῖθεν ἦν σύμπαντα ταῦτα, καὶ καλλιόνως ἐκεῖ (V.8.7.17) – we should expect at least the potential existence of Ideas of individuals at that level.

In fact the explanation that Plotinus usually gives of the multiplicity of existence here is based on the movement towards an ever-increasing diversity which we have outlined. When the contemplation which takes place at various degrees of intensity, proportionate to the levels of being, becomes so weak that the production of natural objects is its only result (cf. III.8.4.28-31), the entities in the intelligible world reflect themselves on to the receptacle below. Many such reflections may arise from a single existent above. Thus the many sensible fires, which may be thought of as ἐλλάμψεις of an archetypal fire, have one source which produces them all (cf. VI.5.8). Yet while the specific forms of things may be due to a multiplication of λόγοι, the differences

[5] L. Robin, *La théorie platonicienne des idées et des nombres d'après Aristote* (Paris, 1908) p. 589, suggests that Plato might have been on the way to holding that there were such Ideas, but he produces no evidence there to show that this was so.

between individuals, other than mere numerical non-identity, can hardly be explained in this way. Such differences would have to be attributed to deficiencies in the imposition of form on matter. It is such deficiencies which Plotinus uses to explain ugliness, and in doing so he allows matter a certain resistance to form (cf. I.8.9.11-14) which its sheer negativity might seem to forbid.[6]

Another general consideration which is relevant to the question under discussion is connected with the position of our intuitive intellect. If this is to be found at the level of Νοῦς rather than Ψυχή, the acceptance of Ideas of individuals seems to follow, since all the components of Νοῦς are Ideas. But this approach can provide no complete solution either, since Plotinus often leaves unspecified the exact position of that part of the soul which remains in the intelligible. It is however from this angle that Plotinus proceeds to deal with the problem in the only place where an unquestionable affirmation of the existence of Forms of particulars is to be found. To an examination of this and the other relevant texts we must now turn.

Let us first consider the evidence which supports the belief in Ideas of individuals. In V. 7, a treatise specifically devoted to this question, it is argued that if each individual can be traced back to the sphere of the intelligible, the principle of his existence must be there too. So if there is always a Socrates, and a soul of Socrates, there will be a Form of Socrates too. One might object, says Plotinus, that if the original Socrates does not always exist as such, but is sometimes reborn as another, for example Pythagoras, there will be no special Form of Socrates in the intelligible world. But he argues that if the soul contains the λόγοι of all the individuals through whom it passes, all those individuals must exist there too.[7] Now each soul does contain

[6] Plotinus is not in fact being inconsistent in regarding matter as pure negativity and as the source of evil. It is both. By being negative, matter has certain effects on all that comes into contact with it. These, when viewed in relation to higher being, are bad. cf. J. M. Rist, 'Plotinus on Matter and Evil', *Phronesis* 6 (1961) pp. 154-66.

[7] This may not mean that Socrates can become Pythagoras, but only that the presence of all the λόγοι in his soul allows for what is still essentially Socrates to reappear in different forms. If Socrates really "became Pythagoras" there would be difficulties about why Socrates should reproduce the λόγοι of Socrates, Pythagoras, X, Y, Z..., and not of A, B, C..., rather than just being reincarnated as Socrates, $S.^1$, S^2... There would also seem to be nothing to prevent the simultaneous existence of more than one Socrates. But we must also allow the possibility that Plotinus' aims in this treatise led him to give only a passing glance to the question of reincarnation, and perhaps even that further consideration of the implications of that doctrine contributed to the possible later abandonment of Forms of particulars. cf. however Rist's remarks, 'Forms of Individuals in Plotinus', *Classical Quarterly* n.s. 13 (1963) p. 228.

the same number of λόγοι as the cosmos. And as the cosmos contains not only the λόγος of Man, but those of individual living beings, the soul too must contain them. We may interrupt Plotinus' argument to point out that the soul must derive the λόγοι it has from above, and so they must exist somehow in Νοῦς. He now goes on to point out that unless the world repeats itself in cycles, the presence of the λόγοι of all individuals in the soul would mean that it contains an infinite number of such λόγοι. If, on the other hand, there is to be a periodic return involving the production of more particulars than the number of entities present in the intelligible pattern, one might object – this is still Plotinus' argument – that there is no need for periods. Instead one archetypal Man will be sufficient to produce all sensible men, and a finite number of souls could produce an infinite number of men. He meets this objection by saying that one formal principle will not suffice as a model for different beings, or in particular one Man for particular men who differ not by virtue of matter, but by many thousands of formal differences. The creation of different beings must proceed from different λόγοι. One cycle will contain all of these, and the next will reproduce the same set again (V.7.1.1-24). Most of the remainder of the treatise is taken up with the refutation of suggested explanations, based on a theory or theories of generation, which are put forward to account for the differences between individuals without assuming a separate formal principle for each.

Here there is no doubt that Plotinus accepts Ideas of individuals. Did he go so far as to accept an infinite number of such Ideas? In the part of his discussion that we have dealt with it seems that the number of such principles is finite, and writers on Plotinus tend to say that this was his doctrine with little sign of hesitation. So Zeller takes the postulation of cycles as a means of avoiding the infinity of the Ideas.[8] Inge writes, "Thus the history of the Universe contains an infinite number of vast but finite schemes, which have, each of them, a beginning, middle and end."[9] Similarly Armstrong says that Plotinus mentions but dismisses the idea of an infinite number of Forms in favour of a finite number reproduced in an infinite succession of world-

[8] *Die Philosophie der Griechen* III.ii[4] (Leipzig, 1903), p. 582.

[9] *The Philosophy of Plotinus*[3] (London, 1929) I, p. 189, cf. also II, p. 56.

periods.[10] On the other hand the interpretation of the final sentence of V. 7.1 given by Bréhier, Harder, and Cilento,[11] would support the view that in this treatise Plotinus envisages an infinite number of Forms of individuals.[12] The sentence runs: τὴν δὲ ἐν τῷ νοητῷ ἀπειρίαν οὐ δεῖ δεδιέναι· πᾶσα γὰρ ἐν ἀμερεῖ, καὶ οἷον πρόεισιν, ὅταν ἐνεργῇ. (V. 7.1.25-6). Bréhier, for example translates: "Mais il ne faut pas craindre l'infinité que notre thèse introduit dans le monde intelligible; car cette infinité est en un point indivisible, et elle ne fait que procéder, quand elle agit." Are we to assume then, as we must if this interpretation is correct, that Plotinus does in the end decide here that there is nothing wrong with numerical infinity in the Ideal world after all?[13]

Such a view would accentuate the contradiction with the passages denying that Ideas of individuals exist at all. But that in itself is no ground for rejecting the interpretation suggested for the sentence in question. The real point is that this interpretation seems to render quite pointless the previous discussion, where the periodical repetition of the world and its phenomena is introduced to explain how a finite number of Ideal archetypes is sufficient to account for all the particulars that ever appear in this world. And if this is so, what need is there for an *infinite* number of such Ideal principles? One cannot say that the theory of cyclical repetition is discarded or superseded by this final sentence of Plotinus' argument, since it reappears both later in the same treatise, and elsewhere (in the later work IV.3-4, at IV. 3.12.8ff. and IV. 4.9.6ff.).

But another interpretation of V. 7.1.25-6 seems to be possible. The first half of the sentence could easily be taken to mean that it can now – after the explanations just given – be seen that the introduction of Ideas of individuals need not involve infinity in the Ideal world,

[10] 'Plotinus' doctrine of the infinite and its significance for Christian thought', *Downside Review* n.s. 73 (1955) p. 51. cf. too C. Carbonara, *La Filosofia di Plotino*[2] (Naples, 1954) p. 205, and M. de Gandillac, *La Sagesse de Plotin* (Paris, 1952) p. 132.

[11] Unspecified references to Bréhier, Harder, and Cilento are to Bréhier's edition and Harder and Cilento's translations of the *Enneads*.

[12] In an earlier discussion, *op. cit.* pp. 119-20, de Gandillac too seems to accept that some sort of quantitative infinity in the intelligible world is involved. Rist's discussion in the article cited in n. 7, pp. 224-5, also implies that the number of Forms is infinite, but he now feels that this is wrong.

[13] That he might at least have given serious consideration to this possibility is suggested by the fact that his disciple Amelius accepted it as right, cf. Syrianus, *Comm. in Metaph.* 147.1ff. K.

and that we need therefore feel no inhibitions about accepting the hypothesis. The second half would most naturally mean that there is a potential infinity there, but that it is realised only in its manifestations here. This will hardly do, for we should then have an adequate explanation of all the particulars that come into existence in this world, without recourse to the cyclical theory. The difficulty would be solved if the last five words, καὶ οἷον πρόεισιν, ὅταν ἐνεργῇ, could be taken to refer to the *result* of repetition in successive cycles, and mean that infinity is unfolded as the original pattern (made up of a finite number of Ideas) reappears again and again, producing an ever-increasing number of particulars. The pattern, however, by virtue of its intelligible nature, is whole and undivided, and at the level at which it is still a pattern (ἐν τῷ νοητῷ), a complete unity though made up of a plurality of components. The force of πᾶσα would then be that all the infinity that there is is contained, as it were, ἐν τῷ ἀμερεῖ, in the undivided plurality of intelligible being, whose action produces an infinite number of manifestations. Such a meaning is given to infinity at the end of the treatise: ἢ καὶ ἐν νῷ, ἢ ἐν ψυχῇ, τὸ ἄπειρον τούτων ἀνάπαλιν τῶν ἐκεῖ προχείρων. (V. 7.3.22-3). καὶ οἷον πρόεισιν ὅταν ἐνεργῇ would then mean that the infinity might be said to advance every time the pattern acts:[14] with each cycle the total number of particulars in all

[14] Since first deciding on this interpretation I have found it embodied in a discussion of the passage in question by L. Sweeney, 'Infinity in Plotinus', *Gregorianum* 38 (1957) p. 730. But Sweeney there denies that there is any infinity in Plotinus' immaterial world except of a kind determined by effects – the hypostases are infinite by their power, an infinity of "extrinsic determination"– (and in the case of the One an infinity of "non-entity"), and regards the One and the lower hypostases as parallel in this respect. He fails to take into account other types of infinity which Plotinus was prepared to admit, and so his view cannot be said to be sufficiently firmly based. For a criticism of Sweeney's article (*loc. cit.* pp. 515-35 and 713-32) see W. N. Clarke, 'Infinity in Plotinus: a reply', *Gregorianum* 40 (1959) pp. 75-98. But in dealing with Νοῦς and Ψυχή Clarke seems to go too far in the other direction, and finds an infinity of being in both, albeit relative to what is below. But the idea of a relative infinity, though it may be implicit in Plotinus' thought, does not appear before Porphyry at the earliest – perhaps in *Sententiae* XXXI – cf. Dodds, *Proclus. The Elements of Theology*[2] (Oxford, 1963) note to prop. 93. Sweeney defends his thesis against Clarke in 'Plotinus Revisited', in the same vol. of *Gregorianum*, pp. 327-31, but in a later paper he admits that the One is intrinsically infinite, cf. 'Another Interpretation of *Enneads* VI.7.32', *Modern Schoolman* 38 (1961) pp. 298f.
For infinity as a divine perfection cf. also R. Mondolfo, *L'infinito nel pensiero dell' antichità classica* (Florence, 1956) pp. 527-8. A balanced account of Plotinus'

time tends further towards infinity, or perhaps better, since time has no beginning, the infinite number of all particulars grows. Though strictly speaking it may be nonsense, one might think of this infinity becoming more infinite by the addition of the particulars produced in each new period.[15]

This interpretation seems to be required by Plotinus' views on infinity. Actual numerical or quantitative infinity in the Ideal world he will not allow. Ἀπειρία as applied to Νοῦς may refer to the lack of impassible demarcations between its "parts" (cf. VI. 4.14.5-8), to its ability to reach everywhere always (VI.5.4.13ff), or to the fact that nothing exists outside Νοῦς so that it could limit it (VI.2.21.9-11).[16] In the treatise "On Numbers" (VI.6[34]) Plotinus points out that infinity and number are incompatible, and asks why we talk about infinite number. Perhaps, he suggests, it is in the same way that we may speak of an infinite line, which we can do only by thinking of one longer than the longest existing one, and not because such a line actually exists. When we come to the intelligible world we may say that there is an infinite line, but it is infinite only in that limit cannot be part of its definition, and not because it cannot be traversed (VI. 6.17.1-15). In a similar way intelligible number is in fact limited. While we can think of a number greater than the greatest number here, there it is impossible to add to the number given, because the addition is already there, since all number is. There is no basis for further additions. So number too is infinite there in a special way, namely in that it cannot be measured by something external (cf. VI.6.18.1ff.). In fact Plotinus even denies that there is an infinite number of sensible objects, and so that the number applicable to these is infinite (VI. 6.2.2-3). Much earlier the fact that it would involve an actual numerical infinite had been used to show that κρᾶσις δι'ὅλου is impossible (IV.7.[2].8[2].18-21).

The proposed interpretation of V.7.1 thus seems to be confirmed. We have then a clear statement that there are Forms of particulars, and we see that the number of these Forms is finite. One further passage may well support the existence of such Forms. In IV.3.5 we read οὕτω τοίνυν καὶ ψυχαὶ ἐφεξῆς καθ' ἕκαστον νοῦν ἐξηρτημέναι, λόγοι

doctrine of infinity is given by Armstrong in the article cited in n. 10, *Downside Review* n.s. 73 (1955) pp. 47f.

[15] The number of particulars present in any one period is of course no more infinite than is the number of their intelligible archetypes.

[16] See further Armstrong, *loc. cit.* pp. 51-2.

νῶν οὖσαι καὶ ἐξειλιγμέναι μᾶλλον ἢ ἐκεῖνοι, οἷον πολὺ ἐξ ὀλίγου γενόμεναι, ... (lines 8-11). Given these words alone one must allow the possibility that Plotinus has in mind here that each νοῦς produces a group of souls, rather than that each νοῦς has a single dependent soul which is a deployment of what exists in a more compact form in that νοῦς. The rest of the chapter might lead one to think that the second of these interpretations is correct, but does not rule out the first. The question under discussion is whether the soul of Socrates still exists as such when we come to its highest part which is not in the body. Plotinus answers that it does: no ὄντα can cease to exist, for even the νόες in the intelligible, which form a unity, retain their identity, by otherness. So too, he continues with the words we have quoted, the souls which come next in the order of existence are one and many. Here, and in what follows, the plurality of νόες is used for purposes of comparison, and there is nothing that must mean that there are as many νόες as there are souls. The same may be said of a sentence in the chapter that follows: ἔστι δὲ καὶ τὴν μὲν (all-Soul) πρὸς τὸν ὅλον νοῦν ἰδεῖν, τὰς δὲ (individual souls) μᾶλλον πρὸς τοὺς αὐτῶν τοῦς ἐν μέρει (IV.3.6.15-17). This suggests more strongly than anything in chapter 5 that each soul has a νοῦς to which it, and no other soul, is attached. Such would seem to be the most natural sense of πρὸς τοὺς αὐτῶν τοὺς ἐν μέρει. But once again the possibility that groups of souls are attached to each νοῦς cannot be excluded. In that case all human souls would be attached to the νοῦς that is the Idea of Man, all horses' souls to the νοῦς that is the Idea of Horse, and so on. In favour of the contrary view we might refer back to the remark at the beginning of chapter 5 that ἀπολεῖται οὐδὲν τῶν ὄντων. This is used to support the existence of Socrates' soul apart from its existence in a body, and οὐκ ἀπολοῦνται is applied to the νόες that retain their identity in spite of their unity. One could argue that this implies that Socrates' soul should also exist among these νόες in a recognizable form. On the other hand its survival at the level of Ψυχή would suffice to ensure that it did not disappear from τὰ ὄντα, which is not here used in the technical sense of components of Νοῦς. Further the point that nothing passes out of existence refers primarily to the doctrine that unity is not, in the intelligible, incompatible with plurality. To sum up, the balance of probability is perhaps in favour of taking this passage to contain the belief in Forms of individuals, but it cannot be at all certain that it does.[17] The

[17] Cilento, 'Psyche', Parola del Passato 16 (1961) p. 209, uses it as evidence for

same may be said of some remarks about νοῦς staying above when the souls descend at IV.3.12.1-5.[18] As a result V.7 is the only unambiguous affirmation of the existence of Ideas of particulars.

We must now pass to some texts which deny the existence of Forms of particulars. Two texts are clearly such denials. In V.9.12 Plotinus writes that we must say that there are Ideas of the universal, not of Socrates, but of Man. Going on to ask whether individual characteristics, such as being snub-nosed or hook-nosed, come from the Ideal archetype, he answers that they are included in the Idea of Man as *differentiae*. But that a particular man should have a particular snub nose is due to matter. Similarly matter and place determine the exact participation in differences of colour, which are included in the formal principle.

The second passage, which seems to have escaped notice, is to be found in VI.4-5. Discussing how particulars participate in Forms, Plotinus argues that it is by being separate from the matter, and not in it, that the Idea of fire is able to inform all fiery matter (cf. VI. 5.8.15-25). The unity of the Idea makes it possible for it to inform what is not a unity, and it is present as a whole to the matter which it informs. The suggestion that the Form provides different parts of itself to different parts of matter is dismissed, on the grounds that it would be ridiculous to introduce a plurality of Ideas of fire so that each separate fire should be informed by a separate Idea (which is what the division of the original Idea would in fact amount to). This, says Plotinus, will not do, because it would lead to an infinite number of Ideas (cf. VI.5.8.35-42). These two passages leave no doubt about Plotinus' intentions.

We must next consider a series of texts whose meaning is less clear, or which are, in some cases at least, open to an interpretation other than the obvious one.

In the same treatise VI.4-5 there is an apparent contradiction about our status in the intelligible world which has been noted and discussed by Arnou.[19] Two passages referring to this status would seem at first sight to give different answers to the question whether or

the belief in Ideas of individuals, but he considers that our souls are part of Νοῦς and not Ψυχή.

[18] Armstrong, *Downside Review* n.s. 75(1957) p. 132 n. 11, and Bréhier do take νοῦς in line 4 here as referring to individual intelligences. Otherwise Cilento, and possibly Harder.

[19] *Le Désir de Dieu dans la philosophie de Plotin* (Paris 1921) pp. 204-8.

not we exist as particulars there. The first (VI.4.14.17ff.) says that before our birth we were ἄνθρωποι ἄλλοι τινες, pure souls and νοῦς in contact with the whole of reality, parts of the intelligible from which we were neither distinct nor isolated. Now another man has been added to the original one, the one that each of us was there, and we are the combination of the two. But now, says Arnou, turning to the second text (VI.5.12.16ff.), from the πᾶς that we were we have become τινες by virtue of the addition of non-being. The state of being πᾶς can be regained by the removal of accretions. The first text, writes Arnou, says that we were τινες in the intelligible world, the second that we were πᾶς.

Before setting out to reconcile the contradiction he sees here, Arnou rightly discounts the possibility of a development, for the two treatises are in fact one. Whatever the exact sense of the first passage, it allows that there was more than one ἄνθρωπος there. Going on to ask whether this does in fact mean that we were each there individually, Arnou answers that it does, on the grounds that Plotinus believed in Ideas of individuals.[20]

Yet this belief appears to be rejected in the sixth chapter of VI.5, where the Ideal Man, ὁ ἄνθρωπος ὁ κατὰ τὴν ἰδέαν is opposed to the man ἐν ὕλῃ. The Ideal Man is said to have come to the particular man and becomes τις ἄνθρωπος. The man who exists in matter πολλοὺς ἐποίησε τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἀνθρώπους. Arnou argues[21] that this does not mean that the Ideal Man has produced a multiplicity of men, but that the individual has unfolded and deployed his model. But then comes an expression which seems to be fatal to his interpretation, ἐστὶν ἕν τι οἷον ἐνσφραγιζόμενον ἐν πολλοῖς (lines 10-11). Arnou, who has already remarked that Plotinus at the beginning of the passage points out that it is a comparison (οἷον εἰ, line 6), attempts to solve the difficulty about the words quoted by saying that this is just where the comparison breaks down. Plotinus, he says, thinks that it is not exact and indicates this with the words οὐχ οὕτως in line 12.

Having thus, as he thinks, succeeded in showing that we were there as individuals, Arnou reconciles the two original passages, those in VI.4.14 and VI.5.12, by saying that we were there as τινες, but because we were there οὐ διακεκριμένοι, we were there after the manner of the

[20] For this he refers to V. 7: the nature of our discussion does not of course allow us to use this as evidence here. Arnou makes no mention of V. 9.12.

[21] Against Bouillet, whom he accuses of neglecting αὐτούς, perhaps wrongly as Bouillet in his translation combines this sentence with the next.

intelligibles, and in this sense πᾶς, as μέρη τοῦ νοητοῦ. But since we were not in the sensible world we were not really a *part*. "Parties du Tout mais restant dans le Tout ne faisant qu'un avec le Tout, nous n'étions pas isolés; encore une fois nous étions τινες et nous ne l'étions pas."

Arnou's discussion makes no reference to the passage in VI.5.8, on the Idea of Fire, which we have noted in the previous section. Unless this passage can be explained away, and I do not see how it can, we are left with a serious inconsistency between it and the text in VI.5.6, as interpreted by Arnou, as well as with the two other passages which he takes to contain the same doctrine. But let us re-examine his treatment. Even without the evidence from VI.5.8, Arnou's contentention that such an apparently plain statement as the one that the Idea of Man is, as it were, stamped on the many individuals, should not be taken too seriously, on the grounds that this is the very point where the comparison breaks down, must excite suspicion. It must not be forgotten that the purpose of the comparison is to throw light on how intelligible being can be everywhere as a whole. Now the argument after the words we are considering runs: αὐτὸ δὲ ἄνθρωπος καὶ αὐτὸ ἕκαστον καὶ ὅλον τὸ πᾶν οὐχ οὕτως ἐν πολλοῖς, ἀλλὰ τὰ πολλὰ ἐν αὐτῷ, μᾶλλον δὲ περὶ αὐτό. ἄλλον γὰρ τρόπον τὸ λευκὸν πανταχοῦ καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ ἑκάστου ἐν παντὶ μέρει τοῦ σώματος ἡ αὐτή· οὕτω γὰρ καὶ τὸ ὂν πανταχοῦ. (VI.5.6.11-15). It seems clear that the point is that the comparison is inexact in that the seal-impressions involve two things inappropriate to an accurate representation of how intelligible being may be present as a whole at separate points. Firstly the presence of the archetype in the reproductions, and not *vice-versa*, and secondly the divided existence – as in the case of the colouring on separate surfaces – of what is in fact present in different places without its unity being infringed, just like soul in the different parts of the body. Here surely is where the parallel breaks down, and not in the production of many images from one pattern. It is with the relation of parts of τὸ ὄν to the whole that Plotinus is concerned (*ibid.* 1-4).

We have still to explain the τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἀνθρώπους of line 9. Arnou takes this as the plural of ὁ αὐτὸς ἄνθρωπος, the Idea of Man. This is certainly a possible meaning, but not the only possible one. The words could also mean that the men are the same, and so πολλοὺς ἐποίησε τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἀνθρώπους would simply mean that the derivation of sensible man from the Ideal Man had led to the production of a multiplicity of (*qua* man) identical men. This is the interpretation of Harder and

Cilento,[22] and our examination of the rest of the argument shows that it is the one that must be accepted. We must conclude that Ideas of individuals have no place in VI.5.6.

But what of the passage in VI.4.14? We may accept Arnou's conclusion that there is no incompatibility between the assertion of individual existence in the intelligible world, and the view that the individual is there equivalent to the whole, which we find in VI.5.12. But if there are no Ideas of individuals, how can the individual exist in the Ideal world? Have we removed the contradiction between VI. 5.8 and Arnou's view of VI.5.6 only to be faced with another between both these passages (instead of just VI.5.8) and VI.4.14? Certainly this is so if all three refer to the same level of being. But it is not necessary that they should. Throughout this treatise there are changes of subject. Sometimes Plotinus discusses Νοῦς, sometimes Ψυχή, and sometimes both together, τὸ νοητόν in the more general sense. In particular we may note that the introductory remarks to VI.4.14 show that this chapter is concerned with Soul, as preceding ones have been. Admittedly Soul is said to contain νόες, but since these are parts of the totality of Ψυχή we must assume that they are νόες either in the loose sense of reasons, or human νόες that Plotinus is here regarding as existing at this level rather than the higher one of Νοῦς. They are, therefore, not Ideas, as is the Man of VI.5.6. Thus the individuality with which Plotinus is here concerned must be that of the individual ψυχή. And to this Arnou's remarks may properly be applied.

Plotinus does not then seem to have held that there were Forms of particulars when he wrote VI.4-5. Some texts from later works point in the same direction, but most of them leave some room for doubt. In the third treatise on the categories Plotinus criticizes Aristotle's distinction between primary and secondary substances (VI.3.9.19-42). He objects to the idea implied in Aristotle's classification that the particular is in some way prior to, and the cause of, the universal. One of his points is this: ὁ Σωκράτης οὐκ ἔδωκε τῷ μὴ ἀνθρώπῳ τὸ εἶναι ἀνθρώπῳ, ἀλλ' ὁ ἄνθρωπος τῷ Σωκράτει· μεταλήψει γὰρ ἀνθρώπου ὁ τὶς ἄνθρωπος. (*ibid.* 27-30). The meaning that most readily presents itself is that Socrates exists as such by participation in the Form of Man: the Platonic term μετάληψις adds its support to this interpretation. But it is possible that Plotinus is merely arguing *ad hominem*, and

[22] Bréhier's version is different, but agrees in referring τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἀνθρώπους to sensible men.

pointing out that the existence of Socrates is not a prerequisite for the existence of the general class of men: X may be a man even if there is no Socrates, while Socrates' manhood depends on his membership of the species Man. A similar line of thought may be all that is behind the previous remarks on the relation of particular manifestations of a science or quality to the universal. Certainly the discussion that follows, about the relation of form to form in matter, and the priority of the former, seems to be couched in Aristotelian terminology and concepts. The only necessarily Platonic or Plotinian idea is that a λόγος in matter is "worse" than one free of it (*ibid.* 32-4). And the introduction of this point need not imply that Plotinus is arguing in his own terms all the time. If he were, it might even be possible to find room for the belief in Ideas of individuals. It is not impossible that Plotinus' train of thought could be this: the Idea of Man is prior to the Idea of Socrates, therefore the sensible Socrates is posterior to men in general. It seems quite likely then that Plotinus is here thinking of species-forms only, but not improbable that he is not talking about Forms at all, and just possible that he might be assuming Forms of particulars after all.[23]

There is also some room for doubt about an earlier passage in VI. 1-3[42-44]. In discussing the structure of Νοῦς Plotinus says that one cannot there grasp anything that is numerically single or an individual (ἄτομον). Whatever you may lay hold of there is an εἶδος, since there is no matter there (VI.2.22.11-13). That this is not merely a reference to the lack of frontiers between the parts of Νοῦς, so that εἶδος could still refer to the Idea of an individual, is made clear by the sequel, where εἶδος is opposed to γένος. We are told too that εἴδη provide a πέρας for prior εἴδη till the ἔσχατον εἶδος, the *infima species*, is reached (*ibid.* 15-17). In itself this passage would seem to rule out any belief in Ideas of individuals. The only difficulty is that the statements we have referred to are made in the course of a discussion of various Platonic texts.[24] It is therefore possible to argue that Plotinus' remarks are coloured by the task in hand. Thus Trouillard suggests that in this passage he is making concessions to Plato in avoiding the introduction of Ideas of individuals.[25] But Plotinus is hardly notorious

[23] It may be worth recalling that in VI. 3 Plotinus is directly concerned only with the categories of the sensible world.

[24] From *Tim.* 39 E in lines 1-3, *Parm.* 144 B in lines 14-15, *Phil.* 16 E in lines 18-19.

[25] *Purification* pp. 76-7. Trouillard makes his position less unacceptable by

for altering his views to make his exegesis of texts conform to the spirit of his Master's writings! So we should probably be right in taking this passage to mean that Plotinus himself does not here believe in Forms of particulars. And if he did not believe in them here, we have further grounds for not seeing them in VI.3, a part of the same treatise. This does not, however, justify us in maintaining that the passage from VI.3 definitely contains a rejection of Ideas of individuals.

One further discussion in the VIth *Ennead* seems to preclude Ideas of individuals. This is concerned with the attributes of the Ideal Man. Even in the Ideal world he is not just νοῦς but has αἴσθησις and everything else that is necessary for life here, so that the form should be complete, and so fully able to inform matter (VI.7[38].3.10ff.). These statements are justified in the following chapters (4-7), and the whole discussion is given in terms of a singular ἄνθρωπος. Certainly one's impression on reading it is that Plotinus is concerned only with a species-form. But there seems to be nothing in this section that makes it impossible that he should be dealing with just one of many Ideas of men, as opposed to the sensible counterpart of the same Idea. Later he talks of Ideas being at the lower end of a sort of vertical section through Νοῦς, as a way of explaining how a horse, for example, may still – by virtue of the higher part of the section – be a νοῦς. The descent down one such section, which is one νοῦς, may finish with a horse or some other animal. Nails, claws, horns, or sharp teeth, may be added (VI.7.9.20-46). Again we seem to be concerned with species. But once again it would perhaps be possible for an advocate of the belief in Ideas of individuals to show that this is not necessarily so. He might have a little difficulty with the first lines of ch. 8.[26] The case against him seems to be clinched by a remark about the Idea of a

pointing out that Plotinus manages to extract from his texts the existence of individuality at the level of Ψυχή, and claiming that this means that individuality is retained in the world of Ideas since it is still present in the intelligible. Trouillard argues in support that Plotinus is not always clear about the boundary between the top of Ψυχή and Νοῦς. But while this is true of the individual, there seems to be little room for enough doubt about the boundary between the hypostases to permit the acceptance as an Idea of something that exists only in Soul.

[26] His difficulty would be greater if he had to explain the phrase ἵππος ὅλος in line 1, as he would have to do if the hitherto accepted reading were correct. In fact Henry-Schwyzer's collation shows that it appears only in one of the primary MSS which otherwise have ὅλως. Ὅλως might leave room for individual Ideas of the animals mentioned, but the sentence still suggest species-forms.

plant in ch. 11: καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνο ἕν, ταῦτα δὲ (that is, those here, sc. τὰ φυτά) πολλὰ καὶ ἀφ'ἑνὸς ἐξ ἀνάγκης (lines 14-15).

Finally we may refer to a text from the last group of treatises. In the course of an argument to show that we should not expect this world to display the same standards of beauty and goodness as its Ideal model, Plotinus writes as follows: οἷον, εἴ τις ἐσκόπει τὸν ἄνθρωπον τὸν αἰσθητὸν ὅστις κάλλιστος, οὐκ ἂν δήπου τῷ ἐν νῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ἠξίωσε τὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο ἀποδεδέχθαι τοῦ ποιητοῦ, εἰ ὅμως ἐν σαρξὶ καὶ νεύροις καὶ ὀστέοις ὄντα κατέλαβε τῷ λόγῳ, ὥστε καὶ ταῦτα καλλῦναι καὶ τὸν λόγον δυνηθῆναι ἐπανελθεῖν[27] τῇ ὕλῃ (III.2[47].7.6-12). Here too the comparison would seem to be of the sensible man with the single Ideal archetype of all men. But again it is open to argue that what the passage means is that even the paragon described falls short of the Ideal principle which is his highest and truest self in Νοῦς, and that this principle is peculiar to one man.

Thus several of the texts we have just examined seem to allow of differing interpretations. But none of them clearly affirms a belief in the existence of Forms of particulars. It can be claimed that some do not rule out such a belief. Yet in each case the interpretation which would do so seems more likely. In one case, the passage from VI.7, we see that Plotinus is definitely thinking of species-forms. All these texts come from late treatises. VI.7[38] is the earliest of the group. If Plotinus did accept Forms of particulars in the others, we should have to assume more fluctuations in his attitude to this question. His answer would be "no" in V.9[5], "yes" in V.7[18], "no" in VI.4-5[22-3], perhaps "yes" in IV.3[27], "no" in VI.7[38], and "yes" again thereafter. Such a development is difficult to accept, but since Plotinus apparently changed his mind twice, in V.7 and VI.4-5, it cannot be claimed that he could not have done so again. One can only say that it is perhaps less likely that he did than that he did not. But in view of the balance of probabilities as far as the meaning of the individual texts is concerned, it is probably safe to say that Plotinus in his last period did not accept the existence of Ideas of individuals.

Is there any hope of reconciling his divergent positions? Scholars who have dealt with this problem and tried to do so have tended to treat it as a question of reconciling V.9 and V.7. By doing so they naturally make their task far easier than it is: the evidence from the latest treatises must vitiate any conclusion which states that Plotinus

[27] Theiler's ἐπανθεῖν (in the revised Harder) is perhaps right.

was always prepared to accept Forms of particulars, or that he worked towards such an acceptance in V.7. Even if the conclusions of our previous paragraph are not accepted, the evidence from VI.4-5 is enough to show that he rejected the belief on a later occasion.

With these reservations let us look at the solutions proposed. F. Heinemann[28] tried to cut the Gordian knot and simply denied the authenticity of V.7, but naturally enough he has found no support for his view. Bréhier tries to narrow the difference by maintaining that V.9.12 admits intelligible origins for the different races of men, and that γρυπότης and σιμότης are characteristics of such formal principles.[29] But the Greek seems to mean that they are things contained in the Idea of Man. In a note *ad loc.* he says that a comparison of this passage with V.7 suggests that differences as far as those between races are due to "préformation", while any further differentiation is accidental.[30] Apart from the objection to his view of V.9.12 we have just mentioned, this suggestion hardly fits with the doctrine of V.7. It could only be supported by giving much more weight than is due to the various ideas canvassed in the second and third chapters of this treatise and paying insufficient attention to the clear indications of the first. Trouillard at least pays attention to passages from other treatises, though we have suggested that his remarks on VI.2.22 are at least questionable.[31] He notes that V.9.12 admits differences arising from matter, and says that this position is approximately the same as that in V.7.3 which allows differences between individuals to arise from defects of form.[32] He concludes that the remark at the beginning of V.9.12, that there is no Idea of Socrates, but only of Man, is just a question or an objection inserted in the exposition.[33] This is

[28] *Plotin. Forschungen über die plotinische Frage, Plotins Entwicklung und sein System* (Leipzig, 1921) pp. 63-73. Heinemann's views on questions of authenticity and development are criticized by Bréhier in his Notices and notes, *passim*, and Harder, *Gnomon* 4 (1928) pp. 647-52.

[29] Notice to V. 9, vol. V, p. 159.

[30] *ibid.* p. 171 n. 1.

[31] See pp. 74-5 above, and n. 25. Other passages which he discusses (*Purification* pp. 76f.) in the furtherance of his view that Νοῦς contains individuals are concerned with individuality at the level of Ψυχή. On this see n. 25. It is interesting to note that he takes IV.3.5 as referring only to the ψυχή of Socrates.

[32] *Purification* p. 76.

[33] *ibid.* Some such idea is presumably what enabled O. Hamelin, *La théorie de l'intellect d'après Aristote et ses commentateurs*, Publié par E. Barbotin (Paris, 1953) p. 45 n. 99, to quote this chapter and V. 9.10 as evidence that Plotinus

hardly suggested by the run of the argument. Another difficulty in Trouillard's suggestion is that according to V.9.12 differences between all individuals are due to matter, while the remark he mentions in V.7.3, at line 6, is concerned only with differences between the offspring of the same parents. Moreover Plotinus seems to deny in the sequel that even such differences are not due to formal principles. Perhaps the most helpful contribution to this approach to the problem is a comment by Ficino on V.9.12: *Omnes formales inter individua differentiae non contingentes ex diversitate materiarum vel locorum, illic ideas habent, sed virtute quadam potius, quam actu proprio, scilicet quatenus in speciebus ipsis, quarum proprie et praecipue sunt ideae, continentur varii quidam singularesque formarum modi, inde quandoque pullulaturi.*[34] This is at least not incompatible with V.9.12, but there seems to be no evidence for any such status for the Ideas of V.7. It does seem then that we must reject the view that V.9 and V.7 embody the same doctrine.[35]

More attractive is a suggestion made by Himmerich,[36] that the question is left open in V.9, and given a positive answer in V.7. But he appears to base his view on the acceptance of Bréhier's remarks about "préformation",[37] and seems to think Bréhier's version, which he misquotes, justifies these.[38] A solution somewhat similar to Himmerich's is proposed by J. M. Rist in a recent article on this subject, in which he confines himself to V.7. and V.9.[39] Starting from the questionable assumption that in V.9.12 Plotinus is out to make a case for Forms of individuals, at least of individual men,[40] he suggests

held that there are Forms of particulars. Hamelin also gives VI.7.14 as evidence for this doctrine: this seems quite unjustified.

[34] Printed *ad loc.* in both Creuzer's editions.

[35] Carbonara, *Filosofia di Plotino*, p. 191 n. 34, reports some other explanations of the two passages in question and adds one of his own, but these either fail to attach sufficient importance to V. 7 or do not explain why there should be two different statements in the two treatises of an assumed single view.

[36] *Eudaimonia. Die Lehre des Plotin von der Selbstverwirklichung des Menschen.* Forschungen zur neueren Philosophie und ihrer Geschichte n.F. 13 (Würzburg, 1959) p. 88.

[37] *ibid.* p. 86.

[38] cf. *ibid.* p. 186, n. 4 to ch. 7. Bréhier translates: "Il faut dire qu'il y a des idées des universaux, non pas de Socrate, *mais de l'homme*". Himmerich omits "des idées". A standard scribal error, on which the note depends. On Bréhier's explanation of these texts see above.

[39] *loc. cit.* (n. 7), *Classical Quarterly* n.s. (1963) pp. 223-231.

[40] *ibid.* p. 224.

that in V.9 he is still rather hesitant about how far individuality is due to form, and that his views develop to the acceptance of Ideas of individuals which appears later in V.7.[41] But the fact remains that in V.7 we find Ideas of particular men while such Ideas are rejected in V.9.

It does seem then that we are faced with a genuine inconsistency between these two passages.[42] In fact, if we discount the somewhat indecisive evidence from IV.3, this inconsistency may well be one between V.7 and the rest of Plotinus' work, for we have seen that there is some definite, and further probable, evidence that he rejected Forms of particulars afterwards. If this inconsistency is to be removed, it can probably only be done by showing that V.7 is no more than an *ad hominem* argument against the theory, or theories, of generation there discussed. But I see no way of doing this. The suggestion is only a guess. It would receive some support if it could be shown that Plotinus did not really believe in the theory of cyclical return. One would have to show convincingly that in other passages where this theory is mentioned (IV.3.12 and IV.4.9) it is not to be taken seriously. The fact that both refer to Zeus might tempt one to see an indication of this, but while Zeus does not always refer to the same hypostasis (cf. IV.4.10.2-4), the use of his name does not seem to justify the assumption that such passages are somehow mythical. The appearance of Zeus is not incompatible with the exposition of serious doctrine, and Plotinus expounds no strange or unusual views in the rest of the two passages in question. And if this doctrine of periodic return could be shown to be un-Plotinian, we should also have to show that there is no connection between it and the doctrine of reincarnation.[43] Only if these obstacles could be overcome could we perhaps go on to argue that the cyclical theory does not belong to Plotinus' own system, but is introduced in V.7 to refute on his own terms a Stoic, or Stoicizing, opponent for whom the doctrine of periodic return would be a cardinal principle.

[41] *ibid.* p. 277.

[42] This conclusion is not new. It was reached by Zeller, *Philosophie der Griechen* III.ii[4], pp. 581-2. Zeller admits that his attempt at conciliation is unsuccessful.

[43] Plotinus certainly believed in reincarnation. The views of Inge, *Philosophy of Plotinus*[3] II, pp. 33-4, who holds that Plotinus did not take this belief seriously, and P. V. Pistorius, *Plotinus and Neoplatonism* (Cambridge, 1952) pp. 98-9, who thinks that he did not believe it at all, have been disposed of by Miss Rich, 'Reincarnation in Plotinus', *Mnemosyne* ser. 4. 10 (1957) pp. 232-8. Miss Rich shows not only that Plotinus did hold this doctrine but that it played an important part in his philosophy.

The difficulties seem too great, and so we must accept that Plotinus did not hold consistent views on the existence of Ideas of individuals.[44] And so we must conclude that we are unable to give a definite answer to the question we set out to solve. The permanent basis of the individual's existence may be, but is not always, a Form in the realm of Νοῦς. Could Plotinus' hesitation perhaps be due to a reluctance to depart from Plato's doctrine on a question so central in the Master's teaching?

[44] Armstrong remarks, in a context which does not admit detailed discussion, that Plotinus sometimes admitted the existence of Ideas of Individuals, Armstrong and Markus, *Christian Faith and Greek Philosophy*, p. 26, n. 1. In his *Architecture of the Intelligible Universe in the Philosophy of Plotinus*. Cambridge Classical Studies 6 (Cambridge, 1940) pp. 79-80 he took this as Plotinus' normal view.

[45] A lightly revised version of this article appears as Chapter 9 of my *Plotinus' Psychology* (The Hague 1971) 112-33; a critique by J.M. Rist, re-arguing part of the case that Plotinus did believe in such ideas, may be found in his 'Ideas of Individuals in Plotinus'. *Dionysius* 1 (1977) 49-68, reprinted in his *Plotinian and Christian Studies*. Collected Studies 102 (London 1979). I remain unconvinced that Plotinus consistently, if ever, believed that there are Forms of Individuals.

V

Plotinus' Psychology: Aristotle in the Service of Platonism[1]

IN HIS *Life of Plotinus* Porphyry wrote that his works contain an admixture of hidden Peripatetic and Stoic material and, in particluar, that he made much use of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*.[2] Hence the title of this paper. The point of it is that Plotinus' psychology is based on a thorough-going Platonic dualism but many of the details are Aristotelian. I shall not argue for this assertion at every point, but shall to some extent leave it to emerge from Plotinus' views and discussions.

But it should be stressed that Plotinus' thought is not crudely syncretistic as are, to a greater or lesser extent, the various forms of Stoicizing Platonism, or Platonizing Stoicism, and also, as far as we know it, the thought of his more immediate middle Platonist predecessors. One does not normally find him simply juxtaposing notions drawn from different sources. Rather he will take ideas that may be useful, sometimes with a fairly large measure of what Professor Armstrong has called critical rethinking,[3] and combine them both with each other and also with what are, as far as one can tell, new ideas of his own. Even if this did not in any case emerge very clearly from Plotinus' own work, we have Porphyry's express testimony to his methods, for he tells us in the *Life* that Plotinus caused to be read in his classes the commen-

[1] A version of this paper was read to the Southern Association for Greek Philosophy at Oxford in September 1970. In part it represents the results of my recent book, *Plotinus' Psychology: His Doctrines of the Embodied Soul* (The Hague, 1971), where some of the positions adopted rather dogmatically here are argued in more detail.

[2] *Vita Plotini*, 14.4-7.

[3] "The Background of the Doctrine 'That the Intelligibles are not outside the Intellect,'" in *Les Sources de Plotin*: Entretiens sur l'Antiquité Classique (Fondation Hardt) V (Vandœuvres-Geneva, 1960), 408. Note: this volume is hereafter cited as *Sources de Plotin*.

taries of Severus, Numenius, Gaius, Atticus, Aspasius, Alexander, Adrastus, and others that were around: this list covers Neopythagoreans, Aristotelianizing and Stoicizing Platonists, as well as Peripatetics. But, says Porphyry, "he was personal and independent in his thinking, and applied the mind of Ammonius to his investigations."[4] What exactly the mind of Ammonius was no one knows, but we may surmise that it had as much to do with approach as with any particular set of doctrines professed by Plotinus' teacher.[5]

Before going on to the details of Plotinus' psychology, it may be as well to give a brief outline of Plotinus' system: those who are familiar with his thought should pass on. It is necessary to proceed thus because all of Plotinus' thought is present in the background of almost everything he says. While his exposition is by no means systematic, and important statements on one subject may be found in the discussion of another to almost as great an extent as in Plato, we cannot with Plotinus safely assume that if he does not say something at a given place he might not at that time believe it. Plotinus did not write a word until he was forty-nine and had already been engaged in philosophy for some twenty years.[6] As far as one can see there was virtually no development in his thought during the time when the *Enneads* were written, though there are a number of questions on which he reformulated his views in different and often more careful language.[7] And he certainly was critical of his own formulations.[8] But allowing for some

[4] *Vita Plot.*, 14.10-16.

[5] The attempts to reconstruct Ammonius' views remain unconvincing and are likely to do so until some solid evidence turns up. A number of such attempts have been made: they are listed and criticized by Professor Dodds, "Ammonius and Numenius," *Sources de Plotin*, pp. 24-32, who says all that needs to be said. A subsequent reconstruction by W. Theiler, "Ammonius der Lehrer des Origenes," in his book *Forschungen zum Neuplatonismus* (Berlin, 1966), pp. 1-45, marks no advance.

[6] *Vita Plot.*, 4.6-14.

[7] On the question of development see most recently Armstrong, *Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy* (Cambridge, 1968), p. 218, and my *Plotinus' Psychology*, p. 4, n. 10. There may have been reformulations on whether or not the One is intelligible and has self-knowledge, or whether there was a separate appetitive faculty. On the former see the early pages of my paper "Nous and Soul in Plotinus: Some problems of Demarcation," to be published in the proceedings of the Convegno Internazionale of the Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei, *Plotino e il Neoplatonismo in Oriente e in Occidente* (Rome, October 5-9, 1970), and the references given there. On the latter, *Plotinus' Psychology*, pp. 40 f. Cf. too J. Guitton, *Le temps et l'éternité chez Plotin et Saint Augustin*[3] (Paris, 1959), p. 71 n. 1.

[8] Cf. Armstrong "Emanation in Plotinus," *Mind* n.s. 46 (1937), 61 and n. 5, and R. Ferwerda, *La signification des images et des métaphores dans la pensée de Plotin* (Groningen, 1965), p. 59.

variations which arise from different problems and different points of view, one can give the main outlines of his system without fear of being seriously misleading.

As befits a Platonist, Plotinus' world is clearly divided into sensible and intelligible being. The gulf, however, is not as great as in Plato, for it is bridged by soul and its layers to a greater extent than is the case even in Plato's later dialogues. At the top of the intelligible world, or rather above it, stands the One, the absolutely transcendent first cause which can be described in terms of the first hypothesis in the Parmenides,[9] and which is Plato's Form of the Good, now on the far side of Being[10] in kind as well as in status. For Plotinus it is no longer a Form. Forms come at the next level, the world of Intellect (*Νοῦς*). Intellect is derived from the One, from which it proceeds or "emanates" automatically and eternally (cf. esp. V.1.6). It emerges in an unformed condition, an indefinite dyad, and is formed and articulated by returning in contemplation to the One (V.4.2.4-8). Its contents are Forms, Being, and Eternal life, which consists in self-contemplation: Aristotle's unmoved mover has been given the Forms as its contents following a middle-Platonic tradition,[11] which may go back to Xenocrates.[12] Plotinus, helped in his thinking by Alexander's comments on Aristotle's Intellect,[13] is much concerned to stress that the self-intellection of Intellect involves a measure of duality which disqualifies it from being the first principle (V.3.10 ff). The third hypostasis, Soul, is a product of Intellect's self-contemplation and comes into being in a manner analogous to that of Intellect itself. Plotinus sometimes has difficultly in keeping Intellect and Soul apart, and sometimes neglects to do so but the attributes of the two normally differ in the following ways. Intellect is one and many, unity in diversity, while Soul is many and One, diversity in unity (IV.8.3.10 f.). Intellect is eternal and above any form of process (IV.4.1.25 ff.). It is, as we have indicated, in im-

[9] Plotinus believed that Plato distinguished his three hypostases in that dialogue cf. V.1.8.23-6. The detailed verbal correspondences were set out by Dodds, "The Parmenides of Plato and the Origins of the Neoplatonic One," *Classical Quarterly*, 22 (1928), 132 f. Cf. too H.-R. Schwyzer, "Die zwiefache Sicht in der Philosophie Plotins," *Museum Helveticum*, 1 (1944), 87-89, and "Plotinos," Pauly-Wissowa, XXI.1 (1951), 553 f.

[10] *Rep.*, 509b, a phrase frequently quoted by Plotinus.

[11] Cf. Albinus, *Did.* X = 164.35-7 (Hermann).

[12] Cf. Frs. 15 and 16 (Heinze) and the discussion by H. J. Krämer, *Der Ursprung der Geistmetaphysik* (Amsterdam, 1964) pp. 42 ff.

[13] Cf. Alexander, *De Anima*, 87.29 ff, *De An. Mantissa*, 108.7 ff (Bruns).

mediate and permanent contact with the objects which are its contents (V.5.2; V.8.4.32-7). Soul on the other hand, exists always, but is linked with time (III.7.11.20 ff.), and its thinking involves a progression from object to object (V.8.6.). In terms of each other Soul is an unfolding of Intellect, its *logos* or deployment at a lower and more diffuse level (cf. I.1.8.6-8). It is causally dependent on Intellect, and therefore by Plotinus' way of thinking it is necessarily different: the cause is not the same as what is caused (*τὸ δὲ αἴτιον οὐ ταὐτὸν τῷ αἰτιατῷ*: VI.9.6.54 f.).

From this transcendent hypostasis Soul derive the individual souls and the world-soul. Substantially identical, at least in theory (IV.9. 1-3),[14] both have higher and lower phases, the lower being produced by the same process which has already produced the hypostasis. This lower soul, usually called nature (*φύσις*),[15] is virtually an extra hypostasis (V.2.1.26). This is the section of Soul which gives life to body and provides the lower faculties, sometimes *qua* world-soul and sometimes *qua* individual-soul. The end of the procession is matter, which shares the formlessness of Aristotle's matter with the evil nature of Plato's, but unlike either is, however remotely, a product of the First Cause. From our point of view the importance of this complete formlessness is that body itself is already a compound of matter and a form of Soul, namely an irradiation (*ἔλλαμψις*) from *φύσις* (VI.4.15.8 ff.). The importance of the procession is that it involves an element of reversion and that all entities in the system, even sometimes matter, are striving towards assimilation with those above them (cf. e.g., III.6.7.13, III.8.8.1-8). All this may give the impression that Plotinus' soul, and also his system as a whole, constitute a kind of Heraclitean flux. This, however, is but one of two sides of a picture, which are produced by looking at the world both statically and dynamically.[16] The other side is a static system of levels of being, and it is largely from this point of view that we shall discuss Plotinus' psychological doctrines. They cannot, however, be understood if one does not bear in mind the origins of soul and its various layers, and the fact that it is in their nature to aspire to what is above.

[14] In practice this identity will not always hold; cf. my paper "Soul, World-Soul and Individual Soul in Plotinus," *Le Néoplatonisme*: Colloques Internationaux du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Royaumont, June 9-13, 1969 (Paris, 1971), pp. 55 ff.

[15] Plotinus will often use this term as the equivalent of *φυτικόν*, the vegetative soul.

[16] Cf. Schwyzer, *Museum Helveticum*, 1 (1944), 87-99, and the references given there on p. 89.

We have already mentioned that body is a compound of matter and soul. This is the only level at which matter is indissolubly linked with soul, and it is so in as much as it is a part of the world conceived as a living being. The permanence of the link may be seen as a manifestation of the world-soul's unchanging and unchanged management of the *cosmos* (cf. III.4.4.4-7). Above the level of body, the union of body and soul in the individual is conceived in what appears at first sight to be a thoroughly dualistic way. Here Plotinus is being faithful to his Platonic heritage, but while for Plato body and soul have nothing in common beyond their symbiosis, the monistic nature of Plotinus' philosophy entails a common origin, however much he might ignore it in stressing their differences. That the compound of body and soul—Plotinus calls it variously *τὸ ζῷον*, *τὸ κοινόν*, *τὸ σύνθετον*, *τὸ συναφότερον*—is at least in theory no more than a juxtaposition emerges nowhere more clearly than in Plotinus' consideration of his predecessors' views of the soul in IV.7[2]. The first part of this treatise, chapters 1-8, is based on a traditional handbook whose traces reappear in Nemesius[17] and possibly Themistius.[18] But there is no reason to believe that Plotinus did not himself accept the views and criticisms expressed in it, and some evidence that he made a number of significant adjustments. This may be seen in a characteristic method of presenting his predecessors' views with an eye to his own preoccupations rather than to historical truth—a method somewhat reminiscent of Aristotle's.[19] His first concern in IV.7 is to clear the field of any materialistic notions of what soul might be. In general, one may say that Plotinus' psychology removes almost completely those vestiges of materialism that still seem to appear in Plato's. Here in IV.7 he deals first with the notion that soul can be the product of some mixture of elements or constituents of elements. This notion he rejects on the grounds that the combination of such material components could not produce life unless they themselves already had it. And that would be soul: in fact there can be no body without some formative principle (IV.7.2). This argument could be said to smack of *petitio principii*, and to some extent this is true of other arguments in this treatise. The significance of this is that it underlines the extent to which a basically Platonic concept of the soul is more or less axiomatic for Plotinus. This emerges most clearly in Plotinus' criticisms of Aristotle's entelechy view, at which Plotinus

[17] *De Natura Hominis*, ch. 2. On the sources of this chapter cf. H. Dörrie, "Porphyrios' Symmikta Zetemata," *Zetemata* 20 (Munich, 1959) pp. 111 ff.

[18] *In de Anima*, 24.22 ff., 41.11 ff. (Heinze).

[19] Cf. *Plotinus' Psychology*, pp. 12 f., 51 ff.

arrives after a lengthy attack on Stoic theories based largely on the contention that both sense-perception and memory would be impossible if the soul were in any way corporeal or impermanent (IV.7.3-8[2] *passim*). His last argument against the Stoics is directed against the view that ἕξις, the structural principle of inorganic matter, is prior to that of organic matter, φύσις, and φύσις to soul. To refute it he uses the Aristotelian notion that higher principles cannot depend on lower ones because the potential can only be realized by the actual (IV.7.8[3]). Here as always Plotinus is prepared to use Aristotle as a stick with which to beat materialists—and others: in the next chapter he uses a Peripatetic argument against the adherents of the view that soul is a harmony.[20]

When he launches into a criticism of the entelechy theory, Plotinus' dualistic approach is immediately apparent. In fact he makes no real attempt to criticize the theory as it was intended, but begins by translating it into terms of his own. He says, "they say that the soul in the compound has the position of form in relation to the matter which is the ensouled body." (IV.7.8[5].2 f.). To say that the body is already ensouled before it is informed by soul is of course Plotinus and not Aristotle. Similarly to argue that if a part of the body were cut off a part of the soul would be cut off as well seems to miss the point, for one could say that this was in a sense what actually happened, since the soul would no longer be able to to do those things which required the missing part. Thus the entelechy of a man without an arm would not be the same as the entelechy of that man with both arms. And one could give a similar answer to Plotinus' contention that the withdrawal of soul into the root of a withered plant shows that Aristotle's definition is not even applicable to the vegetative soul. Then Plotinus complains that the soul's withdrawal in sleep would not be possible on the entelechy view: again he has simply assumed a Platonic position, and when he goes on to amend the objection by saying that there could be no sleep at all he simply ignores the "first" in Aristotle's definition.[21] Finally he produces *as an objection* the fact that if the soul were an entelechy there could be no metensomatosis (IV.7.8[5]).

This thoroughly cavalier treatment of the basis of Aristotle's psychology does not, as we shall see, prevent Plotinus from using some of its details when he comes to construct his own. But for the moment his

[20] Plotinus merely alludes to the argument at IV.7.8[4]. 11-13. W. Jaeger, *Aristotle: Fundamentals of the History of his Development*, trans. Robinson[2] (Oxford, 1948), p. 44 n. 3, states that he took it from the *Eudemus*, but he could equally well have found it in one of Alexander's commentaries, or elsewhere. Cf. *Plotinus' Psychology*, p. 11 n. 10.

[21] "The first actualization of a natural organic body," *De An.*, 412 b 5 f.

main concern is to stress the difference between soul and any kind of material existence. When he has concluded his refutation it is soul's otherness that is emphasized (IV.7.10). Yet in spite of his Platonic assumptions Plotinus does feel a greater obligation than does Plato to give an account of how soul is related to body. His emphasis on their differences does not facilitate his task. We may recall that the soul which comes to the body is a mere reflection of that higher soul which remains at one with all soul: Plotinus keeps in the intelligible an undescended part of the soul, its intellect, which may or may not reach up through the hypostasis Soul to Intellect itself. But even the reflection or image of higher soul is other than body. And when Plotinus talks of it as a reflection or an image (e.g., I.1.11 *passim*) he is using just the same language as he uses when he discusses the relation of a hypostasis to that above it (cf. V.4.2.25 f.). Thus it is the subordination of the embodied soul to what lies above that is at issue, and not its independence.

When he comes to the problem of how soul is in body Plotinus finds himself in some difficulty. He says that if we do not allocate a special place to each of the soul's powers, then the soul will not be in us rather than outside, and it will be difficult to explain how it can do those things for which it requires bodily organs (IV.3.20 *init.*). Yet he rejects any notion that the soul can be in place. None of the usual definitions of place will do, and he considers them each in turn (IV.3.20.10 ff.), probably following a discussion of how soul could be in body in Alexander of Aphrodisias' *De Anima*.[22] He then turns to other ways in which a thing could be said to be "in" another. At this stage he feels obliged to explain why it is generally held that soul is in body (IV. 3.20. 41 ff.), perhaps an indication that he was for the time being unable to cope with the difficulties arising from his concept of their separate natures. But he perseveres, and tries the analogy of ship and helmsman. This he finds acceptable in so far as it maintains the soul's separability, but unsatisfactory because in so far as he is a sailor (πλωτήρ) he is on the ship only incidentally: furthermore he is not in the whole of it. Nor will various refinements of the analogy meet the case. And so he goes on to inspect another analogy: "Should one then say that when soul is present to the body it is present as fire is present to air? For it too when it is present all through a thing is mingled with none of it: it remains unmoved while the other flows by" (IV. 3.22.1-4). One cannot help being struck by the repetition of the verb "to be present"

[22] On the relation of this text to Plotinus' discussion cf. my paper "*Ennead* IV.3.20-1 and its Sources: Alexander, Aristotle and Others," *Arch. Gesch. Phil.*, 50 (1968), 254-61.

which now becomes the keynote of the discussion. For the moment this analogy with air and fire, which he sees here as a source of light and not heat, solves Plotinus' problem: it meets the requirement that there should be coalescence without combination. When light leaves what it has illumined it does so without trace: when that comes into the field of the light it is lit (IV.3.22.4-7). So one could say that the air is in the light, which suits Plotinus' purposes since, following some hints in the *Timaeus*,[23] he regards body as being in soul rather than *vice-versa*. He now says the analogy shows why Plato was right to say that all body is in soul, while not all soul contains body. He takes this remark to refer to such powers of soul as body does not need. Those which it does are not actually established in the parts of the body, or even in the whole, but present themselves to the relevant organs as required for the various psychic functions (IV.3.22.7 ff). Later in the very long treatise in which this has been discussed Plotinus proposes heat as an alternative to light, suggesting that the body is in the position of air that has been heated (IV.4.14.4-10). He subsequently adopts this analogy because it shows that soul does have a real effect on body (IV.4.29.1 ff.), and also conveys the notion that the effect is different from the cause.

What Plotinus failed to do is to give any serious explanation of *how* soul can act on the body, or how it is able to perceive bodily events. All we have is a hint, when Plotinus remarks that the *pneuma* around the soul might account for the difference between our movements and those of the heavens (II.2.2.21 f.), and two passing references in IV.3. to some sort of pneumatic or other body which the soul assumes before incarnation. It has been suggested that Plotinus intended this *pneuma* to have a role similar to Aristotle's connate *pneuma*.[24] While this is not impossible, he says so little that there is no way of proving or disproving this idea. One can say with some degree of certainty that if he did believe in some sort of *pneuma* as a vehicle for soul, he did not regard it as very important: he made no use of it in any of the questions where it would have helped him to explain the soul's operations.[25]

When we come to consider these operations we shall find that while the whole individual soul is theoretically detached, in practice some of its layers are less strictly immune from the effects of life with the body. Plotinus is by no means unaware of this inconsistency and is at times

[23] 34b and 36e.

[24] By Miss A. N. M. Rich, "Body and Soul in the Philosophy of Plotinus," *J. Hist. Phil.*, 1 (1963), 14.

[25] On this point see *Plotinus' Psychology*, p. 139.

quite prepared to state it explicitly. Thus he will urge us to separate ourselves from accretions and not be the composite of body and soul in which the bodily nature outweighs the trace of soul that it has, so that their common life belongs rather to the body (cf. II.3.9.20-4). He will say that the soul that is in the body is *ipso facto* subject to the influence of its environment, to an extent that depends on the strength of its resistance (III.1.8.10 ff.). We shall have to consider this question more fully in connection with Plotinus' views on the affections.

Before one can discuss the details of the soul's operations one must define what it is that one is discussing in each case. Here a difficulty immediately presents itself, for it is not at first sight clear on what principles Plotinus divided the soul, to say nothing of the details of his division. At times we may find Platonic parts, at others Aristotelian faculties. Sometimes they even seem to be combined. Now on general grounds the Aristotelian scheme would seem to be more appropriate since it fits Plotinus' insistence that the soul is indivisible (cf. esp. IV.2. *passim*), and also more specifically the notion that it is not in any place but rather forms a central reservoir of soul from which it supplies such specified psychic powers as may from time to time be needed (see above 347). And when we look more closely we find that tripartition is used only when Plotinus is not actually analyzing how the soul works. In particular it appears in ethical contexts in connection with the classification of vices and virtues. Thus at I.2.1.16-21 Plotinus assigns the civic virtues:

> . . . wisdom which is connected with the rational part, courage with the spirited, temperance which lies in a certain agreement and concord of the desiring part with the reason and justice which consists in each of these performing its own task in unison in respect of ruling and being ruled.

The last words are of course taken from Plato.[26] Similarly when he is discussing the idea put forward at *Phaedo* 93e that virtue and vice are harmony or lack of it Plotinus argues that virtue and vice must first exist in the several parts of the soul. Thus folly is a vice of the rational part, and he asks whether the false opinion that causes it changes that part of the soul, and if the spirited and desiring parts are not also different in cowardice or bravery, in temperance (*σωφροσύνη*) or its opposite, *ἀκολασία* (III.6.2.18 ff.).

It may be that Plotinus thought that tripartite division was more convenient for use in ethical discussion—for which it was invented in

[26] *Rep.*, 443b.

the *Republic*[27]—than the division into faculties. It was certainly so used in the Platonic school tradition by Albinus,[28] and Professor Solmsen and Dr. Rees have pointed out that Aristotle himself tended to use a looser analysis than that of the psychological works when he discussed ethics.[29] Thus he was sometimes prepared to use Plato's concepts and even his terms.[30] I hope I shall be excused if I do not at this point embark on a massive digression about tripartition in Plato, but if Plotinus thought that Plato himself did not really believe in it, he might simply have followed him in using it when it was useful.[31] He does, however, criticize tripartition as a basis for serious psychology, a criticism which could be accounted for by its use among the Middle Platonists. It is attested to by Albinus,[32] and it is likely to have been retained by fundamentalists like Atticus. So when he is considering how anger and desire work in IV.4.28, he argues that the division of the irrational part of the soul into a passionate and a desiring part is unsatisfactory and that it is the *φυτικόν*, or vegetative soul, which is the basis of both. In the case of anger it is the vegetative soul that makes the body aware of anger, however it may have arisen. Further we see an indication that anger and desire are based on the same part of the soul in the alleged fact that those who are least keen on bodily pleasures, and in general less concerned with their bodies, are also less intensely moved to anger. And to say that the desiring part is the vegetative soul while the passionate part is a trace of it in the blood would not do either because it would make the one prior to the other so that both could not be "parts" in the same way. The correct division he says, is one of impulses and their accompaniments as such (*ὀρεκτικὰ ἢ ὀρεκτικά*) and not one of their sources (IV.4.28.63-70). He goes on to add that it is not unreasonable to say that the trace of soul which manifests itself in anger is around the heart (*περὶ καρδίαν*): we must not say that the soul is there, but only that the source or principle of the blood in a certain condition is (*ibid.* 72-5). This is one of a number of passages —we shall have cause to mention others—where Plotinus is particularly careful to avoid saying that the soul is in any particular part of the body. As for tripartition, we do not find it again after this treatise.[33]

But while desire and anger are here in IV.4 clearly assigned to the vegetative soul as two of its specialized activities, we shall see that Plotinus did not remain entirely happy with this classification. Before we deal with this point we should perhaps look briefly at Plotinus' treatment of the other activities of the lower soul. The point to be made here is that he seems to regard these as the activities of a group of closely linked faculties or sub-faculties. Here may be grouped those which he called vegetative, nutritive, growth-producing, and reproductive. Taken as a whole they may be labelled either nutritive, or vegetative: at IV.9.3.21 and 23 each term in turn is opposed to sensation. At VI.3.7.27 f. we have a division into nutritive, perceptual, and intellectual life. Normally this part of the soul is simply called vegetative (*φυτικόν* or *φύσις*). Though there are passages which suggest that there is some confusion and overlapping in Plotinus' division of its faculties, it can be shown that they are in fact coextensive, and that we have here something comparable to Aristotle's plant soul: it is the soul of trees at IV.4.28.58 f.[34] It differs, however, in one important respect. For Plotinus it is not the minimal soul without which no higher form can exist, but the end of a continuum which is seen as extending from above: Plotinus compares soul to such a continuum and says that in it each part is different from the next, in such a way that the prior is not lost in the subsequent (cf. V.2.2.26-9). One might say that the lower reaches of the soul are a kind of retractable under-carriage which is only needed when it touches the ground.

That section of the lower soul which is concerned with maintenance, growth, and reproduction presents no difficulties that cannot be solved by careful inspection of the texts. There are, however, some more serious problems about what one might call the higher activities of the vegetative soul. Though in the passage from IV.4.28 where he criticizes tripartition Plotinus assigned to the vegetative soul such activities as Plato had put in his second and third parts, he did realize that such activities must involve a wider area of the soul. In fact earlier in the

[27] 436 a ff.

[28] *Did.* XXIX = 182.21-3 (HERMANN).

[29] F. Solmsen, "Antecedents of Aristotle's Psychology and Scale of Beings," *American J. Philol.*, 76 (1955), 149 f.; D. A. Rees, "Theories of the Soul in the Early Aristotle," in *Aristotle and Plato in the Mid-Fourth Century*: Papers of the Symposium Aristotelicum held at Oxford in August 1957, ed. I. Düring and G. E. L. Owen (Gothenburg, 1960), pp. 195 ff.

[30] Cf. *Nic. Ethics*, 1119 b 14 f, 1149 a 25 ff.

[31] Some isolated occurrences of the tripartition terms come in passages where the soul's operations are not the point.

[32] *Did.* XVII = 173.9-13, XXIII = 176.9 ff., XXIV *init.*

[33] With two exceptions, one where the three parts occur in a list of possible classifications of qualities (VI.1.12.6) and another where it is equivalent to *θυμός*, the term *θυμοειδές* does not appear after the discussion we have just considered. *Ἐπιθυμητικόν* and *λογιστικόν* are used interchangeably with *ἐπιθυμοῦν* and *λογιζόμενον* in passages where they clearly refer to faculties and not to Platonic parts.

[34] The Greek word *φυτικόν* is clearly related to the word for a plant, *φυτόν*, which was also the lowest form of life recognized by Plotinus; cf. I.4.1.18 f.

single treatise which we have as IV.3 and IV.4 there are remarks which suggest that appetition belongs to the sensitive rather than to the vegetative soul. Thus in IV.3.23 the word *ὁρμή*, impulse, which is elsewhere equivalent to the term for appetition, *ὄρεξις*, is coupled with sensation, *αἴσθησις* (lines 12 f. and 21 f.). In the second of these cases the location of the reasoning faculty is explained by its relation to sensation and impulse, which seem for the purpose to be taken as one faculty. But the real point of the conjunction seems to be that the principle and starting point of all these activities may be put in the brain: the reason for that is that the nerves terminate there. We need not conclude that the faculties governing sensation and appetition are coextensive.

Later in the same chapter, however, Plotinus seems to accept Plato's location of the desiring part in the abdomen. He explains it by saying that nurture depends on the blood: the blood is based on the liver, and the activities of the nutritive soul entail desire for its purposes (IV.3.23.35 ff.). But here too we must be careful not to make too much of the statements about location, since Plotinus is concerned with where the machinery for the various functions may be found rather than where a particular "part" of the soul should be placed. Nevertheless it does seem that appetition and impulse have been separated from desire. This seems at first sight to be inconsistent with the evidence of IV.4.28 where desire and anger, described as *ὀρέξεις*, are associated with the vegetative soul. We should, however, distinguish appetition in its sense of an activity, and appetition as a power of the soul. And we can then see that here too there is an impulse component of anger in the latter sense, and that it is associated with the sensitive soul (cf. IV.4.28.58-63). Thus we seem to have a distinction between desire and anger themselves, and the move to satisfy the urges.

This position is not entirely consistent with that in the late treatise I.1.[53], where desiring and passionate faculties (*ἐπιθυμητικόν* and *θυμικόν*) are clearly sub-faculties of an appetitive faculty (*ὀρεκτικόν*). Here the impulse (*ἔκτασις*) towards anything belongs to this appetitive faculty, and there is no evidence of any further contribution from the sensitive soul or any faculty associated with it (cf.I.1.5.21 ff.). Unfortunately we cannot be sure that this restatement is intended to supersede the earlier view, though there is some change in the classification. The intentions of the two treatises are not the same. In IV.3-4 Plotinus is giving detailed analyses of how the soul works in the body, whereas in I.1. he is trying to distinguish what belongs to the "living being" (*ζῷον*) from what does not. So he may be less concerned with precise distinctions within the soul, and a less precise set of divisions would be

adequate. Be that as it may, we must be prepared to admit that Plotinus may not have made up his mind, or that he changed it. One thing, however, is clear. While Plotinus uses appetition words (*ὄρεξις*, *ἔφεσις* and *πόθος*) to describe the urges, desires, and aspirations of various levels of being,[35] there is no indication that he ever envisaged an appetitive faculty like Aristotle's to cover the choices of the higher soul as well as the urges of the lower.[36]

When he discusses these together with the other affections, Plotinus is particularly concerned to minimize the soul's involvement and to preserve its autonomy as far as possible. That this should be so is not surprising since it is clearly in this sphere that autonomy is most likely to be infringed. One of the consequences of Plotinus' concern is a special concentration on distinguishing levels of the soul. That emerges most clearly in his discussion of the affections in IV.3-4. The stress on freedom from the affections (*ἀπάθεια*) is most marked in the immediately preceding treatise III.6[26], on the impassibility of the incorporeal, the majority of which is actually devoted to the impassibility of matter. As far as soul is concerned, it is in the first place physical changes from which Plotinus aims to show that the soul is exempt: "In general it is our purpose," he writes, "to avoid subjecting the soul to such modifications and changes as the heating and cooling of bodies" (III.6.1.12-14).

His motives appear when he goes on to say that we must avoid attributing such changes to the soul so that we do not make it corruptible. While he recognizes that the difficulties will be most serious in connection with the so-called passible part,[37] he does point out that some explaining will need to be done if one is to maintain the impassibility of the higher part of the soul in the face of the stresses caused by the affections (*ibid.* 14 ff.). Since, however, some form of change must be involved, Plotinus is at pains to show that even in those affections which may start in the soul, the changes will take place in the body. He writes that if we say the soul changes we are in danger of making the same sort of assumptions which we should be making if we were to say the soul blushed or went pale, and continues, "not taking into consideration that these affections take place by means of the soul, but in the other structure," that is, the body (III.6.3.7-11): the passage brings to mind Aristotle's remark that we should not say

[35] Cf., e.g., IV.8.4.1 ff., I.6.7.1 ff. Further references may be found in R. Arnou, *Le désir de Dieu dans la philosophie de Plotin*[2] (Rome, 1967), pp. 59 f.

[36] Cf. *De An.*, 414 b 1 f.

[37] A Stoic term which Plotinus finds it convenient to use as a label for both Stoic and similar views of the kind he is here concerned with.

that the soul feels emotions but the man with his soul.[38] For Plotinus the stress is on "in the other structure." As far as the soul is concerned any change that there might be does not in any case affect its substance. In the passage about virtues and vices which we have already mentioned,[39] Plotinus accounts for the changes that might appear to be involved by arguing that virtue is produced when the lower parts of the soul listen to reason and that in turn to the intellect, the undescended part of the soul which is thereby completely unchangeable in any sense. He compares the effect of listening to reason with the process of vision conceived in Aristotle's terms: it is not, says Plotinus, a change (*ἀλλοίωσις*) but an activity (*ἐνέργεια*), vision in potency and act being in substance the same (III.6.2.34 f.).

The purpose of Plotinus' treatment here and the extent to which he has achieved it are brought out most pointedly in his answer to the paradoxical question which opens the last chapter of this section of III.6: "Why must one seek to make the soul free from affections by philosophy when it is not subject to them to start with?" He resolves the paradox by arguing that we must make the soul which is already free from affections in the sense of physically unchanging free from affections in the sense of free from the evil results of the affections as well. If it does not turn away from the body it will be a bad soul (cf. I.6.5.54-8). This admission that the soul may be at least temporarily damaged by the affections finds an echo in the passages we have already mentioned,[40] as well as others where Plotinus will go so far as to say that the behaviour and even the nature of the individual may be determined by body, either simply or by environment or ancestry, which must both involve it. In IV.3.8 he attributes differences between individual souls to bodies and to their previous lives (line 5 ff.). There he is virtually forced into this position by the difficulty of explaining how the theoretically identical individual souls can differ. In III.1.5 Plotinus says that we generally resemble our parents in respect of appearance and some of the soul's irrational affections. Here he is clearly thinking that irrational affections are connected with physical characteristics, since he is arguing that the environment does not entirely determine our physical make-up (lines 20-31). Later in the same essay he says that if the soul makes any concessions to the body's constitution it will be forced to have desires or to be angry (III.1.8.15 f.). Elsewhere he will say that the body's constitution may cause variations in the strength

[38] *De An.*, 408 b 11-15.
[39] See above p. 348.
[40] II.3.9.20-4, III.1.8.10 ff.

of the desires, which may differ in different individuals (I.8.8.30 f., IV.4.31.39-42). Such differences may also result from temporary bodily conditions (I.8.8.34-7).

While all this may suggest that the body is almost entirely responsible for the emotions, and while Plotinus still treats it as their cause in most cases, when he embarks on a more technical discussion of the affections in IV.3-4 he does take into account those which start in the soul as well. Since he is now concerned primarily with how the emotions work we find that he is more precise than in III.6 where his purpose was somewhat different. He now distinguishes not only between the body, on the one hand, and the higher and lower reaches of the individual soul (*ψυχή* in the narrower sense and *φύσις* respectively), on the other, but also makes certain distinctions in the area under the control of *φύσις*, the lower or vegetative soul. Within the compound of this lower soul and body which is the "living being" he also speaks of a trace of *φύσις* and *τὸ τοιόνδε σῶμα*, the body-so-qualified, which is the body—already itself ensouled—plus the irradiation from *φύσις* which gives it life. We, that is, the higher soul, perceive pain and pleasure in the body without being affected by them. They belong to the compound in so far as it is not simple, but a union of soul and body. This partnership is unstable: the inferior tries to retain as much as possible of the superior member and to be united with it (IV.4.18.19-36). Pain and pleasure consist in the realization that the unity is being destroyed or reconstituted: thus pain is "cognition of the body's withdrawal as it is being deprived of a trace of soul" (IV.4.19.2-4). The cognition itself does not involve any affection: it is described as *γνῶσις ἀπαθής*, a cognition without affection (IV.4.18.10). The rather strange notion of a wish for unity may be understood in the light of a remark Plotinus makes elsewhere (VI.4.15.3-6) that all things receive as much of soul or the intelligible as they are fit to receive. Thus an injured body might be said to be less fit a receptacle for soul than the same body intact.

The same approach is used in dealing with desire. Desires originate in the compound. One must not attribute them to body in just any state, or to soul, but to a body which wants to be more than mere body, and has by virtue of being body urges and requirements which the soul does not. Just as in pain the soul perceives, and then takes evasive action, here sensation and the vegetative soul below it, *φύσις*, take note of the requirement. The lower soul notes a desire which has become clear by the time it reaches it. The power of sensation notes the resultant image, and passes it on to the higher soul which meets or resists the requirement (IV.4.20.10-20). Here too we may note

that the desire is already present before it reaches the vegetative soul itself: it begins in the body-so-qualified (IV.4.20.20 ff.). A similar analysis of anger is given later in the treatise with rather more emphasis, however, on the possible psychic origin of the emotion. But once again Plotinus is very firm about what is involved, and in particular about the contention that any real disturbances take place only in the body and the lowest area of the soul, the vegetative soul and that reflection from it which enlivens the body. And even the vegetative soul only serves to pass on impulses which begin outside it. Communication with the higher soul is assured by sensation and imagination (IV.4.28.22 ff.).

Nevertheless, in spite of his care to keep the higher soul free of the affections, it too may be considered immune from them only if it takes no more than the minimum interest in the things below it (I.2.5). If it becomes too involved in the life of the lower soul it will become corrupted according to the rule that each thing is what it does (VI.7.6. 17 f.). Though strictly it remains unaffected—we may compare the discussion in III.6.5—the lower elements may assume the mastery (IV.4.17. 20 ff., VI.4.15.23 ff.). When Plotinus is thinking of soul from the dynamic point of view, he does tend to think of even the higher soul being somehow changed. Such change, however, is no more than temporary, and may be undone by a process of purification. Nevertheless we must conclude that Plotinus has not succeeded in maintaining even at the level of the vegetative soul that complete immunity from the influence of the body which his professed view of the body-soul relation would seem to require.

At the next level of psychic activity, that of sense-perception, we can see certain improvements on classical Greek-psychology. Here Plotinus is less concerned with drawing lines between body and soul, since it is fairly easy to assign different parts of the process of sense-perception to each. Further he is not involved in the difficulties which present themselves in connection with memory because it is no longer clearly a function of both body and soul.

In discussing sense-perception Plotinus is helped by his insistence on the disjunction between body and soul to make a fairly clear distinction between bodily sensation and mental perception. Professor Dodds has remarked that he "distinguishes sensation from perception more clearly than any previous Greek thinker."[40a] His linguistic resources for doing so were no greater than those available to Plato and Aristotle. How far they separated the two processes is arguable, but I think

[40a] *Sources de Plotin*, p. 386.

one may say that it is by no means certain that they did so clearly. Like Plato and Aristotle, Plotinus had to make do with the term *αἴσθησις* and its cognates to discuss a number of different activities, but the mere fact that he will clearly associate some with body and others with soul means that it is not usually too difficult to see what he is doing at a given point.

The keynote of Plotinus' theory of sense-perception is that the soul does no more than take cognizance of what goes on in the body with which it is associated. In opposing it to intellection, which is direct, Plotinus defines sense-perception as "the soul's apprehension of sensibles through the instrumentality of the body." Here more clearly than at the lower levels the interposition of a corporeal instrument allows the soul to retain its impassivity. No form of sense-perception is an affection (VI.1.19.46). At IV.6.2.16-18 we are told that taste and smell involve affections, perceptions, and judgements. In III.6.1 Plotinus says that perceptions are not affections but activities concerned with affections, and judgements. The judgement is the role of the soul, the affection belongs to the body. If the judgement involved an affection, there would have to be a further judgement, and so on *ad infinitum* (III.6.1.1-6). While that is firmly rejected, Plotinus does recognize that there could be a problem about whether or not the judgement takes on some element of its object, as would happen if the soul in making it received any form of physical imprint. If it did the soul would have to be somehow material. Thus Plotinus is at great pains to argue against the view that perception involves any kind of physical impressions like seal-stamps, or such as are entailed by the notion of physical transmission (*διάδοσις*). Against the impression theory he argues that we see things where they are. The soul looks outward which it would not do if there were an impression in it. In that case it would be unable to make assertions about distance or size. In his view the strongest objection is that one would not then see the objects themselves. As a final argument he produces Aristotle's observation that one cannot see objects placed against the eye to show that anything that was marked with an impression would not be able to perceive the object which marked it[41] (IV.6.1. *passim*).

What the soul does receive is something like a translation of the impression which affects the body. Plotinus holds that the soul's power of perception is directed not to the object but rather to the impressions produced in the "living being." When they reach the soul these "impressions" are already intelligibles (I.1.7.9-11). This, says

[41] *De An.*, 419 a 12 f.

Plotinus, is how we, our true selves, perceive, while the sensation that is directed outside is an image of such perception and belongs to the "living being." Here we have a clear distinction between conscious perception and mere sensation (cf. I.1.7.5 ff.). It must be said, however, that in a passage in IV.3.26 Plotinus seems to attribute more of the process to the "living being" (lines 1-12). Here again his different preoccupations may provide an explanation. In I.1 he is primarily concerned to distinguish the "living being" from anything higher. In IV.3 the fact that there is a contribution from the body could have caused him to assign the whole process to the body.

Plotinus' careful separation of the original sensory stimulus and the subsequent processes was facilitated by the fact that he was able to take advantage of the discovery of the nerves by Herophilus and Erasistratus, and the subsequent elaboration of their work by Galen.[42] The recognition of the nerves' function showed clearly that there was transmission from the surface of the body to a central organ where the information could be handed over, as it were, to the soul for evaluation. Hence Plotinus put the sensitive faculty, or rather, as he carefully points out, the starting point of that faculty's activity, in the brain (IV.3.23. 9-21). Thus he was able to follow Plato, but for good reasons. One might ask whether the soul is still not just a passive recipient of the transmissions. But since perception is an activity in which the soul is the agent, Plotinus could say that this allowed the soul some independence. It would be interesting to have had his explanation of a passing remark that not all sensations are transmitted owing to the low intensity of the stimulus: he cites large marine animals as an example (IV.9.2.12 ff.).

Given Plotinus' insistence on the fundamental differences between soul and the physical world which provides the objects of sense-perception, it is clear that the gulf must somehow be bridged. To do this is the function of the sense organs. Cognition for Plotinus is always some form of assimilation. Yet the soul cannot assimilate to its objects *qua* sensible. On its own it will only assimilate to the objects which it already contains: the result is intellection. In sense-perception the soul grasps the quality of bodies and receives a "smear" of their form. Thus we need something that is subject to change and may receive the form of the sense-object. Therefore some third entity is required, which must, moreover, be in a relation of sympathy with its objects and subject to the same affections (*συμπαθές . . . καὶ ὁμοιοπαθές*). Further, it must be capable of assimilation to both subject and object,

[42] On this discovery see Solmsen, "Greek Philosophy and the Discovery of the Nerves," *Museum Helveticum*, 18 (1961), 184 ff.

to the intelligible and the sensible, a sort of mean proportional between them. The bodily organs provide the missing link (IV.4.23.1-33). But a further necessary condition is the universal sympathy—the Posidonian concept now dematerialized—which obtains between the constituents of a sensible world that forms one living being controlled by a single soul. This sympathy does away with the need for any kind of medium between the sense-object and the percipient organ, and Plotinus argues vigorously against those earlier theories which require one (IV.5 *passim*).

One component of sense-perception, though some would call it inference arising from it, the identification of objects, takes us beyond the scope of joint body-soul functions. Plotinus in fact distinguishes a preliminary identification by the senses working as a whole—common sense (*κοινὴ αἴσθησις*)—which allows of error, from a more reliable identification duly checked by the reason. More immediately connected with sense-perception, and yet equally concerned with material reaching it from above, is the power of imagination and memory. We shall see that its position on the border between those functions of the soul which are inextricably tied up with the body and those which are completely clear of it produces special problems which we do not find in connection with any other faculty. These problems do not of course arise from any need to combine material impressions from the senses with immaterial data from the reason and the intellect. In addition to maintaining that there is in general an intimate connection between the immaterial nature of sense-perception and the possibility of memory, Plotinus further discusses certain characteristics of memory and recollection to show how they are incompatible with any theory which regards memory as the retention of impressions. His careful attention to this point may arise from dissatisfaction with some points in Aristotle's account in the *De Memoria*: at any rate some of his arguments in the treatise *On Sense-Perception and Memory* (IV.6) seem to be aimed at Aristotle, and it is worth noting that Alexander, on whom Plotinus often kept half an eye, was unhappy about Aristotle's use of the word for impressions, *τύποι*.[43] So, while Aristotle says that memory is weaker in children because their bodies are unstable,[44] Plotinus argues that it is better because children have fewer things to remember and so can concentrate on them better, whereas if memories were any sort of impressions a greater number of them would not cause any weakening of the power (*δύναμις*) which he holds memory to be (IV.6.3.21-7).

[43] Alexander, *De An.*, 72.11 ff.
[44] *De Mem.*, 450 b 5-7.

Similarly Plotinus attributes the failing of memory in the aged to a diminution of this power (IV.6.3.53 f.), while Aristotle regards it as a result of the same bodily instability which he held to be the reason for poor memory among the young.[45] So for Plotinus the decline in the ability to remember is parallel to the decline in the keenness of old people's senses. Here again we find him using an analogy between memory and sense-perception to argue against apparently materialistic views of these faculties. It should, however, be stressed that Plotinus always differentiates sense-perception on the one hand from memory and imagination on the other and does not, as Aristotle sometimes does, take imagination to be an activity of the sensitive faculty.[46]

In fact, the definition of a faculty of imagination is for Plotinus the most serious problem arising in connection with the activities which are its province. Perhaps one should say the most serious problem to which he offers a solution, since he never gives a satisfactory account of *how* the soul remembers. What it is that remembers receives a full and lengthy treatment. His first question is whether or not memory is a function of "living being" (IV.3.25.35 ff.). That he should raise this point is significant, since it is not one that has arisen about any of the lower faculties: it subsequently became a question of some importance (I.1). He concludes firmly that memory belongs to the soul alone, but not without admitting that the condition of the body may impair its efficacy (IV.3.26.12 ff.). That he was unable to deny some influence from the body was one of the factors that led to Plotinus' rather strange solution. But it is after he has decided that memory does belong to the soul alone that Plotinus' difficulties really begin, for he then inquires whether memory belongs to the higher soul which is our real self, or that below it (IV 3.27 *init.*). In his eyes the problem is that certain facts about memory suggest that at least some memories belong to each: in that case there will be a distribution problem, and the difficulty of deciding what remembers is considerably aggravated.

One way it could be solved would be for each faculty to remember what affects it, but though Plotinus considers this solution he duly rejects it. He then considers sensitive faculty as a basis for memory, but cannot accept that because it provides no explanation of how one can remember thoughts. That would have to be done by a different faculty, and so we should be faced with the presence of two faculties which remember in each soul (IV.3.29.1 ff.). Plotinus extricates himself from this situation by arguing that neither mental acumen nor keen

[45] *Ibid.*
[46] *De Mem.*, 451 a 14-17.

senses need go with good memory. One might object that what remembers a percept must first perceive it, but if it received it in the form of an image then it would merely have to retain it as such. Then the faculty of imagination, to which percepts are thus relayed, would remember them if they persist (IV.3.29.13-26).

Once Plotinus has established imagination as the basis of memory he is able to deal with non-perceptual memory along the same lines. He suggests that the discursive sequel to intuitive thought is received into the imaginative faculty (IV.3.30.5-7), that is, when we subsequently become aware of intellection (*νόησις*) we do so as discursive thought accompanied by imagination. Plotinus often says that we practice intellection when we are aware of it. Here he gives the reception of sense-perception by the imaginative faculty as a reason why we are not always aware of it (IV.3.30.15 f.). Elsewhere he will talk about intellection taking place without imagination when the mirror into which it is normally reflected, and which one can show to be imagination, is disturbed (I.4.10.17-21).

At this stage Plotinus would seem to have given the obvious answer to a non-problem. But the situation is complicated because it has already been decided that both higher and lower soul will have a memory, and that both will retain at least some memories after death. Plotinus rejects the idea that the imaginative faculty of one soul should remember intelligible objects and that of the other sensible ones because this would lead to the co-existence of two unconnected "living beings" (IV.3.31. 1 ff.). This difficulty arises only because Plotinus considers this question entirely from the static point of view. If one looks at it from the dynamic point of view, with the lower soul merely an outflowing from the higher, the problem almost disappears: almost, because there would still be a difficulty about how the higher soul can have access to the information in the lower soul. The lower has access to the higher through the process of re-identification.

So in the end Plotinus finds no alternative to establishing two faculties of imagination, one for each section of the soul. He insists that the higher knows all that is in the lower, but drops some of its knowledge when it leaves the body (IV.3.31.16-18). One could object at this point that if this were so there would after all be no need for two faculties of imagination. If the higher soul can drop the memories of the lower then there is no need to invent the lower at all. The explanation for its existence may be found in certain remarks in IV.3.32 about the kind of memory the two faculties might have. Here it appears that both could have memories of the same thing, but that the higher would have them without undergoing an affection (*ἀπαθῶς*), while the

lower would have those which involve any element of affection. So the function of the lower faculty appears to be to protect the higher soul and thus maintain that impassibility which Plotinus' general theory of the soul requires. The higher imaginative faculty may select from the stock of memories of the lower such as are not incompatible with its status as a part of the higher soul. Another reason why Plotinus cannot assign memory to the higher soul may lie in the imaginative faculty's susceptibility to error and illusion. Its duties include the transmission of what goes on in the lowest part of the soul, for example the demands of the appetitive faculty or faculties.[47] Moreover it may be seen as something outside our control: in the treatise on free will, VI.8. 2-3, imagination is opposed to what is within our control, *ἐφ' ἡμῖν*.

Given all this, are there any reasons why memory should not simply be assigned to the lower soul? For Plotinus the answer is a clear "yes." If it were assigned to the lower soul that would mean that our real selves are not equipped with memory. And it would mean that the disembodied soul will remember nothing: the lower soul departs at death, so that any memory the higher soul is to retain must be attached to it. And Plotinus believes that the soul's memories help to determine its character and control the extent to which it may descend, for the imagination which is memory involves identification with its objects (IV.4.3.7 f.). In fact Plotinus makes the oddly modern-sounding observation that unconscious memories may have the strongest effect on the soul's character (IV.4.4.7-13). While this remark refers explicitly to the soul's condition before its descent is complete, it would be equally applicable to its life on earth, since only the persistence of such latent memories would allow Plotinus to hold, as he does, that the soul after its release will become progressively more able to remember events from earlier lives (IV.3.27.16-18). Unfortunately Plotinus does not expand on this theme, though he does also stress elsewhere that consciousness of an activity may detract from its intensity (I.4.10.21 ff.). It would seem, however, from a discussion in IV.4.7-8 that one cannot remember a thing without having *at the time* been conscious of it: one may only subsequently be unconscious that the memory exists.

To return to the two faculties of imagination. We have seen the kind of considerations which pulled the faculty apart. If one tried to find historical justification for what is otherwise a unique duplication in Plotinus, one can do little more than suggest a starting point in Aristotle's occasional remarks about two kinds of imagination, but these clearly refer to difference sources of an image and not in any way to

[47] See above p. 352.

different faculties.[48] In defence of Plotinus one can only say that the two faculties which he did in the end establish are virtually faculties of a different kind.

The last of the faculties which are part of man as a member of the sensible world is the discursive reason, sometimes called *διάνοια* or *τὸ διανοητικόν*, or just *νοῦς*, sometimes *τὸ λογιζόμενον*, *τὸ λογιστικόν* or *λογισμός*, or simply *λόγος*. It has sometimes been stated, even by so reliable an authority as Dr. Schwyzer, that these two groups of terms apply to two different faculties,[49] but it is not difficult to show that they refer to only one. Both perform the same duties. Schwyzer takes the *διανοητικόν* to be the higher of the two, a position hard to defend in the face of a text which says that *διάνοια* judges forms presented to it as a result of sense-perception (I.1.9.8 ff.): there would hardly be space for another thought and judgement faculty, *λογισμός*, between *διάνοια* and the sensitive faculty. And since *λογισμός* is also said to process sense-data, that cannot go above *διάνοια*. In fact there are plenty of passages which attribute the same functions to *διάνοια* as others do to *λογισμός*.

A further source of possible confusion affecting this faculty lies in its relation to the undescended intellect. The confusion arises from the fact that Plotinus, like his predecessors, will often use the term *νοῦς* loosely of the discursive reason. Probably as a result of this only superficially confusing carelessness the *λογιστικόν* set of terms have occasionally been treated as if they include the undescended intellect, so that susceptibility to vice and error have wrongly been attributed to that.[50] For such confusions a close inspection of the *Enneads* provides a simple remedy: Plotinus often enough distinguishes explicitly between the two senses of *νοῦς* and rarely allows any ambiguity to remain (e.g. I.1.8.1-3, V.9.8.21 f.).

In a sense the operations of reason are defined by its location between sensation and the intuitive intellect, *νοῦς* in the strict sense. It processes the products of sense-perception, and thinks discursively about entities contained in the intelligible which may be known non-discursively by intellect.[51] On the side of sense-perception reason will perform more elaborate identifications than the merely perceptual

[48] *De An.*, 433 b 29, 434 a 5-7, *De Mot. An.*, 702 a 19.

[49] *Sources de Plotin*, pp. 366, 390.

[50] W. Himmerich, *Eudaimonia. Die Lehre des Plotin von der Selbstverwirklichung des Menschen* (Würzburg, 1959), p. 126.

[51] For a discussion of the validity of the concept of non-discursive thought see A. C. Lloyd, "Non-discursive Thought—an Enigma of Greek Philosophy," *Proc. of the Aristotelian Society*, 70 (1969-70), 261-74.

ones performed by the sensitive faculty. The latter will identify a white object as a man. Reason, in conjunction if necessary with memory, will tell us that he is Socrates. And it will also reveal errors and illusions (I.1.9.10-12). The basis of the reason's identifications may be found in the series of intelligible archetypes with which each of us is equipped by virtue of the existence in Intellect of a part of our soul (cf. VI.7.6.2-6). That part, like Aristotle's intellect, is completely at one with its objects: herein lies the difference between it and the reason. As Plotinus puts it, reason seeks what the intellect already has (IV.4.12.5 ff.). Hence the reason may make mistakes, while the intellect cannot.

The level at which the reason works is for Plotinus usually that at which a person's self is to be found. Plotinus was no better equipped to express such a concept than earlier Greeks, but seems to have had it more clearly in his mind. He discusses it in terms of the question what is the "we" (*ἡμεῖς*) or the man (*ἄνθρωπος*). The "we" is not fixed: it may also be found at the level of Intellect itself. It has been called a "fluctuating spotlight of consciousness."[52] Plotinus will say quite specifically that it is multiple (I.1.9.7), but also that it is really at the level of rational and discursive thought (I.1.7.16 ff.). A passage in VI.4.14 shows how "we" are the active component of the soul, sometimes the intellect that we were before incarnation, and sometimes what has been added to it. We may compare a remark that "we" are the rational soul *when we think* (I.1.7.21 f.). While the vocabulary—*ἡμεῖς* and *ἄνθρωπος*—may derive from the pseudo-Platonic *Alcibiades I* and *Axiochus* respectively,[53] the idea that the reason is the real self can of course be found in the *Nicomachean Ethics*.[54]

The notion that a part of the soul is really "ours" when we use it (cf. V.3.3.34 ff.) is most strikingly illustrated by the case of the intuitive intellect. Since each of us has as his own an intellect in the intelligible, all of whose components are always active, Plotinus is obliged to explain why we do not always think intuitively. His answer is that intellection takes place when we turn our attention to the intellect. It is important to note that in this process there is no question of the true *νοῦς* activating the *νοῦς* within us, an idea which led Professor Merlan to compare Plotinus' intuitive intellect and discursive reason (*νοῦς* and *διάνοια*) with Aristotle's active and passive intellect.[55] Moreover,

[52] Dodds, *Sources de Plotin*, pp. 385 f.
[53] *Alc.* I., 130c; *Ax.*, 365e.
[54] 1166a 16f., 1168 b 31ff., 1177 b 31ff.
[55] *Monopsychism, Mysticism, Metaconsciousness: Problems of the Soul in the Neoaristotelian and Neoplatonic Tradition* (The Hague, 1963), p. 10.

since all soul is to some extent independent of the body, the transcendence of its intellect does not involve Plotinus in the difficulties which presented themselves to Aristotle whenever he arrived at the relation of intellect to the rest of the body-soul complex. The fact that soul at all levels was separate meant that Plotinus was able to preserve a degree of continuity between the top and bottom of the individual soul which Aristotle in the last resort could not. He did it, of course, in the context of a psychology which Aristotle would have rejected out of hand, but which by a strange irony the Neoplatonic commentators were to read back into the *De Anima*.

VI

PLOTINUS, *ENNEADS* V 3 (49). 3-4[1]

As is well known, nearly all of Plotinus' treatises cover a multiplicity of subjects. That is less true of V 3 than of most of them. It treats of self-knowledge, and of the relations between Soul, *Nous*, and the One with special reference to that question: its first nine chapters deal with Soul and *Nous*, the remaining eight with *Nous* and the One. It is important to note that it is one of the latest group of treatises (49th in the chronological order), and, incidentally, the only one of these, apart from some sections of I 1, which deals primarily with matters of metaphysics and epistemology rather than ethical questions like *eudaimonia* and providence. The reason for drawing attention to V 3's position among the last treatises is that it is sometimes thought, so notably by A. H. Armstrong, that in the two treatises of this group where such matters are discussed, viz., this one and I 1, Plotinus dropped his admittedly unorthodox and later notorious view that the individual human intellect stays above, in *Nous*[2]: if it still does not descend with the rest of the soul, it remains in the hypostasis Soul rather than in *Nous*[3]. As I have pointed out before[4], it is by no means clear that this is what actually happened, and one of the most recent treatments of intellect in Plotinus, that by T.A. Szlezak, concludes that Plotinus is consistent and usually clear, and, moreover, that our chapters of V 3 are irrelevant to the question[5].

Whether or not they are, and further, what the answer to the problem is, can only be determined by looking closely at the texts themselves; the purpose of this paper is to examine two chapters which appear to bear closely on the issue, namely the 3rd and the 4th of V 3. The position of *nous*, and its self-knowledge, is the first of the problems to which these chapters are relevant. They do, in fact, present a number of difficulties and ambiguities, not only on this but on other matters too. Another problem closely related to the question of the intellect above, νοῦς ἄνω, is that of individuation. If our intellect is one of the forms in the hypostasis intellect, and of equal status to theirs, then the principle of individuation is a form of each individual. Plotinus is generally agreed to be inconsistent on this issue (Rist, and, in his more recent work, Armstrong[6]). But if *nous* is permanently ἄνω in V 3, that treatise becomes part

of the evidence for forms of individuals in Plotinus, at least if ἄνω means in *Nous* rather than Soul[7].

The third question arising from our chapters is a less problematic one, that is how Plotinus conceived the reception and processing of sense-data. That is a question I have recently discussed elsewhere[8], and so shall say very little about it here.

Before we pass on to look at the texts themselves one further general point should be made. It is that it seems strange that, if Plotinus did drop his view about the undescended intellect, no mention of this change appears in the later Neoplatonists, who always cite him, once, oddly, with Iamblichus[9], as the proponent of this view. It could just possibly be a function of what these later Platonists read: V3 is not referred to as much as some of the treatises, though at least one section of I 1 that would be relevant is cited by both Simplicius and Philoponus[10]. That raises the interesting question, which cannot be dealt with here, of how much Plotinus his successors actually read. And even if they did read the whole of the *Enneads*, one might wonder whether they were prone to see what they expected to see — a well-known characteristic of the later Neoplatonists' study of Plato and Aristotle — or whether they did really, after proper consideration, find these texts to be saying the same as all the others. In either case, it is likely that they will at least have started from the assumption that the intellect remains above. I propose to deal with the two chapters in question by offering a translation — for those not familiar with the problems of reading Plotinus I might add that in his case translation contains a higher element of interpretation than with perhaps any other ancient author — and then adding a commentary on points of interest which bear on the issues outlined above. This commentary will try to raise questions as much as to provide answers.

Before embarking on chapters 3-4, it might be helpful to summarise the two previous ones: chapter 1 asks if what knows itself must be multiple, or if what is not compound (σύνθετον) can have intellection (νόησις) of itself. Plotinus answers that if one part knows another, that is not self-knowledge, and that will not be what is being looked for, a knowledge that is τὸ ἑαυτὸ ἑαυτόν, a thing itself knowing itself; it will rather be ἄλλο ἄλλο, one thing knowing another. Self-knowledge, therefore, must belong to something simple (ἁπλοῦν). If there is no such thing, then we must abandon the idea of self-knowledge, which would

lead to absurdities. We must consider whether *nous* has self-knowledge, whether it is knowledge of itself or other things as well, how it has it, and how far it goes.

Chapter 2 tries soul (in the narrow sense) as a candidate. Soul deals with material from outside, namely that produced by sense-perception and by the impressions —τύποι — it receives from νους: it fits the former to the latter. Does soul, that is the soul's *nous*, stick at this, or does it turn to itself and have self-knowledge? No, that is attributable to *nous*. If we grant it to this part (τούτῳ τῷ μέρει, 1. 17) we shall look at how it differs from what is above: if we do not, we shall go on to that and see what itself knowing itself, αὐτο ἑαυτό, means. If we give it to what is below, we shall discuss what the difference from self-intellection, τοῦ νοεῖν ἑαυτό is. If we have none, then we have pure *nous*. We may comment that here Plotinus already sees self-knowledge as a defining characteristic of *nous*. The discursive reason, τὸ διανοητικόν does not turn to itself, but has knowledge of the impressions, τύποι which it receives from both sides. Hence chapter 3, of which the translation now follows, begins with sense-perception[11].

PLOTINUS, *Enneads* V 3. 3-4.

V 3. 3. For the power of sense-perception has seen a man and given the impression to the reason. What does it say? In fact it will say nothing yet: it has only taken cognisance and is at rest: unless it were to conduct discourse with itself <and ask> «who is this man?», if it has met this one before, and were to say, using its memory, that it is Socrates. If it were to deploy the form, it is splitting up what the imagination has given it. But if, if he is good, it were to say so, it has spoken on the basis of what it has cognized through sensation, but what it says about them it would already have from itself, as it has a standard of the good in itself. How does it have the good in itself? <In that > it is characterised by the Form of goodness, and has been given strength for the perception of the intellect which is of that kind (i.e. good) and illuminates it of things of that kind (= ἀγαθόν because intellect illuminates it.

For this (=*dianoia*) is the pure part of the soul and receives from *nous* the traces (sc. of higher being) which are on it. So why is not *this* intellect, and the rest, starting from the sensitive faculty, soul? Because soul must be involved in reasoning, and all these things, (sc. which we have been talking about) are functions of the reasoning power. Why <then> do we not attribute thinking itself to this part and be done with <the matter>? Because we gave it <the function of> looking at what is outside and busying itself with that, but think it right that intellect should <have the capacity to> to look at what belongs to it and what is in it. But if someone says «what prevents this from looking at what belongs to it with another power», he is not looking for the power of reasoning or calculation to add to it, but is touching on pure intellect.

What prevents pure intellect being in the soul? Nothing, we shall say. Must we further say it belongs to soul? No, we shall not say it belongs to the soul, but we shall say that intellect is ours, being other than what reasons, and going above it, but ours none the less, even if we were not to count it with the parts of the soul. In fact it is ours, and not ours. This is why we both make use of it <in addition to our other faculties> and do not make use of it — we always <use> reason — and it is ours when we use it, and when we do not use it it is not ours. What is this «using in addition»? Is it <we> ourselves becoming it, and speaking as it does? In fact we speak in accordance with it; for we are not intellect. We <speak> in accordance with it by means of the reasoning faculty which first receives it. For, indeed, we perceive with the senses even if we are not the percipients. Do we then think discursively in this way, and think thus through intellect?

No, it is we ourselves who reason and we ourselves think about the thoughts in the discursive reason. For that is what we are. The acts of intellect are from above in this way, just as those from sensation <come> from below: we are this thing, the most genuine part of the soul, a thing in the middle of two powers, a worse and a better: the worse is sensation, the better is intellect. But sensation seems to be agreed to be ours always — for we always perceive with the senses, while intellect is the subject of dispute, both because <we do> not always <think> with it and because it is separate. It is separate because it does not incline towards <us> but rather we to it, looking upwards. Sensation is a messenger for us, but intellect, in regard to us, is a king.

V 3. 4. We too are kings, when <we act> in accordance with it (=*nous*). In accordance with it has two senses, either <that we use> the things <that are in it> as if they were letters inscribed in us like laws, or that we are as it were filled with it and indeed able to see and perceive it as present. And we know ourselves by knowing the other things by means of an object of vision of that kind, either in accordance with the power that recognizes this kind of thing, coming to have knowledge of it with that very power, or actually becoming it. So that he who knows himself is double, the first knowing the nature of the soul's reasoning power, the other above this, the man who knows himself in accordance with intellect by becoming it. And that man <has the capacity> to think himself no longer as a man, but has become entirely other and has snatched himself up to what is above, dragging only the better part of the soul, which alone can grow wings for intellection, so that one might store up there what one has seen.

Does the reasoning faculty not know that it is the reasoning faculty, and that it has knowledge of what is external <to it>, and that it judges what it judges, and that it does so (κρίνει) with the standards in itself which it has from intellect, and that there is something better than itself which does not seek, but possesses <its objects> completely? Does it not know what it is when it knows what kind of thing it is and what kind of functions it has? If it were to say that it is derived from intellect and is second after intellect and an image of intellect, having everything in itself as though written <on it> since the writer — that is the one who has written — is there, will he who has thus acquired

knowledge of himself stop at these things, and will we, using the services of another
25 power, [l. 25] see intellect knowing itself, or shall we, by participating in it, if it is ours and we its, know intellect and ourselves in this way?

<We must> necessarily <know it> in this way if we are to know what is «itself <knowing> itself» in intellect. A person has become intellect when he has shed the rest of
30 himself and looks at that part with that part and at himself with himself. It is, therefore, as intellect that he sees himself.

COMMENTARY

V 3. 3. The chapter begins with the question raised at the end of chapter 2, namely, how reason, διάνοια, can have understanding, σύνεσις. Line **1.** The past tense is used because what αἴσθησις does happens first: the verbs are not philosophical aorists. **2.** Τύπος is, of course, a stoic term, and therefore one with materialist implications, but often used by Plotinus, who is, however, careful to explain the immaterial sense in which he is using it (cf. my *Plotinus' Psychology*, The Hague, 1971, 70 ff., and Plotinus' description of the transmission of sensations of material objects as οἷον ἀμεσῆ νοήματα at IV 7. 6. 22-24). φησὶν and ἐφεῖ are standard Plotinian terms for affirmation by cognitive powers that they have perceived or thought something. **3-5.** This is parallel to other accounts of recognition and identification, cf. e. g. I 1. 9. 15 ff. *Dianoia* has in it, or available to it: (a) images from *phantasia*, which, if retained, are memory (b) information from above, sometimes described in terms of reflections on to *phantasia* (cf. IV 3. 30. 7-11). Recognition and identification are performed by fitting one to the other, cf. e.g. συναρμόττουσα τῷ παρ' αὐτῷ εἴδει κἀκείνῳ πρὸς τὴν κρίσιν χρωμένη ὥσπερ κανόνι τοῦ εὐθέος (I 6. 3. 3-5). **5-6.** The sense here is unclear. Do the words ἐξέλιττοι...μερίζει imply treating on a level below its own? If so, one might expect μερίζοι ἄν, or μερίζει ἂν ἃ...**7.** ὅ stands, as often, for τοῦτο ὅ, the τοῦτο being the object of ἔχοι. **8.** what it says *additionally*, and critically, cf. ἐπικρίνειν and ἐπιζητεῖν **8-9.** Κανόνα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ παρ' αὐτῇ : παρ' αὐτ῾ῦ means *in* itself, not *from* itself. Is this view different from that of V 1. 11 *init.* where we are told that reasoning about the question «is it good»? needs a fixed intance, ἑστώς τι δίκαιον, which is a starting point for λογισμός in the soul? Then it must be not the soul which reasons, but the intellect which always has δίκαιον must be in us. Thus in V 1 *nous* is in us, and therefore we have the standard required for reasoning to take place, whereas here, in V 3, we have it

because intellect illumines soul, ἐπιλάμποντος αὐτῇ νοῦ. **10-11.** The second of the two translations is more likely to be correct, because if *dianoia* is ἀγαθοειδής, then *a fortiori nous* is, and there would be little point in saying so. There would be some point in saying that not only is *nous* itself ἀγαθοειδής, but that it is also able to pass on the power of cognizing ἀγαθά, which is not implicit in the nature of soul. It also gives more point to the words that follow: that is the kind of thing that the ἐπίλαμψις produces. **12-13.** The point of the question is that if can receive these ἴχνη, why should it not thereby become νοῦς (the Aristotelian model of perception is assumed) while the rest, starting from the αἰσθητικόν, becomes soul. The answer is somewhat dogmatic, whichever of two possible senses it has, namely either that ψυχή must consist in reasoning, or that what carries out the reasoning is ψυχή. Is the answer satisfactory, in either version? Yes: it probably depends on the point that νοῦς is not the same as ψυχή in respect of the transition and process, μετάβασις etc., which go with reasoning. **15-18.** There follows a further question: why cannot we attribute self-knowledge to this part? Here Plotinus does give an argument. It is that we have given it the function of looking at what is outside and busying itself — doubtless we are meant to take the pejorative connotations of πολυπραγμονεῖν — with that, while *nous*, by contrast looks at what belongs to, and what is in, itself. **18-22.** What is, or could be, the other power referred to? There are two possible points here: (a) we have already said that self-knowledge belongs to *nous*; does it nevertheless use another *dynamis* to exercise this function, i.e. one that has not yet been mentioned? (b) does *nous* use *dianoia* to exercise the function, so that *dianoia* would thereby have self-knowledge? οὐ τὸ διανοητικόν... λαμβάνει: if someone adds the sort of question in quotation marks, then it is clear that he is talking about *nous*, not *dianoia / logismos*, and so ἄλλῃ δυνάμει cannot be a way of readmitting *dianoia / logismos* as a candidate for self-knowledge. **21.** ἐπιζητεῖ here indicates that *dianoia* and *logismos* would be something additional to the *nous* — which is all that is needed. **21-23.** The discussion in the previous lines has taken *dianoia* and *logismos* to refer to ψυχή as opposed to νοῦς. Hence the question now put, can νοῦς be in ψυχή? He is, of course, talking about intellect in the sense of «pure intellect», not the intellect which he sometimes calls the *nous* of the soul. The straight answer to the question, which must be read with ἐν meaning strictly within, is «no». ἔτι in line 22 thus means «still», in the sense of even though we have excluded ἐν in the narrow sense. **23.** In earlier treatises

Plotinus would probably have answered «yes» because *nous* was more closely tied to, or connected with, *psyche*. What we have here looks more Aristotelian, or perhaps one should say Aristotelian in the way Alexander read Aristotle. In IV 8, on the other hand, Plotinus talks of τι ταύτης staying above, so that *nous* is seen as something belonging to the soul, not as something either separate from it, or actually an internal part of it. **23-24.** Two translations are possible, either «*nous* is ours», or «but we shall say that it is (i. e. describe τοῦτο as) our intellect. The first is more likely, since ὑμέτερον seems opposed to ψυχῆς **23** ff. The position of this *nous* is above the part that reasons. The following words imply that it is therefore above *psyche* (though one might ask whether this means above *psyche* in the strict sense of the part of soul below intellect, or the wider one of soul including *nous*): hence ὅμως δὲ ὑμέτερον etc. This remark perhaps anticipates what will be said about ἡμεῖς at 31 ff. **28-29.** Προσχρώμεθα. This verb is used four times in these two lines, and therefore must be intended to be significant: it implies the use of something additional, in this case additional to what ψυχὴ is. **28.** There is a textual question here which cannot be definitively resolved. The uncial DIANOIAI may, of course, represent both διάνοιαι and διανοίᾳ. Most editors have preferred the latter, against the almost unanimous testimony — only R differs — of the MSS, in accordance with which and their then policy Henry-Schwyzer printed the former in HS^1. HS^2 reverts to διανοίᾳ, which is grammatically easier, being simply dependent on προσχρώμεθα, and this is what I have translated. But διάνοια gives good — if very similar sense: understand ψυχῇ or ἐν ψυχῇ εἰσίν. The anacolouthon is typically Plotinian. **29-31.** Plotinus asks whether προσχρῆσθαι entails identification. ὡς ἐκεῖνος can mean either that we speak as (identical with) *nous*, or speak as *nous* <does>, understanding λέγει, *vel sim.* In either case there is a contrast with κατ 'ἐκεῖνον which Plotinus offers as the correct answer: if we exist or act in accordance with *nous* there is no identification. But does Plotinus mean (a) that we do not become identical with it, negating γινομένους, or (b) that we do not speak as *nous*, negating φθεγγομένους, not because we are not identical with *nous*, but because *nous* does not speak, utter, etc.? The following words, οὐ γὰρ νοῦς ἡμεῖς, suggest the former, i. e. we do not speak ὡς ἐκεῖνος because we are not identical with ἐκεῖνος. **31-32.** We speak, and perform other acts, in accordance with it by means of the λογιστικὸν which first receives it. I take πρώτῳ as adverbial. Plotinus does not have a first and second λογιστικὸν and if he did the first would be intellect rather than reason, and in fact be a

nous internal to the soul. **33.** Another textual difficulty: the MSS καὶ ἡμεῖς οἱ αἰσθανόμενοι gives doubtful, though possible sense. It would be that, unlike what happens in the case of *nous*, we perceive through *aisthesis* and here we are still (i.e. even though there is an intermediary) the perceiver. Igal's κἂν <μὴ> ἡμεῖς gives better sense (and is neater than Theiler's <οὐχ> οἱ αἰθανόμενοι) (a) because of what follows; (b) because καὶ γὰρ should explain what precedes. The case of *aisthesis* would do this if *aisthesis* is parallel to *no esis* in that we are not identical with what perceives, just as in the case of *no esis* «we» are not the same as what νοεῖ. One could, however, make sense of the MSS reading if one took αἰσθανόμεθα to mean perceive when our soul, in the narrow sense, does so (so too αἰσθανόμενοι in the next line) while δι'αἰσθήσεως means through the senses. **34-36.** The text again: καὶ διανοοῦμεν οὕτως is grammatically unsound as well as being tautologous, and was deleted by all editors, from Kirchhoff to Bréhier. Since it is not a likely scribal addition, it must represent something else. Henry-Schwyzer's emendation in HS^1, διὰ νοῦ μὲν οὕτως, would give «do we think through *nous* in the same way», i.e. as we have self-knowledge, understanding a verb of thinking. Better perhaps is Igal's διὰ <νοῦ> νοοῦμεν οὕτως, translated here, giving the same meaning but making the mistake easier to account for. This is adopted by Henry-Schwyzer in HS^2, but in HS^3 they favour deletion. Reading the text as ἆρ' οὖν καὶ διανοούμεθα καὶ διὰ νοῦ νοοῦμεν οὕτως not only gives good sense, but makes the answer clearly related to the question. The response is: no, we do not think discursively through *nous* because we do this ourselves — taking νοῦμεν and νόηματα in line 35 as equivalent to διανούμεθα and διανοήματα. Note that both occurences of αὐτοί in the answer are in emphatic position, the second being immediately explained by the words which immediately follow, τοῦτο γὰρ ἡμεῖς. Just how technical is the use of ἡμεῖς here is open to question: it need not be technical at all. **36** ff. Having established that «we», in whatever sense, are connected with *dianoia*, Plotinus goes on to consider how *nous* relates to it and to us. Τὰ τοῦ νοῦ ἐνεργήματα ἄνωθεν is parallel to τὰ ἐκ τῆς αἰσθήσεως in the following line. Does this mean that *nous* is above all soul so that we, in the non-technical sense, are below it, or is Plotinus just making the weaker point that intuitive thought is at a different level from discursive thought, and parallel with *aisthesis* in that way? He could, if he is making the stronger point, also, be saying that *nous* does not belong to *psyche* in the strict sense, just as *aisthesis* does not, because its activity involves the body. That would be an advance on the points already

made in 23 ff: the weaker point would be more or less repetitious — which does not of course prove that it is not the one Plotinus is making. We may wonder whether there is an intentional contrast betweentὰ τοῦ νοῦ ἐνεργήματα ἄνωθεν and τὰ ἐκ τῆς αἰσθήσεως κάτωθεν, to indicate that the thinking is *in the psyche* though caused by what is above it, whereas the sense-perception is not, but that material comes to the *psyche* from it — in the form of τύποι. **38.** What is meant by διττῆς? If the soul has a μέσον as well as αἴσθησις and νοῦς, then it is three. Can διττῆς δυνάμεως be equivalent to δυαῖν δυνάμεων, a sense sometimes borne by διττὸς in Classical Greek? If *nous* were counted as part of a double soul, which would have to be divided into a rational and an irrational part, then what he is saying does not correspond with the views expressed earlier in the chapter. **41-42.** There is a question about *nous*, says Plotinus, for two reasons, (a) ὅτι μὴ αὐτῷ ἀεὶ should we understand προσχρώμεθα with H-S, or simply νοοῦμεν? (b) ὅτι χωριστός. Two questions arise: firstly, is (a) a consequence of (b), and secondly, does (b) mean separate from body, from other parts of the soul, or from us altogether, so that *nous* is above and we have descended? That is implied by τῷ μὴ προσνεύει and also by ἡμᾶς πρὸς αὐτὸν βλέποντας. We may ask whether this further explanation of χωριστὸς assumes that νοῦς is not ours. There is also a question about the reference of ἀμφισβητεῖται: does it refer to others, and, if so, does Plotinus think they are right to raise the question? **44-45.** *nous* as βασιλεὺς πρὸς ἡμᾶς seems to be a reminiscence of Plato, *Philebus*, 28 c, νοῦς βασιλεὺς ἡμῖν οὐρανοῦ τε καὶ γῆς, but the reference there is to cosmic and not individual intellect: that would not deter Plotinus from taking it to refer to the latter instead.

V 3. 4. 1-2. Can we extract any clear meaning from βασιλεύομεν, and will it help with the understanding of κατ'ἐκεῖνον? If we are to be taken to be βασιλεῖς, and βασιλεύς, and βασιλεὺς is the hypostasis *Nous*, then being κατ'ἐκεῖνον means that we identify with it. If we are merely *like* βασιλεῖς, then we do not identify. The latter is perhaps more likely because of the words καὶ ἡμεῖς: we too, in our way.... κατ'ἐκεῖνον διχῶς: the two senses are importantly different. They are: (a) because something from it is in us. (b) because we are filled with it (and so, again, not identical with it: this is to be contrasted with the notion to be found in other and earlier treatises, that we may become identical with *nous* by somehow switching on to it. (a) The text here has been questioned by R. Stark, «Emendationes Plotinianae», *MH*, 18, 1961, 227, but can, I think, stand, meaning «by the things like letters, that is, something inscribed or written in us like laws, i. e. giving us rules, one of the senses of κανόνες which ch. 3 says we have from *nous*, and thus also something in us which is κατ'ἐκεῖνον. Stark suggests that we should read either κατ'εκεῖνον διχῶς τοῖς νόμοις οἷον or ὥσπερ γράμμασιν: either would be simpler than the received text, but misses the duality of the notion that a) something is as it were on a tablet — here one might compare Aristotle's view of the mind as a tablet in *de Anima* III. 4, 430 a 1. (b) that it is like a ruler or standard. **3-4.** ἢ καὶ δυνηθέντες is probably explanatory of the previous words; cf. HS *in apparatu: aut...aut... vel.* We know ourselves: (a) by learning everything else through (=by means of, reading, with HS2, αὐτοὺς <τῶν> τῷ and η κατά τήν δύναμιν: this is the text translated) that kind of object of vision, that being what we are filled with. We may do this either by acting in accordance with *nous* or by becoming it. Or (b) reading ἢ καὶ τὴν δύναμιν — by learning, or knowing the power that knows that sort of thing, that is, it or oneself, by means of that power, in other words knowing *nous* by *nous* to which we have become assimilated, as suggested by ἢ καὶ ἐκεῖνο γενόμενοι if that reading is correct: if Stark's ἢ (*ibid.* 227 f., adopted by HS3: HS2 return to ἢ) is right, Plotinus is saying that the knowledge is produced by actual identification with the intellect, and not offering this as an alternative. (c) reading, with Stark (*ibid.*) [ἢ] κατὰ τὴν δύναμιν, gives two further possible translations: (i) knowing that kind of thing in accordance with the power that knows <it> by that very power..., with τοιοῦτον as the object of μαθόντες: this is even closer to being tautologous than is (b); (ii) knowing in accordance with the power that knows that kind of thing, with τοιοῦτον as the object of γιγνώσκουσαν. Both (i) and (ii) would enlarge on τῷ...μαθεῖν; but μαθόντες is perhaps redundant in both alternatives. **7 ff.** What we learn, in any case, is that the γιγνώσκων is double, double meaning that it has two senses; the first is that he knows *dianoia* (τὴν διανοίας... φύσιν=διάνοιαν), with τῆς ψυχικῆς added to emphasise that it belongs to soul and not *nous;* the second is that he knows at a level above this: the second, further, may mean either that he knows himself according to that (ἐκεῖνον) *nous* (i.e. not the one that is *dianoia*) by becoming <it>, or that he knows himself according to *nous* by becoming it. There is not a great deal of difference, but the first would draw attention to the *nous* in question not being the noûw cuxikòw which is *dianoia*. **9.** Is ὑπεράνω τούτου merely a reference to stratification, or does it mean something not really in *psyche*, as suggested by the following words, οὐχ ὡς ἄνθρωπον ἔτι... παντελῶς ἄλλον etc.? If τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς

ἄμεινον is simply another way of saying διάνοια, as is strongly suggested by lines 14 ff., that too would indicate that *nous* is not part of *psyche*. That looks like the νοῦς ἄνω doctrine, but the *nous* in question is not part of us as νοῦς ἄνω is supposed to be. On the other hand, this *nous* will not have descended integrally with the soul as in Iamblichus' and Proclus' view of the incarnate human soul. Alternatively these words refer to *nous*, and so mean that intellect is in *psyche*, but that it must go higher to achieve self-knowledge. Returning to lines 9-10, we should consider whether they refer to an actual layer of existence, or rather to a state or activity, i. e. not what is above, but what is in a higher state. **15.** The MSS have εἶδε(ν) or ἴδε(ν); Creuzer and subsequent editors before HS^1 emended to οἶδε, to which they returned in HS^2. All three are, of course, homophonous, and οἶδε and εἶδε give roughly the same sense. **14-28.** What is the argument here? It seems to be as follows: (a) does *dianoia* know that it deals with what is outside, and that there is something better than itself? The answer to these questions is «yes»; (b) does it not then know what it is when it knows what sort of thing it is, and what sort of activity it has? Plotinus may be making either of two points here, namely that knowledge of substance requires a higher grade of knowledge than knowledge of οἷον etc., or that if it does know all that, then one might reasonably suppose that it does know itself; (c) if it knows its relation to *nous* will that not lead to self-knowledge, as in line 23, οὕτως ανω, while a different kind of knowledge of *nous* and self — by the use of ἄλλη δύναμις, possibly but not necessarily the δύναμις, of line 7— is described in lines 24-27? The answer is that it must be the second way if we are to have true self-knowledge. Let us look further at the question of levels. In lines 20-21 the reason says that it is second, after *nous*, and an image of it — second meaning adjacent to — and that everything in it comes from νοῦς,, ὁ γράφων καὶ ὁ γράψας. Is the point of the two different tenses that, διδασκαλίας χάριν one may think of *nous having* done it, while in reality it continues to do so? Some editors cannot accept what they see as duplication: thus Theiler deletes καὶ ὁ γράψας, and Stark wishes to emend to κατέγραψε, which HS^3 reject on the grounds that the word is otherwise unattested in Plotinus: in any case I am not convinced that it gives good sense. Yet again, *nous* seems to be other than soul, cf. too 24-27 which ask whether (a) we look at *nous* knowing itself or (b) we participate in it because it is ours and we are its: again Plotinus is not saying that we are identical with it and *vice-versa*, though we may ask whether μεταλαβόντες means taking a part of, or being informed by. **27-28.** Αναγκαῖον οὕτως,: what is

being accepted? Is it the last suggestion, with νοῦν καὶ αὐτούς, implying assimilation, or is οὕτως, forward-looking, with γεγονώς, indicating identification rather than the degree of assimilation involved in line 27? That may be too fine a distinction. **29.** αὐτῷ may or may not be reflexive, with different implications. The translation takes is as reflexive: if it is not then it refers to *nous* and may indicate that it is still other than the subject.

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1 An earlier version of parts of this paper was given to a seminar at the Katholieke Universiteit of Leuven. I am grateful to its members for their comments. Since then vol. 5 of Professor A. H. ARMSTRONG's Loeb edition of Plotinus has appeared, and has helped me to improve some matters of translation.

2 Cf. esp. IV 8. 8 *init.*

3 Cf. ARMSTRONG, *Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy*, Cambridge, 1967, pp. 224-225; IDEM, Form, Individual and Person in Plotinus, *Dionysius*, 1, 1977, pp. 57-59: these pages contain comment on other points in these chapters, too; cf. G. J. P. O'DALY, *Plotinus' Philosophy of the Self*, Shannon, 1973, pp. 43-45; 57; Ph. MERLAN, *Monopsychism, Mysticism, Metaconsciousness*, The Hague, 1963, pp. 77-81.

4 Cf. Nous and Soul in Plotinus: Some Problems of Demarcation, *Plotino e il Neoplatonismo in Oriente e in Occidente*, Roma, Accademia Naz. dei Lincei, Problemi attuali di scienza e di cultura, 198, 1974, pp. 218-219.

5 Cf. *Platon und Aristoteles in der Nuslehre Plotins*, Basel, Stuttgart, 1979, pp. 199-205.

6 Cf. J. M. RIST, Forms of Individuals in Plotinus, *Classical Quarterly*, 13, 1963, pp. 223 sq., and A Reply to Dr. Blumenthal, *Plotin, Revue Int. de Philos.*, 24, 1970, pp. 298-303; ARMSTRONG, *Form, Individual and Person*, pp. 49 sq.. For another view, cf. my *Plotinus' Psychology*, The Hague, 1971, pp. 112-133.

7 On this cf. ARMSTRONG, *Form, Individual and Person*, p. 57; BLUMENTHAL, *ibid.*, p. 112.

8 Cf. Plotinus and Proclus on the criterion of truth, in P. H. HUBY and G. C. NEAL (edd.), *The Criterion Of Truth*, Liverpool, 1987.

9 Cf. SIMPLICIUS, *In Cat.*, 191. 9-10.

10 Cf. IDEM, *In de An.*, 250 a 4-5; PHILOPONUS, in Moerbeke's translation, 88. 61-63 VERBEKE; cf. also (Ps.) PHILOPONUS=STEPHANUS, *In de An.*, 545. 4-5.

11 The text translated is that of P. HENRY and H.-R. SCHWYZER's *editio minor*, vol. ii, 1977; this is referred to hereafter as HS^2; *the editio maior*, 1959, as HS^1; the *addenda ad textum* in vol. iii of HS^1, as HS^3. Note however that these were published in 1973. THEILER refers to the text in R. BEUTLER and W. THEILER's revision of R. HARDER's translation, *Plotins Schriften*, vol. V, 1960. In the translation < > indicate words understood but not in the Greek, or added to show its meaning. At one or two places alternative translations are given, and shown by /... /.

Plotinus' Adaptation of Aristotle's Psychology: Sensation, Imagination and Memory[1]

That the *Enneads* contain a great deal of Aristotelian doctrine must be obvious to a fairly casual reader even without the explicit testimony of Porphyry.[2] Nevertheless it is not equally obvious in all parts of Plotinus' thought – sometimes, of course, he is in clear disagreement with Aristotle. For various reasons which we shall have to consider the use of Aristotle's ideas in the construction of Plotinus' doctrines of the human soul is pervasive, but does not present us with a simple case of absorption. That, in the nature of the case, would have been impossible, even if we forget Plotinus' capacity for subtle alteration of views, he might at first sight appear to be taking over as they stood, a process which Professor Armstrong has aptly called 'rethinking',[3] but which might well appear as perverse interpretation. Plotinus, as is well known, claimed to be doing no more than expounding views whose antiquity could be vouched for by Plato's own writings (V.1.8.10-14). Many have referred to this claim in connection with Plotinus' relation to Plato. It is perhaps not equally well understood that a man who could think himself so good a Platonist would have been quite capable of thinking that those parts of his psychology which were Aristotelian were roughly the same as those of his source, or more importantly perhaps, that Aristotle's views were the same as his own. His attitude is not unlike that of those Aristotelian commentators who were later to claim that Aristotle's views were like Plato's if only one understood them aright.[4]

I have made these points at this stage because the basis of Plotinus' psychology is a paradox which, I suggest, can only be understood if one thinks in such terms. The paradox lies in the fact that Plotinus' soul was, like Plato's, separate from and, ideally, opposed to the body, but worked like Aristotle's which was by definition the body's essence. And yet Plotinus was well aware of the crucial difference: he did not fail to criticize Aristotle's entelechy theory, and of course attacked both his definition of the soul and its implications (IV.7.8[5]).

That the body: soul relation was Platonic and dualist is stated nowhere more clearly and emphatically than in the first lines of IV. 3.22: 'Should one say then that when soul is present to body it is present as fire is to air? For that too when it is present is not present, and when it is present all through a thing is mixed with none of it: it remains unmoved while the other flows by'.[5] The independence of soul which this text asserts is not always preserved in practice. One might think of Plotinus' warnings about the consequences of the affections (*πάθη*), and, in general, the way he regards the lowest phases of the soul as quite closely linked with the body, and always liable to suffer from the association, an association which is even capable of having undesirable effects on the soul's higher ranges (cf. e.g. IV.8.2.26-30, VI.4.15.18ff.)[6]. This is so in spite of the careful way in which Plotinus will, for example, talk of the desiring faculty as having the basis of its action in a certain part of the body, namely the liver (IV.3.23.35-40) – a point, incidentally, on which Plotinus is in a sense more Platonic than Plato, who puts the equivalent 'part' of the soul in the abdomen as if it were a lump of matter.[7] Here it would seem that Plotinus was more scientific, and thus more in sympathy with Aristotle's approach, than his professedly Platonic position should have allowed.

The fact that Plotinus used Aristotle's account of the soul's operations, and, of course, his general view of the way the soul should be divided, while differing with him over the whole basis of psychology, namely what the soul was and how it related to the body, accounts for a large measure, though certainly not all, of the differences between their views about its functions. There are, of course, others. One is Plotinus' view

of the soul as a reflection of higher being, itself as a whole dependent on what lies above, and with each phase or section depending on that above and less valuable than it. Here ethics and metaphysics invade psychology. Thus soul for Plotinus is viewed from the top downwards, and lower sections are sometimes regarded as dispensable. When soul is functioning as it should and so looking upwards, the lower section is absorbed in the higher: one might think of a kind of hanging collapsible cup.[8] In Aristotle the situation is reversed: the soul is like a pyramid, where each layer, or series of faculties, cannot exist without that below. As a result Plotinus tends to consider any function of the soul at least partly against the background of its possible contribution to man's upward progress, and perhaps to evaluate it in this light.

Aristotle on several occasions records that there is a progress through the lower to the higher forms of cognition and knowledge, not thereby implying that the 'lower' forms are 'worse' than the 'higher'.[9] His aim is to analyze how one acquires knowledge and he makes it clear on numerous occasions that sense-perception is the indispensable foundation of the process. This no Platonist could admit, though Aristotle's own Platonism does re-assert itself in the view that at the end of the process we have knowledge of things inherently more knowable than the sense-data from which it starts. Here we see one example of Aristotle's different approach, which also shows itself in his more scientific attitude to psychology. Put quite simply, he wants to analyze the functions of soul wherever in the world it might operate, and is particularly interested in the demarcations between various forms of life. Plotinus, unlike Plato, does see, and has perhaps learned from Aristotle, that soul extends to all forms of life (cf.I.4.1.18ff.) – and even finds it in things that Aristotle properly regards as inanimate (IV.4.27) – but he is not really interested in those other than man. It should not be forgotten that, whatever others made of it later, the *de Anima* is a biological treatise.

The differences we have outlined are perhaps most interestingly studied in the middle section of the human soul, at the levels of perception, imagination and memory. The top and bottom are less instructive, for the following reasons. At the

top, at the level of *nous*, Aristotle's soul, or at least the active *nous*, is also detached from the body. I shall avoid for now the problems that would be presented if the passive *nous*, whose nature is defined as pure potentiality, were the highest manifestation of the body's actuality, and the no less troublesome matter of the exact level where Plotinus' human *nous* is to be situated. Whether the answer be the hypostasis *Nous* or the hypostasis Soul makes little difference for the present purpose.[10] But in any case this is another area where Aristotle is closer to Plotinus' intentions as well as his practice by virtue of a Platonic feature of his thought. If Aristotle's active *nous* were after all one of the 'intelligences', then Aristotle and Plotinus are here very close.

At the bottom of the scale the two thinkers are again fairly close, but whereas at the upper end of the scale this is explicable in terms of Aristotle's Platonism, at the lower end it is to be seen as a result of Plotinus' apparent Aristotelianism– unintentional though it may have been. Especially at the level of the vegetative soul, which both Aristotle and Plotinus call by a variety of names, what is done by soul in Aristotle is the work of body alone in Plato. Moreover, as soul descends, or reflects itself, further downwards, it becomes more and more closely bound up with body until its function becomes the information of previously formless matter (VI.7.7.8ff.). Here in producing body, the soul is functioning as world-soul: sometimes it is also seen as a manifestation of world-soul at the next level, that of the vegetative soul.[11] Here the gap between body and soul, whether regarded as world-soul or individual soul, is small enough for Aristotle's ideas not to be far removed from Plato's, though of course their professed positions were no less different than elsewhere.

The way both may make the same kind of statements for different reasons is well illustrated when Plotinus, discussing the impassibility of soul when involved with the affections, says that if we say the soul changes in the emotions we are liable to be doing the same sort of thing as if we were to say the soul goes pale or blushes, without taking into account that these things happen through the soul but in some other structure, that is, the body (III.6.3.7-11).[12] Aristotle had compared the notion that the soul is angry with the view that it builds or

weaves, and thought it would be better to say not that the soul feels pity, learns or thinks, but that it is the man with his soul that does these things (408b 11-15).[13] Aristotle is concerned to make it clear that the soul does not act independently of the body whose form it is. Plotinus, on the contrary, wants to show that the soul is independent of the body with which it is merely associated.

This requirement is still operative at the level of sense-perception. It is perhaps what made it possible for Plotinus to arrive at the fairly clear distinction he makes between sensation and perception, equipped as he was with no better linguistic tools than his predecessors.[14] Of these none, as far as we know, made the distinction with any clarity. Plotinus did it simply, though perhaps crudely, by separating sense-perception into an affection (*πάθος*) of the body, and a judgement or act of cognition on the part of the soul. So, for example, at the start of III.6: 'We say that perceptions are not affections, but activities and judgements concerning affections: the affections take place elsewhere, let us say in the body so qualified, but the judgement is in the soul, and the judgement is not an affection – otherwise there would have to be another judgement, regressing to infinity – but we still have a problem here, whether the judgement *qua* judgement takes on anything from its object. If it has a mark from it, then it has undergone an affection.'[15] There are, of course, other places where Plotinus points out that the faculty of sensation is not affected by what happens to its organs, or to the body in general. So at IV.6.2. 16-18 he says that in the case of taste and smell there are affections and also perceptions and judgements of these which are a cognition of the affections, but not identical with them.[16] Perception in general is the soul's judgement of the body's affections (IV.4.22.30-32). But the introduction to III.6 is particularly significant when considered in its context. The whole purpose of the first part of this treatise is to show that the soul is not changed by the emotions (cf. esp. III.6.1.12-14): these being functions of the soul below the sensitive faculty are of course more likely then sense-perception to have some effect on the soul itself. What happens in perception is used as a paradigm of the soul's freedom from the affections of the body

and its separation from it. Later in the treatise vision is used to illustrate another point, this time to show how the lower parts of the soul may listen to reason without actually being changed: vision, he says, is simply the actualization of a potency. The act and potency are in essence the same, and so vision entails no essential change: the sense cognizes its objects without undergoing any affection (III.6.2.32ff.). Here we can see clearly what Plotinus is in fact doing: he is discussing sense-perception for the light it can throw on other matters. The two points he wishes to make here are that there may be temporary changes involving parts of the soul either in relation to others, or to the body, and that changes in the body need not, and generally do not, affect the soul. In the area of the affections he does not quite succeed.[17] Elsewhere he will use his basically Aristotelian view of vision as a pattern for the relation of various levels of reality.[18] Its usefulness here, rather than just the normal Greek feeling that vision was the most important sense – stated explicitly by Aristotle at *de Anima* 429a 2f. – is the most likely reason for Plotinus' interest in vision. If this explanation is correct it becomes less surprising that for Plotinus sensation is almost synonymous with vision: he says very little more about taste and smell than the remark we have referred to, virtually nothing about touch and gives a short account of hearing, again primarily illustrative.[19] A sound fills the air for anyone who is there to be able to hear it, and the whole sound is in any one part of the air: that is how we are to understand the presence of soul (VI.4.12). This kind of paradigmatic purpose is at least part of the reason why the distribution of Plotinus' discussions of perception is so different from Aristotle's. There is of course more to be said. In his treatise *Problems about the Soul* (IV.3-5), as well as in one or two specialised smaller treatises, like that on why large objects perceived at a distance appear small (II.8), Plotinus does seem to be interested in the workings of the human soul for their own sake. This is perhaps also true of I.1, but only to an extent, for there Plotinus is primarily concerned with making a distinction between those human activities which involve both body and soul and those which are the work of soul alone.

Such then are the reasons for Plotinus' uneven coverage of the questions that present themselves. What of the details? As

far as their general notions of what happens in sense-perception go, Aristotle and Plotinus are not very far apart. Aristotle says that each sense is 'that which is able to receive the sensible forms (i.e. of sense-objects) without their matter',[20] and compares the way wax may receive the imprint of a signet-ring without its material, the metal (424a 17-21). Plotinus' definition is similar, but its intention may be subtly different. For him sense-perception is 'the perception of the soul or the 'living being' (ζῷον) of sensible objects, the soul grasping the quality attached to bodies and receiving an imprint of their forms' (IV.4.23.1-3).[21] By inserting 'quality attached to bodies' Plotinus causes one to wonder just what he means by the word which is translated 'forms' but can equally well mean appearances. Are 'forms' no more than appearances? That would be in order for a Platonist, but perhaps not in harmony with Plotinus' fairly positive attitude to the sensible world in this treatise, and the distinction may be over-subtle. Nevertheless the impression that Plotinus does mean to indicate the illusoriness of sensible qualities is strengthened by the fact that the word he uses for receiving an imprint (ἀπομάττειν) occurs in that part of the *Timaeus* where Plato describes the production of sensible objects in the Receptacle.[22] In any case Plotinus is perhaps closer to Aristotle in another passage, III.6.18.24ff., where he talks of soul not being prepared to accept the forms of sensible objects with multiplicity but seeing them *when they have put off their mass*,[23] if by this he means something like Aristotle's 'without matter'.

Where Plotinus certainly differs from Aristotle is in his view that the soul's power of perception is not properly exercised on the sense-objects themselves, but on the impressions which sensation has produced in the 'living being': these have by then become intelligible (I.1.7.9-12). Here we do have a sensation: perception distinction. For Aristotle there was of course no question of a distinction between what is done by body and soul, and so his account was much simpler: the body and soul unit perceived sensible objects by means of the appropriate faculty, the sensitive, acting through, or in, the appropriate organ. In fact, faculty and organ are the same, except in definition (424a 24-6).

The role of the sense organs was in line with the general requirements of the two thinkers' approaches. In Aristotle's psychology it was possible, not to say desirable, for the organs to be independently active. Vision is, after all, inherent in the eye. It is its form and essence: an eye that cannot see is simply not an eye (412b 18-22). For Plotinus, on the other hand, an eye *qua* part of a body can only see when activated by the relevant faculty of its detached soul, and its function, like that of all the sense organs, is to act as an intermediary, a kind of transformation point, between the sensible objects outside and the immaterial soul 'inside' which is only able to perceive what is presented to it in an intelligible form (IV.4.23). In fact the senses are different only because different sense organs perform this role (IV.3.3.12ff.). By itself soul can only think (*νοεῖν*) the objects which it already possesses (IV.4.23.5f.). Through the sense organs it can be assimilated to the sensible objects (*ibid.*21ff.), just as in Aristotle's theory the organs, or senses, become like the objects from which they were originally different, though potentially the same (cf. 417a 18-21, 422a 6f.). It should not, however, be forgotten, that for Plotinus the organ must already, if there is to be perception, have a degree of similarity to the object, whether this is described in terms of sympathy as in IV.4.23, or, rarely, more Platonically in terms of being light-like, as at I.6.9.30f. Plotinus' concept of an inward transmission from the organs to the soul as such was of course greatly helped by the post-Aristotelian discovery of the nerves.[24]

A further and immediately obvious difference comes over the question of a medium between object and organ. Quite simply Aristotle thought that one was required while Plotinus did not. This is one of the more technical questions which Plotinus discussed at some length, in IV.5, which is an appendix to the treatise on the soul. Here again he disagrees quite openly with Aristotle, though he does not mention him by name. Plotinus wished to explain the contact between subject and object in perception by means of the sympathy (*συμπάθεια*) that existed between all parts of the world in virtue of its status as a living being, a notion he had taken over from certain later Stoics – dare one say Posidonius? This sympathy operated equally between the parts of the world and the parts of each ensouled individual in it, which allowed Plotinus to explain both internal and external perception in the same way. That had the advantage of greater economy and simplicity than a theory which required a medium for external perception when there could be none in the case of internal perception. That was a problem which would not have been serious for Aristotle, since he did not, in general, consider what role perception might have in respect of the percipient subject himself. There is, of course, one exception, the attribution in the *de Anima* to the several senses themselves of awareness than they are perceiving. But Aristotle merely says that they, rather than some other sense, see or hear that they are seeing or hearing (425b 12ff.). His main reason is a fear of regress, and he is not much concerned with how the process works. By his own theory there should be a medium, and that could have been a serious difficulty even in the *de Sensu* version where the senses acting together, as the common sense, are responsible for this kind of perception (*de Sensu* 455a 12 ff.). Here then we have one manifestation of Plotinus' interest in various kinds of self-awareness and self-consciousness. This was an area in which Aristotle had taken little interest and where Plotinus was in advance of his predecessors and sometimes foreshadowed modern developments in psychology – as also in his brief reference to the importance of unconscious memories (IV.4.4.7-13).

To return to mediums. Plotinus arraigned two classes of offenders, one whose own theories required a medium, and another for whom it was unnecessary to the concept of perception with which they worked. Aristotle falls into the latter and worse class. Plotinus discusses the question mainly, but not exclusively, in terms of vision. His general view is that there is no need for anything between object and eye to be affected so long as the eye itself is (IV.5.1.15ff.). He here ignores Aristotle's argument from the impossibility of seeing objects placed directly on the eye (419a 12f.), an argument he is quite prepared to use elsewhere for another purpose.[25] Against the idea that air must be changed before we can see, he argues that we should then be seeing the adjacent air, and not the object itself, just as if we were being warmed by air rather

than by a fire (IV.5.2 50-55). This is not the best of arguments. A better one is that if vision depended on the air being lit, that would make nonsense of the fact that we can and do see lights in the dark: this means that the darkness is still there when we see. Plotinus rejects any attempt to salvage mediums by arguing that their absence would break the sympathy between subject and object: he does so by anticipating his final conclusion that sense-perception depends on the sympathy which arises from common membership of one living organism (IV.5.3.1ff.). Before he reaches that he stops to consider the view that air might be necessary if one thinks that light can only exist in air. He points out that the air would then be incidental to the process of vision (IV.5.4.2-7). It is interesting to note that Plotinus has here arrived at a correct position for a dubious reason: we do now know that light can be propagated through a vacuum. Unfortunately for Plotinus the same is not true of sound, whose medium Plotinus wishes to abolish by the same argument. One might wonder, incidentally, whether Plotinus' unwillingness to accept any kind of medium, against which he argues mainly in terms of vision, had anything to do with his views on the exalted status of light. Was light too good to be involved so basically in sense-perception?

One further question must be considered. How did Aristotle and Plotinus deal with the assessment of sense-data by the soul, and what did they think about their objective validity? The first half of the question is perhaps badly framed in the case of Aristotle, given his answers to the second. For in the case of at least one kind of perception, that of the relevant quality by the appropriate sense, such as colour by vision, there was no scope, or very little, for error. Error could arise in the perception of something as an attribute, or, more often, in the apprehension of the common sensibles, such as size or shape (428b 17-25). The latter Plotinus attributed to a combination of perception and opinion (VI.9.3.27-32).[26] Aristotle omits to tell us how error is detected, but it would seem that it must be done by reason working with the images which the sensations produce. This is certainly what Plotinus thought. Incoming sense-data were compared with a pre-existing pattern derived from above (VI.7.6.2-7). Reason dealt with images produced by

perception (V.3.2.2ff.): the percept of a man will set off a chain of inference, and reason by using memory can pronounce that it is Socrates (V.3.3.1-5). But here reason performs a function which in Aristotle was a matter of perception: the sense of sight perceives a white object incidentally *as* the son of Diares (418a 20f.). As a result of this difference Plotinus does not need reason to confirm what is its own conclusion. What was in Aristotle a case of perception has become for Plotinus a matter of inference. Some form of verification will, for him, have been necessary even at the level of Aristotle's usually infallible perceptions: as far as Plotinus was concerned, sense-perception produced opinion, not truth (V.5.1.62-5). Here Plotinus' Platonism is clearly responsible for his view. See n. 37

For Plotinus the faculty of imagination is the terminus for perceptions as such (cf. IV.3.29.24f.). They may be passed on to reason for processing, or retained as memories. Imagination is also responsible for other forms of transmission between parts of the soul, or between soul and body. Its duties in connection with memory are particularly complex. It is probably because of this wide variety of functions that Plotinus tended to see imagination as a faculty – or rather two – in its own right. Aristotle, on the other hand, tended to think of it as a subdivision of the sensitive faculty, different by definition rather than in essence (*de Insomn.* 459a 15ff.). He defined it as a 'movement caused by the activity of perception' (428b 13f.).[27] Nevertheless he will sometimes speak of imagination acting independently of sensation, and in particular producing sense-like images, as in dreams, when no sensation is present. This is one of the differences between imagination and perception that he mentions in the course of framing the definition: others are that all animals have sensation but not imagination, and that perceptions are true whereas imaginings (φαντάσιαι) – for want of a better English word – are usually false (428a 5ff.). We may note in passing that whereas Plotinus regarded perception as unreliable and was less suspicious of imagination, which usually acted as an agent of some other power, Aristotle held perception to be reliable and thought that imagination was usually wrong: he was still influenced by its connection with the verb meaning 'to appear' with its strong connotation of appearing other than is the case (428b 2ff.).

Notwithstanding such differences one can see that Plotinus is working with the same concept as Aristotle, though he adapts it, exploiting a certain vagueness in some of Aristotle's statements, and extends the sphere of its operation. Both clearly and primarily associate imagination with the sense, both use it as a means of presenting material acquired by the senses to the reason, both hold that it is the basis of memory.

In its connection with sense-perception imagination presents the fewest problems. It is the power of soul by which we have available for consideration, or for subsequent use through memory, the information provided by the senses. We have seen that in Plotinus sense-percepts, as processed by imagination, were presented to the reason. Similarly in Aristotle reason deals with images which it has before it in the manner of perceptions (413a 14f.). The contexts are different, but since for both images derive from sensation, and are considered by reason, we may take it that the underlying doctrine is the same. There is, however, an important difference in the use of images. For Aristotle they are probably necessary for thought of any kind (413a 16f.), while for Plotinus the thinking of the true *nous*, the intuitive thinking which is superior to mere reasoning, can and does proceed without them, since *nous* is simply present among its objects. In fact the reason is informed of intuitive thought by means of images, and imagination makes the results of both kinds of thinking known to the rest of the soul (IV.3.30.5-11). When the imaginative faculty is disturbed then thinking proceeds without images (I.4.10.17-19).[28]

At the other end of Plotinus' scale, imagination makes the condition of the lower faculties, and that part of the body for which they are responsible, known to the higher soul (cf.IV.4.17.11ff., 20.17f.). In the case of desire the sensitive faculty perceives an image which conveys to it the condition of the lower soul (IV.4.20.12ff.). Thus we have a kind of sub-sensitive imagination in addition to that which operates between sensation and reason, and on one occasion Plotinus goes so far as to say that the former is imagination in the strict sense (VI.8.3. 10 ff.). Transmission of information about the body was of course a problem for Plotinus in a way that it was not for Aristotle, but it is possible that he constructed this

downward extension of the activities of the imaginative faculty on the basis of Aristotle's remarks in the *de Anima* and elsewhere about the role of imagination in desire – and other emotions – and movement: an animal can move in so far as it is equipped with appetition, and appetition does not exist without imagination (433b 27-30). So appetition and imagination are both involved in the causation of movement (433a 20): at *de Motu Animalium* 702a 17-19 Aristotle says that imagination prepares appetition. Further, Aristotle does, at *de Anima* 433b 31ff., raise the question of how the imperfect animals, that is those which have only the sense of touch, can have imagination, which normally presupposes all five senses, a question presented by the fact that these animals appear to have pleasure and pain. If so, they must have desire, which should imply imagination. Aristotle suggests that they perhaps have it in an indeterminate way (ἀορίστως). This last suggestion in particular could be a starting point for Plotinus' lower imagination, which he describes as 'unexamined' (ἀνεπίκριτος), in a context where the term may well imply that vagueness makes this kind of imagination unverifiable (III.6.4.18-23).[29]

Plotinus' most radical alteration of Aristotle's scheme of faculties comes when he considers the role of imagination as the basis of memory. Aristotle had little difficulty in coming to the conclusion that memory and imagination belong to the same faculty since all memories, even those of intelligible objects, require mental pictures *(de Mem.* 450a 11-14). Plotinus comes to the conclusion by a more difficult route, by way of considering from various points of view the possibility that each faculty could have those memories relevant to its peculiar activities. His difficulties arise mainly from two requirements, first the need to clarify the relation of memory and its faculty to the 'living being', the compound of body and the lower faculties, and then the apparent impossibility of having the activities of the higher part of the soul remembered by the lower, and *vice-versa*. Here the role of imagination as a transmitter and mediator between the different sections of the soul provides the solution.

But of course there are further difficulties, which I have discussed in detail elsewhere.[30] Before we consider them briefly

for their relevance to the present question, something should be said about the actual functioning of memory. Basically, in both Plotinus and Aristotle, the faculty retains images presented to it either from sensations below or reasonings above. But Plotinus, whose discussion in the treatise *On Sensation and Memory* (IV.6) is clearly based on Aristotle's account in the *de Memoria*, as Bréhier showed,[31] does not simply accept it as it stands.[32] He makes several alterations of detail, mainly with a view to removing materialistic, or at least apparently materialistic, features of Aristotle's account. In the first place he objects to Aristotle's talk of memory being the retention of some sort of imprint (*τύπος*) produced by perception or learning (*de Mem.* 450a 30-32). As Plotinus says at the start of his discussion (IV.6.1.1-5) it would make no sense to talk in these terms if one holds that perception does not involve any imprint, and the rest of the chapter argues once again that it does not. Plotinus was certainly not the first to be worried about the implications of the impression concept: Alexander had already expressed concern and said that the word was used only for lack of an appropriate one.[33] Plotinus says we must think rather of some sort of translation of the impression which affects the body: in an earlier treatise he speaks of 'something like indivisible thoughts' (IV.7.6.23).[34] For similar reasons Plotinus rejects Aristotle's explanation of the decline in old people's memory. Aristotle had accounted for it in terms of bodily changes, which he also took to be the cause of poor memory in the very young (*de Mem.* 450b 5-7). Plotinus substituted the suggestion that the psychic power involved declined, which enabled him to offer the same explanation for the fall-off in both memory and sense-perception (IV.6.3.51-5). As to the young, Plotinus argues, surely rightly, that they in fact remember better because they have as yet less material to remember (*ibid.* 21-4).

Let us return now to the problem of faculties. Here Plotinus innovates by splitting the faculty of imagination. This is the only way he feels able to explain how the higher soul which survives this life can, as it does, retain memories from it without being affected during life by the less elevated forms of memory which a person must have in the ordinary life of this world (IV.3.31-2). He thus requires a lower imaginative faculty to deal

with such lower memories and protect the higher memory, a need arising from his basic position that the soul, and particularly the upper soul, remains unaffected by its administration of the body with which it is, in theory, merely associated. Since, however, the soul as a whole must in this life have certain information available to it, the information stored by the lower soul is available to the higher. Moreover the break may, at least partly, be obscured if we think in terms of Plotinus' view of the lower soul as a product of the upper soul's attention to what lies below. Similarly the lower soul can become reassimilated to the higher—though if this were to happen happen definitively the activities of the lower would disappear. That would remove the very reason for the lower imaginative faculty's existence.

This radical innovation is by far the clearest case of the changes in Aristotelian psychology that arose from the needs of Plotinus' brand of Platonism, and in particular from the need to defend the soul's autonomy. Yet even this change may have been suggested by Aristotle's references, both in the *de Anima* and the *de Motu Animalium*, to two types of imagination, one rational and the other perceptual,[35] and also the hint in the *de Anima* of a lower kind of imagination which we have already mentioned.[36] For the purposes of this paper too much attention may have been focused on the similarities between Aristotle's views and Plotinus'. Perhaps as a corrective it would be as well to remember that there were a number of questions in which Aristotle was interested and to which Plotinus simply paid no attention. Such are the nature of sense objects and the sense organs, and the forms of sense-perception which had little relevance to Plotinus' higher interests. In the workings of the soul at the level of plants and animals Plotinus shows very little interest. At the risk of speaking in cliches one might suggest that the differences are to a large measure due to the fact that Aristotle was a scientist as well as a metaphysician, and simply wanted to know. If one wonders why Plotinus adopted and adapted Aristotle's psychology the answer would seem to be that – apart from certain historical factors – he wished to remain a good Platonist and yet felt obliged to give a more

satisfactory account of the soul's workings than Plato himself had found either possible or desirable.

NOTES

1. For the purposes of this paper I have deliberately left aside the history of psychology between Aristotle and Plotinus. Much of this is still inadequately treated, and some will remain so for sheer lack of evidence. But it is of interest in considering Plotinus' psychology to see what he chose to use. Note: all unspecified references to Aristotle are to the *de Anima*.
2. *Vita Plotini* 14.4-7.
3. 'The Background of the Doctrine "That the Intelligibles are not Outside the Intellect" ' *Les Sources de Plotin*. Entretiens sur l'Antiqité Classique V. Fondation Hardt (Geneva 1960) 402.
4. Cf. e.g. Simplicius, *de Caelo* 640.27-30. See further my paper 'Some Observations on the Greek Commentaries on Aristotle' in Actes du XIV^{e} Congrès International des Études Byzantines.
5. *Ἆρ' οὖν οὕτω φατέον, ὅταν ψυχὴ σώματι παρῇ, παρεῖναι αὐτὴν ὡς τὸ πῦρ πάρεστι τῷ ἀέρι; καὶ γὰρ αὖ καὶ τοῦτο παρὸν οὐ πάρεστι καὶ δι' ὅλου παρὸν οὐδενὶ μίγνυται καὶ ἔστηκε μὲν αὐτό, τὸ δὲ παραρρεῖ.* It is clear from the context here, and also from what he says later when he refines the analogy from light to heat (IV.4.29 *init.*), that Plotinus is here thinking of fire primarily as light. One might wonder if even this Platonist statement is not itself suggested by Aristotle's description of light being the presence of fire in the transparent (418b 13-16).
6. On this see further my *Plotinus' Psychology. His doctrines of the embodied* soul (The Hague, 1971) 64-66.
7. Plotinus may well be deliberately improving on Plato since he offers this statement in IV.3 as an explanation of why the desiring part had been put in the liver.

8. Sometimes Plotinus thinks of these lower phases as belonging to the world-soul in its capacity of informing matter, rather than to the individual soul, cf. e.g. IV.9.3.11ff. and *Plotinus' Psychology 27-30.*
9. Cf. *Anal. Post* 99b 26ff., *Met.* A 980a 21ff.
10. For discussion of this problem cf. *Plotinus' Psychology* 115ff., and also my paper "*Nous* and Soul in Plotinus. Some Problems of Demarcation" in *Atti del Convegno Internazionale* sul tema *Plotino e* il *Neoplatonismo*. Roma 5-9.10-1970 Problemi attuali di Scienza e di Cultura. Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei (Rome 1974) 203-219.
11. Cf.n.6. above.
12. *κωδυνεύομεν γὰρ περὶ ψυχὴν ταῦτα λέγοντες ὅμοιόν τι ὑπολαμβάνειν, ὡς εἰ τὴν ψυχὴν λέγομεν ἐρυθριᾶν ἢ αὖ ἐν ὠχριάσει γίγνεσθαι, μὴ λογιζόμενοι, ὡς διὰ ψυχὴν μὲν ταῦτα τὰ πάθη, περὶ δὲ τὴν ἄλλην σύστασίν ἐστι γιγνόμενα.*
13. *τὸ δὴ λέγειν ὀργίζεσθαι τὴν ψυχὴν ὅμοιον κἂν εἴ τις λέγοι τὴν ψυχὴν ὑψαίνειν ἢ οἰκοδομεῖν· βέλτιον γὰρ ἴσως μὴ λέγειν τὴν ψυχὴν ἐλεεῖν ἢ μανθάνειν ἢ διανοεῖσθαι, ἀλλὰ τὸν ἄνθρωπον τῇ ψυχῇ.*
14. See further *Plotinus' Psychology* 67f.
15. *τὰς αἰσθήσεις οὐ πάθη λέγοντες εἶναι, ἐνεργείας δὲ περὶ παθήματα καὶ κρίσεις, τῶν μὲν παθῶν περὶ ἄλλο γινομένων, οἷον τὸ σῶμα φέρε τὸ τοιόνδε, τῆς δὲ κρίσεως περὶ τὴν ψυχήν, οὐ τῆς κρίσεως πάθος οὔσης – ἔδει γὰρ αὖ ἄλλην κρίσιν γίνεσθαι καὶ ἐπαναβαίνειν ἀει εἰς ἄπειρον – εἴχομεν οὐδὲν ἧττον καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἀπορίαν, εἰ ἡ κρίσις ᾗ κρίσις οὐδὲν ἔχει τοῦ κρινομένου. ἤ, εἰ τύπον ἔχοι, πέπονθεν* (III. 6.1.1-8).
16. *γεύσεως δὲ καὶ ὀσφρήσεως τὰ μὲν πάθη, τὰ δ' ὅσα αἰσθήσεις αὐτῶν καὶ κρίσεις, τῶν παθῶν εἰσι γνώσεις ἄλλαι τῶν παθῶν οὖσαι.*
17. See above p. 42.
18. E.g. *Nous* formed by the One . . . . like vision in act: *οἷον ὄψις ἡ κατ' ἐνέργειαν* (V.1.5.17f.).
19. All five senses are mentioned together in connection with the provision of appropriate powers to the various organs

by an undivided soul at IV.3.23.1ff.

20. τὸ δεκτικὸν τῶν αἰσθητῶν εἰδῶν ἄνευ τῆς ὕλης.
21. τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἐστι τῇ ψυχῇ ἢ τῷ ζῴῳ ἀντίληψις τὴν προσοῦσαν τοῖς σώμασι ποιότητα συνιείσης καὶ τὰ εἴδη αὐτῶν ἀποματτομένης.
22. *Tim.* 50E.
23. . . . .ὁρῶσα οὐκ ἀνέχεται μετὰ πλήθους δέχεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἀποθέμενα τὸν ὄγκον ὁρᾷ.
24. By Herophilus and Erasistratus in the third century B. C.: their work was later advanced and refined by Galen.
25. To argue against the impression theory of perception (IV.6.1.32-5).
26. αἰσθήσεως καὶ δόξης ἑπομένης αἰσθήσει.
27. κίνησις ὑπὸ τῆς ἐνεργείας τῆς αἰσθήσεως.
28. That this is what Plotinus means can be seen by comparing this chapter with IV.3.30.
29. On the relation of the different kinds of imagination cf. *Plotinus' Psychology* 92f.
30. Ibid. 83ff.
31. In the Notice to IV.6 in the Budé edition of the *Enneads.*
32. The parallel emerges more clearly in IV.6 than in IV.3-4 because, unlike the latter, the former is not concerned with eschatology.
33. *de Anima* 72.11-13.
34. οἷον ἀμερῆ νοήματα.
35. All imagination is rational or perceptual: φαντασία δὲ πᾶσα ἢ λογιστικὴ ἢ αἰσθητική (433b 29); the imagination is due to thought or perception: ἡ φαντασία. . . .γίνεται ἢ διὰ νοήσεως ἢ δι' αἰσθήσεως (*de Mot. Animal.*7021 19).
36. See above p. 54.
37. On Plotinus' theory of sense-perception, and a different view of some of the matters treated in this paper, see now E.K. Emilsson, *Plotinus on Sense-perception (Cambridge 1988).*

VIII

SOME PROBLEMS ABOUT BODY AND SOUL IN LATER PAGAN NEOPLATONISM: DO THEY FOLLOW A PATTERN?*

With one notable exception, all serious pagan philosophers in late antiquity took a firmly Platonist view of the soul's relation to the body, a view that was, moreover, shared by not a few of their Christian contemporaries. The theological implications of such a view were to lead to all sorts of controversies and anathemas which I do not intend to discuss[1] – nor would I be competent to do so. But for the pagan philosophers too this concept of the soul brought with it a whole range of difficulties, and in this paper I shall examine, briefly, how far it produced a consistent pattern of problems for them.

With the exception I have mentioned, namely Themistius, all these philosophers were Neoplatonists.[2] Leaving aside one matter of considerable importance, one can distinguish an earlier and a later Neoplatonist view of the nature of the individual soul and its relation to body in terms of degrees of complexity or complication. The later is complicated by the characteristic tendency of post-Iamblichean Neoplatonism to introduce mediating entities at every point of transition, both within the intelligible world and between it and the sensible.

Apart from this tendency to multiply entities at all levels, for which the later Neoplatonists are notorious, there is, I think, another reason why their views on the body-soul relation differ markedly from those of the earlier Neoplatonists. It is to be found in the different aims of the philosophers concerned. As a crude generalization, the interests of many of the later group, particularly those who were inclined to follow the lead of Iamblichus, were primarily soteriological rather than scientific.Though they were by no means averse from hard and careful thinking – the logical coherence of, for example, Proclus' *Elements of Theology* is decidely superior to that of most of the *Enneads* – their ultimate aim in doing philosophy seems more obtrusively to be the achievement of personal salvation in this life and that, or rather those, to come. This is not to deny that Plotinus and Porphyry shared that interest, but in reading their works, or the evidence for them – in the case of Porphyry – one is much more aware of an interest in the answers to philosophical questions for their own sake. The difference is perhaps reflected in the very different tone of Porphyry's *Life of Plotinus* and Marinus' *Life of Proclus*. The latter is basically the life of a pagan saint, the former, while certainly not free from an interest in the occult and a desire to demonstrate Plotinus' very special qualities, gives us a picture of a philosopher at work such as Marinus presents almost incidentally. He, by contrast, shows an unhealthy interest in matters like rain-making and luminous phantoms of Hecate which we have no grounds for writing off as products of the biographer's imagination[3]. Plotinus was not received at Rome, as was Proclus at Athens, by a series of divine signs and manifestations of super-

* All references to the Aristotelian commentators are to page and line of the Berlin Academy edition, Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca.

[1] For an early stage cf. Nemesius, de Nat. Hom 115.4ff. Matthaei.

[2] On the position of Themistius see my, Themistius, the last Peripatetic commentator on Aristotle?, in Arktouros. Hellenic studies presented to B. M. W. Knox, Berlin 1979, 391–400.

[3] Vita Procli 28.

natural approval[4]: in his case we are told far more about what went on in his classes, which authors were read, and what sort of discussions took place between the members of Plotinus' entourage[5]. For our present purpose the implications of these different attitudes are, in the first place, an even greater concern to maintain the soul's freedom from the effects of symbiosis with the body and, in the second, a far greater interest in the mechanism of life apart from the body, both short-term – in philosophical separation – and longer term, in pre-existence and reincarnation. Again, these aspects are not absent in the earlier period, nor in Plato himself, but they are less important.

Before going further, let us look at the common assumptions of Neoplatonic psychology. Some will be familiar, but it will in any case be useful to state them at the outset, for it is these assumptions that directly or indirectly produce most of the problems in the Neoplatonists' accounts of the human soul. The first and most important of these assumptions is that the soul is, as Plato maintained, other than the body, and in its most »real« form has nothing, except its ultimate source, in common with a body which is, at best, an impediment to full self-realisation[6]. The point about the common ultimate source is not, of course, Plato's but it would be as well to keep firmly in mind that, in general, the Neoplatonists, however un-Platonic some of their ideas might be, saw themselves as merely commentators on a Plato who did not always makes himself clear[7]. The second of their assumptions, which is virtually – subject to certain conditions – incompatible with the first, is that the operations of the soul in the body were to be explained in Aristotelian terms[8]. To spell out the incompatibility: Aristotle's psychology depended on the view that body and soul were part of the same entity – perhaps the word »part« is better omitted – so that his explanations of how the soul functioned could not fit easily into a Platonic structure. Only at the point where Aristotle's own structure broke down did it adapt easily to the Neoplatonic system, or rather systems: it still needs to be said that it is important to avoid lumping the Neoplatonists together into one or two groups and inferring a degree of homogeneity which did not exist. Nevertheless, on the topic we are discussing it is generally safe to use the rough distinction outlined at the start of this article.

The fundamental incompatibility between a Platonic and an Aristotelian psychology was overcome by Plotinus, to his satisfaction if not to ours, by the assertion that the soul was »present to the body« and affected it as one thing another, so long as the presence continued[9] – he compared this relationship first to that between light and air, and then to heat and air, emphasizing that this latter comparison allowed for the continuation of some sort of influence of soul on body after the separation which is death[10]. Nevertheless he allowed a closeness of soul to body at the lower levels which sometimes at least went beyond the mere juxtaposition which his view otherwise required, and which tended to infringe the soul's independence. As Plotinus put it, the lower soul could be affected by the κρᾶσις, the mixture, of ingredients of the body with which it was associated, or by the times and places in which that body found itself[11]. This was one point at which the late Neoplatonists usually offered another solution. A second point where problems arose, and where they were in almost equal difficulty, was at the division between those activities of the soul which depended on the availability of the body and those which did not. This was

[4] Ibid. 10–11.
[5] Cf. esp. Vita Plot. 13ff.
[6] Cf. e.g. Plot, IV.7.9–10.
[7] Cf. Plot. V.1.8.10–14, Proclus, in Alc. 227.21–2.
[8] Cf. my, Plotinus' psychology, The Hague 1971, 134–9.
[9] Cf. esp. IV.3.22.
[10] IV.4.29.1ff.
[11] Cf. e.g. III.1.8.14–20.

a point at which the soul tended to break in two[12]. A third was the status of the intuitive intellect, which remaind a matter of controversy throughout the history of Neoplatonism[13], and which later Neoplatonists tended to attack with a view to tidiness in the system rather than that bridging of gaps which was their more usual response to problems about continuity. It is here that we have the exception to our initial generalization about degrees of complication.

As a kind of converse of the last point, we find in Plotinus a concern to work out the details of the mode of operation of soul in body which leads him to make a series of very careful distinctions between levels of soul, the faculties to be found at those levels, and the degree of bodily involvement in each of these faculties' activities[14]. Though such discussions are sometimes the product of questions of another kind, the thoroughness and persistence with which they are conducted strongly suggests that the problems themselves had a degree of intrinsic interest for Plotinus which is reminiscent of Aristotle rather than Plato. With Proclus, and as far as we can tell with Iamblichus and Syrianus too, the focus of interest is, in more than one sense, elsewhere. That is not to say that there are no discussions of faculties and mechanisms, but that they are conducted with a view to restricting the extent of the sensible world's effect on the soul and showing how its activities within it were simply a degraded form of its higher ones. Hence perhaps the tendency to refer to imagination as νοῦς παθητικός[15], which one might loosely translate as a »passive kind of thought«, and also the irritating prevalence of inconsistency in Proclus' use of terms to designate the activities of this area of the soul. Αἴσθησις, φαντασία, δόξα, all fluctuate in meaning, and φαντασία, which is so important in both Aristotle and Plotinus, is normally pushed out of the higher soul altogether, and replaced there by what Proclus calls δόξα; only the special case of the commentary on Book 1 of Euclid is a fairly consistent exception to this rule[16].

Such deliberate inattention to consistency, and the avoidance of the difficulties inherent in working out the complexities of the lower soul's operation, was not, however, universal. The trend is reversed among those later Neoplatonists whose interests were to some extent influenced by the exigencies of the Aristotelian texts they were expounding. May I hasten to add that that alone cannot explain and account for what they say because in the last resort it was their own philosophy that they were expounding through the medium of their exposition of Aristotelian texts[17]: for that there were at least sometimes extra-philosophical reasons, but that is another matter[18].

These were the areas in which the most serious difficulties arose in explaining how soul worked with body. A further set presented themselves when it came to explaining how soul lived without body. The allied subjects of reincarnation and pre-existence had been of interest to Platonists since Plato himself departed from the agnostic position of Socrates and asserted not only that the soul survived death, but also that we owe our knowledge of

[12] Cf. Plotinus' psychology 89–91.
[13] Cf. esp. Proclus, in Tim. III.333.28ff.
[14] See Plotinus' psychology 61–5.
[15] Cf. e.g. Proclus, in Eucl. 52.3–12, in Remp. II. 52.6–8, [Philop.], in de An. 490.22–3.
[16] Cf. my, Plutarch's exposition of the de Anima and the psychology of Proclus, in De Jamblique à Proclus. Entretiens sur l'Antiquité classique. Fondation Hardt. 21, Vandœuvres-Geneva 1975, 137–47.
[17] Cf. my, Neoplatonic elements in the de Anima commentaries, Phronesis 21, 1976, 64–87.
[18] On the special circumstances at Alexandria cf. H.-D. SAFFREY, Le Chrétien Jean Philopon et la survivance de l'école d'Alexandrie au VI^e siècle: REG 67 (1954), 399–401 and the remarks of L. G. WESTERINK, Anonymous Prolegomena to Platonic philosophy, Amsterdam 1962, xi–xiii; also ALAN CAMERON, PCPhS n.s. 15, 1969, 9.

matters other than contingent fact to the experience of a previous existence: the second of these assertions (perhaps historically the prior) was, incidentally, replaced by Plotinus with his doctrine of the undescended intellect, but re-established by some of his successors[19].

Plato had assumed that one's behaviour in this life would somehow alter one's soul, but, in spite of a wealth of picturesque detail which he provides to illustrate the results of such alteration, notably in the Myth of Er, he does not really face the problems such an assumption entails. Plotinus, on the other hand, was aware that there was a whole series of such problems, which he made serious, if not necessarily successful – we might say necessarily unsuccessful – attempts to solve. If the soul was completely other than body, how could it in any way be affected by the activities of the compound which was the living being, and if it were not so affected, how could it preserve any trace of activities which were not, strictly, its own? And if it could not do so in such a way as to carry over characteristics from one life to the next, could it at least do so in a way which made the character of an individual a product of his previous empirical existence? The alternative was that all individual characteristics were not only temporary but also illusory.

The nature of the difficulty varied with different levels of the soul. At the lower levels, where there was less of a problem in envisaging a soul that somehow changed in conformity with a person's activities[20], questions arise as to how far this sort of psychic life was individual at all, and Plotinus at least sometimes held that it was not[21]. As one goes up the scale of the soul's functions there is, in one way, less difficulty about individuation – if we are prepared to allow that it can be a matter, more or less, of definition – but then it becomes increasingly difficult to explain how, if at all, the soul has anything to do with what goes on »below«. This type of problem appears at its most intractable with Plotinus' notion that the highest part of the soul does not descend.

Plotinus does not tell us why he adopted this view, which he admitted was unorthodox[22]. It would take more space than is available here to investigate this question, but it is probably correct to say that his stress on the continuity of the constituents of the intelligible world had something to do with it[23]. It enabled him to retain a foothold, or perhaps one should say a headhold, for the individual human being in the intelligible world. He attempted to deal with the most obvious difficulty entailed by this view, that it would seem to lead to every individual being ceaselessly engaged in the intuitive intellection of objects with which he is identical, by saying that intellection only takes place *for us* at times when we are aware of it, that is when the soul is directed to, or focussed on, what is above. Then the intellection is reflected in a lower form by being deployed in a more diffuse way in reason, and then in the imagination which is reason's normal concomitant[24]. His successors were more impressed by the difficulties, and objected to Plotinus' innovation on two grounds. In the first place a continuously thinking mind would be an entirely different entity from an intermittently thinking one – so argued Proclus, following his teachers Plutarch and Syrianus – and thus could not be part of the individual living in this world, unless it were possible for there to be a composite entity with one constituent which thought constantly, and another which thought intermittently. That they were not prepared to accept[25]. A second problem related to the individual's moral condition. If his highest part were in the sphere of unchanging reality, permanently engaged in contemplation of it, then the whole of the individual soul would be in a state of unalterable perfection and unimpaired happiness, εὐδαιμονία, with all the connotations of that term for a Platonist philosopher[26]. This question seems to have remained a subject for apparently vigorous discussions. It appears with occasional signs of vehemence in reports of Iamblichus, Plutarch and Syrianus, and in various texts of Proclus and Simplicius[27]. Interestingly Simplicius at one point indicates that Iamblichus, who is always credited with holding the anti-Plotinian view, was not at all times equally convinced that Plotinus was wrong. In his commentary on the *Categories* Simplicius brackets Iamblichus with Plotinus as holders of the opinion that the soul remains »above«: ἐν ἡμῖν ἐστί τις τοιαύτη ἀεὶ ἄνω μένουσα[28]. One might argue that Iamblichus on further consideration abandoned this view[29]. At any rate it is also attributed to Theodorus of Asine[30], and some would say that it still appears in Simplicius' older contemporary Damascius[31]. Another problem that Plotinus' view would have presented to the average post-Iamblichean Neoplatonist was its untidiness. While they were much concerned to bridge gaps in the intelligible world, and between it and the sensible, by the production of ever greater numbers of mediating entities, usually conceived as middle terms of triads of the form A, A and B, B, they were at the same time almost equally concerned not to blur the outlines of the structures this produced. So all those who rejected the intellect that remains above might be seen as insisting on tidiness, a pernicious tidiness which those of them who wrote commentaries on Aristotle displayed by insisting that his active intellect could not be transcendent because the subject of the *de Anima* in which he discussed it was ψυχὴ λογική, the rational or discursive soul[32]. In offering this interpretation they were exhibiting a prejudice. Whether or not they were right is another matter altogether.

Such insistence on demarcation led to further difficulties. While for Plotinus the union with higher reality, and ultimately the highest reality in the non-sensible world, which all of them agreed in regarding as the goal of the philosophic life, was explicable in terms of a change of focus, the introduction, or reintroduction, of sharp divisions between our souls and the intelligible world, meant that ways had to be found to cross the divide. This was almost certainly the reason why the same philosophers who seemed so keen on intellectual order and the maintenance of clear divisions in the structure of intelligible hierarchies, allowed themselves to advocate the practice of theurgy, the attainment of communion with the divine, that is the intelligible, by the employment of supernatural, not to say disreputable, practical methods. I do not want to discuss this subject at length, but merely wish to

[19] Cf. Plot. V.9.5.32 with Plotinus' psychology 96–7, and Plutarch ap. [Philop.], in de An. III.518.21–6.
[20] Cf. e.g. III.6.5 and Plotinus' psychology 54ff.
[21] Cf. IV.9.3.23–8.
[22] IV.8.8.1–3.
[23] On this continuity see esp. V.2.2.26–9.
[24] Cf. e.g. IV.3.30.7–15.
[25] Proclus, El. Th. 211; for Plutarch cf. [Philop.], in de An. 535.13–16, and for Syrianus Hermias, in Phaedrum 160.1–4 Couvreur.
[26] Cf. Proclus, in Tim. III.334.3–15.
[27] See nn. 25 and 26, and for Simplicius cf. in de An. 6.12–15.
[28] In Cat. 191.9–10.
[29] For further discussion of this text cf. C. STEEL, The changing self. A study on the soul in later Neoplatonism: Iamblichus, Damascius and Priscianus. Verh. van de Konink. Ac. voor Wetensch. Lett. en Schone Kunsten van België. Kl.Lett. 40, 1978, n. 85, 48–9: his suggestion that it could be made consistent with other Iamblichus texts if we amended to ὡς Πλωτίνῳ κατὰ Ἰάμβλιχον δοκεῖ will hardly do, *i.a.* Plotinus' position was too well known for there to be any reason to cite Iamblichus in evidence.
[30] Proclus, in Tim. III.333.28–30.
[31] At de Princ. II.254.3–7 Ruelle; so E. R. DODDS, Proclus. The Elements of Theology, Oxford 1933, 309. H. DÖRRIE, Porphyrios' »Symmikta Zetemata« = Zetemeta 20 (Munich 1959) 196 n.2; T. A. SZLEZÁK, Platon und Aristoteles in der Nuslehre Plotins, Basel/Stuttgart 1979, 167 n. 548. Notwithstanding Plotinus' psychology 6 n. 17 and Neoplatonic elements 74, I now think that he did not: for this view see I. HADOT. Le problème du Néoplatonisme alexandrin. Hiéroclès et Simplicius, Paris 1978, 171–2, and STEEL (n. 29) 49–51.
[32] Simplicius, in de An. 240.2–5, [Philop.], in de An. 536.2–4.

mention it here as an indication of the way in which irrationalism is prone to erupt in what might seem a very rational, if thoroughly misguided, system of thought.

Irrational motivations are likely to have played their part in the differences among later Neoplatonists on the subject of reincarnation. That there was some form of survival after death, with or without reincarnation, seems to have been almost universally accepted, as was pre-existence *ad infinitum* by those pagan Platonists who did not take the *Timaeus* as a literal account of creation. Even some Christian Platonists believed in pre-existence, the cause of centuries of trouble[33]. But from that point on there are considerable divergences, and even for those who do not think the details of reincarnation and pre-existence are any better than a manifestation of what Herodotus in another context called barbarian foolishness and stupidity[34], these divergences are of some interest, not for themselves but for what they tell us about their holders' concepts of the soul: what was the real or essential soul, and what degree of reality did those parts have which may have been thought capable of survival for a limited time. They also throw some light on the degree of coherence between the levels or faculties of a single soul, and the extent to which these levels may be subject to changes resulting from the life of the individual. To put it another way, a belief that soul will show in the next life signs of its activities in this may be taken to indicate that such activities are not confined to the compound of body and whatever level of soul may be involved with it, but extend to the whole soul – and so cross the boundaries between body and soul on the one hand, and higher and lower soul on the other. In general, the discussion may be taken to relate to a general pre-occupation with the boundary between the rational and the irrational. It has been suggested that that was how it all arose[35], but that is probably too simple an explanation.

With these considerations in mind we might look at the implications of the information contained in a well-known sentence of Damascius' commentary on the *Phaedo* (until recently known under the name of Olympiodorus)[36]. It gives us a summary of some earlier views on reincarnation, albeit slightly simplified, as can be seen by comparing Proclus' account in his *Timaeus* commentary[37]. Here we are told that some thinkers attribute immortality to the whole range of soul, from the rational to that state which gives life to the body, ἀπὸ μὲν τῆς λογικῆς ψυχῆς ἄχρι τῆς ἐμψύχου ἕξεως: the example given is the middle Platonist – or Neopythagorean – Numenius, from which we may infer that no *Neo*platonist subscribed to this extreme formulation. Others said it extended μέχρι τῆς φύσεως, as far as nature, that is, as far as the lower faculties, those above that reach of soul which merely transforms matter into body, for example sometimes Plotinus: the »sometimes« is the commentator's comment. Still others hold that it extends μέχρι τῆς ἀλογίας , as far as the irrational soul, a vague term which probably means that part of the irrational soul which is above the φύσις, or nature, which is the limit given in the previous case. Iamblichus and Plutarch are listed for this view among »more recent thinkers« (i.e. recent as opposed to classical). Οἱ δὲ μέχρι τῆς λογικῆς ὡς Πρόκλος καὶ Πορφύριος: others, like Proclus and Porphyry, restrict it to the rational soul. It may be worth recalling that that term now includes the highest reaches of the soul, and so when Damascius goes on to say that there are some who include only νοῦς, that is the Peripatetics, he

[33] Cf. e.g. G. BARDY, Art. Origénisme: Dict. de Théol. Cath. XI.2 (1932) 1565ff.
[34] Herod. I.60.3.
[35] So DÖRRIE, Kaiserzeitliche Kontroversen über die Seelenwanderung, Hermes 85, 1957, 434.
[36] L. G. WESTERINK, ed. The Greek Commentaries on Plato's Phaedo, Amsterdam 1977, II. Damascius: Damasc. I.177 = [Olympiodorus], in Phaed. 124.13–20 Norvin.
[37] III.234.8ff.

is setting out a view which for him would be impossible because it would involve splitting a single level of the soul, but would have been quite reasonable for Plotinus, who did not in fact hold it. A further view, which does not directly concern us, is that it is soul as a whole that is immortal: the individual is simply reabsorbed into the soul of all. Now this latter might seem to be the only view that a Neoplatonist could consistently maintain, yet none of them, as far as we know, did so. It alone, of all the views that are given, admits the contingency of life in the sensible world, and takes into account the theory to which all Neoplatonists would have expressed adherence if pressed, that each individual soul is fundamentally indentical not only with all other individual souls, but also with the soul of the whole universe[38]. This, *inter alia*, is why one must think in terms of irrational motivation, not only as a determinant of different concepts of immortality, but also of the acceptance of any view that allowed personal immortality at all. The point would seem to be that a conviction of the importance, and permanence, of the individual personality was permitted to interfere with the account of the soul's destiny which a stricter adherence to their own rationally expounded principles should have caused these thinkers to give.

Some of the factors which could be taken into account in reaching conclusions about the area of the soul which might be the subject of immortality may be seen clearly displayed in Plotinus' discussion of memory at the end of *Ennead* IV.3, to which we have already referred in passing. He is there concerned to show that if immortality is to have any meaning for the individual soul, if, that is, the soul is to survive with any of its personal individuality intact, then it must somehow keep traits of the life it has lived during the incarnation it is leaving. This for Plotinus is done by memory, which raises further problems[39]. Briefly, memory depends on imagination, or rather it is a function of the imaginative faculty. That receives data from sensation, and so cannot operate without body. That would seem to tie memory indissolubly to the lower soul and body. On the other hand memory also stores the products of psychic activities not concerned with, nor even, so Plotinus, thought, derived from, anything sensible. To that extent the contents of memory were suitable for retention in a life without body, but what of those memories which belonged to the sub-rational soul and had corporeal connections or origins? Plotinus' solution was to split the imaginative faculty, allowing memory of both rational and non-rational activities in this life and the retention of information about it in the next – in a later passage he says that the nature of a soul is in part determined by its memories[40]. The inconveniences of the solution were to be reduced by the notion that the two faculties were united during this life, so that after it some memories of the lower soul could be absorbed and retained, if only for a time, by the higher soul[41]. This was just the sort of untidiness that later Neoplatonists were so anxious to avoid, and their anxieties may be reflected in Damascius' report of Plotinus – probably based on an early treatise[42] – which does not conform with the picture we have just given, a picture which emerges clearly from Plotinus' lengthy and careful discussions in the 4th *Ennead*.

The other views Damascius reports, if correctly reported[43], and in some cases we can show that they are, may also be taken to be symptomatic of this anxiety. Another feature

[38] For Plotinus cf. esp. IV.9; for Proclus in Tim. II.164.3–19.
[39] Cf. IV.3.27–32.
[40] IV.4.4.7.13.
[41] Cf. IV.3.31 and Plotinus' psychology 89–92.
[42] Perhaps IV.7 [2].14.
[43] There are some points where the Phaedo commentary at least simplifies the situation; cf. WESTERINK (n. 36), ad loc. Any misreporting could be due to the pupil who produced the commentary from Damascius' lectures rather than to Damascius himself: on the status of the commentators cf. WESTERINK, ibid. 15–16.

of them is remarkable, and may be worth noting at this stage. It is that the distribution of these views does not correspond to the standard but sometimes, I think, mistaken view, of the general outlook of the philosophers concerned. We are often told that Iamblichus admitted all sorts of irrational elements into Neoplatonism and was eagerly followed in this by Proclus, whereas Plotinus and Porphyry assigned much less importance to such elements, and that Plutarch is closer to them than to his pupils Syrianus and Proclus[44]. Yet here we find the allegedly sensible Plutarch bracketed with the »wild« Iamblichus, and Iamblichus' great admirer Proclus sharing the views of Porphyry, arguably the sanest of all the Neoplatonists.

If we look further at Plutarch we shall see that, contrary to the suggestion that there might be a close relation between their views on reincarnation and on the articulation of the soul, Plutarch's view on the latter subject – except, of course νοῦς ἄνω – seems to have been similar to that of Plotinus, while his view on the former was not. So we cannot take it for granted that it was only those who regarded the lower soul as importantly different from the higher who were inclined to shed it in the intervals between lives in bodies. The reservation should however, be entered, that information about Plutarch is very scanty, and it does indicate that, though he, like Plotinus, duplicated the imaginative faculty, he somehow regarded it as unitary notwithstanding: thus he abolished the gap which he created in the central area of the soul[45]. If the abolition is more important than the creation, then of course the connection between his views on the nature of the soul and on the type of survival accorded to it is much closer. I have raised this rather unsatisfactory matter here partly as a warning against assuming a higher degree of certainty than the inadequate evidence warrants.

Having said that, let us look at Proclus, a representative of the other group and a figure about whose views we are much better informed. But yet again there is an area of unclarity affecting Proclus' views on that part of the soul where breaks are likely to occur. In Proclus' case we almost know too much, and can see how at various times and in various contexts he held different opinions about the organization, and possibly about the ingredients, of what it would be convenient to call the »middle soul«[46].

One way of looking at the double imaginative faculty that we find in Plotinus and Plutarch would be as a kind of double insulation for the true soul against the currents of corporeality coming from the lower soul and the body. If that is so, one might go on to look at the series of quasi-material bodies, composed of different kinds of *pneuma*, or sometimes light, with which other later Neoplatonists provide the soul[47], as a new kind of insulation. Basing themselves on a passage in the *Timaeus* where Plato has the souls lodged in vehicles before they are launched into the heavens[48], and another where the body is described as a vehicle for the soul[49], and combining their reading of Plato with another distortion, this time of Aristotle's references to *pneuma* as part of the body's control system, they thought they had good reason for interposing these vehicles, ὀχήματα, between body and soul – in the case of the lower soul – or between the purely intelligible nature of the higher soul and its condition of potential association with body. The beginnings of this concept

[44] So R. BEUTLER, Plutarchos von Athen RE XXI.1, 1951, 963–4.
[45] Cf. [Philop.] 515. 12–29 and my, Plutarch's exposition of the de Anima, (n. 16), 134.
[46] Ibid. 137ff.
[47] For the history of this question see DODDS (n. 31) app. 2, 313–21.
[48] 41DE.
[49] 69C.

may be found in Plotinus, though for him it assumed no great importance[50], and it was probably developed by Porphyry[51]. In Proclus we already find it as standard doctrine, and by his time – he may himself have been the innovator – it has been further elaborated into two such bodies[52]. The one, almost permanently attached to the higher soul, is virtually immaterial, the other more material and a function of the relationship with a body. That Proclus had two of these bodies while Iamblichus had only one may be part of the reason why one held that both sections of soul were immortal and the other that only one survived. Further, and again we have no explicit account of Proclus' reasoning, it could be that the elaboration of this insulation system is what caused Proclus to entertain a view similar to that of Plotinus with its rather different basis.

At this stage we must consider briefly how, if at all, these vehicles are related to, or correspond with, the lower part of the soul as envisaged by Proclus, and by those of his predecessors who managed without vehicles. In the first place the fact that a soul is destined for incarnation means that it must produce from itself a lower stage which will operate its bodily machine. This is not just a modernistic metaphor. It was normal Platonist parlance to talk of the body as a tool which the soul used, a view that could be claimed as Platonic[53], but was also, in part, another distortion of Aristotle, this time of his definition of the soul. We may see how it was produced by looking at Simplicius' commentary on *de Anima* 2.1 where he extracts from the description of the body as ὀργανικόν in the definition of the soul the idea that the body is the soul's instrument, while ignoring the sense of »equipped with organs« which ὀργανικόν was originally intended to have[54]. We have seen how Plotinus used the φανταστικόν, the imaginative faculty, to protect the higher soul from influence from below, and at the same time to mediate such influences in an acceptable form, and suggested that the soul vehicles might perform analogous functions. In this context it is interesting to note that Porphyry, who had only one, seems to have made his psychic vehicle the recipient of the images: thus it was closely connected with, if not actually identical with the imagination[55]. Similarly Iamblichus saw his vehicles as the destination of at least those images which come from the gods »above«, and which the imaginative faculty collects[56]. Proclus too, at least sometimes, saw the penumatic vehicle as the seat of the common sense and imagination[57].

That is not to say that those Neoplatonists who did believe in such vehicles envisaged them as a direct replacement for the lower soul. They were there to bridge that gap which Plotinus had tried to bridge by talking about the presence of soul to body, and Porphyry by his description of the association as σχέσις, a relationship – conveniently vague but inconveniently uniformative[58]. The body's functions were still under the control of soul. Proclus in his *Elements* spells out clearly that body cannot initiate action[59], and therefore all actions must be produced by soul. But he also admits that the immaterial and impassible can, in certain circumstances, be subject to effects from the passible and material[60].

[50] Cf. II.2.2.21–2, IV.3.9.5–6, IV.3.15.1–3, and Plotinus' psychology 139.
[51] Cf. e.g. Sent. 29 = 18.6–13 LAMBERZ and perhaps de Abst.I.31 = 109.14ff. NAUCK, where Porphyry talks of χιτῶνες.
[52] Cf. e.g. in Tim. III.238.2ff.
[53] The *locus classicus* for later Platonists was Alc. I. 129D–130E.
[54] Simplic. in de An. 90.29ff.; cf. too Neoplatonic elements 93–4.
[55] Cf. Sent. 29 = 18.7–12L; Πρὸς Γαῦρον VI. 1 = 42.5–17 KALBFLEISCH.
[56] De.Myst. 3.14 = 132.9–15 PARTHEY.
[57] In Remp. 2.167.2ff.; in Tim. III.236.27ff.
[58] On this concept cf. DÖRRIE (n. 31) 87–8.
[59] El. Th. 80.
[60] Cf. in Tim III.287–8.

While at this lower level the psychic vehicle may have assumed one of the functions of φαντασία, the higher vehicle in so far as it was permanent, may also, if in a rather different way, have provided a partial replacement for the soul's continuous representation in the intelligible, a representation which Plotinus had given it, but which most of the later Neoplatonists tidied away. For Plotinus this undescended part of the soul gave access to the intelligible world and ultimately to the One itself: look and you will see, or rather, think and you will think. The doctrine was unorthodox and untidy, but it did have this advantage, that the philosopher – and others do not seem to have been excluded – had a permanent *entrée* into that world which all Platonists thought was their goal. Once the soul was removed from that world by the fact of incarnation, it became correspondingly more difficult to achieve that goal, and the temptation to seek dubious aids to its realisation was not always resisted. Practical and magical means to elevate the soul were the result, a group of practices described as θεουργία, theurgy, a system for operating on the gods, or the divine in general, by methods far removed from contemplation and the exercise of the intellect[61]. While Porphyry, the first Neoplatonist to admit theurgy, was very firm about its being an aid for those incapable of making the ascent by the unaided use of their own faculties, and of no interest to true philosophers, Iamblichus and Proclus, and probably Syrianus too, lost sight of this distinction and allowed theurgy a place in the activities of the philosopher as well. And that, as DODDS noted long ago, is a reflection of the lower status they assigned to the human soul[62]. And that in turn may or may not be a symptom of that less optimistic view of man and his destiny which was not confined to the decreasing body of pagan philosophers. It can also, less speculatively, be seen as a consequence of that search for tidiness in the articulation of the structures of both the intelligible and sensible worlds which, as we have seen, may be observed as a recurring pattern in the problems about the soul which presented themselves to all the later Neoplatonists[63].

[61] The evidence is conveniently collected by DODDS, Theurgy and its relationship to Neoplatonism: JRS 37 (1947) 55–69, reprinted in The Greeks and the Irrational, Berkeley/Los Angeles 1951, 283–311; for recent discussions see A. SMITH, Porphyry's place in the Neoplatonic tradition, The Hague 1974, 80–141, and A. D. R. SHEPPARD, Studies on the 5th and 6th essays of Proclus' commentary on the Republic = Hypomnemata 61 (Göttingen 1980) 150–6.

[62] Proclus, Elements, xx.

[63] An earlier version of this paper was given to the Cambridge Late Antiquity Seminar in December 1980.

IX

PLOTINUS AND PROCLUS ON THE CRITERION OF TRUTH

I

The standard Hellenistic problem about the existence and nature of a 'criterion of truth' was not often discussed as such by the Neoplatonists.[1] Part of it was, as we shall see, irrelevant, not to say a non-problem, for a Platonist. But the issues raised by those who first formulated the question were certainly not ignored. Nor was the traditional label forgotten. It reappears even in Simplicius, who says of Aristotle's logical works that they 'furnish us with a criterion of truth', τὸ κριτήριον ἡμῖν τῆς ἀληθείας εὐτρεπιζούσας (*In Phys.* 5.30-31), and describes Aristotle's use of received opinions (ἔνδοξα) as 'comparing opposite views with, and testing them against, general concepts used as a criterion', ἔθος γὰρ αὐτῷ ταῖς κοιναῖς ἐννοίαις κριτηρίῳ χρωμένῳ πρὸς ταύτας παραβάλλειν καὶ βασανίζειν τὰς ἀντικειμένας δόξας (ibid. 646.35-36). In these texts we have two of the traditional senses of criterion, a method of establishing the truth and a yardstick against which to measure it.

The difficulties of establishing the meaning of 'criterion' are notorious, and I do not propose to discuss here what the various philosophers from Epicurus on meant by it. That problem has been much discussed in recent years,[2] and those who wish to see further discussion will find it in other chapters of this volume.[3] Much of the earlier discussion was concerned with how one might establish the existence of the objects of cognition. It was this context which produced answers of the kind 'apprehensive presentation' – or

whatever the correct translation of *kataleptike phantasia* might be – as given in the *locus classicus* in Diogenes Laertius, 7.54. The related question, about the means or instruments by which a judgment could be made, that through which (δι' οὗ) in Sextus' threefold division of the meanings of logical criterion (*Adu. math.* 7.34-35), could also be answered by naming cognitive powers. Sextus gives reason and sense perception (ibid. 37, cf., again, D.L. 7.54), while for Ptolemy sense perception is an instrument of intellect, which makes the judgment (cf. *On the Kriterion* 5.11-14). A further sense, the standard by which truth could be assessed (cf. e.g. Epicurus in Diogenes Laertius 10.31) is the one in which a Platonist might be expected to show most interest, and is, as we saw, one still used by Simplicius. It is to some of the answers which Plotinus and Proclus give to the range of questions covered by the criterion issue that this chapter will attend, whether or not they are couched in its traditional terminology. Yet at this stage one might say that there was nothing for a Neoplatonist to discuss: truth resides in the second hypostasis and is attained by the individual through his soul's assimilation to this hypostasis. In fact by the time of Proclus truth had become one of the triadic descriptions of its nature. The matter is not, of course, quite so simple. In the first place we must examine how far, and in what ways, things which are not part of the intelligible world itself have any truth or validity, and how this is to be established. In the second something must be said about the relation of truth, *aletheia*, to the contents of *Nous* considered from other points of view, and under other descriptions.

II

Let us begin by considering the views Plotinus expresses about what in other writers might be seen as various candidates for the role of criterion, either as a standard, or as a means of measuring conformity to, or deviation from, it. One of the candidates that had been proposed was the concept (*ennoia* or *prolepsis*).[4] The notion that a concept can provide a basis for the evaluation of a view, if not of a particular *datum* of sense or thought, may still be found in Plotinus, though he makes relatively little use of it. Thus in the discussion of free will in 6.8 the concept is used as a criterion: an opponent's view that free will does not exist is said to be refuted

with the argument that, if he concedes that the word is comprehensible, then the concept of free will fits (ἐφαρμόζειν) things which he says it should not (ch.7.20-24). Though the use there is looser, one might perhaps compare 6.3.2.1-4 where it is argued that the nature pertaining to bodies (τὴν περὶ τὰ σώματα φύσιν) is not substance because it fits the concept of things that change (διὰ τὸ ἐφαρμόττειν τὴν ἔννοιαν ῥεόντων).

In any case we should note the use of ἐφαρμόζω ('to fit'), which Plotinus uses in related contexts of things measuring up to, or drawing their validity from, the truth or reality supplied by a higher level of being. So when soul has impressions (τύποι), they are not themselves an object of cognition but may be fitted to the 'true impressions' from which they derive. While this might at first sight suggest validating the second hand by reference to the third hand, the following sentence shows that what is being referred to is the relevant part of *Nous* itself, for Plotinus continues by saying that one might say that in this way *nous* is not separate from us (1.2.4.23-27). That this is what is involved in the 'fitting of impressions' is also indicated by a remark at 5.3.2.11-13 that the rational faculty of the soul has understanding (σύνεσις) when it recognizes (ἐπιγινῶσκον) and fits the impressions that are new and have recently come to it to those which it has had for a long time. What the soul has had for a long time is most readily understood as the *logoi* of intellect and its contents, which are part of the soul's cognitive equipment, or even as meaning that the soul fits things directly to the contents of *nous* to which it has permanent access through its undescended higher self. Both explanations are offered because there are passages in 5.3 which suggest that the highest part of soul is no longer in *Nous* itself but rather in the hypostasis Soul.[5]

In either case the knowledge comes from establishing the connection between input to the soul and the soul's own standards which it has through its relation to, or identity with, higher being. So we may see it as a special case of this principle when Plotinus, inquiring into the soul's self-knowledge, decides that the part that is intellectual, but not intellect (νοερόν πως), that is the reasoning faculty, knows itself when what it takes in is akin to it and it can fit it to the traces in itself (5.3.6.18-28). The word for 'traces' used in this passage (ἴχνη) always in Plotinus indicates the mode in which a representation of higher being is present at a lower level. That the intake must be akin (συγγενῆ) is presumably, though Plotinus does

not (in a difficult passage) make this clear, because the reasoning faculty will assimilate to its objects: its own ability to measure these against its innate repertoire of *logoi* from above will depend on an initial conformity. The following lines show that none of these provisos apply to the level of *nous* itself: 'true *nous* .... is the same as objects truly thought, which really exist and do so in the primary sense' (τὸν ἀληθῆ νοῦν .... ὁ αὐτὸς τοῖς νοουμένοις ἀλήθεσι καὶ ὄντως οὖσι καὶ πρώτοις). Since *nous* is identical with itself, self-knowledge must be associated with it. For our present purposes the important point here is that 'true *nous*', that is intellect rather than reason, is its own criterion, a standard of validity that requires no further point of reference. Because it does not comply with these requirements practical reason is necessarily excluded from self-knowledge.

The notion that *Nous* supplies a standard against which things may be measured appears in an earlier chapter of the same treatise, 5.3, where Plotinus says explicitly that reason has measures, or rulers (*kanones*), from intellect. This comes in a series of questions about what reason might know about itself, subsequently to be answered, as we have already seen, in terms of real self-knowledge being available to it only in so far as it is *nous*. The *kanones* are the means by which reason makes the judgments that it does: ἆρα οὐκ οἶδε .... καὶ ὅτι κρίνει ἃ κρίνει, καὶ ὅτι τοῖς ἐν ἑαυτῷ κανόσιν, οὓς παρὰ τοῦ νοῦ ἔχει; ('does it not know .... that it judges what it judges, and that it does so by means of the standards which it has from the intellect?', 5.3.4.13-17). The conjunction of the last two passages gives us a picture of Plotinus' views on how material handled by the reason is subject to judgment. It is measured against a standard, to which it is fitted or compared, and that standard is provided by intellect, which alone is self-validating. And since our last text has referred to the process as judgment, it is in order to put these discussions under the heading of treatments of the 'criterion of truth'.

Whereas in the text we have just considered *kanon* means a rule or measure in the sense of a standard against which something is judged, it may also be found in similar contexts with another of the meanings of criterion, namely that of an instrument by means of which something is judged or measured.[6] Clearly both go back to the basic meaning of a ruler, which may be either a standard of straightness or a means of establishing whether or not something is straight. Both meanings appear to be present in the treatise *On*

dialectic (1.3 [20]) where Plotinus explains the dialectic's recognition of what is false by saying that it recognizes it accidentally, judging it as alien by means of the truth in itself, recognizing it when it appears by putting it alongside the measure that is the truth: ὡς ἀλλότριον κρίνουσα τοῖς ἐν αὐτῇ ἀλήθεσι τὸ ψεῦδος, γινώσκουσα, ὅταν τις προσαγάγῃ, ὅ τι παρὰ τὸν κανόνα τοῦ ἀληθοῦς (1.3.5.13-17).[7] *Kanon* was, of course, a term used earlier in the discussion of the criterion, by Epicurus,[8] but it and other terms indicating measuring equipment were subsequently abandoned. It has been suggested that they were felt to be too metaphorical, and were therefore replaced by the technical term *kriterion*.[9] Be that as it may, it is interesting to speculate that Plotinus preferred an item of the older terminology because it made the point more clearly.

The function of a ruler appears also in the discussion of cognitive processes in Plotinus' discussion of sense perception in 4.4.23. There Plotinus compares the role of the sense organs to that of a ruler being used by a craftsman as a thing between himself and the artefact to which he applied it. The tool or instrument is represented as being between those who are making a judgment and the objects of that judgment (μεταξὺ τῶν κρινόντων καὶ τῶν κρινομένων): its purpose is to convey the characteristics of the objects concerned to the person making the judgment. Here the ruler, and thus the sense organ, is clearly a criterion in the sense of being an instrument for the acquisition of information about the external world. But in the sense of a standard against which to evaluate that information the criterion would be a straightness in the soul, to which that of the world is being submitted through the intermediary of the ruler which has been interposed (ὁ γὰρ κανὼν τῷ εὐθεῖ τῷ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ καὶ ἐν τῷ ξύλῳ συναψάμενος ἐν τῷ μεταξὺ τεθείς: 4.4.23.36-42). So perceptual judgments about the external world are parallel to those the soul makes about the conditions of a body: it is the soul's function to do that in so far as it is equipped with the power to judge: κριτικῇ δὲ οὔσῃ τῇ ψυχῇ ὑπάρχει..... τὴν κρίσιν ποιεῖσθαι (cf. 4.4.22.30-32). But once the soul has acquired data from the external world it can only identify them and, further, pronounce on their validity, by means of those internal standards to which we have already referred. Here too the notion of fitting recurs. The discussion of the sense organs' function as intermediaries between soul as perceiving subject and perceived objects comes in a chapter introduced by the problem that an intelligible line would not fit

(ἐφαρμόζω again) a sensible one, nor would intelligible fire or man fit the sensible one. This, which is really an aspect of the old Platonic problem of how particulars relate to Forms, seems to have become more precisely formulated, as were some other problems in psychology, during the course of the thinking and discussion which eventually produced the great treatise *On the Problems of the Soul* (4.3-5 [27-29]).[10] In the early treatise 1.6 [1] Plotinus assumes that the comparison with internal standards is the way that sense data are processed without investigating exactly how this could happen when the data are sensible and the standards to which they are referred are not, though he does show that he is aware of the difficulty and even gives an answer in terms of the way form is present, divided, in the mass of an external object. But the outlines of the process are the same, and it is interesting to note that the vocabulary, as well as the procedure, in 1.6 resembles that in 4.4. A beautiful body is recognized by the faculty whose duty this is, which is the ultimate authority in making judgments about things in its province (ἧς οὐδὲν κυριώτερον εἰς κρίσιν τῶν ἑαυτῆς), and this happens when the other, that is the higher, soul gives its further verdict, *epikrinei*: or one might say it pronounces by fitting (sc. what is referred to it) to the *Form* it has within it and using that for the judgment like a ruler for the judgment of straightness (συναρμόττουσα τῷ παρ' αὐτῷ εἴδει κἀκείνῳ πρὸς τὴν κρίσιν χρωμένη ὥσπερ κανόνι τοῦ εὐθέος, 1.6.3.1-5). As we have indicated Plotinus here deals with the problem of soul processing sense data in terms of the mass and divisibility of a sensible object. The solution here is that soul somehow compacts the formal element in bodies and hands it on to what is inside, in an undivided form and one that is appropriate and fitting (σύμφωνον καὶ συναρμόττον) to what is there (cf. 1.6.3.9-15). The means by which this is done remained, at this stage, an open question, or perhaps one should say one that Plotinus did not wish to pursue. We may note that in the chronologically adjacent treatise 4.7 [2], at ch.6.22-24, Plotinus also talks in terms of sense data going forward to what in the context there – he is arguing against Stoic-type materialism[11] – he calls the controlling part of the soul (*hegemonoun*) in the form of something like undivided thought (οἷον ἀμερῆ νοήματα). In the last resort the system of making perceptual judgments by fitting what is perceived by the senses to an internal standard is a representation, as is everything else in this world, of an intelligible pattern. For when in 6.7 Plotinus considers

the mode of presence in the intelligible of things we know in their sensible forms he looks at the case of sense perception. Asking how what perceives by the senses could occur at the superior level (πῶς οὖν ἐν τῇ κρείττονι τὸ αἰσθητικόν;) he answers that it is there as something which perceives what is perceptible there in the way that perceptible things exist at that level. That is how the power of sense perception there takes in harmony, while the sensible man perceives with (ordinary) sense perception, and fits the harmony to one there, or perceives fire which fits the fire there, whereas perception for a higher soul is analogous to the nature of the fire there (cf. 6.7.6.1-7).[12] The following lines show that we are to understand the activity of man here as analogous to that of man in the intelligible (cf. esp. lines 15-18).

So far we have looked at how sensible objects are submitted to the criterion constituted by the intelligible archetype within us. We must next consider which of the soul's faculties handles this material when it is in a form in which assessments, identifications and evaluations can be made, and how it does so. Evaluations are included because Plotinus does occasionally indicate that moral judgments are to be made in the same way as perceptual ones.[13] That is that a moral quality or action is referred to the internal set of standards with a view to seeing how far it conforms to them in just the same way as are the appropriately translated data originating from sensible objects. So we find the same analogy with the judgment of straightness, or lack of it, using a ruler, that appears in Plotinus' discussion of sense perception, applied to the recognition of good or its absence. We recognize virtue by intellect and wisdom (*phronesis*).[14] Vice is recognized by its being what does not fit virtue, just as we distinguished what is straight and what is not by means of a ruler: ἢ ὥσπερ κανόνι τὸ ὀρθὸν καὶ μή, οὕτω καὶ τὸ μὴ ἐναρμόζον τῇ ἀρετῇ (1.8.9.2-4). So the internal standard, for that is what *nous* will recognize, is again that to which external data are referred for judgment. Indeed Plotinus explicitly says that we will recognize virtue by *nous* and *phronesis* because it recognizes itself. In other words virtue, by being a component of *nous* and so identical with any or all of it, may be regarded as the active component when it is itself the object of cognition. In this connection we may recall the discussion of virtue at the level of *nous* in 1.2. The virtues as such do not exist at that level but the equivalents – they are like models (*paradeigmata*) of the ones here – may be found in the very qualities

which make *nous* what it is (cf. 1.2.7.1-8).[15] When the soul says that a person is good it does so because it has in it a standard of good (κανόνα ἔχουσα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ παρ' αὐτῆ): it has the power to perceive something of this kind because *nous* illumines it (5.3.3.6-18).

In these passages Plotinus is talking about the recognition of good. The basis of rational consideration of whether something is just or good or beautiful is similarly dependent on the possession of a firm standard provided by intellect. Thus in 5.1.11 we are told that when reasoning attempts to discover whether a particular thing is just or good there must be a fixed instance of the just (ἑστώς τι δίκαιον) which is a starting point for the reasoning in the soul, and that is the intellect in us, which is always in possession of the just (cf. 5.1.11.1*ff*.).

When we come to Plotinus' treatment of the assessment of sensible objects of perception, we are immediately faced with difficulties. He tells us virtually nothing about the relation of sense data to the objects involved. But his general position is indicated in 5.5.1, where he says that things in the sphere of sense perception which seem to be most clearly reliable (ἃ δοκεῖ πίστιν ἔχειν ἐναργεστάτην) are open to doubt because what appears to be their existence may be in affections rather than in the objects, and *nous* or reason are needed to pass judgment. This is because even if one grants the existence of the objects which the sense perceived, what is cognized by it is a representation of a thing and not the thing itself (τό τε γινωσκόμενον δι' αἰσθήσεως τοῦ πράγματος εἴδωλόν ἐστι καὶ οὐκ αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα ἡ αἴσθησις λαμβάνει) for that remains external (lines 12-19). A further cause of unreliability is that certain objects and conditions may by their nature cause disturbances in the senses perceiving them (cf. 5.8.11.24-27). Yet what Plotinus tells us about the objects themselves is mainly concerned with their relation to higher being on the one hand, and on the other with their structure as compounds of matter and form, or body and a further formal element – further because body for Plotinus consists of matter and a minimal amount of form derived either from the lowest level of the individual's soul, or, collectively, from the world soul.[16] Since, then, his interest in the sensible object is either ontological, or incidental to the psychology of cognition, he has provided us with all too little of the sort of epistemological discussion with which earlier treatments of the criterion were associated. Here we return to our initial observation that in one sense there is no problem about a criterion

for establishing the existence of sensible objects, or the relation to these objects of the information about them provided by our senses. In the strict sense they do not exist, and the confrontation of sensible object with an intelligible archetype, which we have discussed in the previous pages, serves primarily to identify the objects.[17] In so far as they are identifiable they do, of course, exist in our sense, but Plotinus as a Platonist cannot ascribe to them any existence in his. Thus the principle that information about such objects is to be handed on to a higher faculty of the soul for it to pass judgment on it is not simply a view about the proper machinery for the passing of such judgments, but, as we have already indicated, a pronouncement on both the status of the information and that of the psychic faculties which provide it. As his discussion of the genesis of physical objects in 3.6, much of which follows the *Timaeus*, makes clear, they are only produced by the temporary irradiation – or other descriptions of information – of matter by a low grade formal principle (cf. 3.6.10.19-11.8, *passim*; 5.9.3.35-37). It is for such reasons that they are inadequate premises for thought (cf. 6.5.2.1-9): the premises for knowledge come from *Nous* (1.3.5.1-2). Since matter is false, what is closely associated with it cannot share in truth (3.6.13.31-34).

Nevertheless the inferior ontological status of the contents of the physical world does have epistemological implications. Since for Plotinus real knowledge of an object consists in that identity of subject and object, knower and known, which is characteristic of the hypostasis *Nous* and exists there alone, any other objects can be 'known' only in a way whose inferiority and unreliability is commensurate with their distance from *Nous*. Thus error is inherent in principle in all other modes of cognition, and conversely, inapplicable to *Nous* itself. Hence the statement in 1.1 [53] that *nous* does not make mistakes. It either makes contact with its objects or it does not: ὁ δὲ νοῦς ἢ ἐφήψατο ἢ οὔ, ὥστε ἀναμάρτητος (1.1.9.12-13).

Knowledge of this kind is available to us at those times when we are active participants in *Nous*, either by assimilating to it, if the highest part of our soul is not actually part of it – as it may no longer have been when Plotinus wrote his last treatises[18] – or by focussing our attention on the constant noetic activity of that part, and shutting out those activities which would distract us from it (cf. e.g. 4.3.30.7-15; 5.8.3.9-10). It is therefore acquired by successfully turning our soul up to *nous*; by contemplating it we become it, and

so have the truth and knowledge it contains (6.5.7.1-6). This is why, when we are engaged in the search for truth by means of reason, as conducted by our reasoning faculty, *dianoia*, the truth of our conclusions is guaranteed by their coincidence with *Nous* or some part of it. Dialectic properly conducted terminates in intellection (cf. 1.3.4.9-20; 4.4.12.5-13). One cannot say that *Nous* would make mistakes and fail to think what is, because that would involve having a *nous* that was not *nous* (5.5.1.1-3).

This point is made at the start of the treatise *That the Intelligibles are not outside the Intellect, and on the Good* (5.5), which expounds the basis of Plotinus' view of the nature of the second hypostasis, that is, the universal intellect. One of the points that is most strongly stressed in this treatise is the presence of truth in the hypostasis as an integral part of it – a view not, of course, confined to this treatise. And since the establishment of the truth about what exists is a recurrent theme of the criterion discussion, a brief exposition of Plotinus' views on this subject would be an appropriate end to this section.

In some parts of the argument in 5.5 the need for intellect to possess the truth about its objects is used to establish that these objects are internal to it. If they were not, says Plotinus, intellect would be mistaken in respect of the things it contemplates because it would have only representations of them (5.5.1.50-58: cf. 5.3.5.19-26). That produces error and not truth, a point made earlier in the same chapter with regard to sense perception.[19] If it realises that it is in possession of falsehood it will also admit that it does not share in truth. If truth is not in *nous*, he writes in the concluding lines of the chapter, this sort of *nous* will be neither truth nor truly *nous* nor *nous* at all, nor will truth exist anywhere else (εἰ οὖν μὴ ἀλήθεια ἐν τῷ νῷ, οὗτος μὲν ὁ τοιοῦτος νοῦς οὔτε ἀλήθεια ἔσται οὔτε ἀληθείᾳ νοῦς οὔτε ὅλως νοῦς ἔσται. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ἀλλοθί που ἡ ἀλήθεια ἔσται: lines 65-68). Therefore, he begins the next chapter, one must not look for the intelligibles outside or say that there are in intellect impressions of things that are (τύποι ... τῶν ὄντων) or, by depriving it of truth, produce ignorance and even non-existence of the intelligibles, and further, destroy intellect itself. If one is to introduce knowledge and truth, and preserve being, all these things must be attributed to true intellect. That way it will have true knowledge. Truth in it will be a place for the things that are, and it will live and think: καὶ ἡ ἀλήθεια ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ ἕδρα ἔσται τοῖς οὖσι καὶ ζήσεται καὶ νοήσει (lines 10-11), words which suggest the beginnings of a triad of truth, life, intellect, ἀλήθεια, ζωή, νοῦς. As a result real truth (ἡ ὄντως ἀλήθεια), by which we are to understand that truth in intellect which Plotinus has been discussing, consists not in agreement with something else, but with itself: it, its existence and its pronouncements are identical (ibid. 18-20: cf. 3.7.4.7-12). So *nous*, all being, and truth are one nature (μία τοίνυν φύσις αὐτὴ ἡμῖν, νοῦς, τὰ ὄντα πάντα, ἡ ἀλήθεια: 5.5.3.1-2), an even closer approximation to a triad. Ultimately, of course, truth derives from the One, which illumines intellect with it (4.7.10.32-37). One might perhaps sum up by saying that for Plotinus the real criterion of truth is truth itself.

III

Though later Platonists certainly acknowledged his importance in the customary manner,[20] Plotinus in some ways seems to have stood outside the mainstream of the Platonic tradition. The best known example of this is, of course, his view of the undescended soul, which he himself acknowledged as unorthodox (cf. 4.8.8.1-3). He is also conspicuous in his comparative freedom from the scholastic method of imperial philosophy. These factors may have contributed to the fact that Plotinus did not produce a single discussion of the criterion under that name. Proclus, who is in some ways more traditional in his procedures, if not necessarily in the outcome of his thinking, provides us with a number of texts where *kriterion* appears as such. They may form the basis of our discussion of his view on the matters in question, though they do not contain all, or even the most important things, that he has to say about them. Unfortunately we no longer have the work to which he himself refers for a longer and more precise discussion of the criterion, namely his commentary on Plato's *Theaetetus* (cf. *In Tim.* 1.255.25-26). That reference comes at the end of a short section of the *Timaeus* commentary specifically devoted to criteria (ibid. 254.19-255.26), views on which are, characteristically, attributed to Plato. For Proclus' discussion begins with the comment 'we can see from all this what Plato thinks about criteria' (περὶ κριτηρίων ἣν ἔχει δόξαν). 'All this' in turn refers to some 15 pages of discussion of the passage in *Timaeus* 28*a* where Plato distinguishes his two modes of being both by their

stability or lack of it and the means by which they are apprehended, intellect with reason on the one hand, opinion with irrational sense perception on the other. In the course of his exposition of this text Proclus gives us what is equivalent to the lists of criteria we have previously encountered – though the term itself is not used till 254.19 – for he discusses each of the cognitive powers mentioned both in relation to each other and also to the objects each might have. Under this latter heading we find instances of one of Proclus' basic epistemological principles, which of course he wishes to derive from Plato, namely that each kind of thing is cognized by a power appropriate to it, or by combinations of more than one (cf. *Plat. Theol.* 1.3 = 1.15.18-21).[21] Matters are complicated by the usual Proclan multiplication of entities, for he succeeds in distinguishing five kinds of *noesis*, corresponding to the area of intellect and reason in Plotinus (cf. 243.26-244.19),[22] but the tenor of the whole discussion is to argue that Plato had correctly assigned cognitive powers to being and becoming.

Let us now look at the section on criteria. Proclus is clearly aware of the divergence of views in earlier discussions of this subject, for he begins by drawing attention to the fact that different thinkers posited a different criterion, ἄλλων γὰρ ἀλλὸ τὸ κριτήριον θεμένων. The singular is significant because he contrasts those who have given one each, sensation, opinion, reason or intellect – followers of Protagoras and part of a fragment of Xenophanes[23] exemplify the first two – with Plato who distinguished the nature of criteria in a way appropriate to objects, assigning intellect to the intelligibles, reason to the objects of reason, opinion to those of opinion and sense perception to those of the senses: ὁ Πλάτων οἰκείως τοῖς πράγμασι τὴν τῶν κριτηρίων διεῖλεν οὐσίαν, τοῖς μὲν νοητοῖς νοῦν ἀπονείμας, τοῖς δὲ διανοητικοῖς διάνοιαν, τοῖς δὲ δοξαστοῖς δόξαν, τοῖς δὲ αἰσθητοῖς αἴσθησιν (1.254.24-27). Here he has imposed his own system of appropriate (οἰκείως) modes of cognition more clearly than in the preceding discussion of Plato's text, where more prominence is given to the particular combinations Plato himself used. Nevertheless he does not wish to see these criteria as disparate. Their unity is assured by the unity and multiplicity of the soul. If, he argues, judging belongs to the soul – as it does because body does not have this power – and the soul is unity and multiplicity, then the judging faculty is both simple and multiform (καὶ μονοειδὴς ἡ κριτικὴ δύναμις καὶ πολυειδής). That raises the

question of what this faculty might be and Proclus answers that it is reason, λόγος.

At first sight this answer is puzzling in two ways.[24] Firstly because it seems to introduce *logos* as an extra faculty of the soul, for the usual lists contain intellect, discursive reason, and sometimes opinion (*nous*, *dianoia*, *doxa*).[25] Secondly we have just been told that discursive reason, *dianoia*, is one of the four criteria, and if reason in any form were to be treated as the criterion *par excellence*, we might expect that to be the choice. Instead we have what would otherwise be taken as an alternative designation of the reason introduced as something additional to reason described as *dianoia*. It also seems that *logos* is superior to *dianoia* because its use of *dianoia* in making judgments is described together with, though not quite in the same terms as, the use of opinion, imagination – a further addition since the beginning of this section – and sense perception: 'in proceeding to the judgment of intermediate *logoi* it uses discursive reason and not just itself, and turns to itself through it, but in judging the objects of opinion it moves the power of opinion, in judging those of imagination, the power of imagination, and for those of sensation the power of sense perception': εἰς δὲ τὴν τῶν μέσων λόγων ἐπίκρισιν εἰσιὼν τῇ διανοίᾳ καὶ οὐχ ἑαυτῷ χρῆται μόνῳ καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν διὰ ταύτης ἐπέστραπται, τὰ δὲ δοξαστὰ κρίνων κινεῖ καὶ τὴν δόξαν, τὰ δὲ φανταστὰ τὴν φαντασίαν, τὰ δὲ αἰσθητὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν (255.9-13). We should note, that though the relation of *logos* with intellection is discussed in similar terms to that with discursive reason and we are told that it uses itself and intellection (ἑαυτῷ τε χρῆται καὶ τῇ νοήσει, line 4), that use is not for judgment, but rather for contemplation of the intelligibles, ἐπὶ τὴν τῶν νοητῶν θέαν (ibid. 2-3). The reason for the difference would be that the intelligibles do not require submission to a criterion.

We must return to our initial difficulty over the introduction of *logos*. Apart from *dianoia* being the candidate we might expect to be chosen if *one* of the cognitive faculties listed as criteria in the earlier part of the passage is to be taken as the only criterion, in so far as it is the faculty which normally deals with the information produced by the senses and opinion, *nous* itself could be argued to be more appropriate if, as Proclus at least sometimes thought, higher cognitive powers can handle the objects of the lower ones but not vice versa.[26] Here, however, as we have seen, it is only employed by *logos* for its (i.e. *logos'*) contemplation of the intelligible, and has no

connection with anything below. The solution seems to lie in the connection of our section on criteria with the preceding discussion of *Timaeus* 28a, to which it too belongs. If that is so, the main factor in the presence of *logos* here would be its importance in the *Timaeus* text, where it is associated with intellection in the cognition of being. That being so Proclus feels obliged to explain it at greater length, but finds himself with an entity in search of a role. Next, given that he wishes to replace his list of four criteria by one, there are advantages in producing something other than any of the four to fulfil this function.

Having made this suggestions we must look at what Proclus actually says about *logos*: it is discussed specifically at 1.246.10-248.6. Beginning with ways of classifying *logos* he considers one that divides it into kinds pertaining to opinion, knowledge – in the sense of scientific knowledge – and intellection (δοξαστικός, ἐπιστημονικός, νοερός). He then argues that since we all have opinion, reason, and *nous*, which here, says Proclus, means the highest part of reason, and our substance is *logos*, we must consider all of these (246.18-23). Here *logos* looks more like an activity than a faculty, but in the sequel it is called the highest part of the soul (τὸ ἀκρότατον τῆς ψυχῆς), and is used rather as an equivalent to Plato's intellectual part of the soul as it appears in the Divided Line. So here in the *Timaeus*, according to Proclus, Plato calls the highest and least divided part of us *logos* as a designation which throws light on our intellect and the nature of the intelligibles. It works below the intellection of *nous* itself, and thus apprehends the intelligibles together with intellection. This, of course, reverses the Platonic order.[27] Proclus contrasts the process with that of the intellection of *nous* itself, which always is the intelligible and always sees it. Here we should observe that this kind of intellect is no longer, as in Plotinus, a part of us, but at a higher level. So that what *logos* does here is to provide us with the closest approach to the cognitive and self-cognitive powers of *nous* itself compatible with the proposition that a permanently active and self-knowing *nous* cannot be part of our individual human soul.[28] *Logos* revolves round *nous* and contemplates it, deploying the unity of *nous* (cf. 1.247.8-248.6).[29]

All this would suggest that in the criteria section *logos* is best understood as replacing *nous* after 255.2. For here *logos* seems to relate to intellection, *noesis*, in very much the same way as in the passage we have just considered. But though it has been given the

status of sole criterion, if there is to be such, the ensuing description of its operation shows that the lower faculties are needed when their objects are to be judged. Their information is required sometimes to assist in an enquiry, sometimes for the acceptance or refutation of the judgments made by the lower group of faculties: τὰς κρίσεις τῶν δευτέρων δυνάμεων (255.13-24). We should note that these lower faculties are still allowed judgments, but we can now understand the list of criteria in a different way from that initially apparent: all faculties are judges in their own sphere, but the judgments of the lower ones are subject to that of a higher court.

What Proclus does not discuss now is what is at issue in the judgments, but a remark at the end, that mistakes arise διὰ τὰ ὄργανα ('through the sense organs'), indicates that we are concerned with the truth value of information handled by the soul. That ὄργανα here means sense organs rather than instruments of measurement may be inferred from an earlier reference to a power of the soul which is higher than sense perception and no longer cognizes through organs (*In Tim.* 1.250.4-7). The power they refer to is *doxa*, which is credited with the ability to pass judgment on information about the cause of an affection which is merely reported by the senses. The notion that faculties may reject as wrong data supplied by those immediately below them recurs later in the same commentary. At 1.343.3-15 Proclus explains how this operates from intellect through reason, opinion, and imagination down to sense perception. Each of these except *nous* have either positive or negative characteristics which make them inferior as a means of cognition, from a Platonist viewpoint, to those above. Thus opinion is above the shapes and impressions which accompany imagination, and knowledge (*episteme*) can overrule opinion which does not give an account of causes. Only *nous* is irrefutable, and only it tells us about being such as it is. Here then *nous* might be seen as the real criterion, though in this passage Proclus does not use the term at all.[30]

Given that the higher faculties may thus refute the lower, we may wonder in what sense the latter are criteria at all – if we take a criterion to be a way of establishing whether or not something is true or correct. The answer seems to be that they are criteria in a relative sense, for we find in the *Republic* commentary that Proclus distinguishes reliable and unreliable criteria: intellect and *logos* are of the former kind, imagination and sensation of the latter; κριτήρια ....

ἅπταιστα λόγος καὶ νοῦς, ἐπταισμένα δὲ φαντασία καὶ αἴσθησις (2.277.18-19).[31] Though in this passage the criteria are introduced for moral rather than epistemological ends – their purpose is to distinguish things which are good and bad, and which of these are truly so – the basis of the distinction between them as criteria is the usual combination of epistemological and ontological considerations. Those who use the first group recognise being as such, those who use the others confuse being and not-being. Further the ones which are not associated with matter are superior to those which are in respect of judgment, as are those which know themselves and the others to whose which do not know either themselves or the others. Intellect and *logos* come into the former category, imagination and sense perception into the latter (ibid. 23-28). We may recall here the emergence of *logos* as the real criterion at *In Timaeum* 1.254-55. It would seem that Proclus' point in both passages is that there are criteria appropriate to the various levels of being, but that truth simply does not exist at the lower one (cf. *In Remp.* 2.278.22-28). Such a view would also accord with the general principle which we have already noted that entities are cognized by a cognitive power appropriate to them.[32]

Near the end of this section of the *Republic* commentary Proclus speaks of using not the infallible criteria, but worthless measures, μοχθηροῖς κανόσι, of good and its opposites. The presence of the notion of measure, which we observed repeatedly in Plotinus, introduces one of the other senses of criterion which we had not yet seen in Proclus, that of a yardstick. It is a sense that recurs, as one might expect, in the commentary on Euclid i. There, moreover, the notion is associated with that of derivation from above. How, asks Proclus, can the soul, if it has not previously acquired *logoi*, discriminate between false and true among the things produced in mathematics? What measures can it use to measure truth in these things? (ποίοις δὲ κανόσι χρωμένη τὴν ἐν τούτοις ἀλήθειαν παραμετρεῖ; *In Eucl.* 13.13-18). A few pages before Proclus had explicitly introduced the question of the criterion of the objects of mathematics (10.16-17). Following the lead given in *Republic* vi he answered that it is reason, *dianoia* (ibid. 11.26-12.2), but though the Divided Line gives Proclus a Platonic *point d'appui*, the explanation he provides is Neoplatonic. It is that the objects of mathematics are neither entirely divisible – as are those of *nous* – nor apprehended by sensation and fully divisible. *Dianoia* is also contrasted with *nous* in that it deals with its objects discursively, and with *doxa* by the stability and validity of its material (11.10-22). The reason is not, however, the sole criterion. There are others for other kinds of objects, and if reason does sometimes appear to be the primary one, that may in part be attributed to the subject matter of the commentary, which, as I have argued elsewhere, may also be responsible for the differences between Proclus' treatment of the imagination here and in the other works.[33]

When Proclus discusses the assessment of sense data we see that they are not always, as in Plotinus, submitted to the judgment of *dianoia* for identification and for the evaluation of their truth content. That is because Proclus has introduced *doxa* as an additional cognitive power in the upper soul, and it is at least sometimes able to perform these functions. Thus it is *doxa* that can tell that honey is not, as reported by the senses, bitter, or the sun just a foot across (*In Tim.* 1.249.27ff). Nevertheless in the *Alcibiades* commentary *doxa* is described as sharing with sensation and imagination the defect that it produces conflicts and oppositions (*In Alc.* 246.3-7). Earlier in that passage we even find the reason being misled by sensation. This state of criterial anarchy is perhaps best explained as the result of the protreptic purpose of the discussion in which it comes: in it we are enjoined to escape from all the soul's lower activities, so that Proclus is prone to exaggerate their effects. Reason reappears as a judge of information about the sensibles in the *De Providentia*. It will not allow itself to follow the affections of the senses but, possessing in itself criteria of the deceptive movements from the outside, adds what is missing to the senses' affections and refutes their errors, doing so from its own resources. It is not possible, he says, to judge sensation on the basis of sensation but only on that of intellectual *logoi* which sense perception cannot cognize (44.7-13). Interestingly *doxa* does not appear in this or the preceding chapter, which deals with the inadequacy of sense perception.

Here we seem to have a view close to the Plotinian one that the real basis of assessment is an internal standard from above, but we are not supplied with the same kind of detailed explanation. As I have suggested before, the reason for this may simply be that Proclus was more interested in keeping the senses and what they had to say in their proper ontological place, than in discussing what we might learn from them or how it related to the truth.[34] As the last text

cited indicates, truth is rather to be found within us. Knowledge of the truth, says Proclus in the *Alcibiades* commentary, is in us but we are impeded from grasping it by the intrusion of affections that result from becoming. The list given includes false imaginings and excessive desires. We must remove these and turn to ourselves, τούτων δὲ ἀφαιρεθέντων εἰς ἑαυτοὺς λοιπόν ἐπιστρέφειν δεῖ (212.11-15). The word for turning, ἐπιστρέφειν, does, of course, characteristically imply movement in the direction of higher levels of being. It is in that sense that we should understand a later text in the same work where Proclus strongly asserts that souls do not gather knowledge from the sensible: they do not discover what is *one* from what is partial. Knowledge comes from inside and corrects the deficiencies of phenomena. The truth about eternal objects is not to be received from outside, but the soul must go inside itself and there seek the truth, the good, and the eternal *logoi* of things that are. Its own nature is full of these things, but is obscured by a search for the truth directed to other and external objects (ibid. 250.5-251.2). Knowledge is equipped with criteria for everything, taken from its own self (ibid. 262.6-7), which are the same in all (274.17-19). That is why in the field of real knowledge there is no disagreement. These texts seem to confirm that in the last resort Proclus' interest in the assessment of information about the external world is minimal: it is rather to be seen as a distraction from the business of acquiring knowledge and truth. Even in those places where he is prepared to allow that it might not be, it never does more than provide a starting point from which the soul in its search must move away, a point clearly made in the closing section of the prologue to the Euclid commentary which sees mathematics as a means of moving our souls toward intellect and the apprehension of truth (*In Eucl.* 46.15*ff.*; cf.21.14-17).

This text has echoes of *Republic* vii, but the close association of truth and *nous* is Proclus' normal position. That emerges in a long discussion of *Timaeus* 29c2-3 (*In Tim.* 1.344.28-351.14). In the course of it he actually distinguishes three kinds of truth, one that is One-like (ἑνοειδής) and is light that comes from the One, another that comes from the intelligibles and illumines the intellectual orders (νοεραὶ διακοσμήσεις), and a third which is innate in souls and which by means of intellection can grasp being and by knowledge (*episteme*) be together with its objects, δι' ἐπιστήμης συνοῦσα τοῖς ἐπιστητοῖς (347.21-30). This third kind appears to be dependent on,

rather than identical with, intellection. In most passages where he talks about truth as something that exists he seems to identify it rather with the second, for he will deny truth or knowledge to the soul as such. So long as it remains soul, he says in the *Elements of Theology*, a soul may not know being, so that *qua* soul it is not cognitive - *gnostikon* in the sense of having true knowledge – and its essence is not knowledge (*gnosis*), so that it is subsequent in being to those things that are cognitive by their very essence (*ET* 190.18-23). Rather souls produce truth and knowledge by looking at the intellect (cf. *In Tim.* 1.269.7-8). Philosophical discussions which move up to the divine intellect, in so far as they do, recapture the truth (ibid. 3.356.20-22) and those souls which remember what is there easily remember the truth (ibid. 1.83.4-6). All its other activities involve error: only life in accordance with intellect is free from it, μόνη δὲ ἡ κατὰ νοῦν ζωὴ τὸ ἁπλανὲς ἔχει (*In Parm.* 1025.29-33). Truth is seen together with *nous* in the type of contemplation most appropriate to Being (ibid. 653.18-20). In fact all knowledge consists in turning towards, fitting, and assimilating to the object of knowledge, and therefore truth is the fitting of the knower to that which he is knowing, ἡ πρὸς τὸ γινωσκόμενον ἐφαρμογὴ τοῦ γινώσκοντος (*In Tim.* 2.287.1-5). All this shows that it is the identity of subject and object characteristic of intellect and its activities which is the guarantee of truth. It will follow from this that, as Proclus says at *In Timaeum* 2.51.16-17, things in the sublunary world only have an obscure form of truth (ἀμυδρὰ ἀλήθεια).

In the end truth is enshrined in the triadic structure of the intelligible world. This is not the place to go into the complexities of Proclus' triads, but we may note two of the ways truth appears there. In the *Platonic Theology* it is coupled with love and faith, ἔρως, ἀλήθεια, πίστις (1.25 = 1.109.10-110.8).[35] There it brings being to divine wisdom, filled with which intellect has knowledge of being, as do souls which participate in it and are thus able to work in an intellectual manner: πρὸς δὲ αὖ τὴν θείαν σοφίαν, ἧς καὶ ὁ νοῦς πληρούμενος γινώσκει τὰ ὄντα καὶ ψυχαὶ μετέχουσαι νοερῶς ἐνεργοῦσιν, ἀλήθεια δήπου καὶ ἀνάγει καὶ προσιδρύει τὰ ὄντα. Truth is responsible for the presence of true wisdom because it illumines all things that are exercising intellection, and joins them to their objects just as the very first truth (ἡ πρωτίστη sc. ἀλήθεια) joined intellect with its objects (109.17-23). In a further related[37]

passage of the *Platonic Theology* truth is linked triad with the very first intellection, ἡ πρωτίστη νόησις 6-7, cf. 20-22).

It will not have escaped notice that in these ing with truth and the intelligible there is no mention of the n. As in Plotinus the real truth which is to be found in *Nous* not require either a means of establishing its existence, or a procedure for assessing how far the objects of knowledge conform to it. The need for both simply does not exist at the only level where truth does. Knowledge can only result from the identity of the knower with the known, and his close assimilation to it. Once that has happened truth, through its own identity with intellect and the intelligible, is necessarily involved in any act of cognition that may take place.

NOTES

Proclus' works are cited as follows:

(a) the commentaries: *In Alc.* by chapter and line of L. G. Westerink's edition (Amsterdam 1954); *In Parm.* by column and line of V. Cousin's 2nd edition = *Procli Opera Inedita III* (Paris 1964, repr. Hildesheim 1961); *In Eucl.* i, *In Remp.*, *In Tim.* by volume (where applicable), page and line of the Teubner texts (*edd.* Friedlein, Kroll, Diehl).

(b) Other works: *Elements of Theology* by proposition number; *Platonic Theology* by book and chapter with, for vols.I-III, volume, page and line of the Budé edition by H. D. Saffrey and L. G. Westerink (Paris 1968-87); *Tria Opuscula* by chapter and line of H. Boese's edition (Berlin 1960).

1. But cf. Proclus, *In Tim.* 1.254.19*ff.*, discussed below, p.267-271.

2. Cf. e.g. G. Striker, 'Κριτήριον τῆς ἀληθείας', *NAWG* 1974.2 (Göttingen 1974) 47-110; A. A. Long, 'Sextus Empiricus on the criterion of truth', *BICS* 25 (1978) 35-49; J. Annas, 'Truth and Knowledge', and C. C. W. Taylor, '"All perceptions are true"', in M. Schofield, M. Burnyeat, J. Barnes (ed.), *Doubt and Dogmatism. Studies in Hellenistic epistemology* (Oxford 1980) 84-104 and 105-124.

3. Cf. the articles by Kidd (ch.9 Stoics), Long (ch.10 Ptolemy), and Sharples (ch.12 Philo, Alcinous, and Alexander).

4. Cf. Striker, ibid. 90-102, and the references given there; on these terms and the differences between them cf. esp. F. H. Sandbach, '*Ennoia* and *Prolepis* in the Stoic theory of knowledge', *Class. Quart.* 24 (1930) 45-51, reprinted with corrections in A. A. Long, (ed.) *Problems in Stoicism* (London 1971) 22-37.

5. As also in 1.1, e.g. 5.3.4.20*ff*., 1.1.13.7-8; cf. my '*Nous* and Soul in Plotinus, some problems of demarcation', in Atti del Convegno internaz. dell' Accademia Naz. dei Lincei: *Plotino e il Neoplatonismo in Oriente e in Occidente*. Rome 5-9.10.1970, *Problemi attuali di scienza e di cultura 198* (Rome 1974) 218*f*.; T. A. Szlezák, *Platon und Aristoteles in der Nuslehre Plotins* (Basel/Stuttgart 1979), 196-202.

6. For the two uses cf. also Sextus Empiricus, *Adu. math.* 2.80, where *kanon* and *kriterion* are coupled, and *Pyrr. hyp.* 2.15 where ruler and compass are given as examples of *kriteria* in the sense of artificial measures.

7. I take ὅ τι sc. ἐστι as '... what it is, placed alongside the rule (or standard)...'. The words are usually translated as 'that it is contrary to ....' (so Bréhier, Harder, Cilento). But cf. Igal's '*percatándose de cuanto no se ajusta a la regla*', considering how far it fails to fit.

8. Cf. e.g. Diogenes Laertius 10.129 (*Letter to Menoiceus*).

9. Cf. Striker, op. cit. (n.2) 61-62.

10. Not necessarily the discussion of soul's relation to body referred to by Porphyry, *Vita Plot.* 13. Cf. my *Plotinus' Psychology* (The Hague 1971) 16 n.20.

11. On this passage, and the identity of the opponents, cf. *Plotinus' Psychology* 72-73, with notes.

12. This interpretation depends on reading οὕτως in 1.3: if HBT's οὗτος were correct the comparison with sensible man would begin at διό in 1.2 and δὲ in 1.3 would have to be excised.

13. For *kriterion* in moral contexts cf. Diogenes Laertius 10.129 and Sextus Empiricus, *Pyrr. hyp.* 2.14.

14. *Phronesis* may here have the sense defined at 1.6.6.12-13: νόησις ἐν ἀποστροφῇ τῶν κάτω, πρὸς δὲ τὰ ἄνω τὴν ψυχὴν ἄγουσα ('intellection which involves turning away from what is below and leading the soul to what is above').

15. On virtues in *Nous* cf. now J. M. Dillon, 'Plotinus, Philo and Origen on the grades of virtue', in *Platonismus und Christentum*. Festschrift H. Dörrie , ed. H.-D. Blume and F. Mann. *Jahrb. f. Antike und Christentum*, Ergänzungsband 10 (Münster 1983) esp. 98-101.

16. Plotinus is inconsistent on this point, cf. *Plotinus' Psychology* 27-30.

17. Cf. 5.3.3.1-5 where reason identifies what sense perception has seen before passing moral judgment.

18. See n.5.

19. See above p.264*ff*.

20. Cf. my 'Plotinus in later Platonism', in *Neoplatonism and Early Christian Thought*, ed. H. J. Blumenthal and R. A. Markus (London 1981) 212*ff*.

21. There are some passages where this principle seems to be infringed, cf. e.g. *In Tim.* 1.352.15-19 and my 'Proclus on Perception', *BICS* 29 (1982) 6.

22. Φανταστικὴ γνῶσις is considered as a sixth candidate, but rejected on the grounds that it does not cognize being (244.19-245.4); cf. also A.-J. Festugière *ad loc.* in his translation of *In Tim.*, vol.II (Paris 1967) 80 n.1.

23. DK 21B34.5.

24. Festugière, ibid. n.5, draws attention to the unusual uses of λόγος in the preceding pages.

25. On these lists cf. my 'Plutarch's exposition of the *De anima* and the psychology of Proclus', in *De Jamblique à Proclus*. Entretiens sur l'Antiquité Classique XXI. Fondation Hardt (Vandoeuvres-Geneva 1975) 137*ff*.

26. Cf. n.21.

27. Plato's νοήσει μετὰ λόγου becomes λόγος μετὰ νοήσεως.

28. Cf. e.g. *Elements of Theology* 211.

29. On *logos* and its function here cf. W. Beierwaltes, *Proklos, Grundzüge seiner Metaphysik*. (Frankfurt/Main 1965) 207-212.

30. On *nous* and truth see below p.274*ff*.

31. It should be noted that λόγος is here used in the ordinary way as an equivalent of διάνοια.

32. See above p.268.

33. Cf. 'Plutarch's exposition' (see n.25) 144-46. B. L. van der Waerden, 'Die gemeinsame Quelle der erkenntnistheoretischen Abhandlungen von Iamblichos und Proklos', *SHAW* 1980.2 (Heidelberg 1980), argues that this and other parts of the prologue to the Euclid commentary are based on Geminus.

34. Cf. op. cit. (n.21) 1. But there are a few passages where he allows sense data to initiate progress to knowledge, cf. *In Tim.* 2.113.26*ff*.; *In Eucl.* 18.17*ff*.

35. For this triad cf. also *In Tim.* 1.212.21-22.

36. On these matters cf. Beierwaltes, op. cit. (n.29) 128*f*.

37. Cf. the *notes complémentaires* in Saffrey-Westerink vol.III.140*ff*.

X

PLOTINUS IN LATER PLATONISM

To us, Plotinus was the founder of Neoplatonism. Many of his ideas were not new, but the overall structure of his thought, its power, and its great measure of internal consistency differentiate his work unmistakeably from what went before—and much of what came after, dependent as much of it was on his achievement. Did Plotinus' Neoplatonic successors think of him in this way?

The later Neoplatonists, who were accustomed to refer to their predecessors by a variety of honorific titles, did not exclude Plotinus. He is great, wonderful, divine, most divine.[1] But what did these names mean? Respect, yes, for they were not given to Stoics or Epicureans, nor often to Peripatetics. But we cannot simply infer that such marks of respect entailed agreement. Even the Neoplatonists, with their overriding conviction that all serious philosophers, that is, all Platonists and Aristotelians, were really trying to say the same thing,[2] were aware that they did not always do so. This remains true notwithstanding the number of occasions on which they shut their eyes to their disagreements, or made thoroughly unsatisfactory attempts to explain them away.

In many areas their attitudes to Plotinus illustrate these points. In the *Platonic Theology*, Proclus lists Plotinus with his pupils Porphyry and Amelius, together with the later Theodorus and his own intellectual hero Iamblichus, as the outstanding exponents of the Platonic tradition.[3] Yet later in the same work he will complain that Plotinus failed to make necessary distinctions in his description of the intelligible, and praise his own master Syrianus for bringing order to the vagueness of his predecessors and disentangling their confusions.[4] These two passages encapsulate the view most, if not all, later Neoplatonists took of Plotinus. To them he was a deeply respected figure, but they could not be satisfied with the relatively low level of complexity and elaboration in his analyses of the intelligible universe.

From another point of view one might say that later Neoplatonic treatments of problems already handled by Plotinus often took his loose ends and ambiguities as their point of departure. There are of course questions on which his views are simply rejected. The most obvious is the treatment of the Aristotelian categories, where even Porphyry, who in some ways sticks very closely to Plotinus, differed radically from his master. Another is the treatment of the higher soul, to which we must return shortly. But apart from these major issues—time and evil are others—there are enough points of disagreement in detail to show that Plotinian Neoplatonism was by no means accepted as an unquestioned starting point.

Here we must stop to consider difficulties arising from our source. The later Neoplatonists are, to varying extents, prone to reproduce material from their predecessors, without acknowledging its provenance. It is generally agreed, for example, that Simplicius' *Categories* commentary is heavily dependent on that of Iamblichus, and that in turn on Porphyry's great commentary in seven books.[6] Yet explicit references to Porphyry are far fewer than those to Iamblichus, and the case for Simplicius' dependence on him cannot be said to be incontrovertible. Similarly one cannot always be certain when views which can be identified with Plotinus are really his. Explicit named citations are comparatively rare even in those Neoplatonists like Simplicius whose scholarly procedures most closely approach our own. Thus, to be sure we are not misrepresenting what actually happened, we must see what conclusions can be drawn from those places where Plotinus is actually named.

That is one methodological difficulty. There is another, perhaps easier to handle. It is that, though Plotinus did not proclaim himself a commentator on the writings of either Plato or Aristotle, but merely as an exponent of Plato's philosophy, later Neoplatonists took him as both. The reason is not obscure: since Aristotle as well as all the Platonists were assumed to be setting out the same basic Platonic philosophy, it was natural to infer that any opinion a later writer might have on a subject treated by Plato or Aristotle was in fact commentary on their discussion of that subject. That these things were so I have shown elsewhere, and so propose to take them for granted now.[7] One implication is, however, material. It is that when a later Neoplatonist is disagreeing with opinions that Plotinus is alleged to have expressed about an Aristotelian text, or even a Platonic one, they are disagreeing with Plotinus' own opinions. Only

rarely, however do they say so: in general his own opinions are not distinguished from his "commentary".

It has been suggested that the traditional view of Plotinus as the founder of Neoplatonism is false.[8] Rather, Plotinus is just one among the thinkers of the 3rd Century, and one whose views were not the direct ancestor of later Neoplatonism. If anything these are a development of Middle Platonic notions which Plotinus himself did not always adopt, with an injection from sources like the *Hermetica* and the *Chaldaean Oracles*. To think of the tradition in this way is perhaps helpful from one point of view, but misleading from another. It is misleading in so far as it may correctly explain the absorption of irrational material into a Neoplatonism which as manifested in Plotinus was free of them, but at the same time it can easily tend to exaggerate the importance of such elements in later Neoplatonism. Recent scholarship has shown that the once common view of a system thoroughly corrupted by irrationalism is untenable. Yet it is perhaps helpful in so far as it stresses that later Neoplatonists were more liable than Plotinus to accept non-philosophical explanations and procedures.

Differences of that kind are not, however, our main concern. More strictly philosophical matters are, though the two cannot always be kept apart. The best illustration of the scope for disagreement between Plotinus and other Neoplatonists is probably the well-known controversy about the descent of the intellect. Plotinus maintained that there was some part of our mind which remained permanently in the intelligible, usually within the second hypostasis itself, and was, consequently, permanently active. This was a view which Plotinus himself admitted to be unorthodox.[9] Most later Neoplatonists did not accept Plotinus' view, but insisted that the soul does indeed descend as a whole.[10] Their motivation was probably their characteristic desire to make clear distinctions between levels of being wherever possible, rather than greater faithfulness to the intentions of Plato himself. Certainly the arguments they produce suggest that the main burden of complaint against Plotinus was that if a part of the soul remains in the intellect, then the soul as a whole will behave as an intellectual being, and furthermore, that since all the components of the second hypostasis are always—eternally—engaged in intellection it would be impossible to explain how our thinking was other than permanent and continuous. Though there is no explicit polemic against it they do not seem to have accepted Plotinus' explanation that the thinking

does indeed go on all the time, but that we are only intermittently aware of it because our existence in the physical world provides distractions and prevents that focussing on higher reality, and in fact identification with it, which enables us to have knowledge of the intelligible.

Later Neoplatonists, however, with the exceptions of Theodorus and perhaps Damascius,[11] were not satisfied with this account. They regard it as axiomatic that the human soul as such was not in the intelligible, but was attached to a body, and therefore resident in the physical world. This axiom is basic to the Neoplatonic commentators' exposition of Aristotle's utterances about the intellect: their argument of last resort was that Aristotle's *nous* could not be separate from the rest of the soul and located in the intelligible because that would make it another kind of mind, superhuman and divine, whereas the subject of the *de Anima* was for them clearly defined, as the rational, that is the specifically human, soul.[12] Plotinus, whose undescended mind is cited as exposition of Aristotle, is ruled out of court both for this reason, and also because he made the intellect double, a rational and a super-rational intellect. All this is set out in the pseudo-Philoponus commentary on Book III of the *de Anima*, where Plotinus is treated simply as another commentator.[13] But since we know from Porphyry's list of his works[14] that we possess all of them, and that they include no commentary on the *de Anima*, it is clear that his views on the soul are simply being presented as a *Stellungnahme* to those of Aristotle, as if they were commentary. Hence the particular formulation of the criticisms of Plotinus.

This, though the best example of such treatment of Plotinus, is by no means unique. Another conspicuous case is Plotinus' discussion of time in III.7, though that does contain more explicit discussion of Aristotle's own positions. One other factor that probably affected the later Neoplatonists' view of the status of the human soul—here we must for a moment introduce the non-rational characteristics of later Neoplatonism—was theurgy. The idea that it was possible to enter into communication with higher reality without going through the difficult rational preliminaries prescribed by Plotinus enabled them to segregate the human soul from the upper world without depriving it of the faculty of making contact with what was there.[15] They thus demoted the soul from the higher position it held in Plotinus' thought without removing privileges.

It should not, however, be inferred that the later Neoplatonists'

more rigid distinction between the human soul and Soul or Intellect in themselves is reproduced at all levels. If we look at the central section of the soul we shall find that some of Plotinus' problems have simply re-appeared, though not necessarily for the same reasons. Any Platonist working, as all late Platonists did, with an Aristotelian-type arrangement of the soul, would naturally look for a demarcation between those faculties which are involved with the body, and those which are not. It will come somewhere in the area of imagination, *phantasia*, which is actuated by sense impressions or messages from them, and so is associated with the body, but also provides a dematerialized form of the data so acquired as material for rational thought: it also transmits the operations of intellect downwards. Thus it has links with both upper and lower soul. Plotinus, for eschatological reasons, needed an imaginative faculty associated with the upper, surviving, soul, and yet to preserve the upper soul's freedom from affection needed imagination to be associated rather with the lower. Plotinus in the end doubled the faculty, and attributed a power of imagination to both sections of the soul.[16] Later Neoplatonists did not follow him in this, but did have their own demarcation problem in the same area. In Proclus, and probably his teacher Plutarch, it was manifested in vacillation over the role of the imagination, and how *phantasia* related to the faculty they called *doxa*, opinion, which sometimes seems to overlap *phantasia* and at other times merely to double it.[17] While this solution, or attempt at a solution, was not explicitly connected with the difficulties which appear in Plotinus, it is clear that they are related by their nature, if not by historical descent. Unfortunately we have no explicit discussion of Plotinus' position.

One area in which the later Neoplatonists differ radically from Plotinus, as opposed to merely modifying—or over-interpreting—his views, is in the interpretation of Aristotle's categories.[18] And this, of course, is the only subject on which one could say that Plotinus was actually expounding Aristotle—a procedure perhaps motivated by a wish to reconcile with his own thought a part of Aristotle's which seemed particularly resistant to such incorporation, and which Plotinus did not succeed in incorporating—unless his relegation of Aristotle's categories to the sensible world be counted as success. Given Porphyry's "nominalist" interpretation of the *Categories* one can be sure that he was fully aware of this exclusion when he said that Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, which use the categories extensively, are to be found condensed in the *Enneads*.[19] It was in any case Porphyry

who re-instated the categories in Platonic philosophy, where they had already found a place before Plotinus. The Middle Platonists, after all, had adopted them, perhaps without fully considering the implications.[20] For in so far as they had any metaphysical sense, they were inappropriate to a Platonic system. It was Porphyry, as Professor Lloyd has pointed out, who made them fit precisely by making them part of what he calls "a logic ... stripped of certain metaphysical implications".[21] But in so far as he did find an important place for the categories, Porphyry stands closer to his Middle Platonist predecessors than he does to Plotinus.

Simplicius, to whom we owe most of the information we have about the content of Porphyry's large *Categories* commentary, follows him and Iamblichus on most points.[22] That Simplicius should reject Plotinus' critique of Aristotle on this question is not unexpected, though we should note that he takes Plotinus' treatment seriously and lists it with the other commentaries.[23] Given his aim of harmonising Plato and Aristotle as completely as possible,[24] it would be surprising to find him accepting the relegation of so basic a part of Aristotle's work, and Porphyry had provided a means of making it consistent with Platonism. Given all this, Simplicius' treatment of Plotinus' views on categories is predictable. While he continues to refer to Plotinus in terms no less respectful than elsewhere, he insists that he cannot accept his positions. So, for example, he tells us that "the great Plotinus" said that Aristotle did not put movement into a category because he said it was an incomplete activity. If so, argues Plotinus, he could have put activity above it and made movement a species of it. Having reported that, and stated Iamblichus' objections, Simplicius gives further details of Plotinus' position, and then quotes without dissent Iamblichus' declaration that it is very far from the truth.[25] Earlier, in reporting that he, together with Lucius and Nicostratus, had raised certain difficulties about whether the categories could apply to both sensible and intelligible being he had labelled Plotinus "most divine": he nevertheless continued to point out that he was wrong.[26] Other references to Plotinus are made in a similar spirit. Simplicius regarded Plotinus' whole approach to this work as misconceived, since it failed to take account of the logical aim of Aristotle's treatise.[27] He himself took the view that the categories were not entities, but terms signifying entities.[28]

No other extant ancient commentary on Aristotle makes so much explicit reference to Plotinus. We are hampered by the commentators' habits. Apart from Simplicius they do not make a practice of giving more than a very occasional named reference to earlier discussions, except those of Alexander. Thus Simplicius' references to Plotinus account for the vast majority of such references. Those in "Philoponus' " commentary on the *de Anima* are confined almost entirely to Book III, and these are nearly all concerned with the undescended intellect.

Let us now see what we can learn from the others. Simplicius' *de Caelo* commentary is not a promising start. Of the four passages which cite Plotinus, two quote the same sentence from II.1.2, where Plotinus says that the permanence of the heavenly bodies is no problem for Aristotle if one accepts his hypothesis of a fifth element, a passage already cited by Proclus in his *Timaeus* commentary.[29] On the first occasion Simplicius himself points out that his context is not the same as Plotinus': he is commenting on Aristotle's discussion of different types of movement at the beginning of the *de Caelo*, a context where of course Aristotle's concept of *aithēr* is important. Plotinus is talking about the other application of *aithēr*, the possibility of explaining in terms of this extra element how bodies can be permanent. On the second occasion Simplicius does quote Plotinus in the course of a discussion of the same subject. On neither is he concerned to evaluate Plotinus' pronouncement, and so we can draw no conclusions from either of these passages, or the two other references in this commentary, unless that the sensible world is a less sensitive area than the intelligible. In these others Simplicius mentions points made by Plotinus, and others, about difficulties arising from the fact that, on Aristotle's theory of motion, the four terrestrial elements would no longer have their normal rectilinear motion when they have arrived in their natural place, but would have to stay still or move in a circle.[30] This passage, from II.2.1, is also to be found in Proclus' *Timaeus* commentary,[31] suggesting the possibility that Simplicius himself found it in the work of Proclus.

One further point which the passages we have just considered suggest is that Plotinus was in any case a figure of sufficient status, and one sufficiently far removed from contemporary arguments, for the 5th and 6th century commentators occasionally to quote tags from him out of context. There is one very clear case. We find that Plotinus' remark in the treatise *On Dialectic* that the philosophical man must be given mathematics to accustom him to belief in the immaterial turns up in a number of late commentaries, in slightly altered form and in a variety of contexts: in extant works it appears

eight times, from Iamblichus through Proclus and Philoponus to Olympiodorus and David: in addition it appears in the Platonic *scholia* and in Psellus.[32]

Two other problems to which the later Neoplatonists offered solutions markedly different from Plotinus' are the nature of time, and of evil. The divergences on time fit into the pattern we have already observed, namely that where metaphysical difficulties lead Plotinus to make statements that are either unclear, or capable of differing interpretations, his successors attempted to impose an artificial clarity by positing additional ontological levels. Accordingly, they dealt with the problems arising from Plotinus' attachment of time to Soul and eternity to *Nous* by hypostasizing first time and then both, and giving them a narrowly determined position in the intelligible—in the loose sense—hierarchy. The means adopted by Iamblichus and those who came after him have formed the subject of a recent monograph,[33] and so, having noted the application of the ordinary late Neoplatonic methodology, I shall pass over the matter briefly.

Time, said Iamblichus in his commentary on the *Categories*, was itself a substance.[34] And while he continued to regard eternity as a measure of real existence,[35] he did say that it was an active order ordering other things and not itself ordered.[36] That gave Proclus, following Iamblichus but here as elsewhere developing his ideas, the cue for his notion that eternity was something in which other entities participate and which had substantial existence.[37]

Before we leave this topic it is worth noting that Simplicius, when he came to discuss Aristotle's treatment of time in *Physics* IV, was inclined to treat Plotinus as another commentator, and tends to agree with his "view on Aristotle" on some of the points where the later Neoplatonists could not accept the Stagirite's own opinion.[38] Thus on defining time in terms of its use as a measure of movement rather than as an entity in itself, Simplicius is happy to quote Plotinus' argument from III.7, that if time is the number or measure of movement, then difficulties arise from its application to different kinds of motion.[39] Plotinus infers that time cannot be adequately defined in Aristotle's terms which tell us what time measures, but not what it is, a clear invitation to take the step which Plotinus did not take, namely to make time not a concomitant of some form of intelligible being, but an intelligible in its own right. Simplicius, who was in general trying to rescue Aristotle, found Plotinus' views more helpful than those of his own more recent predecessors, in so far as

Plotinus' time was at least to be defined in terms of what already existed otherwise. Plotinus, moreover, while excluding the view that time is no more than a measure, does make some use of the idea that time is involved in measurement.[40]

The second problem, evil, must also be discussed briefly here. Unlike time it does not have a clear point of departure in Aristotle, but it is relevant in so far as it also presents a difference between Plotinus and later Neoplatonism in an area where Plotinus' thought was unclear or inconsistent. Plotinus' views on this question have been much discussed, and various attempts made to reconcile what appear to be conflicting expressions of them.[41] The first is that evil is matter, which is evil intrinsically, the second that the negativity of matter is incidentally a cause of evil in conjunction with the soul.[42] It is probably fair to say that none of these attempts has carried the field: perhaps the problem is insoluble. Here again we find greater clarity, arguably the result of lesser understanding, in Proclus. Proclus denied both that matter could be evil, since for him matter was directly, rather than mediately, related to the One, and also that there could be self-subsistent evil at all.[43] For him evil is rather a kind of teleological inadequacy. Thus he has given a superficially clear account where Plotinus had not, but one which entails difficulties of its own.[44]

We have seen then that in some areas later Neoplatonists will introduce Plotinus' views to corroborate their own. This was equally true of his opinions as a Platonist and, as they took him to be, as an interpreter of Aristotle. These agreements are most often to be found in relatively uncontroversial areas of their thought. But at the extremes of the metaphysical world, and at those other points where difficulties were likely to arise, we do find substantial differences. We must however, beware of thinking in terms of chronological changes. The later Neoplatonists continued to disagree among themselves, and the process we have looked at was not one of linear development away from Plotinus.[45]

NOTES

1. Cf. Proclus, *in Remp.* II.310.8, *in Tim.* III.245.27, I.427.14, Simplicius, *in Cat.* 2.3; 73.27, Olympiodorus, *in Cat.* 9.38.

2. Cf. my "Neoplatonic Elements in the *de Anima* Commentaries", *Phronesis* 21 (1976), 65–7 (hereafter "Neoplatonic Elements").
3. *PT* 1.44ff. Portus = 6.16ff. Saffrey-Westerink.
4. *PT* 21.54ff. P = 42.4ff. S-W. For a similar complaint cf. *in Tim.* III.12.9–12.
5. This was clearly recognized by the later Neoplatonists, cf. e.g. Proclus in the passage cited in n. 3.
6. Cf. Simplicius, *in Cat.* 2.9ff. and B. D. Larsen, *Jamblique de Chalcis. Exégète et philosophe* (Aarhus, 1972), I.233.
7. Cf. "Neoplatonic Elements", 74–7.
8. So J. Whittaker in *De Jamblique à Proclus*. Entretiens Hardt 21 (Geneva, 1974), 65f.
9. *Enn.* IV.8.8.1–3.
10. Cf. e.g. Proclus, *in Tim.* III.333.28ff. Simplicius *in de An.* 6.12ff., ps-Philoponus *in de An.* 535.13–16.
11. For Theodorus cf. Proclus, *in Tim.* III.333.29f., Damascius *de Princ.* II.254.3–7 Ruelle, but cf. now I. Hadot, *Le problème du Néoplatonisme alexandrin* (Paris, 1978), 171f.
12. On this cf. "Neoplatonic Elements", 79–81.
13. *in de An.* 535–7 *passim*.
14. *Life of Plotinus* 24–6.
15. Cf. E. R. Dodds, *Proclus, The Elements of Theology*[2] (Oxford, 1963), xx; A. Smith, *Porphyry's Place in the Neoplatonic Tradition* (The Hague, 1974), 147–9.
16. On this question see further my *Plotinus' Psychology* (The Hague, 1971), 90ff.
17. Cf. my "Plutarch's Exposition of the *de Anima* and the Psychology of Proclus", in *De Jamblique à Proclus* (see n. 8), 133–47.
18. On this cf. esp. A. C. Lloyd, "Neoplatonic Logic and Aristotelian Logic", *Phronesis* I (1955–6), 58–72 and 146–160.
19. *Life of Plotinus* 14.5–7.
20. Cf. Albinus (Alcinous) *Didaskalikos* 6 = 159.34ff. Hermann; J. Dillon, *The Middle Platonists* (London, 1977), 276ff.
21. *Loc. cit.* (n. 18) 58.
22. Simplicius, *in Cat.* 2.9–11 and 3.2–13.
23. Cf. *in Cat.* 2.3–5 and *passim*.
24. Cf. "Neoplatonic Elements", 65–7.
25. *In Cat.* 303. 32–304.32.
26. *Ibid.* 73.23ff.
27. *Ibid.* 16.16–19.
28. *Ibid.* 11.30ff.
29. Simplicius, *in de Caelo* 12.11–16, 115.30f., Proclus, *in Tim.* I.237.24–6.
30. Simplicius, *in de Caelo* 20.10ff., 37.33ff.
31. Proclus, *in Tim.* III.114.30ff.
32. Plotinus, *Enn.* I.3.3,5f.: the later references may conveniently be found in the *index testium* of Henry and Schwyzer's *editio maior, ad loc.*
33. S. Sambursky and S. Pinès, *The Concept of Time in Late Neoplatonism* (Jerusalem, 1971).
34. Cf. Simplicius, *in Phys.* 793.19.
35. *Ibid.* 18f.
36. Proclus, *in Tim.* III.30.30ff.
37. Cf. Proclus, *Elements of Theology* 53 and Dodds, *ad. loc.*
38. Cf. Simplicius, *in Phys.* 769.6ff., 706.25–8, 791.27f.
39. III.7.9.1–12, Simplicius, *ibid.* 769.6ff.
40. III.7.12.37ff. On these matters cf. further W. Beierwaltes, *Plotin über Ewigkeit und Zeit* (*Enneade* III.7) (Frankfurt/M., 1967), *passim* and H. Meyer, *Das Corollarium de Tempore des Simplikios und die Aporien des Aristoteles zur Zeit* (Meisenheim am Glan, 1969), *passim*, esp. 37ff.
41. Cf. esp. the discussion between J. M. Rist and D. O'Brien in J. M. Rist, "Plotinus on Matter and Evil", *Phronesis* 6 (1961), 154–66 and "Plotinus and Augustine on Evil", in *Plotino e il Neoplatonismo in Oriente e in Occidente*. Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei: Problemi attuali di Scienza e di Cultura 198 (Rome, 1974), 495–504; D. O'Brien, "Plotinus on Evil", *Downside Review* 87 (1969), 68–110, reprinted with minor revisions in *Le Néoplatonisme*. Colloques Internat. du C.N.R.S. (Paris, 1971), 114–150.
42. Cf. I.8.8.37ff., I.8.4.6ff., I.8.5.1ff.
43. Cf. esp. *de Malorum Subsistentia* 37.5–7 = p. 223 Boese.
44. On the changes made by Proclus cf. F. P. Hager, "Die Materie und das Böse im antiken Platonismus", *Mus. Helv.* 19 (1962), 93–103.
45. I should like to thank Professor Markus for reading a draft of this paper.

XI

FROM KU–RU–SO–WO–KO TO ΘΕΟΥΡΓΟΣ: WORD TO RITUAL

(75) Theurgy has long been regarded as one of the undesirable facets of late Neoplatonism. Now that Neoplatonic philosophy is taken more seriously in the English–speaking world, in no small measure another Liverpool achievement, the nature and importance of theurgy have been the subject of much recent discussion,[1] most of it, coincidentally, within — or just outside — the *tria lustra* we are celebrating. That discussion, however, unlike some earlier treatments,[2] has not paid much attention to the meaning and origins of the actual word *theourgos* and its cognates.[3] It is the purpose of this paper to do so, treating it in the first place as just another *–ε/οργος* compound and going back, appropriately to the catholicity of *LCM* and its editor, to the first uses of such compounds in Mycenaean and Homeric Greek.

According to the *Suda*, *θεουργός*[4] was used to describe himself by the son of Julian the Chaldaean, in the time of Marcus Aurelius: no earlier use is attested. J. Bidez suggested that the word was a kind of hype of *θεολόγος*, theologian, to suggest that instead of merely talking about gods he knew how to act, 'en conférant une nature divine'.[5] If Bidez' interpretation is correct, the first use of the word would carry the meaning of producing *θεοί*, one of several meanings that have been suggested for the term. Others are that it means one who does *θεῖα ἔργα*, or one who operates on the gods, the meaning perhaps

[1] Some examples are R. T. Wallis, *Neoplatonism* (London, 1972), passim, esp. pp. 120–23, 153–57; A. Smith, *Porphyry's Place in the Neoplatonic tradition* (The Hague, 1974), pp. 81–150; A. D. R. Sheppard, 'Proclus' attitude to theurgy', *C. Q.* n.s. 32 (1982), 212–224; G. Shaw, 'Theurgy: rituals of unification in the Neoplatonism of Iamblichus', *Traditio* 41 (1985), 1–28. The classic earlier discussion is E. R. Dodds, 'Theurgy and its relationship to Neoplatonism', *JRS* 37 (1947), 55–69, reprinted as Appendix II, 'Theurgy' in *The Greeks and the Irrational* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1951, repr. Boston 1957), pp. 283–311; see also H. Lewy, *Chaldaean Oracles and Theurgy* (Cairo, 1956, repr. with addenda by various hands, ed. M. Tardieu, Paris, 1978), an extraordinarily difficult book to use (hereafter *Oracles*).

[2] Cf. S. Eitrem, 'La théurgie chez les néoplatoniciens et dans les papyrus magiques', *Symbolae Osloenses* 22 (1942), 49–50; H. Lewy, 'The Meaning and the History of the terms "Theurgist" and "Theurgy"', Excursus IV in *Oracles*, pp. 461–66.

[3] Cf. however F. Cremer, *Die chaldaïschen Orakel und Jamblich* 'De Mysteriis' (Meisenheim am Glan, 1969 [Beitr.z. Klass. Philol. 26]), pp. 19–36.

[4] s.v. *Ioulianos*, *Suidae Lexicon* ed. A. Adler, II (Leipzig, 1931), p. 641.

[5] *La vie de l'empéreur Julien*[2] (Paris, 1965), p. 369 n. 8.

most readily suggested by the Neoplatonic texts in which it occurs as well as the history of both its own antecedents and those of other *-ε/οργος* compounds.[6] Hence some years ago I suggested that *δημιουργός* understood — one should add 'by Platonists' — as one who works on the world suggested the meaning for *θεουργός* 'one who works on the gods'.[7] Given the free–for–all conditions of Greek etymologising, I would still maintain that that is at least a possibility.

The interpretations that have found most favour, are, however, others, that of Psellus that it means, in some sense, making into a god,[8] or, alternatively, that it involves somehow becoming godlike by ritual means. G. Shaw in a recent article has suggested that theurgy be defined as 'the ritual manifestation of divine powers', by which, as the continuation of his discussion shows, he means divine powers in human persons,[9] thus coming close to Bidez' — and Psellus'— understanding. While this might (**76**) be correct, it is not readily suggested by the stem *θεουργ-* itself. In fact the difficulty of pinning down its meaning is a persistent problem, as appears from the latest treatment by R. Majercik, in the introduction to her edition of the *Oracles*.[10]

Notoriously these and the later Neoplatonic texts in which the words appear do not always make it clear just what *θεουργία* is, or what a *θεουργός* does.[11] I do not propose to reopen that question and conduct a lengthy re–examination of the relevant texts here. Instead I shall look primarily at the words themselves. Of course, as is, or should be, well known, the etymology of a word — like etymology — does not necessarily provide a key to its meaning except in the particular context in which it first acquired it, even if that can be found.[12] All it does is make a historical statement about a word, which may or may not be a guide to its meaning at any given time.[13] But in so far as those who coined the term *θεουργός* will have had some sense of the meaning of such words in Greek, it may be of interest to look more closely at their history. There are two — or three — kinds of *-εργος* compounds, viz. *-εργος/-εργός* and another with -o- vocalism, *-οργος*. Semantically the orginally different

[6] This is traced, for Mycenaean and the first millennium of 'Greek', by F. Bader, *Les composés grecs du type demiourgos* (Paris, 1965).

[7] *De Jamblique à Proclus*. (Geneva, 1975 [Entretiens sur l'Antiquité Classique 21]), p. 100, in the discussion of E. des Places' paper on religion in Iamblichus, a suggestion not well received by the speaker.

[8] Michael Psellus, *De omnifaria doctrina* 74, (ed. L. G. Westerink, (Utrecht, 1948) = *PG* CXXII 721D–723A.

[9] 'Theurgy as demiurgy: Iamblichus' solution to the problem of embodiment', *Dionysius* 12 (1988), 39.

[10] *The Chaldaean Oracles. Text Translation and Commentary*. (Leiden, 1989 [Studies in Greek and Roman Religion 5]), p. 22

[11] The word is also used by Christian writers, cf. Lampe s.v., but their usage is, unsurprisingly, not much help here.

[12] Cf. e.g the now classic article by E. Benveniste, 'Problèmes sémantiques de la reconstruction', *Word* 10 (1954), 251–64, or, more generally, S. Ullmann, *The Principles of Semantics*. (Glasgow — Oxford, 1959 [Glasgow University Publications LXXXIV 2]), pp. 171–203.

[13] '. . . .a statement about spatio–temporal sequences' Y. Malkiel, 'How English dictionaries present the etymology of words of Romance origin', in R. Burchfield ed., *Studies in Lexicography* (Oxford, 1987), p. 179.

types in-*εργος* and -*εργός* had already merged in Homer.[14] Any compound having any of these as second element and an -o- stem noun as the first would, of course, be indistinguishable once both loss of-*ϝ*- and contraction had taken place, but the Mycenaean forms of such words usually show the -o- grade forms.

One cannot, of course, expect that the Greeks at the time of whoever invented the name *ὁ θεουργός* for the wretched Julian were aware of the distinction, though some grammarians may have been — and some might have noticed that the surviving uncontracted forms of words like *δημιουργός* ended in *-εργος*. Historically this and other endings are misleading, and must come under suspicion of being artificial post–contraction recreations no better than such as *ὁροῶσα*, though unlike that group, which are manifestly fakes, *δημιοεργός* does not betray its status. The evidence for that is to be found on the Mycenaean tablets. These provide examples of both the -*ϝεργος* and -*ϝοργος* types, showing words ending in *-we-ko* and *-wo-ko*. Such are *ku–ru–so–wo–ko* and *to–ko–so–wo–ko* (both nom.pl.: *khrusoworgoi*, goldsmiths [PY An 207], and *toxoworgoi*, bowmakers [PY An 26]), *a–pu–ko–wo–ko* gen. pl. *ampukoworgoi*, headbandmakers[15] or perhaps fenceworkers [PY Ad 671]) and, from the less common *–we–ko* type, *pi–ro–we–ko* (*philowergos*, a name [PY Jn389]).[16] Always assuming that these interpretations[17] are correct, we have here already two slightly different senses for *–ϝοργ–* compounds: while *toxoworgoi* may have made bows, *khrusoworgoi* cannot have made the gold but, since we are hardly likely to be dealing with Pylian alchemists, must have worked on it.

If the word *θεουργεῖν* does mean something like 'to operate on the gods' then it would have the same sort of sense as words like *ku–ru–so–wo–ko*, that is, one who works on the object or material signified by the nominal form (**77**) which forms the first part of the compound. On the other hand *δημιουργός*, which might appear to be relevant to discussion of *θεουργός*, probably has a different sense, since *δημιο–* is a nominal form with adjectival force, so that the word most naturally means one who does *δῆμος*–pertaining things.[18] It may, of course, also mean one who works on these,[19] but that would hardly describe the activities of

[14] Cf. E. Risch, *Wortbildung der homerischen Sprache*[2] (Berlin/New York, 1974), p.207

[15] So Ventris–Chadwick, *Documents in Mycenaean Greek*[2] (Cambridge, 1973), p.156.

[16] And, incidentally, a testimony to the longevity of Greek naming practices, since we have *Φιλόπονοι* at the end of our period.

[17] Given by Ventris and Chadwick, ibid. p. 180.

[18] Here we should note not only that *δημιουργός* and *θεουργός* are formally different, since *θεουργός* has as its first element a noun, but that if it were to be equivalent to *δημιουργός* we should expect the non–existent **θειουργός*. *θεουργός* cannot be a development of **θειουργός* because the word was coined far too late for it to have been affected by the loss of intervocalic–*ι* from *θειο–*, and **θειουργός* would in any case have been likely to survive by analogy with *θεῖος*, itself <**thes–ios*.

[19] For another view of the meaning of *δημιουργός* see L. R. Palmer, 'Mycenaean Greek Texts from Pylos', *TPhS* (1954), 43–45, who thinks they are workers on *δῆμος* land, basing himself on a Hittite law code which is not obviously relevant; P. Chantraine, *Dictionnaire Etymologique de la langue grecque* I (Paris, 1968), s.v. *δημιουργός*, describes the idea as ingenious but perverse, though not actually disprovable; cf. also K. Murakawa, 'Demiurgos', *Historia* 6 (1957), 412–15.

those who are said to be *δημιουργοί* in early post–Mycenaean Greek, that is in Homer and the somewhat later *Homeric Hymn to Hermes*. The list of *δημιουργοί, οἳ δημιουργοὶ ἔασιν*, at *Odyssey* 17. 383–85 consists of seers, doctors, carpenters and poets, and even if carpenters do work on a material, the material is certainly not *δῆμ–*. Similarly at 19. 135 it is heralds who are described as *δημιουργοί*, and they if anyone are the people's workers. In the *Hymn to Hermes*, the sense of *δημιουργοί* is less clear. At line 98 we have *ταχα δ' ὄρθρος ἐγίγνετο δημιουργός*. The meaning of these words is disputed, but at the risk of being accused of literal–mindedness, not necessarily a damning accusation in connection with texts of this kind, one might say that dawn does nothing. Nevertheless Hesychius took *δημιουργός* to mean 'which does work', namely warming things and bringing them to their end,[20] apparently followed by Càssola who translates 'l'alba operosa', though his note, 'che spinge gli uomini al lavoro',[21] indicates a different sense, and is more likely to be correct, as is Allen and Sikes' 'which starts men on their work',[22] making *δημιουργός* an adjective meaning to do with work, with the original sense of 'pertaining to the people' now becoming weaker.

That sense, was, of course, maintained in a number of Greek dialects, where it was the name of magistrates, e.g. *δαμιοργοί* at Delphi, Elis and Mantinea and on some of the islands, including some that spoke an Attic–Ionic form of Greek,[23] thus diverging from the Attic semantic development to cover artisans and no longer 'professionals' — the Odyssean carpenters being an exception — of the kind listed by Homer: it may not be well known to 'ancient philosophers' that in Athens *δημιουργοί* probably formed a distinct 'class' alongside the *εὐπατρίδαι* and the variously named *ἄγροικοι* or *γεωργοί*.[24] According to Strabo (8. 7. 1) four classes were instituted by Ion, priests, farmers, *δημιουργοί* and guards, *φύλακες*, a legendary organisation reflected in the antediluvian Athens of Plato's *Critias* (112B).[25]

All that notwithstanding, the sense of craftsman is, of course, the one which the word has in the *Timaeus*, the work which probably filled more of the Neoplatonists' brain cells than anything except Plato's *Parmenides*. One would have to say that the craftsman in question was far superior to any who might

[20] S.v. *ὁ ἥλιος, ὅτι πάντα πέσσει καὶ τελειοῖ*

[21] F. Càssola, *Inni Omerici* (Milan, 1975), ad loc.

[22] T. W. Allen and E. E. Sikes, *The Homeric Hymns* (London, 1904), ad loc.

[23] In the latter case the form would, of course, be *δῆμι–* rather than *δαμι–ουργοί* Cf. C. D. Buck, *The Greek Dialects* (Chicago, 1955), p. 134 with glossary entry, p. 355; for Elis and Mantinea see Thucydides 5. 47; cf. also *LSJ* s.v. *demiourgos*, II.

[24] These classes are tied up with Athenian legend, and appear in Aristotle's account of the aftermath of Solon's reforms *Ath. Pol.* 13.2. On the *δημιουργοί*, and their infrequent appearance, see P. J. Rhodes, *A commentary on the Aristotelian Athenaion Politeia* (Oxford,1981), pp. 1f., 78f. and, on 13. 2, pp. 183f.

[25] E. Benveniste, *Le vocabulaire des institutions indo–européennes* (Paris, 1969), I 288–91, sees in this and other quadripartite organisations a reflex of an Indo–European social structure.

normally have been described by the word in Classical Athens. In fact the word is uncommon in fourth-century authors other than Plato and Aristotle, and seems to have passed from common literary use in the post–classical period: almost all of its occurrences thereafter are in philosophical writers.(78)

Nevertheless we may assume that the Neoplatonists knew Greek literature well enough to be aware of the earlier senses, and whatever reservation one might have about some of them, it is certainly a proper assumption for Proclus, given his attention to Homer and Hesiod.[26]

In later, post–Proclan, Neoplatonism the word hardly occurs. Damascius is apparently an exception, and it would be no surprise if he were, but though he refers fairly often to a *θεουργός* or *θεουργοί* the references are usually to them as people who hold certain views, which Damascius will either report, or, sometimes (e.g. at II 204. 12–13 Ruelle) accept. Interestingly the noun *θεουργία* seems to be absent. Philoponus, on the other hand, does not use *θεουργ** at all and Damascius' colleague Simplicius but once. Of other theurgy words neither of them uses *τελεστική*. Simplicius uses *ἱερατικός* once, at *In De caelo libros* 469. 4–11, where we read that our luminous[27] soul–vehicle could hear the harmony of the spheres if properly purified by one of three methods: the third is *ἱερατικὴ τελεσιουργία*, which is probably something theurgic, but possibly not something in which Simplicius himself believes since the whole context is about views allegedly (my caution, not Simplicius') held by Pythagoras.[28] Philoponus uses *ἱερατική* only once, in a context which, as one might expect in one of his Christian works, has nothing to do with theurgy[29]; the same is true of two instances of *θεοφορ**, a word which Simplicius does not use. Where he does use *θεουργ** the sense of operating on the gods is clear enough. Thus in the *Corollarium de Tempore* of his *Physics* commentary Simplicius talks about Proclus' attitude to Iamblichus: Proclus tries to show not only that he is a *νοῦς* but also a god, and to have him called into view by

[26] Cf. in the first place *In Cratyl.*, *In Remp.*, *In Tim.*, passim. On the question of the correctness of the attribution of the *Chrestomathy* see now R. Lamberton, *Homer the Theologian. Neoplatonist allegorical reading and the growth of the epic tradition.* (Berkeley/LA/London, 1986 [The Transformation of the Classical Heritage IX]), p. 177, and the references given in n. 51: Lamberton, ibid., notes a piece of dubious etymologizing of *ἔπος* meaning epic metre attributed to Proclus by Photius, *cod.* 239 = V 156. 8-11 Henry. A. D. R. Sheppard, in 'Iamblichus on Inspiration: *De Mysteriis* III 4–8', a paper given to the as yet unpublished Liverpool conference on Iamblichus, 24–26. 9. 1990, notes that Iamblichus has etymology in mind in his discussion of another theurgy term, *θεοφορία*, in *De Myst.* 3. 7 = 107. 5ff. Des Places, and draws attention to des Places' note on an earlier section of the same chapter where he takes Iamblichus' remarks on *ἐνθουσιασμός* to be 'd'après l'étymologie'.

[27] The reading *αὐτοειδὲς* in line 7 – *τὸ αὐτοειδὲς αὐτοῦ καὶ οὐράνιον ὄχημα* – is surely a mistake for the standard *αὐγοειδές*, the simplest of majuscule mistakes.

[28] A reference to *ἡ Ἀσσύριος θεολογία* at *In Phys.* 643. 27 is to a point of physics.

[29] *De Opific. Mundi* 197. 10–12 Reichardt

theurgists (795. 3–7). That Iamblichus is mentioned here is significant in so far as it seems to have been only he and his closest — intellectually — followers who held that the concept and practice were of great importance to philosophers. At least, if the Neoplatonists after Proclus were interested in, or practised, theurgy, they have not told us much about it, and given the length of their writings, together with a sometimes dubious sense of relevance, the virtual silence of most of them is surely not without significance.

More surprising is its rather infrequent appearance in the philosophical work of Syrianus, or rather what we have of it in either its reflection in Hermias' *Phaedrus* commentary, or in the extant books of the *Metaphysics* commentary. Syrianus can hardly be accused of being so scholarly a commentator on Plato and Aristotle that he would have had nothing to do with such nonsense. What is interesting is that we find so much of it in the work of his devoted pupil Proclus,[30] suggesting perhaps that it was Proclus himself rather than Syrianus or Plutarch who was mainly responsible for the insertion of Iamblichus into the mainstream of late antique Platonism, a possibility reinforced by the lack of explicit reference to Syrianus indicated by the 'Index of Ancient Texts Quoted' in J. M. Dillon's edition of the remains of Iamblichus' expositions (**79**) of Plato.[31] There is only a single reference to him, and that to the *In Hermogenem*. Similarly B. Dalsgaard Larsen's wider collection of Iamblichean material finds only one extract in Syrianus,[32] though that is from his *Metaphysics* commentary, where he cites Iamblichus on the *Parmenides*.[33] We must not, however, think of Syrianus as being simply opposed to theurgy, since there is an extensive discussion of it under one of the other names the Neoplatonists used for it, namely τελεστική, in Hermeias' commentary on the kinds of madness, in *Phaedrus* 244A–245A (*In Phaedrum* 84. 17–97. 27 Couvreur, passim).[34] Moreover, Damascius in his *Phaedo* commentary gives Syrianus with Iamblichus and Proclus as examples of those who privilege theurgy.[35]

30 Cf. e.g. Proclus, *In Parmenidem* 1061. 20–31 Cousin^2. The reference to his teacher is in the standard form for Syrianus. For the identification cf. too the note ad loc. in G. Morrow and J. M. Dillon's translation (Princeton, 1987).

31 J. M. Dillon, *Iamblichi Chalcidensis In Platonis Dialogos Commentariorum Fragmenta* (Leiden, 1973).

32 B. Dalsgaard Larsen, *Jamblique de Chalcis. Exégète et philosophe* (Aarhus, 1972), II *Appendice: Testimonia et fragmenta exegetica.*

33 *In Metaph.* 38. 36–39

34 This section of Hermeias and its importance for the relation between the views of Syrianus and Proclus , is discussed by A. D. R. Sheppard, 'Proclus' attitude to theurgy', *CQ* n.s. 32 (1982), 214–218.

35 [Olympiodorus] *In Phaedonem* 123. 3–6 = L. G. Westerink, *The Greek Commentaries on Plato's Phaedo* .II *Damascius.* (Amsterdam/Oxford/New York, 1977 [Verh.d. Kon. Nederlandse Ak. d. Wet. Afd. Lett. n.s. 93]), 172. 1–3, p. 105. Westerink, ad loc., notes that Damascius lists these three as those to whom Isidore paid special attention, *Vit. Isid.* fr. 77.

It would, of course, be interesting to know what was the attitude of Proclus' and Syrianus' teacher Plutarch, not least because he more than anyone else seems to have rekindled an interest in Neoplatonic philosophy at Athens, the centre which has often, if wrongly, been accused of being excessively addicted to the wilder Iamblichean kind of Neoplatonism — in contrast with the more serious attitude of Alexandria.[36] In the introduction to her recent and very welcome edition of the fragments of Plutarch D. P. Taormina devotes a section to Plutarch and theurgy in which she uses the information we have about theurgic practices being passed down in Neoplatonic families — families including both families in the strict sense and those who were treated as such — as the basis for the assertion that Plutarch must have engaged in all the practices which Marinus (*Vita Procli* 28) attributes to Proclus, hardly a safe conclusion unless one assumes that theurgic practice was invariable in a way that the philosophy of the practitioners was not.[37] Moreover, though transmission *via* Plutarch may be indicated by the text of Marinus, it could mean that Plutarch's daughter Asclepigeneia learned all this stuff from Nestorius and passed it on to Proclus, namely that the *pater* from whom she acquired her knowledge and skills was not her actual parent.[38] In this connection we should note that Plutarch does not appear in Damascius' lists of enthusiasts for theurgy.[39]

But the history of theurgic practice is fortunately not our subject now. Without going into that, we can safely say that the practitioners either thought they were doing something to the gods, or, as most of the more recent investigators think, making themselves more like them[40], and so, in a loose sense, making gods. Both these senses are closer to the original Greek use of noun *-εργο-/-οργο-* compounds than to the early meaning of δημιουργός: only in its special Platonic significance does the latter have anything in common with — one possible view of — the activities of the θεουργός, and then not very much.

36 On this largely if not entirely unjustified contrast cf. I. Hadot, *Le problème du Néoplatonisme alexandrin: Hiéroclès et Simplicius* (Paris, 1978), passim; H. J. Blumenthal, 'John Philoponus: Alexandrian Platonist', *Hermes* 114 (1986), 314–35.

37 D. P. Taormina, *Plutarco di Atene. L'Uno, l'Anima, le Forme.* (Catania, 1989 [Symbolon 8]), pp. 42–44: 'le pratiche che egli [sc. Marino] attribuisce esplicitamente a Proclo *devono necessariamente* (my italics) far parte del patrimonio culturale di Proclo', ibid. p. 44.

38 Cf. R. Masullo's note on the relevant passage of ch. 28 in her edition, Marino di Neapoli, *Vita di Proclo* (Naples, 1985), p. 143.

39 See above, and note 35. G. Fowden, 'The pagan Holy Man in late antique society', *JHS* 102 (1982), 39, speaks of 'the two masters, Plutarch and Syrianus, who were to initiate him (sc. Proclus) into theurgic Neoplatonism'.

40 Cf. e.g. Shaw, 'Theurgy as Demiurgy' (see n. 9), 40–41.

XII

PLUTARCH'S EXPOSITION OF THE *DE ANIMA* AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCLUS

From the beginning of Neoplatonism the unity of the person had been a problem. In Plotinus the soul broke in two in the middle, at the level of *phantasia* which he doubled, and also tended to fly apart at the ends, where the intellect remained in the intelligible at the upper end, and the vegetative soul at the lower belonged, at least sometimes, to the world soul rather than the individual soul [1]. That such difficulties should arise among Platonists is not surprising, since they necessarily had to account for the way an immaterial soul could deal with both intelligible and sensible forms of cognition and activity: the more careful they were to do this accurately, the more liable they were to run into problems of coherence and consistency. As often in later Neoplatonism, some of the theories that were put forward may be seen as new approaches to questions which had been left unsolved, or made more acute, by Plotinus. The purpose of this paper is to look at some of the views of Proclus, and where they can be ascertained, his master Plutarch, about the human soul, with special reference to the way in which they dealt with matters affecting its central faculties.

[1] On these problems, cf. my *Plotinus' Psychology* (The Hague 1971), 27 ff. and 89 ff.

Before going any further it might be as well to disclaim two extreme views about Plutarch which are possibly attractive but probably misleading. One, that Proclus simply followed Plutarch's views about the soul, which he learned either directly by reading the *Phaedo* and *De anima* with him as a young student [1], or indirectly through Syrianus. The other, which has been put forward by R. Beutler in his Pauly-Wissowa article on Plutarch, that Plutarch somehow stood aside from the wilder tendencies of contemporary Neoplatonism and offered a straightforward interpretation of Aristotle in a commentary on the *De anima* from which most of the clearly identifiable information about him is derived through the commentaries of Simplicius and Stephanus (Ps.-Philoponus) [2]. Though it has been asserted that much material from Plutarch has been absorbed into subsequent commentaries on both Plato and Aristotle [3], it is not easy to identify such material and I do not propose to make the attempt now. I should merely like to say that Simplicius disagrees with Plutarch sufficiently often — on nearly half the occasions where he cites him — for it to be totally unsafe to assume that anything in him is derived from Plutarch in the absence of firm and specific proof that it is. Therefore nothing that is not actually labelled as the opinion of Plutarch will be taken to be such.

One further general point must be made about Plutarch. This is that all the evidence on his thought — as opposed to

[1] Cf. Marinus, *Procl.* 12.

[2] R. Beutler, *Plutarchos von Athen*, in *RE* XXI 1 (1951), 963 f., and, with some reservations, *Porphyrios*, in *RE* XXII 1 (1953), 309. He is followed by E. Evrard, Le maître de Plutarque d'Athènes et les origines du néoplatonisme athénien, in *Ant. Class.* 29 (1960), 391-7; cf. also K. Praechter, *Syrianos*, in *RE* IV A 2 (1932), 1737. For another view see H. D. Saffrey — L. G. Westerink's introduction to the Budé edition of Proclus, *Théologie platonicienne* (Paris 1968), p. XLVII.

[3] R. Beutler, *Plutarchos von Athen*, 963; *pace* Beutler, Plutarch's suggestion to Proclus about a *Phaedo* commentary (Marin. *Procl.* 12) tells us nothing about his influence on any other commentary.

biographical and largely anecdotal material in Damascius' *Life of Isidore* and Marinus' *Life of Proclus* — is contained in commentaries. It is therefore arguable that most if not all of the statements about his views which we have are about his views on the interpretation of Plato or Aristotle rather than reports about his own opinions, and that we cannot properly assume that the former represent the latter. I hope however we may agree that they do. If it needs argument, I have argued the point elsewhere [1], and should merely like to say two things briefly now. First, that on the controversy about the position of the intuitive intellect, an area where we are relatively well informed, it can be shown that commentators' positions reflect their own opinions : in fact views which are given as the opinion of commentators on Aristotle are sometimes views which were not originally offered as such at all. Second, that Aristotle as well as Plato and the Neoplatonists themselves were seen to be aiming at expressions of a single truth, so that a commentary on Aristotle was simply not a place for expressing anything other than what one took to be the truth, an attitude best shown by the to us shocking statement of Simplicius in the introduction to his *Commentary on the De anima* that he would try to expound Aristotle sticking as closely as possible to the views of Iamblichus and the truth itself: ...παντάχου δὲ κατὰ δύναμιν τῆς τῶν πραγμάτων ἀντεχομένῳ ἀληθείας κατὰ τὴν Ἰαμβλίχου ἐν τοῖς ἰδίοις αὐτοῦ περὶ ψυχῆς συγγράμμασιν ὑφήγησιν (p. 1, 18-20 Hayduck). On the basis of the situation outlined we may perhaps make the following working assumption : if there is no substantial difference between a thinker's opinion about Aristotle and his own view—unless he explicitly expresses disagreement with him—then if Plutarch expresses a view on a passage in Aristotle which differs from Proclus' views on the same subject, Proclus and Plutarch themselves disagree about the point in question, and *vice versa*.

[1] Cf. my « Neoplatonic elements in the *de anima* commentaries », in *Phronesis* 21 (1976).

On these assumptions, let us return to Plutarch, and try to assess the nature of his approach to psychology as manifested in the *testimonia* to his comments on the *De anima*. Here the picture presented by R. Beutler, and subsequently accepted, in general, by E. Evrard, requires some adjustment. R. Beutler sees Plutarch as being in most matters a faithful transmitter of the outstanding achievement of Alexander, and in particular of Alexander's interpretation of specific texts [1]. The exception which R. Beutler notes is their disagreement about *nous*. Plutarch did not accept that the *De anima* referred to a *nous* other than the human one [2]. This, as R. Beutler recognised, is in itself a matter of far-reaching importance. But the differences are by no means confined to this one point. To begin with, there is an important difference of principle : Philoponus (*In de an.* p. 21, 20-23 Hayduck) tells us that Plutarch accused Alexander of pretending to comment on Aristotle while in fact expounding his own views, a strange accusation from a Neoplatonist which we might take to mean that Alexander was too close to Aristotle and not close enough to Plato. Be that as it may be, it does tell us clearly enough that Plutarch did not see himself as a mere transmitter of results achieved by Alexander, for the complaint is about Alexander's treatment of the whole πραγματεία, and not just a single text. And when we look at detailed reports of their opinions, we find that on other occasions, including a classification of various meanings of *nous* in Aristotle [3], Plutarch disagrees with Alexander. These are usually matters of detailed explanation of a text. That, according to R. Beutler, was Plutarch's style [4], but the same might be said of Simplicius, Philoponus, Ps.-Philoponus, that is Stephanus, or others. Even if it were not so, one would expect that reports of a commentator's

[1] *Plutarchos*, 963 f.

[2] Philop. *In de an.* p. 536, 2-5 Hayduck.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 518, 9 ff.

[4] *Plutarchos*, 964.

opinions should normally refer to matters of detail, for it is after all on these that one goes to a commentary for help.

Even Proclus' style of commentary does not ignore such matters, though it allows for a great deal besides. And if one were to be dependent on reports in the Aristotelian commentators for knowledge of Proclus, and happened to have only some and not others — it is after all only two of the commentaries which furnish the bulk of our evidence about Plutarch — one might form a similar impression of Proclus himself. Thus in Philoponus' *Commentary on the Posterior Analytics* three of the four passages in which we have reports of Proclus contain detailed discussions of texts : the fourth is simply a reference to Proclus' work on a geometrical subject [1]. On the other hand if one looks at Simplicius' *Commentary on the De caelo* one would get a rather different view of Proclus' procedures. There about half the references give us Proclus' specific views on the point under discussion, as opposed to his opinion on a matter that may be relevant to the issue in hand, but few of these contain actual discussion of the meaning of the Greek. Part of the reason for this may be that the material in question comes not from a commentary by Proclus on the Aristotelian treatise, but from remarks made by him in his own *Timaeus commentary* and elsewhere. The other part may be the different way in which Simplicius and Stephanus — from whose commentary on Book III most of the references to Plutarch come — cite their Neoplatonic predecessors. Most of the reports of Plutarch's opinion on the interpretation of Aristotle's Greek happen to come from Stephanus, and far fewer from Simplicius and Priscian, and in this commentary Stephanus does not cite Proclus at all. Thus it is better not to assume that Plutarch's method of exposition was necessarily different from what Proclus' method in expounding the same texts would have been. That is not to make any inference, yet, about the matter.

[1] Pp. 111, 31 ff.; 160, 13 ff.; 181, 19 ff. and 129, 16 Wallies.

To return to the question of Plutarch and Alexander. It may or may not be true that Plutarch often agreed with Alexander. Given the state of our evidence about both we cannot say how often. But we can perhaps say that in many cases all commentators are likely to have agreed with Alexander because he was simply restating what was clearly the meaning of Aristotle's text, and that in those cases where we have their opinions cited side by side there are enough disagreements to suggest the need for some caution in describing Plutarch as a faithful follower of Alexander's interpretation. It is true that on a number of occasions they are quoted together as holding a certain opinion, but one should at least consider the possibility that this is because they alone had written extensive commentaries on some or all of the *De anima* [1]. The matters on which they are reported to have disagreed are not only matters of principle of the kind suggested by Plutarch's accusation of dishonesty, or the difference about the status of the soul or souls discussed in the *De anima*, as reflected in their divergent views on the status of *nous* in that work, but also on points of more limited scope, the meaning of a passage or the interpretation of a particular sentence. We have, it must be admitted, only a single clear case of each, but there is no reason to think that there will not have been others as well. What we have are these. In the first category we have Simplicius expressing his preference for Plutarch over Alexander on the interpretation of the words τὸ δὲ κινοῦν καὶ κινούμενον τὸ ὀρεκτικόν [2]. Plutarch said that Aristotle meant that the ὀρεκτικὴ ἐνέργεια was a κίνησις with Aristotle speaking Platonically — perhaps we should say Neoplatonically — and that the κίνησις was ποιητική and not παθητική, another way of describing what a Neoplatonist meant by ἐνέργεια. Alexander's rejected (by Simplicius), though clearly correct interpretation, was that the

[1] Cf. my « Did Iamblichus write a commentary on the *de anima*? », in *Hermes* 102 (1974), 540-546.

[2] *De an.* 433 b 16 f.

ὄρεξις is moved κατὰ συμβεβηκός (Simpl. *In de an.* p. 302, 23-9 H.). This passage is worth more than its numerical weight, for it exhibits a characteristic which we might in any case expect to find, namely that Alexander gave the simple Aristotelian explanation of a text which Plutarch Neoplatonised. There may also have been a difference about how we perceive that we perceive. According to one of two conflicting reports which we must discuss in more detail [1], Plutarch and Alexander both said that it was done by κοινὴ αἴσθησις, according to the other, Plutarch ascribed this function to the λογικὴ ψυχή, probably to *doxa* [2].

In the second category we have a discussion on a point in Aristotle's section about what has which faculties. Difficulties arose over the meaning of ... οὐχ οἷόν τε δὲ σῶμα ἔχειν μὲν ψυχὴν καὶ νοῦν κριτικόν, αἴσθησιν δὲ μὴ ἔχειν μὴ μόνιμον ὄν, γεννητὸν δέ — ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ ἀγέννητον· διὰ τί γὰρ οὐχ ἕξει ; or, as some read it, διὰ τί γὰρ ἕξει; [3]. The latter was Alexander's way and he took Aristotle's meaning to be διὰ τί γὰρ ἕξει αἴσθησιν, interpreting, as Stephanus puts it, ἐρωτηματικῶς. Plutarch took the opposite view — τὴν ἐναντίαν βαδίσας — and took the question as διὰ τί γὰρ οὐχ ἕξει αἴσθησιν τὰ οὐράνια on the grounds that it was not better for a body not to be so endowed. Alexander had said it was better neither for body or soul to have sense-perception (Philop. *In de an.* p. 595, 36-596, 18 H.). As Stephanus says below they read the text differently, and as he points out at some length, the point rested on a difference between Platonists and Aristotelians (p. 596, 36 ff.). So here too we have a contrast between Plutarch the Platonist interpreter and Alexander the Aristotelian, a difference which also appears, and was seen to appear, in Plutarch's opinion that Aristotle thought children have νοῦς

[1] See below pp. 134 ff.

[2] Philop. *In de an.* pp. 465, 24 f. and 464, 20-25 H.

[3] *De an.* 434 b 3-5.

κα θ' ἕξιν [1]. We may take it then that Plutarch's approach was not utterly at variance with contemporary Neoplatonic trends and that he was not, as Themistius had been, an upholder of true Aristotelianism in his interpretation of the *De anima*.

It does not of course follow from this conclusion either that Plutarch's views were simply the conventional views of his time, or in particular that Proclus can be expected to agree with Plutarch on all points of interpretation of Aristotle's *De anima* or on his view of the soul — as we have suggested before there is not much difference between these. That there is unlikely to be any difference between a Neoplatonist's interpretation of Plato and his own views hardly needs to be said. And in this area we do find some points of disagreement, to be precise in the interpretation of the *Phaedo*. "Olympiodorus'" *Commentary on the Phaedo* gives us the only two reports of Platonist views I have been able to discover where Plutarch and Proclus appear together as the holders of different opinions. One is on a general philosophical point, the other on a piece of detailed interpretation. The first, which clearly need not be taken from expositions of the text which "Olympiodorus" (in fact Damascius) is discussing, namely *Phaedo* 69 e-70 a, gives a list of opinions about how much of the soul is immortal ... οἱ δὲ μέχρι τῆς ἀλογίας, ὡς τῶν μὲν παλαιῶν Ξενοκράτης καὶ Σπεύσιππος, τῶν δὲ νεωτέρων Ἰάμβλιχος καὶ Πλούταρχος· οἱ δὲ μέχρι μόνης τῆς λογικῆς, ὡς Πρόκλος καὶ Πορφύριος (p. 124, 13-20 Norvin) [2]. It is interesting that on this point at least, and a point of some importance, Plutarch lines up with Iamblichus while Proclus agrees with Porphyry — or at least stands between them — not what one would expect if Plutarch were in all matters a representative of

[1] Philop. *In de an.* pp. 518, 20 ff. and 519, 34 ff. A further difference of detailed interpretation may lie behind Simpl. *In de an.* p. 160, 7-13 H., where Simplicius does not report explicit disagreement, but Plutarch's explanation of *De an.* 422 b 27-31 would not make sense if he accepted Alexander's reading of the passage.

[2] The commentator may have over-simplified, cf. Proclus' own account, *In Ti.*, III pp. 234-8 Diehl.

a more sensible kind of Neoplatonism than that represented by Iamblichus and Proclus. That may be true in other areas, like metaphysics, where Plutarch probably did stand closer to Porphyry than to his more immediate predecessors [1]. We might also notice in passing that on this point at least Proclus' view is closer to what may have been Aristotle's than is Plutarch's, how close depends on what λογική was intended to cover here. The second text from Olympiodorus is concerned with the interpretation of *Phaedo* 66 b : who are the speakers? Plutarch said if they were γνήσιοι φιλόσοφοι, how could they endure the πάθη τῶν πολλῶν? Proclus said that they were the γνήσιοι φιλόσοφοι but that the πάθη Plato was talking about were those of men in general (p. 104, 18-23 Norvin). This is hardly a significant or very informative difference. It serves only to confirm that Proclus could disagree with Plutarch. Here he did so even where we know they studied the dialogue together : Plutarch, according to Marinus (*Procl.* 12), told the young Proclus that if he published their discussions of the *Phaedo* and *De anima* he would have his own commentary on the *Phaedo*. It might be as well to say at this point that there is no suggestion in Marinus that these readings also led to a commentary on the *De anima* by Proclus, and no other evidence that Proclus produced such a commentary — or at least that he published one, since it is likely enough that he did lecture on the *De anima* as part of the usual introductory course on Aristotle. It is not impossible however that he simply used Plutarch's commentary, either for the whole of the *De anima*, or for such parts as it covered, and merely pointed out places where he himself held a different view. One's assessment of the likelihood that Proclus did adopt some such procedure depends on how close Plutarch's interpretation of Aristotle's psychology — and so his own — was to that of Proclus. To this question we must now turn.

[1] Cf. E. Evrard, *art. cit.*, 398 f. and P. Hadot, *Porphyre et Victorinus* I (Paris 1968), 105.

Let us start from the top. Here we can be brief. The controversy between the Neoplatonists about the status of the human intellect is well known. Plotinus, admittedly unorthodox, held that the highest part of our soul does not descend [1], while Iamblichus, normally at least [2], and Proclus thought otherwise [3]. Though the second became the commonly accepted view, we cannot simply assume that it was universal, for Damascius took Plotinus' position [4]. Plutarch's adherence to the same view as Proclus can however be deduced from Stephanus' reports in his section on *De anima* III 5. There we are told that Plutarch thought that the human intellect was single and that it thought sometimes but not always: καὶ τοῦτον τὸν ἁπλοῦν οὐ λέγει ἀεὶ νοοῦντα, ἀλλά ποτε νοοῦντα (Philop. *In de an.* p. 535, 13-15 H.). Since we know that at least part of Proclus' objection to the Plotinian position was that it did not account for the fact that intellection was intermittent but ought, according to him, to entail permanent conscious intellection [5], we may take it that Plutarch's position was much the same, and that he meant by a single intellect the same as Proclus intended by having intellect and reason as parts of the same λογικὴ ψυχή, as opposed to putting *nous* and *dianoia* on different ontic levels. On this matter, then, Plutarch and Proclus agree. Since their agreement lies in holding a majority opinion, this would not be a matter of great significance had not R. Beutler argued that Plutarch held the Plotinian view [6]. But, as E. Evrard suspected, the evidence adduced by R. Beutler is probably not to the point [7]. Stephanus' remarks at Philop. *In de an.* p. 553, 10-12 H., on which he

[1] Cf. esp. IV 8, 8, 1-3.

[2] But cf. Simpl. *In Cat.* p. 191, 9 f. K.

[3] *Elem. theol.* 211; *In Parm.* p. 948, 18 ff. Cousin; *In Ti.*, III p. 333, 28 ff. Diehl.

[4] *Pr.* 400, II p. 254, 3 ff. Ruelle.

[5] Cf. *Elem. theol.* 211.

[6] *Plutarchos*, 965 f.

[7] *Art. cit.*, 393 n. 167.

relied, need have nothing to do with the human *nous*: hence the comment τὸ θεῖον γὰρ κεχώρισται.

More can be learnt about the relation between Proclus and Plutarch from a study of their views of the soul's faculties in relation to each other, and in particular how the upper and lower souls are linked. The difficulties involved in this issue centre round the role of *phantasia*. In Plotinus the difficulties had led to a duplication of this faculty. Plutarch and Proclus seem to share a certain indecisiveness in this area. The next section of this paper will discuss the apparently inconsistent statements and reports of their views on the status and operation of *doxa* and *phantasia*. That there are difficulties here in Proclus has already been noted. In particular M. Trouillard has pointed out that, in the *Timaeus commentary*, *doxa* seems to have the role later played by *phantasia* in the *Commentary on Euclid I* [1]. Closer examination of the relevant texts will, however, tend to show that we are not dealing with a straightforward development of Proclus' opinions, but that the situation is more complex than at first appears to be the case. Plutarch presents similar problems.

Given the fact that a Neoplatonic soul splits in a way roughly corresponding to functions involving or independent of the body, problems are liable to arise at the point of junction. That is perhaps obvious. The solutions offered were, however, different. Plotinus' duplication of the central faculty was clearly unsatisfactory. His reasons lay partly in the requirements of his eschatology: he wished the upper soul to retain memories arising from the activities of the lower soul and at the same time wanted to ensure that the upper soul had a power of memory and imagination completely independent of the lower to which this power properly belonged. This particular problem should not have arisen for Proclus since he did not admit the permanent survival of the irrational soul. Plutarch did, and

[1] Proclos, *Eléments de théologie* (Paris 1965), 34 n. 3.

thus exposed himself to the difficulties which Plotinus had encountered. It was perhaps to avoid these that he apparently tried to show that *phantasia* could be double and yet not double at the same time. Ps.-Philoponus reports as follows: τὴν δὲ φαντασίαν διττὴν οἴεται Πλούταρχος· καὶ τὸ μὲν πέρας αὐτῆς τὸ ἐπὶ τὰ ἄνω, ἤγουν ἡ ἀρχὴ αὐτῆς, πέρας ἐστὶ τοῦ διανοητικοῦ, τὸ δὲ ἄλλο πέρας αὐτῆς κορυφή ἐστι τῶν αἰσθήσεων (*In de an.* p. 515, 12-15 H.). But for Plutarch this duality was not incompatible with unity: a few lines below we are given the parallel Plutarch produced to account for its situation. The duality, which at first sight appears to be one of being, is rather one of function. The parallel Plutarch gave is of two lines, one from above and one from below, meeting at a point: the point is one in so far as it is a single point, but two in so far as it may be taken either with the upper or with the lower line. This would suggest that *phantasia* might similarly be taken as double in so far as it is linked with what is above and below, but Plutarch seems to have thought that it was double in a different sense. Having set out the parallel of the lines meeting at a point he went on to say οὕτω καὶ ἡ φαντασία δύναται καὶ ὡς ἓν καὶ ὡς δύο λαμβάνεσθαι, διότι τῶν μὲν αἰσθητῶν τὸ διῃρημένον εἰς ἓν συναθροίζει, τῶν δὲ θείων τὸ ἁπλοῦν καὶ ὡς ἄν τις εἴποι ἑνιαῖον εἰς τύπους τινὰς καὶ μορφὰς διαφόρους ἀναμάττεται (*ibid.*, 26-29): here the point seems to be that the faculty is agent and focus of both convergence and divergence at the same time. As reported by Stephanus the parallel is intended to illustrate the position of the upper limit of the faculty which is in contact with the reasoning faculty: οὕτω τὸ ἄνω μέρος τῆς φαντασίας τὸ συναπτόμενον τῷ διανοητικῷ ἐστιν (*ibid.*, 22-23), rather than the connection of *phantasia* with higher and lower faculties.

In any case it is clear that, according to this testimony, Plutarch intended *phantasia* to be the centre of the soul. It borders immediately on *dianoia* above and *aisthesis* below. Yet in another passage of Stephanus it appears that a similar position is occupied by *doxa*. There we are told that Plutarch said that

it is the function of the λογικὴ ψυχή to take cognisance of the activities of the senses and that *doxa* is the means by which it does so: φησὶ γὰρ ὅτι κατὰ τὸ ἄτιμον μέρος τῆς λογικῆς ψυχῆς, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἡ δόξα, τοῦτο γίνεται. The reason, which appears to be Plutarch's, is that *doxa* links the rational and the irrational souls: ἡ γὰρ δόξα, τὸ κοινότατον μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ ἄτιμον, συνάπτει τὴν λογικὴν τῇ ἀλόγῳ (*In de an.* p. 464, 23-7 H.). Since *doxa* must come below *dianoia* and is here stated to be in contact with the senses, it would seem to occupy the same position in the soul which *phantasia* occupied in the other passage. Have we then a similar uncertainty about *doxa* and *phantasia* to that which appears in Proclus? There is unfortunately a further difficulty about Plutarch. In the course of the next page of Stephanus, where he is still discussing how we perceive that we perceive, we read that certain νεώτεροι ἐξηγηταί, following neither Alexander nor Plutarch, and rejecting Aristotle himself, said that such perception was the work of a δύναμις προσεκτική which perceived not only the activities of the senses, but also those of the higher cognitive faculties. These interpreters complained about Plutarch saying that *doxa* was responsible, on the grounds that it does not cognize the activities of *nous*, whereas there should be one thing registering the activities of all the soul's faculties. Though he accepts their προσεκτικόν, our commentator dismisses this complaint in the following words: ταῦτα δὲ λέγοντες οὐ κατηγοροῦσι Πλουτάρχου· οὐδαμοῦ γὰρ αὐτὸν εὗρον λέγοντα ὅτι ἡ δύναμις ἡ αἰσθανομένη τῶν ἐνεργειῶν τῶν αἰσθήσεων τῆς δόξης ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ συμφωνεῖ κατὰ τοῦτο τῷ Ἀλεξάνδρῳ, τὴν κοινὴν αἴσθησιν καὶ αὐτὸς αἰτιώμενος... (p. 465, 22-6 H.). How can one reconcile these two reports? Even if in the first the word δόξα was not used by Plutarch himself, but the words ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἡ δόξα were rather the commentator's gloss on τὸ ἄτιμον μέρος τῆς λογικῆς ψυχῆς, and the sentence about δόξα joining the irrational to the rational soul were to be explained in the same way, we should still have to say that Stephanus on p. 464 understood Plutarch to have held a view for which he was blamed by the νεώτεροι ἐξηγηταί

and wrongly blamed in Stephanus' opinion, because according to Stephanus on p. 465, he did not hold it. One possible explanation — and it is admittedly speculative — is that what we have on p. 464 is a report taken from the text of one of the νεώτεροι ἐξηγηταί themselves [1], while Stephanus' statement on p. 465 relies on his own reading of a text of Plutarch other than the one they used. That Plutarch changed his mind during the course of his long career is, of course, quite possible.

Thus, given the lack of conclusive evidence, we cannot be certain what Plutarch's view was, or how the text of Stephanus is to be explained. If, however, the view that the senses' activities are perceived by *doxa* were one of two views that Plutarch held, and one that he held towards the end of his career, having perhaps substituted *doxa* for *phantasia* because of inherited difficulties about the latter, and if, further, we are right in taking the remark about *doxa* uniting the upper and lower souls as his, then we might have here a connection between Plutarch's thought and the concept of *doxa* that appears in Proclus' *Timaeus commentary*. That, as we know, was an early work [2], and so one where it would be reasonable to expect that Proclus still held views learned from his teachers, which he may subsequently have altered. But before we can go further than merely suggesting this as a possibility, we must attempt to clear up the role of *phantasia* and *doxa* not only in the *Timaeus commentary*, but in Proclus' thought as a whole.

Here we are faced with two sets of problems, for neither the status nor the role of these two powers is clearly or consistently described. Thus it is not surprising that the discussion to Mme A. Charles' paper on imagination to the Royaumont congress reflected a feeling that the status of *phantasia* was unre-

[1] So too R. Beutler, *Plutarchos*, 966; Beutler, however, implies that Plutarch is simply misreported.

[2] Cf. Marinus, *Procl.* 13.

solved [1]. This is perhaps a feeling that adequately represents the truth. The point is that any attempt to find a simple answer to the question, "what did Proclus mean by φαντασία, and what role did he assign to it?" is unlikely to succeed.

Let us then consider what sort of answer might be correct. What is immediately clear is that in the *Timaeus commentary* Proclus has much more to say about *doxa* and much less about *phantasia* than in the other works [2]. The import of his statements, however, is not clear. At first sight the usual view in this work seems to be that the immediate neighbour of *aisthesis* on the higher side is *doxa*. In the first place we have a number of passages which mention several faculties or activities, and do not include *phantasia* between *doxa* and *aisthesis*, such as I p. 257, 18 ff. Diehl. Of course we cannot be sure that any of these are intended to be complete, even for that part of the soul which they cover. In addition some of these texts expressly locate *doxa* next to the sensitive faculty. So at *In Ti.*, I p. 248, 22-8 Diehl, we read : ἔχεται δὲ τῆς δόξης ἡ αἴσθησις, μέση μὲν καὶ αὐτὴ οὖσα τοῦ τε αἰσθητηρίου καὶ τῆς δόξης· τὸ μὲν γὰρ αἰσθητήριον μετὰ πάθους ἀντιλαμβάνεται τῶν αἰσθητῶν ... ἡ δὲ δόξα γνῶσιν ἔχει καθαρὰν πάθους, ἡ δὲ αἴσθησις μετέχει μέν πως καὶ τοῦ πάθους, ἔχει δέ τι καὶ γνωστικόν, καθόσον ἐνίδρυται τῷ δοξαστικῷ καὶ ἐλλάμπεται παρ' αὐτοῦ καὶ γίνεται λογοειδής ... Further, one passage implies that *doxa* belongs to the lower soul rather than the upper where it is clearly placed elsewhere [3]. At II p. 247, 9-16 the joint of the soul comes at the lowest part of the διανοητικόν and the summit of the δοξαστικόν — this seems to indicate that τὸ δοξαστικόν belongs to the part of the soul in which *aisthesis* and the desires are located, that is the part of which *phantasia* is normally the

[1] *L'imagination, miroir de l'âme selon Proclus*, in *Le Néoplatonisme*, Colloques internat. du C.N.R.S., Royaumont 9-13. 6. 1969 (Paris 1971), 249-51.

[2] It is evident that this is not merely a consequence of the subject matter of the *Timaeus*.

[3] Cf. *In Ti.*, I p. 223, 16 f.; *In R.*, II p. 91, 9 f. Kroll; *Oracles chaldaïques*, fr. 2.

highest part in Neoplatonic psychology in general and Proclus' other works in particular.

The passage from I p. 248 suggests that *doxa* performs the function which we might expect to be that of *phantasia*, namely the reception and transmission ἀπαθῶς of what *aisthesis* perceives without such freedom from affection. That *doxa* has the same objects as *aisthesis* is shown, if it needs to be, by a statement two pages further on that there is a power superior to *aisthesis*, namely *doxa*, μηκέτι δι' ὀργάνου γινώσκουσα, ἀλλὰ δι' ἑαυτῆς τὰ αἰσθητὰ καὶ τὴν παχύτητα τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἐπανορθουμένη (I p. 250, 5-8). Shortly before we find that *doxa* has the duty of passing judgement on the data provided by sense perception, a function which is perhaps more appropriate to the discursive reason (I p. 249, 13 ff.). The point of mentioning this here is that *doxa* appears to behave as an ordinary faculty of the Neoplatonized Aristotelian type soul, rather than merely being a blanket term for all modes of cognition relating to the sensible world such as we should find were Proclus merely using it after the manner of Plato. At II p. 310, 8-10 we find that *doxa* is explicitly described as an activity τῆς δοξαστικῆς ψυχῆς, though this passage may be Iamblichus rather than Proclus [1], and in any case refers specifically to the cosmic soul. We are also told that *doxa* is the rational soul's link with the irrational. Proclus even says that this is generally accepted : ὅτι μὲν οὖν πέρας ἐστὶ τῆς λογικῆς ἁπάσης ζωῆς καὶ ὅτι συνάπτεται πρὸς τὸ ἀκρότατον τῆς ἀλόγου, πολλάκις ἐστὶ τεθρυλημένον (I p. 248, 7-10) [2].

Now if *doxa* is as clearly connected with *aisthesis* as it appears to be in the texts we have mentioned, one consequence would be that there is relatively little scope for *phantasia*. And in a number of passages we find that *phantasia* is in fact very closely

[1] It is attributed to him by B. Dalsgaard Larsen, *Jamblique de Chalcis..., Appendice : Testimonia et fragmenta exegetica* (Aarhus 1972), fr. 257, and with some reservations by J. M. Dillon, *Iamblichi Chalcidensis In Platonis dialogos commentariorum fragmenta* (Leiden 1973), fr. 59 : cf. his commentary on this fragment, pp. 340-2.

[2] Cf. also *In Ti.*, III p. 286, 29 ff., quoted below p. 141.

linked with *aisthesis*, if not actually identified with it [1]. In an account of which gods cause what in this world Proclus says that while Hermes is the cause of the κινήσεις of *phantasia*, the sun, which he has previously said is the maker of all the senses, has made its οὐσία, ὡς μιᾶς οὔσης αἰσθήσεως καὶ φαντασίας (*In Ti.*, III p. 69, 18-20 Diehl). Elsewhere it is not clear whether or not *phantasia* and *aisthesis* are to be taken as separate or as aspects of one faculty : so at I p. 352, 28-32, discussing what we must have for knowledge of the images of reality, he writes : δεόμεθα γὰρ καὶ φαντασίας καὶ αἰσθήσεως καὶ ὀργάνων ἄλλων τῶν πολλῶν πρὸς τὴν γνῶσιν.

There are however a number of passages in the *Timaeus commentary* which apparently include *phantasia* as a full and independent faculty. At I p. 255, 9-13 there is a list of what appear to be powers which are moved by *logos* when it judges their appropriate objects ... τὰ δὲ δοξαστὰ κρίνων κινεῖ καὶ τὴν δόξαν, τὰ δὲ φανταστὰ τὴν φαντασίαν, τὰ δὲ αἰσθητὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν. But a list of criteria ascribed to Plato on the previous page reads : τοῖς μὲν νοητοῖς νοῦν ... τοῖς δὲ διανοητικοῖς διάνοιαν, τοῖς δὲ δοξαστοῖς δόξαν, τοῖς δὲ αἰσθητοῖς αἴσθησιν (p. 254, 25-7). Earlier φανταστικὴ γνῶσις is considered, but rejected, as a candidate for νόησις in νοήσει μετὰ λόγου περιληπτόν [2] (I p. 244, 19 ff.). It is however a candidate put up ὑπό τινων, and so the occurrence of φανταστικὴ γνῶσις here may not tell us anything about Proclus himself. But at I p. 343, 3 ff. *phantasia* comes in a series of faculties each of which may refute that below : ἐπεὶ καὶ αἴσθησιν μὲν ἐλέγχει φαντασία, διότι μετὰ πάθους γινώσκει κατὰ σύγκρισιν ἢ διάκρισιν, ὧν αὐτὴ καθαρεύει· δόξα δὲ φαντασίαν...

In addition there is a further group of passages, in which *phantasia* is prominent, whose status is, or may be, different.

[1] This has been noticed by W. O'Neill, Proclus, *Alcibiades I* (The Hague 1965), 107 n.323, who simply takes it as one of two senses of *phantasia*, the other being that where *phantasia* is a faculty between reason and perception.

[2] *Ti.* 28 a.

First we have a list of entities or faculties which deal with various kinds of object in different ways : τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ γινώσκει ὁ θεὸς μὲν ἡνωμένως, νοῦς δὲ ὁλικῶς, λόγος δὲ καθολικῶς, φαντασία δὲ μορφωτικῶς, αἴσθησις δὲ παθητικῶς (I p. 352, 16-18). Now this list immediately follows a reference to Porphyry and looks like explanation of the view attributed to him that forms of knowledge are not characterised by the nature of their objects : rather ταῖς τῶν γινωσκόντων διαφοραῖς ἀλλοῖος γίγνεται τῆς γνώσεως ὁ τρόπος. A. R. Sodano, who prints these words as a fragment [1] of Porphyry's *Timaeus commentary*, stops the fragment there, but the following words may well be Porphyry's own explanation. A similar question arises over a passage where Proclus reports that Porphyry explains children's good memory by saying that their souls have less experience of human evil : ἅτε οὖν μήτε περισπώμεναι μήτε ἐνοχλούμεναι ὑπὸ τῶν ἐκτὸς εὐτύπωτον μὲν ἔχουσι τὸ φανταστικόν ... Proclus gives two further explanations involving *phantasia*, and in all three it has the status of a faculty. The last sentence of this discussion seems to sum up and take account of the whole in a way which strongly suggests that it may all be Porphyry, that is as far as πάσχοντες (I p. 194, 14-195, 8). On this occasion again A. R. Sodano does not print the whole text, but does express hesitation [2]. In one further passage, at I p. 395, 22 ff., we read of *phantasia*'s activities, καὶ μὴν καὶ ἡ φαντασία πολλὰ περὶ τὸ σῶμα παθήματα ἀπεργάζεται παρ' αὐτὴν μόνην τὴν ἑαυτῆς ἐνέργειαν. This point is developed at some length. The remarks come in the course of a series of objections by Porphyry against Atticus' views on creation. Here it is quite clear that the whole portion on *phantasia* is to be attributed to Porphyry himself — this time A. R. Sodano prints the whole section [3] — and that strengthens the case for taking the other

[1] A. R. Sodano, *Porphyrii In Platonis Timaeum commentariorum fragmenta* (Napoli 1964), fr. 45.

[2] Fr. 25, and note *ad loc.*

[3] Down to p. 396, 3 : fr. 51 = p. 38, 15-24.

two texts as representing Porphyry's views rather than Proclus' own.

There is nevertheless a residue of passages which have *phantasia* as a faculty and which appear to give Proclus' own views. Some we have already cited, but the most important is III p. 286, 29 ff. This passage, inconsistently with that which puts the junction of the soul at the meeting-place of *dianoia* and *doxa*, has *doxa* and *phantasia* juxtaposed at the centre of the soul : ἔστι γὰρ βάσις μὲν τῆς λογικῆς ζωῆς ἡ δόξα. κορυφὴ δὲ ἡ φαντασία τῆς δευτέρας, καὶ συνάπτουσιν ἀλλήλαις ἥ τε δόξα καὶ ἡ φαντασία καὶ πληροῦται δυνάμεων ἡ δευτέρα παρὰ τῆς κρείττονος. Yet a few lines before Proclus has distinguished between an αἴσθησις μεριστή, πάθεσι συμμιγῆ ποιουμένη τὴν κρίσιν, ἔνυλος and another which is ἄϋλος, καθαρά, γνῶσις ἀπαθής, and has the same nature as *phantasia* : which it is depends on whether it operates internally or externally. Does the existence of this set of texts mean that the first group we have discussed merely omit *phantasia* but still leave room for it, in spite of indications to the contrary, or do we have here some evidence of doubt preliminary to a change of view?

That the latter may be the case is indicated by evidence from Proclus' other works, and I should like to suggest that we can see some traces of the change : if so, the last passage we have cited, with its distinction of two kinds of *aisthesis*, one of which is of the same nature as *phantasia*, may be a token of the way the change took place.

For in the *Alcibiades commentary* we find that *aisthesis* and *phantasia* are clearly distinguished, while *doxa* and *phantasia* seem to have come closer together. But again all is not clear. At 288, 5-8 (Creuzer) the reception of stimuli from *aisthesis*, *phantasia*, *doxa*, *thumos* and *epithumia* is given as a cause of internal discord. Here *doxa* and *phantasia* are separate, though the presence of *thumos* and *epithumia* makes one wonder whether Proclus is in fact treating them all as faculties rather than as activities. But at 140, 16 f. we are given a hierarchy of faculties : νοῦς γὰρ

προσέχως ὑπὲρ διάνοιαν, διάνοια δὲ ὑπὲρ δόξαν καὶ φαντασίαν. That this list ends as it does, rather than with καὶ δόξαν (or δόξαν δὲ) ὑπὲρ φαντασίαν, at least suggests that these two are taken together. Further at 199, 5-8 we have a distinction between *aisthesis* knowing things ἐνύλως which are ἀϋλότερον ἐν τῇ φαντασίᾳ, a distinction which implies a substantial difference such as was denied in the *Timaeus commentary*.

Signs of a similar process may be seen in the *Cratylus commentary*, with an interesting addition. For here we find two passages, though in neither case part of a psychological discussion, which refer to ἄλογος δόξα. In the first Proclus says that while Socrates is analogous to *nous*, Hermogenes is analogous to ἄλογος δόξα ἐφιεμένη τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, Callias to σωματοειδὴς φαντασία καὶ ἔνυλος (*In Cra.* 67, p. 29, 1-3 Pasquali). Here one is reminded of Plotinus' distinction between a first *phantasia* which is *doxa* and another περὶ τὰ κάτω ἀμυδρὰ οἷον δόξα [1]. In the second, *à propos* applying names according to different aspects of an entity he exemplifies ὥσπερ εἴ τις τὴν ἄλογον δόξαν φαντασίαν προσαγορεύοι, ἢ τὸν νοῦν διάνοιαν, πρὸς ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο βλέπων (113, p. 65, 13-15). A possible inference from these remarks is that he is now thinking of *doxa* as something much closer to *phantasia* than to the faculties of the rational soul with which he sometimes classes it [2]. If this is correct the statement that *doxa* and *phantasia* are virtually brothers, *qua* neighbours, which follows the first of these two texts, may well signify more than mere quasi-spatial juxtaposition. Another passage, where Proclus says that the things above the heavens would not be μνημονευτὰ καὶ διὰ φαντασίας ἢ δόξης ἢ διανοίας γνωστά (113, p. 66, 9 f.), does not show that *doxa* and *phantasia* should be taken together : on the other hand the absence of *aisthesis* here could indicate that *phantasia* was being taken with what comes above rather than

[1] III 6, 4, 19-21. It should, however, be noted, that both may belong to the irrational soul, cf. *Plotinus' Psychology*, 92 f.

[2] Cf. n. 3 p. 137.

below, that is, that it is being distinguished from *aisthesis* to a greater extent than from *doxa*. Neither of these commentaries, however, gives anything like a full treatment of the soul's organization.

The *Republic commentary* contains the most comprehensive scheme in Proclus of the soul's faculties and activities. This shows *doxa* and *phantasia* co-existing as two separate faculties, one attached to the higher and one to the lower soul. As there are ὀρέξεις and γνώσεις in the ψυχὴ λογική (including two kinds of ὄρεξις and γνῶσις, one concerned with what is above, the other with what is below), so irrational powers exist as images of these, ἡ μὲν φανταστικὴ τῆς νοητικῆς, ἡ δὲ αἰσθητικὴ τῆς δοξαστικῆς (*In R.*, I p. 235, 2 ff. Kroll). As far as cognitive faculties go we have approximately the same position as in the passage from the *Timaeus commentary* which gave *doxa* and *phantasia* as the bottom and top of the two levels of soul. Nevertheless the usual situation in this commentary is roughly the reverse of that in the *Timaeus commentary* : there too there is an explicit list which contains both, but *doxa* is generally present on occasions where several faculties are mentioned, while *phantasia* is most often absent, here *phantasia* is generally present while *doxa* more often is not. Thus at II p. 277, 18 f. there is a list of criteria : κριτήρια μὲν γὰρ ἄπταιστα λόγος καὶ νοῦς, ἐπταισμένα δὲ φαντασία καὶ αἴσθησις. Here *doxa* is not listed as a critical faculty as it had been in the *Timaeus commentary*, nor is it even given as a correlative of *aisthesis* as one might expect from the first *In R.* passage. It must of course be admitted that such lists tend to be incomplete : thus at I p. 111, 19-22 νοῦς, ψυχὴ νοερά, φαντασία and αἴσθησις participate in different ways in θεὸς μετεχόμενος ; *doxa* is absent, but then so is *dianoia*, and both could be included in ψυχὴ νοερά. And there are texts which may refer to both *doxa* and *phantasia*. So at I p. 105, 5-9 we read : ὁποῖ' ἄττα γὰρ ἂν ᾖ τὰ τῆς ζωῆς εἴδη, τοιαύτην ἀνάγκη καὶ τὴν μέθεξιν γίνεσθαι τῶν κρειττόνων· καὶ οἱ μὲν νοερῶς τῶν νοερῶν μετέχουσιν, οἱ δὲ δοξαστικῶς, οἱ δὲ φανταστικῶς, καὶ οἱ μὲν ἀπαθῶς τῶν παθῶν,

οἱ δὲ μετριοπαθῶς, οἱ δὲ ἐμπαθῶς. But in such a context we cannot, of course, be sure that δοξαστικῶς and φανταστικῶς imply the existence of faculties.

This commentary also discusses specifically whether or not τὸ φανταστικόν is the same as τὸ αἰσθητικόν. Proclus begins by saying that it would seem that when it works externally it is αἰσθητικόν, but when it retains what it has perceived then it is φανταστικόν. Yet he concludes that they are different κατ' οὐσίαν (I p. 233, 3-16). And this is the reverse of the situation in the *Timaeus commentary* where we were told that the οὐσία of both *aisthesis* and *phantasia* is the same.

That in spite of all these signs that its scope has diminished *doxa* remained a faculty in its own right throughout may be seen from *De mal. subsist.* 56, 7-9, if the *Tria Opuscula* are indeed late [1]. And though at *De prov.* 27, 4-6 Proclus seems to acknowledge that it was not one of Aristotle's types of cognition — or even Plato's — and to call its existence into question, it re-appears in the following chapter. That both *doxa* and *phantasia* were kept throughout may possibly have had something to do with Plotinus' original difficulties with *phantasia.*

We have not yet considered the *Commentary on Euclid I.* Here *doxa* is generally absent, while there are constant references to *phantasia.* It does not, however, follow that this work represents the term of the suggested development in Proclus' views. There are special reasons for the prominence of *phantasia* in this work which do not apply to Proclus' other writings, namely that he is concerned to explain how we can have representations of the spatially extended concepts which are the objects of geometry (cf. esp. p. 54, 22 ff. Friedlein) [2]. The point of the references to *doxa,* which are not frequent, is generally that

[1] Cf. H. Boese, *Procli Diadochi Tria Opuscula* (Berlin 1960), p. IX f., and W. Beierwaltes, Philosophische Marginalien zu Proklos-Texten, in *Philos. Rdschau* 10 (1962), 65.

[2] The connection between *phantasia* and mathematics already appears at *In Ti.,* II p. 237, 11-15.

mathematical knowledge is superior to it : otherwise they merely locate it below *dianoia* (p. 11, 26 ff.) [1], which is, *inter alia,* the faculty of mathematical reasoning (p. 18, 10-17). It is therefore by no means clear that *phantasia* in this work simply replaces *doxa.* We can only say with safety that *doxa* is generally irrelevant to the questions at issue. It is classed with *aisthesis* as being concerned with externals (p. 18, 14-17) and, unlike the objects of mathematics, their objects are subject to change (p. 27, 7 f.). What we can say is that there is here no suggestion that *doxa* processes the products of *aisthesis,* but only that it too deals with sensible objects. *Phantasia,* on the other hand, is directly in contact with sense-perception. At p. 45, 5-10 Proclus says that the Pythagoreans saw that learning is *anamnesis,* not something coming from outside ὥσπερ τὰ ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσθητῶν φαντάσματα τυποῦται ἐν τῇ φαντασίᾳ, οὐδ' ἐπεισοδιώδης οὖσα, καθάπερ ἡ δοξαστικὴ γνῶσις. Here δοξαστικὴ γνῶσις may be merely a form of activity without Proclus necessarily thinking of it as that of a separate faculty. Some support for the first alternative might be seen in the reference at p. 52, 20 f. to *phantasia* τὸ μέσον κέντρον κατέχουσα τῶν γνώσεων, for here *phantasia* is placed straightforwardly at the centre of the soul's cognitive faculties : if we compare this with statements we have already noted that *doxa* and *phantasia* are juxtaposed at the centre of the soul, then it would seem that we have further evidence for the demotion of *doxa* from the role it had in the *Timaeus commentary,* and possibly to a greater extent than in the *Republic commentary.* Moreover *phantasia* seems to be more clearly separated from *aisthesis* than in the other works. But *doxa* still retains its independence : at p. 95, 26 ff. Proclus says the unit and number, by which, he explains, he means μοναδικὸς ἀριθμός, have their existence in *doxa,* and therefore have no shape or extension, whereas even the point is extended quasi-spatially in *phantasia.* This relationship again has *doxa* above *phantasia.*

[1] Following an exposition of the Divided Line.

Nevertheless *phantasia* is perhaps more closely, or at least more explicitly, linked with thought here than elsewhere. In a passage which has already received some attention [1], Proclus compares *phantasia* to a mirror in which the soul sees reflections of reality (p. 141, 2 ff.) : earlier he had described it as a mirror in which the *logoi* in *dianoia* are reflected externally (p. 121, 1-7) — an old image that Plotinus had used to explain our consciousness of *noesis* [2]. Put more directly, *dianoia* deploys its objects and refers them to *phantasia* which is on its threshold : it cherishes the separation from sensibles but finds τὴν φανταστὴν ὕλην a suitable receptacle for its objects (p. 54, 27 ff.). What *phantasia* "thinks" are impressions and forms of a thought : πᾶν, ὅπερ ἂν νοῇ, τύπος ἐστὶ καὶ μορφὴ νοήματος (p. 52, 25 f.). But the point is still *phantasia*'s role in the representation of mathematical figures. Nothing suggests that its nature is much different from that indicated by the other works, though the emphasis here is very much on its activity in relation to higher faculties [3]. Proclus makes the point that it receives not only *logoi* from *dianoia* but also τὰς τῶν νοερῶν καὶ θείων εἰδῶν ἐμφάσεις (p. 94, 22-4). So it would probably be fair to say that the scope of *doxa* has been restricted by the closing of the gap between *phantasia* and *dianoia*. As in the *Republic commentary*, and perhaps to a greater extent, *phantasia* is now in a position similar to that of *doxa* in the *Timaeus commentary*.

We may conclude this discussion of Proclus' treatment of *doxa* and *phantasia* as follows. Both appear throughout his works, but in the accounts of the soul's operations it is *doxa* that is more important at the stage represented by the *Timaeus commentary*, while *phantasia* becomes increasingly important thereafter.

If this is correct, and if Plutarch's view about the function of *doxa* and its status at the centre of the soul was his later

[1] Cf. A. CHARLES, *loc. cit.* (n. 1 p. 137).

[2] IV 3, 30, 7-11. Cf. also Porphyry, *Gaur.* VI, p. 42, 9 Kalbfleisch, where *phantasia* is not itself the mirror.

[3] Cf. also *In Euc.* p. 56, 10-22 Friedlein.

view, then Proclus has started from a position like Plutarch's and moved away from it during the course of his philosophical career. The connection between *phantasia* and thought, though it appears clearly only in the *Euclid commentary*, could also have been retained from Plutarch, who explained why thought does not continue for ever by saying that *nous* works μετὰ φαντασίας [1]. In any case we know that both had the same view about the status of *nous*. If we take these points together we may say that in those areas where we do have evidence Proclus' ideas on psychology corresponded with, or developed from, those expressed by Plutarch in the course of his exposition of Aristotle. Whether or not Syrianus was an intermediary must remain an open question, but the fact that Proclus is known to have studied psychological works with Plutarch makes it unnecessary to assume that he was. Apart from the specific comparisons we have discussed, one further point may be made. This is that if Plutarch's interpretation of Aristotle's psychology was, as we have argued, less austere, and less like Alexander's interpretation than has sometimes been suggested, then it is in general more likely that Proclus will have followed him in matters where his influence can no longer be identified.

ADDENDA: p. 132 lines 7-8: Additional note against 'Damascius took Plotinus' position': I have since been convinced that I have misinterpreted the relevent text (see n.4) and that Damascius held the normal late Neoplatonic view. The matter is discussed by I. Hadot, *Le Problème du Néoplatonisme alexandrin: Hiéroclès et Simplicius* (Paris 1978) 171f.

[1] Philop. *In de an.* p. 541, 20-24 H.

XIII

MARINUS' LIFE OF PROCLUS : NEOPLATONIST BIOGRAPHY

Like so many entities in Neoplatonic thought itself, Neoplatonist biography can be arranged as a triad : biography of an earlier thinker by a Neoplatonist, biography of a Neoplatonist by another Neoplatonist, biography of a Neoplatonist by a writer who was not himself a Neoplatonist. This classification is not simply a rather facile *jeu d'esprit*, but serves to isolate the three biographies of Neoplatonic thinkers which have in common that they were written by pupils of those thinkers, pupils who were themselves practising Neoplatonists and whose philosophical views therefore resembled those of their subjects : I say resembled advisedly because it is still frequently if erroneously held that there was a unitary philosophical system which may be labelled "Neoplatonism", or at best two such systems, "Plotinian" and "post-Plotinian" Neoplatonism. The biographies that fall into this group are also, fortuitously, three in number, Porphyry's *Life of Plotinus*, Marinus' *Life of Proclus*, and Damascius' *Life of Isidorus*. They are to be distinguished from lives of "classical" thinkers, those of Pythagoras by Porphyry and Iamblichus, though the latter, in spite of the wealth of miscellaneous information about Pythagoras – or, at least Pythagoreanism – that it contains (1), is not strictly a biography, and Olympiodorus' short *Life of Plato*. The *Life of Aristotle* attributed to Ammonius is, as has long been recognised, misattributed (2). In so far as these works contain Neoplatonic ideas, which characteristically appear as anachronistic misinterpretations, they are not without interest in the present

References to Marinus, *Vita Procli* are by chapter, and page and line of J. F. Boissonade's (1814) edition as printed in the Didot edition of Diogenes Laertius, ed. Cobet, Paris, 1850. Unspecified references to Porphyry are to the *Sententiae*, chapter 32, by page and line of E. Lamberz' Teubner edition, Leipzig, 1975.

(1) Rather it is a treatise on an appropriate way of line, cf. W. Burkert, trans. E. L. Minar, *Lore and Science in Ancient Pythagoreanism*, Cambridge (Mass.), 1972, 97.

(2) Cf. J. Freudenthal, *Ammonius* (15), *RE*, II.i. 1894, 1865.

context but they are not our concern here. Nor are those lives of Neoplatonists written by outsiders, or for practical purposes the sympathetic but not professional outsider Eunapius ; he does not of course cover the later figures in the movement.

Though the three biographies of and by Neoplatonists have that in common, they do differ in certain important respects. The differences reflect the persons and philosophical outlooks of the biographers and their subjects as well as divergent purposes in producing the biographies themselves. At one extreme we have Porphyry's *Life of Plotinus*, about which I do not propose to say much now. For the present I am interested in three points of contrast between it and the *Life of Proclus*.

1) With all the care that needs to be taken about such generalizations, it is, I think, permissible to say that Porphyry as well as Plotinus, and in his case there can be no doubt about it, represent a more philosophical and correspondingly less religious Neoplatonism than that of Iamblichus and his successors ; I use successors in an exclusively chronological sense. That must be, at least in part, responsible for the less hagiographical tone of this work, and a lesser interest in the irrational.

2) Porphyry was a man of comparable intellect to his master, whose thought we can be fairly sure that he understood, though there are a few cases of probably unwitting distortion – not so much in the *Life* as in the *Sententiae*. Nevertheless he regarded himself as having provided an important stimulus to Plotinus' teaching and writing. He claims, for instance, that Plotinus was more productive and wrote better during the time that he, Porphyry, was with him in Rome (cf. *V. Plot.*, 6.31-37), and some have thought that the long discussion of problems about the soul mentioned in *V. Plot.*, 13.10-17 was the basis of Plotinus' huge treatise on that subject (3), a belief for, which, however, there is no good evidence. Marinus worshipped Proclus from below. Damascius tended to look down on Isidorus from above (4).

(3) *Enn.*, IV.3-5 ; for this suggestion cf. H. DÖRRIE, *Porphyrios' "Symmikta Zetemata"*, Zetemata, 20, Munich, 1959, 18, n. 1 ; *contra* my *Plotinus' Psychology*, The Hague, 1971, 16, n. 1.

(4) Cf. e.g. PHOTIUS, *cod.*, 242, 226 and 246 = DAMASCIUS, *Vita Isidori* ed. C. ZINTZEN, Hildesheim, 1967, pp. 292 and 302.

3) The main purpose of Porphyry's *Life* was almost certainly to act as an introduction to his edition of the *Enneads*. Hence much of it is concerned with technical and scholarly matters such as one might find in the introduction to a major modern edition : we do not of course have a commentary, though it has been argued that parts of such a commentary are to be found in the Arabic *Theology of Aristotle* (5). Thus much of the material in it is not of a kind that we should expect to find in the other two. Possible parallels, such as an explanation by Philoponus of his procedures in publishing Ammonius' courses, must remain among the list of scholarly *desiderata*.

Marinus' life of Proclus is, at least superficially, more biographical than either of the other two. It is more biographical than the *Life of Plotinus*, because of the special features of that life which we have already mentioned, and also than the *Life of Isidorus*, because that is much less of a *βίος* of one man. In fact if it were not for the introductory words *ἐκ τοῦ Ἰσιδώρου βίου* (6) at the head of Photius *cod.* 242, the somewhat disjointed collection of extracts which provides most of our evidence for this work, we should probably entertain serious doubts about its description, and be inclined to identify it with the work listed as *φιλόσοφος ἱστορία* in the *Suda*, where a *Life of Isidorus* does not appear. That is because many of the extracts are not about Isidorus at all, but about other philosophers whom Isidorus and Damascius had read, or with whom they had studied. Some of the pieces have no clear reference, coming as they do from that end of Photius' work – the last 47 *codices* – where extracts are notoriously disconnected (7), so that one cannot always be sure what they are about. But it would not be totally inaccurate to give the work some such label as Damascius "a history of modern Neoplatonism up to and including Isidorus, my immediate predecessor as *διάδοχος* at the Academy". I shall leave

(5) By P. THILLET, *Indices porphyriens dans la Théologie d'Aristote*, in *Le Néoplatonisme*. Colloques Internat. du CNRS. Royaumont 9-13.6.1969. Paris, 1971, 292-302.

(6) The previous *ἀνεγνώσθη* is probably redundant, cf. W. T. TREADGOLD, *The Nature of the Bibliotheca of Photius*. Dumbarton Oaks Studies 18. Washington, 1980, 42.

(7) Cf. TREADGOLD, *ibid.*, 43-44.

aside the question of what is meant by "the Academy" (8), and return to Marinus.

Before going any further it might be useful to set out a few facts about this biography and its subject. Proclus belongs wholly to the fifth century, and primarily to Athens, though the cross-fertilisation between the two centres of learning, which has been documented by H.-D. Saffrey and others (9), means that he was as important to Alexandrian Platonism as to Athenian. His teacher Syrianus taught Hermias, the father of Ammonius, who in his turn studied at Athens with Proclus himself and later taught Damascius and Simplicius at Alexandria, as well as instituting the Alexandrian tradition of writing commentary on Aristotle from a Neoplatonic standpoint. Most of this information is provided by Damascius in the *Life of Isidorus*, though it is not exclusively derived from that source (10). Proclus was born in 410 or 412 ; astronomical or astrological factors lead to doubt, just as they clearly indicate the date of his death, 485, on April 17 (11). Though known as the Lycian, presumably from his parentage (cf. *V. Proc.*, 6), he was actually born in Constantinople. He did spend his early years in Lycia, and there begun the study of rhetoric which was to take him to Alexandria, where he started his philosophical studies. By the age of 20 he had left for Athens, and soon attached himself to Syrianus, who fed him into his own teacher Plutarch, the leading Neoplatonist at the time, and probably the man responsible for the revival of Neoplatonic teaching at Athens (12). If we are to believe Marinus, Proclus became Plutarch's star pupil and when he was dying he commended this young genius to Syrianus' special care. On Syrianus' death, at a date that cannot be established, Proclus took over the leadership of the Athenian Platonists, living in what had once been Plutarch's house and then

(8) On this question cf. J. P. Lynch, *Aristotle's School*, Berkeley/Los Angeles, 1972, 182-89 ; H. J. Blumenthal, *529 and its Sequel : what happened to the Academy ?*, in *Byzantion*, 48, 1978, 371-76 ; J. Glucker, *Antiochus and the Late Academy*. Hypomnemata, 56. Göttingen, 1978, 296-329.

(9) Cf. Saffrey, *Le chrétien Jean Philopon et la survivance de l'école d'Alexandrie*, in *Rev. Ét. Gr.*, 67, 1954, 395-99.

(10) Cf. fr. 119, 120, 127, Zintzen.

(11) He died a year after an eclipse which can be dated to 484 : the day is given as the 17th of the Roman month April, ch. 36, 169.8.

(12) Cf. Blumenthal, *op. cit.* (n. 8), 373-75.

Syrianus' (*V. Proc.*, 29, 166.16-18). Apart from a year when he found it necessary or prudent to remove himself, Proclus spent the rest of his career at Athens. Again at a date unknown, Marinus came to study with him and eventually succeeded him – not without other candidates. These bare outlines of Proclus' career can be found in Marinus' biography, which we can date. It will have been completed within a year of Proclus' death – astronomy again (cf. ch. 37) (13). The importance of that date is simply that the biography was written immediately after Proclus' death, and in the place where Proclus lived and worked, so that many of those who knew him would have been on the spot, giving a relatively good chance that most of the factual information is accurate and that the less factual material is not largely fictitious, or subject to gross distortion and exaggerations.

Since a good deal of Proclus' work is extant we can see that Marinus did not exaggerate either his intellectual power or his industry. To exaggerate would have been one way for a generous man to try to increase his own status ; the opposite approach, which we find in the *Life of Isidorus* (14), belittles the previous holder of the office. In the event Marinus spends a good deal of his space on matters other than the purely academic, a far larger proportion than does Porphyry in the *Life of Plotinus*, where the latter take up about twice as much space as the former. After making some customary remarks in the opening chapter about his duty to proclaim the greatness of his subject, however inadequate he might be for the task, Marinus departs from the standard procedures of biography by announcing in his second chapter that he will abandon the normal methods of *logographoi*, who arrange their account in an ordered series of chapters, *κατὰ κεφάλαια ... ἐν τάξει*, by which he appears to mean a standard ordering of topics. Instead he will make Proclus' *εὐδαιμονία* the foundation of his work. That he says is most appropriate because Proclus was the most *εὐδαίμων* of all who have been so described. By appealing to *τὸ πρέπον* Marinus shows, of

(13) Marinus tells us that another eclipse was predicted to take place a year after Proclus' death : *ὡς ἐσομένην*. We may assume that Marinus would not have mentioned this if he had been writing later and the eclipse had not occurred. If it had already taken place he would doubtless have said so.

(14) See n. 4.

course, that he is working within the rhetorical tradition, in which Proclus himself had been trained (*V. Proc.*, 8), and of whose methods and theories his work shows some awareness (15). One thinks in particular of some of the essays on the *Republic*, and it may be worth recalling that Syrianus wrote a commentary on two works of Hermogenes (16). From the sequel it is clear that *εὐδαιμονία* is to be understood both in its ordinary sense, and in that of the attainment of the *τέλος* of ethics. That, Marinus claims, Proclus had done not only in respect of the specific *εὐδαιμονία* of *σόφοι*, which he had acquired to an outstanding degree, but also of that possession of the requisite *ἀρετή* for the good life and of *εὐποτμία*, the availability of external *ἀγαθά* : *κεχορήγητο γὰρ ἀφθόνως ἅπασι τοῖς ἔξω λεγομένοις ἀγαθοῖς*. All this, and the vocabulary in which it is couched, recalls the Aristotelian *εὐδαίμων, τὸν κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐνεργοῦντα καὶ τοῖς ἐκτὸς ἀγαθοῖς ἱκανῶς κεχορηγημένον* (*EN*, I, 1101a, 14-15).

From this point on Marinus proceeds along lines which are not Aristotelian but clearly Neoplatonic, and the framework he has proposed to use soon turns out to be a version of a *scala virtutum* that is very much a part of Neoplatonic thought. From the introduction of this scale in chapter 3, the rest of the work is arranged on the structure it provides. The greater part of Proclus' career and his achievements is distributed around the various virtues. The only exceptions to this procedure are found in a group of chapters, 6-13, which trace his background and education, and the section at the end which gives us his horoscope, an account of his death, and some concluding remarks. Even the straight biography of his early life is placed where it is because that is the appropriate place for the virtues involved up to that point. It is in the elaboration of this scheme of virtues and the attachment of Proclus' biography to them that Marinus' work is uniquely Neoplatonic. I am not, of course, suggesting that biographies of philosophers – or others – fail to talk about virtues, and certainly not that other philosophers did not do so. The point is simply that the scheme of virtues used is Neoplatonic, and the form in which we find it here

(15) On *τὸ πρέπον* cf. G. L. KUSTAS, *Studies in Byzantine Literature*, Athens, 1973, 41, n. 1 and the references given there.

(16) *Περὶ ἰδεῶν* and *περὶ στάσεων* ; cf. K. PRAECHTER, *Syrianos* (1) *RE*, IV a ii, 1932, 1732-33.

characteristically late-Neoplatonic. Further, the virtues do not appear in the biography as some among the other praiseworthy characteristics of its subject, but virtually all the material in the work is hung on the framework they provide. The importance of this scale of virtues for Marinus' work is not, of course, a new discovery. It was first treated at some length by O. Schissel von Fleschenberg in a 1928 monograph which, however, leaves much to be desired (17) : in some ways the review by W. Theiler is more valuable (18). Some further discussion may be found in an article by A.-J. Festugière on the order in which Proclus and other Neoplatonists read Plato's dialogues (19). Festugière there attempts to show that that order too related to the scale of virtues ; different dialogues concentrate on different virtues and those dealing with the higher ones come later in the syllabus (20). But I think it is fair to say that the matter has not been dealt with in sufficient detail. Festugière's and subsequent discussions, moreover, approach the whole question from a standpoint other than the examination of Marinus' biography as such. Nor has the material in the biography been considered in relation to Proclus' philosophy, which in the absence of evidence to the

(17) *Marinos von Neapolis und die Neuplatonischen Tugendgrade*. Texte und Forschungen zur Byzantinisch-Neugriechischen Philologie 8. Athens, 1928 ; cf. esp. 22-23 and 95. Most of the material in this rather inaccessible book deals with figures other than Marinus.

(18) In *Gnomon*, 5, 1929, 308-17.

(19) A.-J. FESTUGIÈRE, *L'ordre de lecture des dialogues de Platon aux V^e/VI^e siècles*, in *Museum Helveticum*, 26, 1969, 281-96 ; for further discussion of the scale of virtues cf. J. PÉPIN, *Théologie cosmique et théologie chrétienne*, Paris, 1964, 380-85 ; L. G. WESTERINK, *The Greek commentaries on Plato's Phaedo*. I. *Olympiodorus*. Verh. der Kon. Ned. Ak. van Wet. Afd. Lett. n.r. 92. Amsterdam/Oxford/New York, 1976, 116-8 ; I. HADOT, *Le problème du Néoplatonisme alexandrin : Hiéroclès et Simplicius*, Paris, 1978, 152-58. Marinus' use of the virtues as a framework is also noted by P. HADOT, *Exercices spirituels*, *Annuaire de la V^e Section de l'École Pratique des Hautes Études*, 84, 1977, 45 = *Exercices spirituels et philosophie antique*, Paris, 1981, 57 and J. TROUILLARD, *La mystagogie de Proclos*, Paris, 1982, 37, in a chapter which is a revised version of *Le merveilleux dans la vie et la pensée de Proclos*, in *Rev. Philosophique*, 163, 1963, cf. there p. 442.

(20) *Ibid.* : the starting point is ch. 26 of the *Anonymous Prolegomena to Platonic Philosophy* ; cf. also WESTERINK in his edition of that work, Amsterdam, 1962, xxxix-xl ; P. HADOT, *Les divisions des parties de la philosophie dans l'antiquité*, in *Museum Helveticum*, 36, 1979, 220-21.

contrary we may assume Marinus to have followed – as a general principle, though obviously a gross over-simplification, one can say that Neoplatonists tended to signal their disagreements rather than their agreement (21).

The scale of virtues first appears in a simpler form in Plotinus at *Ennead*, I.2. Ultimately of course it depends on Plato's four-fold classification of virtues into φρόνησις or σοφία, ἀνδρεία, σωφροσύνη and δικαιοσύνη, for which the Neoplatonists relied on *Republic*, IV (22). The difference between Plato's virtues and the Neoplatonic schemes lies in the fact that while Plato's virtues are those of the individual, either in himself or in respect of others in the πόλις, each applicable to a given part of the soul, or in the case of justice, to their mutual relations, the Neoplatonic virtues are, like other things in the Neoplatonic world, to be found in different forms at different levels. It is this transformation that distinguishes the description of virtues in Plotinus I.2 from the Platonic uses. As compared with later treatments it is relatively simple. In investigating the possible meanings of Plato's phrase ὁμοίωσις θεῷ (*Theaetetus*, 176B) Plotinus is concerned with the problem of whether, and how, virtues can exist at the various levels on which soul may live, or to which it may raise itself. Taking phrases from the *Republic* and *Phaedo* out of context (23), he attributes to Plato the identification of civic virtues, πολιτικαὶ ἀρεταί, and others which are purifications, καθάρσεις (I.2.3.5-10). He does not use the later term, καθαρτικαί (sc. ἀρεταί), which seems to have been invented by Porphyry (24). The first group are the standard Platonic virtues, the second involves ἀπάθεια : it is the state of soul in which it exercises intellection and is free from the affections, διάθεσις τῆς ψυχῆς καθ' ἣν νοεῖ τε καὶ ἀπαθὴς οὕτως ἐστιν (*ibid.*, 13-20). In Plotinus' subsequent discussion it turns out that this

(21) SCHISSEL's view, *op. cit.* (n. 17), 26, that Marinus stood closer to Porphyry than to Proclus is not supported by his reference to Marinus' silence about the virtues above theurgy in ch. 3.

(22) *Rep.*, 427E ff.

(23) *Rep.*, 430C, *Phaedo*, 69B-C.

(24) For Porphyry's divergences from Plotinus see esp. H.-R. SCHWYZER, *Plotinisches und unplotinisches in den ΑΦΟΡΜΑΙ des Porphyrios*, in *Plotino e il Neoplatonismo in oriente e in occidente*. Convegno internaz. dell'Accad. Naz. dei Lincei. Rome, 5-9.10.1970. Problemi attuali di scienza e di cultura 198. Rome, 1974, 224-28.

kind of virtue relates to soul, albeit its highest part, and not yet to *nous*. For all Neoplatonists the soul, we should recall, is divided at least into a lower part which operates with or through body, and a higher which does not, and which includes discursive reason and also, for most Neoplatonists, the intuitive intellect, *nous*. For Plotinus, who was unorthodox in this respect, *nous* was separate from the rest of soul in that it did not "descend" with it, but even for those who did not hold this view, *nous* still represents a higher level of the soul's activity. To return to *Ennead*, I.2 : Plotinus goes on to consider what happens when a man reaches the condition of contemplation of the contents of *Nous*, that is *nous* in the sense of the second of his three hypostases, One, *Nous*, and Soul. Here σοφία and φρόνησις consist in θεωρία ὧν νοῦς ἔχει. For Plotinus a problem arises about the identity of virtues at this level, since he attributed virtue to soul rather than to *nous*. His answer is that what exists at the higher level of *nous* is a kind of pattern, οἷον παραδεῖγμα (I.2.6.11-17).

This discussion, in *Ennead*, I.2, which I have greatly abbreviated, is not without its problems, but they may be left aside for the moment (25). For our present purposes the interest of the discussion is that Porphyry, in chapter 32 of the *Sententiae*, formalised what he took to be its results into the definition of two further types of virtue, which he called θεωρητικαί and παραδειγματικαί. In Porphyry's case it may be more correct to think in terms of using Plotinus as a starting point, rather than reading things into Plotinus which do not belong there. If he was clearly aware of the philosophical differences, that could be another reason why his biography is so different from that of Marinus. Perhaps in any case he wrote the *Life of Plotinus* before he did the work that is represented by the *Sententiae*. That of course is speculation. What is not is that Porphyry produced a series of four types of virtue, πολιτικαί, καθαρτικαί, θεωρητικαί, παραδειγματικαί, consisting respectively in μετριοπάθεια (23.4) ἀπόστασις τῶν ἐντεῦθεν (24.2), ἀπάθεια and

(25) The difficulties are more acute with respect to the higher virtues, since Plotinus doubts whether they are virtues at all. On these problems see now J. M. DILLON, *Plotinus, Philo and Origen on the grades of virtue*, in *Platonismus und Christentum*. Festschr. H. DÖRRIE. *Jahrb. f. Antike und Christentum*. Ergänzungsband 10, Münster, 1983, 92-105.

intellectual activity, *νοερῶς τῆς ψυχῆς ἐνεργούσης* (25.9, 27.8-9),and, finally, being in *Nous* and in contact with what really is, that is the being which is *Nous*, and which *Nous* is (cf. 29.1-10).

Since Porphyry and Plotinus give us a fuller discussion of these groups of virtues than their successors, who are clearly building on their work, it may be useful at this stage also to set out some of the more detailed information which Porphyry gives us about them. The political or civic virtues are dealt with summarily, and are simply assigned to the three parts of the soul, following Plato and the tradition ; justice is, as it is for Plato, the *οἰκειοπραγία* of each of the three parts in respect of ruling and being ruled (23.6-12). At the next level, the cathartic, the virtues are defined in terms of the general characteristic of maintaining detachment from body. So *φρονεῖν* is *τὸ μὴ συνδοξάζειν τῷ σώματι*, not assenting to the level of opinion that the body is liable to produce, *σωφρονεῖν* is *τὸ μὴ ὁμοπαθεῖν*. *Ἀνδρία* is not to fear that separation from body will lead to a void and not-being, and *δικαιοσύνη* is the dominance of reason and intellect with no dissent, *μηδενὸς ἀντιτείνοντος* (24.8-25.6). In the theoretic group *φρόνησις*, as we have mentioned, lies in the contemplation of the contents of *Nous*, justice is *οἰκειοπραγία* in the pursuit of the way to virtue and activity in the accordance with it, temperance is turning inwards towards *nous* – a standard Neoplatonic way of envisaging *νόησις* : it may be seen as making contact with what is already present within us. Courage is *ἀπάθεια*, achieved by assimilation to the inherent freedom from change and affection of the *nous* that is the object of contemplation (27.8-28.5). Finally the paradeigmatic virtues : wisdom (here *σοφία*) is *nous* knowing, temperance is its being focused on itself, *δικαιοσύνη* is here replaced by the *οἰκειοπραγία* which was previously its definition and is now described simply as *τὸ οἰκεῖον ἔργον*, which we may interpret as the condition of being *nous*. Courage is the sameness and continued stability which arises from the power of *nous* : *τὸ ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ μένειν καθαρὸν διὰ δυνάμεως περιουσίαν* (29.3-7). Before we leave Porphyry we should note the kind of person he assigns to each level of virtues at 31.4-8. The man who acts according to what he now calls practical virtues is a *σπουδαῖος ἄνθρωπος*, the one who is at the level of cathartic virtues is *δαιμόνιος ἄνθρωπος*, or even *δαίμων ἀγαθός*, he whose activity is confined to the virtues that relate to *nous*, that is the theoretic, is *θεός* while *ὁ κατὰ τὰς παραδειγματικάς* is

θεῶν πατήρ, a term which has, or was to have, associations with theurgy, an activity not normally attributed to Porphyry.

By the time of Marinus this scheme has become more complex, though we are not well informed of the details of the complications, and it is by no means clear who made which changes. What we have is the addition of three further kinds of virtue, *φυσικαί* and *ἠθικαί*, both below the level of Plotinus and Porphyry's *πολιτικαί*, and *θεουργικαί*, sometimes called *ἱερατικαί*, terms Porphyry does not use (26). Marinus further refers to *τὰς ἔτι ἀνωτέρω τούτων*, whose identity we shall have to consider later. Some or all of these additions may or may not have been due to Iamblichus, but discussions or even lists of them appear almost exclusively in sources later than Marinus, such as Damascius, in his commentary on the *Phaedo*, Simplicius expounding Epictetus' *Encheiridion*, and Olympiodorus on the first *Alcibiades* (27). It is, however, possible that some if not all of these accounts go back to Proclus. This is most likely to be the case with Damascius, parts of whose *Phaedo* commentary (that until recently attributed *in toto* to Olympiodorus, as in Norvin's Teubner text) (28) are derived from a course or courses of lectures by Proclus (29). Thus we cannot be sure how much of this scheme existed before Marinus. It is theoretically possible, though not likely, that he contributed to its elaboration (30). There seems to have been some confusion, or lack of information, among the Neoplatonists themselves. While Porphyry clearly distinguishes paradeigmatic virtues in the *Sententiae*, Damascius says that they were added by Iamblichus in a work – or discussion – *περὶ ἀρετῶν* (*in*

(26) They are usually regarded as synonymous ; for another view see H. LEWY, *The Chaldaean Oracles and Theurgy*. Publications de l'IFAO. *Rech. d'Arch. de Philol et d'Hist.*, 13. Cairo, 1956 (repr., with additions, ed. M. TARDIEU, Paris, 1978), 464-65.

(27) DAM., I.138-44W = 113-14N ; SIMPLIC, 2.30-3.2 DUEBNER ; OLYMPIOD., 4.15-8.14W ; cf. also AMMONIUS, in *De Interpretatione*, 135.19-32 ; PHILOPONUS, in *Categorias*, 141.25-143.3 ; *Anon. Prol.*, 26.

(28) On the correct attributions see R. BEUTLER, *Olympiodorus* (13), *RE*, XVIII.i, 1939, 211-18 ; WESTERINK, *Damascius. Lectures on the Philebus wrongly attributed to Olympiodorus*, Amsterdam, 1959, xv-xx.

(29) Cf. WESTERINK, *Greek commentaries* (see n. 19), I.18-19.

(30) We may simply note that Proclus' followers produced the longest list, cf. those of Damascius and Marinus himself.

Phaedonem, I.143W = 114.20-21N). Westerink's solution is that Iamblichus' additions may have been that he made the paradeigmatic virtues qualities of human intelligence by participation, and thus distinct from the theurgic virtues (31), but that is not the plain meaning of Damascius' text. It is not impossible that Damascius did not know the *Sententiae*, and it is worth noting in this connection that other references to Porphyry in his commentary could be derived from Proclus (32). As far as our actual evidence goes we cannot confidently trace the extended scheme back beyond Proclus. The downward extensions, that is the physical and dispositional virtues, both appear for the first time in Proclus' *Alcibiades* commentary (ch. 96), the upward ones in the *Life of Proclus* itself; further, we should recall that the material in Damascius' *Phaedo* commentary may also be from Proclus.

Be that as it may the two lower groups are yet further examples of the way in which the later Neoplatonists tended to fill gaps in the systems of their predecessors. If every level of being and activity is to have its peculiar virtues, then just as soul without body has its virtues, so body without soul should have its own set, or rather body seen independently of all except that level of soul needed to give it form and life (33). And if that level is to have virtues, then perhaps body and soul acting together on the irrational level should also have their own, to fill the gap below the level where body and soul operated together in the civic virtues. This line of reasoning is not, as far as I know, set out in any extant work, but, given our knowledge of later Neoplatonic ways of thinking, it seems plausible enough. It would simply be an exemplification of the principle that all things are in all in an appropriate way, *πάντα ἐν πᾶσιν, οἰκείως δὲ ἐν ἑκάστῳ*, as Proclus puts it in the *Elements of Theology* (Prop. 103). The higher virtues may have been devised for analogous reasons.

When Marinus proceeds to discuss Proclus himself in terms of the virtue scale, we find that he is endowed with qualities that fit all the

(31) *Ibid.*, II. Damascius, 1977, 87.

(32) Cf. *e.g.*, Dam., in *Phaedonem*, I.177W = 124.13-20N and Proclus, in *Tim.*, III.234.8 ff.

(33) It may be worth remarking that Plotinus does use the term *φυσικὴ ἀρετή* in one passage, but in a different context, and not in a technical sense : it is used to oppose the other three virtues to *σοφία*, cf. I.3. 6.18-24.

available slots. It is almost as if Marinus has written the job-profile of a Neoplatonic philosopher and scholarch without having a particular individual in mind. So we are told that all the *φυσικαὶ ἀρεταί* are innate in those who have them, and that in the case of the subject of our author's praises, *ἐν ὑμνουμένῳ δὲ παρ' ἡμῖν ἀνδρὶ μακαρίῳ*, they were all present from birth. Marinus then remarks, and it is not clear whether this is simply retrojection to the moment of birth of a description of the man he knew in later life, that the traces of these virtues showed clearly *ἐν τῷ τελευταίῳ καὶ ὀστρεώδει περιβλήματι* (3, 152.16-18). Here Marinus seems to be combining two sets of Neoplatonic ideas about the body: The first, which has a history longer than Neoplatonism itself, is that the body is the last of a series of garments in which the soul is clothed when it makes its way into a body (34). The second is suggested by the word *ὀστρεῶδες*, which is normally found in contexts relating to the more specifically Neoplatonic, and late-Neoplatonic at that, idea that there are three vehicles, *ὀχήματα*, for the soul (35). They are assumed in descreasing order of immateriality : the highest which is sometimes described as light-like, *αὐγοειδές*, is virtually immaterial, and belongs to the rational soul. The next, *ἀεροειδές* or *πνευματικὸν ὄχημα* (or sometimes *σῶμα*), is attached to the irrational soul before incarnation and remains with it for a time afterwards. In particular it is the basis of the faculties of perception and imagination (cf. e.g. Proclus, *in Tim.*, III.286.20 ff.) (36). The body in the normal sense of *σῶμα* is the last in the descending series, and sometimes tied to it by the description *ὀστρεῶδες σῶμα*, so at Proclus, *in Tim.*, III.298.10-19, where the verb *περιβάλλω* is used of its attachment to soul. *Τελευταίῳ*, of course, fits both schemes. The notion of two quasi-material bodies may be due to Proclus himself, though the term *αὐγοειδὲς ὄχημα* occurs once in Hermias' version of Syrianus' *Phaedrus* lectures (37). The word *ἴχνη*,

(34) Cf. P. Wendland, *Das Gewand der Eitelkeit*, in *Hermes*, 51, 1916, 481-85.

(35) Earlier Neoplatonism had one : Proclus probably invented the second, cf. my *Some problems about body and soul in later pagan Neoplatonism*, in *Platonismus und Christentum* (see n. 25), 82-83. On the history of this concept see E. R. Dodds, *Proclus. Elements of Theology*, Oxford, 1933, App. 2, pp. 313-21.

(36) Cf. further my *Proclus on perception*, in *Bull. Inst. Class. Stud.*, 29, 1982, 5.

(37) At *in Phaedrum*, 144.27, Couvreur. I. Hadot, *op. cit.* (n. 19), 105, thinks Hermias – and Hierocles – had one.

traces, is also of some interest : in Neoplatonic writing it normally means a lower representation of something higher. Most often it is used of levels of soul (38). Here it suggests that Marinus is thinking in terms of a vertical distinction between the psychic component of the συναμφότερον, the compound of body and the lowest level of soul, that which gives life, and the body which it enlivens. The φυσικαὶ ἀρεταί themselves would inhere in the συναμφότερον ; their visible signs would then be their ἴχνη. Such a view would be supported by the examples of physical virtues which he gives. Physical wisdom is manifested in εὐαισθησία, the efficient functioning of the perceptive faculty and in particular what Marinus calls the τιμιώταται αἰσθήσεις, vision and hearing, a status all Platonists had assigned to vision since Plato had singled it out as the clearest of the senses in the *Phaedrus* (250D). The idea of εὐαισθησία as physical wisdom would also be supported by the well-established analogy between perception and intellection.

Before going any further it might be worth looking at the apparently strange notion of φυσικαὶ ἀρεταί. In classical Greek there would be no problem about this idea. It would simply be understood as physical as opposed to moral or intellectual excellence – *corpus sanum*. But though knowledge of this sense may have facilitated the downward development of the *scala virtutum*, I think it is true that ἀρετή as a current term in Neoplatonic writers – or perhaps in all writers of this period – no longer retains that sense. In so far as it does not, φυσικός becomes inappropriate because ἀρετή would then more naturally be described by adjectives whose sense is antithetical to φυσικός, for instance ψυχικός. This difficulty is, however, removed if one understands φυσικός in the way our discussion has already indicated, as referring to the level of soul which is specifically concerned with the body and its operations, a level or type of soul which had been called φύσις since Plotinus (39) : it is not infrequently found contrasted with ψυχή, which in such contexts means not soul in general, but that part of it which is above the level of φύσις.

(38) Cf. already PLOTINUS, IV.4.28 *passim* ; for soul as an ἴχνος of *nous* cf. *e.g.* V.1.7.42-48.

(39) Cf. IV.4.18.1 ff., and *Plotinus' Psychology* (see n. 3), 58-65.

Let us now look briefly at the remaining physical virtues, noting that the term ἀρετὴ σώματος at 152.32 should be read in the light of this explanation. Courage is applied to bodily strength, and in particular immunity to cold and heat, ἀπαθὴς (sc. ἰσχύς) ὑπὸ χειμώνων τε καὶ καυμάτων, as well as resistance to neglectful or harmful regimen and overwork, useful characteristics for a professional academic. The ἀπάθεια in respect of cold and heat recalls Alcibiades' character sketch of Socrates in the *Symposium* (40) and had in any case become part of the characterisation of philosophers and holy men (41). The notion of ἀπάθεια is, we may recall, associated with courage at the level of theoretic virtue by Porphyry (28.3-4) (42). That part of physical courage then has at least an element of stereotype, whereas the second group of characteristics looks as if they may be designed to fit Proclus himself. His constant activity by day and night, writing, praying, teaching and being helpful to others, is illustrated with concrete examples later in the biography, though once again we cannot be sure that we are not dealing with stereotype traits : Plato and Plotinus too had been credited with being satisfied with little sleep (43). Next temperance : that is related to beauty, and in particular is manifested in the fitting relationship, συμμετρία, of the parts of the body. That is the outward counterpart to the harmony and concord, συμφωνία and ἁρμονία, to which Plato had compared temperance in the *Republic* (431E 3-4), though he explained it as superiority to pleasure and desire. Plotinus and Porphyry in their description of civic virtues repeated the by then traditional idea that the lowest part – of Plato's tripartite – soul is in agreement with the highest : both use Plato's word συμφωνία (I.2.1.16-21, 23.9-10).

The description of Proclus' appearance that Marinus gives looks at first sight as if it does relate to the individual he is describing. That impression does not, however, survive comparison with Porphyry's

(40) PLATO, *Symp.*, 220A-B.

(41) Cf. L. BIELER, *ΘΕΙΟΣ 'ANHP. Das Bild des "Göttlichen Menschen" in Spätantike und Frühchristentum*, Vienna, I. 1935 (repr. Darmstadt, 1976), 63.

(42) This type of ἀπάθεια is not associated with "theoretic" – or other – virtues by Plotinus in I.2, or with the physical ones by Proclus at *in Alc.*, 96.

(43) Cf. D. L. III.39, PORPHYRY, *V. Plot.*, 8 and BIELER, *op. cit.*, 62, who gives some Christian references too.

description of Plotinus in class (*V. Plot.*, 13). *Ἰδεῖν δὲ ἦν σφόδρα ἐράσμιος*, writes Marinus, *ἐράσμιος μὲν ὀφθῆναι* says Porphyry. Something like a living light blooming on the body shone from the soul of Proclus, *τὸ ἀπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ..... οἱονεὶ φῶς ζωτικὸν ... ἀπέστιλβε*. When Plotinus spoke proof of his intellect came through to his face and shone light upon it, ... *τοῦ νοῦ ἄχρι τοῦ προσώπου τὸ φῶς ἐπιλάμποντος* (44). He was so beautiful that all attempts to produce his portrait were inadequate, says Marinus, and one wonders if he is trying to improve on Plotinus, who refused to have his portrait painted, but, according to Porphyry, was in the end excellently portrayed from memory by a painter called Carterius who was brought into Plotinus' lectures by Amelius (*V. Plot.*, 1). The words Marinus uses for retailing the portraitist's failure heighten our suspicions : *ὅμως ἔτι λείπεσθαι πολλῷ εἰς μίμησιν τῆς τοῦ εἴδους ἀληθείας*, an outcome that Plato himself could have been taken to predict in *Republic*, X. Finally, justice in the soul consists in co-operation between the "parts" ; in the case of physical virtue it is the satisfactory relationship between the parts of the body. So well equipped with this was Proclus that he was ill no more than two or three times in his life, and he was so unfamiliar with illness that he failed to recognize the seriousness of the condition which killed him at the age of 75. Though the distinction of physical temperance and justice seems excessively artificial, the factual information offered is credible and may be true. As any elementary psychology text book will point out, there is a high correlation between superior intelligence and good health.

The *ἠθικαὶ ἀρεταί* are treated, though not so named, in the two following chapters, 4 and 5. In fact we do not have the list of detailed characteristics of this group that we have for those above and below. It is clear enough that they are intended to include qualities of disposition, as opposed to the physical attributes of the *φυσικαὶ ἀρεταί*, and the developed moral states and actions in accordance with them which are in the class of the *πολιτικαί*. But at this level neither Marinus nor his source seems to have decided which qualities correspond to which of the four divisions of virtue

(44) An alternative translation would be "... to his face which shone with light". For some similar descriptions of outward manifestations of goodness cf. Bieler, *ibid.*, 50-56.

that apply at all levels but the highest. These *ἠθικαὶ ἀρεταί* are the first level of virtues of *ψυχή*. Interestingly this level seems to be understood as the slice of soul above *αἴσθησις*, but one including the imaging faculty for it includes memory, which is a function of that faculty. Usually there is a division above, or through, *φαντασία*, with it and *αἴσθησις* closely linked if not actually identified (45). Less surprisingly we are told that the qualities Proclus had in this area were those which Plato – who is named here – wanted to have as elements of the philosopher's nature (46). But the list of dispositional qualities is not clearly distributed around the virtues. We are told that Proclus was *φίλος τε καὶ συγγενὴς ἀληθείας* (which stands here in the place of *σοφία* or *φρόνησις*) *δικαιοσύνης*, *ἀνδρίας*, *σωφροσύνης*, but we are not told in any organized way in what this friendship and affinity consists. Temperance is found in a contempt for bodily pleasure and a desire for learning, and courage, somewhat unremarkably, in not being afraid of things others feared. Justice appears in his early love for it, while wisdom, not named, seems to consist in his ready absorption and retention of learning (ch. 5). These two chapters, then, are to a much lesser extent constrained by Marinus' scheme of virtues, and they form a transition to those that follow, where the biographical element predominates. To that extent chapter 6 is also transitional because the account of Proclus' early years closes with the comment that in Lycia he was brought up in the best habits, *καλλίστοις ἤθεσι*, and so acquired the *ἠθικαὶ ἀρεταί*. Since these had already been dealt with, and treated as if they were inborn rather than acquired, this remark may have been motivated by no more than the wish to fit as much as possible into the framework of virtues.

The next seven chapters give details of Proclus' early studies, first in rhetoric and then philosophy, up to the composition of the *Timaeus* commentary in his 28th year. Some suspicion must attach to the fact that this was the age at which Plotinus first began to study philosophy (*V. Plot.*, 3.6-7), but it may of course be a genuine

(45) Cf. my *Plutarch's exposition of the* De Anima *and the psychology of Proclus*, in *De Jamblique à Proclus*. Fondation Hardt. Entretiens sur l'Antiquité Classique XXI, Vandœuvres-Geneva, 1975, 138-44, and *Proclus on perception* (see n. 36), 3-5.

(46) Cf. *Rep.*, 535A-D.

coincidence. In this section there is little reference to the virtues. A more conspicuous feature is the series of references to divine guidance and a variety of omens. In this respect Proclus' career is presented in a markedly different way from that of Plotinus in Porphyry's *Life*. Had that work been written from the same standpoint, one would expect a god to have directed Plotinus' search for a teacher to Ammonius, and a sign to show him that he had found the right man. Porphyry merely puts into his hero's mouth the words *τοῦτον ἐζήτουν*, as a comment to the friend who had recommended Ammonius (*V. Plot.*, 3.10-13). Some of Proclus' human activities look suspect, like the story about drinking from the spring at the memorial to Socrates, but, if it were not true that Proclus had no idea that Socrates was commemorated here, that is just the sort of thing that a young and enthusiastic student, or tourist, might have done. The account of his philosophical reading in chapter 13 follows the lines of the usual Platonic training, Aristotle as propaedeutic and preparation for initiation into the mysteries of Plato. In these terms reading the *Phaedo* (ch. 12) seems to come too early, at least if we assume that the standard programme was strictly followed. If it was, then either the work with Plutarch was a special privilege accorded to an outstandingly promising student, or we must assume not only that the two years spent on Aristotle, but also the time spent on reading the Platonic dialogues that were to be read before the *Phaedo*, precede the reading of the *De anima* and *Phaedo*. The matter is not without interest in so far as it raises a question about how far the syllabuses we find in several sources were actually followed (47), as opposed to their being a way of discussing and arranging the dialogues in terms of the single purpose which it was customary to assign to each from Iamblichus onwards. The order of narration certainly does not prevent us putting work mentioned in chapter 13 before the sessions with Plutarch reported in chapter 12, if only because the study of the *Timaeus* mentioned at the end of chapter 13 should come after that of works referred to in the following chapters. Though there were variations in the ordering of the dialogues, the *Timaeus* was always one of the last to be read : it was held to deal with the highest

(47) For these reading lists cf. esp. *Anon. Prol.*, 24-26, OLYMPIOD., in *Gorgiam*, 4-5, and WESTERINK, *Anon. Prol.*, xxxvii-xl ; FESTUGIÈRE, *op. cit.* (n. 19).

matters. Thus the *Anonymous Prolegomena* describes the *Timaeus* and *Parmenides* as *τέλειοι*, and puts them after those which are *θεωρητικοί* and about theology, that is after the dialogues listed under that head in accordance with the five point scale of virtues of which *θεωρητικαί* are the highest (26.32-4W). Yet in the following chapter Marinus reverts to the *Republic* and *Laws*, which are low-level dialogues connected by Marinus with the political virtues, while the author of the *Anonymous Prolegomena* tells us that only some thought they should be handled at all (*ibid.*, 36-37).

As suggested above, the placing of these chapters is not unconnected with the scheme of virtues, even if they do not figure prominently within the section. That can be seen from the concluding sentence of chapter 13 : *ἐκ τῆς τοιαύτης ἀγωγῆς τὸ ἦθος ἐπὶ μᾶλλον κατεκοσμεῖτο, μετ' ἐπιστήμης τὰς ἀρετὰς ἀνειληφώς*, his dispositional qualities were further improved, and with the acquisition of knowledge he progressed in virtue.

The next sentence, which opens chapter 14, tells us that he added the *πολιτικαὶ ἀρεταί*. Thus we return to the framework of the virtue scale, and the account of Proclus' earlier career can be seen to be inserted into it. The associated reading was Aristotle's *Politics*, presumably included in the *πολιτικαὶ πραγμάτειαι* mentioned with the Aristotelian readings of chapter 13, and Plato's *Laws and Republic*, to whose sometimes extra-curricular status we have already referred. The standard work for political virtues was the *Gorgias* (cf. Olympiodorus, *in Gorg.*, 6.4-6W, *Anon. Prol.* 26.25). Marinus' remark that Proclus acquired virtues *μετ' ἐπιστήμης* may be connected with Proclus' own comment in the *Alcibiades* commentary that political – as opposed to dispositional – virtue is already associated with knowledge (*in Alc.*, 96.10).

Proclus' interests in civic life and his relations with the civic power are duly recorded in connection with the attainment of civic virtue (chapters 14-17). About the nature of these virtues Marinus says little. That may or may not be because this was by now the least interesting set of virtues, since they are the ones already treated explicitly by Plato himself in *Republic* IV. Under the heading of political courage, which in the *Republic* is not of course practised in conflict with authority, we have the account of Proclus' difficulties at Athens which led to his temporary retreat to Lydia (ch. 15, 158.40 ff.). The exact circumstances are concealed by a flood of

rhetoric. One of the periodic attempts to interfere with the public teaching of pagan philosophy could have been the reason. The only thing we can be sure of is that the real cause was not that given by Marinus, a divine manœuvre to enable Proclus to be initiated into what remained of ancient Asian wisdom, *ἵνα γὰρ μηδὲ τῶν ἐκεῖ ἀρχαιοτέρων ἔτι σωζομένων θεσμῶν ἀμύητος ᾖ*. Here again one is struck by the contrast with the *Life of Plotinus*. Plotinus arranges to go east with Gordian because he himself wished to know about Persian and Indian philosophy (*V. Plot.*, 3.15-19). Again one wonders if the point about Proclus' interest in ancient wisdom, credible enough in itself, was not added to the story of his withdrawal from Athens just because the life of Plotinus contained that particular interest. The philosopher's journey to the east is of course an old *topos* anyhow. Even Democritus is alleged to have gone (DK 68 A 1) [48]. In chapter 16 there is another point which recalls Plotinus. Proclus, we are told, was spirited in the pursuit of the right. At the same time he was gentle, *ἅμα καὶ πρᾷος* (159.31), and it is *πρᾳότης* that Porphyry told us shone from Plotinus when he was speaking in his classes (*V. Plot.*, 13.8-10), and after an account of Plotinus' relations with his associates we are told that he put intellectual activity first, *ἦν δὲ καὶ πρᾷος* (*V. Plot.*, 9.18). The corresponding section of the life of Proclus follows in chapter 17 with an account of Proclus' outstanding benevolence. He was like a father to his colleagues and friends, and their wives and children (17, 159.45). This recalls Porphyry's chapter about the women who were Plotinus' devotees and the children he cared for (*V. Plot.*, 9). Peculiar to Proclus is an interest in the health of his protégés. We are told among other things that Proclus himself had some medical expertise *καί τι καὶ αὐτὸς ἐν τούτοις περιττότερον ἐσηγεῖτο* (159.51-52), perhaps an early sign of that interest in medicine among the latest Neoplatonists to which Westerink has drawn attention [49]. The details of Proclus' relations with Archiades and others may be left aside as straight biography.

At the beginning of chapter 18 Marinus announces an appropriate end to the political virtues, inferior as he puts it to the

(48) On this theme cf. J. FAIRWEATHER, *Fiction in the biographies of ancient writers*, in *Ancient Society*, 5, 1968, 268.

(49) Cf. *Philosophy and medicine in late antiquity*, in *Janus*, 51, 1963, 169-77.

real ones, and a transition to the cathartic virtues. With this we are again on Neoplatonic ground. The political virtues are seen to be preparatory to detachment from human concerns, so that the soul may assimilate to god, *ἵνα καὶ τὴν ὁμοίωσιν ἔχῃ πρὸς τὸν θεόν*. That, let us recall, is the *Theaetetus* tag that was the starting point in Plotinus I.2. But while the political virtues control and remove affections and false opinions, the cathartic virtues separate the soul from the weight of becoming, *γένεσις*. In other words we are now at the level of the upper soul acting without body, and focusing on higher reality. That is what *φυγὴ τῶν ἐντεῦθεν* implies. These words too are, of course, from the *Theaetetus* ; the un-Platonic reading of them is a common motif from Plotinus on [50]. The words Marinus uses are the same as Plotinus' at I.2.3.6. The theme of separation is the cue for Marinus to fit in details of what the unsympathetic reader would describe as Proclus' religiosity [51]. Again we may compare the detached attitude Porphyry ascribes to Plotinus (*V. Plot.*, 10). Philosophy returns in chapter 20 where Marinus explains the status of these virtues in terms of the Neoplatonic breakdown of the soul's faculties. They consist in the rational soul not involving itself in *πάθη*, as opposed to restraining them at the lower, political, level. When Marinus says that Proclus' sex life went no further than the imagination he appears to be making a precise philosophical point, for the faculty of *φαντασία* forms the upper boundary of the lower soul in the standard late Neoplatonic psychology [52], and is, moreover, frequently seen as a faculty of insulation between it and the upper soul. Yet once more the characteristic is one of those outlined by Porphyry (34.6-10) though in a different context [53]. The exercise of cathartic virtues is confined to the rational soul, in so far as they consist in its maintaining its separation from what is below. Hence Marinus' reference to Proclus' soul collecting itself and almost leaving the body. In fact the description of these virtues closely

(50) Plato's explanation is *δίκαιον καὶ ὅσιον μετὰ φρονήσεως γένεσθαι*.

(51) For an account of Proclus' religion cf. DÖRRIE, *Die Religiosität des Platonismus im 4. und 5. Jahrhundert nach Christus*, in *De Jamblique à Proclus* (see n. 45), 257-81.

(52) On this cf. *e.g. De Jamblique à Proclus*, 133 ff.

(53) He is dealing with how, and how far, cathartic virtue can be achieved ; cf. also PLOT., I.2 5.18-21.

follows Porphyry (24.9-25.6). *Φρονεῖν*, writes Marinus, is not concerned with things that are subject to change – the standard Aristotelian description of the contents of the sublunary world ; rather it consists in *αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτὸ εἰλικρινὲς τὸ νοεῖν*, that is thinking without reference to material objects, which corresponds to Porphyry's *μόνην ἐνεργεῖν ... ὃ διὰ τοῦ καθαρῶς νοεῖν τελειοῦται* (25.1-2). *Τὸ πρὸς ἑαυτὴν ἔστραφθαι*, which Marinus adds, is simply another Neoplatonic way of describing *νοεῖν*, based on the view that the higher realities are within us and so accessible to introspection (cf. e.g. PLOT., V.1.11.4-15) (54). We should note, however, that at this level it is soul that turns to itself, not *nous* : that is indicated by *τὸ πρὸς ἑαυτήν*. *Μηδαμοῦ δὲ συνδοξάζειν τῷ σώματι* has its exact counterpart in Porphyry : *τὸ μὲν μὴ συνδοξάζειν τῷ σώματι*. The same verb occurs in Plotinus I.2.3.14. Temperance consists in not associating with what is worse, that is the lower soul – Porphyry describes this concisely as *τὸ μὴ ὁμοπαθεῖν* – and also, according to Marinus, in *ἀπάθεια* instead of *μετριοπάθεια*. Here Marinus differs from Porphyry who reserves *ἀπάθεια* for the theoretic virtues (25.9). With courage and justice Marinus again follows Porphyry closely ; *τὸ μὴ φοβεῖσθαι αὐτὴν ἀφισταμένην τοῦ σώματος* are, bar the addition of *αὐτήν*, the very words Porphyry had used, and the description of justice is verbally close, with Marinus inserting *χείρων* to describe the lower soul where Porphyry had used the less colourful expression *μηδενὸς ἀντιτείνοντος* (55). Both tell us, with only the order of the words changed, that *νοῦς* and *λόγος* are in charge. Before leaving these virtues we should note that *νοῦς* is here used, as often, in the sense of reason, and not the intuitive intellect, which was seen as a higher level of soul.

Hence Proclus ascended to the next set of virtues, Plotinus' and Porphyry's *θεωρητικαί* (ch. 22, *init.*). Unlike Porphyry, Marinus does not have a separate class of paradeigmatic virtues, and seems to have distributed some of their characteristics to his theoretic and theurgic groups, of which the latter has no place in Porphyry's scheme. This in spite of the fact that Marinus had available the later distinction between two intellectual levels, *νοερός* and *νοητός*, the second being

(54) Cf. too PORPH., 27.4-5.
(55) Cf. PLOT., I.2.3.18, *τὰ δὲ μὴ ἀντιτείνοι*.

the higher (56). When he tells us that these virtues where acquired by his hero when he was using the apprehension of his *νοερὰ ἐνέργεια*, he might seem to be locating them on the lower of these two levels, but he may be doing no more than repeating Porphyry's words *νοερῶς τῆς ψυχῆς ἐνεργούσης*, words which Porphyry used to distinguish these virtues from the paradeigmatic which are the province of *νοῦς* rather than *ψυχή*. The further characterisation in Marinus, that Proclus was no longer reasoning *διεξοδικῶς καὶ ἀποδεικτικῶς*, uses one of the usual ways of distinguishing *ψυχή* from *νοῦς* : we may compare Plotinus IV.1.15-16. That Marinus combined the theoretic and at least some part of the paradeigmatic virtues is further suggested by his description of the objects of the *ἐπιβολαὶ τῆς νοερὰς ἐνεργείας*, namely *τὰ ἐν τῷ θείῳ νῷ παραδείγματα*. *Θεῖος νοῦς* is the transcendant hypostasis *Nous* (above the new class of souls) from which according to Proclus' though not Plotinus – and perhaps not Porphyry – we have descended and are normally separate (57).

All this relates to wisdom. The other theoretic virtues conform more closely to the Porphyrian model. The account in chapters 24 and 25 gives justice as the *οἰκειοπραγία* of rational soul, not now in relation to anything else, but on its own, and what is *οἰκεῖον* to it is *τὸ πρὸς νοῦν καὶ θεὸν ἐνεργεῖν*. Porphyry says it is *τὸ πρὸς νοῦν ἐνεργεῖν* (28.1-2). Proclus' temperance was the soul's turning in to *nous*, *ἡ εἴσω πρὸς νοῦν στροφή*. Porphyry used the same words (28.2-3). Courage was the search for the *ἀπάθεια* of its object, *τὴν ἀπάθειαν τοῦ πρὸς ὃ ἔβλεπε ζήλωσας*, writes Marinus. The formulation in the *Sententiae* is *ἀπάθεια καθ' ὁμοίωσιν τοῦ πρὸς ὃ βλέπει* (28.3-4). Interspersed with the details of these virtues is biographical material about Proclus' work as a philosopher, with particular reference to theology, and his enormous industry. We should note that *φιλοπονία*, originally one of the qualities required in a trainee guardian (58), became a popular attribute for philosophers. Damascius uses it of Hermias, Ammonius, and Marinus himself (59).

(56) Cf. *e.g.* PROCLUS, *El. Th.*, prop. 181.
(57) For Proclus' views on this subject, and his report of earlier thinkers', cf. *in Tim.*, III. 333.28 ff., for Plotinus cf. esp. IV.8.8.1-3.
(58) Cf. *Rep.*, 575C, *πάντῃ φιλόπονον ζητητέον*.
(59) *Vita Isid.*, 74 : Hermias was *φιλοπονίᾳ οὐδενὸς δεύτερος* ; 142 : Marinus ; 79 : Ammonius.

When Marinus proceeds with theurgic virtues (ch. 26) one cannot help suspecting over-schematization. Marinus associates the advance to these virtues with Proclus' study of Porphyry and Iamblichus' works on the *Chaldaean Oracles* as well as Syrianus' on the *Orphica*. It is difficult to believe that a man such as Marinus describes Proclus to have been would have abstained from the intensive study of these writings just because Syrianus did not actually work on them with him. The ascent to a new level of virtue when Proclus became the leader of the school seems to be just too convenient, and we may note in this connection that it was Plutarch's family who, Marinus tells us, were the special custodians of that wisdom : by then Proclus had, after all, been associated with them for some years. Theurgy, or as it was sometimes called, the hieratic art, was a way of operating on the gods and causing one's soul to ascend to the level of the divine by various techniques, largely magical, other than the philosophical contemplation which earlier Platonists had prescribed for that purpose. That is why the possessor of these virtues is *θεῶν πατήρ*, an attribute later redistributed upwards from Porphyry's man who achieved the paradeigmatic virtues. Marinus himself does not use the expression, but theurgy and paradeigmatic virtue are associated in Olympiodorus' *Phaedo* commentary (8.2.13-20W = 46,8-17N) (60), and the connection of *θεῶν πατήρ* with theurgy will have been made by whoever was the source of Psellus' *De omnifaria doctrina*, 74 : *ὁ μὲν ἔχων τὴν θεουργικὴν ἀρετὴν θεοπάτωρ κατονομάζεται*. Psellus explains : *ἐπειδὴ γὰρ θεοὺς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἐργάζεται*, and it emerges from his further comments that the *θεός* is the *θεουργός* himself, *θεὸς ἀτεχνῶς γεγονώς*. The *Chaldaean Oracles* – to which unspecified references to *λόγια* refer – appear to have been the theurgist's text book, and Iamblichus the man chiefly responsible for incorporating the system into Neoplatonism (61). Marinus (26, 164.7-8) says that he named the

(60) He assigns paradeigmatic virtue to Plotinus, *ibid.*, 12-13W = 6-8N.

(61) On theurgy cf. DODDS, *Theurgy and its relationship to Neoplatonism*, in *J. Rom. Stud.*, 37, 1947, 55-69 (repr. in *The Greeks and the Irrational*, Berkeley/Los Angeles, 1951, 283-311) : for a less disapproving view cf. R. T. WALLIS, *Neoplatonism*, London, 1972, esp. 120 ff. and 153-7 ; A. SMITH, *Porphyry's Place in the Neoplatonic Tradition*, The Hague, 1974, 82-141 ; A. D. R. SHEPPARD, *Proclus' attitude to theurgy*, in *Classical Quarterly*, n.s. 32, 1982, 212-24.

theurgic virtues. Damascius, in the *Phaedo* commentary attributes their exposition to him, and adds that *οἱ περὶ Πρόκλον*, perhaps meaning Syrianus and Proclus himself, clarified them (62). The description of these activities takes us away from philosophy. Rain-making, and saving Athens from drought, and the more spectacular idea of preventive measures against earthquakes (28, 165.22-25) seem to bring us nearer to the sphere of the late antique holy man (63). The story of the cure of Asclepigeneia, for which Proclus called in one Pericles, *ἄνδρα μάλα καὶ αὐτὸν φιλόσοφον* (29, 165.42-166.11), suggests that Marinus would not have recognised the distinction, and like the writer of a hagiography, he may have introduced these "miracles" here as a demonstration of his subject's achievement of semi-divine status (64).

One final point must be made about the scale of virtues. Marinus, it will be remembered, had allowed for some even higher than the theurgic, but intentionally said no more about them (65). At first sight such higher virtues might seem to be excluded by the description of the theurgic virtues as *ἀκροτάτας ... ὡς πρὸς ἀνθρωπινὴν ψυχὴν* (26, 164.6-7). That description need not, however, exclude the most obvious candidate for the slot, mystic union achieved by contemplation. In that, it could be said, the soul ceased to be *ἀνθρωπινή* : it was certainly a prerequisite that it should be identified with *Nous*. Perhaps the class remained empty because Proclus never achieved that state.

Chapter 34 forms the real conclusion to the work : the rest may be regarded as appendices. From its opening words we may infer that all the material in the previous chapters about Proclus' encounters with the gods and the special favours he received from them are to be seen as functions of his theurgic virtues. Again we may note that the distribution of material seems to be arbitrary, not to say inconsistent : we may recall that Athena herself turned Proclus to philosophy when he had not yet progressed even to the

(62) DAM., I.144W = 114-25N.

(63) Cf. now G. FOWDEN, *The pagan holy man in late antique society*, in *J. Hell. Stud.*, 102, 1982, 50.

(64) TROUILLARD, *Mystagogie* (see n. 19), 38-9, attributes at least part of the prominence of wonderful happenings in *Vita Procli* to Marinus' stupidity.

(65) Cf. *σιωπήσαντες*, 152.12.

political virtues (cf. 6, 154.19-20 ; 9, 155.27-29). This summarising chapter, with its emphasis on Proclus' unsurpassed virtues, its claim to have made his *εὐδαιμονία* the beginning, middle and end of the work, and its concluding sentence recalling the Aristotelian concept of *εὐδαιμονία* which had been introduced at the start (66), now adding the words – Aristotle's (67) – *καὶ ἐν βίῳ τελείῳ*, serves to confirm, if any further confirmation were necessary, that the organization according to the virtues controls the whole arrangement of the biography. Moreover, as we have argued, it also seems to have been responsible, at the least, for a not insignificant reshuffling of the actual events of Proclus' career (68).

(66) See above pp. 472-473.

(67) Cf. *EN*, 1101a 16 : *μὴ τὸν τυχόντα χρόνον ἀλλὰ τέλειον βίον.*

(68) An earlier version of this paper was read to a meeting of the seminar on Christian and pagan biography, 4th to 7th centuries, held at the Institute of Classical Studies, London in May 1983. I should like to thank its members for their helpful comments.

XIV

ALEXANDER OF APHRODISIAS IN THE LATER GREEK COMMENTARIES ON ARISTOTLE'S DE ANIMA*

Of the commentators on Aristotle whose works survive in other than partial or fragmentary form Alexander is unique in that he worked before the new Platonism of Plotinus and his successors came to dominate Greek philosophy: I use "successors" in the temporal and therefore not necessarily philosophical sense. With the exception of Themistius he is also alone in that he wrote more or less unbiased commentaries on Aristotle,[1] commentaries that were on the whole an honest, and generally successful – though this is admittedly now controversial[2] – attempt to set out what Aristotle thought.[3]

* Where no work is given references to the commentators are to their commentaries on the De anima.

[1] For Themistius cf. my Themistius, the last Peripatetic commentator on Aristotle?, in: Arktouros, Festschrift Knox (1979) 391–400; for another view cf. E.P. Mahoney, Neoplatonism, the Greek commentators, and Renaissance Aristotelianism, in: Neoplatonism and Christian Thought, ed. D.J. O'Meara (Albany 1982) n. 1, on 264–266.

[2] Alexander himself, in his De anima, claimed that, since Aristotle's views were superior to others', his task would be fulfilled if he set out Aristotle's opinions as clearly as possible and added a few comments of his own: ἐπεὶ δ' ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις τὰ Ἀριστοτέλους πρεσβεύομεν ἀληθεστέρας ἡγούμενοι τὰς ὑπ' αὐτοῦ παραδεδομένας δόξας τῶν ἄλλοις εἰρημένων, οὕτω δὲ καὶ ἃ ἐν τῷ περὶ ψυχῆς δόγματι φρονοῦμεν, ἔσται τὰ κατὰ τὴν πρόθεσιν ἡμῖν πεπληρωμένα, ἂν τὰ ὑπ' ἐκείνου περὶ ψυχῆς εἰρημένα ὡς ἐνδέχεται σαφῶς ἐκθώμεθα καὶ τοῦ καλῶς ἕκαστον αὐτῶν εἰρῆσθαι τὰς οἰκείας παρασχώμεθα παραμυθίας (2,4–9). But acquaintance with the Neoplatonists' frequent professions to be doing no more than expounding Plato would suggest the need for caution in accepting such claims.

[3] Some modern scholarship has found Platonic elements in Alexander, cf. P. Merlan, Monopsyschism, Mysticism, Metaconsciousness. Problems of the soul in the Neoaristotelian and Neoplatonic tradition, The Hague 1963, esp. 39sqq.; P.L. Donini, Tre studi sull'Aristotelismo nel II secolo d.C., Turin 1974, 5–59 passim; cf.

The first question that arises from these assertions is why this should have been so–if indeed it is true. Why should not commentators who wrote during the long period of Neoplatonism's intellectual ascendancy have been equally honest interpreters of Aristotle? In one sense one might admit that they were, but add immediately that their powers of self-deception were considerably greater. And here it is relevant that, unlike Alexander himself, the later commentators–such as Porphyry, Syrianus, Ammonius, Simplicius, Philoponus, Olympiodorus and Stephanus, were all, except again Themistius, themselves practising Neoplatonists, a fact which has important implications for their approach to the work of commenting on Aristotle. Perhaps it would be as well to state at this stage that "Neoplatonism" is not a description of a cut and dried set of doctrines, and that to apply the term "Neoplatonist" to a particular writer does not mean that he must believe all, and only, those things believed by others so described. Thus these commentators will have held, and can be shown to have held, different views on the subjects treated in such Aristotelian works as they were discussing.[4] And here we come to the implications of their Neoplatonism, for the mere fact that they held different views is more important than it ought to have been.

At this point I should like to summarize some conclusions, for which I have argued elsewhere, but which are basic to the matters under consideration here.[5] It is, of course, theoretically possible for a philosopher to write scholarly commentary without introducing his own views: in practice things never turn out quite like that. But quite apart from the general tendency for philosophers to see their own views at least adumbrated in the texts of earlier philosophers–Aristotle himself is, of course, a notorious example–two particular factors operated in the case of the Neoplatonic commentators. They

now too F.M.Schroeder, The analogy of the active intellect to light in the 'De anima' of Alexander of Aphrodisias, in: Hermes 109 (1981) 215–225; *contra* P.Moraux, Le De anima dans la tradition grecque. Quelques aspects de l'interprétation du traité, de Théophraste à Thémistius, in: Aristotle on mind and the senses, Proceedings of the seventh Symposium Aristotelicum, edd. G.E.R.Lloyd and G.E.L.Owen, Cambridge 1978, 299–300; id. in: Gnomon 50 (1978) 532–533, reviewing Donini, and my review in: JHS 97 (1977) 195.

[4] Cf. my Neoplatonic elements in the De anima commentaries, in: Phronesis 21 (1976) 79–86, and Some Platonist readings of Aristotle, in: PCPhS n.s. 27 (1981) 6–8, 12–13.

[5] For a fuller discussion cf. Neoplatonic elements, 64–87.

were these. First, there was the long process whereby Aristotelians, Platonists and Stoics came to adopt some of each others views, in a variety of mixtures according to a particular individual's philosophical orientation.[6] The process begins in the 1st century B.C.[7] By the time of the great 5th and 6th century commentators it was more than merely acceptable to find one philosopher's views in the writings of another. The most important result of this process was that Aristotle became more and more closely assimilated to Plato, a view of his position that might be acceptable to certain European scholars,[8] but is totally at variance with the normal reading of Aristotle to-day. Moreover, by the time we are considering here, a course on Aristotle was usually given as a preliminary, not to say prerequisite, to the study of Plato which meant, roughly, Plato's metaphysics.[9] Given this situation it was easier for Neoplatonic commentators than it would otherwise have been to find their own views in the text of an Aristotle whom they were inclined to see as an exponent of the same Platonist truth to which they themselves subscribed. Here we come to the second factor, an open and conscious attempt to harmonize the thought of Aristotle and Plato on most issues, or perhaps one should say the words in which that thought was expressed, because it was by special interpretation of the words (λέξις) that the "real meaning" of Aristotle's text could be shown to be compatible with Plato's philosophy (cf., e.g. Simplic. In Cat. 7,29–32). The

[6] Mixtures should not be taken to imply fortuitous juxtapositions. For a recent protest against the notion of eclecticism cf. J.M.Dillon, The Middle Platonists. A study of Platonism 80 B.C. to A.D. 220, London 1977, xiv–xv.

[7] For this development up to the time of Plotinus, from a Platonist point of view, cf. Dillon, op.cit.; the Peripatetic perspective is of course to be found in Moraux's own Der Aristotelismus bei den Griechen von Andronikos bis Alexander von Aphrodisias, Berlin–New York 1973–; for Plotinus himself cf. Porph., Vita Plot. 14.

[8] One thinks in particular of the "Tübingen school", cf. esp. H.J.Krämer, Der Ursprung der Geistmetaphysik, Amsterdam 1964, passim.

[9] For Aristotle as an introduction to Plato cf. Marinus, Vita Procli 13, and for the order of studying his works Simplic., In Cat. 5,3–6,5; on the standard Plato course cf. L.G.Westerink, Anonymous Prolegomena to Platonic Philosophy, Amsterdam 1962, xxxvii–xl; A.-J.Festugière, L'ordre de lecture des dialogues de Platon aux Ve/VIe siècles, in: MH 26 (1969) 281–296, and on the whole curriculum P.Hadot, Les divisions de la philosophie dans l'antiquité, in: MH 36 (1979) 219–221. Themistius again shows his independence by being interested in Plato as a political thinker, cf. my Themistius (see n.1) 393.

usual approach was to say that if one paid attention to the meaning behind the text, and not to the superficial impression created by the mere expression of it, one would find that what appeared to be attacks by Aristotle on Plato were nothing of the kind. An interesting example may be found in a passage of Simplicius' De caelo commentary where Alexander is criticized for attacking Plato because he had failed to understand the purpose of Aristotle's arguments (In Cael. 388,20–34). Thus it was possible for Simplicius, in the preface to his De anima commentary,[10] to state it as his intention to discover and set out Aristotle's internal consistency and his essential harmony with the truth – as seen by Platonists – and for both him and Philoponus to argue over and over again that apparent differences between Plato and Aristotle were not in fact such.[11] Given the combination of such open statements of their intentions with the basic view that Aristotle and Plato were both expounding one truth, it would be unreasonable not to be suspicious about the commentators' pure scholarship. Our suspicions might well be increased by statements like that of Simplicius that he intended to explain the De anima in accordance with the truth and the views of Iamblichus (In An. 1,18–20).

Given all this one might after all expect something other than straightforward commentary. In particular it would not be surprising

[10] For convenience I continue to call the author of this commentary Simplicius, as I think he was. The attribution has been contested by F. Bossier and C. Steel, Priscianus Lydus en de In De anima van Pseudo (?) Simplicius, in: Tijdsch. voor Filos. 34 (1972) 761–822, with French summary on 821–822, who attribute the work to Priscian. I. Hadot, while accepting that they may be right about the authorship argues that the doctrines in it are the same as those in Simplicius' other works, cf. Le problème du néoplatonisme alexandrin. Hiéroclès et Simplicius, Paris 1968, 193–202. If that is correct, the question of authorship may be largely prosopographical. Cf. further I. Hadot, La doctrine de Simplicius sur l'âme raisonnable humaine dans le commentaire sur le manuel d'Epictète, in: Soul and the Structure of Being in late Neoplatonism. Syrianus, Proclus and Simplicius, edd. H. J. Blumenthal and A. C. Lloyd, Liverpool 1963, 46–71, and my The psychology of (?) Simplicius' commentary on the De anima, ibid. 73–93 with the discussion, 93–94. The commentary is treated as Priscian's by Steel in his The changing self. A study of the soul in later Neoplatonism: Iamblichus and Priscianus, Brussels 1978, cf. esp. 123–160 (= Verh. Kon. Ac. Wet. Lett. etc. Belg. 40 [1978] n. 85).

[11] Quite apart from lesser disagreements exception must always be made of the notorious dispute about the eternity of the world and the nature of the heavens, cf. esp. Simplic., In Phys. 1156,28–1182,39.

to find the content of the commentaries influenced by the philosophical opinions of authors who thought that Aristotle and Plato were both trying to say the same thing, though they might sometimes disagree on what that was. In fact one must go further and accept that much of what is in the commentaries is primarily an expression of the commentators' own thought. For they seem to have been so convinced of the unity of what we should distinguish as Platonism, Aristotelianism and Neoplatonism that they were prepared to take as exposition of Aristotle views that were originally put forward as an individual's own philosophical position. The most striking case of this comes in the interpretation of De anima III 5: I shall not discuss this at length here, but shall briefly set out the main points which emerge, as they provide a clear illustration of the attitudes and approaches involved.[12]

In the pseudo-Philoponus commentary on Book III – the real author is Stephanus – we have a list of opinions on the meaning of active intellect (535,4–16). The opinions are those of Alexander, Plotinus, Plutarch (of Athens) and Marinus. Alexander's is rejected in the first place because his explanation, that intellect in act is the supreme cause of all things, that is Aristotle's unmoved mover, would fall outside the scope of the De anima as seen by the Neoplatonists, namely soul and νοῦς in us,[13] a difference between them and Alexander to which we must return.[14] Plotinus, we are told, states that Aristotle means by intellect in act our νοῦς which is permanently engaged in intellection. This is the key case, for we know both that Plotinus did not write commentaries on Aristotle – we have a complete list of his works prepared by his pupil, editor and biographer, Porphyry[15] – and also that the view here given as his view on Aristotle is identical with his own position in a Platonist controversy about whether or not the highest part of the human soul descended with the rest of the individual soul to form the compound that makes a person, or remained above, and therefore in a state of unimpeded intellection, in the intelligible world.[16] Plutarch's view may

[12] Cf. Neoplatonic elements (n. 4) 72–82.

[13] Cf. [Philop.], In An. 536,2–4; 537,18–24.

[14] See below pp. 104–105.

[15] Porph., Vita Plot. 24–26: all these works, of course, survive.

[16] Cf. esp. Plot., Enn. IV 8.8,1–3; on the later history of the question cf. Proclus, In Tim. III 333,28 sqq.; Hermias, In Phaedr. 160,1–4; Simplic., In An. 6,12–17.

have been contained in a commentary on the De anima, but can also be shown to relate to this controversy. He thought we have a single intellect which sometimes thinks and sometimes does not, and his view can be paralleled from Proclus, his pupil, who gave it in his own independent work, Elements of Theology (211) as well as in his commentaries on Plato.[17] Similarly Marinus, whom we do not otherwise know to have written a commentary on the De anima, is credited with a view that Aristotle means by intellect in act some demonic or angelic intellect: this too can be explained by reference to Proclus, his teacher, this time to Proclus' Timaeus commentary, where such minds form part of a triad mediating higher intellect to our world (III 165,7–22).

All this should make it clear that we are likely to find the Neoplatonists' personal positions masquerading as explanation of Aristotle. One reason may have been that the commentators and their contemporaries were, on at least some, not to say many, questions no longer able to tell the difference. When we consider their attitudes to Alexander we must not be surprised if they disagree with him when his view is closer than theirs to what we would take to be Aristotle's meaning, while they interpret him in a Platonic way. In fact they will occasionally state that that is why they do not accept Alexander's interpretation. One further factor should be born in mind, an external one. This is that in Alexandria, for whatever reason, the delivery of lectures on Aristotle and the publication of comments on his treatises, often derived from those lectures, became the standard means of philosophical expression for the Neoplatonists there.[18] This will inevitably have encouraged the insertion of Platonism into the exposition of Aristotle. There would have been a special stimulus if the reason for this concentration on Aristotle was, as has sometimes been suggested, that Ammonius made an agreement with the ecclesiastical authorities at Alexandria not to teach Plato,[19] but I

[17] Cf. Proclus, In Tim. ibid.; In Parm. 948,18–38.

[18] By contrast some, if not all, of Simplicius' commentaries were produced as scholarly works, for readers, in the first place, cf. K. Praechter, Art. Simplicius (10), in: RE III A 1 (1927) 205.

[19] That some agreement was made on the basis that Ammonius took Christian pupils in exchange for official subventions was argued by P. Tannery, Sur la période finale de la philosophie grecque, in: RPhilos. 42 (1896) 275–276, and accepted by H.-D. Saffrey, who suggested that abandoning the teaching of Plato may have been one of the conditions, cf. Le chrétien Jean Philopon et la survivance de l'école d'Alexandrie au VIe siècle, in: REG 67 (1954) 400–401; cf. also Alan Cameron, The last days of the Academy at Athens, in: PCPhS n.s. 15 (1969) 9; and L. G. Westerink, Anonymous Prolegomena (see n. 9) xi–xii, who thinks there was an agreement but that it did not entail dropping lectures on Plato.

am no longer sure that such an agreement was ever made.[20] The Alexandrians did not stop teaching Plato, and other reasons might be involved, such as the predominance of Athens in Platonic studies.

To read Aristotle un-Platonically was to all the late commentators a sign of perversity, and we find accusations made against Alexander that he interprets Aristotle perversely to make Aristotle's views conform to his own, from our point of view a strange accusation coming as it does from those who were themselves guilty of that very charge. They could make this complaint while continuing to honour Alexander as the interpreter of Aristotle *par excellence*. Simplicius more than once calls him simply the commentator on Aristotle (In Phys. 707,33) or just ὁ ἐξηγητής, the commentator (ibid. 1170,2 and 13).[21] Even when he has been attacking an interpretation of the Eleatics offered by Alexander, he will describe him as ὁ γνησιώτερος τῶν Ἀριστοτέλους ἐξηγητῶν, and explain the length of his own discussion by the inadequacy of Alexander's (In Phys. 80,15–17). Similarly in the De anima commentary he can refer to Alexander as ὁ τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους ἐξηγητής while disagreeing with his understanding of Aristotle (52,26–30).[22] As we shall see, there were certain respects in which such honorific references were not merely lip service. We should note that other Neoplatonists were treated in the same way. Plotinus and Iamblichus are always spoken of in terms of the greatest respect – Iamblichus is frequently referred to as ὁ θεῖος – but their opinions are not necessarily accepted. One need only think of the references to ὁ μέγας Πλωτῖνος and ὁ θεῖος

[20] The case rests almost entirely on Damasc., Vita Isid. fr. 316 Zintzen = Photius, Cod. 242, 292, which does not say that this is what happened. I shall discuss this matter further in a treatment of Philoponus as an Alexandrian Platonist.

[21] The reference is quite clear: Alexander is named at 1169,33, cf. also In Phys. 1176,32, with 1175,13.

[22] A passage in an Athenian source, Syrianus, In Metaph. 100,1–13, which has sometimes been taken to refer to Alexander as ὁ νεώτερος Ἀριστοτέλης cannot do so, as the views attributed to that person are incompatible with those reported for Alexander in the same passage, cf. Moraux, Aristoteles, der Lehrer Alexanders von Aphrodisias, in: AGPh 49 (1967) 179–182.

'Ιάμβλιχος in the opening section of Simplicius' Categories commentary (2,3.9).

Let us start with the accusations of perversity, since they provide a motivation for the kind of differences we do find. Immediately we are faced with the difficulty that we cannot always tell whether or not Alexander himself has been misrepresented. The references to him in the De anima commentaries of Philoponus, Simplicius and Stephanus seem nearly all to be to Alexander's own lost commentary on the De anima, and the only control we have is whether or not these views on Aristotle conform with what are probably Alexander's own opinions as found in his treatise Περὶ ψυχῆς, a treatise which is still often, but nonetheless incorrectly, treated as if it were a paraphrastic commentary of the type later written by Themistius. Themistius for one will not have regarded it as such, for he claimed to have invented the paraphrase-type exposition, modestly claiming in the introduction to his paraphrase of the Posterior Analytics that he was not proposing to compete with the many and excellent full commentaries that had already been produced: that would be a pointless quest to enhance one's own reputation (In An. Post. 1,1–7).[23] Philoponus himself refers to Alexander's treatise as a separate work at In An. 159,18.

Fortunately, we may learn something about the later treatment of Alexander from questions which do not depend on the accuracy with which he is reported. In his comments on the opening words of the De anima Philoponus cites Plutarch for the opinion that Alexander's commentary on Aristotle was really a facade for the display of his own doctrines, an opinion with which Philoponus clearly concurs, as he goes on to use the point to criticize Alexander's comment on the opening words of the treatise: ὁ μὲν οὖν 'Αλέξανδρος, ὥς φησιν ὁ Πλούταρχος, ἔκθεσιν τῶν ἰδίων δογμάτων ποιήσασθαι βουλόμενος καὶ συγκατασπάσαι ἑαυτῷ καὶ τὴν 'Αριστοτέλους προσεποιήσατο ὑπομνηματίζειν ταύτην τὴν πραγματείαν. ἐκ προοιμίων οὖν τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἐνδιάστροφον γνώμην δεικνὺς αὐτὸ τὸ προοίμιον διαστρόφως ἐξηγήσατο· "Alexander, as Plutarch says, wishing to expound his own doctrines and forcibly to drag Aristotle into conformity with himself, pretended to comment on this treatise. So showing his perverse understanding from the start, he produced a perverse exposition of the beginning" (21,20–25). A similar complaint, this time without reference to Plutarch, but using the same word, συγκατασπᾶν, may be found a few pages earlier, at 10,1–3, where Alexander is mentioned as one of those who think the whole soul is inseparable and therefore mortal. From a completely different context we might compare Simplicius' complaint in the Physics commentary (77,9–10) that Alexander's own preoccupations caused him to oppose those who said being is one.

[23] On Themistius' purpose in writing paraphrase see my Photius on Themistius (Cod. 74): did Themistius write commentaries on Aristotle?, in: Hermes 107 (1979) 175–176.

Stephanus, discussing 434 b 4–5, on whether or not heavenly bodies are endowed with sense perception, quotes the views of both Plutarch and Alexander. Here we have a mixture of philological and philosophical differences. Alexander, Stephanus tells us, read the text as διὰ τί γὰρ ἔξει; "why should ‹the heavenly bodies› have ‹sense perception›?", and explained it as an open question (ἐρωτηματικῶς). Plutarch went the opposite way, took it with a negative, and wrote διὰ τί γὰρ τὰ οὐράνια οὐχ ἕξει αἴσθησιν; "why should not the heavenly bodies have sense-perception?" Stephanus tells us that both chose their reading to conform with the answer they wished to find in Aristotle, a negative one in Alexander's case, a positive one in Plutarch's (595,37–596,36). He next concedes that one can show from Aristotle's writings that the heavenly bodies do not share in sense-perception, but immediately goes on to say that such a demonstration may be refuted from the writings of the Platonists, a refutation which he then proceeds to produce (596,36–598,7). Unfortunately he does not identify the Πλατωνικοί, but it is clear that it is their reading, rather than the more Aristotelian one, which he prefers. Simplicius, on the other hand, in discussing the preceding words – in some texts – ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ ἀγένητον, prefers Alexander's understanding of these words to Plutarch's on the grounds that Alexander does not attribute αἴσθησις to heavenly bodies, a thing Aristotle nowhere does, whereas Plutarch's explanation causes him to do so (320,28–38).

Nevertheless Simplicius gives an extreme Athenian-type interpretation of Aristotle's psychology. It depends on splitting the soul into as many layers as will enable him to deal with ambiguities, real and imagined, by transforming each of two possible interpretations of a text into separate entities, making both sides of the ambiguity true in

one way if not another.[24] Such an approach, though common to all later Neoplatonists, is more marked in the Athenian Neoplatonism best represented by Proclus, whose ideas – or the Iamblichean ideas which come to us in Proclus' writings – clearly influenced Simplicius, notwithstanding his training at Alexandria.[25] He later studied under Damascius[26] at Athens and worked with him there.[27]

Thus Simplicius, commenting on 407 b 23–26, complains that other interpreters, among whom he includes Alexander, made mistakes because they failed to distinguish between the form of life – and life is for him roughly equivalent to soul – which uses body as an instrument, τὴν ὡς ὀργάνῳ χρωμένην, and that which forms the instrument and makes it such as it is, τῆς τὸ ὄργανον ὡς ὄργανον εἰδοποιούσης. In consequence Alexander thought that soul does not use body as an instrument (52,22–30). In other words, Alexander, having failed to make a Neoplatonic distinction, and an extreme one at that, fails to misinterpret Aristotle's basic concept of the soul in such a way as to make it, in at least one sense, a separable entity such as the Platonist concept, which all the late commentators shared, required.[28]

The mention of Plutarch in conjunction with Alexander in two of these passages is interesting and significant. These two are the only commentators referred to with any frequency – Plutarch more often in Book III, to which any full commentary he wrote may have been confined – and in almost every case where their views are at variance Plutarch's is preferred to Alexander's. That this should be so is only to be expected in view of the Neoplatonic orientation of the

[24] Cf. my The psychology of (?) Simplicius (n. 10) 78–82.

[25] That there were such differences does not mean that Alexandrian and Athenian Neoplatonism were based on a radically different view of the structure and extent of the intelligible, as was maintained by Praechter, Richtungen und Schulen im Neuplatonismus, in: Genethliakon C. Robert, Berlin 1910, 105–155, summarised on 155–156, reprinted in: Kleine Schriften, ed. H. Dörrie, Hildesheim – New York 1973, 165–216, summary 215–216; also in articles, Hierocles (18) in: RE III (1913) 1479–1482 and Simplicius (see n. 18) 204–213. For a critique of Praechter's views cf. I. Hadot, Le problème (n. 10) 47–65.

[26] Cf. e.g. Simplic., In Phys. 642,17.

[27] If the author of Simplicius' De anima commentary is after all Priscian the point about the Athenian milieu still stands.

[28] For further discussion of Simplicius' interpretation cf. Some Platonist readings (n. 4) 6.

later commentators. Plutarch has sometimes been characterised as a sane and respectable commentator, a reliable interpreter of Aristotle free from the wilder tendencies of later Neoplatonism.[29] If this were so we should expect to find, leaving aside other evidence as to his views both on the soul and other matters, that Plutarch and Alexander agreed more often than not, at least in their basic approach. Yet, as we have already seen, it is in relation to their approach that they are liable to be opposed. We must of course allow the possibility that both are cited only in cases such as those we have considered, where they disagree, or when the commentator who cites them disagrees with them both,[30] while for most of their commentaries they will have agreed with each other, and their views will have been acceptable to their successors. Now that may have been the case, but if so it is not necessarily important that it was so, for the simple reason that large sections of the De anima will have been uncontroversial in any case.

That statement perhaps requires justification. How, when the basis of Neoplatonic psychology is Platonic, in so far as there is no question about the soul's separate and independent existence, can any considerable part of a treatise which starts from the opposite assumption have remained uncontroversial? Briefly, the answer is this. From Plotinus on the Neoplatonists accepted the main outlines of Aristotle's psychology in so far as it related to the soul's functions rather than its nature.[31] Thus controversy was centred on the points where the soul might or might not have been separable from the body, the lower part for the Neoplatonists and the higher for Aristotle. The whole central section of the soul, with its various functions, nutrition, reproduction, perception, memory and even, to an extent, discursive thought, operated for the Neoplatonists in more or less the way described by Aristotle – while being for the Neoplatonists separable like a Platonic soul. In this area the main problems for the Neoplatonists arose over the demarcation of the boundary

[29] Cf. Praechter, Art. Syrianos (1) in: RE IV A 2 (1932) 1737, and R. Beutler, Art. Plutarchos (3) in: RE XXI 1 (1951) 963–964; *contra* H.-D. Saffrey and L. G. Westerink, edd. Proclus, Théologie Platonicienne I, Paris 1968, xlvii.

[30] Cf. Simplic., In An. 50,36–37; 259,38–260,2; [Philop.], In An. 465,22–27; 529,17–26.

[31] Cf. my Plotinus' Psychology. His doctrines of the embodied soul, The Hague 1971, 134–140.

between higher, rational, and lower, irrational, soul, a problem hinted at in Aristotle's treatise (432 a 22–26), but not of primary concern to him, and then over their constant anxiety to stress the active and independent nature of the soul's part in any activity involving both body and soul.[32] Thus there is a *prima facie* likelihood that arguments against Alexander should be preponderantly, if by no means entirely, related to his views about the unity of body and soul and the nature of the intellect.

There is one further area where one would not expect the late commentators to disagree consistently with Alexander. That is in matters of pure scholarship, reading, textual interpretations, the construction of sentences or even their meaning – in the primary as opposed to the philosophical sense. Inevitably there will be some differences even on the former, such as simple disagreements about cross-references, or points of grammar.[33] In the last instance, of course, the boundaries between straight philological comment and active philosophical interpretation are – we have already seen a case of this –[34] likely to be blurred, notwithstanding the efforts of the latest generation of commentators – Stephanus rather than Philoponus or Simplicius, though the procedure can be traced back to Proclus – to separate formally their discussion of thought and language.[35] In fact Stephanus is, if anything, less good than the others, who do not make the formal distinction in their work, at keeping the two apart in those cases which pertain to Alexander's interpretations. And in all the cases where he presents Alexander's interpretation by name he rejects it: this applies also to his citations of Alexander on philosophical points, a situation whose explanation we have already touched on. The genuine Philoponus, on the other hand, in the commentary on Books I and II agrees with Alexander on purely philological points half as often again as he disagrees (6:4), with the reverse ratio applying where philological and philosophical points

[32] Cf. ibid. 69 sqq., and Proclus on perception, in: BICS 29 (1982) 6–8.

[33] Cf. e.g. Simplicius' complaint about Alexander's criticism of a double negative at Phys. II 4, 196 a 8–10 at In Phys. 329,14–20, or the simple disagreement about a cross reference at Simplic., In An. 50,36–37.

[34] Cf. the differences between Plutarch and Alexander on III 12, discussed above, p. 98.

[35] Cf. Festugière, Modes de composition des commentaires de Proclus, in: MH 20 (1963) 77–100.

combine (2:3). The figures are of course far too small to have any statistical significance; they merely indicate a trend. This is unfortunate, as the same proportions apply to the philological issues in Simplicius: on the combined questions disagreements outnumber agreements by 6:1. In the case of the genuine Philoponus commentary on Book III, available only for chapters 4–9 in Moerbeke's translation, there are no agreements, arguably because no purely philological points are at issue. Moreover, that part of the De anima is of course more "Neoplatonically sensitive" than the rest in so far as it deals with intellect, which may also in part explain the greater divergence between Stephanus and Alexander. Only in part, because the difference holds also for those parts of Book III whose subject is more neutral – the discussions of imagination, locomotion and the arrangement and distribution of the faculties. An important point that emerges from these admittedly scant figures is that Alexander is not only cited on those occasions when the commentators feel that his view must be disposed of or at least corrected.

So far we have said nearly nothing about Themistius. Themistius is a useful control since he wrote non-Platonic commentary at a time, the mid-fourth century,[36] when Platonism was already the prevailing philosophy, even if it had not yet been so for some three centuries. Thus, unlike Simplicius and Philoponus, he is to be found on the same side as Alexander in his account of Aristotle's definition of the soul, and even closer to Aristotle – arguably of course – than Alexander himself on the question of the active intellect, which Themistius took as internal to the individual human soul (102,30 sqq.). These two cases alone suffice to show both that it was not necessary to write Platonic commentary after the rise of Neoplatonism, and also that a commentator's views could still, on crucial issues, reflect his own judgement rather than a prevailing school line. As in modern times the place where a man worked may have affected his views: Themistius was at Constantinople, not at Athens or Alexandria. It may of course be argued that the method Themistius used restricted his scope for unorthodoxy, but it will not be entirely outrageous to suggest that Aristotle's text leaves plenty of

[36] The commentaries were written at an early stage in Themistius' career, cf. A. H. M. Jones, J. R. Martindale, J. Morris, Prosopography of the Later Roman Empire I, Cambridge 1971, 889.

scope for more than one paraphrase. Unfortunately Themistius' views are not discussed sufficiently often in the other De anima commentaries for any useful conclusions to be drawn from such discussions as we do find. In his De anima commentary Simplicius mentions him only once (151,14). Philoponus in one discussion mentions him to object to his views on the problem at De anima 422 b 17 sqq. about whether or not a single sense is involved in the perception of different kinds of objects of touch (408,25–411,1), a question sufficiently difficult for disagreement not necessarily to be significant, and on another occasion to disagree about whether or not flesh is a sense organ (418,25–26). Stephanus refers to him three times, once on the number of senses, where he accepts Themistius' opinion (490,9–19) but suggests that a Platonic explanation would be preferable (ibid. 27–34), and twice on the definition of imagination: here he disputes a view which he seems to have carelessly misrepresented (508,19–21; 514,29–31).[37] None of these points depends on a difference between a Platonic and non-Platonic reading of an Aristotelian text.

It is, as we have already indicated, on just such points that Alexander is criticised. We have mentioned how Simplicius complains about his view of the body soul relation.[38] Philoponus makes some attempt to come to terms with Aristotle's definition (215,4–216,25), and so does not attack Alexander on this point, though in the course of the discussion he does take issue with him on another matter. He does, however, object no less than Simplicius to Alexander's treatment of those passages where Aristotle suggests that perhaps some part of the soul is separable after all.[39] These of course more often relate to the intellect, but the different approaches of Alexander and his Neoplatonic successors emerge just as clearly over the still unresolved problem passage where Aristotle, having argued that the soul must be the inseparable entelechy of the body, allows the possibility that some parts may be separable just because they are not the body's entelechy, and then continues ἔτι δὲ ἄδηλον εἰ οὕτως ἐντελέχεια τοῦ σώματος ἡ ψυχὴ ὥσπερ πλωτὴρ πλοίου,[40] "it is unclear

[37] See further my Neoplatonic interpretations of Aristotle on *phantasia*, in: RMeta 31 (1977) 253–254.

[38] Cf. p. 99 above.

[39] See pp. 104–105 below.

[40] Simplicius' *lemma* reads τοῦ σώματός ἐστιν ὥσπερ but the sense is not affected.

whether soul is the entelechy of the body as a sailor is of a ship" (413 a 8–9). For Simplicius (96,3–15) these remarks present a difficulty because for him it is perfectly clear that the soul is an entelechy of that kind, that is, detachable: he does not discuss, or even mention, Alexander's view that Aristotle appears to be in doubt. Philoponus does but, of course, rejects it because for him there can be no doubt on this point (225,20–31). But Alexander, like some modern interpreters, raises the possibility that Aristotle is talking about the intellect. As Philoponus puts it Alexander is forced to say that Aristotle may be referring to the intellect: προϊὼν δὲ καὶ ὑπὸ τῆς λέξεως βιαζόμενός φησιν ὅτι ἔοικε δὲ περὶ νοῦ λέγειν ὅτι ἔστι χωριστός (ibid. 25–26).

Yet Philoponus himself does not think that Aristotle can be discussing a completely separate intellect anywhere in this work, a point that comes up at several places where the possibility arises that Aristotle could be talking about a fully transcendent intellect (413 b 24–27, 415 a 11–12). In discussing these passages Philoponus brings to bear a principle of interpretation which excludes certain possibilities right from the start, namely that all works of Plato and Aristotle had one particular philosophical purpose. How misleading this could be is perhaps best shown by the fact that Iamblichus, who seems to have been responsible for this system, decided that the Sophist was a theological work dealing with the sublunary demiurge.[41] Under this rule the De anima was a work about λογικὴ ψυχή, the rational soul, that is the human soul as attached to an individual and separate from the transcendent intelligible world (cf. e.g. Simplic. 4,29–31). This arbitrary limitation of the scope of the De anima is produced as an argument here and elsewhere, most notably in the discussions of III 5 by Stephanus, to which we have already referred,[42] and also by Simplicius (cf. 240,2–5)[43] to show that Aristotle could not have been talking about what Neoplatonists called divine (θεῖος) or unparticipated (ἀμέθεκτος) intellect, and so not about the supreme cause, as Alexander maintained.

[41] Cf. the scholion on Plat., Soph. 216 a, p. 445 Greene; also in Plato, ed. Hermann VI, 249.

[42] See above pp. 94–95.

[43] Cf. also [Philop.], In An. 518,36–519,2 where Ammonius is reported to have complained that both Alexander and Plutarch failed to see that the treatise is not about ὁ θύραθεν νοῦς.

Just as Philoponus had refused to accept that Aristotle shows any doubt about the separability of soul, so Simplicius, discussing 413 b 15–16, where Aristotle says there is a problem about separability, writes that we must not follow Alexander in thinking the remark is occasioned by intellect: the difficulty is about the senses, which use separate organs (101,18–32). At 413 b 24–26 Aristotle says nothing is yet clear about the power of thought, but it seems to be a different kind of soul and the only one that can be separable. Simplicius, like Philoponus, maintains that Aristotle's difficulty is not about the separability of intellect. When Alexander suggests that Aristotle's "seems" (ἔοικε) leaves open two possibilities, Simplicius asserts that "seems" must mean "is apparently" (πρέπει or φαίνεται), and argues that the rational soul is certainly separate – a good example of how the Neoplatonists read their philosophical presuppositions into an ostensibly philological discussion (102,27–103,8). In discussing the same text Philoponus, as we have just seen, uses his view that the divine intellect must be separable to exclude Alexander's suggestion that that is the subject of Aristotle's doubt (241,28–242,5; cf. also 194,12–13). And when at 415 a 11–12 Aristotle, talking about lower faculties being entailed by higher ones, says that the intellect that thinks is another subject, Philoponus rejects Alexander's explanation that the reference is to the divine intellect on the grounds that that is not Aristotle's subject here (261,10–262,4).

These are a few examples of how the Neoplatonist commentators confronted Alexander on matters where differences could hardly fail to arise. What happens is clear enough. But it would be wrong to think that these principles of interpretation are not applied at other points in the work. Let us take an apparently innocuous issue like the section where Aristotle discusses locomotion under the stimulus of the appetitive faculty (433 b 8 sqq.). Alexander, giving a clearly Aristotelian explanation, said that the faculty was moved accidentally. Plutarch differed, and said that the activity of the appetitive faculty is movement: this Simplicius describes as a Platonic explanation, and prefers it (302,23–30).[44] On the other hand, a few pages below Simplicius prefers Alexander to Plutarch on the question whether moving but ungenerated entities have sense-perception (320,33–34): we have already looked at his and Stephanus'

[44] On this text see further Some Platonist readings (n. 4) 12.

account of this passage.[45] As we indicated, Stephanus there quotes Alexander only to disagree with him, and here we have at least one piece of evidence to show that Neoplatonist commentators could take a different view of the same passage. If we had more examples of texts where Alexander's views of the De anima were discussed by more than one of his successors, we should be able to form a clearer picture of how far the different commentators were prepared to accept them, and thus incidentally of the precise differences between these commentators themselves on the points at issue.[46]

[45] Cf. above p. 98.

[46] An earlier version of this paper was given to a joint session of the Classical Association of Canada and the Canadian Philosophical Association at Laval University, and was written during the tenure of a Junior Fellowship at the Center for Hellenic Studies, and a Leverhulme Research Fellowship.

XV

John Philoponus and Stephanus of Alexandria: Two Neoplatonic Christian Commentators on Aristotle?

"Two Neoplatonic Christian commentators on Aristotle?" The query is crucial, and could equally well come at three points in the title of this paper. It could come after the word "two" because it is not yet clear how much difference there, in fact, is between the commentaries of Philoponus and Stephanus on Book 3 of Aristotle's *de Anima*—it is these two commentaries with which I shall be primarily concerned. We now have Stephanus of Alexandria's exposition of this book in the transmitted text of Philoponus' commentary, while Philoponus' own survives only in a thirteenth-century Latin version by William of Moerbeke, and only for chapters 4–8 at that; it is also to some extent reflected in the paraphrase commentary by Sophonias,[1] which should probably be dated to the fourteenth century. So that is one question. One could also place the query after "Christian." Their philosophical background is manifestly Neoplatonic, but were they both, or was only Stephanus, Christian at the time when they wrote their commentaries—or gave the lectures on which the commentaries as we have them are based?[2] Yet again one could put it after "commentators." Were they Christians whose exposition of Aristotle *thereby* differed from what it would have been had they been pagans, or

commentators on Aristotle who were no more than incidentally Christian? In other words, do the Christian convictions that both may have had bear in any way on their reading of Aristotle? And if they do, how can we detect the operation of this bias? Finally, we might ask how much these men were genuinely commentators on Aristotle at all.

Let us deal first with what should, at first sight, be the easiest of these questions: one commentator, or two? On a superficial level three sets of differences immediately present themselves. First, a crude measure, but informative nevertheless, is the scale of the commentaries. In the one Neoplatonic commentary which survives intact, that of Simplicius (?Priscian),[3] the commentary on Book 3 is twice as long as that on Book 1, and three-quarters as long again as that on Book 2, whereas in Stephanus' version (or whatever it is), the commentary on Book 3 is only four-fifths as long as Philoponus' on Book 1, and not much longer—some twenty pages—than Philoponus' on Book 2.[4] Now this might be a sign of different interests rather than anything else, but should at least be noted as a possible indication of difference. More significant is that within Book 3 itself, the relative length of discussion in different passages is not always the same. Sometimes Philoponus has more to say on one passage, at others Stephanus will give a long exposition of texts on which Philoponus has very little to say.

Second, we have a difference relating to the organization of the material. Philoponus' commentary continues with no marked breaks or divisions other than those arising from the text on which it is a commentary. Stephanus', on the other hand, falls into that series of divisions into *theōria* and *praxis* which seems to have been codified by Olympiodorus, though it can be traced back to Proclus.[5]

Third, we have a matter of scholarly practice. Stephanus' commentary, but not Philoponus', contains numerous named references to earlier commentators (or philosophers assumed to be commentators—especially Alexander and Plutarch, perhaps the only previous authors of full-scale commentaries on the *de Anima*, or at least Book 3 of it) and a continuous examination and dissection of the views of both these and others. That this apparent difference was not due to excisions by the Latin translator can be seen at once by a comparison with Philoponus on Books 1 and 2, as well as his other commentaries. Only Alexander constitutes an exception, both in the Latin *de Anima* commentary and elsewhere. But it must not be thought that the translator never made changes or additions: in the exposition of 3.4 we have a note on the fact that Greek *morion*, unlike Latin *pars*, was neuter, which cannot have been in the original. Thus we have here a *prima facie* case for distinguishing our two commentators as independent authorities—within the limits of independence at this point in the tradition. We have not yet excluded the possibility that they produced different presentations of a similar commentary; the formulation here is deliberately vague since, theoretically at least, straight dependence and common descent are equally possible. But a look at both the structure and the detailed contents of some of the comparable parts of each commentary will show that they are in fact independent.

By way of example let us take the opening discussion of 3.4, where Aristotle turns from imagination to thought, from the irrational to the rational soul. This

latter distinction is one that is not present in Aristotle's treatise—it is mentioned only in passing in a later discussion, and attributed to persons unnamed[6]—but it is of course one of the major concerns of the Neoplatonist commentators, our two as well as Simplicius, who were much preoccupied with allocating the soul's faculties and activities to its higher or lower sections. Thus *phantasia*, working as it does with both, naturally presented peculiar difficulties, which are prominent in the exposition of *de Anima* 3.3.[7] Some of these are also conspicuous in the treatment of 3.4, where they are relevant insofar as it is necessary to establish how far reason and intellect involve imagination.

A brief look at the structure of the two expositions of 3.4 will show that the two commentaries cannot simply be identified. Philoponus, but not Stephanus, gives a short introduction to the discussions that are to follow. Both commentaries then tell us that Aristotle is setting out to answer three questions. Since Aristotle himself does not say this, it is probably part of the commentary tradition.[8] Aristotle himself says that whether or not the part of the soul by which it knows and thinks is separable—thus indicating that he does not himself intend to deal with that question in this place—we must ask how this part of soul differs from others, and how thinking takes place. Thus Aristotle asks *two* questions: the commentators, with their own special concerns clearly influencing their reading of Aristotle, have him ask three. According to Philoponus these are:

1. Is the rational soul separate or inseparable?
2. How does it differ from the sensible (*a sensu*)?
3. How does intellection happen in us?[9]

Stephanus' list is not, however, the same. The three questions he gives are:

1. Is the soul destructible or not?
2. How is the rational soul different from the sensible?
3. How does intellection take place?[10]

In these lists only the second and third questions more or less coincide. The first in Stephanus' list could be an implication of the one given by Philoponus, which is closer to what Aristotle actually says. The second and third, as we have said, do go back to Aristotle himself, but in the first the commentators have taken the words in which Aristotle puts aside the question of separability, as he repeatedly does, and turned them into a third question which not only reflects their own interests, but which is clearly more important to them than the other two. These however are Neoplatonic—or perhaps just simply Platonic—interests, and not Christian ones, though they do of course relate to Christian problems. The answers given are in any case firmly in the Platonic tradition.

A curious mixture of Neoplatonic aims and Aristotelian content emerges from Stephanus' *theōria*, the preliminary general discussion of matters under investigation in this section.[11] Stephanus announces that he will deal with the first two of the three questions, and start with the second because the second helps towards an answer to the first. Proceeding thus, he distinguishes rational soul from sensation—let us remember that the distinction of a rational soul from an irrational one does

not figure in Aristotle's discussion—and argues that, though they have certain features in common, they differ in their reaction to intense stimuli. While this point is of course raised by Aristotle himself later in the treatise,[12] he does not draw the conclusion that is produced by Stephanus, namely that the very fact that *nous* thrives on intenser stimuli, and is helped by them to deal with the lesser ones, is a strong indication of its eternity. Neither this arrangement of the arguments nor the argument itself is to be found in Philoponus' discussion of this chapter. Nor is the second argument: that since *nous* can and does think all things, it must be incorporeal and eternal. The preoccupations that emerge from these discussions (preoccupations with discerning the differences between the levels of soul, and with the question of immortality) are of course highly relevant to our last question, how much these works are in fact commentaries on Aristotle. The answer suggested by this section is that they are rather meditations arising from the text of Aristotle, and that is an answer that can easily be reinforced by other evidence. The most conspicuous is the Neoplatonizing treatment of the next chapter, 3.5, which introduces into the exposition of Aristotle the whole Neoplatonic debate on the status of the individual *nous*.[13] Similarly we have the assumption that Aristotle must be talking in terms of a detachable soul on the Platonic model, patently wrong but consistently maintained by all the Neoplatonic commentators, in spite of some attempts by Philoponus to understand Aristotle in his own terms.[14] Thus the whole discussion of 3.4 is based on a consequence of the Platonic model, namely that the soul uses the body as a tool or instrument.

In the sequel the two discussions diverge further, and even when the same or similar points are made, the order in which they are introduced is not the same. Philoponus continues[15] by discussing how the intellect might be a part of the soul, and argues that Aristotle has used the term improperly. He maintains that in the soul the part must be coterminous with the whole, and this means that either the whole soul would be immortal, or not; whereas Aristotle has previously said that we are dealing with a different section of the soul. Further, the word "soul" is used equivocally, just as, for example, "sun" may mean the body or its light, and "Ajax" may refer either to the son of Telamon or a mysterious Trojan: neither of these examples is to be found in Stephanus. At the equivalent point in his discussion, Stephanus gives us the views of Plutarch and Alexander on the significance of the *lemma*,[16] but does not involve himself in the meaning of "part" until after he has dealt with the meanings of *nous*, which in the Philoponus commentary are discussed immediately after the section on "part."[17]

If we compare the two discussions of the senses of *nous* we find a similar account given by both commentators, though again the presentation differs. Philoponus goes straight on to consider three senses of *nous*,[18] while Stephanus gives us his view of what Aristotle means after telling us that Alexander and Plutarch take them differently. He discusses their treatments in some detail, and also explains Ammonius' differences with them before going on to his own position.[19]

Philoponus, on the other hand, states his own position first and then goes on to discuss certain views of Alexander, which Stephanus mentioned at a correspondingly earlier stage. Here, apart from the difference of presentation, we find that

the two commentators have produced substantially different accounts of Alexander's position. Alexander, as is well known, held that the strictly human intellect was mortal, and that the active intellect was external to the individual. Now, according to Philoponus, Alexander was unable to deny that intellect was such as he has told us Aristotle's intellect was, citing the Aristotelian description of it as pure or unmixed and impassible. Therefore, says Philoponus, because he could not go against these pronouncements, Alexander said that Aristotle was talking about the universal intellect.[20] Stephanus, on the other hand, says that in order to maintain his position, Alexander did just what Philoponus said—rightly—he was unable to do, namely that he attacked the idea that *nous* was pure, impassible, and separate.[21] Here, on a point of considerable importance, they give manifestly conflicting accounts of Alexander, the only authority whom Philoponus cites by name in this part of his commentary.

Here, then, are a few examples, which could be multiplied without difficulty, of the difference in presentation and substance between the two commentators. They should suffice without multiplication to show that we have before us two separate commentaries, and not merely different versions of a typical and traditional Alexandrian lecture course on the *de Anima*. Yet certain similarities of approach are clearly present.

Now that we have established that we are dealing with two separate commentaries, we must turn to the question of their authors' religion. In Stephanus' case the mere fact of his Christianity (suggested by his name, his date, and his occupation of an official chair at Constantinople,[22] as well as the occasional pronouncement)[23] should be accepted[24]—its importance is another matter—but in that of Philoponus there is a problem. Here we must expand the point about being Christian at the time of composition of the *de Anima* commentary, or indeed of any of the Philoponus commentaries.[25]

Until recently, then, it has been commonly thought, lack of evidence from antiquity notwithstanding, that Philoponus had begun his philosophical activities as a pagan and subsequently become a convert to Christianity—to which his name John suggests, but does not prove, allegiance—after he had written his commentaries. This is the view of Gudeman in his generally unsatisfactory *Pauly* article, and has been maintained by others since.[26] In a book difficult of access—it was published in occupied France—R. Vancourt treated Philoponus as if he were a Christian when he wrote the *de Anima* commentary.[27] Subsequently E. Evrard, examining the chronological relationships of Philoponus' *oeuvre*, mainly on the basis of his views on the movement of the heavenly bodies and his understanding of Aristotle's fifth element, has argued that there is no chronological separation between the commentaries and the other works, and in particular that the *de Aeternitate Mundi contra Proclum* was written before the commentary on the *Meteorologica*.[28] That in itself, if correct, as I think it is, is sufficient to destroy the traditional position. It would mean that we cannot be sure that there was in fact any time when he was a pagan. Evrard proceeded to examine briefly the *de Anima* commentary, and to suggest that the apparently non-Christian views in it, on the preexistence of the soul and the immortality of the luminous body, are explicable

in terms of an Origenism which, he thinks, survived at Alexandria. He further suggested, following Vancourt, that Philoponus' explanation of *de Anima* 3.5 was influenced by the wish to select from the field a view not incompatible with Christianity, namely that we have a single soul of which the intellect is part.

To take the second point first. Whether or not Philoponus was a Christian is probably irrelevant; the choice he makes is explicable in terms of the Neoplatonic tradition: three of the four views presented in the commentary are in fact Neoplatonic views, and are connected with Aristotle only insofar as the Neoplatonists thought they and Aristotle were expounding the same philosophy. I have examined this matter in some detail elsewhere, so shall not pursue the point now, but simply say that what Philoponus—and Stephanus—did was to adopt the standard and orthodox Neoplatonic view about the human intellect, namely that it is single and fully descended.[29] Insofar as that is what they did, we cannot attach great significance to their choice. It remains possible that Christian prejudice affected it, but it is unnecessary to introduce it into the discussion of their motives. Ironically, the problems presented by the Platonic view of the soul could be solved by reading Aristotle in the way we think he should be read, which is just what his interpreters in antiquity did not normally do. Thus a more straightforward reading of Aristotle might be a result of Christian bias, and one might consider in this context Aquinas' interpretation of 3.5.[30] As for luminous bodies, these, or pneumatic ones, were characteristic of Platonists and Platonizers alike.[31]

Similar explanations may be offered of Philoponus' view that the world was created in time. Like the dispute about the status of the intellect, this too reflects a long-standing and well-known controversy among Platonists after Plato. The point at issue was, of course, the interpretation of Plato's *Timaeus*. This is another controversy whose details need not concern us here. It need only be recalled that the view that the world was created in time was not a function of Christian readings of Plato, but can be traced back to Plato's immediate pupils—if not to Plato himself—and reappears at intervals thereafter.[32] In this matter too, Christian conceptions are compatible with the view offered and may have influenced its choice but, here again, the internal history of the Platonic tradition offers sufficient explanation of the facts.

Whatever one's assessment of Philoponus' Christianity and its influence on his views about these questions might be, it is clear that it was not otherwise sufficiently pervasive to prevent him from producing Neoplatonic material that is not strictly compatible with Christianity, at least in the course of background outline exposition. Thus, in speaking of the various levels of perfection and knowledge of different faculties of soul, he will say of *nous* that it is more obscure than reason in that its activities rarely penetrate to men, and then only to a few.[33] This seems at first sight to make intellect external. Insofar as it does, it is inconsistent with the understanding of 3.5 manifested by both Philoponus himself and Stephanus, who, as we have mentioned, chooses that Neoplatonic view of human intellect which holds it to be single and internal. Any doubts that might remain about the presence of material ill-suited to Christian ideas may be resolved by a reading of the preface to Philoponus' exegesis of Book 1.

The determination of Philoponus' position does, of course, present unusual difficulties because his views were by no means orthodox. Not only was he a monophysite (that is straightforward enough), but he struck at least one of his contemporaries as having deceived himself by holding views appropriate to the very pagans he ostensibly attacked. This was Cosmas Indicopleustes, the Traveler to India.[34] Cosmas may not have been a man of great philosophical culture or acumen, and he may not have known that Philoponus was a late convert—possibly because he was not—but this view of Philoponus should at least put us on our guard against saying that he was not a Christian at the time he wrote the *de Anima* commentary just because it manifests strange views about man and his nature.

And such views are present. If one were to set out some criteria for establishing whether or not a writer was Christian, one might think of the following: 1) a refusal to accept the soul's preexistence, though that is subject to the difficulty about Origenism already mentioned;[35] or more significantly, 2) disembodied existence after death of the normal Platonist type[36]—Porphyry had singled out reincarnation with a body for a scornful attack in his work *Against the Christians*;[37] and 3) the absence of the belief that the soul is capable of attaining salvation, or union with higher Being, by its own unaided efforts.[38] By these criteria Philoponus fails to qualify. All these views may be found right at the start of his commentary, in the preface. There we have the soul's preexistence[39] (which may not be crucial), survival after death without the body,[40] and several references to soul's assimilation to *nous* by habituation, or the practice of the cathartic virtues,[41] with no word of any help from above. We have already suggested that heresy rather than paganism may, at least in part, be the explanation of all this. If however one is trying to show that he held pagan views in the commentaries, and Christian views elsewhere, one has to show that there is a clear measure of inconsistency between the commentaries and those works which are indisputably part of Philoponus' writings *qua* Christian. Now when one looks at some of his views on the soul in this light, the opposite turns out to be the case. Thus what he has to say in his disquisition on the creation of the world, the *de Opificio Mundi*, about the ensoulment of the embryo turns out to be, shall we say, easily compatible with Neoplatonic views on the subject.[42] In particular, he divides the soul into two, a rational and an irrational part. Animals other than man have an irrational soul inseparably united to the body. Man in addition has a separate part (*chōriston*) which is the rational soul. He makes the distinction in connection with Aristotle's definition of the soul, and he treats that definition in a way that is not difficult to recognize as Neoplatonic, comparable not only with what Philoponus himself says in his commentary on the *de Anima*, but also with the explanation offered by Simplicius, who has never been suspected of Christianity.[43] What he does is to say that part of the soul is an entelechy of the body, as music is an activity of the lyre; while another part is separate like a sailor on a ship (or a charioteer)—an old image going back to the hesitation at *de Anima* 2.1,[44] a passage vigorously exploited by several Neoplatonists.[45] On this basis we should have to treat the *de Opificio Mundi* as a non-Christian work, which it patently is not. Therefore the appearance of the same view in works of uncertain status cannot be taken to show that they are pagan in doctrine, let alone in authorship.

As for vocabulary that might indicate Christian training or ways of thinking, there is virtually none in Philoponus. What there is, a reference to angels and the essence of angels,[46] may be a medieval insertion. That Moerbeke did not always, as is commonly thought, provide a straight literal translation is shown by the discussion, mentioned above, of the fact that the word Aristotle uses for "part" in 429 a 10 is, unlike its Latin equivalent, neuter.[47] If however we compare this situation with that in Stephanus, its significance is diminished. Given that Stephanus was a Christian writer, we might expect a higher incidence of Christian vocabulary. But apart from a very short section[48] to which Professor Westerink has already drawn attention,[49] and which, if it alone survived, would give a very different impression from the whole, there is virtually none in the part of the commentary that covers chapters 1–8, some 124 pages in all. The section that is an exception to this rule and has some Christian terminology actually embedded in the text, has *angeloi* in the Christian rather than the Neoplatonic sense, a reference to *eusebē dogmata* clearly meaning Christian (by now a standard sense,[50] as opposed to Platonic) doctrines, and also one to *theos*, again in the Christian rather than the normal Greek sense. In addition there is an apparently approving reference to Providence (*pronoia*) as a name for God.[51] Possibly one should add here a number of ambiguous references to faculties vouchsafed to us by the demiurge,[52] who could be either the ordinary Platonists' demiurge or the Almighty in Platonic disguise, and the tag "he said and it happened" (*eipe kai egeneto*) which seems to allude to the Genesis account of creation.[53]

With these we should perhaps put the terminology of the section-ending marks. The usual form of these in Stephanus is *en toutois hē theōria sun theōi plēroutai*: "here, with God's help, ends the general discussion" or, *en hois hē prāxis sun theōi plēroutai*: "here, with God's help, ends the lecture." For comparison, the pagan Olympiodorus uses slightly different formulae, such as *tauta ekhei hē theōria*: "this is the content of the general discussion," without any mention of divine aid. These appear uniformly in the commentaries on Aristotle's *Meteorologica*, Plato's *Gorgias* and *Phaedo*, and also the *First Alcibiades*. In the commentaries on Platonic and pseudo-Platonic works, however, there are separate section headings for the lectures, of the type *praxis sun theōi*: "lecture, with God's help," followed by a numeral. Now the Olympiodorus commentaries are probably editions by students,[54] and it could well be they—or even later copyists—who put in the non-integral chapter headings. If that is so, and if the chapter-end markings in Stephanus are not also later additions, more skillfully inserted so as to have the appearance of being integral to the text, then we do have at least a superficial mark of Stephanus' beliefs. "Superficial" must be stressed because there are, as we have seen, other explanations of his choices as a commentator. As for Philoponus, one would not expect to find comparable expressions in his text, given the absence of the organization of material to which they belong.

All this indicates, at least by way of sample, that Christianity was, at most, of little importance in the composition of these commentaries and the selection of the views they express. Further exemplification of this point would not be difficult, but space precludes it here.

Instead we must now come to our last question, how much were these men

genuinely commentators on Aristotle. It is a question that is not as difficult as the others, though the obvious answer is misleading. Superficially, the answer must be yes, of course they were. They did after all write, or provide the material for, commentaries in the sense of exegetical works discussing the interpretation of texts. And when we consider primarily philological explanation of what unclear passages of Aristotle mean, then their opinion as interpreters of the text deserves to be respected in a perfectly straightforward way. The difficulty comes at the next level, that of philosophical exposition. And here things are a good deal less straightforward. Enough has probably been said in the earlier part of this paper to indicate the kind of answer that might be given, and there is no need to spend very long on it now. It should already be clear that we have to admit that we are not dealing with mere exposition of a difficult thinker. At this point it might be as well to state that what is being said does not imply that it is possible to explain a philosophical text without some involvement in philosophy, and perhaps some proneness to introduce one's own opinions. Nevertheless, the Neoplatonic commentators are a special case. Like some of the scholastics, the Neoplatonists' professed aim was to expound a given body of truth: for the Neoplatonists this was the philosophy of Plato, with which that of Aristotle was held, in the main, to coincide. It should not need to be said here that the words that are presented as an interpretation of Plato (whether with obvious labels like Proclus' *On Plato's Theology* or others less obvious like the *Enneads*[55]) are in fact presentations of views which Plato would not have recognized as his own without becoming the victim of an elaborate Socratic elicitation of truths that he never knew he knew. With Aristotle the situation is not all that different, for the reasons we have mentioned. To these we may add the local conditions in Alexandria in the time of Ammonius and Philoponus which made Aristotle preferable as the vehicle for Neoplatonic philosophy.[56] Some of the differences might be attributed to the nature of the Aristotelian treatises discussed, for these afford only the occasional opportunity for the higher flights of Neoplatonic speculation. If we had a set of commentaries on the *Metaphysics*, things might be different: that of Syrianus on a few of the less potentially explosive books of that work is sufficient indication of what can be done.

By way of summary let us review our initial questions. "Two?" Yes, that is clear. "Two Christian?" To this the answer is less clear. One, certainly, that is Stephanus; the other probably yes too, but not to an extent or on doctrinal lines that would be easily detectable on any page of his commentary, and this, on the whole, is true of Stephanus too. "Two Christian commentators?" then, in the sense we have defined, No: even Stephanus offered primarily Neoplatonic exposition. Philoponus, as we have suggested, wrote a commentary not deeply imbued with such Christian convictions as he may have held at the material time. If his course had included one, it would be particularly interesting to have Stephanus' equivalent of Philoponus' general introduction to Book 1, in which he sets out his own views, and which is full of the sort of Neoplatonism that would be likely to give doctrinal offense. Possibly in the interval the climate of opinion which Justinian was trying to promote by his measures, such as they were, against the

public teaching of pagan philosophy[57]—and I would strongly stress public—may at last have had its effects. But that is speculation. Speculation should, of course, normally be discouraged, but I would like to close with some more. It has never been clear why, instead of Philoponus' commentary on Book 3 of the *de Anima*, we have that of Stephanus. Philoponus' was not lost. It was still available to Moerbeke in the thirteenth century and to Sophonias perhaps a century later still.[58] Yet our earliest manuscripts of Philoponus, which date back to the eleventh and twelfth centuries,[59] already contain the pseudepigraphic commentary for Book 3. Is the reason perhaps that at the time when these manuscripts, or their predecessors, were compiled, Philoponus' work was regarded as suspect—whether the cause was such apparent paganism as impressed itself on contemporaries like Cosmas and some modern scholars, or his notorious monophysitism—and the opportunity was taken to substitute the work of Stephanus on that part of the *de Anima* which was, more than any other, theologically delicate?[60]

JOHN PHILOPONUS AND STEPHANUS OF ALEXANDRIA: TWO NEOPLATONIC CHRISTIAN COMMENTATORS ON ARISTOTLE?

Note: All references to the Greek commentaries on Aristotle are by page and line of the Berlin Academy edition, (CAG), and to the *de Anima* commentary unless otherwise stated; references to the Latin version of Philoponus' commentary on Book 3 of the *de Anima* are to G. Verbeke's edition, *Jean Philopon. Commentaire sur le de Anima d'Aristote. Traduction de Guillaume de Moerbeke* (Louvain/Paris, 1966).

1. Cf. S. van Riet, "Fragments de l'original grec du 'de Intellectu' de Philopon dans une compilation de Sophonias," *Rev. Philosophique de Louvain* 63 (1965) 5–40.
2. On the relation of our texts to the original courses, cf. M. Richard, "ΑΠΟ ΦΩΝΗΣ," *Byzantion* 20 (1950) 191–199.
3. The authenticity of the commentary usually ascribed to Simplicius has recently been questioned, and its authorship assigned to Priscian, by F. Bossier and C. Steel, "Priscianus Lydus en de 'in de Anima' van Pseudo(?) Simplicius", *Tijdschrift voor Filosofie* 34 (1972) 761–782: their reasons do not seem to me entirely convincing. For another view cf. now I. Hadot, *Le Problème du Néoplatonisme Alexandrin. Hiéroclès et Simplicius* (Paris, 1978), 193–202.
4. Themistius, by contrast, wrote roughly the same on all three books.
5. Cf. A. J. Festugière, "Mode de composition des commentaires de Proclus," *Mus. Helv.* 20 (1963) 81ff. The presence of this arrangement in Book 3 only of Philoponus' commentary was already noted by the CAG editor, M. Hayduck, preface p. v.
6. Cf. 432a 26.
7. Cf. H. Blumenthal, "Neoplatonic interpretations of Aristotle on *Phantasia*," *Rev. of Metaphysics* 31 (1977) 251–252.
8. Simplicius refers to his (lost) commentary on *Metaphysics Lambda* for a discussion of *nous khōristos*, cf. 217. 23–28.
9. Philoponus 2. 13–27.
10. Stephanus 516. 8–15.
11. *Ibid.* 516. 8–517. 32.
12. Cf. above, p. 56, and n. 6.
13. On this cf. H. Blumenthal, "Neoplatonic elements in the *de Anima* commentaries," *Phronesis* 21 (1966) 72–83.
14. Cf. *ibid.*, 84–86, and Philoponus 215. 4ff., 224. 12ff.
15. Philoponus 2. 33ff.
16. Stephanus 518. 8ff.
17. Stephanus 520. 21ff.
18. Philoponus 3. 54–4. 69
19. Stephanus 518. 8–520. 20.
20. Philoponus 4. 70–75.
21. Stephanus 521. 11ff.
22. He was summoned to the capital to become *oikoumenikos didaskalos* under Heraclius (610–634), cf. H. Usener, *De Stephano Alexandrino* (Bonn, 1880), in *Kleine Schriften* 3 (Leipzig, 1914) 248ff.
23. E.g., Stephanus 527. 29–32: on this cf. above, p. 61.
24. Cf. L. G. Westerink, *Anonymous Prolegomena to Platonic Philosophy* (Amsterdam, 1962) xxiv–xxv.
25. Some of these are, of course, publications by Philoponus of courses given by Ammonius, who was not a Christian.
26. A. Gudeman, "Ioannes Philoponus," Pauly-Wissowa, *Real-Encyclopädie* 9.i (1916) 1769, 1771, followed, e.g., by Schmid-Staehlin, *Geschichte der Griechischen Literatur*[6] 2.ii (Munich, 1924) 1067, and M. Meyerhoff, "Joannes Grammatikos (Philoponos) von Alexandrien und die Arabische Medizin," *Mitteilungen des Deutschen Instituts für ägyptische Altertumskunde in Kairo* 2 (1931) 2–3.
27. *Les derniers commentateurs alexandrins d'Aristote* (Mémoires et Travaux des Facultés Catholiques de Lille) (Lille, 1941) 55–56. Cf., too, H. D. Saffrey, "Le chrétien Jean Philopon et la survivance de l'Ecole d'Alexandrie au VI[e] siècle," *Rev. des études grecques* 67 (1954) 402.
28. "Les convictions religieuses de Jean Philopon et la date de son Commentaire aux 'Météorologiques,'" Académie R. de Belgique, *Bulletin de la Classe des Lett., Sc. Mor. et Pol.* sér. 5. 39 (1953) 299–357.
29. Cf. the article cited in note 13, 73–74.
30. *Commentary on de Anima* 734.
31. On this question cf. E. R. Dodds, *Proclus. The Elements of Theology*[2] (Oxford, 1963) 313–321. Philoponus discusses it in his preface, cf. especially 18. 7–33.
32. For a history of the question, cf. Proclus *in Tim.* I. 276. 10ff. For modern accounts, from opposing points of view, cf. F. M. Cornford, *Plato's Cosmology* (London, 1937) 34ff., and G. Vlastos, "The disorderly Motion in the *Timaeus*" (1939) reprinted with an updating postscript, "Creation in the *Timaeus*: is it a fiction?" (1964), in R. E. Allen (ed.) *Studies in Plato's Metaphysics* (London, 1965) 379–399 and 401–419.
33. Philoponus 229. 31–33.
34. Cf. *Topographia Christiana* 7. 1 (340A), and the notes *ad loc.* in the edition of W. Wolska-Conus, vol. 3, Sources Chrétiennes 197 (Paris, 1973) 56. Cf. also *eadem, La Topographie Chrétienne de Cosmas Indicopleustes* (Paris, 1962), chap. 5, especially 183ff.
35. Verbeke, in the introduction to his edition of Philoponus, lxx, suggests that a belief in preexistence and reincarnation may not have been regarded as incompatible with Christianity even at this period.
36. The Origenist belief in man's resurrection without a body, as well as preexistence, had been rebutted by Gregory of Nyssa a century and a half before Philoponus; cf. e.g., *de Hom.Opif.* 28. Migne, *Patrologia graeca* (*PG*) 44. 229B ff., and J. Daniélou "La résurrection du corps chez Grégoire de Nysse," *Vig. Chr.* 7 (1953) 155ff. It should however be noted that Origenism was not yet dead in Philoponus' time; cf. e.g., Justinian's letter to the patriarch Menas, 534 A.D.
37. Cf. *Contra Christianos* fragment 94 Harnack.
38. As opposed to the view that man approaches God by grace, encapsulated in Gregory's *ei gar hoper autos esti tēn physin, toutou tēn oikeiotēta kharizetai tois anthropois . . .*: "if he *gives* to men *by grace* assimilation to what he himself is by nature . . .," *de Beat.* 7, *PG* 44. 128OD.
39. Philoponus 5. 26–32.
40. *Ibid.* 12. 15ff.
41. *Ibid.* 2. 12–14, 18.16–24.
42. *De Opificio Mundi* 6. 23 = 276. 22–278. 13 Reichardt.
43. Simplicius 86. 17ff.
44. 413a 6–9.
45. Cf. Simplicius 95. 24–33.
46. Philoponus 25. 8.
47. Moerbeke, *op. cit.*, 6. 10–12.
48. Stephanus 527. 27–33.
49. *Op. cit.*, (n. 24) xxiv.
50. For this cf. e.g., Paul the Silentiary, *Hagia Sophia* 126–27.
51. Cf. Lampe, *Patristic Greek Lexicon* s.v. *Pronoia* B. 2. iv., for this use.
52. Stephanus 511. 26, 521. 6.
53. *Ibid.* 547. 12–14.
54. Cf. Westerink, *The Greek Commentaries on Plato's Phaedo* vol. 1. *Olympiodorus* (Amsterdam/Oxford/New York, 1976) 20.
55. Cf. the comments of Proclus, *PT* i.i = I. 6. 16ff. Saffrey-Westerink and Plotinus, *Enn.* 5. 1. 8.10–14.

56. On these conditions cf. A. D. E. Cameron, "The last days of the Academy at Athens," *Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society* n.s. 15 (1969), and, on the arrangements made, Saffrey, *op. cit.* (n. 27) 400–401.
57. Cf. Cameron, *ibid.*, 7–8 and H. Blumenthal, "529 and its sequel: what happened to the Academy?" *Byzantion* 48 (1978) 369–385.
58. Cf. the article "Fragments . . ." by S. Van Riet cited in note 1.
59. The eleventh century manuscript Vaticanus 268, is defective for the last two-thirds of Stephanus: Parisinus 1914, from the twelfth century, is the first complete manuscript.
60. I should like to thank those members of the conference whose comments have enabled me to make improvements to this paper.

ADDENDUM: Additional note to p.54, against line 4 (line ending...Stephanus on Book 3 of Aristotle's): Stephanus' authorship of the Greek commentary on *De Anima* 3 has been questioned in an article by P. Lautner, 'Philoponus, *In De Anima III:* quest for an author', *Classical Quarterly* n.s. 42 (1992) 510-522: Lautner, p. 519, thinks the most likely author is a pupil of Philoponus.

XVI

SIMPLICIUS (?) ON THE FIRST BOOK OF ARISTOTLE'S DE ANIMA

Neoplatonic exposition of classical Greek philosophy includes two kinds of reinterpretation. The first and most basic is, of course, the reading of Plato himself as a Neoplatonist. This is, it goes without saying, to be found primarily in all the independent works of Neoplatonism, as well as in commentaries on works of Plato. The other, with which readers of the Aristotelian commentators are more often concerned, is the Platonization of Aristotle. The latter is crucial to our understanding of any Neoplatonist commentator, both in himself and also as an authority on Aristotle. And since we are dealing with a text at least superficially based on Aristotle, I shall devote most of this paper to some of the somewhat strange interpretations of him to be found in Book 1 of the De anima commentary. At the same time this particular book also offers an opportunity, which the commentary on what will have seemed to him the more obviously philosophically interesting parts of the De anima does not[1], to see how Simplicius works in the area of Plato interpretation, and we shall look at the way in which Plato and Aristotle are both subjected to similar techniques of interpretation.

May we begin, then, by recalling an obvious characteristic of De anima 1, namely that it contains a considerable amount of material of a kind not to be found in the other books. That, of course, is not uncharacteristic of the opening book of an Aristotelian work — in the form in which we like Simplicius have them. The difference consists in the relatively high proportion of discussion of views about the soul held by Aristotle's predecessors, most notably Plato himself. Those unfamiliar with Neoplatonic commentary might therefore expect to find this difference clearly reflected in Simplicius' expositions. One of the questions I want to raise is how far this actually turns out to be

1 The commentary on Book 3 is nearly twice as long as those on Books 1 and 2.

the case. Connected with it is another question relating to his methods, namely how far the organization of Aristotle's material influences that of Simplicius. One might suspect that the answer is that it does not do so to any very great extent, and we may note immediately that Simplicius will not only, as does Aristotle himself, introduce general issues which are not fully discussed till later in the treatise, but also refer to specific discussions in the other books, most strikingly the discussion of intellect in Book 3. Thus we find him quoting the words χωρισθεὶς δ'ἐστὶ μόνον τοῦθ' ὅπερ ἐστίν from 3.5[2] when he is discussing soul's relation to the body in the context of chapter 5 of Book 1 (77.10—11). Similarly, in the discussion of the same chapter, at which we shall look more closely, he mentions the idea that intellection requires imagination, which Aristotle discusses in 3.7 (77.35)[3]; there is also a discussion of immortality, with an explicit reference forward to Book 3, at 59.31—32. These are obvious but clear examples of the way Simplicius does not feel bound by the sequence of Aristotle's treatment: one might say that this is a perfectly reasonable procedure for a commentator. Whether or not this procedure involves an unjustifiable reinterpretation of the text discussed is another matter. In general, the degree of Neoplatonic distortion of particular texts needs to be assessed in each case. I need hardly argue here that such distortion exists, and hope I may be permitted to assume its existence, and look at some selected texts on that assumption.[4]

This commentator sees his task primarily as the exposition of his own psychology and of how Aristotle's psychology is, in general, a manifestation of the same philosophy. This is a view for which I have argued before, and which most members of this gathering are unlikely to find strange or problematic[5]. In any case Simplicius tells us at the start of this commentary that that is what he is doing. May I recall his introductory remarks in the very first paragraph of the work (1.1—21)? One must seek the truth about the soul as about other things, and it is closest to us. Further, we should look at the opinions

[2] 430a 22—23.

[3] 431a 14ff., 431b 2ff.

[4] It is argued for in my 'Neoplatonic elements in the De Anima commentaries", Phronesis 21 (1976), 64—87, hereafter cited as "Neoplatonic elements" and "Some Platonist readings of Aristotle", Proc. Cambridge Philological Society n. s. 27 (1981), 1—16, hereafter "Some Platonist readings".

[5] Cf. "Neoplatonic elements" 65—71.

of those who have reached the highest level of understanding: that is why we must study the De anima. Plato has said many splendid things, and they have been explained and shown to be consistent with each other by those who have expounded Plato. But the situation is less satisfactory in respect of Aristotle's treatise on the soul — for this he cites the, to him, supreme authority of Iamblichus — ὡς τῷ ἀρίστῳ τῆς ἀληθείας κριτῇ δοκεῖ τῷ Ἰαμβλίχῳ. They disagree not only in the explanation of his language, but especially about the matter. Therefore, says Simplicius, he has decided to investigate and write about Aristotle's consistency both with himself and with the truth. In doing so he proposes both to pay attention to Aristotle's objections against others, and also to support his own conclusions about uncertain points from Aristotle's clear views and pronouncements. In so far as possible he aims to stick to the truth about the subjects concerned following the lead of Iamblichus' own writings on the soul. The two aims are, he thinks, identical.[6]

Here we have a plain identification of the truth with a correct exposition of Aristotle, and we may supply the inference that Aristotle's philosophy, if properly understood, is the same philosophy which Simplicius and the other Neoplatonists found in Plato. We may note in passing that such an account of the right approach to an Aristotelian treatise would be acceptable to Neoplatonists of varying convictions: they would, of course, have to understand some of Aristotle's theories and discussions in different ways, so that they could turn out to conform to their own individual standpoints.

One consequence of this approach is that the soul must be discussed in terms of Neoplatonic hierarchies. There are, as we shall see, several points in the commentary on Book 1, and of course many more in that on Book 3, where the relation of the soul Aristotle is discussing to Simplicius' own structure of souls and intellects come into focus.[7] Yet in a way some of this discussion is redundant because Simplicius has specified at the start that the discussion is about ψυχή, which rules out the intellect in the higher Neoplatonic sense, though he does leave for subsequent discussion the question whether it is

[6] For Iamblichus as Simplicius' model in method and more cf. Simplicius, In Cat. 2.15—25, 3.2—4.

[7] Cf. below p. 98 l. 29—100 l. 32, p. 107 l. 9—109 l. 14.

about all soul, and why Aristotle seems to omit any discussion of οὐράνιαι ψυχαί (1.22—24).

First, however, he proposes to consider the branch of philosophy to which psychology belongs. For our present purposes we should note that some of the points he goes on to make, both about the kind of soul to be studied and the kind of philosophy which studies it, are assembled in the introductory pages, and there discussed in connection with Simplicius' own concerns, rather than simply taken where they might arise from the text when Aristotle himself discusses whether or not the soul is in the sphere of the physical philosopher in the later part of ch.1. That is not to say that these matters are not discussed when Simplicius comes to the text in question.[8] Like Aristotle, Simplicius is prepared to put the study of "parts" of soul which have no connection with body in a separate compartment. The terms in which he does it are not Aristotle's: ὅσον δὲ νοερόν, τῇ πρώτῃ φιλοσοφίᾳ, ἡ τὰ νοητὰ γινώσκουσα καὶ τὸν τῶν νοητῶν θεωρητικὸν γινώσκει νοῦν, καὶ οὐ τὸν ἐξῃρημένον μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν ἐν ἡμῖν (2.33—3.2): in so far as it is intellectual it is considered by first philosophy which cognizes the intelligibles and the intellect that cognizes them, not only the transcendent intellect but the one in us. When Aristotle himself talks of first philosophy, he does so only to say that things that are separable in themselves belong to it. Unlike Simplicius, Aristotle at this stage regards the existence of such a part of the soul as no more than a possibility. Simplicius on the other hand, on the basis of a discussion from De partibus animalium 1.1[9] (which he cites at 2.6—28) in which Aristotle concludes that natural philosophy deals with soul in as much as it or some part of it is the form of a living being and a source of motion, but not necessarily with the whole soul, asserts that as Aristotle there says that it is not the whole soul that is to be discussed, and that not all soul but only one or several parts of it are φύσις while *nous* is included in the De anima, that is clearly not just a "physical" treatise: οὐκ ... ἁπλῶς φυσικὴ ἡ περὶ ψυχῆς πραγματεία (3.26—27). Simplicius adds that this is his own conclusion. The reason why he brings in all these matters, and we might think that they would be better treated later, is, it would appear, that according to the now well established procedures of commentary he sees it as

[8] 403 a 25 ff., discussed on pp. 20—23.

[9] Part. An. 641 a 17—b 10.

his first task to define the purpose of the treatise, and that is what he goes straight on to discuss.

His view of that purpose restricts it to the soul of θνητὰ ζῷα, things that are alive but impermanent. Aristotle, he says, appears to exclude those of the heavenly bodies, except in objections to the mathematical demonstrations of the Timaeus. Simplicius finds it necessary to offer explanations as to why Aristotle should have deviated so far from his alleged purpose. Perhaps, he says, what Plato said about the heavenly souls was sufficent, and he merely wished to object to the apparent meaning of the mathematics, or he thought that what was said about the highest part of our intellect would lead up to the soul of the heavens: ἴσως δὲ καὶ διὰ τῶν περὶ τῆς ἀκρότητος τοῦ ἡμετέρου νοῦ εἰρημένων ἀξιῶν εἰς τὴν οὐρανίαν ἀναπέμπεσθαι ψυχήν (cf. 3.29—35). As evidence for this supposition he cites Aristotle's remark that the world-soul might be like our so-called *nous*.[10] Three points of interest emerge here. First the assumption that Aristotle is following guidelines like Simplicius' own about the proper contents of his treatise, and that any deviations from these require explanation. Second, the notion that Aristotle is likely to be content with what Plato says on a given question and that his objections are directed against superficial misunderstandings, τῷ φαινομένῳ ... τῶν μαθηματικῶν. Third, that any views on matters not contained in the purpose of the treatise are to be inferred from discussion of those which are.

Simplicius explains the comparison between *nous* and the world-soul by pointing out that the world-soul is pure and intellectual — καθαρὸς καὶ νοερὸς λόγος — and entirely unconnected with what he calls δευτεραὶ ζωαί (by which he must mean those of the sub-intellectual levels) because this kind of soul neither inclines to bodies nor comes to belong to them, but they to it while it remains on its own (4.1—4). The point is not an Aristotelian one, and the vocabulary is again Neoplatonic.

Simplicius also feels called on to explain why Aristotle does not appear to deal with Plato's words about the human soul's departures and choices of lives. This is not a subject whose omission from the De anima would be likely to strike us if it were not thus drawn to our attention. Simplicius suggests that Aristotle does not treat these questions because he realises that Plato has dealt with them adequately.

[10] 407 a 3—5.

But his aim — presumably Aristotle's — is not to make the soul inseparable from the body. He says that the cause of our forgetting our own separate life is given in Book 3, so we clearly do exist before our arrival in the body (ibid. 5—11). Here again we have the Platonic assumption used to explain what Aristotle says — and what he does not say. The reference to Book 3 can hardly be to anything other than the brief comment in 3.5, οὐ μνημονεύομεν δέ, ὅτι τοῦτο μὲν ἀπαθές, ὁ δὲ παθητικὸς νοῦς φθαρτός, which certainly follows the remark that only *nous*, or the active *nous*, is immortal or everlasting but is not, as is well known, necessarily, and certainly not clearly, offered as an explanation of it.[11] That, we might think, is not very strong evidence for Platonic eschatology as the background to the De anima. We might also ask ourselves whether the background to Simplicius' comments here is the underlying assumption of the Neoplatonic curricula that Plato and Aristotle's works are part of a metaphysically scaled sequence, and that Aristotle's treated matters preliminary to and lower than those of Plato's. Simplicius does not himself, in this commentary, indicate that this is the case, but his tendency to assign different areas of psychology to Aristotle and Plato, as well as to specific treatises, would fit into this pattern. So would the immediately following characterization of the De anima: Aristotle confines himself to the soul in mortal things and deals comprehensively with its powers and essence οὐδεμίαν αὐτῆς ἀπολείπει ἀνεπεξέργαστον δύναμίν τε καὶ οὐσίαν (4.13).

Some of the general principles which I have discussed so far may seem obvious ones either for Simplicius in particular or, in general, for a commentator who was a Neoplatonist of whatever given persuasion, but I have deliberately done so to avoid simply assuming identity of authorship for the De anima commentary and the others. That there is a question about this should by now be well known, even if the article by F. Bossier and C. Steel which examines the question in some detail is not as well known as it should be — whether one agrees with its conclusions or not.[12] But our chances of arriving at

11 430a 22—25.

12 F. Bossier and C. Steel, "Priscianus Lydus en de "In De anima van pseudo (?) — Simplicius", Tijdschr. voor Filosofie, 34 (1972), 761—822. For other views see I. Hadot, Le problème du néoplatonisme alexandrin: Hiéroclès et Simplicius, Paris 1978, Appendice, 193—202; and my "The psychology of (?) Simplicius' commentary on the De anima", in Soul and the Structure of Being in Late Neoplatonism ed. H. J. Blumenthal and A. C. Lloyd, Liverpool 1982, 72—75.

the truth will obviously be greater if we can establish similarities and differences between the whole corpus by treating separately in the first place that member of it whose credentials must be either disproved or re-established.

Before embarking on the actual text of Aristotle, Simplicius adds some further Neoplatonic interpretations and distinctions which he will use in later parts of the commentary. He asserts that Aristotle first gives us what is common to all kinds of soul, that it is the formal cause not just of bodies but of bodies qua ὄργανα ζωτικά: the formal cause of the former is φύσις. Here we have that distinction already found in Plotinus between two layers of soul, one which makes matter into body and another which makes mere body into living body at the lowest level,[13] which Simplicius frequently introduces into the De anima. Further distinctions follow (cf. 4.14ff.). What makes and informs the living organism — if that is an acceptable translation of ὡς ὄργανον ζωτικὸν εἰδοποιοῦσα — is either soul or part of soul or something not devoid of soul: the last of Simplicius' three possibilities would admit φύσις, or indeed any further level of soul one might care to define which might be regarded as not-soul in so far as it is lower than whatever level one might specify as soul in the strict sense — as the Neoplatonists' rational soul is often specified. Whatever it is, it is this informing soul which gives the thing that is informed life by giving it the capacity to move: it is moved by another and superior kind. Though Simplicius does not say what this superior kind of soul is, the most likely candidate would seem to be the sensitive and appetitive level, for that is most closely involved in motion; but the rational part is not necessarily excluded[14] (14.17—19). Apparently accepting for the moment the Aristotelian notion that soul is not self-moved, but moves a body which is moved, Simplicius leads into his own explanation of entelechy, namely that it is double and corresponds both to the user of the ὄργανον which is body, and to the form which makes that body what it is — the Platonic view that the soul uses a body subordinate to it, which Simplicius will explain in more detail when

13 Cf. e. g. Enn. 4. 4. 18, 4. 7. 1. 8ff., and my Plotinus' Psychology, The Hague 1971, 9 and 61f.

14 That ἑτέρα refers exclusively to the irrational soul is argued by I. Hadot loc. cit. (note 12) 197f. and note 23.

he comes to discuss the Aristotelian definition of the soul in its proper place.[15] We should note too that even here he anticipates his explanation of the "sailor on the ship" problem. One entelechy corresponds to the ship, the other to the sailor. Whatever explanation of Aristotle's text one might adopt, the notion that both sailor and ship are an entelechy is not one readily suggested by what Aristotle himself says. Simplicius has "solved" the problem by seeing it in entirely Platonic terms.[16] For Aristotle the ship is not an entelechy, but the thing which makes it what it is might be thought to be one. In the following section (4.33—5.5) Simplicius also groups the several faculties which Aristotle distinguishes and discusses them according to his distinction between used and user: τὰς μὲν μᾶλλον εἰς τὸ ὀργανικὸν ἀποκλινούσας, τὰς δὲ κατὰ τὸ χρώμενον ἱσταμένας μᾶλλον ὁρᾷ. In this context Simplicius can accommodate even *nous* in the entelechy concept. So at 4.38 f. he says that every soul, according to Aristotle, is the entelechy of the body which is ὀργανικόν — we must understand Simplicius' sense of "having the status of an instrument" as well as Aristotle's "equipped with organs", a piece of interpretation which is not set out here but already used in anticipation of its subsequent exposition.[17] On the other hand, Simplicius continues, not every soul is an entelechy in respect of each of its powers, for intellect is clearly stated to hold together no body, and not to use the body as an instrument. This seems to refer to the closing section of Book 1 where Aristotle says that it seems impossible that every part of soul should hold together a part of body because it is difficult to conceive of a part of body which intellect would hold together[18]: no mention there of the Platonic notion of using an instrument, though for Simplicius the two ideas are closely related.

Apart from a summary of the contents of Book 1, Simplicius devotes the rest of his introduction (5.6—6.17) to further points about *nous*. In the first place he commends Aristotle for the distinctions he makes in soul's intellectual powers. These are three, a practical one that uses imagination and is linked to the life of the body too, and a theoretic one which falls into two according to its degree of perfection and dissociation from body. The higher does not use imagination: that is below it and operates together with the kind of intellectual activity which proceeds, in other words is directed downwards and outwards. The activity of the higher is stable — we may explain that this is a function of its independence — and identical with its essence. It is by virtue of this that soul can imitate transcendent *nous* and be immortal. Thus our upper soul is subject to triadic analysis and related to the higher levels in the Neoplatonic hierarchy.

The preference for explanation in terms of stratification leads to the introduction of another recurrent theme in this commentary which I have discussed before, and will therefore treat rather cursorily now, the view of soul in general, and reason in particular, as a middle entity.[19] This view, which he will later attribute to Xenocrates as well (62.2—13),[20] Simplicius now attributes to Aristotle who, he says, regards our soul in respect of its rational part as in the middle of the two extreme kinds of life, and so compares it sometimes to the sensitive, sometimes to the intellectual, and sometimes views it as descending to the former, at others as rising to imitation of the intellectual. The latter seems to indicate the area above our soul, for Simplicius goes on to talk about the soul rising towards the indivisible and remaining complete in itself, as far as possible, when it imitates the intellect above it, τὸν ὑπερέχοντα αὐτῆς . . . νοῦν, while at other times it departs from itself in its inclination to the external and goes forward to division ἀφισταμένην πως ἑαυτῆς ἐν τῇ ἔξω ῥοπῇ . . . καὶ εἰς μερισμὸν προϊοῦσαν. Its division is combined with its ascent to the undivided — which puts it where Neoplatonic souls are customarily located, by way of an interpretation of Timaeus 35 a, between divided and undivided forms of existence.[21] Its procession is combined with reversion

15 Cf. also 51.28 ff. and "Some Platonist readings" 5 f.

16 It is discussed in more detail at 96.3—15: on this disc. cf. "Neoplatonic elements" 85 f.

17 Cf. 51.28 ff. and, where it arises from the text itself, 90.29 ff., 93.28 ff.

18 Cf. 411 b 15—19.

19 In "Simplicius and others on Aristotle's discussions of reason" published in J. Duffy and J. Peradotto, edd., *Gonimos. Neoplatonic and Byzantine studies presented to Leendert G. Westerink at 75 (Buffalo 1988) 103–119.*

20 The soul's middle position is what Xenocrates is said to have wanted to show by saying that the soul is a self-moving number, cf. also 66.1—3. Simplicius, moreover, has Aristotle objecting to Xenocrates' view on the ground that he thought the soul's middle position kept it above the division entailed by number and movement (cf. 62.11—13).

21 On the interpretation of Tim.35a from Xenocrates to Plotinus cf. H.-R. Schwyzer, "Zu Plotins Interpretation von Platons Timaeus 35A", Rh.Mus. n. F. 84 (1935), 360—8. Plotinus distinguishes the kind of being that is μεριστὴ ἐν σώμασι, corresponding to qualities etc., from another περὶ τὰ σώματα μεριστή

to itself, and its departure from itself with rest in itself, which is obscured when it inclines to the outside: καὶ γὰρ ὁ μερισμὸς αὐτῆς μετὰ τῆς εἰς τὸ ἀμέριστον συναιρέσεως, καὶ ἡ προβολὴ μετὰ τῆς εἰς ἑαυτὴν ἐπιστροφῆς, καὶ ἡ ἑαυτῆς ἀπόστασις μετὰ τῆς ἐν ἑαυτῇ μονῆς, ἀμυδρουμένης ὅτε εἰς τὸ ἔξω ῥέπει (6.5—8). We could not, incidentally, wish for a better example of the translation of Aristotle into a thoroughly Neoplatonic set of concepts. It need hardly be said that all of this would have been meaningless to Aristotle himself. Hardly less good an illustration is what follows, where Simplicius talks of the soul participating in the ἄκρα so that it may simultaneously remain at rest and change, through its middle place between what merely remains immobile and what is altogether subject to change: διὰ τὴν τῶν μόνως τε μενόντων καὶ πάντῃ μεταβαλλομένων μεσότητα. It is divided, in a way, and, as it were, undivided, it is at the same time involved in becoming and ungenerated, destroyed in a way and yet preserved from destruction (ibid. 8—12). That, says Simplicius, returning to the old Neoplatonic controversy about the position of our *nous,* is why we do not like Plotinus[22] posit a part of it which is at rest, unchanged and pure. Nor, on the other hand, does it proceed entirely in its inclination to the world of becoming. Rather it proceeds as a whole and remains on its own (ibid. 12—15), a paradoxical description which is just another way of describing the intermediate status of even the higher part of the human soul. Lest we should think that Simplicius is here departing from his task of explaining Aristotle to expound his own philosophy, he now says explicitly that the whole exposition of the text will show that these things were the opinion of Aristotle, as well as having been more clearly set out by Iamblichus: ὡς καὶ Ἀριστοτέλει δοκοῦντα καὶ ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἰαμβλίχου ἐναργέστερον ἐκπεφασμένα (cf. 6.15—17). Yet it is only the opening reference to the third book, at 5.38, and the closing attribution of all the intervening material to Aristotle that would link it to the De anima for a reader accustomed to ordinary Aristotelian philosophy.

In these twenty lines on the characteristics of our rational soul, Simplicius has demonstrated in the clearest possible way how he will

which is soul, cf. Enn. 4.2.1, 4.1, 4.3.19. For the purpose of explaining the De anima Simplicius tended to ignore this distinction between two intermediate kinds.

22 Cf. esp. 4.8.8.1—3. Plotinus' view was rejected by most of his successors, cf. e. g. for Iamblichus and Proclus, Procl., In Tim. III.333.28 ff.; for Plutarch, Ps.-Philop., In De an. 535.13—16, for Syrianus (probably) Hermias, In Phaedrum 160.1—4.

follow the directions he gives himself in the opening section of the commentary. We shall see that similar disquisitions on general principles recur later in the Book 1 commentary, and we shall consider some further cases shortly. But before proceeding any further, I should like to raise a question to which I am not yet able to give more than a partial answer. One of the more difficult questions that presents itself when one reflects on the commentators' methods is just what it is in the texts they are discussing that causes them to depart from relatively straightforward exposition and embark on the kind of philosophical discussion that we have just examined, which turns out to belong to Neoplatonic philosophy rather than to the study of Aristotle. A few such triggers, as one might call them, can be identified easily enough. One is disagreement between Aristotle and Plato, or to put it as Simplicius might more readily put it himself, a text which suggests that Aristotle and Plato might not be saying the same thing about the same issue. Some of the discussions which will concern us here come under this heading and, of course, from the point of view of the commentator whose basic assumptions include the general agreement of Plato and Aristotle on most matters, the explanation of the apparent exceptions to this rule is an important part of his business.

A second, though less automatic, trigger is any reference to soul or *nous* which might raise difficulties about the kind of soul or *nous* that is at issue. It is not surprising that this should be so, because the various Neoplatonic systems, however much they might differ amongst themselves, did after all succeed in finding their hierarchies of soul and intellect in the smaller number of souls and intellects recognized by Plato — and Aristotle was talking about the same things! Here is an ample source of what we should regard as distortions rather than explanations of the texts of Aristotle — or Plato, as the case may be. But these bases for Neoplatonization are, it might be said, obvious once stated. I state them simply to set out two clear examples of what I hope may be found to be a series of guidelines to a commentator's methods. I do not, however, propose to present such a set of guidelines here, but rather look in detail at some further cases of the exposition of Aristotle, arising from Book 1 of the De anima, which show the operation of the two factors we have identified.

One other general question which should be raised is why Simplicius — or any other commentator — should wish to consider the

views of Aristotle's predecessors, other than Plato, at all. Let us for the moment assume that it is not merely a matter of scholarly interest, but that the process should contribute to the establishment of the truth. That, as we shall see, is not merely an arbitrary assumption or even just an inference from the commentators' approach in general. That approach, however, would in itself indicate that earlier views on the soul are in the last resort to be considered for their bearing on the basic questions which Simplicius is trying to answer with the help — or through the medium — of Aristotle's discussions.

Simplicius does in fact offer an explanation of how he thinks the ideas of earlier thinkers can help when he comments on the opening words of Book 1, ch. 2 (23.33—24.8). Because, he says, the truth about things does not come to us of its own accord (αὐτόθεν) an investigation of several contraries comes first. In the area under discussion such questions are: whether the soul is or is not a substance, if it is whether it exists in potency or act, and whether it is a body or incorporeal. Again, if it is a substance, whether it is separate or inseparable, or in some way both. As some of the opinions that have previously been set out about the soul have drawn attention to the contrary propositions about it, their investigation makes a large contribution to the questions we ask, and to the discoveries we can make when we look at the points whose consideration has led different people to formulate different views; we refute some while accepting others: μέγα ἡμῖν ἡ περὶ αὐτῶν ἱστορία συντελεῖ πρός τε τὴν διαπορίαν καὶ πρὸς τὴν εὕρεσιν ἐπισημαινομένοις, εἰς ἃ ἀποβλέψαντες οἱ μὲν ὠδί, οἱ δὲ ὠδὶ τιθέασι, καὶ τὰ μὲν ἐλέγχουσι, τὰ δὲ ἀποδεχομένοις. There is here a difference of emphasis between Simplicius and his subject. Whereas Aristotle thinks that we should start by stating the problems to be solved, and then adduce the views of earlier thinkers to help us solve them,[23] Simplicius seems to envisage that these earlier thinkers' views help us to identify the problems. That, one might suggest, stems from the underlying Neoplatonic belief that everyone was, in the end, trying to solve the same problems and reach the same truth. Such assumptions are not, of course, entirely foreign to Aristotle's own approach to historical material, but we need only refer to his well-known treatment of Plato to show that the degree of convergence he envisaged is far less than that of Simplicius and his contemporaries.

[23] 403b 20—25.

We may draw similar conclusions from the opening of the section on soul and movement (An 405b31 ff., Simplicius 34.3—19). Here, in Simplicius' introductory comments on ch. 3, we may again see a difference of approach from Aristotle's. Ἐπισκεπτέον δὲ πρῶτον περὶ κινήσεως, the chapter begins. Aristotle explains that it may not only be incorrect to describe the nature of the soul as what moves, or has the capacity to move itself, but that it might even be impossible for it to possess motion at all. Simplicius, more generally, says that the point — σκοπός — is to examine previous views and argue against any errors in them. In particular he sees it as necessary to discover whether any of what has been handed down involves an unusual use of language: this is to avoid mistakes that might arise therefrom, with certain views appearing to be true because of the reputation of their authors.

The particular point at issue here is the meaning of κίνησις. Plato, we are told, uses the word for the life of the soul in so far as it is in a diffused state, and neither fully divided nor remaining pure and undivided in its own place, ἐπι τῆς ψυχικῆς ζωῆς ὡς ἀνελιττομένης οὔτε μεριζομένης πάντῃ οὔτε καθαρῶς ἀμερίστου μενούσης (ibid. 9—10). All the terminology here is, of course, Neoplatonic and comes neither from Plato or Aristotle. It emphasises, *inter alia*, the soul's intermediate status between the more compact because undivided world of higher souls and intellects on the one hand, and the purely corporeal on the other. It is this life that Simplicius says Plato describes as κίνησις because of the descent from the indivisible, and he makes self-movement, τὸ αὐτοκίνητον, the essence of soul because it has its existence by virtue of that sort of life, being below undivided existence without having departed from it altogether. The purpose of this, according to Simplicius, is that by "moved", κινητόν, he indicates its descent while, by the "self-", αὐτὸ-, he shows that it is at rest in the undivided, and remains in itself at the same time as it proceeds from itself (ibid. 10—15). But, Simplicius continues, Aristotle, who normally applies κίνησις to the kind that is divisible and continuous, in accordance with the common usage, not only denies it of the soul's nature, or essence, but also says that soul in itself is in no way subject to motion, οὐ μόνον τῆς ψυχικῆς αὐτὴν ἀποφάσκει οὐσίας, ἀλλὰ μηδὲ ὁπωσοῦν καθ'αὑτὴν κινεῖσθαι τὴν ψυχὴν ἀποφαίνεται (ibid. 18—19).

Here we should note two points of interest. In the first place, we have a passage where the author of this commentary finds Plato and

Aristotle opposed: one appears to attribute movement to the soul, the other to deny it. When he has examined their statements it turns out that this is not the case because κίνησις is being used in two different senses. Though Simplicius does not make this explicit we can now see that what we might be led to accept by attending to the renown of a statement's author and not to the meaning of the words, is that there is no form of κίνησις in soul, as indicated by Aristotle's statement, rather than that it has the kind of κίνησις which is ζωή, as shown by Plato's less common use of the word. So that we are not ourselves misled by the use of words, it should perhaps be remarked that Plato himself does not always use κίνησις in this Neoplatonic sense, though it could, of course, be found in the Neoplatonists' favourite text from the Sophist, 248 e—249 a. Thus Simplicius has tacitly included himself among those who use the word in an unusual way, and left us to draw the conclusion that Aristotle is wrong.

Some further comments on these matters may be found a few pages later when Simplicius discusses Aristotle's view that soul is moved only incidentally (38.26 ff.). Aristotle objects that if soul itself is moved it would change its nature: ἐξίσταιτο ἂν ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας (406 b 12—14). Simplicius explains that Aristotle does not use κίνησις of the typical activity of the Neoplatonic soul, transition from one object or activity to another of those within its sphere without dispersing itself τὴν . . . ἀπ' ἄλλης εἰς ἄλλην μετάβασιν ἀθρόαν οὖσαν . . . (39.3—4). He then again draws attention to Plato's use of κίνησις, both in respect of movement of the soul relating to its activity — τὰς κατ' ἐνέργειαν τῆς ψυχῆς μεταβάσεις — and also to refer to its descent from its intellectual and undivided being when it "moves" in respect to its existence: καλεῖ δὲ καὶ τὴν κατ' οὐσίαν αὐτῆς ἀπὸ τῆς νοερᾶς καὶ ἀμερίστου οὐσίας ὑπόβασιν κίνησιν ὡς ἔκστασιν. I avoid translating οὐσία as essence because I am not convinced that Simplicius actually held that the soul changed essentially as a result of its involvement with the physical world.[24] That is another matter: for now we should note the

[24] Cf. "The psychology of (?) Simplicius" (see note 12), 91—92; for another view cf. C. Steel, The changing self. A study of the soul in later Neoplatonism: Iamblichus, Damascius and Priscianus. Verhandelingen van de Koninklijke Akademie voor Wetenschapen, Letteren en Schone Kunste van Belgie. Kl. Lett. 40, 1978, nr 85 (Brussels 1978), 52—69 on Iamblichus and Priscian: Steel thinks Simplicius did not believe in change κατ' οὐσίαν, ibid. 114 f.: somewhat differently I. Hadot, "La doctrine de Simplicius sur l'âme raisonnable humaine dans le commentaire sur le Manuel d'Epictète" in Soul and the Structure of Being (see note 12), 46—67. Hadot thinks that Simplicius, like his master Damascius, as well as Iamblichus, Hierocles, Augustine and other Neoplatonists, assumed, under certain circumstances, some change in the substance of the rational soul: this was however, reversible; cf. too the *résumé* of her lecture "La mort de l'âme selon les néoplatoniciens", in Annuaire de l'Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes, Ve Section 91 (1982—83), 351—54.

way in which Plato, like Aristotle, is interpreted in terms that he himself would have found it difficult to understand. The ἔκστασις is specified as τοῦ ὅρου καὶ τοῦ εἴδους. That, it is claimed, is just what Aristotle thinks, because he usually called the definition and the form οὐσία (cf. 39.8—13). Here follows a possible definition of soul which looks like Simplicius' own but is based on accepting as the truth Aristotle's objection to non-incidental movement: ἔσται οὖν ἡ ψυχὴ τῆς μὲν εἰδητικῆς οὐσίας ἔκστασις, with the qualification that it is the actual ἔκστασις that gives it its being and existence without involving it in becoming or perishing, κατ' αὐτὴν δὲ τὴν κίνησιν οὐσιωμένη καὶ τὸ εἶναι ἔχουσα, ἀλλ' οὐ γινομένη καὶ φθειρομένη. These last words too suggest that the change is not actually permanent, but rather one that causes soul to manifest its being in a different way. Be that as it may, Simplicius seems to envisage the Aristotelian soul descending, if not as in the Timaeus, at least according to the Neoplatonists' concept of descent which they derived from it.

From here Aristotle, according to Simplicius (39.16 ff.), having distinguished the senses of κίνησις, denies that the soul can move spatially and then investigates the views of Democritus and the apparent statements of Timaeus (i.e. Plato). He is naturally unable to argue that Democritus did not believe that the soul either undergoes or imparts locomotion. He is, in any case, more concerned with Aristotle's reading of the Timaeus, according to which Timaeus says that the soul moves body. That is not necessarily the exact meaning of the passages to which Aristotle and Simplicius seem to refer[25]. Be that as it may, Simplicius digresses from the discussion of movement, with the remark that Aristotle was obscure about what Plato called κινήσεις of the soul, and goes on to discuss the Timaeus account of the soul's creation (39.37—41.6) Here we may note another piece of Plato interpretation, and one that fits Simplicius' own interest in the

[25] 34 a and 36 c ff.

soul as a middle or intermediate entity which we have already noted.[26] For at 40.3 ff. he presents the geometrical elements in the soul's creation as showing that Plato wanted to display the soul's intermediate position between undivided being and being divided in our bodies, apparently reversing the sequence of the Timaeus.[27] The middle status of soul is also, the commentary explains, shown by the fact that a line is intermediate between a point and a solid, while a straight line indicates the soul's procession and the circular curvature its return, πρόοδος and ἐπιστροφή again, neither the language nor the concepts of Plato. Similarly the circular lines stand for the soul being undivided in its deployment — κατὰ ἀνέλιξιν — not simply so like *nous*. Soul is also seen as intermediate in relation to the movement of the heavens: if *nous* moves the heavens it does so with the soul which projects the undivided motive activity of *nous* through its own deployed life, which is intermediate, to the continuous and divisible activity of the heavens, ἥτις διὰ τῆς ἰδίας ἀνειλιγμένης ζωῆς ὡς μέσης πρόαγει τὴν ἀμέριστον τοῦ νοῦ κινητικὴν ἐνέργειαν εἰς τὴν συνεχῆ καὶ μεριστὴν τοῦ οὐράνου ἐνέργειαν (ibid. 17—20). It is this alone which Aristotle describes as κίνησις and, according to Simplicius, he therefore objects to Timaeus — the speaker of the dialogue — attributing a divided activity to the soul. The point is, he writes, that we, using the standard sense of the word, should not understand Plato in such a way as to think that the soul was some kind of magnitude or extension, or that it was moved in the way bodies are moved. So, though Simplicius does not make this explicit here, we should not see any inconsistency between statements in Aristotle and Plato about the soul and movement, or indeed its nature. Aristotle himself, we may recall, in criticizing Plato complains that soul is not a magnitude[28].

It is indeed remarkable that Simplicius manages to comment on a number of points in Aristotle's critique of Plato in this chapter without it being at all clear to a reader who does not have the text of the De anima before him that Aristotle is doing anything other than following Plato's lead. Thus the section on the lemma ὁ δὲ νοῦς εἷς καὶ

[26] Here too Simplicius seems to have lost sight of the 4 levels of being earlier Neoplatonists found in the Timaeus, cf. note 21 above.

[27] The soul's position is discussed at 35 a. The mathematical points Simplicius refers to seem to be those of 36 b ff. rather than the earlier reference to the ingredients of the mixture.

[28] Cf. 407 a 2—3.

συνεχὴς ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ νόησις (407 a 6—7) begins with the words ἑπομένως τῷ Πλάτωνι, following Plato (41.31 ff.) Aristotle argues from the nature of the world-soul's activity that it must be an intellect rather than a soul, an argument which Simplicius chooses to treat as simple exposition, for he comments that Aristotle follows Plato in determining a thing's nature from its activity, a fair summary of what Aristotle himself is about at 407 a 2 ff. but one that thoroughly misrepresents the intention of his discussion.

While our attention is focussed on this part of the commentary we should take note of the way in which Simplicius also takes the opportunity it offers of introducing points about the hierarchical structure of soul and intellect of various types. Aristotle says that by ψυχὴ τοῦ παντός Timaeus means something like ὁ καλούμενος νοῦς, which we may translate by something like "what is known as intellect". Simplicius, as inheritor of a tradition which was accustomed to making manifold distinctions in the use and significance of *nous*, appears to read καλούμενος as that which is inaccurately called *nous*, and refers it to the rational soul, as in those texts which more or less explicitly discuss the status of our intellect and argue, or assert, that it is our fully descended rational soul, and therefore to be distinguished from any kind of transcendent intellect. It is in this light that he interprets Aristotle's point that the world soul of the Timaeus differs from the sensitive, as Aristotle himself puts it, and epithumetic soul, in that circular movement is not appropriate to either of these. Simplicius, moreover, seems to see the contrast with ψυχὴ αἰσθητικὴ and ἐπιθυμητική, which his ἥτις at 41.27 indicates that he takes as referring to one soul which would therefore be the Neoplatonists' lower irrational soul, as an argument for identifying *nous* with rational soul (cf. 41.24—29). In the sequel he compares the intellection of things without body in respect of its indivisible nature with transcendent intellect: it is one and undivided like that of the *nous* above soul, καθάπερ ἡ τοῦ ἐξῃρημένου τῆς ψυχῆς νοῦ; it grasps all the ὄντα simultaneously and without transition, while our knowledge of formal definitions does not apply to everything simultaneously, but to each form in turn. Our rational cognition always deals with definitions, and parts and wholes of arguments, trying to attain a unified view as far as possible. Eventually certain concepts may be apprehended as a whole, for example ζῷον, λογικόν and θνητόν (42.1—20). So, he continues, the point of Aristotle's saying that *nous* is one and continuous is that *nous* above

soul is one because indivisible, whereas our rational nature is one because it is deployed and extended as into a continuum, διὰ τὴν ἀνέλιξιν οὕτω μία ὡς εἰς συνέχειαν ἐκτεινομένη, not like a spatial one, but one that steps down (χαλάσασαν) the pure indivisibility of the form. Simplicius sums up by adducing Aristotle's next sentence,[29] saying that Aristotle's οὕτω ὡς τὸ μέγεθος συνεχής shows the nature of the being that is between that which is undivided and that which is divided about bodies, while his ἢ ἀμερής[30] refers to the *nous* above soul, since that which is participated by soul is in between (42.32—35).

It has seemed worth looking at this section of the commentary in some detail because it illustrates several of the points we are considering. It begins by treating Aristotle's arguments against Plato as a contribution to the explication of Plato, though unlike some such texts it does not draw attention to the "apparent inconsistencies". It proceeds by way of relating the discussion to Neoplatonic hierarchy problems, to show how Aristotle's text is itself allegedly making a contribution to the exposition of such a hierarchy. It then shows one of the ways in which Aristotle is read Neoplatonically, as well as exemplifying the manner in which Neoplatonically sensitive subjects cause our commentator to embark on prolonged discussions of a kind whose relevance we might wish to question.

Such factors may also be observed at a later point in Simplicius' commentary on the same chapter of the De anima, 1.3., where he pursues various difficulties about the connection between mind and circular motion arising from the ψυχηγονία. Among the Aristotelian objections is that if circular motion is repeated that will entail that the intellect frequently cognizes the same thing. Simplicius readily accepts that the object will be the same, but takes issue with the notion of repetition (47.6 ff.). Always having the same object he attributes to the intellect above ours, from which is to be excluded not only repetition — αὖθις καὶ αὖθις — but also any kind of temporal extension or a succession of nows. Rather we have something which remains immobile and comprehends the whole infinite stretch of time indivisibly. It cognizes the same thing not often but once, in the sense of an eternal once, ὥστε οὐ πολλάκις τὸ αὐτὸ ἀλλ' ἅπαξ κατὰ τὸ αἰώνιον ἅπαξ. Our *nous* by contrast, in so far as it operates by transition, does not move from the same to the same but from one thing to another, and arrives back at the same thing by way of intermediates. A further point in the Neoplatonic intelligible structure is introduced in this section when Simplicius raises the question why not even the divine souls — θεῖαι ψυχαί — can have a form of intellection which is one in the sense that it is always of everything and does not involve transition. The answer, and again we are a long way away from Aristotle and Plato, is that its intellect is inferior to the *nous* which is above the soul because it is merely in a sort of contact with the intelligibles rather than being in a state of undivided unity with them, καὶ ταύτῃ ὑφεῖται τοῦ ὑπὲρ ψυχὴν νοῦ ὡς καὶ κατὰ τὴν πρὸς τὰ νοητὰ συναφήν· ἡ μὲν γὰρ καθ' ἕνωσιν ἀμέριστον, ἡ δὲ κατὰ οἷον ἐπαφήν. Simplicius proceeds (ibid. 26 ff.) to add further reasons, now explicitly acknowledged as his own — φήσω, why the notion of intelligizing the same thing repeatedly is unsatisfactory.

Next we have what looks like an open conflict between Plato and Aristotle which is, moreover, exactly the opposite of that which we might expect. For Aristotle complains that Plato has attached the soul, or rather *nous*, too closely to body. Specifically Aristotle complains that it is burdensome for the soul to be mingled inextricably with body: ἐπίπονον δὲ καὶ τὸ μεμῖχθαι τῷ σώματι μὴ δυνάμενον ἀπολυθῆναι (407 b 2—3). That, says Aristotle, is clearly to be avoided if it is better for a soul to be without body, as is generally said and widely accepted. We would take this to be a reference to the Platonists. Simplicius explains that Plato accepts this and most people would agree, a change produced by adding τοῖς to Aristotle's πολλοῖς, and one for which we need not spell out the reasons. Simplicius says that it is not best for inseparable soul to be apart from the body because that would not be its οἰκεῖον ἀγαθόν. So, he interprets, that life with body which Aristotle called mixture is unnatural and inappropriate, and therefore onerous, for a separate soul because it attaches to it not qua separate soul but qua soul that has departed from its own nature. That, of course, is one of the standard descriptions of the descended soul. In our soul escape or disentanglement is possible, but the discomfort remains for the world-soul because of the permanence of its situation. That, says Simplicius, is why Aristotle seems to object to Plato's words. These would also, he adds, seem to attribute descent

[29] διόπερ οὐδ' ὁ νοῦς οὕτω συνεχής, ἀλλ' ἤτοι ἀμερὴς ἢ οὐχ ὡς μέγεθός τι συνεχής, 407 a 9—10.

[30] ἢ ἀμερὴς: Simplicius; ἤτοι: Aristotle.

and use of the body as a tool to it.[31] In this respect separation is always better. But, says Simplicius, we should not understand Plato's words in this way, nor, a fortiori, should we think that this is how things are. We should not take it that soul descends to the body or uses it as a tool, being combined with it. Rather it makes its body its own by remaining in itself and reverting to itself: it moves it in a transcendent way. The purpose, he adds, is that we should have a model for our separate life (cf. 48.24—49.17).

A similar approach is used to deal with Aristotle's complaint that Plato has not made it clear why the heavens should revolve (50.1—17). Here, however, Simplicius has to concede that he cannot see why Aristotle makes this complaint, in so far as Aristotle refutes the applicability of corporeal or natural motion which Plato did not intend to attribute to soul. We must, he says, understand the soul's κίνησις in the light of Plato's real intention, thus implying that Aristotle's disagreement is not with Plato but with a misunderstanding of Plato. He goes on to say what he himself thinks the soul's movement is, using terms we have already discussed.

The question of Plato's alleged mixture of soul and body comes up again when Simplicius discusses 1.5, where Aristotle refers to "certain earlier thinkers" — τινες — who say that soul is combined with the whole: καὶ ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ δέ τινες αὐτὴν μεμῖχθαι φασίν. Here Simplicius notes that though the σκοπός of the De anima is primarily the soul of θνητά Aristotle nevertheless does offer some discussion of the soul of the heavens, saying that it is without extension, intellectual, and present to the body in a separate way, not combined with it as Plato appeared to say (73.4—8). What Plato actually thinks we are told in a further comment on the same page: there is no combination of soul and body, but soul stays in itself and body comes to belong to it (ibid. 33—35). We may note that, in the same discussion about how body is related to soul, Simplicius remarks that in the case of our souls a higher vehicle is extended along with the soul to the world body: the "higher vehicle", ὄχημα may be understood in relation to the frequent late Neoplatonic habit of referring to the body as a second or third vehicle, in addition to that, or those, to which souls were attached.[32]

It is probably unnecessary to say that the whole question of soul's relation to body is problematic for a Platonist dealing with Aristotle. The texts of Aristotle whose interpretation we have just seen do, of course, offer a reversal of the usual problem, namely that Aristotle's soul is too closely associated with body for any Platonist to accept his account of it in the way we should. The difficulty is, of course, most acute at the level where soul is least separate from body, namely that at which it gives life to what without it would have none. Since Aristotle here has soul related to body in the indivisible relation of form to matter, some means must be found to explain this relation in a way that is compatible with the soul's separate existence, its presence to, rather than combination or union with body. Hence the resort to the concept of a double entelechy, one which acts as form to body, and the other which uses the body so formed. I have discussed this question elsewhere, so do not want to look at the details of Simplicius' discussion now.[33] But the matter is far too important to leave out of account. From our point of view it is also significant that the discussion at pp. 51—52 already anticipates the longer but perhaps no more informative one that Simplicius supplies at the point where the definition comes in Aristotle's text.[34] It is one more case where Simplicius's interpretations of texts from subsequent books are already brought into play in his exposition of Book 1. In fact the relation of soul to body at the lower levels had become an issue even earlier when Simplicius comments on Aristotle's remark that all the things which happen to soul seem to involve body[35]. Here Simplicius uses the distinction between the soul — his actual word here is ζωή — which uses and that which informs to distinguish πάθη in which body merely participates in what the soul does or actually works with it (cf. 18.20 ff.). Aristotle, according to Simplicius, also keeps all soul above any affection, not only the separate soul which remains in itself, but even the one that uses the body (19.11—15) — more translation into Neoplatonic concepts. These points are taken up again *à propos* a passage in 1.5 where Aristotle looks at three ways of defining soul (66.6 ff.), a suitable text with which to conclude since it in effect provides a summary of some of the principles that govern the whole of Simplicius'

31 At 49.9—10 the subject of δόξειε is not clear: it could be Plato's ῥῆμα or Aristotle: κἀκείνῳ would then be either νοῦς = world-soul in the former case, or Plato in the latter.

32 Cf. e. g. Proclus, in Tim. III. 237.24—27.

33 Cf. "Neoplatonic elements" 83—84; "Some Platonist readings" 4—5.

34 Cf. 90.29—91.15.

35 403 a 16.

work. Aristotle, according to Simplicius, has shown that soul is unmoved by any of the bodily movements, that the soul which informs the ὄργανον is incorporeal, and that that applies to an even greater extent to that which uses it, and still more to the intellectual soul. Cognition, which takes place using the body cannot take place without an affection, but that is to be located in the body itself and not in the act of cognition because cognition is an activity (ἐνέργεια). This is of course a standard Neoplatonic point already to be found in Plotinus.[36] Nevertheless, it is at least implied that even the rational soul uses body because it is described as ἀρχικός to the highest degree whenever it does not use body as an instrument. Here we should recall that both memory and imagination, as well as practical reason, may be found in the higher rather than the lower soul. At the highest level of cognition complete and individual union belongs only to εἴδη: rational substances relate to each other in the manner appropriate to *logoi*. They are not, however, separate from each other because their existence is not in division but in a slacker form of participation (κεχαλασμένη again) and one that is inferior to undivided union. It is, says Simplicius, a matter of different degrees of decline as one moves away from the forms themselves. At the end the relation is entirely external (67.2—14). So Aristotle does not altogether reject the similarity between the subject and object of cognition — this arises from his criticism of Empedocles — but says that it does not necessarily consist in identity. By the close of the section Aristotle seems to have been equipped with the outlines of the Neoplatonic doctrine that everything must be appropriately related to that which it is to receive: πᾶν τὸ δεκτικὸν οἰκείως ἔχειν δεῖ πρὸς τὸ ἐγγιγνόμενον εἶδος (cf. ibid. 22f.).

Once more we have found that it is Simplicius' own interests that have shaped the discussion. In this the commentary on Book 1 is no different from that on 2 and 3, but in so far as the matters that Simplicius discusses at length tend to arise in those books rather than this, we may say that the degree of distortion is greater, and the relevance of the discussions to the texts in question correspondingly less.

All unspecified references are to Simplicius, In De anima by page and line of the Berlin Academy edition: references to Aristotle are to the De anima unless otherwise stated.

[36] Cf. e. g. 3.6.1.1—7, 4.3.23.

XVII

Soul Vehicles in Simplicius

There has been a not inconsiderable amount of discussion of the nature and function of the ὄχημα — or ὀχήματα — the body or bodies made of not quite bodily substance which served as an intermediary between body and soul in various Neoplatonisms from Porphyry, or even arguably Plotinus, down to and including Proclus. Rather less attention, and, in Simplicius' case virtually none,[1] has been paid to the nature and role of such intermediary vehicles in the Neoplatonist commentators on Aristotle.

The purpose of the following pages will be to examine the use of the concept in Simplicius. In particular it will seek to establish

1) how many such vehicles there were
2) what they were made of
3) what was their function, and, related to 3)
4) what was their life-expectancy
5) were they simply such as one would expect to find in the work of a Neoplatonist at this time, or are they in some way modified by the commentary context.

In considering these matters special attention will be paid to the vocabulary used to discuss them. It should not, however, come as a surprise to discover that it is not significantly, if at all, different from that of those Neoplatonists who did not concentrate their endeavours on the exposition of Aristotle.

References to the Aristotelian commentators are by page and line of the Berlin Academy edition, *Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca (CAG)*.

[1] But see I. Hadot, *Le problème du néoplatonisme alexandrin: Hiéroclès et Simplicius* (Paris 1978) 181-83.

* * *

The answer to the first question might seem to be obvious, namely two. But let us pause before simply accepting it.

In the texts from the *Timaeus* which were normally regarded as authority for giving vehicles to souls, each soul had one.[2] And that was the form the doctrine took in its earlier versions.[3] It seems to have been Proclus who introduced a second, so that the upper and lower souls could have one each. That gave them both an intermediary between immaterial soul and substantially different body, and *inter alia*, meant that it was easier for soul to operate with a body in the physical world without undergoing substantial (κατ' οὐσίαν) change, a matter on which Proclus appears to have differed from his predecessor Iamblichus, and Damascius from Proclus.[4] Simplicius' own position is not clear. Recent discussions have arrived at different answers.[5] In any case we should neither assume that his partnership with Damascius at Athens need imply that they shared the same view, nor that his training in Alexandria points in the opposite direction.

Since we know that he certainly believed in two ὀχήματα, even though he may not have been the first to do so, let us look briefly at Proclus. At first sight it might appear that he believed not only in two, but even in three such vehicles, for in the *Timaeus* commentary we find that he apparently refers to that number. There, at III 298.27-29 he writes, τὸ μὲν οὖν συμφυὲς ὄχημα ποιεῖ αὐτὴν ἐγκόσμιον, τὸ δὲ δεύτερον γενέσεως πολῖτιν, τὸ δὲ ὀστρεῶδες χθονίαν: the vehicle which

[2]41D-E; 44E; 69C.

[3]For the history of this doctrine cf. R. C. Kissling, "The ΟΧΗΜΑ-ΠΝΕΥΜΑ of the Neoplatonists and the *De Insomniis* of Synesius of Cyrene", *AJP* 43 (1922) 318-330; E.R. Dodds, *Proclus. The Elements of Theology* (Oxford 1963) Appendix 2, 313-21 and 347f.; A. Smith, *Porphyry's Place in the Neoplatonic Tradition* (The Hague 1974) Appendix 2, 152-58; J.F. Finamore, *Iamblichus and the Theory of the Vehicle of the Soul.* American Classical Studies 14 (Chico 1985).

[4]Cf. C. Steel, *The Changing Self. A Study on the Soul in later Neoplatonism: Iamblichus, Damascius and Priscianus.* Verh. van de Kon. Academie voor Wetenschappen, Letteren en Schone Kunsten van België, Kl. Lett. 40, 1978, 85 (Brussels 1978) 52-73.

[5]Steel, ibid.; I. Hadot (op. cit. (n. 1) 170-74 and "La doctrine de Simplicius sur l'âme raisonnable humaine dans le commentaire sur le Manuel d'Epictète", in H.J. Blumenthal and A.C. Lloyd ed., *Soul and the Structure of Being in Late Neoplatonism* (Liverpool 1982) 47-70; Blumenthal, ibid., 91f. and 71f.

is natural to it puts it inside the cosmos, the second makes it (i.e. the soul) a citizen of the world of becoming, the one that is like a shell makes it an inhabitant of the earth. Their relations, he goes on, are analogous to that of the earth to becoming and of that to the cosmos: that also applies to their accompaniments (περιθέσεις). The one always exists because the soul is always in the cosmos, the one exists before this body and after it, being in the sphere of becoming both before and after it, the third only exists when the soul is moving from one partial life to the other (ibid. 298.29-299.4). This passage might suggest that there is one vehicle for the soul outside the cycles of existence—one thinks here of the *Phaedrus*—one for the soul when it is involved in a series of incarnations, and a third, which one would associate with the vegetative or nutritive soul, which is only needed when a soul is not merely in a condition for embodiment, but actually embodied. The question then arises whether this third vehicle is an intermediary between soul and body, or simply a colourful way of talking about the ordinary earthly body with a view to showing its relationship to soul in direct comparison and contrast with that of the higher "bodies" which are clearly of a different substance. In other words, is ὀστρεῶδες a special kind of body, and thus parallel to terms like αὐγοειδές, light-like, or merely a description of body in its normal sense? Normally Proclus talks in terms of two, one attached to the upper and rational, the other to the lower and irrational soul, and in the sequel to the text we have just looked at he talks of an irrational life which is different both from that of the first vehicle and of the last body: παρά τε τὴν τοῦ πρώτου ὀχήματος καὶ τὴν τοῦ ἐσχάτου σώματος ζωήν (ibid. 300.5-7). Here too a question presents itself: does σῶμα mean body in the normal sense, or body of the kind in question, for the intermediate bodies are often, of course, described as such and such a σῶμα? In any case this third intermediary, if it did exist, had no function distinct from that of the ordinary body, so that its role would have been merely that of completing a triad of additional bodies.[6] That this was indeed its role is further suggested by a text in the *Platonic Theology* (III 5, 125P = 18.24-19.3 Saffrey-Westerink) where we read that of participated souls the first and most divine are in control of simple and eternal bodies, the next of both simple bodies and those tied to matter,

[6]The habit of referring to the real body as something analogous to the quasi-material ones goes back to Porphyry, cf. *De abstinentia* I 31 = 109.10-19 Nauck and J. Pépin, "Saint Augustin et le symbolisme néoplatonicien de la vêture", in *Augustinus Magister.* Congrès International Augustinien. Paris 1954. I (Études augustiniennes n.d.) 295f.

simultaneously, while a further set rule, at the same time, over bodies of both these kinds and composite ones. The sequel shows that the first two kinds of body are the light-like vehicle, a "tunic" which is material but made of simple components: by means of these tunics they are associated with composite and multiform (σύνθετοις... καὶ πολυμορφοῖς) bodies (ibid. 19.11-15).[7]

Simplicius too may be found referring to a dependent body which is ὀστρεῶδες in the *Physics* commentary (966.5), but there the point is to contrast the sort of body a soul inhabits in the terrestrial sphere with the ones it associates with in the heavens:[8] that is referred to as πνευματικόν. Discussing an interpretation of Theophrastus he has argued that the soul does not need anything interposed between it and body: its distance is assured by body's unsuitability to receive the soul's irradiation: ἀρκεῖ γὰρ ἡ τοῦ σώματος ἀνεπιτηδειότης πρὸς τὸ μὴ δέχεσθαι τὴν ἔλλαμψιν τῆς ψυχῆς (cf. 965.26-30). It does, however, have ὀχήματα appropriate to its location: the dependent (ἐξημμένον) bodies are his explanation of these ὀχήματα (966.3-9).

Nevertheless, if the lower of the two can be identical with the ordinary body, the pneumatic one cannot, and Simplicius specifically argues that the inability of one body to penetrate another is not sufficient ground for saying that souls which have the lower cannot have the higher too: they are different kinds of body, and therefore any objection to two bodies of the same kind interpenetrating are inapplicable. It is not absurd, he says, for higher and finer bodies which are of a different nature to penetrate grosser and more material ones (ibid. 5-13).

Now if it is the case that Simplicius believed only in one vehicle above the one that is identical or nearly so with the body, then he has returned to the pre-Proclus version of the soul-vehicle doctrine. *Prima facie* that seems unlikely, and, in fact, when we proceed to look at the constituents of the vehicles, we shall see that there is a distinction between two groups of descriptions, of which one appears to apply to a higher, the other to a lower vehicle. What is less clear is just what the several descriptions in these two groups mean, and to that question we must now turn.

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[7]On this passage cf. Dodds, loc. cit. (n. 3) 320f. and the *Notes Complémentaires* in Saffrey and Westerink's edition, pp. 113f.

[8]Cf. ὀστρέινον σῶμα at *In De an.* 287.16-22 which is again body in the usual sense.

Disregarding for the moment the possible limitation of certain kinds of vehicle-material to certain spheres of existence, let us collect the terms used by Simplicius to describe these materials.

Some we have already encountered above. These are αὐγοειδές— the neuter forms are appropriate because these terms all modify σῶμα — πνευματικόν and, *ambiguae status*, ὀστρεῶδες (and ὀστρέινον). Two of these, we may note straight away, are those we met in our preliminary look at Proclus' views on these matters. Three others are found, namely αἰθερῶδες, ἀρχοειδές, and αὐτοειδές, of which at least one must rest under suspicion of being a textual error.

A further -ειδής word, namely θνητοειδές, is also found with σῶμα, but not with ὄχημα, and so is even more likely than ὀστρεῶδες to be simply descriptive of the ordinary material body rather than of one made of something else which provides an intermediary for the soul: at *In De an.* 74.1-4 he talks of an ὄχημα συγκατατεινόμενον τῇ ψυχῇ εἰς τὸ θνητοειδὲς σῶμα, a vehicle extended to the mortal kind of body along with the soul. When shortly thereafter Simplicius is discussing Aristotle's definition of the soul, he uses the same word to describe the lowest form of life, below the higher and more perfect one which involves movement: it is the θνητοειδὴς ζωή to which, in furtherance of his Neoplatonizing exposition of the definition, he ascribes ὀργανικόν which, of course, he understands to mean in the position of, or having the status of, a tool (87.25-27). Before leaving this area of the soul's life we should, however, note that Iamblichus had used the word σωματοειδές to describe the soul vehicle of δαίμονες, which would have to be of a different material from that of our ordinary bodies (cf. *De mysteriis* 12 = 167 des Places).[9] Further, when Proclus cites οἱ περὶ... Ἰάμβλιχον as authority for the view that individual souls have vehicles made of the same *pneuma* as those of the heavenly bodies, that would indicate that the *pneuma* in question is of the most refined kind (cf. *In Tim.* III 266.25-31).

Αὐγοειδές, perhaps the commonest term for the upper vehicle in those systems where there are two, clearly relates the substance it describes to light, and at the same time distinguishes it from it. What exactly it is is probably impossible to ascertain, since the whole point of this non-material quasi-material substance is that it should be other than other substances. At the same time the history of the Neoplatonists' view of light shows that they regarded it as the closest

[9]Cf. G. Verbeke, *L'évolution de la doctrine du pneuma du stoicisme à S. Augustin* (Paris and Louvain 1945) 378.

possible approach to the immaterial, and of the very highest status below purely intelligible entities.[10] All this is well-known: the reason for recalling it here is to stress that the term in question is a thoroughly appropriate description of the kind of entity we are discussing. We may note in passing that the word does not occur in Simplicius' *De anima* commentary, which may, or may not—because of the low incidence of all these words—throw some light on the question of that work's authenticity.[11]

The *De anima* commentary, is, of course, concerned with the individual human soul: the study of ψυχὴ λογική is given as its σκοπός (cf. e.g. 172.4-8). Elsewhere we may find an αὐγοειδές ὄχημα attached to the soul of the heavens, or the world-soul. So at *In Phys.* 615.31-35 we find the world-soul's light-like vehicle mentioned as a candidate for the identity of the shaft of light described in the Myth of Er (*Republic* 616B). This is as far as I know, the only certain occurrence in Simplicius, but, though the interpretation is ascribed to Porphyry, the language appears to be that of Simplicius himself.

There is, however, a further possible instance in the *De caelo* commentary (469.7-11). There the received text reads αὐγοειδές, but Heiberg has changed it to αὐτοειδές on the basis of the word *autoideale* in Moerbeke's translation. In a majuscule MS the difference is of course minimal, and it seems likely that a scribe unfamiliar with the more abstruse Neoplatonist terminology would have changed a word that looked strange to one superficially more comprehensible. What exactly αὐτοειδές might mean in the present context is far from clear. The text, as printed by Heiberg, reads: εἰ δέ τις τοῦτο τὸ σῶμα τὸ ἐπικήριον ἐξηρτημένος τὸ αὐτοειδὲς αὐτοῦ καὶ οὐράνιον ὄχημα καὶ τὰς ἐν αὐτῷ αἰσθήσεις κεκαθαρμένας σχοίη...: if someone being attached to this perishable body had the heavenly vehicle which was of the same kind, then he would have the pure senses (which would enable him to hear and see things invisible and inaudible to others, and in particular Pythagoras' music of the spheres). As I have translated it

[10]For two different views of the significance of light cf. W. Beierwaltes, "Die Metaphysik des Lichtes in der Philosophie Plotins", *Ztschr. für Philosophische Forschung* 15 (1961) 334-62; R. Ferwerda, *La signification des images et des métaphores dans la pensée de Plotin* (Groningen 1965) 46-65.

[11]On this matter cf. the differing views of F. Bossier and C. Steel, "Priscianus Lydus en de "In de anima" van pseudo(?) Simplicius", *Tijdschrift voor Filosofie* 34 (1972) 761-821; I. Hadot, *Le Néoplatonisme* (see n. 1) 193-202 and "La doctrine de Simplicius" (see n. 5) 94; Blumenthal, "The psychology of (?) Simplicius' commentary on the *De anima*", ibid. 73-93.

αὐτοειδές makes no sense, since the whole point is that we should have to be possessed of something other than the body to have these superior perceptions. If, moreover, one were to translate Moerbeke's calque translation of a presumed αὐτοειδές, it is difficult to see what that should mean: "ideal itself"? That would neither be a sensible description of something that had even the smallest component of corporeality, however refined, nor would it be a likely meaning for a compound in -ειδής. Most of these are relatively late, Plato's ἀγαθοειδής (*Republic* 509A) being an early example.[12] Elsewhere the word αὐτοειδής is rare. It appears much earlier in Marcus Aurelius, at 11.12, where it is almost certainly a wrong reading.[13]

On the other hand there is one text, in the *De Primis Principiis* of Simplicius' contemporary Damascius, where αὐτοειδές does give good sense while bearing the meaning one would expect. There, discussing the Forms and their representations, Damascius explains that the Forms themselves exist at the greatest degree of unification in the Demiurge: subsequently αὖτα ἃ ἐστιν τὰ ἐφεξῆς πάντα *αὐτοειδῆ* ἐστιν ἀρχόμενα ἀπὸ τῶν θεῶν τούτων: the next set of things that are all of the same kind, having their origin in these divine beings (340=II 201.15-16 Ruelle).[14] This passage makes it the more likely that the MS reading should be maintained, and αὐτοειδές abandoned at the one point where it occurs as an adjective for soul vehicles in the *CAG* editions of Simplicius. In fact there is only one other occurrence of the word there, used in a nominal sense. At *In De an.* 29.15-20 τὰ αὐτοειδῆ figure in a list of the contents of the Ideal Living Being of the *Timaeus*, which Simplicius interprets in the normal way as the noetic *diakosmos*. Here we are told what it means, namely the first things [that are] and their principles: τὰ πρώτιστα καὶ αἱ τούτων ἀρχαί, which are then listed: ἡ τοῦ αὐτοενὸς ἰδέα ἥ τε τοῦ πρώτου μήκους and so on. In this context αὐτοειδής has a perfectly clear sense of the kind that one would expect, namely the Forms themselves. Putting this together with the case in Damascius makes it the more likely that this

[12]See C.D. Buck and W. Petersen, *A Reverse Index of Greek Nouns and Adjectives* (Chicago 1949) 703-707: apart from a few cases in Herodotus these are virtually none earlier than Plato, with the arguable exception of some in the Hippocratic corpus.

[13]ψυχῆς σφαῖρα αὐτοειδής makes no sense here, and almost all recent editors have abandoned it; for another view cf. A.S.L. Farquharson (Oxford 1944), who retains it, ad. loc.

[14]For the normal use of -ειδής compounds cf. also ταυτοειδής and ἑτεροειδής in the same section, 201.12 R.

is not the word Simplicius used in the *De caelo* commentary to describe a soul-vehicle.

Next αἰθερώδες: unlike the other terms we have been looking at this is not an -ειδής compound, so that its meaning is not so much aether-like as actually made of aether.[15] Again, it is not common in Simplicius, but is found as a description of a soul vehicle in the *De anima* commentary, where perception and imagination are attributed to τὸ αἰθερώδες τῆς ἡμετέρας ψυχῆς ὄχημα (17.16-17). On the other occasion on which Simplicius uses the word it describes a possible candidate for the material in the spaces between stars (*In De caelo* 461.18-20): the question is not Aristotle's but the commentator's, and the word is not Aristotelian.[16] These two passages together do, however, confirm that the vehicle is made of some substance other than the ordinary corporeal elements.

The last -ειδής word we have to consider is ἀρχοειδής. At first sight it appears that it may already have appeared as an ὄχημα epithet in the *Phaedrus* commentary of Ammonius' father and academic predecessor Hermias, where the word occurs at 69.18 Couvreur. In fact it is a conjecture of Couvreur's, who replaced the generally accepted αὐγοειδές by ἀρχοειδές on the basis of its appearance a few lines earlier, where, in a different context, it makes perfectly good sense. At 14-18, however, the point at issue is that the human soul by means of the power of perception in the ἀρχοειδὲς (*sic*) ὄχημα can perceive activity of a divine, or semi-divine vehicle with which its own is contrasted, but with which it thus communicates: κοινωνία...γίνεται τοῦ δαιμονίου ὀχήματος καὶ τοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς. For two reasons the word is suspect in this context. In the first place ἀρχοειδές does not give the expected contrast with a higher kind of entity, which the δαιμόνιον ὄχημα clearly is: it is a word of good Aristotelian ancestry and means superior, or like, having the status of, an ἀρχή. Secondly one would expect, if not a reference to the vehicle's status, then one to its material, which the word does not provide either. Elsewhere in Hermias αὐγοειδές is used, but describes not the soul but the upper heavens to which the divinely led procession of the *Phaedrus* myth aspires (144.26-28): here αὐγοειδές has a clearly comprehensible sense, for the upper heavens might reasonably be described as being like light. So, returning to the

[15]For a list of ώδης words cf. Buck-Petersen, op. cit. (n. 12) 708-15. It should, however, be said that the suffix is sometimes used with the same sense as -ειδής. On ώδης see P. Chantraine, *La formation des noms en grec ancien* (Paris 1933) 429-32.

[16]The commentary is on *De caelo* 290 a29-b11.

ἀρχοειδές ὄχημα, it looks as if once again, as in the case of αὐτοειδές which we have already considered, a word of more obvious meaning, or in this case one better known, has been substituted for the rarer and less perspicuous αὐγοειδές.

We have not yet considered the word most commonly associated with the soul-vehicle, namely πνευματικός. In fact, in the authors we have been discussing it is less common than one might expect: Philoponus shows a different pattern.[17] In Simplicius the πνευματικὸν ὄχημα is the one the soul acquires for embodiment at a higher level than that of the ordinary body here on earth. Its acquisition is a result of soul being inside the cosmos (cf. *In Phys.* 965.31-966.3). That applies to any kind of soul. Thus the specifically human soul also has a vehicle made of *pneuma*: it is not, however, normally described as πνευματικόν: in fact, outside the passage we have just cited, the word occurs only twice in Simplicius, both times in the same section of the *Categories* commentary, where it comes in Stoic contexts and relates to their concept of quality.

This brings us to the second of our initial questions, namely what the soul-vehicles were made of. We have not, however, explicitly answered the first. Let us for the moment say that, contrary to expectations, the texts we have seen suggest that Simplicius, unlike some of his predecessors and contemporaries, operated with one soul vehicle for the individual human soul. A further look at the constituents of these vehicles may help to produce a less tentative answer.

* * *

The terms we have looked at so far suggest various candidates for the material of soul-vehicles: light, *aether*, *pneuma*. The two first would seem to go together, referring as they do to materials present in the higher reaches of the physical world. *Pneuma*, in spite of its associations with *aether*, is less clearly associated with a particular area of the cosmos.

We have already seen that αὐγοειδές in the places where it occurs in the *Physics*, and possibly also the *De caelo*, commentary is specifically used of the heavenly regions or the world-soul.[18] That this

[17]Some 15 examples of πνευματικός, and about 300 of πνεῦμα and its other cognates: Simplicius has about 50.

[18]See above 177-178.

should have a vehicle made of light, or something like it, is appropriate to both its location and function. Is the same material to be found in the human soul vehicle, or, if there is more than one such vehicle, in one of them?

Possibly the three words in question do not indicate distinct materials. Let us go back for a moment to Iamblichus. We find that he uses αὐγοειδές and αἰθερῶδες as descriptions of one and the same thing. Thus in the *De mysteriis* he talks of prophetic power illuminating the ethereal and light-like vehicle attached to the soul: τὸ περικειμένον τῇ ψυχῇ αἰθερῶδες καὶ αὐγοειδὲς ὄχημα ἐπιλάμπει (III 14 = 117 des Places). Earlier in the same book Iamblichus describes the *pneuma* in us as light-like, αὐγοειδές (III 11 = 113), and in a later chapter, talking of the purification of the soul and the removal of elements of becoming, as both light-like and ethereal: ἀπορρίπτει τοῦ αἰθερώδους καὶ αὐγοειδοῦς πνεύματος...(V 26 = 182). So here, in the work of the man whom Simplicius at the start of his *De anima* commentary proclaims as his guide to the understanding of Aristotle (1.14-20), we have one soul vehicle, made of a single substance which is describable by all three of our terms αἰθερωδές, αὐγοειδές and, being made of *pneuma*, πνευματικός.

We have already seen indications that the same situation obtains in Simplicius—which would provide an interesting example of the commentator agreeing with Iamblichus against Proclus, who, as we have seen, firmly subscribes to the view that there is more than one soul-vehicle, and whose views one might have expected to be transmitted to Simplicius by way of his pupil and Simplicius' teacher Ammonius.[19] Given the question about the identity of the author of the *De anima* commentary and the others, it might be as well to say that there is no clear evidence that the doctrine of the *De anima* commentary differs from that of either the other commentaries on Aristotle or that on Epictetus.[20]

Given the above descriptions of *pneuma* one might ask whether Simplicius entertained the notion of different qualities of that substance, in so far as the type that is described as αὐγοειδές might not

[19]For Proclus as teacher of Ammonius cf. Damascius, *Vita Isidori* fr. 127 Zintzen = *Suda s.v.* Aidesia; for Simplicius cf. e.g. *In De caelo* 271.19.

[20]See the treatments by I. Hadot and Blumenthal referred to in n.11 above; for another view the article of Bossier and Steel cited there. I should add that both authors have since told me that they are more than ever convinced that Simplicius cannot have written the *De anima* commentary.

be the most appropriate for some of the functions that *pneuma*, or the body constituted by it, are required to perform. In one section of the *De anima* commentary there is a hint that this is indeed what Simplicius has in mind. Discussing why fire does not become alive through the presence of soul, he remarks that it is not a suitable vehicle, ὄχημα, for it: what is is something higher, which is, at least secondarily, of the same sort of composition as things in the heavens, τῆς οὐρανίας ὂν καὶ αὐτὸ συστάσεως δευτέρως (73.33-74.1). He then goes on, in a sentence we have already looked at while considering the use of θνητοειδές, to say that even in our own case a superior vehicle is extended with the soul towards the body.[21] Αὐγοειδές in the one, or two, places where it occurs in Simplicius is used of the *pneuma* in the world's upper regions. Yet its use in other writers indicates that it was by no means confined to that area, but rather may be used of any kind of *pneuma*. Indeed, as early as Galen we find it as a description of a special kind of body when he offers as alternatives that the soul is either made of αἰθερῶδές τε καὶ αὐγοειδὲς σῶμα, or has an ὄχημα consisting of that substance.[22]

On the other hand, σωματοειδές, which, as we have already seen, may be used to describe something that is other than body, could be taken to denote a kind of vehicle for the individual soul that is of an inferior kind to that described as αὐγοειδές or αἰθερῶδες. Does Simplicius so use it?

In so far as it describes materials, it is used in the *De caelo* commentary to refer to the substance of the heavens, that is to something which, while material, is not, or may not be, made of the same materials as things in the terrestrial world (cf. e.g. 360.29-361.7). When, however, he is commenting on the opening chapter of Book 2 a few pages later, Simplicius uses the term in the same way as Plato, who may have invented it, used it in the passage of the *Timaeus* which Simplicius is discussing there, namely to mean what is in the category of the corporeal.[23] There is, however, a passage in the *Categories* commentary where it is quite clear that σωματοειδές is not just a synonym for σῶμα, for in it the two are explicitly contrasted. Discussing "Archytas" Simplicius writes: δύνατον δὲ οἶμαι λέγειν ὅτι

[21]See above 177.

[22]Cf. *De Hipp. et Plat. Plac.* V.643 Kuhn = II 474.23-27 de Lacy (*CMG* V 4,1,2). See further R.B. Todd, "Philosophy and Medicine in John Philoponus' commentary on Aristotle's *De anima*", *Dumbarton Oaks Papers* 38 (1984) 108.

[23]36D, quoted at 80.2-6; cf. too *In Phys.* 359.32-35.

ἐπικτητὸν μὲν εἶναι δεῖ καὶ κεχωρισμένον τῆς οὐσίας τὸ ἐχόμενον, οὐ πάντως δὲ σῶμα, ἀλλὰ σωματοειδές (376.33-35).[24] Simplicius' further comments, on ζωὴ σωματοειδής, show that he means by σωματοειδές something that is involved with, but not identical with, body (376.37-377.8).[25] It appears in this sense too in the *De anima* commentary, where it is used to describe forms of cognition which intellect does not use because they involve both body and soul, namely sense-perception and imagination: οὐδὲ χρῆται σωματοειδεῖ γνώσει αἰσθήσει ἢ φαντασίᾳ (45.26-29). In general the soul, in so far as it is involved with a living being may be involved in the movements, σωματοειδεῖς κινήσεις, pertaining to that form of life (cf. 36.30-31).[26] There is some fluctuation in the area of activity to which the word applies: sometimes it is the whole range from *phantasia* downwards, sometimes the sub-sensitive level only.[27]

The upshot of this examination of the uses of σωματοειδές is that it gives no indication of a special kind of *pneuma* or vehicle for the lower soul. So, in spite of our original assumption of the likelihood that Simplicius believed in more than one such vehicle, it now appears that he did not. Rather, there was only one, made of a substance variously described as αἰθερῶδες, αὐγοειδές and πνευματικόν.

* * *

We now come to the question of its function. To it there is more than one answer. The first, and almost obvious one, is that the vehicle mediates in a way which none of the adherents of this view ever satisfactorily defined, between the immaterial soul and the material body. In this respect it simply provides an answer, on the usual basis of multiplying entities if no other solution is possible, to a question which had quite properly concerned Neoplatonists since those early days when Plotinus, according to Porphyry had spent three

[24]The word Simplicius attributes to Archytas himself is σωματῶδες.

[25]Cf. too the analogous but different use quoted from Eudemus at *In Phys.* 201.23-27, where Simplicius refers to the elements which are not bodies but produce them.

[26]For the basis of motion being σωματοειδής cf. also *In De an.* 303.8-10.

[27]Cf. e.g. 40.30-32 with 57.12-16.

days discussing πῶς ἡ ψυχὴ σύνεστι τῷ σώματι, how the soul is associated with the body (Porphyry, *Vita Plotini* 13).[28]

The second is that the vehicle, rather than either soul or body themselves, is seen as the basis of some of the soul's activities. Here Simplicius with his one vehicle attributes to it the function that Proclus with two attributed to the lower of them, that is to be the basis of sensation and imagination. This view is clearly related to the older notion that *pneuma*, not yet formalized into the material of a soul-vehicle, was the substance in which the images of *phantasia* were realised: Porphyry talks of the image somehow being smeared into the *pneuma* (cf. *Sententiae* 29 = 18.10-12 Lamberz). When we come to Proclus we find that he talks about higher αἴσθησις being ἐν τῷ ὀχήματι. This is the kind of αἴσθησις that is actual cognition, and also imagination, which is essentially the same (cf. *In Tim.* III 286.20-29). It takes place in the πνευματικὸν ὄχημα and is opposed to the mere sensation which takes place in the ὀστρεώδες σῶμα (cf. ibid. 237.24-27).[29] Even more clearly Hermias—and if it is correct to see his work as merely a report of Syrianus' lectures, this may precede Proclus[30]—had made the vehicle of the disembodied soul the subject in perception: τὸ ὄχημα λαμπρὸν ὂν καὶ καθαρὸν ὅλον δι' ὅλου ἐστὶν αἰσθητικὸν καὶ κατὰ πᾶν ὁρᾷ καὶ κατὰ πᾶν ἀκούει (cf. 68.21-23).

For Simplicius himself the tie between perception and the soul vehicle is such that it is applied even to the heavenly bodies. In the *De anima* commentary their vehicles are described as θεῖα, and it is in them that perception of sensible objects takes place (cf. 215.17-25).[31] In the individual human soul imagination is distinguished from reason, *inter alia*, by being σωματοειδής and therefore unable to deal with simple objects (285.25-28). That statement does not, of course, on its own, associate imagination with the soul-vehicle, the same applies to the description of appetition as σωματοειδής, as opposed to the mind's

[28]According to H. Dörrie this discussion was the basis of Plotinus' treatise *On the Problems of the Soul, Enn.* IV 3-5, c.f. *Porphyrios' "Symmikta Zetemata". Zetemata* 20 (Munich 1959) 18 n.1; *contra* Blumenthal, *Plotinus' Psychology* (The Hague 1971) 16 n.20.

[29]Cf. Blumenthal, "Proclus on Perception", *Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies* 29 (1982) 3.

[30]The possibility arises because Proclus wrote his *Timaeus* commentary when he was still a young man and Syrianus was still alive, cf. Marinus, *Vita Procli* 13. For αὐγοειδὲς ὄχημα in Syrianus cf. *In Metaph.* 86.3.

[31]Cf. also *In De caelo* 469. 7-11 and p. 178 above.

cognition or βούλησις, at 295.13.15 (cf. 296.19-21). It is only when these are taken in conjunction with the explicit attribution of the sensitive soul's cognition to a vehicle that we can infer that the σωματοειδής nature of such forms of cognition consists not only in association with the body as such, in which the sense organs reside, but also with the vehicle which mediates between the different spheres of existence to which body and soul belong. It is, we may now see, remarkable how little Simplicius actually says about soul-vehicles as such, the more so if we compare their incidence in Proclus or, to a lesser extent, Philoponus.[32]

What does it amount to? Firstly, that the vehicle is seen as a necessary bridge entity between immaterial soul and material body and therefore, almost needless to say, found in the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle. Secondly, that it is involved with those activities which require the co-operation, in the strict sense, of body and soul, and most particularly those where the contribution of each might be regarded as more or less equivalent, that is those which are performed by the sensitive faculty or faculties of the soul through the organs of the body. Similar co-operation is, as we have seen, to be found on a lower level too.

On the other hand there does not, in Simplicius, seem to be any notion that the higher activities of the soul, those which are a result of its embodiment but which do not require a direct input from the body, though they may work with material obtained through its use, require a separate vehicle. In respect of these, the function of the one vehicle that Simplicius does have is apparently no more than to provide conditions for embodiment. Does it, in consequence, disappear when embodiment ceases?

* * *

Here we come to our fourth question, the length of a vehicle's life. More precisely, we must ask whether Simplicius' vehicles are added to the soul at each incarnation and removed thereafter, and in the latter case, how long thereafter? *Prima facie* this issue relates to the question, about which there was no consensus, about how much of the soul might survive death. To illustrate the situation we may refer to the well known passage in Damascius' *Phaedo* commentary which tells us that Iamblichus and Plutarch held the view that the soul down

[32]For Proclus see above; for Philoponus cf. esp. the preface to *In De an.*, 17ff.

to the irrational part was immortal, while Proclus and Porphyry confined immortality to the rational soul.[33] That indicates that two vehicles and immortality for irrational as well as rational soul do not necessarily go together, for Proclus, as we have seen, believed in two while Iamblichus still had only one. Nor, as that might suggest, was it the case that those who held that there was one vehicle thought that the whole soul must be treated in the same way: if they did, we should not find Proclus and Porphyry in the same slot. To complicate matters further, Proclus himself seems to have believed that the lower vehicle perishes at death, but may have been inconsistent on the fate of the upper: according to the *Elements of Theology* (Prop. 209) and the *Timaeus* commentary (III 267.25-268.3) the αὐγοειδὲς ὄχημα, the higher vehicle, survived, but according to a passage in Damascius' *Phaedo* commentary which may be derived from Proclus, that does not apply to the outstandingly virtuous souls translated to a pure abode in *Phaedo* 114B-C.[34]

All these matters require further investigation. As far as Simplicius is concerned we can only say that there is no view that he might clearly be expected to have held. As it is, the *De anima* commentary does not greatly concern itself with immortality. The same is true of the other text where we might seek evidence, namely the *Encheiridion* commentary. Thus it may well be that the question we have raised here cannot be given more than a speculative answer.

* * *

This brings us to our final question. One might ask whether the absence of prolonged discussions of immortality, and thus of some treatment of the destiny of our soul's vehicles, has anything to do with the fact that there is so little about immortality in the *De anima* itself. To anyone familiar with the methods and procedures of Neoplatonist commentary such questions are hardly worth asking, since these writers notoriously brought in any subject they thought fit. The extent to which their actual interpretations of Plato or Aristotle were influenced by the text they were discussing was another matter, and

[33]Damascius, *In Phaed.* I 177.3-5 Westerink = Olympiodorus, *In. Phaed.* 123.13-20 Norvin. On this passage see Blumenthal, "Plutarch's Exposition of the *De Anima* and the Psychology of Proclus", in *De Jamblique à Proclus*. Entretiens Hardt 21 (Vandoeuvres-Geneva 1975) 130f.

[34]Cf. Westerink ad I 551.

might vary. In Simplicius' case that extent, as I have argued elsewhere, was not great.[35] As far as the question of soul vehicles is concerned, they are necessarily independent of the text of Aristotle. In so far as that text allowed the commentators in general, and Simplicius in particular, to find the Neoplatonist division into a rational and an irrational soul, there was scope for Simplicius, once vehicles were admitted, to have either one or two. Hence his views on their number cannot be said to have been influenced by the context provided by the Aristotelian works he was expounding. And in so far as more than one answer was current among Neoplatonists, Simplicius' own, if perhaps no longer the most widely adopted, must be seen against that background, as a product of Neoplatonism rather than of the mind and preoccupations of the Aristotelian commentator.

[35]Most recently in "Simplicius (?) on the first book of Aristotle's De Anima", in *I. Hadot*, ed. *Simplicius, sa vie, son oeuvre, sa survie.* Actes du Colloque international de Paris 28.9-1.10. 1985 (Berlin and New York 1987) 91-102. Philoponus may have had a somewhat different approach, cf. "John Philoponus: Alexandrian Platonist?" *Hermes* 114 (1986) 332f.

XVIII

529 AND ITS SEQUEL : WHAT HAPPENED TO THE ACADEMY ?

In an excellent and already well-known article Professor Alan Cameron has made a strong case for the thesis that, notwithstanding the evidence of Malalas (1), and a long-established tradition, Justinian did not succeed in finally closing the Platonic Academy in 529, and that its activities continued after a short interruption (2). The purpose of this paper is, firstly, to argue that some of the evidence usually adduced in favour of the view that the Academy was closed may not be applicable, but that it seems nevertheless to have succumbed to some form of imperial pressure, and, secondly, to question the view that philosophy continued to be taught, or even studied, at Athens from 532 until the Slavs sacked the city nearly fifty years later (3).

The most important piece of evidence for the continued existence of the Academy is a passage from Olympiodorus' commentary on Plato's *1st Alcibiades* which says, "Perhaps Plato made a practice of taking no fees because he was well-off. That is why the *diadochika* have lasted till now, in spite of many confiscations" (4). *Diadochika* is left untranslated since its meaning is by no means certain. It could refer to the salary of the Head of the Academy (5). It could also, however, be a term for the Academy's endowments in general (6). A third meaning, suggested by J. Whittaker, is spiritual rather than material heritage, but in spite of his

(1) *Chron.*, XVIII = 451.16-19 NIEBUHR.

(2) *The last days of the Academy at Athens*, in *Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society*, n.s. 15 (1969), 7-29 (hereafter "*Last days*" An abridged French version, *La fin de l'Académie*, may be found in *Le Néoplatonisme.* Colloques internationaux du C.N.R.S. (Paris, 1971), 281-90.

(3) In 578 or 579 ; cf. D. M. METCALF, *The Slavonic threat to Greece circa 580 : some evidence from Athens*, in *Hesperia*, 31 (1962), 134 f.

(4) *In. Alc.*, 141 : the text runs *ἴσως δὲ ὁ Πλάτων ὡς εὐπορῶν ἀμισθίαν ἐπετήδευσεν · διὸ καὶ μέχρι τοῦ πάροντος σῴζονται τὰ διαδοχικά, καὶ ταῦτα πολλῶν δημευσεων γινομένων.*

(5) So apparently CAMERON, *Last days*, 12.

(6) So L. G. WESTERINK, *Anonymous Prolegomena to Platonic Philosophy* (Amsterdam, 1962), xiv, and CAMERON, *ibid.*, 11.

arguments it is unlikely that the word in its context does not refer to some form of funding (7). To this point we must return shortly.

Cameron argues convincingly that this passage was written somewhere around 560, on the grounds that it refers to an incident in the career of a *grammaticus* called Anatolius, dateable to the late 540s, as one that his readers can no longer be expected to remember. He infers from this that the Academy was still operating at that time, and moreover, in possession of substantial funds some thirty years after its alleged closure and expropriation (8). At about the same time Whittaker, apparently writing before the appearance of Cameron's paper, and arguing against Westerink, questioned whether the text adduced provided evidence either for confiscations at the time when Olympiodorus was writing (9), or for the continued availability of material resources (10).

Olympiodorus' report certainly raises some serious problems. The first relates to the confiscations. Cameron has discussed a number of possible occasions between 529 and the date of the composition of Olympiodorus' commentary about 560 (11). If Academy funds were being confiscated during that period, then clearly there must have been a conspicuous Academy to be subject to the confiscations. But, as Whittaker has pointed out, the reference of the present participle stating that there were confiscations could be to any time during the reference of the main verb, that is to the whole period between Plato and the time of writing. One possible inference is that the funds had been subjected to confiscations even before 529 but still survived in the hands of the scholarchs after that date. Justinian's edict is quite likely not to have been new, but, like much of his legislation, a re-enactment of former decrees (12) — some of which were in any case disregarded (13).

(7) Cf. *God, Time, Being. Two studies in the transcendental tradition in Greek Philosophy*. Symbolae Osloenses Fasc. Supplet., 23 (Oslo, 1971), 60 f.

(8) *Last days*, 11 f.; cf. also WESTERINK, *op. cit.*, xiv f., but see now *The Greek Commentaries on Plato's Phaedo*. II, *Damascius*. Verhandelingen der Kon. Nederlandse Akad. van Wetenschappen, Afd. Letterkunde, n.r. 93 (Amsterdam/Oxford/New York, 1977), 9.

(9) *Loc. cit.*, 58 f.

(10) *Ibid.*, 59-61.

(11) *Last days*, 9 ff.

(12) Cf. the headings to numerous constitutions in the *Codex Iustiniani*.

(13) Cf. CAMERON, *Last days*, 9 and A. H. M. JONES, *The Later Roman Empire 284-602* (Oxford, 1964), I, viii.

Nevertheless, it is difficult to find a suitable earlier occasion, or occasions, to be the time of the confiscations in question.

A second, and more basic, problem attaches to the funds themselves. There is no other evidence, except a report in the *Suda* article on Plato (14), and a parallel text in Photius, which attributes any of the late Academy's resources, or those of its office-holders, to inheritance from Plato. This *Suda* article, which is based on Damascius' *Life of Isidore* (15), tells us that only the Academy garden had been Plato's — he was not well-off — and that there were large accretions of funds in the fifth century (16). We know that most of the major buildings in Athens were destroyed by the Heruls in 267 (17). Damascius, moreover, in the extract provided by Photius, made a point of denying what he says was a commonly held view that the resources of the Academy went back to Plato himself: *ἡ τῶν διαδόχων οὐσία οὐχ ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ νομίζουσι Πλάτωνος ἦν τὸ ἀνέκαθεν*. This summary too continues with the points that Plato was not rich, that only the garden was his, and that there were large additions through bequests later (18). From this text we may infer that Olympiodorus' *diadochika* must have been school resources under the control of the school's head: Damascius is talking about sums of money, and the garden could hardly have been part of the scholarch's salary.

If, then, such funds as were available to the Academy in the 5th and 6th centuries were not the product of Plato's own endowments, Olympiodorus — or his source — has wrongly inferred from the Academy's current, or recent, wealth, and Plato's aristocratic background and refusal to take fees (19), that Plato himself was responsible for the endowments. Damascius' disclaimer shows that he was not the first to do so. And if Olympiodorus was wrong about that, then he might also, though less obviously, have been wrong in saying that the

(14) *Suidae Lexicon*, ed. ADLER, IV (Leipzig, 1935), 142.3 ff.

(15) Cf. fr. 265 ZINTZEN.

(16) *Loc. cit.*, lines 6-9.

(17) The Athenians themselves removed stone from old buildings to construct walls; on this, and the effects of the invasion, cf. H. A. THOMPSON, *Athenian Twilight: A.D. 267-600*, in *J. Rom. Studies*, 49 (1959), 61-64.

(18) PHOTIUS, *Cod.*, 242 (364a 32-8 BEKKER = VI.38 HENRY).

(19) *In Alc.*, 141: *ἴσως δὲ ὁ Πλάτων ὡς εὐπορῶν ἀμισθίαν ἐπετήδευσεν*.

funds existed in his own day. His information could have been some thirty years out of date, a period for the survival of obsolete information by no means inconceivable even with modern methods of disseminating information (20). We need look no further than the reputations of university departments in our own times. If the close relation between Athenian and Alexandrian philosophers that had obtained in the fifth century were by now a thing of the past, whether because of *odium academicum*, as manifested in the bitter attacks launched by Philoponus on the views of Proclus in a previous generation, and Simplicius in his own, the latter being furiously reciprocated (21), or because nothing was any longer happening at Athens, or for some other reason, that would be sufficient to explain such an error.

To return to the question of a re-endowment in the 5th century. There are a number of indications that this happened. In the first place, negatively, there is little if any evidence that the Academy, or any but insignificant Platonists, were active at Athens in the preceeding period (22). Positively, we have a report from Synesius that he went to Athens and found nothing going on at all : "It is like a sacrificial victim at the end of the proceedings, with only the skin left as a token of the animal that once was. So philosophy has moved its home, and all that is left for a visitor is to wander around looking at the Academy, the Lyceum, and, yes, the *Stoa Poikile* ..." (23).

(20) For another view cf. CAMERON, *Last days*, 12, who says that it is unlikely that Olympiodorus would have kept the reference in his course if it was no longer true.

(21) For those on Proclus, cf. PHILOP., *De Aeternitate mundi contra Proclum*, *passim*, and the *Suda*, s.v. *Πρόκλος* ; the nature of those on Simplicius must be inferred from Simplicius' replies, for which cf. esp. the commentary on *Physics* Θ and W. WIELAND, *Die Ewigkeit der Welt (Der Streit zwischen Joannes Philoponus und Simplicius)*, in *Die Gegenwart der Griechen im neueren Denken*. Festschr. H.-G. GADAMER (Tübingen, 1960), 291-316 ; see also below pp. 379 f.

(22) Cf. J. P. LYNCH, *Aristotle's School. A study of a Greek educational institution* (Berkeley-Los Angeles, 1972), 184-87.

(23) *Ep.*, 135 = *PG*, LXVI.1524C. Synesius seems to be expressing genuine disappointment, unlike Aeneas of Gaza, who claims to have found Athens equally defective in philosophy a century later, cf. *Theophrastus*, 37-41 = *PG*, LXXXV.877A-B. Aeneas' comments, however, are likely to have been tendentious : he probably wrote in the last years of Proclus, or soon thereafter, cf. SCHMID-STAEHLIN, *Gesch. der Griech. Lit.*[6], II.ii (Munich, 1924), 1032. Cf. CAMERON, *Last days*, 25-27, against G. DOWNEY's inadequately demonstrated view that Gaza flourished while Athens

The best candidate for the honour of having restarted the teaching of Platonism at Athens is Plutarch the son of Nestorius (24). Saffrey and Westerink's attempts to show that there was a continuous tradition there rest on somewhat meagre evidence (25). Plutarch has an equally good claim to have been the man who provided the material resources for this resumption. We know that he had a house large enough to accommodate the school's activities under his successors Syrianus and Proclus (26). Moreover a Plutarch at about the right time was sufficiently wealthy to finance the Sacred Ship's journey up the Acropolis in the Panathenaic procession on three separate occasions :

Δῆμος [Ἐ]ρεχθῆος βασιλῆ[α] λόγων ἀνέθηκεν
Πλούταρχον σταθερῆς ἕρμα σαοφροσύνης ·
ὃς καὶ τρὶς ποτὶ νηὸν Ἀθηναίης ἐπέλασσεν
ναῦν ἐλάσας ἱερήν, πλοῦτον ὅλον προχέας (27).

The last line need not be taken literally. It could be rhetorical exaggeration, or a play on Plutarch's name, and so the apparent exhaustion of the dedicatee's funds would not preclude the endowment of the Academy, which could in any case have preceeded the Panathenaic processions — or the final ruinous one — so that the depletion of his resources, even if true, need not be relevant. The Plutarch in this inscription is almost certainly the same as the one who put up another inscription, dedicated to Herculius, and described himself as a sophist :

Τὸν θεσμῶν ταμίην Ἑρκούλιον, ἁγνὸν ὕπαρχον,
Πλούταρχος μώθων ταμίης ἔστησε σοφιστής (28).

This Herculius was Pretorian Prefect of Illyricum in 410-412 (29), so

languished, *Justinian's view of Christianity and the Greek classics*, in *Anglican Theological Review*, 40 (1958), 17-19 and *Julian and Justinian and the unity of faith and culture*, in *Church History*, 28 (1959), 345 f.

(24) Cf. E. EVRARD, *Le maitre de Plutarque d'Athènes et les origines du néoplatonisme athénien*, in *L'Antiquité Classique*, 29 (1960), 404-406.

(25) Cf. PROCLUS, *Théologie Platonicienne*, ed. etc. H.-D. SAFFREY and L. G. WESTERINK, I (Paris, 1968), xxxv-xlviii.

(26) Cf. MARINUS, *Vita Procli*, 29.

(27) *IG*, II², 3818.

(28) *IG*, II², 4224. For the identification cf. G. KAIBEL, *Epigrammata Graeca* (Berlin, 1878), p. 376, and L. ROBERT, *Hellenica*, 4 (Paris, 1948), 95 f.

(29) Cf. *Codex Theodosianus*, XII.1.172 with XV.1.49 and G. SEECK, *Herculius*

that the dates fit with those of the philosophers (30). But was the Plutarch of the inscriptions the same Plutarch? Identification or disjunction has rested on little more than assertion and counter-assertion. Wilamowitz and Kaibel, who approvingly reported him, thought that they were the same (31). Recently F. Millar, accepting from Robert the identity of liturgist and sophist, thinks that Plutarch the son of Nestorius was not the same person on the grounds that the liturgist "was a sophist, not a philosopher" (32). This reason for rejecting the identification is not, however, entirely convincing. In the first place *φιλόσοφος* is metrically impossible, and if that is not regarded as sufficient reason for substituting the other term, perhaps Plutarch's commentary on at least parts of the *Gorgias*, in which he defined rhetoric, and must have dealt further with rhetorical matters (33), could have earned him the title. In any case *σοφιστής* had long since lost its pejorative connotations (34), so that it would have been an adequate alternative for use in a public inscription.

Some recent epigraphical joins have made it likely that two further inscriptions refer to our Plutarch (35). If the reconstructions by W. Peek are either correct, or nearly so, then one of these identifies him by his patronymic (36), and the other actually refers both to an interest in Platonic philosophy, and to wealth : it too has a play on the name and the word for wealth (37), recalling the first of the two inscriptions just

(4), *RE*, VIII (1913), 614 ; on his activities cf. A. Frantz, *From Paganism to Christianity in the temples of Athens*, in *DOP*, 19 (1965), 192.

(30) Plutarch died, at an advanced age, when Proclus, born in 410, was 22, cf. Marinus, *Vita Pr.*, 12.

(31) Kaibel, *op. cit.* (n. 28), 376.

(32) Cf. *P. Herennius Dexippus: the Greek world and the third-century invasions*, in *J. Rom. Stud.*, 59 (1969), 17 and n. 64.

(33) Cf. *Prolegomenon Sylloge*, ed. H. Rabe, *Rhetores Graeci*, XIV (Leipzig, 1931), 217.3-9 = *Rhetores Graeci*, ed. C. Walz, VII.i (Stuttgart/Tübingen/London/Paris, 1833), 33 f.

(34) Cf. Philostratus, *Vitae Soph.*, 489 *init.* and *passim.*

(35) The joins were made by M. Th. Mitsos, *Ἀπὸ τοὺς καταλόγους Ἀθηναίων ἐφήβων κλπ* (III), in *Ἀρχαιολ · Ἐφημερίς*, 1971 (Athens, 1972), 64 f. and Plate 7 : his restorations are questioned by W. Peek, *Zwei Gedichte auf den Neuplatoniker Plutarch*, in *Ztschr. für Papyrologie und Epigraphik*, 13 (1974), 201 (I am grateful to Professor H. F. Cherniss for drawing my attention to this article).

(36) Peek, *ibid.*, 203 f.

(37) *Ibid.*, 202 f.

discussed, and so, incidentally, making it more likely that that too refers to the philosopher. As reconstructed it reads :

[χρ]υσᾶ τ[άμφ' ἀρετῆς ὑμνήσας θε]σμὰ Πλάτωνο[ς],
[πλο]ῦτος [τῷ σοφίης οὐχ ἅδε δευό]μενος
[Π]λούτ[αρχ', εἰκόνα σὴν χαίροις οὐ γερ]ασφόρε λεύσσας ·
[ἣ ἱ]ερεῖ γέρ[ας ἔστι, ὡς στέφα]νος τεμένει.

If all this is right, then we do have evidence for considerable personal wealth in the hands of the Neoplatonist Plutarch. If it is not, it is probably still fair to say that Plutarch was not so common a name at Athens for it to be likely that, even if the Plutarchs we have considered were different, they were also unrelated, so that the philosopher could have had access to considerable family funds.

So far we may say that Olympiodorus was almost certainly wrong about the Platonic inheritance. There will have been an Academy with considerable financial resources before his time, and possibly somehow still in it, but these resources were probably provided in the first place by Plutarch, and in any case topped up by wealthy pupils and benefactors.

If Plutarch restarted the teaching of Platonism at Athens, what happened thereafter ? It might be argued that since Proclus taught in his own house there was no public building, no open school. But if so, why should the authorities have bothered to take steps against it — if they did ? Another, if much earlier case of imperial interference with education that springs to mind is Julian's ban on Christian schoolmasters, and that related to open education of minors (38). Justinian's measures, as we shall see, seem to have had the same purpose. Further, the fact that Syrianus and Proclus taught in Plutarch's home suggests that they came by it in virtue of their appointments : that these were private rather than public appointments does not affect the point. Thus we must accept that at this stage, if not demonstrably in the next generation, we are dealing with a more or less formal institution. Is there any further evidence for its existence ?

A house that would have been suitable for the purpose was excavated, in the 1955 season, at a site that would fit Marinus' description of the

(38) Cf. J. Bidez, *La Vie de l'Empereur Julien* (Paris, 1930), 263 f. The relevant texts are collected by J. Bidez and F. Cumont, *Iuliani Imperatoris Epistulae et Leges* (Paris/London, 1922), 70-75.

location of his master's house (39). Archaeologists have sometimes been inclined to assume that it was the site of the Neoplatonic Academy's activities (40) — the original Academy seems not to have survived the 267 invasion, if it had not fallen into decay long before. Certainty in such matters is, of course, usually impossible. A further piece of evidence about the use of this building might be provided by a portrait head, of the type of those portraying Neoplatonic philosophers (41), which may have come from the same area. It has been suggested that it came from our house (42), but we cannot know this, for its provenance has not been recorded, and we can only surmise that it came from this area below the Acropolis which has yielded much similar material. The head has been tentatively indentified as a representation of Plutarch (43). If this is right, and if it did come from the same house, then it is quite likely that the building was the one used first by Plutarch and later by his successors Syrianus and Proclus (44).

Another piece of archaeological evidence, which has come to light since Cameron's article, is, however, more important. A. Frantz reports that at a house in the same area, and one likely to have been a philosophical or rhetorical school, a cache of statuary was found in a well, in excellent condition — as opposed to the usual debris dumped in wells (45). That, she suggests, indicates that the statues were removed

(39) MARINUS, *Vita Pr.*, 29. Details of the excavation are given by J. MILIADES, *Ἀνασκαφαὶ νοτίως τῆς Ἀκροπόλεως*, in *Πρακτικὰ τῆς Ἀρχαιολογικῆς Ἑταιρείας*, 1955 (Athens, 1960), 47-50 with Pl. 3b, reported also by A. K. ORLANDOS, *Ἔργον τῆς ἀρχαιολογικῆς ἑταιρείας κατὰ τὸ* 1955 (Athens, 1956), 7-11 ; a summary by G. DAUX may be found in *Bulletin de Correspondance Hellénique*, 80 (1956), 232-34.

(40) So FRANTZ, *loc. cit.* (n. 29), 193 and *Pagan Philosophers in Christian Athens*, in *Proc. of the American Philosophical Soc.*, 119 (1975), 32 ; more cautiously MILIADES, *loc. cit.*, 48 f.

(41) Cf. G. DONTAS, *Kopf eines Neuplatonikers*, in *Athenische Mitteilungen*, 69/70 (1954-5), 150-2. with Pl. 14 and Beilage 54-5.

(42) Cf. MILIADES, *loc. cit.* (n. 39), 49 f., and FRANTZ, *Pagan philosophers*, 32, who writes, "the identification is reinforced by the discovery of a portrait in or near the house" : this could be misleading, especially since it implies that the portrait was found during recent excavations.

(43) DONTAS, *loc. cit.*, 151 f.

(44) DONTAS suggested, with the appropriate reservations, that the statue may have stood in Plutarch's own house, *ibid.*, 152 ; cf. MILIADES, *loc. cit.*, 49.

(45) Cf. *Pagan philosophers*, 36 f. ; for further details cf. T. L. SHEAR jr., *The Athenian Agora : excavations of 1971*, in *Hesperia*, 42 (1973), 161-64.

from their normal location by someone who intended to replace them. The other material from the well is of an appropriate date, and so she connects this deposit with Justinian's measures : the statues were put in a safe place until the normal activities of the school could be resumed, with the normal décor (46).

If this connection is right, we may ask why the statues were not raised and returned to their original positions when the immediate threat was relieved, as it must have been if we are to believe that the original owners of this building resumed their former pursuits at Athens soon after. In fact the house was eventually occupied by Christians who damaged such sculptures as had not been removed (47).

One answer could be that the restoration and re-opening of any pagan teaching establishment, and so of the Academy *as an institution*, turned out to be impossible after all between 529 and what we might take as the final destruction of ancient Athens in 579/580. And the philosophers who set off for Persia in 532, some two years after the edict, and returned from there the following year, may not have returned to Athens — it is in any case not certain that all the persons listed by Agathias, our source for this episode (48), came from Athens in the first place (49). As far as I know, there are no specific reports that they went there when they came back from the East (50). Damascius may, as Alan Cameron has argued, have stayed in his home town of Emesa, where an epigram he wrote for one Zosimē is dated to 538 (51), but it must be admitted that that in itself is hardly adequate evidence for his residence there at any time, let alone for the prolonged retirement which Cameron thinks more likely than just a visit. Simplicius certainly remained active as a scholar. His commentary on the *de Caelo* postdates the exile and

(46) Cf. FRANTZ, *ibid*, 37.

(47) Cf. SHEAR, *loc. cit.*, 163 f.

(48) Agathias II.30-31 = 80-82 KEYDELL. AVERIL CAMERON, *Agathias on the Sassanians*, in *DOP*, 23 (1969), 175, has suggested that Agathias obtained his information from Simplicius himself.

(49) This had until recently been generally assumed : it was questioned by AVERIL CAMERON, *Agathias* (Oxford, 1970), 101.

(50) Cf. ALAN CAMERON, *Last days*, 21, who concedes that there is no direct evidence that any of them did return to Athens, though he goes on to argue that some did : on this see below. LYNCH, *op. cit.* (n. 22), 167, simply assumes that all seven went back there.

(51) *Last days*, 22. The epigram is *AP*, VII.553.

was followed by those on the *Physics* and *Categories*, in that order (52). But we do not know where he wrote them. The only other of the seven about whom we know anything is Priscian, and we do not know where he worked either.

Long ago Tannery saw that it was impossible to prove that Simplicius went back to Athens, though he seems to have inclined to the view that he did (53). He could equally well have gone to Alexandria. He had, after all, been a pupil of Ammonius there, and other Platonists were to be found in the city who, either by conversion or by way of compromise, continued to teach Platonism under the cover of Aristotle. It may not be insignificant that, unlike other members of the Athenian school, including his older contemporary Damascius, Simplicius wrote on Aristotle rather than Plato, even if his commentaries do show unmistakeable signs of Athenian Neoplatonism (54). Cameron, arguing against the supposed opinion of Tannery (55), has tried to show that Simplicius did go back to Athens (56). He starts from the assumption that he must have had constant access to the resources of a major library. This limits his possible places of residence to Alexandria, Athens and Constantinople. Unless we are to think in terms of Simplicius travelling with a considerable library, that much is clear. Constantinople can perhaps be ruled out as being too near the centre of government. Cameron's case against Alexandria rests on three points, a doubt about the availability of pre-Socratic texts in libraries outside Athens, a reference to Philoponus by Simplicius as one unknown to the writer (57), and third, an allusion in Paul the Silentiary's *Ecphrasis* on Sta. Sophia to a "bean-eating" Athenian (58), which he thinks is directed at Simplicius (59).

(52) Cf. K. PRAECHTER, «*Simplicius*», in *RE*, III a i (1927), 204.

(53) P. TANNERY, *Sur la période finale de la philosophie grecque*, in *Revue Philosophique*, 42 (1896), 286.

(54) Cf. my *Neoplatonic elements in the De Anima commentaries*, in *Phronesis*, 21 (1976), 79 f.

(55) Whom he took to have said that Simplicius took up residence in Alexandria : he only considered the possibility, and suggested occasional library visits, *loc. cit.*

(56) *Last days*, 22 f.

(57) Cf. *in de Caelo*, 26.18 f.

(58) *Hagia Sophia*, 125-27.

(59) *Last days*, 22 f.

The point about the availability of pre-Socratic material is the easiest to answer : there is no evidence to show that it was restricted to Athens, or that there were major gaps in the holdings of libraries elsewhere.

Simplicius' claim not to know Philoponus does at first sight appear to rule out residence in Alexandria, where we know that Philoponus was still working for a long time after 532 (60). But it is possible that Simplicius is merely being offensive. A possible Platonic precedent might be found, if needed, in Socrates' claim at *Euthyphro* 2B not to know Meletus whom he almost certainly did know (61). Simplicius and Philoponus had in any case both been students of Ammonius. Cameron infers from Simplicius references to Philoponus' work and opinions as a young man's (62), that they were not contemporaries, and had not met in Ammonius' courses. But he does not, *pace* Cameron, actually refer to Philoponus as a "youngster", and the descriptions are clearly disparaging (63). Even if he had simply described him as a youth, the precedent of Socrates could again be relevant. For in the same passage of the *Euthyphro* he also described Meletus as young, and that too might well not have been true (64). Moreover it is not impossible that Simplicius did reside in Alexandria, and yet did not personally know Philoponus. Since we have no information about the personalities of these gentlemen, we cannot rule out the possibility that Simplicius found Philoponus' views so distasteful that he did not wish to know their author. That some such explanation might apply is suggested by the extraordinarily fierce tone of Simplicius' polemic against Philoponus. Its ferocity, which Simplicius himself seems to have recognised (65), has suggested to others that his claim that he entertained no

(60) Cf. E. HONIGMANN, *Evêques et évêchés monophysites d'Asie antérieure au VI^e siècle*. Corpus Scriptorum Christ. Orient. Subsidia 2 (Louvain, 1951), 181 f. and 193 f. (I owe this reference to Professor R. B. Todd) and H.-D. SAFFREY, *Le chrétien Jean Philopon et la survivance de l'école d'Alexandrie au VI^e siècle*, in *Revue des Etudes Grecques*, 67 (1954), 408, n. 2.

(61) Cf. my *Meletus the accuser of Andocides and Meletus the accuser of Socrates : one man or two ?*, in *Philologus*, 117 (1973), 176 f.

(62) E.g. *in de Caelo*, 42.17, *in Physica*, 1169.8 f.

(63) Cf; SAFFREY, *loc. cit.* (n. 60), 402, n. 4.

(64) Cf. the article cited in n. 61, 177 f.

(65) *In de Caelo*, 26.17 f. ; cf. WIELAND, *loc. cit.* (n. 21), 300 f.

feelings of hostile rivalry (*φιλονεικία*) (66) towards Philoponus indicates that there were indeed personal feelings involved (67).

As for the bean-eating Athenian, the relevant lines are :

χρινεῖ δὲ τούτους οὐ κυαμοτρώξ 'Αττικός,
ἀλλ' ἄνδρες εὐσεβεῖς τε καὶ συγγνώμονες,
οἷς καὶ τὸ θεῖον καὶ βασιλεὺς ἐφήδεται ...

Friedlaender long ago pointed out that the obvious reference is to the splenetic Demos in Aristophanes' *Knights*, who is there characterized by the same word in a passage which also refers to his activities as a judge (68). There is no good reason to reject this explanation in favour of a somewhat nebulous reference to an Athenian philosopher : if anything mocking references to philosophers should rather allude to abstinence from beans. The contrast with pious men who gladden God and the Emperor might however, as Averil Cameron has suggested, indicate that Athens was still a byword for impiety when the poem was first recited in 563 (69), without necessarily referring to philosophers (70). But here again we must bear in mind that reputations are often still current when the grounds for them no longer obtain. In any case there is no reason why the allusion must be exclusively to contemporary or even recent circumstances. Diehl may well have been right in taking it as a dispararaging reference to pagan Athens and its past glories in general, as opposed to the new centre of civilization in Christian Constantinople (71).

(66) *Ibid.*, 18 f.

(67) Cf. WIELAND, *loc. cit.*, 301, and also A. GUDEMAN, *Ioannes* (21), in *RE*, IX (1916), 1766 f. ; contra PRAECHTER, *op. cit.* (n. 52), 204.

(68) Eq. 41 and 50 ff. ; cf. P; FRIEDLAENDER, *Johannes von Gaza und Paulus Silentiarius. Kunstbeschreibungen Justinianischer Zeit* (Berlin, 1912), 270 ; cf. now too R. C. MCCAIL, "*ΚΥΑΜΟΤΡΩΞ ΑΤΤΙΚΟΣ*, in PAULUS SILENTIARIUS, *Descriptio*, 125 : no allusion to Simplicius", *Proc. Cambridge Philol. Soc.*, n.s. 16 (1970), 79-82.

(69) Most probably on 6th January, after several days of ceremonies (cf. lines 74-80), cf. FRIEDLAENDER, *ibid*, 110 : it will in any case have been later than the formal re-opening on Christmas Eve, 562 ; for this see *Διήγησις περὶ τῆς 'Αγίας Σοφίας*, 27, in *Scriptores Originum Constantinopolitanarum* ed. T. PREGER I (Leipzig, 1901), 104.7-105.11.

(70) *Op. cit.* (n. 49), 103.

(71) C. DIEHL, *Justinien et la civilisation byzantine au VI^e siècle* (Paris, 1901), II.565.

If, then, we cannot establish what happened on the basis of the evidence considered so far, can we get any help from Agathias' report of the circumstances attending the philosophers' return from Persia ? All he says is that in the agreement made between Justinian and Chosroes to terminate hostilities in 532 provision was made that the philosophers should return to their own places and be free thenceforward to live in their own homes under an indemnity : *τὸ δεῖν ἐκείνους τοὺς ἄνδρας ἐς τὰ σφέτερα ἤθη κατίοντας βιοτεύειν ἀδεῶς τὸ λοιπὸν ἐφ' ἑαυτοῖς* (72). About the conditions of the indemnity we know no more, but it is tempting to speculate that they included a stipulation that the philosophers should not conspicuously flout imperial edicts. If it also included freedom from prosecution for some offence, that offence could have been the illegal continuation of prohibited forms of teaching before their eventual departure some two years after 529 : we know nothing of their activities in the interval (73). The immunity may however, have had nothing to do with philosophy. The individuals concerned might well have feared that they would encounter problems over what could be seen as defection to the enemies of the Roman Empire, the more so since they were returning within a few months of the Nika riots, and the authorities could be expected to be more suspicious than in normal times (74). Here we must simply admit ignorance.

As for living in their own homes, we are not entitled to infer, as does Lynch, that this means that the terms included return to Athens (75). It could mean that they were to be granted freedom to continue their work — so long as it did not involve teaching — in their original homes, or in a previous place of residence. That would have been satisfactory from the government's point of view in that it would entail dispersal of the team, and if Cameron's suggestion that Damascius stayed at Emesa is right, there would be some evidence for such an interpretation. The phrase might also mean that they could do what they wanted but only in their own homes, with the implication that they were not to get together to put on courses in Platonism. That would gain some support for one

(72) II.31 = 81.15-19K.

(73) Though CAMERON, *Last days*, 13 ff., argues that Simplicius wrote his commentary on Epictetus *Encheiridion* during this time.

(74) The riots took place in January, the treaty was concluded in spring ; cf. PROCOPIUS, *BP*, I.24.1 and I.22.17 and JONES, *op. cit.* (n. 13), I.271 f.

(75) *Op. cit.* (n. 22), 167.

of the reasons Agathias gives for their departure, that the laws prevented them from taking part in the affairs of the community without interference because of their paganism (76). All we can be sure of is that they were to be allowed to lead their private lives unmolested. If, however, Cameron's arguments about Simplicius' return to Athens are accepted, that is an end to the discussion of where they were to go. Simplicius' research activities, now, as Cameron has suggested, uninterrupted by teaching, would be covered by the interpretation suggested here.

The balance of evidence so far is on the side of a curtailment of the Academy's — in its new form — activities in 529, and no full resumption thereafter. But before we leave the matter we should look again at the evidence that has previously been used to show that the Academy was closed down in that year. Some of its is certainly not very good. Let us start with Malalas, whose report seems more clearly applicable to the circumstances of the Platonists than do the various provisions of Justinian's *Code* that are usually cited in this connection. Malalas writes: "In the consulship of the same Decius the same Emperor sent an edict to Athens commanding that no one should teach philosophy, that the laws should not be expounded, and that there was to be no gaming in any of the cities ..." (77). He is not, however, a historian of the first rank (78), and in this case he may have made illegitimate inferences from the regulations, and so misinterpreted what actually happened. In particular he may have generalised from the more specific provisions of Justinian's laws, which the edict could have been intended to enforce, to include all teaching of philosophy, rather than teaching by pagans in the public employ. Be that as it may, the provisions of the *Code* which are normally adduced do not unquestionably refer to the activities of the Academy, in so far as it was a private operation. Two sections refer to teaching by pagans. Of these the first forbids pagans, as well as heretics and Samaritans, to hold military or civil posts, and to corrupt the souls of simple men under the guise of education. It continues, *μόνοις δὲ ἐκείνοις διδάσκειν καὶ σιτήσεως*

(76) II.30 = 80.22 f. K: *ἀδεῶς ἐνταῦθα ἐμπολιτεύεσθαι, ὡς τῷ καθεστῶτι οὐχ ἑπομένοις.*

(77) For the reference cf. n. 1.

(78) For a characterization cf. E. Stein, *Histoire du Bas-Empire*, I (Paris-Brussels-Amsterdam, 1949), 703 f.

τυγχάνειν ἐφιέμεθα τοῖς τῆς ὀρθοδόξου πίστεως οὖσιν: we ordain that only those who are of the orthodox faith are *to teach and receive public ration allowances* (79). If the words underlined are conjunctive, then the prohibition is against pagans holding public teaching posts. The Academy would not be affected, a point noticed by Bury in connection with a second text which forbids the teaching by pagans of all subjects and goes on *ἀλλὰ μηδὲ ἐκ τοῦ δημοσίου σιτήσεως ἀπολαύειν αὐτούς*: "but they are not even to receive the benefit of ration allowances from public funds" (80). This last clause seems to carry the implication that it is excluding pagans from a lesser benefit than the general provision: the greater benefit would then be the receipt of public monies. We know that at certain times an *annona* was attached to the salaries of official professors (81).

Bury, who thought Malalas was referring to the provision just discussed, suggested that confiscation of Academy endowments might be covered by *Codex* I.11.9, which forbids legacies and donations *ἐπὶ συστάσει τῆς τοῦ Ἑλληνισμοῦ δυσσεβείας*, for the maintenance of the Hellenic impiety, and orders their forfeiture to the local polity (82). But here too there is a difficulty, namely that no mention is made of teaching. It seems likely that the target was simply pagan cult, as indicated by the section title, *De Paganis Sacrificiis et Templis*. The Academy would only have come under these provisions if it had been regarded as a cult centre: perhaps Athena's famous appearance to Proclus, in which she announced that she wished to come and stay with him, is an indication that it was (83).

Perhaps the crucial provision was rather another section of the same constitution, namely I.11.10.1, which enjoined baptism of all pagans on pain of exclusion from civil rights and the confiscation of both real and movable property. In this connection we should note that Agathias' account gives disapproval of Christianity as a reason for the philoso-

(79) *Cod. Iust.*, I.5.18.4.

(80) *Ibid.*, I.11.10.2; cf. J. B. Bury, *History of the Later Roman Empire* (London, 1923), II.370, n. 1.

(81) Cf. Jones, *op. cit.* (n. 13), II.707 and Procopius, *Anecdota*, 26.5

(82) Bury, *ibid.*

(83) Cf. Marinus, *Vita Pr.*, 30, and Saffrey-Westerink, *op. cit.* (n. 25), xxiii: "Ainsi sa propre maison devint-elle comme le temple d'Athéna".

phers' departure from Athens in search of their illusory, as it turned out, philosopher king (84).

One general reservation must, however, be made, about the use of Justinian's *Code* as evidence. Our version of the *Code* is the second, published in 534. We cannot therefore be sure that any of its provisions stood in the earlier 529 version, either at all or, more importantly, in the precise terms in which we now have them (85). This reservation applies to all the above discussion, and in particular means that we cannot safely take another report in Malalas as proof that this last-mentioned clause was used against the Academy. Malalas tells us that there were persecutions of pagans, and many confiscations, in 529, but says nothing about enforced baptism. According to his report pagans were not to hold public office (86), heretics were to be exiled, and those who were not orthodox were to be excluded from military service (87).

If, then, we interpret all these legal provisions in the way least favourable to their being applicable to the Academy, and also accept Cameron's interpretation of Olympiodorus' *Alcibiades* commentary, the case for even temporary enforced closure is, if anything, even weaker than Cameron himself maintained. We must also bear in mind that imperial decrees were by no means always actually enforced (88). Yet we have still to explain the trip to Persia (89), and the statues in the well, and to deal with the negative evidence constituted by the lack of any clear or certain reference to the Academy or to Neoplatonic activity in Athens subsequently. All we have is the text from Olympiodorus and that, as we have argued, is by no means conclusive, and the unprovable possibility that Simplicius may have returned to Athens after 532. From all these circumstances Malalas gains in credibility, and, taking the evidence as a whole, it would seem that Justinian's measures must have somehow affected the Academy, and that its members thought it would be wise to interrupt their activities. Proclus had once taken a year off in

(84) II.30 = 80.11 f. K.

(85) On the two versions cf. H. F. JOLOWICZ, *Historical Introduction to the study of Roman Law* (Cambridge, 1932), 485 and 499-502.

(86) Almost certainly the meaning of *πολιτεύεσθαι* in this context.

(87) MALALAS, XVIII = 449.3-10 N.

(88) Cf. n. 13 above.

(89) Unless we are to think that all seven philosophers went off only in search of a pipe-dream.

comparable circumstances (90), so that Damascius and his colleagues — whether or not they were the persons named by Agathias — could encourage themselves with the knowledge that philosophic activity in Athens had once before been resumed after a break. And then, for whatever reasons, the hope was not fulfilled. If this is right, then the year 529 must be allowed to retain its traditional significance. But not all of it. Greek philosophy, if not openly the Platonist kind, continued to be taught elsewhere and when, a century later, Heraclius called Stephanus to Constantinople to hold an official chair of philosophy (91), Neoplatonism was installed in the capital with the blessing of the Emperor himself.

(90) Cf. MARINUS, *Vita Pr.*, 15.

(91) Cf. H. USENER, *De Stephano Alexandrino* (Bonn, 1880), in *Kleine Schriften*, III (Leipzig, 1914), 248 ff. and F. FUCHS, *Die höheren Schulen von Konstantinopel im Mittelalter*, in *Byz. Archiv.*, 8 (Leipzig, 1926), 9 ff.

ADDENDA: There is now a widespread but to my mind unprovable view that the philosophers returned neither to Athens nor Alexandria, but took up residence on the eastern confines of the empire, at Harrān (Carrhae). On this see I [00-00 i.e last or penult, p.] and n.34.

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