

PLOTINUS

WITH AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY

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IN SEVEN VOLUMES

VII

ENNEADS
VI. 6-9



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PREFACE

TO LOEB PLOTINUS VI-VII

The text of these volumes corresponds to that of the third volume of the revised *editio minor* of Henry and Schwyzer (*Plotini Opera* III, Oxford Classical Texts, 1982), with correction of printers' errors and a few changes in punctuation, except in the following places, where the changes are indicated in the critical notes:

vol. VI	vol. VII
VI. 1. 12. 38	VI. 7. 1. 48-9
VI. 2. 5. 5	VI. 7. 7. 25
VI. 2. 9. 21	VI. 7. 7. 26-8
VI. 3. 4. 36	VI. 8. 1. 7
VI. 4. 3. 15	VI. 8. 14. 19
VI. 5. 8. 29-31	VI. 8. 18. 29
VI. 5. 10. 44	VI. 8. 21. 23
VI. 5. 12. 6	

Indices have not been provided. The availability of the recently published *Lexicon Plotinianum* (by J. H. Sleeman and Gilbert Pollet: Leiden and Leuven 1980) makes the provision of a selective word-index unnecessary and likely to be misleading; and the *Index Fontium* in *Plotini Opera* III (see above), while not complete, is very extensive and must be referred to by anyone seriously interested in the sources of

PREFACE

Plotinus; work on its revision and expansion is continuing.

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A. H. ARMSTRONG.

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SIGLA

- A = Laurentianus 87, 3.
- A¹ = codicis A primus corrector.
- E = Parisinus Gr. 1976.
- B = Laurentianus 85, 15.
- R = Vaticanus Reginensis Gr. 97.
- J = Parisinus Gr. 2082.
- U = Vaticanus Urbinas Gr. 62.
- C = Monacensis Gr. 449.
- Q = Marcianus Gr. 242.

- w = AE
- x = RJ

- mg = in margine
- ac = ante correctionem
- pc = post correctionem
- H-S¹ = Henry-Schwyzzer, editio maior
- H-S² = Henry-Schwyzzer, editio minor (= OCT)

VI. 6. ON NUMBERS

Introductory Note

THIS treatise is number 34 in Porphyry's chronological order. It immediately follows the work now generally referred to as the "*Gross-Schrift*" or "Great Work", which Porphyry so strangely divided into four and placed in three different Enneads (see Introductory Note to III, 8), so that in his Ennead edition it appears as III. 8 (30), V. 8 (31), V. 5 (32) and II. 9 (33). V. 5 contains a brief account of what Plotinus thought about the One and numbers in chapters 4 and 5, and the present treatise is announced at the end of chapter 4: "If there are any difficulties about this, we will deal with them later." The status of numbers in the intelligible world and the generation of Numbers and Forms from ultimate principles, the One and the Indefinite Dyad, had been matters of interest and importance to Platonists since the lifetime of Plato himself, especially to those who were influenced by that side of their traditional inheritance which goes back to the Pythagoreans. Between the time of the revival of Platonism and Pythagoreanism in the first century B.C. and the time of Plotinus a considerable numerological literature had developed. But his treatise on Numbers is not at all closely related to it. His thought here is outstandingly original and independent and his interest in numbers is subordinate to his great primary concerns, to show how all reality proceeds in due order from its source, the One or Good, and how the human spirit may find its way back to that source, which is also its goal. He looks back to the discussions about the Ideal Numbers which took place in the Academy in the lifetime of Plato (about which he does not appear to know more than the scanty

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and baffling surviving evidence permits us to). And he takes account of Aristotle's discussions of the Ideal Numbers in Books A, M and N of the *Metaphysics* and of such limited light as the Aristotelian commentators read in his school, notably Alexander of Aphrodisias (see Porphyry *Life* chapter 14), could throw on these passages of Aristotle. But he does not seem to have been very much interested in or affected by the Pythagorean or Pythagoreanizing numerologists. The differences between their surviving works and the thought of Plotinus about the Ideal Numbers and the One are well described in the introduction to the recent Paris edition of VI. 6: "The two principal themes developed in this treatise, which are the problem of infinite number (chs. 1-3 and 17-18) and the status of number in the intelligible (chs. 4-16), do not derive from the current arithmological tradition. On the other hand, this tradition is distinguished by two very widespread characteristics: it includes a technical initiation into arithmetic and culminates in a theology and mysticism of numbers ... Now Plotinus shows himself very reserved about the number-mysticism which was so much in favour before, as after, his time. As for his arithmetical knowledge, it is indisputable, but it does not seem to have been encumbered by technical detail" (cp. Porphyry *Life* ch. 14, 7-10).

There is however one passage from a Pythagorean numerological writer, Moderatus of Gades, who seems to have been of some philosophical importance and whose thought in some ways anticipated the Neoplatonism of Plotinus,² the beginning of which is worth quoting in conclusion as it has something in common with the approach of Plotinus and shows why he would have

¹ Plotin *Traité Sur les Nombres* (*Ennéade* VI 6 34), ed. with translation and commentary by Janine Bertier and others (Paris 1980), Introduction pp. 9-10.

² On Moderatus see J. Dillon *The Middle Platonists* (London 1977) 344-51.

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thought it necessary to take speculation about numbers seriously. It is to be found in Porphyry's *Life of Pythagoras* 48-53: "Moderatus says that the Pythagoreans, since they were not able to express clearly in words the first forms and the first principles because they were so hard to understand and hard to explain, turned to the numbers for the sake of intelligible instruction." For Plotinus not only the One but the realities of the intelligible world are strictly beyond the reach of discursive thought and language. But the traditional number-language, like other kinds of language, may instruct us and help us on our way to the direct apprehension of them which is our goal.

Synopsis

Is multiplicity, as a falling away from the One, and so infinity as innumerable multiplicity, evil? Yes, in so far as it is a self-dissipation of a thing's self, a going outwards instead of inwards. But it can be limited and made good and beautiful by unitary and unifying form (ch. 1). The "number of the infinite" is not in the sense-world. Number is not created by the numberer; it is limited in the intelligible world but we multiply it subjectively (ch. 2). How can the infinite really exist as infinite (or undetermined), when what exists is already determined by number? Multiplicity in the real intelligible world is not evil, though lower than the One, because it is determined and unified by the One; but it is the infinite (undetermined) which is limited. Infinity is not in motion or at rest: difficulty of focusing the mind on this slippery nature (ch. 3). Different ways of thinking about intelligible numbers: are they posterior to the Forms or co-ordinate with them or prior to them? Difficulties in the interpretation of Plato on number (ch. 4). Numbers cannot be simply incidental even if inevitable accompaniments of Forms: they must have some kind of prior independent existence (ch. 5). Refutation of a subjective-idealist view of Forms and

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Numbers: thought does not make intelligible realities but they make our thought of them (ch. 6). The wonderful unity in diversity of Intellect, in which all realities are together, which Soul loves and aspires to; how to attain to contemplation of that reality (chs. 7-8). The order of the primary triad: Being before Intellect, Intellect before Life; the real numbers are in and prior to Being; quantitative number is an image of them (chs. 8-9). Continuing argument for the priority and independent existence of all number, not only the one (chs. 10-11). Refutation of the Stoic view that one and number have no real existence but are ways in which the soul is affected when it encounters things: the one and number are prior to thought and to substance (chs. 12-13). Number cannot be reduced to relation (ch. 14). Intellect is the true universal living being in which all living things exist together, and our universe imitates it; in both, numbers are prior to and generate beings (ch. 15). Quantitative number is secondary and depends for its existence on substantial number in Intellect and in the soul (ch. 16). The infinity or unlimitedness of intelligible number is not like the subjective unlimitedness of a line; line and figure are posterior to number, but have a real existence in the real living being and in Intellect (ch. 17). Number in the intelligible is unlimited only in the sense that it is absolute measure and cannot be measured by anything else. Concluding vision of the beauty and majesty of the intelligible world (ch. 18).

VI. 6. (34) ΠΕΡΙ ΑΡΙΘΜΩΝ

1. Ἄρ' ἐστὶ τὸ πλήθος ἀπόστασις τοῦ ἑνὸς καὶ ἡ
 ἀπειρία ἀπόστασις παντελῆς τῷ πλήθους ἀνάριθμον
 εἶναι, καὶ διὰ τὸ τὸ κακὸν εἶναι, ἢ ἀπειρία, καὶ ἡμεῖς
 κακοί, ὅταν πλήθος; καὶ γὰρ πολὺ ἕκαστον, ὅταν
 5 ἀδυνατοῦν εἰς αὐτὸ νεύειν χέηται καὶ ἐκτείνεται
 σκιδνάμενον· καὶ πάντῃ μὲν στερισκόμενον ἐν τῇ χύσει
 τοῦ ἑνὸς πλήθους γίνεσθαι, οὐκ ὄντος τοῦ ἄλλο πρὸς ἄλλο
 μέρος αὐτοῦ ἐνοῦντος· εἰ δέ τι γένοιτο αἰεὶ χεόμενον
 μένον, μέγεθος γίνεται. ἀλλὰ τί δεινὸν τῷ μεγέθει; ἢ εἰ
 ἡσθάνετο, ἢν ἂν ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ γὰρ γινόμενον καὶ
 10 ἀφιστάμενον εἰς τὸ πόρρω ἡσθάνετο. ἕκαστον γὰρ οὐκ
 ἄλλο, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ ζητεῖ, ἢ δ' ἔξω πορεία μάταιος ἢ
 ἀναγκαῖα. μάλλον δέ ἐστιν ἕκαστον, οὐχ ὅταν γένηται
 πολὺ ἢ μέγα, ἀλλ' ὅταν ἑαυτοῦ ἢ ἑαυτοῦ δ' ἐστὶ πρὸς
 αὐτὸ νενευκός. ἢ δὲ ἔφεσις ἢ πρὸς τὸ οὕτως μέγα
 15 ἀγνοοῦντός ἐστι τὸ ὄντως μέγα καὶ σπεύδοντος οὐχ οὐ
 δεῖ, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ ἔξω· τὸ δὲ πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ ἔνδον ἦν.
 μαρτύριον δὲ τὸ γινόμενον μεγέθει, εἰ μὲν ἀπηρτη-

¹ Plotinus begins here with a traditional Neo-

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1. Is multiplicity a falling away from the One, and infinity a total falling away because it is an innumerable multiplicity and for this reason is evil in so far as it is infinity, and are we evil when we are multiplicity? For a thing is multiple when, unable to tend to itself, it pours out and is extended in scattering; and when it is utterly deprived of the one in its outpouring it becomes multiplicity, since there is nothing to unite one part of it to another; but if something comes to be which abides in its outpouring, it becomes a magnitude. But what is there dreadful about magnitude? Now, if a thing perceived it, it would be dreadful; for it would perceive that it had come to be out of itself and had gone far away from itself. For everything seeks not another, but itself, and the journey to the exterior is foolish or compulsory. A thing exists more, not when it comes to be many or large, but when it belongs to itself: and it belongs to itself in tending to itself. But the desire to be great in this way is the property of something which does not know what true greatness is and is hastening not where it should but to the exterior; but the direction towards itself was inward. A sign of this is that when a thing comes to exist in magnitude, if it is by separation of parts, it exists as each

Pythagorean view of the evil of multiplicity and infinity (or indefiniteness), which, in his usual way, he modifies in the direction of a more positive valuation of multiplicity and number as the treatise continues. Cp. ch. 3, 7-9.

μένον, ὡς ἕκαστον τῶν μερῶν αὐτοῦ εἶναι, ἐκεῖνα
 εἶναι ἕκαστα, ἀλλ' οὐκ αὐτὸ τὸ ἐξ ἀρχῆς· εἰ δ' ἔσται
 20 αὐτό, δεῖ τὰ πάντα μέρη πρὸς ἓν ὥστε εἶναι αὐτό, ὅταν
 ἀμνηστέη ἓν, μὴ μέγα, ἤ. γίνεται τοῖνυν διὰ μὲν τὸ
 μέγεθος, καὶ ὅσον ἐπὶ τῷ μεγέθει ἀπολλύμενον αὐτοῦ· ὅ
 τι δὲ ἔχει ἓν, ἔχει ἑαυτό. καὶ μὴν τὸ πᾶν μέγα καὶ καλόν.
 ἢ ὅτι οὐκ ἀφείθη φυγεῖν εἰς τὴν ἀπειρίαν, ἀλλὰ
 25 περιελήφθη ἐνί· καὶ καλὸν οὐ τῷ μέγα, ἀλλὰ τῷ καλῷ·
 καὶ ἐδεήθη τοῦ καλοῦ, ὅτι ἐγένετο μέγα. ἐπεὶ ἔρρημον ὄν
 τοῦτο, ὅσῳ μέγα, τόσῳ ἂν κατεφάνη αἰσχροῦ· καὶ οὕτω
 τὸ μέγα ὕλη τοῦ καλοῦ, ὅτι πολὺ τὸ δεόμενον κόσμου.
 μᾶλλον οὖν ἄκοσμον τὸ μέγα καὶ μᾶλλον αἰσχροῦ.

2. Τί οὖν ἐπὶ τοῦ λεγομένου ἀριθμοῦ τῆς ἀπειρίας;
 ἀλλὰ πρῶτον πῶς ἀριθμός, εἰ ἀπειρος; οὔτε γὰρ τὰ
 αἰσθητὰ ἀπειρα, ὥστε οὐδὲ ὁ ἐπ' αὐτοῖς ἀριθμός, οὔτε ὁ
 ἀριθμῶν τὴν ἀπειρίαν ἀριθμεῖ· ἀλλὰ κἄν διπλάσια ἢ
 5 πολλαπλάσια ποιῆ, ὀρίζει ταῦτα, κἄν πρὸς τὸ μέλλον ἢ
 τὸ παρεληλυθὸς λαμβάνη ἢ καὶ ὁμοῦ, ὀρίζει ταῦτα. ἀρ'
 οὖν οὐχ ἀπλῶς ἀπειρος, οὕτω δέ, ὥστε αἰεὶ ἐξεῖναι
 λαμβάνειν; ἢ οὐκ ἐπὶ τῷ ἀριθμοῦντι τὸ γεννᾶν, ἀλλ' ἤδη
 ὠρισται καὶ ἔστηκεν. ἢ ἐν μὲν τῷ νοητῷ ὥσπερ τὰ ὄντα
 10 οὕτω καὶ ὁ ἀριθμὸς ὠρισμένος ὅσος τὰ ὄντα. ἡμεῖς δὲ
 ὡς τὸν ἄνθρωπον πολλὰ ποιοῦμεν ἐφαρμόζοντες
 πολλάκις καὶ τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα, οὕτω μετὰ τοῦ

¹ The text of Plato referred to here seems to be the mention of ἀπειρος ἀριθμός at *Parmenides* 144A6, cf. Aristotle *Metaphysics* M 8. 1083b36–1084a1.

and every one of its parts, and they each of them exist, but not the original thing itself; but if it is going to be itself, all its parts must tend to one: so that it is itself when it is one in some way, not large. So through magnitude and as far as depends on magnitude it loses itself; but as far as it possesses a one, it possesses itself. Yet, all the same, the universe is large and beautiful. This is because it has not been left to escape into infinity, but has been circumscribed by one; and it is beautiful not by largeness but by beauty; and it needed beauty because it became large. For if this universe was destitute [of beauty] it would have appeared as ugly as it was large; and so largeness is the matter of beauty, because what needed ordered beauty was many. Therefore the largeness [of the universe] is rather lacking in ordered beauty and rather ugly [than beautiful].

2. What, then, about what is called the number of the infinite¹? But first, how is it a number, if it is infinite? For the objects of sense are not infinite, so their number is not infinite either, and the numberer does not number infinity; but, even if he makes them twice or many times as many, he limits them, and even if he takes into account the past or the future or both at once, he limits them. Is then the number not simply infinite, but so that we can always take more? No, the generation of number is not in the power of the numberer, but it is already limited and stands fast. Or, in the intelligible, just as the real beings are limited so is the number limited to as many as the real beings. But we, just as we make "man" many by many times applying beauty and the rest to him, so along with each image we generate an

εἰδώλου ἐκάστου καὶ εἰδωλον ἀριθμοῦ συναπογεννώμεν,
καὶ ὡς τὸ ἄστνυ πολλαπλασιοῦμεν οὐχ ὑφεστὸς
15 οὕτως, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς πολυ-
πλασίους ποιοῦμεν· καὶ εἰ τοὺς χρόνους δὲ ἀριθμοῖμεν,
ἀφ' ὧν ἔχομεν ἀριθμῶν ἐπάγομεν ἐπὶ τοὺς χρόνους
μενόντων ἐν ἡμῖν ἐκείνων.

3. Ἄλλὰ τὸ ἄπειρον δὴ τοῦτο πῶς ὑφέστηκεν ὄν
ἄπειρον; ὃ γὰρ ὑφέστηκε καὶ ἔστιν, ἀριθμῶ
κατελήπται ἤδη. ἀλλὰ πρότερον, εἰ ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν ὄντως
πλήθος, πῶς κακὸν τὸ πλήθος; ἢ ὅτι ἤνωται τὸ πλήθος
5 καὶ κεκώλυται πάντη πλήθος εἶναι ἐν ὄν πλήθος. καὶ διὰ
τοῦτο δὲ ἐλαττοῦται τοῦ ἐνός, ὅτι πλήθος ἔχει, καὶ ὅσον
πρὸς τὸ ἐν χεῖρον· καὶ οὐκ ἔχον δὲ τὴν φύσιν ἐκείνου,
ἀλλὰ ἐκβεβηκός, ἠλάττωται, τῷ δ' ἐνὶ παρ' ἐκείνῳ τὸ
σεμνὸν ἔχει, καὶ ἀνέστρεψε δὲ τὸ πλήθος εἰς ἐν καὶ
10 ἔμεινεν. ἀλλ' ἡ ἀπειρία πῶς; ἢ γὰρ οὐσα ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν
ἦθη ὠρισται, ἢ εἰ μὴ ὠρισται, οὐκ ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν, ἀλλ' ἐν
τοῖς γνωμομένοις ἴσως, ὡς κἂν¹ τῷ χρόνῳ. ἢ κἂν ὀρισθῆ,
τούτῳ γε ἄπειρος· οὐ γὰρ τὸ πέρασ, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἄπειρον
ὀρίζεται· οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἄλλο τι μεταξὺ πέρατος καὶ ἀπείρου,
15 ὃ τὴν τοῦ ὄρου δέχεται φύσιν. τοῦτο δὴ τὸ ἄπειρον
φεύγει μὲν αὐτὸ τὴν τοῦ πέρατος ιδέαν, ἀλίσκεται δὲ
περιληφθὲν ἔξωθεν. φεύγει δὲ οὐκ εἰς τόπον ἄλλον ἐξ

¹ Igal: καὶ Enn.

¹ The idea of subjective, imaginary multiplication here derives from Aristotle *Physics* Γ 8. 208a15–20.

image of number, and, as we multiply the town though it does not really exist as multiple, in the same way we also multiply the numbers¹; and if we should be numbering times, we apply numbers to them from those which we have, and those numbers still remain within us.

3. But how can this infinite really exist as infinite? For what really exists and is, is already determined by number. But before we consider that, if there is really multiplicity in the real beings, how is multiplicity evil? Now [multiplicity there is not evil] because the multiplicity is unified and not allowed to be altogether multiplicity, being a one-multiple. And because of this it is less than the One, because it has multiplicity, and in so far as it is compared with the One, it is worse; and since it does not have the nature of that One, but has gone out from it, it has been diminished, but it keeps its majesty by the one in it, and it turned back its multiplicity to one and there it stayed. But how about infinity? For if it exists in the real beings it has already been limited, or if it has not been limited, it is not in the real beings, but perhaps in the things which come to be, as also in time.² Now even if it is limited, it is by this very fact infinite [or unlimited]; for it is not limit but the unlimited which is limited [or bounded]; for there is certainly nothing else between limit and unlimited which receives the nature of boundary. This infinity, certainly, in itself runs away from the idea of limit, but is caught by being surrounded externally. But it does not run away from one place to another: for it does not even

² Cp. Aristotle *Physics* Γ 7. 207b14–15.

20 *ἐτέρου· οὐ γὰρ οὐδ' ἔχει τόπον· ἀλλ' ὅταν ἀλῶ, ὑπέστη
 τόπος. διὸ οὐδὲ τὴν λεγομένην κίνησιν αὐτῆς τοπικὴν
 θετέον οὐδέ τινα ἄλλην τῶν λεγομένων αὐτῆ παρ' αὐτῆς
 ὑπάρχειν· ὥστε οὐδ' ἂν κινοίτο. ἀλλ' οὐδ' ἔστηκεν αὐ-
 ποῦ γὰρ τοῦ ποῦ ὕστερον γενομένου; ἀλλ' εἰκεν ἢ
 κίνησις αὐτῆς τῆς ἀπειρίας οὕτω λέγεσθαι, ὅτι μὴ
 μένει. ἀρ' οὖν οὕτως ἔχει, ὡς μετέωρος εἶναι ἐν τῷ
 αὐτῷ, ἢ αἰωρεῖσθαι ἐκεῖσε καὶ δεῦρο; οὐδαμῶς· ἄμφω
 25 γὰρ πρὸς τὸν αὐτὸν τόπον κρίνεται, τό τε μετέωρον
 οὐ παρεγκλίνον [πρὸς τὸν αὐτὸν τόπον]¹ καὶ τὸ
 παρεγκλίνον. τί ἂν οὖν τις ἐπινοήσειεν αὐτήν; ἢ
 χωρίσας τὸ εἶδος τῆ διανοία. τί οὖν νοήσει; ἢ τὰ ἐναντία
 ἅμα καὶ οὐ τὰ ἐναντία· καὶ γὰρ μέγα καὶ μικρὸν
 30 νοήσει—γίνεται γὰρ ἄμφω—καὶ ἐστὼς καὶ
 κινούμενον—καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα γίνεται. ἀλλὰ πρὸ τοῦ
 γίνεσθαι δῆλον, ὅτι οὐδέτερον ὠρισμένως· εἰ δὲ μὴ,
 ὠρισας εἰ οὖν ἄπειρος καὶ ταῦτα ἀπείρως καὶ
 ἀορίστως, φαντασθεῖν γ' ἂν ἐκάτερα. καὶ προσελθὼν
 ἐγγὺς μὴ ἐπιβάλλων τι πέρας ὥσπερ δίκτυον
 35 ὑπεκφεύγουσαν ἕξεις καὶ οὐδὲ ἐν εὐρήσει· ἤδη γὰρ
 ὠρισας. ἀλλ' εἴ τω προσέλθοις ὡς ἐνί, πολλὰ φανείται·
 καὶ πολλὰ εἴπῃς, πάλιν αὖ ψεύσῃ· οὐκ ὄντος γὰρ*

¹ del. Kirchhoff.

have any place; but when it is caught, place comes
 into existence. Therefore one cannot assume that
 what is called its movement is movement in place
 nor does any other one of what are called forms of
 movement belong to it of itself; so that it would not
 be in motion. But on the other hand it does not stand
 still either: for where could it, when "where" came
 to be afterwards? But the movement of infinity itself
 seems to mean that it does not stay still. Is it then in
 a state of being up above in the same place, or
 swinging to and fro? Certainly not: for both are
 judged in relation to the same place, what is up there
 and does not swing towards the same place and that
 which swings. In what way, then, could one conceive
 infinity? By separating its form in one's reasoning.
 What, then, will one conceive? One will conceive it
 as the opposites and at the same time not the oppo-
 sites: for one will conceive it as great and small¹—
 for it becomes both—and at rest and moving—for it
 does really become these. But it is obvious that
 before becoming them it is neither definitely: other-
 wise, you have limited [or defined] it. If then it is
 infinite, and infinitely and indefinitely infinite, it
 could be imagined as either. And when you come up
 close to it and do not throw any limit over it like a
 net you will have it slipping away from you and will
 not find it any one thing: for [if you did] you would
 have defined it. But if you approach any of it as one,
 it will appear many; and if you say that it is many,
 you will be wrong again: for if each [part] of it is not

¹ Aristotle records that Plato spoke of the indefinite principle of multiplicity as a dyad "great and small": see *Physics* Γ 4. 203a15–16 and *Metaphysics* Α 6. 987b26.

ἐκάστου ἐνὸς οὐδὲ πολλὰ τὰ πάντα. καὶ αὕτη ἡ φύσις αὐτῆς καθ' ἕτερον τῶν φαντασμάτων κίνησις, καὶ, καθὸ 40 προσῆλθεν ἡ φαντασία, στάσις. καὶ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι δι' αὐτῆς αὐτὴν ἰδεῖν, κίνησις ἀπὸ νοῦ καὶ ἀπολίσθησις· τὸ δὲ μὴ ἀποδρᾶναι ἔχειν, εἴργεσθαι δὲ ἕξωθεν καὶ κύκλω καὶ μὴ ἐξεῖναι προχωρεῖν, στάσις ἂν εἴη· ὥστε μὴ μόνον ἐξεῖναι κινεῖσθαι λέγειν.

4. Περὶ δὲ τῶν ἀριθμῶν ὅπως ἔχουσιν ἐν τῷ νοητῷ σκεπτέον, πότερι ὡς ἐπιγινόμενων τοῖς ἄλλοις εἶδουσιν ἢ καὶ παρακολουθούντων αἰεὶ οἷον ἐπειδὴ τὸ ὄν τοιοῦτον οἷον πρῶτον αὐτὸ εἶναι, ἐνοήσαμεν μονάδα, 5 εἴτ' ἐπεὶ κίνησις ἐξ αὐτοῦ καὶ στάσις, τρία ἤδη, καὶ ἐφ' ἐκάστου τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον. ἢ οὐχ οὕτως, ἀλλὰ συνεγενήθη ἐκάστῳ μονὰς μία, ἢ ἐπὶ μὲν τοῦ πρῶτου ὄντος μονὰς, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ μετ' ἐκεῖνο, εἰ τάξις ἐστί, δυὰς ἢ καὶ ὅσον τὸ πλήθος ἐκάστου, οἷον εἰ δέκα, δεκάς. ἢ οὐχ 10 οὕτως, ἀλλ' αὐτὸς ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ ὁ ἀριθμὸς ἐνοήθη καὶ εἰ οὕτως, πότερα πρότερος τῶν ἄλλων, ἢ ὕστερος. ὁ μὲν οὖν Πλάτων εἰς ἔνοιαν ἀριθμοῦ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἐληλυθέναι εἰπὼν ἡμερῶν πρὸς νύκτας τῇ παραλλαγῇ, τῇ τῶν πραγμάτων ἑτερότητι· διδοὺς τὴν νόησιν, τάχ' 15 ἂν τὰ ἀριθμητὰ πρότερον δι' ἑτερότητος ποιεῖν ἀριθμὸν λέγοι, καὶ εἶναι αὐτὸν συνιστάμενον ἐν μεταβάσει ψυχῆς ἐπεξιούσης ἄλλο μετ' ἄλλο πρᾶγμα καὶ τότε γίνεσθαι, ὅταν ἀριθμῇ ψυχὴ· τοῦτο δ' ἐστίν, ὅταν αὐτὰ διεξίη καὶ

one, all of them cannot be many. And this nature of it according to one and another of your imaginations is movement, and, according as imagination has arrived at it, rest. And the impossibility of seeing it by itself is movement from intellect and slipping away; but that it cannot run away but is held fast from outside and all round and is not able to go on, this would be its rest: so that one may not say that it is only in motion.

4. But we must consider how the numbers are in the intelligible, whether as coming into existence after the other Forms or always accompanying them; for instance, since being is of such a kind as to be itself the first, we conceived it as monad, then, since movement and rest came from it, we at that stage conceived three, and a number for each of the other Forms. No, not like this, but one monad was generated along with each, or a monad for the first existent and for that after it, if there is an order, a dyad or as much as the plurality of each is, for instance a decad if it is ten. Or not like this, but number was conceived itself by itself; and if so, was it prior to the others or posterior to them? Now Plato says that men came to the idea of number by the alternation of day and night, attributing the concept to the difference of the objects; perhaps he is saying that the things numbered are prior and make number by their difference, and that it is coming into existence in the transition of soul as it goes on from one thing to another, and comes into existence when the soul numbers¹: that is when it goes over things

¹ Plotinus is expounding here Plato *Timaeus* 39B–C and 47A on how we come to our knowledge of number and time.

λέγη παρ' αὐτῆ ἄλλο, τὸ δὲ ἄλλο, ὡς, ἕως γε¹ ταυτίον τι
 20 καὶ μὴ ἕτερον μετ' αὐτὸ νοεῖ, ἐν λεγούσῃς. ἀλλὰ μὴν
 ὅταν λέγῃ "ἐν τῷ ἀληθινῷ ἀριθμῷ" καὶ τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἐν
 οὐσίᾳ, πάλιν αὖ ὑπόστασιν τινα ἂν ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ τοῦ
 ἀριθμοῦ λέγοι καὶ οὐκ ἐν τῇ ἀριθμούσῃ ὑφίστασθαι
 ψυχῇ, ἀλλὰ ἀνακινεῖσθαι ἐν ἑαυτῇ ἐκ τῆς περὶ τὰ
 αἰσθητὰ παραλλαγῆς τὴν ἔννοιαν τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ.

5. Τίς οὖν ἡ φύσις αὐτοῦ; ἄρα παρακολοίθημα καὶ
 οἶον ἐπιθεωρούμενον ἐκάστη οὐσίᾳ, οἶον ἄνθρωπος καὶ
 εἷς ἄνθρωπος, καὶ ὄν καὶ ἐν ὄν, καὶ τὰ πάντα ἕκαστα τὰ
 νοητὰ καὶ πᾶς ὁ ἀριθμός; ἀλλὰ πῶς διὰς καὶ τριάς καὶ
 5 πῶς τὰ πάντα καθ' ἑν καὶ ὁ τοιοῦτος ἀριθμός εἰς ἐν ἂν
 συναγοίτο; οὕτω γὰρ ἔσται πλήθος μὲν ἐνάδων, εἰς ἐν δὲ
 οὐδεὶς παρὰ τὸ ἀπλοῦν ἐν· εἰ μὴ τις λέγοι, ὡς διὰς μὲν
 ἔστιν ἐκεῖνο τὸ πρᾶγμα, μᾶλλον δὲ τὸ ἐπὶ τῷ πράγματι
 θεωρούμενον, ὃ δίῳ ἔχει δυνάμεις συνειλημμένας οἶον
 10 σύνθετον εἰς ἐν. ἢ οἴους ἔλεγον οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι, οἱ
 ἐδόκουν λέγειν ἀριθμοὺς ἐκ τοῦ ἀνάλογον, οἶον
 δικαιοσύνην τετράδα καὶ ἄλλον ἄλλως· ἐκείνως δὲ
 μᾶλλον τῷ πλήθει τοῦ πράγματος ἐνὸς ὄντος ὁμως καὶ
 τὸν ἀριθμὸν συζυγῇ, τοσοῦτον ἐν, οἶον δεκάδα. καίτοι

¹ Kirchhoff: τε Enn.

¹ The *Timaeus* passages might suggest that number only exists in the numbering soul and is posterior to the visible realities numbered. So Plotinus turns immediately to *Republic* VII 529C-D, where Socrates is insisting that true, philosophical astronomy is concerned not with the visible heavenly bodies but with "true" number and figure perceptible only to thought.

² Cp. Aristotle *Metaphysics* Γ 2. 1003b22-30.

and says in itself "this is one thing and that is another", as, for instance, as long as it thinks something the same and does not think another thing after it, it says "one". But then when Plato says "in the true number", and speaks of the number in substance,¹ he will, on the other hand, be saying that number has an existence from itself and does not have its existence in the numbering soul but the soul arouses in itself from the difference in sensible things the idea of number.

5. What, then, is the nature of number? Is it an accompaniment of each substance and something observed in it—man and one man,² for instance, and being and one being, and so with all the individual intelligibles and the whole of number? But how is there a dyad and a triad, and how are all unified, and how could such and such a number be brought together into one? For in this way there will be a multiplicity of unities, but no number will be brought into unity except the simple one; unless someone were to say that the dyad is that thing itself, or rather what is observed in that thing, which has two powers brought together, as if conjoined into one. Or numbers might be as the Pythagoreans said they were: they seem to have spoken of numbers analogically,³ the tetrad as justice, for instance, and other numbers in other ways; but in that way the number would be coupled with the multiplicity of the thing, which all the same is one, a one which is so many, a decad for instance. We however do not

³ Plotinus clearly has no source for early Pythagorean thought which he regards as more dependable than Aristotle. He is using here *Metaphysics* A 5. 985b23-51.

ἡμεῖς οὐχ οὕτω τὰ δέκα, ἀλλὰ συνάγοντες καὶ τὰ
 15 διεστῶτα δέκα λέγομεν. ἢ οὕτω μὲν δέκα λέγομεν, ὅταν
 δὲ ἐκ πολλῶν γίνηται ἓν, δεκάδα, ὡς καὶ ἐκεῖ οὕτως. ἀλλ'
 εἰ οὕτως, ἄρ' ἔτι ὑπόστασις ἀριθμοῦ ἔσται ἐπὶ τοῖς
 πράγμασιν αὐτοῦ θεωρουμένου; ἀλλὰ τί κωλύει, φαίη
 ἂν τις, καὶ τοῦ λευκοῦ ἐπὶ τοῖς πράγμασι θεωρουμένου
 20 ὑπόστασιν τοῦ λευκοῦ ἐν τοῖς πράγμασιν εἶναι; ἐπεὶ καὶ
 κινήσεως ἐπὶ τῷ ὄντι θεωρουμένης ὑπόστασις ἦν
 κινήσεως ἐν τῷ ὄντι οὔσης. [ὁ δ' ἀριθμὸς οὐχ ὡς ἡ
 κίνησις]¹ ἀλλ' ὅτι ἡ κίνησις τι, οὕτως ἐν ἐπ' αὐτῆς
 ἐθεωρήθη· <ὁ δ' ἀριθμὸς οὐχ ὡς ἡ κίνησις>¹ λέγεται.
 25 εἶτα καὶ ἡ τοιαύτη ὑπόστασις ἀφίστησι τὸν ἀριθμὸν τοῦ
 οὐσίας εἶναι, συμβεβηκὸς δὲ μᾶλλον ποιεῖ. καίτοι οὐδὲ
 συμβεβηκὸς ὅλως· τὸ γὰρ συμβεβηκὸς δεῖ τι εἶναι πρὸ
 τοῦ συμβεβηκέναι, καὶ ἀχώριστον ἦ, ὅμως εἶναι τι ἐφ'
 ἑαυτοῦ φύσιν τινά, ὡς τὸ λευκόν, καὶ κατηγορεῖσθαι
 κατ' ἄλλου ἤδη ὃν δὲ κατηγορηθῆναι. ὥστε, εἰ περὶ
 30 ἕκαστον τὸ ἐν καὶ οὐ ταῦτὸν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ τὸ "εἰς
 ἄνθρωπος", ἀλλ' ἕτερον τὸ ἐν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου καὶ κοινὸν
 τὸ ἐν καὶ ἐφ' ἑκάστου τῶν ἄλλων, πρότερον ἂν εἴη τὸ ἐν
 τοῦ ἀνθρώπου καὶ ἑκάστου τῶν ἄλλων, ἵνα καὶ ὁ
 ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν ἄλλων τύχη ἕκαστον τοῦ ἐν
 35 εἶναι. καὶ πρὸ κινήσεως τοίνυν, εἴπερ καὶ ἡ κίνησις ἐν,

¹ transpos. Igal.

¹ I adopt this rendering of καὶ ἐκεῖ in agreement with Henry and Schwyzer; most translators take ἐκεῖ in the usual sense

conceive ten like this, but we bring together things
 that are separate and say "ten". This indeed is how
 we say "ten", but when a unity comes to be from
 many, we say "decad", because this is how it is also
 in the Pythagorean way of thinking.¹ But if this is
 so, will there still be any real existence of number
 when it is only observed in things? But, someone
 might say, what is there to prevent there being a real
 existence of white in things, though white also is
 only observed in things? For movement also was
 observed in being and there was a real existence of
 movement which is in being. But because movement
 is a something, in this way a unity was observed in
 it; but number is not spoken of in the same way as
 movement. And then a real existence of this kind
 would deprive number of being substance, and make
 it rather something incidental. Yet not even altog-
 ether an incidental; for the incidental must be some-
 thing before incidentally occurring, and, even if it is
 inseparable, all the same be something by itself, a
 particular nature, like white, and be predicated of
 something else when it is already what it will be
 predicated as. So that, if "one" applies to each
 individual thing and "one man" is not the same as
 "man", but the "one" is other than the "man" and
 the "one" is common and belongs to all the other
 individual things, the "one" would be prior to
 "man" and all the other individual things, so that
 man and each of the others might succeed in being
 one. And so it is prior to movement, since movement
 also is one thing, and prior to being, so that being

for Plotinus, "in the intelligible world", which does not seem appropriate here.

καὶ πρὸ τοῦ ὄντος, ἵνα καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦ ἔν εἶναι τύχη· λέγω
 δὲ οὐ τὸ ἔν ἐκείνο, ὃ δὴ ἐπέκεινα τοῦ ὄντος
 φαμέν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦτο τὸ ἔν ὃ κατηγορεῖται τῶν εἰδῶν
 ἐκάστου. καὶ δεκάς τοῖνυν πρὸ τοῦ καθ' οὐ
 κατηγορεῖται δεκάς· καὶ τοῦτο ἔσται αὐτοδεκάς· οὐ γὰρ
 40 δὴ ὡς πράγματι ἐπιθεωρεῖται δεκὺς αὐτοδεκὺς ἔσται.
 ἀλλ' ἄρα συνεγένετο καὶ συνέστη τοῖς οὖσιν; ἀλλ' εἰ
 συνεγενήθη ὡς μὲν συμβεβηκός, οἷον τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ
 ὑγίεια—δεῖ καὶ καθ' αὐτὸ ὑγίειαν εἶναι. καὶ εἰ ὡς
 στοιχείῳ δὲ συνθέντῳ τὸ ἔν, δεῖ πρότερον εἶναι ἔν αὐτὸ
 45 τὸ ἔν, ἵνα σὺν ἄλλῳ εἴτα [εἰ πρότερον εἶναι]¹ συμμιχθὲν
 ἄλλῳ τῷ γενομένῳ δι' αὐτὸ ἔν ἐκείνο ποιήσῃ ψευδῶς
 ἔν, δύο ποιοῦν αὐτό. ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς δεκάδος πῶς; τί γὰρ δεῖ
 ἐκείνῳ τῆς δεκάδος, ὃ ἔσται διὰ τὴν τοσαύτην δύναμιν
 δεκάς; ἀλλ' εἰ εἰδοποιήσῃ αὐτὸ ὡςπερ ὕλην καὶ ἔσται
 50 παρουσία δεκάδος δέκα καὶ δεκάς, δεῖ πρότερον ἐφ'
 ἑαυτῆς τὴν δεκάδα οὐκ ἄλλο τι οὖσιν ἢ δεκάδα μόνον
 εἶναι.

6. Ἄλλ' εἰ ἄνευ τῶν πραγμάτων τὸ ἔν αὐτὸ καὶ ἡ
 δεκάς αὐτή, εἴτα τὰ πράγματα τὰ νοητὰ μετὰ τὸ εἶναι
 ὅπερ ἔστι τὰ μὲν ἐνάδες ἔσονται, τὰ δὲ καὶ δυάδες καὶ
 τριάδες, τίς ἂν εἴη ἡ φύσις αὐτῶν καὶ πῶς συστάσῃ;
 5 λόγῳ δὲ δεῖ νομίζειν τὴν γένεσιν αὐτῶν ποιείσθαι.
 πρῶτον τοῖνυν δεῖ λαβεῖν τὴν οὐσίαν καθόλου τῶν εἰδῶν,
 ὅτι ἔστιν οὐχὶ νοήσαντος ἕκαστον τοῦ νενοηκότος, εἴτ'

¹ del. Kirchhoff.

itself may succeed in being one; but I mean not that
 One which we say is "beyond being"¹ but this other
 one which is predicated of each individual Form. So
 the decad also is prior to that of which decad is
 predicated; and this will be the absolute decad; for
 the thing in which decad is observed certainly will
 not be the absolute decad. Did this other one, then,
 come into being and exist along with the real beings?
 But if it was generated along with them, it would be
 incidental, like health to man—but health also must
 be something in itself. And if the one is like an
 element of a compound, there must be beforehand a
 one which is one in itself, that it may be compounded
 with another; then, if it is compounded with another
 which has become one through it, it will make that
 other spuriously one, by making it two. But how is it
 with the decad? For what need of the decad has the
 thing which is going to be a decad by the power of
 that amount? But if it is going to inform it like
 matter, and the thing is going to be ten and decad by
 the presence of decad, the decad must exist before-
 hand by itself and be nothing else but only decad.

6. But if the one itself and the decad itself exist
 without the things, and then the intelligible things,
 after being what they are, are going to be, some of
 them henads and some of them dyads or triads, what
 would be their nature, and how would it come into
 existence? But we must understand that we make
 them come into being only in thought. First, then,
 we must comprehend the substantial nature of the
 Forms in general, that it does not exist because the

¹ Plato *Republic* 509B9, the text which is one of the
 foundations of the doctrine of the One beyond Being.

αὐτῇ τῇ νοήσει τὴν ὑπόστασιν αὐτῶν παρασχομένων. οὐ γάρ, ὅτι ἐνόησε τί ποτ' ἐστὶ δικαιοσύνη, δικαιοσύνη
 10 ἐγένετο, οὐδ' ὅτι ἐνόησε τί ποτ' ἐστὶ κίνησις, κίνησις ὑπέστη. οὕτω γὰρ ἔμελλε τοῦτο τὸ νόημα καὶ ὕστερον εἶναι τοῦ πράγματος αὐτοῦ τοῦ νοηθέντος—δικαιοσύνης αὐτῆς ἢ νόησις αὐτῆς—καὶ πάλιν αὖ ἢ νόησις προτέρα τοῦ ἐκ τῆς νοήσεως ὑποστάντος, εἰ τῷ νενοηθέντι ὑπέστη. εἰ δὲ τῇ νοήσει τῇ τοιαύτῃ
 15 ταῦτόν ἢ δικαιοσύνη, πρῶτον μὲν ἀποπον μηδὲν εἶναι δικαιοσύνην ἢ τὸν οἶον ὀρισμὸν αὐτῆς· τί γάρ ἐστι τὸ νενοηθέντι δικαιοσύνην ἢ κίνησιν ἢ τὸ τί ἐστὶν αὐτῶν λαβόντα; τοῦτο δὲ ταῦτόν τῷ μὴ ὑφεστώτος πράγματος λόγον λαβεῖν, ὅπερ ἀδύνατον. εἰ δὲ τις λέγοι, ὡς ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνευ ὕλης τὸ αὐτό ἐστὶν
 20 ἢ ἐπιστήμη τῷ πράγματι, ἐκείνως χρῆ νοεῖν τὸ λεγόμενον, ὡς οὐ τὴν ἐπιστήμην τὸ πᾶγμα λέγει εἶναι οὐδὲ τὸν λόγον τὸν θεωροῦντα τὸ πᾶγμα αὐτὸ τὸ πᾶγμα, ἀλλὰ ἀνάπαυ τὸ πᾶγμα αὐτὸ ἀνευ ὕλης ὄν νοητόν τε καὶ νόησιν εἶναι, οὐχ οἷαν λόγον εἶναι τοῦ
 25 πράγματος οὐδ' ἐπιβολὴν πρὸς αὐτό, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ τὸ πᾶγμα ἐν τῷ νοητῷ ὄν τί ἄλλο ἢ νοῦν καὶ ἐπιστήμην εἶναι; οὐ γὰρ ἢ ἐπιστήμη πρὸς αὐτήν, ἀλλὰ τὸ πᾶγμα ἐκεῖ τὴν ἐπιστήμην οὐ μένουσαν, οἷα ἐστὶν ἢ τοῦ ἐν ὕλη πράγματος, ἐτέραν ἐποίησεν εἶναι· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν
 30 ἀληθινὴν ἐπιστήμην· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν οὐκ εἰκόνα τοῦ πράγματος, ἀλλὰ τὸ πᾶγμα αὐτό· ἢ νόησις τοῖνον τῆς κινήσεως οὐ πεποίηκεν αὐτοκίνησιν, ἀλλ' ἢ αὐτοκίνησις

¹ A clear statement that a Platonic Form is something very different from a hypostatized Aristotelian universal.

² Aristotle *De Anima* Γ 5. 430a2-3 and 7. 431a1-2.

thinker thinks each of them and so by that very thinking gives them their existence. For it is not because the thinker thought out what righteousness is that righteousness existed, or because he thought out what movement is that movement existed. For in this way this thought would be both posterior to the thing itself which was thought—the thought of righteousness posterior to righteousness itself—and on the other hand the thought would be prior to what existed as a result of thought, if it came into existence by thinking. But if righteousness is the same as the thought of righteousness, first of all it is absurd that righteousness should be nothing except something like its definition¹: for what is thinking righteousness or movement except grasping their essential nature? And this is the same as grasping the conception of a non-existent thing, which is impossible. But if someone were to say that "in immaterial things the knowledge and the thing are the same",² one must understand what is said in the sense that it does not mean that the knowledge is the thing nor the reason contemplating the thing the thing itself, but the other way round, that the thing itself when it is without matter is object of thought and thought, not thought in the sense of being a definition of the thing or an intuition of it, but the thing itself in the intelligible is nothing else but intellect and knowledge. For the knowledge is not directed to itself, but the thing there makes the knowledge, which does not stay like the knowledge of a thing in matter, to be different: that is, makes it true knowledge: that is, not an image of the thing but the thing itself. So the thought of movement has not made absolute movement, but absolute move-

πεποιήκε τὴν νόησιν, ὥστε αὐτὴ ἑαυτὴν κίνησιν καὶ νόησιν· ἢ γὰρ κίνησις ἢ ἐκεῖ κἀκείνου νόησις, καὶ αὐτὸ δὲ κίνησις, ὅτι πρώτη—οὐ γὰρ ἄλλη πρὸ αὐτῆς—καὶ ἢ 35 ὄντως, ὅτι μὴ σιμβέβηκεν ἄλλω, ἀλλὰ τοῦ κινουμένου ἐνέργεια ὄντος ἐνεργεία. ὥστε αὐ καὶ οὐσία· ἐπίνοια δὲ τοῦ ὄντος ἐτέρα. καὶ δικαιοσύνη δὲ οὐ νόησις δικαιοσύνης, ἀλλὰ νοῦ οἶον διάθεσις, μᾶλλον δὲ ἐνέργεια τοιαύδε, ἥς ὡς ἀληθῶς καλὸν τὸ πρόσωπον καὶ 40 οὕτε ἔσπερος <οὔτε ἑῷος οὔτω καλὰ>¹ οὐδ' ὅλως τι τῶν αἰσθητῶν, ἀλλ' οἶον ἀγαλμά τι νοερόν, οἶον ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἐστηκὸς καὶ προφανὲν ἐν αὐτῷ, μᾶλλον δὲ ἐν αὐτῷ.

7. Ὅλως γὰρ δεῖ νοῆσαι τὰ πράγματα ἐν μιᾷ <φύσει>² καὶ μίαν φύσιν πάντα ἔχουσαν καὶ οἶον περιλαβοῦσαν, οὐχ ὡς ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς ἕκαστον χωρὶς, ἀλλαχοῦ ἥλιος καὶ ἄλλο ἄλλοθι, ἀλλ' ὁμοῦ ἐν ἐνὶ 5 πάντα· αὕτη γὰρ νοῦ φύσις· ἐπεὶ καὶ ψυχὴ οὕτω μιμείται καὶ ἡ λεγομένη φύσις, καθ' ἣν καὶ ὑφ' ἥς ἕκαστα γεννᾶται ἄλλο ἄλλοθι, αὐτῆς ὁμοῦ ἑαυτῇ οὔσης. ὁμοῦ δὲ πάντων ὄντων ἕκαστον αὐ χωρὶς ἐστίν· ἐνορᾷ δὲ αὐτὰ τὰ ἐν τῷ νῷ καὶ τῇ οὐσίᾳ ὁ [ἔχων]³ νοῦς οὐκ ἐπιβλέπων, ἀλλ' ἔχων, οὐδὲ χωρίζων ἕκαστον.

¹ Kirchhoff.

² Müller.

³ del. Theiler.

¹ Euripides *Melanippe* fr. 486 Nauck², quoted by Aristotle *Nicomachean Ethics* E 3. 1129b28–9. Plotinus quotes it also at I. 6. 4. 11–12, where it connects in his mind, as perhaps it does here, with the vision of the beauty of the moral Forms in Plato *Phaedrus* 250B.

ment has made the thought of it, so that it has made itself as movement and thought; for movement there is also the thought of that thing itself, and it itself is movement, because it is the first movement—for there is no other before it—and real movement, because it is not incidental to something else, but is the active actuality of what is moved, which exists in actuality. So, again, it is substance; but the [mere] notion of being is different. And righteousness is not the thought of righteousness, but a kind of disposition of intellect, or rather an active actuality, of such a kind that “its face” is truly beautiful and “neither the morning nor the evening star are so fair”,¹ not at all any object of sense, but like an intellectual statue, as if standing out from itself and manifesting in itself, or rather existing in itself.

7. In general one must think of the intelligible things as in one nature, and one nature holding them all and in a way encompassing them, not each one separate as in the things of sense, the sun in one place and something else in another, but all things together in one²; for this is the nature of Intellect; since Soul imitates it in this way, and what we call Nature, according to which and by which the individual things are generated one in one place and one in another, while it is all together in itself. But though all things are together each one, on the other hand, is separate; but Intellect sees them, the things that are in Intellect and Being, not by looking at them but by having them, and does not separate each

² ὁμοῦ πάντα is a phrase from the beginning of the book of Anaxagoras (fr. B 1 DK) which Plotinus finds particularly applicable to his intelligible world.

10 κεχώρισται γὰρ ἤδη ἐν αὐτῷ αἰεί. πιστούμεθα δὲ πρὸς
 τοὺς τεθναμακότας ἐκ τῶν μετεληφότων· τὸ δὲ
 μέγεθος αὐτοῦ καὶ τὸ κάλλος ψυχῆς ἔρωτι πρὸς αὐτὸν¹
 καὶ τῶν ἄλλων [τὸν]² εἰς ψυχὴν ἔρωτι διὰ τὴν τοιαύτην
 φύσιν καὶ τῷ ἔχειν ἢ κατὰ τι ὠμοίωται. καὶ γὰρ δὴ καὶ
 15 ἄτοπον εἶναι τι ζῶον καλὸν αὐτοζῶον μὴ θαυμαστοῦ τὸ
 κάλλος καὶ ἀφάστου ὄντος. τὸ δὴ π α ν τ ε λ ἔ σ ζ ῶ ο ν
 ἐκ πάντων ζῶων ὄν, μᾶλλον δὲ ἐν αὐτῷ τὰ πάντα ζῶα
 περιέχον καὶ ἐν ὄν τοσοῦτον, ὅσα τὰ πάντα, ὥσπερ καὶ
 τόδε τὸ πᾶν ἐν ὄν καὶ πᾶν τὸ ὄρατὸν περιέχον πάντα τὰ
 ἐν τῷ ὄρατῷ.

8. Ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν καὶ ζῶον πρῶτως ἐστὶ καὶ διὰ
 τοῦτο αὐτοζῶον καὶ νοῦς ἐστὶ καὶ οὐσία ἢ ὄντως καὶ
 φαμεν ἔχειν καὶ ζῶα τὰ πάντα καὶ ἀριθμὸν τὸν
 σύμπαντα καὶ δίκαιον αὐτὸ καὶ καλὸν καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα
 5 τοιαῦτα—ἄλλως γὰρ αὐτοάνθρωπόν φαμεν καὶ ἀριθμὸν
 αὐτὸ καὶ δίκαιον αὐτό—σκεπτέον πῶς τούτων ἕκαστον
 καὶ τί ὄν, εἰς ὅσον οἶόν τέ τι εὐρεῖν περὶ τούτων. πρῶτον
 τοίνυν ἀφετέον πᾶσαν αἴσθησιν καὶ νοῦν νῶ θεωρητέον
 καὶ ἐνθυμητέον, ὡς καὶ ἐν ἡμῖν ζωὴ καὶ νοῦς οὐκ ἐν
 10 ὄγκῳ, ἀλλ' ἐν δυνάμει ἀόγκῳ, καὶ τὴν ἀληθινὴν οὐσίαν

¹ Kirchhoff: αὐτὸ Ern.

² delevimus ut correctionem ad αὐτὸ falso hic insertam:
 τὸν EBxUQ: τῶν AC.

¹ The "complete living being" is the intelligible paradigm of the material universe in Plato *Timaeus* 30C. It is clear from ch. 8 that Plotinus, like most Platonists, takes it to be the whole intelligible universe. Life in Plotinus is

individual thing; for they are already separated in it for ever. We confirm this for those who are surprised at it from the participants: its greatness and beauty by the love of soul for it and by the love of other things for soul because it has a nature of this kind and by its having a nature by which it is in some respect made like Intellect. For it is certainly quite absurd for there to be any beautiful living being if the absolute living being is not of wonderful and inexplicable beauty. It is truly the "complete living being" composed of all living beings, or rather encompassing in itself all living beings, being one as large as all things¹; just as this All is one and is all that is visible, encompassing all things that are in the visible.

8. Since, then, it is the primary living being, and for this reason the absolute living being, and is Intellect and substance, real substance, and we claim that it contains all living things and the whole of number, and the absolutely righteous and beautiful and all other such things—we speak in a different way of absolute man and absolute number and absolute righteousness—we must enquire how each of these exists as an individual and what it is, as far as it is possible to discover anything about these things. First, then, we must put away all sense-perception and contemplate Intellect by intellect and consider that in us also there is life and intellect, not in bulk but in bulkless power, and that

often thought of as prior to intellect; but the intelligible living being as the formed, structured whole must be considered posterior to the intellect which eternally forms and structures its life.

ἐκδεδυκέναι ταῦτα καὶ δύναμιν εἶναι ἐφ' ἑαυτῆς
 βεβῶσαν, οὐκ ἄμενηνόν τι χρήμα, ἀλλὰ πάντων
 ζωτικωτάτην καὶ νοερωτάτην, ἧς οὔτε ζωτικώτερον
 οὔτε νοερώτερον οὔτε οὐσιωδέστερον, οὐδὲ τὸ
 ἐφαψάμενον ἔχει ταῦτα κατὰ λόγον τῆς ἐπαφῆς, τὸ μὲν
 15 ἐγγὺς ἐγγυτέρω, τὸ δὲ πόρρω πορρωτέρω. εἴπερ οὖν
 ἐφετὸν τὸ εἶναι, τὸ μάλιστα ὄν μάλλον ὃ τε μάλιστα
 νοῦς, εἴπερ τὸ νοεῖν ὅλως· καὶ τὸ τῆς ζωῆς ὡσαύτως· εἰ
 δὴ τὸ ὄν πρῶτον δεῖ λαβεῖν πρῶτον ὄν, εἶτα νοῦν, εἶτα
 τὸ ζῶον—τοῦτο γὰρ ἤδη πάντα δοκεῖ περιέχειν—ὃ δὲ
 20 νοῦς δεύτερον—ἐνέργεια γὰρ τῆς οὐσίας—οὔτ' ἂν κατὰ
 τὸ ζῶον ὁ ἀριθμὸς εἴη—ἤδη γὰρ καὶ πρὸ αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐν
 καὶ δύο ἦν—οὔτε κατὰ τὸν νοῦν—πρὸ γὰρ αὐτοῦ ἡ
 οὐσία ἐν οὐσα καὶ πολλὰ ἦν.

9. Λείπεται τοίνυν θεωρεῖν, πότερα ἡ οὐσία τὸν
 ἀριθμὸν ἐγέννησε τῷ αὐτῆς μερισμῷ, ἢ ὁ ἀριθμὸς
 ἐμέρισε τὴν οὐσίαν· καὶ δὴ καὶ ἡ οὐσία καὶ κίνησις καὶ
 στάσις καὶ ταῦτ' ὅν καὶ ἕτερον αὐτὰ τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἢ ὁ
 5 ἀριθμὸς ταῦτα. ἀρχὴ δὲ τῆς σκέψεως· ἀρ' οἶόν τε
 ἀριθμὸν εἶναι ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ ἢ δεῖ καὶ τὰ δύο ἐπὶ δυσὶ
 πράγμασι θεωρεῖσθαι καὶ τρία ὡσαύτως; καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸ
 ἐν τὸ ἐν τοῖς ἀριθμοῖς; εἰ γὰρ ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ ἄνευ τῶν
 ἀριθμητῶν δύναιτο εἶναι, πρὸ τῶν ὄντων δύναιτο ἂν
 10 εἶναι. ἀρ' οὖν καὶ πρὸ τοῦ ὄντος; ἢ τοῦτο ἐατέον καὶ πρὸ
 ἀριθμοῦ ἐν τῷ παρόντι καὶ δοτέον ἀριθμὸν ἐξ ὄντος
 γίνεσθαι. ἀλλ' εἰ τὸ ὄν ἐν ὄν ἐστι καὶ τὰ δύο ὄντα δύο
 ὄντα ἐστί, προηγῆσεται τοῦ τε ὄντος τὸ ἐν καὶ ὁ ἀριθμὸς

¹ These are the "very important kinds" of Plato *Sophist* 254-255A which Plotinus understands as the categories of the intelligible world.

the true substance has stripped off these things and is a power standing on itself, no feeble shadowy thing but the most living and intelligent of all, than which nothing is livelier or more intelligent or more substantial; that which touches it has all this in proportion to [the closeness of] its touch, that which is near more nearly and that which is far from farther. If then being is an object of desire, that which is most of all being is still more desirable, and that which is most of all intellect, if intelligence in general is desirable; and the same with life. If then one should take being first, since it exists first, then intellect, and then the living being (for it is already established that this contains all things)—but intellect comes second, for it is the active actuality of substance; then number would not be on the level of the living being—for even before it both one and two existed—nor on the level of intellect—for substance was before it, which was already one and many.

9. It remains then to consider whether substance generated number by its own division, or number divided substance; for certainly either substance and movement and rest and same and other generated number or number generated them.¹ The starting-point of our investigation is: can number exist by itself, or must the two be observed in two things, and the three likewise? And, indeed, also the one which is among the numbers? For if it could exist by itself without the things numbered, it could exist before beings. Then also before being? Well, let us leave this and assume for the present that the one is before number and grant that number comes to exist from being. But if being is one being, and two beings are two beings, the one will precede being

τῶν ὄντων. ἄρ' οὖν τῇ ἐπινοίᾳ καὶ τῇ ἐπιβολῇ ἢ καὶ τῇ
 15 ὑποστάσει; σκεπτόν δὲ ᾧδε· ὅταν τις ἄνθρωπον ἕνα νοῆ
 καὶ καλὸν ἕν, ὕστερον δὴ πον τὸ ἐν νοεῖ ἐφ' ἑκατέρω· καὶ
 δὴ καὶ ὅταν ἵππον καὶ κύνα, καὶ δὴ σαφῶς τὰ δύο
 ἐνταῦθα ὕστερον. ἀλλ' εἰ γεννώη ἄνθρωπον καὶ γεννώη
 ἵππον καὶ κύνα ἢ ἐν αὐτῷ ὄντας προφέρῃ καὶ μὴ κατὰ
 20 τὸ ἐπελθόν μήτε γεννώη μήτε προφέρῃ, ἄρ' οὐκ ἐρεῖ·
 "εἰς ἕν ἰτέον καὶ μετιτέον εἰς ἄλλο ἕν καὶ δύο ποιητέον
 καὶ μετ' ἐμοῦ καὶ ἄλλο ποιητέον"; καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ τὰ
 ὄντα, ὅτε ἐγένετο, ἠριθμήθη· ἀλλ' ὅσα ἔδει¹ γενέσθαι
 δηλοῦν ἦν [ὅσα ἔδει].² πᾶς ἄρα ὁ ἀριθμὸς ἦν πρὸ αὐτῶν
 τῶν ὄντων. ἀλλ' εἰ πρὸ τῶν ὄντων, οὐκ ἦν ὄντα. ἢ ἦν ἐν
 25 τῷ ὄντι, οὐκ ἀριθμὸς ὦν τοῦ ὄντος—ἐν γὰρ ἦν ἔτι τὸ
 ὄν—ἀλλ' ἢ τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ δύναμις ὑποστᾶσα ἐμέρισε τὸ
 ὄν καὶ οἶον ᾧδίνεω ἐποίησεν αὐτὸν τὸ πλῆθος. ἢ γὰρ ἢ
 οὐσία αὐτοῦ ἢ ἢ ἐνέργεια ὁ ἀριθμὸς ἔσται, καὶ τὸ ζῶον
 αὐτὸ καὶ ὁ νοῦς ἀριθμὸς. ἄρ' οὖν τὸ μὲν ὄν ἀριθμὸς
 30 ἠνωμένος, τὰ δὲ ὄντα ἐξεληλιγμένους ἀριθμὸς, νοῦς δὲ
 ἀριθμὸς ἐν ἑαυτῷ κινούμενος, τὸ δὲ ζῶον ἀριθμὸς
 περιέχων; ἐπεὶ καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐνὸς γενόμενον τὸ ὄν, ὡς ἦν
 ἐν ἐκείνῳ, δεῖ αὐτὸ οὕτως ἀριθμὸν εἶναι διὸ καὶ τὰ εἶδη
 35 οὐσιώδης ἀριθμὸς· ἄλλος δὲ ὁ μοναδικὸς λεγόμενος
 εἰδωλον τούτου. ὁ δὲ οὐσιώδης ὁ μὲν ἐπιθεωρούμενος

¹ Harder: δεῖ Enr.

² del. Harder, ut correctionem ad 22 ὅσα δεῖ.

³ Plotinus is working here with the speculation about Ideal Numbers in the Old Academy discussed by Aristotle in *Metaphysics* M and N. For "monadic" (arithmetical) number see M 8. 1083b16–17.

and number will precede beings. Is this, then, in our idea and intuitive conception of it, or in its reality? But we should proceed with the investigation in this way: when someone thinks one man and one beauty, he presumably thinks the one later in each case; and also when he thinks a horse and a dog, it is perfectly obvious here that he thinks the two afterwards. But suppose he was generating man and generating horse and dog, or, when they existed in himself, bringing them out, and not just generating them or bringing them out as they casually occurred to him, will he not say "We must go to one, and pass to another one, and make two, and make another one along with me"? And certainly the beings were not numbered at the time when they came to be; but it was [already clear] how many there had to be. The whole number, therefore, existed before the beings themselves. But, if numbers were before beings, they were not beings. Now number was in being, not as the number of being—for being was still one—but the power of number which had come to exist divided being and made it, so to speak, in labour to give birth to multiplicity. For number will be either the substance or the actual activity of being, and the absolute living being is number, and Intellect is number. Is not Being, then, unified number, and the beings number unfolded, and Intellect number moving in itself, and the Living Being inclusive number? Since, because Being came into existence from the One, as that One was one, Being must also in this way be number: this is why they called the Forms henads and numbers. And this is substantial number; but the other, which is called monadic, is its image.¹ But the substantial number is that con-

τοῖς εἶδεσι καὶ συγγενῶν αὐτά, πρῶτως δὲ ὁ ἐν τῷ ὄντι
καὶ μετὰ τοῦ ὄντος καὶ πρὸ τῶν ὄντων. βάσιν δὲ ἔχει τὰ
ὄντα ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ πηγὴν καὶ ρίζαν καὶ ἀρχήν. καὶ γὰρ
40 τῷ ὄντι τὸ ἐν ἀρχῇ καὶ ἐπὶ τούτου ἐστὶν ὄν· σκεδασθεῖη
γὰρ ἂν· ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐπὶ τῷ ὄντι τὸ ἐν· ἤδη γὰρ ἂν εἶη ἐν
πρὶν τυχεῖν τοῦ ἐν, καὶ ἤδη τὸ τυγχάνον τῆς δεκάδος
δεκάς πρὶν τυχεῖν τῆς δεκάδος.

10. Ἐστὼς οὖν τὸ ἂν ἐν πλήθει ἀριθμός, ὅτε πολὺ
μὲν ἠγείρετο, παρασκευὴ δὲ οἶον ἦν πρὸς τὰ ὄντα καὶ
πρωτύπωσις καὶ οἶον ἐνάδες τόπων ἔχουσαι τοῖς ἐπ'
αὐτὰς ἰδρυθησομένοις. καὶ γὰρ καὶ νῦν "τοσοῦτον
5 βούλομαι" φησι "πλήθος χρυσοῦ ἢ οἰκιῶν". καὶ ἐν μὲν
ὁ χρυσός, βούλεται δὲ οὐ τὸν ἀριθμὸν χρυσοῦ ποιῆσαι,
ἀλλὰ τὸν χρυσοῦ ἀριθμὸν, καὶ τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἤδη ἔχων
ἐπιθεῖναι ζητεῖ τοῦτον τῷ χρυσῷ, ὥστε συμβῆναι τῷ
χρυσῷ τοσοῦτω γενέσθαι. εἰ δὲ τὰ ὄντα μὲν ἐγένετο πρὸ
10 ἀριθμοῦ, ὁ δ' ἀριθμὸς ἐπ' αὐτοῖς ἐπεθεωρεῖτο τοσαῦτα
κινήσεισθαι τῆς ἀριθμούσης φύσεως, ὅσα τὰ ἀριθμητά,
κατὰ συντυχίαν ἦν ἂν τοσαῦτα καὶ οὐ κατὰ πρόθεσιν
τοσαῦτα, ὅσα ἐστίν. εἰ οὖν μὴ εἰκῆ τοσαῦτα, ὁ ἀριθμὸς
αἴτιος πρῶν τοῦ τοσαῦτα· τούτο δὲ ἐστίν, ἤδη ὄντος
15 ἀριθμοῦ μετέσχε τὰ γενόμενα τοῦ τοσαῦτα, καὶ ἕκαστον
μὲν τοῦ ἐν μετέσχε, ἵνα ἐν ἦ. ἐστὶ δὲ ὄν παρὰ τοῦ ὄντος,
ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ ὄν παρ' αὐτοῦ ὄν, ἐν δὲ παρὰ τοῦ¹ ἐν.
ἕκαστόν τε ἐν, εἰ ὁμοῦ πολλὰ ἦν τὸ ἐν τὸ ἐπ' αὐτοῖς, ὡς

¹ Theiler: παρ' αὐτοῦ (vel αὐτοῦ) Enn.

templated in the Forms and sharing in their generation, and, primarily, the number in Being and with Being and before the beings. The beings have their foundation in it, and their source and root and principle. For indeed the One is the principle of Being, and the being of Being rests upon this; for otherwise it would be scattered; but the One does not rest upon Being; for then Being would be one before attaining the One, and what attains the decad would be a decad before attaining the decad.

10. Being, therefore, standing firm in multiplicity was number, when it woke as many, and was a kind of preparation for the beings and a preliminary sketch, and like unities keeping a place for the beings which are going to be founded on them. For even here and now one says "I want such and such an amount of gold or house-property." And gold is one, but he wants not to make number gold but gold number; and since he already possesses the number he tries to apply it to the gold, so that it will happen to the gold to become so much. But if the beings came into existence before number, and the number was observed in them as the numbering nature was moved to a total corresponding to the things numbered, they would be so many by chance, and not as many as they are by deliberate predisposition. If then they are not as many as they are just casually, number is a cause which pre-exists their being so many: that is, it was when number already existed that the things which came to be participated in the "so many" and each one of them participated in the "one", so that it might be one. It is a being from Being, as Being is being from itself, and one from the one. And each is one, if the one in them is many all

τριὰς ἓν, καὶ τὰ πάντα ὄντα οὕτως ἓν, οὐχ ὡς τὸ ἓν τὸ
κατὰ τὴν μονάδα, ἀλλ' ὡς ἓν ἡ μυριάς ἢ ἄλλος τις
20 ἀριθμός. ἐπεὶ καὶ ὁ λέγων ἤδη πράγματα μύρια
γενόμενα, εἰ εἶπε μύρια ὁ ἀριθμῶν, οὐ παρ' αὐτῶν
φησι τὰ μύρια προσφωνεῖσθαι δεικνύντων ὥσπερ τὰ
χρώματα αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ τῆς διανοίας λεγούσης τοσαῦτα·
εἰ γὰρ μὴ λέγοι, οὐκ ἂν εἶδείη, ὅσον τὸ πλήθος. πῶς οὖν
25 ἔρεϊ; ἢ ἐπιστάμενος ἀριθμεῖν· τοῦτο δέ, εἰ ἀριθμὸν
εἶδείη· εἶδείη δ' ἂν, εἰ εἶη ἀριθμός. ἄγνοεῖν δὲ τὴν φύσιν
ἐκείνην, ὅσα ἐστὶ τὸ πλήθος, ἄτοπον, μᾶλλον δὲ
ἀδύνατον. ὥσπερ τοίνυν εἰ λέγοι τις ἀγαθὰ, ἢ τὰ παρ'
αὐτῶν τοιαῦτα λέγει, ἢ κατηγορεῖ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ὡς
30 συμβεβηκὸς αὐτῶν. καὶ εἰ τὰ πρῶτα λέγει, ὑπόστασιν
λέγει τὴν πρώτην· εἰ δὲ οἷς συμβέβηκε τὸ ἀγαθόν, δεῖ
εἶναι φύσιν ἀγαθοῦ, ἵνα καὶ ἄλλοις συμβεβήκη, ἢ¹ τὸ
αἴτιον τὸ πεποιηκὸς καὶ ἐν ἄλλῳ δεῖ εἶναι ἢ αὐτοαγαθὸν
ἢ γεγεννηκὸς τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐν φύσει οἰκεία. οὕτως καὶ ἐπι
35 ὑφεστῶσαν δεκάδα ἂν λέγοι, ἢ οἷς συμβέβηκε δεκάς
λέγων αὐτὴν δεκάδα ἀναγκάζοιτο ἂν τίθεσθαι ἐφ' αὐτῆς
οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ δεκάδῃ οὖσαν. ἀνάγκη τοίνυν, εἰ τὰ ὄντα
δεκάδα λέγοι, ἢ αὐτὰ δεκάδα εἶναι ἢ πρὸ αὐτῶν ἄλλην
δεκάδα εἶναι οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ αὐτὸ τοῦτο δεκάδα οὖσαν.²

¹ Igal: ἢ Enn.² Kirchhoff: εἶναι Enn., H-S¹.

together, as the triad is one, and all the beings are one, not like the one of the number one, but as the ten thousand or any other number is one. Since someone who says that things have now come to ten thousand, if he says "ten thousand" as he counts, he is not asserting that the things are called "ten thousand" of and from themselves, as if they were showing their colours, but it is the reason which says there are so many of them; for if it did not say so, he would not know how many there were. How, then, can he say how many? Because he knows how to number; but this is so if he knows number; but he could only know number if there was number. But it would be absurd, or rather impossible, to be ignorant of the nature of number, of how much the amount is. It is, then, as when someone speaks of good things: he either speaks of them as good of themselves, or predicates the good incidentally of them. And if he is speaking of primary goods, he is speaking of the first real existence; but if of things to which the good is incidental, there must be a nature of good in order for it to be incidental to other things, in that the cause which produces good also in another must be either the Good Itself or something which has generated the good in its own nature. In this way also one who speaks of a number in the real beings, a decad for instance, would be speaking either of the decad which exists as itself, or if he was speaking of the things to which decad is incidental he would be compelled to postulate the decad itself existing by itself and being nothing but decad. It is necessary, then, if one says that the real beings are decad, that they themselves must be the decad or there must be another decad prior to them which is nothing else

40 καθόλου τοίνυν δεκτέον,¹ ὅτι πᾶν, ὅτιπερ ἂν κατ' ἄλλου
κατηγορηται, παρ' ἄλλου ἐλήλυθεν εἰς ἐκείνο ἢ ἐνέργειά
ἐστὶν ἐκείνου. καὶ εἰ τοιοῦτον, οἶον μὴ ποτέ μὲν
παρεῖναι, ποτέ δὲ μὴ παρεῖναι, ἀλλ' αἰεὶ μετ' ἐκείνου
εἶναι, εἰ οὐσία ἐκείνο, οὐσία καὶ αὐτό, καὶ οὐ μᾶλλον
ἐκείνο ἢ αὐτὸ οὐσία· εἰ δὲ μὴ οὐσίαν διδοίη, ἀλλ' οὖν
45 τῶν ὄντων καὶ ὄν. καὶ εἰ μὲν δύναιτο τὸ πρᾶγμα ἐκείνο
νοεῖσθαι ἄνευ τῆς ἐνεργείας αὐτοῦ, ἅμα μὲν εἶναι οὐδὲν
ἦττον ἐκείνω, ὕστερον δὲ τῆ ἐπινοία τάττεσθαι παρ'
ἡμῶν. εἰ δὲ μὴ παρεπινοεῖσθαι οἶόν τε ἄνευ ἐκείνου, οἶον
ἄνθρωπον ἄνευ τοῦ ἔν, ἢ οὐχ ὕστερον αὐτοῦ, ἀλλὰ
50 συνυπάρχον, ἢ πρότερον αὐτοῦ, ἵνα αὐτὸ δι' ἐκείνο
ὑπάρχη· ἡμεῖς δὲ φάμεν πρότερον τὸ ἔν καὶ τὸν
ἀριθμόν.

11. Ἄλλ' εἰ τὴν δεκάδα μὴδὲν εἶναι τις λέγοι ἢ
ἐνάδας τοσαύτας, εἰ μὲν τὴν ἐνάδα συγχωροῖ εἶναι, διὰ
τί μίαν μὲν συγχωρήσει ἐνάδα εἶναι, τὰς δὲ δέκα οὐκέτι;
ὡς γὰρ ἢ μία τὴν ὑπόστασιν ἔχει, διὰ τί οὐ καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι;
5 οὐ γὰρ δὴ συνεζεύχθαι δεῖ ἐνὶ τινὶ τῶν ὄντων τὴν μίαν
ἐνάδα· οὕτω γὰρ οὐκέτι ἕκαστον τῶν ἄλλων ἔν εἶη. ἀλλ'
εἰ δεῖ καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν ἄλλων ἔν εἶναι, κοινὸν τὸ ἔν
τοῦτο δὲ φύσις μία κατὰ πολλῶν κατηγορουμένη, ἢν
ἐλέγομεν καὶ πρὸ τοῦ ἔν πολλοῖς θεωρεῖσθαι δεῖν καθ'
10 αἰτὴν ὑπάρχειν. οὕσης δὲ ἐνάδος ἔν τούτῳ καὶ πάλιν ἔν
ἄλλῃ θεωρουμένης, εἰ μὲν κακείνη ὑπάρχει, οὐ μία
μόνον ἐνάς τὴν ὑπόστασιν ἔξει καὶ οὕτως πλήθος ἔσται
ἐνάδων· εἰ δ' ἐκείνην μόνην τὴν πρώτην, ἦτοι τῷ

¹ Sleeman: δεκτέον Enn.

but that very thing, decad. In general, then, it must be accepted that everything, whatever it is, which is predicated of something else came to it from something else or is the active actuality of the thing of which it is predicated. And if it is of such a kind as not to be sometimes present and sometimes not, but to be always with that thing, if that thing is substance, it also is substance, and what it is predicated of is no more substance than it is; but if one does not grant it substance, at least it belongs to the real beings and exists. And if that thing could be thought of without its actual activity, that activity could none the less be simultaneous to it, but ranked later by us in our thought. But if it cannot be thought except along with what is predicated of it, as "man" cannot be thought without the "one", it is either not posterior to but co-existent with it, or prior to it, so that the thing may exist through the activity; but we maintain that the one and number are prior.

11. But if someone says that the decad is nothing but so many henads [or units], if he agrees that the unit exists, why will he agree that one unit exists and not agree that the ten do? For why do not the other units have existence as the one does? For the one unit must not be yoked to any one being: for if it was, each of the others could no longer be one. But if each individual one of the others must also be one, the one is common: this means that there is one nature predicated of many, which we said must exist in itself before being observed in many. If then a unit exists in this thing and is again observed in another, if that other unit also really exists, it will not be only one unit which has existence, and so there will be a multiplicity of units; but if it is said that only that

μάλιστα ὄντι συνοῦσαν ἢ τῷ μάλιστα ἐνὶ πάντη. ἀλλ' εἰ
 15 μὲν τῷ μάλιστα ὄντι, ὁμωνύμως ἂν αἱ ἄλλαι ἐνάδες καὶ
 οὐ συνταχθήσονται τῇ πρώτῃ, ἢ ὁ ἀριθμὸς ἐξ ἀνομοίων
 μονάδων καὶ διφοραὶ τῶν μονάδων καὶ καθόσον
 μονάδες· εἰ δὲ τῷ μάλιστα ἐνί, τί ἂν δέοιτο τὸ μάλιστα
 ἐν, ἵνα ἐν ἢ, τῆς μονάδος ταύτης; εἰ δὴ ταῦτα ἀδύνατα,
 ἀνάγκη ἐν εἶναι οὐκ ἄλλο τι ὄν ἢ ἐν ψιλόν,
 20 ἀπηρημωμένον τῇ οὐσίᾳ αὐτοῦ πρὸ τοῦ ἕκαστον ἐν
 λεχθῆναι καὶ νοηθῆναι. εἰ οὖν τὸ ἐν ἄνευ τοῦ πράγματος
 τοῦ λεγομένου ἐν κάκει ἔσται, διὰ τί οὐ καὶ ἄλλο ἐν
 ὑποστήσεται; καὶ χωρὶς μὲν ἕκαστον πολλὰι μονάδες, ἃ
 καὶ πολλὰ ἐν. εἰ δ' ἐφεξῆς οἶον γεννώη ἢ φύσις, μᾶλλον
 25 δὲ γεννήσασα ἢ οὐ σταῖσα καθ' ἐν ὧν ἐγέννα, οἶον συνεχῆ
 ἕνα ποιούσα, περιγράψασα μὲν καὶ σταῖσα θάττον ἐν τῇ
 προόδῳ τοὺς ἐλάττους ἀριθμοὺς ἀπογεννήσαι, εἰς πλεόν
 δὲ κινηθεῖσα, οὐκ ἐπ' ἄλλοις, ἀλλ' ἐν αὐταῖς ταῖς
 κινήσεσι, τοὺς μείζους ἀριθμοὺς ὑποστήσαι· καὶ οὕτω
 30 δὴ ἐκάστοις ἀριθμοῖς ἐφαρμόσαι τὰ πλήθη ἕκαστα καὶ
 ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων εἰδυῖαν, ὡς, εἰ μὴ ἐφαρμοσθεῖη
 ἕκαστον ἀριθμῷ ἐκάστῳ, ἢ οὐδ' ἂν εἶη ἢ ἄλλο τι ἂν
 παρεκβάν εἶη ἀνάριθμον καὶ ἄλογον γεγεννημένον.

first unit exists, it will do so as coupled either to that
 which in the highest degree exists or to that which is
 in the highest degree one in every way. But if to that
 which exists in the highest degree, then the other
 units will have merely their name in common with
 the first, and will not be ranked on the same level
 with it, or number will consist of unlike unities and
 there will be intrinsic differences between unities
 even in so far as they are unities; but if it is coupled
 to that which is one in the highest degree, why
 would what is one in the highest degree need this
 unity in order to be one? If these suggestions are
 impossible, there must be a one which is nothing else
 but bare one, isolated in its essential nature, before
 each individual one is spoken and thought. If, then,
 the one without the thing which is called one is
 going to exist also there in the intelligible, why
 should not another one as well come into existence?
 And each individual taken separately will be many
 unities, that is, many "ones". But if that nature
 generates in a kind of succession, or rather has
 generated, or does not stand still at one thing of
 those which it has generated, but makes a kind of
 continuous one, when it draws a line and stops more
 quickly in its outgoing it generates the lesser num-
 bers, but when it moves further, not in other things
 but in its very own movements, it brings the greater
 numbers into existence; and so it would fit the
 particular multiplicities and each particular being
 to the particular numbers, knowing that, if each
 particular thing was not fitted to each particular
 number, it could not exist at all or would get away
 and be something else by becoming innumerate and
 irrational.

12. Ἄλλ' εἰ καὶ τὸ ἓν καὶ τὴν μονάδα μὴ ὑπόστασιν
λέγοι ἔχειν—οὐδὲν γὰρ ἓν, ὃ μὴ τὶ ἓν—πάθημα δέ τι
τῆς ψυχῆς πρὸς ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων, πρῶτον μὲν τί
κωλύει, καὶ ὅταν λέγῃ ὄν, πάθημα λέγειν εἶναι τῆς
5 ψυχῆς καὶ μηδὲν εἶναι ὄν; εἰ δ' ὅτι νύττει τοῦτο καὶ
πλήττει καὶ φαντασίαν περὶ ὄντος ποιεῖ, νυττομένην καὶ
φαντασίαν λαμβάνουσαν τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ περὶ τὸ ἓν
ὀρώμεν. ἔπειτα πότερα καὶ τὸ πάθημα καὶ τὸ νόημα τῆς
ψυχῆς ἓν ἢ πλῆθος ὀρώμεν; ἀλλ' ὅταν λέγωμεν "μὴ ἓν",
10 ἐκ μὲν τοῦ πράγματος αὐτοῦ οὐκ ἔχομεν τὸ ἓν—φαινομένην
γὰρ οὐκ εἶναι ἓν αὐτῷ τὸ ἓν—ἔχομεν ἄρα ἓν, καὶ ἔστιν
ἓν ψυχῇ ἄνευ τοῦ "τὶ ἓν". ἀλλ' ἔχομεν τὸ ἓν ἐκ τῶν
ἔξωθεν λαβόντες τινὰ νόησιν καὶ τινὰ τύπον, οἷον
ἐννόημα ἐκ τοῦ πράγματος. οἱ μὲν γὰρ τῶν λεγομένων
παρ' αὐτοῖς ἐνοημάτων ἓν εἶδος τὸ τῶν ἀριθμῶν καὶ
15 τοῦ ἑνὸς τιθέντες ὑποστάσεις ἂν τοιαύτας τιθεῖεν, εἴπερ
τι τῶν τοιούτων ἓν ὑποστάσει, πρὸς οὓς περὶ αὐτῶν
καιρίως ἂν λέγοιτο. ἀλλ' οὖν εἰ τοιοῦτον οἷον ἕστερον
ἀπὸ τῶν πραγμάτων λέγοιεν γεγενῆσθαι ἓν ἡμῖν πάθημα
ἢ νόημα, οἷον καὶ τὸ τοῦτο καὶ τὸ τί καὶ δὴ καὶ ὄχλον
20 καὶ ἐορτὴν καὶ στρατὸν καὶ πλῆθος—καὶ γὰρ ὡς περὶ τὸ
πλῆθος παρὰ τὰ πράγματα τὰ πολλὰ λεγόμενα οὐδὲν

¹ Plotinus is arguing here against the Stoics: cp. *SVF* II 864 and 866.

12. But if someone says that the one and the unit have no real existence—for there is nothing that is one which is not some one thing—but the one is a way the soul is affected in regard to each of the real beings, first of all, what is the obstacle to saying that whenever one says "being" one is speaking of a way in which the soul is affected and there is no such thing as being? But if it is because this stabs and strikes and takes a mental image of being, we see that the soul is also stabbed by and takes a mental image of the one.¹ Then, do we see this way of being affected and this thinking of the soul as one or many? But when we say "not one", we do not have the one from the thing itself—for we say that the one is not in it—but we do have the one, and it is in the soul without the "some one thing". But we have the one by taking some kind of thought and impression from the things outside us, a sort of idea derived from the thing. For those who posit the idea of number and the idea of the one as one species of what are called in their philosophy ideas,² should posit existences of this kind, if any of such things are in existence; and there is much that could appropriately be said against them about this. But if they were to say that this way of being affected or thought arises in us as a kind of after-consequence of the things, like the "this" and the "something" and, for that matter, "crowd" and "feast" and "army" and "multitude"—for just as the multitude is nothing over and above the things which are said to be

² ἐννόημα is a Stoic term; for the Stoics ἐνόηματα had no extra-mental existence: cp. *SVF* I 65 and Diogenes Laertius VII 61.

ἔστιν οὐδ' ἡ ἑορτὴ παρὰ τοὺς συναχθέντας καὶ εὐθυμουμένους ἐπὶ ἱεροῖς, οὕτως οὐδὲ τὸ ἐν μόνον τι καὶ ἀπηρημωμένον τῶν ἄλλων νοοῦντες, ὅταν λέγωμεν εἰ πολλὰ δὲ καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα εἶναι, οἷον καὶ δεξιὸν καὶ τὸ
 25 ἄνω καὶ τὰ ἀντικείμενα τούτοις· τί γὰρ ἂν εἴη πρὸς ὑπόστασιν ἐπὶ δεξιοῦ ἢ ὅτι ὁ μὲν ὠδί, ὁ δ' ὠδί ἔστηκεν ἢ κἀθηται; καὶ δὴ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἄνω ὡσαύτως, τὸ μὲν τοιαύτην θέσω (ἔχειν)¹ καὶ ἐν τούτῳ τοῦ παντός μᾶλλον, ὃ λέγομεν ἄνω, τὸ δὲ εἰς τὸ λεγόμενον κάτω—
 30 πρὸς δὴ τὰ τοιαῦτα πρῶτον μὲν ἐκκίνο λεκτέον, ὡς ὑπόστασις τις τῶν εἰρημένων ἐν ἐκάστῳ τούτων, οὐ μέντοι ἡ αὐτὴ ἐπὶ πάντων οὔτε αὐτῶν πρὸς ἄλληλα οὔτε πρὸς τὸ ἐν ἀπάντων. χωρὶς μέντοι πρὸς ἕκαστον τῶν λεχθέντων ἐπιστατέον.

13. Τὸ δὴ ἀπὸ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου γενέσθαι τὴν νόησιν τοῦ ἐνός, τοῦ ὑποκειμένου [καὶ]² τοῦ ἐν αἰσθήσει ἀνθρώπου ὄντος ἢ ἄλλου ὄτουοῦν ζώου ἢ καὶ λίθου, πῶς ἂν εἴη εὐλογον, ἄλλου μὲν ὄντος τοῦ φανέντος—τοῦ
 5 ἀνθρώπου—ἄλλου δὲ καὶ οὐ ταύτου ὄντος τοῦ ἐν; οὐ γὰρ ἂν καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ μὴ ἀνθρώπου τὸ ἐν ἢ διάνοια κατηγοροῦ. ἔπειτα, ὡσπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ δεξιοῦ καὶ τῶν τοιοῦτων οὐ μᾶτην κινουμένη, ἀλλ' ὀρώσα θέσω διάφορον ἔλεγε τὸ ὠδί, οὕτωςί τι ἐνταῦθα ὀρώσα λέγει ἐν· οὐ γὰρ δὴ κενὸν πάθημα καὶ ἐπὶ μηδενὶ τὸ ἐν λέγει.
 10 οὐ γὰρ δὴ ὅτι μόνον καὶ οὐκ ἄλλο· καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῷ “καὶ οὐκ ἄλλο” ἄλλο ἐν λέγει. ἔπειτα τὸ ἄλλο καὶ τὸ ἕτερον

¹ Theiler.² del. Beutler.

many, nor the feast anything over and above those assembled and enjoying themselves at the ceremonies, so, when we say “one”, we do not think of the one as something alone and quite apart from the other things; and there are many others like this, like “right” and “up” and their opposites; for what would there be of real existence about “right” other than that one stands or sits here and the other there? And it would be just the same with “up”, that a thing has this kind of position and is more in that part of the universe, which we call “up”, and another more in that called “down”—in answer to this sort of argument we must first say this, that there is some kind of real existence in each of these things mentioned, but not the same in all, either of themselves in relation to each other or in the relation of all to the one. So we must consider each of the arguments separately.

13. How could it be reasonable to suppose that the thought of the one originated from what underlies it, which is a man or some other living thing, or even a stone, in the realm of sense, since what appears is one thing—the man—and the one is another and not the same? Otherwise reason would not predicate “one” in the case of a thing which is not man. And then, just as in the case of “right” and the like reason was not moved without any cause, but because it saw a different position it said “here”, so in this case it is because it sees something that it says “one”; for it is not reporting an empty way of being affected and saying “one” about nothing. For it is certainly not saying that the thing is alone and there is no other thing; for in the “no other thing” it is saying another “one”. And then the “other” and

ἕστερον· μὴ γὰρ ἐρείσασα πρὸς ἓν οὔτε ἄλλο ἐρεῖ ἢ
 διάνοια οὔτε ἕτερον, τό τε “μόνον” ὅταν λέγῃ, ἓν μόνον
 λέγει· ὥστε τὸ ἓν λέγει πρὸ τοῦ “μόνον”. ἔπειτα τὸ
 15 λέγει, πρὶν εἰπεῖν περὶ ἄλλου “ἓν”, ἐστὶν ἓν, καὶ περὶ οὗ
 λέγει, πρὶν εἰπεῖν ἢ νοῆσαι τινα περὶ αὐτοῦ, ἐστὶν ἓν· ἢ
 γὰρ ἓν ἢ πλείω ἑνὸς καὶ πολλά· καὶ εἰ πολλά, ἀνάγκη
 προϋπάρχειν ἓν. ἐπεὶ καὶ ὅταν πλῆθος λέγῃ πλείω ἑνὸς
 λέγει· καὶ στρατὸν πολλοὺς ὠπλισμένους καὶ εἰς ἓν
 20 συντεταγμένους νοεῖ, καὶ πλῆθος ὄν οὐκ ἔῃ πλῆθος
 εἶναι· ἢ διάνοια δῆλόν που καὶ ἐνταῦθα ποιεῖ ἢ διδοῦσα
 τὸ ἓν, ὃ μὴ ἔχει τὸ πλῆθος, ἢ¹ ὁξέως τὸ ἓν τὸ ἐκ τῆς
 τάξεως ἰδυῦσα τὴν τοῦ πολλοῦ φύσιν συνήγαγεν εἰς ἓν·
 οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐδ’ ἐνταῦθα τὸ ἓν ψεύδεται, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ
 25 οἰκίας τὸ ἐκ πολλῶν λίθων ἓν· μᾶλλον μέντοι τὸ ἓν ἐπ’
 οἰκίας. εἰ οὖν μᾶλλον ἐπὶ τοῦ συνεχοῦς καὶ μᾶλλον ἐπὶ
 τοῦ μὴ μεριστοῦ, δῆλον ὅτι ὄντος τινὸς φύσεως τοῦ ἑνὸς
 καὶ ὑφεστῶσης. οὐ γὰρ οἶόν τε ἓν τοῖς μὴ οὐοῖ τὸ
 μᾶλλον εἶναι, ἀλλ’ ὥσπερ τὴν οὐσίαν κατηγοροῦντες
 καθ’ ἐκάστου τῶν αἰσθητῶν, κατηγοροῦντες δὲ καὶ
 30 κατὰ τῶν νοητῶν κυριώτερον κατὰ τῶν νοητῶν τὴν
 κατηγορίαν ποιούμεθα ἓν τοῖς οὐοῖ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ
 κυριώτερον τιθέντες, καὶ τὸ ὄν μᾶλλον ἓν οὐσία καὶ
 αἰσθητὴ ἢ ἓν τοῖς ἄλλοις γένεσιν, οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἓν μᾶλλον
 καὶ κυριώτερον ἓν τε τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς αὐτοῖς διάφορον
 35 κατὰ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἓν τοῖς νοητοῖς ὁρῶντες εἶναι—
 κατὰ πάντας τοὺς τρόπους εἰς ἀναφορὰν μέντοι ἑνὸς

¹ ἢ (vel) U, Creuzer: ἢ wBCCQ: εἰ x: ἢ H-S¹.

the “different” come later; for if the reason does not rest on the one it will not say “other” or “different”, and when it says “alone” it says “one alone”; so that it says the “one” before the “alone”. And then what speaks is one before it says “one” of something else, and that about which it speaks, before anyone speaks or thinks about it, is one, for it is either one or more than one and many; and if many, one must exist before it. For also when it says “multitude” it says “more than one”; and it thinks an army as many men armed and brought together into one order, and does not allow what is a multitude to be a multitude; the reason which gives the “one” which the multitude does not have makes it clear [that it is not only a multitude], or, by seeing the “one” which results from its order, gathers the nature of the many into one; for the one is not falsely predicated here any more than it is of a house which is one from many stones; though the “one” of the house is more one. If then it is more one in the continuous and [still] more one in the indivisible, it is clearly because the one is a particular nature which has existence. For it is not possible for there to be a “more” in non-existents, but just as when we predicate substance of each individual sense-object, and also predicate it of the intelligibles, we predicate it more appropriately of the intelligibles, putting the “more” and the “more appropriately” in the realm of real beings, and say that there is more being in the category of substance, even sensible substance, than in the other genera, in the same way also we see that the one, which differs in respect of more [and less] also in the sense-objects, is also more and more appropriately in the intelligibles—and in all these ways it must be

εἶναι φατέον. ὡσπερ δὲ ἡ οὐσία καὶ τὸ εἶναι νοητὸν καὶ οὐκ αἰσθητὸν ἔστι, κἂν μετέχη τὸ αἰσθητὸν αὐτῶν, οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἐν περὶ αἰσθητὸν μὲν ἂν κατὰ μετοχὴν θεωροῖτο, νοητὸν μέντοι καὶ νοητῶς ἢ διάνοια αὐτὸ
 40 λαμβάνει· ὥστε ἀπ' ἄλλου ἄλλο νοεῖ, ὃ οὐχ ὄρα· προῆδει ἄρα· εἰ δὲ προῆδει ὄν τόδε τι, ταῦτόν τῳ ὄν. καὶ ὅταν τι, ἐν αὐτῷ λέγει· ὡσπερ ὅταν τινέ, δύο· καὶ ὅταν τινάς, πολλούς. εἰ τοίνυν μηδέ¹ τι νοῆσαι ἔστιν ἄνευ τοῦ ἐν ἢ τοῦ δύο ἢ τινος ἀριθμοῦ, πῶς οἶόν τε ἄνευ οὐ οὐχ οἶόν τε
 45 τι νοῆσαι ἢ εἰπεῖν μὴ εἶναι; οὐ γὰρ μὴ ὄντος μηδ' ὀτιοῦν δύνασαι² νοῆσαι ἢ εἰπεῖν, λέγειν μὴ εἶναι ἀδύνατον. ἀλλ' οὐ χρεία πανταχοῦ πρὸς παντὸς νοήματος ἢ λόγου γένεσιν, προϋπάρχειν δεῖ καὶ λόγου καὶ νοήσεως· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν πρὸς τὴν τούτων γένεσιν παραλαμβάνοιτο. εἰ δὲ
 50 καὶ εἰς οὐσίας ἐκάστης ὑπόστασιν—οὐδὲν γὰρ ὄν, ὃ μὴ ἐν—καὶ πρὸ οὐσίας ἂν εἴη καὶ γεννῶν τὴν οὐσίαν. διὸ καὶ ἐν ὄν, ἀλλ' οὐκ ὄν, εἴτα ἐν· ἐν μὲν γὰρ τῳ “ὄν” καὶ ἐν πολλὰ ἂν εἴη, ἐν δὲ τῳ “ἐν” οὐκ ἐν τὸ “ὄν”, εἰ μὴ καὶ ποιήσειεν αὐτὸ προσενεῦσαν αὐτοῦ τῇ γενέσει. καὶ τὸ
 55 “τούτο” δὲ οὐ κενόν· ὑπόστασιν γὰρ δεικνυμένην λέγει

¹ H-S: μήτε Enn.

² Igal: δύνασθαι wBIUCQ: δύναται Kirchoff: δύνατον H-S¹: om. x.

affirmed that there is a reference to one. But just as substance and being is intelligible and not perceptible, even if the perceptible participates in it, in this way also the one might be perceived in the perceptible by participation, but the reason grasps it as intelligible and does so intellectually; so that it thinks one thing, which it does not see, from another; so it knew it before. But if it knew it before as being this particular thing, it is the same as being. And when it says it is something, it says as well that there is one; just as when it says “some” in the dual, it says that there are two; and when in the plural, that there are many.¹ If, then, it is not possible to think anything without the one or the two or some number, how is it possible for that not to exist without which it is not possible to think or speak? For it is impossible to say that something does not exist of which, since it does not exist, you cannot think or say anything at all. But that which is needed everywhere for the coming into existence of every thought and statement must be there before statement and thinking: for this is how it can be brought to contribute to their coming into existence. But if it is needed for the existence of each and every substance—for there is nothing which is which is not one—it would also exist before substance and as generating substance. For this reason also it is one-being, but not first being and then one; for in that which was being and also one there would be many; but being is not present in the one except in the sense that it might make it by inclining to its generation. And the “this” is not an empty word; for

¹ Cp. Plato *Sophist* 237D6-10.

ἀντὶ τοῦ ὀνόματος αὐτοῦ καὶ παρουσίαν τινά, οὐσίαν ἢ
 ἄλλο τι τῶν ὄντων· ὥστε τὸ “τοῦτο” σημαίνει ἂν οὐ
 κενόν τι οὐδ’ ἔστι πάθημα τῆς διανοίας ἐπὶ μηδενὶ ὄντι,
 ἀλλ’ ἔστι πρᾶγμα ὑποκείμενον, ὥσπερ εἰ καὶ τὸ ἴδιον
 60 αὐτοῦ τινος ὄνομα λέγοι.

14. Πρὸς δὲ τὰ κατὰ τὸ πρὸς τι λεχθέντα ἂν τις
 εὐλόγως λέγοι, ὡς οὐκ ἔστι τὸ ἐν τοιοῦτον οἶον ἄλλου
 παθόντος αὐτὸ μηδὲν παθὸν ἀπολωλεκέναι τὴν αὐτοῦ
 φύσιν, ἀλλὰ δεῖ, εἰ μέλλοι ἐκ τοῦ ἐν ἐκβῆναι, πεπονθέναι
 5 τὴν τοῦ ἐνὸς στέρησιν εἰς δύο ἢ πλείω διαιρεθῆναι. εἰ οὖν ὁ
 αὐτὸς ὄγκος διαιρεθῆις δύο γίνεται οὐκ ἀπολόμενος ὡς
 ὄγκος, δῆλον ὅτι παρὰ τὸ ὑποκείμενον ἦν ἐν αὐτῷ
 προσὸν τὸ ἐν, ὃ ἀπέβαλε τῆς διαιρέσεως αὐτὸ
 φθειράσης. ὃ δὴ ὅτε μὲν τῷ αὐτῷ πάρεστιν, ὅτε δὲ
 10 ἀπογίνεται, πῶς οὐκ ἐν τοῖς οὐσι τάξομεν, ὅπου ἂν ἦ;
 καὶ συμβεβηκέναι μὲν τούτοις, καθ’ αὐτὸ δὲ εἶναι, ἐν τε
 τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς ὅταν φαίνεται ἐν τε τοῖς νοητοῖς, τοῖς
 μὲν ὑστέρις συμβεβηκός, ἐφ’ αὐτοῦ δὲ ἐν [τοῖς
 νοητοῖς]¹ τῷ πρώτῳ, ὅταν ἐν, εἶτα ὄν. εἰ δὲ τις λέγοι,
 ὡς καὶ τὸ ἐν μηδὲν παθὸν προσελθόντος ἄλλου αὐτῷ
 15 οὐκέτι ἐν, ἀλλὰ δύο ἔσται, οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἐρεῖ. οὐ γὰρ τὸ ἐν
 ἐγένετο δύο, οὔτε ᾧ προσετέθη οὔτε τὸ προστεθέν, ἀλλ’
 ἐκάτερον μένει ἐν, ὥσπερ ἦν· τὰ δὲ δύο κατηγορεῖται

¹ delevimus, ut glossam ad τῷ πρώτῳ.

it is used to speak of a real existence which is pointed out instead of its name, and of a presence, a substance or some other of the things which really are; so that the “this” would indicate something which is not empty, and it is not a way in which the reason is affected about nothing existent, but a thing underlying the thought, just as if it said the proper name of a thing itself.

14. One might reasonably reply to what has been said under the head of relation, that the one is not the kind of thing to lose its own nature when something else is affected and it is affected in no way; but if it is going to escape from the one it must experience the deprivation of the one by being divided into two or more. If therefore the same bulk becomes two by being divided without being destroyed as bulk, it is clear that besides the underlying bulk the one was in it as something added, which it lost when the division destroyed it. Now, how can we avoid ranking among things which exist, wherever it may be, what is sometimes present to and sometimes absent from one and the same thing? And we shall affirm that it is present to these things incidentally, but exists by itself, when it appears both in perceptible and intelligible things, incidentally to the later order, but on its own in the first [order of being], when it is first one and then being. But if someone were to say that the one also, without being affected in any way, when something else comes to it will no longer be one but two, he will not be speaking correctly. For it was not the one which became two, neither the one which was added nor the one it was added to, but each of them remains one, as it was; but the “two” is predicated of both, but the

κατ' ἀμφοῖν, χωρὶς δὲ τὸ ἐν καθ' ἑκατέρου μένοντος.
οὕκουν τὰ δύο φύσει ἐν σχέσει καὶ ἡ δυάς. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν
20 κατὰ τὴν σύνοδον καὶ τὸ συνόδω εἶναι ταῦτόν τῷ δύο
ποιεῖν, τάχ' ἂν ἦν ἡ τοιαύτη σχέσις τὰ δύο καὶ ἡ δυάς.
νῦν δὲ καὶ ἐν τῷ ἐναντίῳ πάθει θεωρεῖται πάλιν αὐτὴ δυάς·
σχισθέντος γὰρ ἐνός τινος γίνεται δύο· οὐ τοίνυν οὔτε
σύνοδος οὔτε σχέσις τὰ δύο, ἢ' ἂν ἦν σχέσις. ὁ αὐτὸς δὲ
25 λόγος καὶ ἐπὶ παντὸς ἀριθμοῦ. ὅταν γὰρ σχέσις ἦ ἡ
γεννώσά τι, ἀδύνατον τὴν ἐναντίαν τὸ αὐτὸ γεννᾶν, ὡς
τοῦτο εἶναι τὸ πρᾶγμα τὴν σχέσιν. τί οὖν τὸ κύριον
αἴτιον; ἐν μὲν εἶναι τοῦ ἐν παρουσία, δύο δὲ δυάδος,
ὥσπερ καὶ λευκὸν λευκοῦ καὶ καλὸν καλοῦ καὶ δικαίου
30 δίκαιον. ἢ οὐδὲ ταῦτα θετέον εἶναι, ἀλλὰ σχέσεις καὶ ἐν
τούτοις αἰτιατέον, ὡς δίκαιον μὲν διὰ τὴν πρὸς τάδε
τοιάνδε σχέσιν, καλὸν δέ, ὅτι οὕτω διατιθέμεθα οὐδενὸς
ἄλλου ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ οἷον διαθεῖναι ἡμᾶς οὐδ'
ἤκοντος ἐπακτοῦ τῷ καλῷ φαινομένῳ. ὅταν τοίνυν ἴδῃς
35 τι ἐν ὃ λέγεις, πάντως δήπου ἐστὶ καὶ μέγα καὶ καλὸν
καὶ μῆρῖα ἂν εἴῃ εἰπεῖν περὶ αὐτοῦ. ὡς οὖν τὸ μέγα καὶ
μέγεθός ἐστιν ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ γλυκὺ καὶ πικρὸν καὶ ἄλλαι

¹ Cp. Plato *Phaedo* 96E8–97E1. Plotinus here is following the *Phaedo* very closely, i.e. he is treating numbers simply

“one” separately of each, which remains what it is. The two and the dyad is not therefore naturally relative. But if two was by coming together, and coming together was the same thing as making two, perhaps the two and the dyad would be a relation of this kind. But as it is the dyad is also observed on the other hand in the opposite way of being affected; for when some one thing is cut, it becomes two; so that the two is neither a coming together nor a cutting, so as to be a relation. And the same argument applies to every number. For, when it is a relation which produces something, it is impossible for the opposite relation to produce the same thing so that this thing can be the relation. What then is the proper cause of number? A thing is one by the presence of the one and two by the presence of the dyad, just as it is white by the presence of the white and beautiful by that of the beautiful and just by that of the just.¹ Otherwise, one would not be able to maintain that these exist either, but would have to make relations responsible for these two, as if the just was so because of this particular relation to these particular things, and the beautiful because we are so disposed, with nothing existing in the underlying reality of a kind to dispose us, and nothing coming from outside to what appears beautiful. Whenever, then, you see something which you call one, it is of course also in every way great and beautiful and there would be a vast number of other things to say about it. Therefore, as the great and greatness are in it, and sweet and bitter and other

as a particular kind of Forms, with the same objective reality and causative power as other Forms.

ποιότητες, διὰ τί οὐχὶ καὶ τὸ ἓν; οὐ γὰρ δὴ ποιότης μὲν
 ἔσται πᾶσα ἡτισοῦν, ποσότης δ' ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν οὐκ ἔσται,
 οὐδὲ ποσότης μὲν τὸ συνεχές, τὸ δὲ διωρισμένον οὐκ
 40 ἔσται, καίτοι μέτρῳ τὸ συνεχές χρήται τῷ διωρισμένῳ.
 ὡς οὖν μέγα μεγέθους παρουσία, οὕτω καὶ ἓν ἐνός καὶ
 δύο δυάδος καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ὡσαύτως. τὸ δὲ ζητεῖν πῶς
 μεταλαμβάνει κοινὸν πρὸς πάντων τῶν εἰδῶν τὴν
 ζητουμένην μετάληψιν. φατέον δ' ἐν μὲν τοῖς
 45 διηρημένοις ἄλλως θεωρεῖσθαι τὴν [δεκάδα]¹ ἐνρῦσαν
 δεκάδα, ἐν δὲ τοῖς συνεχέσιν ἄλλως, ἐν δὲ ταῖς πολλαῖς
 εἰς ἓν τοσαύταις δυνάμεσιν ἄλλως· καὶ ἐν τοῖς νοητοῖς
 ἤδη ἀναβεβηκέναι· ἔτι δὲ ἐκεῖ μηκέτι ἐν ἄλλοις
 θεωρουμένους, ἀλλ' αὐτοὺς ἐφ' αὐτῶν ὄντας τοὺς
 ἀληθεστάτους ἀριθμοὺς εἶναι, αὐτοδεκάδα, οὐ δεκάδα
 50 τιῶν νοητῶν.

15. Πάλιν γὰρ ἐξ ἀρχῆς τούτων ἡδὴ λεχθέντων
 λέγωμεν τὸ μὲν ζύμπαν ὄν τὸ ἀληθινὸν ἐκεῖνο καὶ ὄν
 εἶναι καὶ νοῦν καὶ ζῶον τέλειον εἶναι, ὁμοῦ δὴ πάντα ζῶα
 εἶναι, οὐ δὴ τὸ ἓν ἐνί, ὡς ἦν αὐτῷ δυνατόν, μεμίμηται·
 5 καὶ τόδε τὸ ζῶον τὸ πᾶν ἔφυγε γὰρ ἢ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ φύσις
 τὸ ἐκεῖ ἔν, εἴπερ καὶ ἔμελλεν αἰσθητὸν εἶναι. ἀριθμὸν δὴ
 δεῖ αὐτὸν εἶναι σύμπαντα· εἰ γὰρ μὴ τέλειος εἴη, ἐλλείπει·
 ἂν ἀριθμῶ τι· καὶ εἰ μὴ πᾶς ἀριθμὸς ζῶων ἐν
 αὐτῷ εἴη, παντελὲς ζῶον οὐκ ἂν εἴη· ἔστιν

¹ del. Igal.

qualities, why not also the one? For there will certainly not be every possible kind of quality, but not quantity, in the real things; nor will the continuous be quantity and the discrete not, although the continuous uses the discrete as a measure. As therefore a thing is great by the presence of greatness, so it is one by the presence of one and two by the presence of dyad, and the rest in the same way. But the problem of how the thing participates [in number] is common to the enquiry about participation in all the Forms. But we must affirm that the decad is observed in one way in things that are discrete and in another in things that are continuous, and in other ways in the many unified powers of this particular number; and that we have already ascended among the intelligibles; and that there are the true numbers, no longer observed in other things but existing themselves on their own, the absolute decad, not the decad of some intelligibles.

15. Now that this has been said, let us say again, starting at the beginning, that total being, that true being, is both being and intellect and perfect living thing, and is all living things together; this universal living thing here below has imitated its one, as far as it could by [its own] one; for the nature of the perceptible escaped the one there, since it was going to be perceptible by the senses. It must certainly be total number; for if it was not perfect, it might be deficient in some number; and if the whole number of living things was not in it, it would not be the "complete living thing".¹ Number therefore exists

¹ Again Plato *Timaeus* 31B1.

10 οὖν ὁ ἀριθμὸς πρὸ ζῶον παντὸς καὶ τοῦ παντελοῦς
ζῴου. ὁ μὲν δὴ ἄνθρωπος ἐν τῷ νοητῷ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ζῶα
καθὸ ἐστὶ, καὶ ἡ ζῶον παντελές ἐστὶν ἐκεῖνο. καὶ γὰρ
καὶ ὁ ἐνταῦθα ἄνθρωπος, ἡ ζῶον τὸ πᾶν, μέρος αὐτοῦ·
καὶ ἕκαστον, ἡ ζῶον, ἐκεῖ ἐν ζῶω ἐστίν. ἐν δὲ τῷ νῷ,
καθόσον νοῦς, ὡς μὲν μέρη οἱ νοῖ πάντες καθ'
15 ἕκαστον ἀριθμὸς δὲ καὶ τούτων. οὐ τοίνυν οὐδ' ἐν νῷ
ἀριθμὸς πρώτως· ὡς δὲ ἐν νῷ, ὅσα νοῦ ἐνέργειαι καὶ ὡς
νοῦ, δικαιοσύνη καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι ἀρεταὶ καὶ
ἐπιστήμη καὶ ὅσα νοῦς ἔχων νοῦς ἐστὶν ὄντως. πῶς οὖν
οὐκ ἐν ἄλλῳ ἢ ἐπιστήμη; ἢ ὅτι ἔστι ταῦτόν καὶ ὁμοῦ ὁ
20 ἐπιστήμων, τὸ ἐπιστητόν, ἡ ἐπιστήμη, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα
ᾠσαύτως· διὸ καὶ πρώτως ἕκαστον καὶ οὐ συμβεβηκὸς
ἢ δικαιοσύνη, ψυχῇ δέ, καθόσον ψυχῇ, συμβεβηκός·
δυνάμει γὰρ μᾶλλον ταῦτα, ἐνεργείᾳ δέ, ὅταν πρὸς νοῦν
καὶ σὺν νῷ.² μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο ἤδη τὸ ὄν, καὶ ἐν τούτῳ ὁ
25 ἀριθμὸς, μεθ' οὗ τὰ ὄντα γεννᾶ κινούμενον κατ' ἀριθμόν,
προστησάμενον τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς τῆς ὑποστάσεως αὐτῶν,
ὡσπερ καὶ αὐτοῦ τὸ ἐν συνάπτον αὐτὸ τὸ ὄν πρὸς τὸ
πρώτον, οἱ δ' ἀριθμοὶ οὐκέτι τὰ ἄλλα πρὸς τὸ πρῶτον·
ἀρκεῖ γὰρ τὸ ὄν συνημμένον. τὸ δὲ ὄν γενόμενον ἀριθμὸς
30 συνάπτει τὰ ὄντα πρὸς αὐτό· σχίζεται γὰρ οὐ καθὸ ἐν,
ἀλλὰ μένει τὸ ἐν αὐτοῦ· σχιζόμενον δὲ κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ

¹ Creuzer: ὡς Enn.

² R^{2mg}: συνη Enn.

prior to every living thing and to the "complete living thing". Man is certainly in the intelligible, and the other living things in that they exist, and that intelligible exists in that it is the "complete living thing". For in fact the man here below also, in that the All is a living thing, is part of it; and each individual thing, in that it is a living thing, is there in the intelligible living thing. And in Intellect, in so far as it is Intellect, all the intellects exist individually as parts; but then there is a number of these also. Not even in Intellect then does number exist primarily; but it is in Intellect as the sum of the active actualities of Intellect; and, as it is the number of Intellect, it is righteousness and self-control and the other virtues and knowledge and all the things by the possession of which Intellect is really Intellect. How then is knowledge not in something else? It is because the knower, the known and the knowledge are the same and all together, and it is just the same with the rest; for this reason each exists primarily and righteousness is not incidental but is incidental to soul in so far as it is soul; for in soul these things are rather potential, but are actual when it is directed to Intellect and with Intellect. But immediately after Intellect comes being, and number is in this, and with its help it produces the real beings when moving according to number, setting the numbers before their existence as the One stands before its own, joining being itself to the first (but the numbers no longer join the other beings to the first; for it suffices that being is joined to it). But being, when it has become number, joins the beings to itself; for it splits (not in so far as it is one, but its one abides); and when it has split according to its

φύσιν εἰς ὅσα ἠθέλησεν, εἶδεν εἰς ὅσα κατὰ¹ τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἐγέννησεν ἐν αὐτῷ ἄρα ὄντα· ταῖς γὰρ δυνάμεσι τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ ἐσχίσθη καὶ τοσαῦτα ἐγέννησεν, ὅσα ἦν ὁ ἀριθμός. ἀρχὴ οὖν καὶ πηγὴ ὑποστάσεως τοῖς οὖσιν
 35 ὁ ἀριθμὸς ὁ πρῶτος καὶ ἀληθής. διὸ καὶ ἐνταῦθα μετὰ ἀριθμῶν ἢ γένεσις ἐκάτοισι, καὶ ἄλλον ἀριθμὸν λάβητι, ἢ ἄλλο γεννᾶ ἢ γίνεται οὐδέν. καὶ οὗτοι μὲν πρῶτοι ἀριθμοί, ὡς ἀριθμητοί· οἱ δ' ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἤδη ἀμφότερα ἔχουσιν· ἢ μὲν παρὰ τούτων, ἀριθμητοί, ἢ δὲ
 40 κατὰ τούτους τὰ ἄλλα μετροῦσι, καὶ ἀριθμοῦντες τοὺς ἀριθμούς καὶ τὰ ἀριθμητά· τίνοι γὰρ δέκα ἂν λέγοιεν ἢ τοῖς παρ' αὐτοῖς ἀριθμοῖς;

16. Τούτους δὴ, οὓς φαμεν πρῶτους ἀριθμούς καὶ ἀληθεῖς, ποῦ ἂν τις φαίη θείητε καὶ εἰς τί γένος τῶν ὄντων; ἐν μὲν γὰρ τῷ ποσῷ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι παρὰ πᾶσι καὶ δὴ καὶ ποσοῦ μνήμην ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν ἐποιεῖσθε
 5 ἀξιοῦντες ὁμοίως [ἐν]² τῷ συνεχεῖ καὶ τὸ διωρισμένον ἐν τοῖς οὖσι τιθέναι. πάλιν τε αὐτὸ λέγετε, ὡς πρῶτων ὄντων οὗτοι εἰσιν οἱ ἀριθμοί, ἄλλους τε αὐτὸ ἀριθμούς παρ' ἐκείνους εἶναι λέγετε ἀριθμοῦντας. πῶς οὖν ταῦτα
 10 ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ ἐν τῷ ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς πότερα ποσόν τι ἢ

¹ coniectimus: καὶ Enn.

² expunctum in A, del. Kirchinoff.

¹ In this chapter Plotinus has moved from the simple Platonism of the *Phaedo* to a position more in accord with the later discussions in the Academy, alluded to by

nature into as many as it wished, it looked to see how many it had generated according to number, which were therefore in it; for it was split by the powers of number and generated as many as the number was. Therefore the first and true number is the principle and spring of existence for the real beings.¹ And so here below too the coming into being of every individual thing takes place with the help of numbers, and when something takes another number it generates something else or nothing comes to be at all. And these are the first numbers, as numbered; but those in the other things already have both; in that they come from these first, they are numbered numbers, but in that they are according to these, they measure the other things, numbering both the numbers and the things numbered; for by what could they say "ten" except by the numbers in themselves?

16. Now, these which we affirm are the first and true numbers—someone might ask "Where do you put them, and in which of the genera of beings? For everybody puts them in the quantitative, and you did mention the quantitative in what you said before, when you claimed that one must put the discrete like the continuous among beings.² But again on the other side you say that these are the numbers of the first real beings, and again you say that there are other numbering numbers beside these. So tell us how you arrange all this. For there is a great deal of difficulty here; since the one also which is in per-

Aristotle, in which the Ideal Numbers are prior to the Forms.

² In ch. 14, 33–40.

πολλάκις μὲν τὸ ἐν ποσόν, αὐτὸ δὲ μόνον ἀρχὴ ποσοῦ
καὶ οὐ ποσόν; καὶ πότερα ἀρχὴ οὐσα συγγενὲς ἢ ἄλλο
τι; ταῦτα ἡμῖν πάντα δίκαιοι διωυφεῖν ἔστε. λεκτέον
οὖν ἀρξαμένοις ἐντεῦθεν περὶ τούτων, ὡς ὅταν μὲν—
15 πρῶτον δ' ἐπὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ποιητέον τὸν λόγον—ὅταν
τοῖνον ἄλλο μετ' ἄλλου λαβῶν εἴπῃς δύο, οἶον κύνα καὶ
ἄνθρωπον ἢ καὶ ἀνθρώπους δύο ἢ πλείους, δέκα εἰπῶν
καὶ ἀνθρώπων δεκάδα, ὁ ἀριθμὸς οὗτος οὐκ οὐσία οἷδ'¹
ὡς ἐν αἰσθητοῖς, ἀλλὰ καθαρῶς ποσόν. καὶ μερίζων¹
καθ' ἓνα καὶ τῆς δεκάδος ταύτης μέρη ποιῶν τὰ ἓνα
20 ἀρχὴν ποιεῖς καὶ τίθεσαι ποσοῦ· εἰς γὰρ τῶν δέκα οὐχ ἐν
καθ' αὐτό. ὅταν δὲ τὸν ἄνθρωπον αὐτὸν ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ
λέγῃς ἀριθμὸν τινα, οἶον δυάδα, ζῶον καὶ λογικόν, οὐχ
εἰς ἔτι ὁ τρόπος ἐνταῦθα, ἀλλ' ἢ μὲν διεξοδεύεις καὶ
ἀριθμεῖς, ποσόν τι ποιεῖς, ἢ δὲ τὰ ὑποκείμενά ἐστι δύο
25 καὶ ἐκάτερον ἐν, εἰ τὸ ἐν ἐκάτερον συμπληροῦν τὴν
οὐσίαν καὶ ἢ ἐνότῃς ἐν ἐκατέρῳ, ἀριθμὸν ἄλλον καὶ
οὐσιώδη λέγεις. καὶ ἡ δυὰς αὕτη οὐχ ὕστερον οὐδὲ ὅσον
λέγει μόνον ἔξωθεν τοῦ πράγματος, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐν τῇ οὐσίᾳ
καὶ συνέχον τὴν τοῦ πράγματος φύσιν. οὐ γὰρ ποιεῖς
ἀριθμὸν σὺ ἐνταῦθα ἐν διεξόδῳ ἐπιὼν πράγματα καθ'
30 αὐτὰ ὄντα οὐδὲ συνιστάμενα ἐν τῷ ἀριθμείσθαι· τί γὰρ
ἂν γένοιτο εἰς οὐσίαν ἄλλῳ ἀνθρώπῳ μετ' ἄλλου
ἀριθμουμένῳ; οὐδὲ γὰρ τις ἐνός, ὥσπερ ἐν χορῶ, ἀλλ' ἢ

¹ Creuzer: μερίζον Enn.

ceptible things—is it something quantitative, or is a
number of times one quantitative, but it itself the
principle of the quantitative and not quantitative?
And, being the principle, is it of the same genus, or
something else? You owe us an explanation of all
this.” So, starting from this point, we must say about
all this that when—we must base our discussion first
on perceptible things—when, therefore, you take
one thing after another and say “two”, a dog and a
man for instance, or two men, or more when you say
“ten” and “a decad of men”, this number is not a
substance, not even the kind of substance which
occurs among perceptible things, but purely quanti-
tative. And when you divide into ones and make
them part of this decad you make and posit the ones
as principle of the quantitative, for a one of the ten is
not one in itself. But when you say that man in
himself is a particular number, a dyad for instance,
animal and rational, your way of proceeding here is
not one single way, but in so far as you are counting
and numbering you are making something quantita-
tive, but in so far as the underlying realities are two
and each of them is one, if each one is an essential
completion of the substance and unity is in each, you
are speaking of a different and substantial number.
And this dyad is not posterior, nor just as much as it
says merely, outside the thing, but that which is in
the substance and holds the nature of the thing
together. For you certainly do not make number
here below when you go through one after another
things which have their own existence and do not
come together in the numbering: for what difference
does it make in substance to one man if he is counted
along with another? For there is no unity either, as

δεκάς αὕτη τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐν σοὶ τῷ ἀριθμοῦντι τὴν
 ὑπόστασιν ἂν ἔχοι, ἐν δὲ τοῖς δέκα οἷς ἀριθμεῖς μὴ
 35 συντεταγμένους εἰς ἓν οὐδὲ δεκάς ἂν λέγοιτο, ἀλλὰ δέκα
 σὺ ποιεῖς ἀριθμῶν, καὶ ποσὸν τοῦτο τὸ δέκα· ἐν δὲ τῷ
 χορῷ καὶ ἔστι τι ἕξω καὶ ἐν τῷ στρατῷ. πῶς δ' ἐν σοί; ἢ
 ὁ μὲν πρὸ τοῦ ἀριθμεῖν ἐγκείμενος ἄλλως· ὁ δ' ἐκ τοῦ
 φανῆναι ἕξωθεν πρὸς τὸν ἐν σοὶ ἐνέργεια ἢ ἐκείνων ἢ
 40 κατ' ἐκείνους, ἀριθμοῦντος ἅμα καὶ ἀριθμὸν γεννῶντος
 καὶ ἐν τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ ὑπόστασιν ποιῶντος ποσοῦ, ὥσπερ
 καὶ ἐν τῷ βαδίζειν ὑπόστασιν τινος κινήσεως. πῶς οὖν
 ἄλλως ὁ ἐν ἡμῖν; ἢ ὁ τῆς οὐσίας ἡμῶν· μετέχουσα
 φησιν ἀριθμοῦ καὶ ἀρμονίας καὶ ἀριθμὸς αὐτὴ καὶ
 ἀρμονία· οὔτε γὰρ σῶμά φησί τις οὔτε μέγεθος· ἀριθμὸς
 45 ἄρα ἢ ψυχῆ, εἴπερ οὐσία. ὁ μὲν δὲ τοῦ σώματος ἀριθμὸς
 οὐσία, ὡς σῶμα, ὁ δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς οὐσία, ὡς ψυχαί. καὶ
 δὴ ὅλως ἐπὶ τῶν νοητῶν, εἰ ἔστι τὸ ἐκεῖ ζῶον αὐτὸ
 πλείω, οἷον τριάς, αὕτη ἢ τριάς οὐσιώδης ἢ ἐν τῷ ζῳῷ.
 ἢ δὲ τριάς ἢ μήπω ζῳου, ἀλλ' ὅλως τριάς ἐν τῷ ὄντι,
 50 ἀρχὴ οὐσίας. εἰ δ' ἀριθμεῖς ζῳον καὶ καλόν, ἐκάτερον

¹ Plato *Timaeus* 36E6-37A1. In considering Pythagorean and Platonic thought about numbers it is most important always to remember that, from Pythagoras onwards, the numbers are musical numbers, the numbers of melody and rhythm.

² A Pythagorean doctrine accepted by Plato's pupil

there is in a chorus, but this decad of men would have its existence in you, the numberer, but in the ten which you number, which are not ordered together into one, one could not even speak of a decad, but you make ten by numbering, and this ten is quantitative; but in the chorus there is also something outside you, and also in the army. But in what way is the number in you? Now, that which is latent in you before the numbering is there in a different way; but that which comes from the outward appearance to the number in you is the actualisation either of those numbers in you or according to them, when you number and at the same time generate number and in this actualisation produce a real existence of the quantitative, just as in walking you produce a real existence of a kind of movement. What, then, about the number which is in us in a different way? It is the number of our substance; for, Plato says, since it participates in number and melody¹ it is again number and melody; for, one says, it is not body or magnitude; the soul therefore is a number,² if it is a substance. The number of body is certainly substance, in a bodily way, but the number of soul is substances in the way souls are. And indeed generally among the intelligibles, if the living being there is itself more than one, a triad for instance, this triad in the living being is substantial. But the triad which does not yet belong to the living being, but is in a general way a triad in real being, is a principle of substance. But if you number "living being" and "beautiful", each of them is one, but you Xenocrates: see Aristotle *Metaphysics* A 5. 985b30 and Xenocrates fr. 60 Heinze; for Xenocrates the soul was a *self-moving* number.

μὲν ἓν, σὺ δὲ γεννᾷς ἀριθμὸν ἐν σοὶ καὶ ἐνεργεῖς ποσὸν καὶ δυάδα. εἰ μὲντοι ἀρετὴν τέτταρα λέγοις—καὶ τετράς ἐστὶ τις οἶον τὰ μέρη αὐτῆς εἰς ἓν—καὶ ἐνάδα τετράδα οἶον τὸ ὑποκείμενον, καὶ σὺ τετράδα ἐφαρμόττεις τὴν ἐν σοὶ.

17. Ὁ δὲ λεγόμενος ἄπειρος ἀριθμὸς πῶς; πέρας γὰρ οὗτοι αὐτῷ διδόασιν οἱ λόγοι. ἢ καὶ ὀρθῶς, εἶπερ ἔσται ἀριθμὸς· τὸ γὰρ ἄπειρον μάχεται τῷ ἀριθμῷ. διὰ τί οὖν λέγομεν “ἄπειρος ὁ ἀριθμὸς”; ἀρ’ οὖν ὡσπερ 5 ἄπειρον λέγομεν γραμμὴν—λέγομεν δὲ γραμμὴν ἄπειρον, οὐχ ὅτι ἐστὶ τις τοιαύτη, ἀλλ’ ὅτι ἔξεστιν ἐπὶ τῇ μεγίστῃ, οἶον τοῦ παντός, ἐπινοῆσαι μείζω—οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ; γνωσθέντος γὰρ ὅσους ἐστὶν ἔστω αὐτὸν διπλασίονα ποιῆσαι τῇ διανοίᾳ οὐκ ἐκείνῳ 10 συνάψαιτα. τὸ γὰρ ἐν σοὶ μόνῳ νόημα καὶ φάντασμα πῶς ἂν τοῖς οὐσι προσάψαις; ἢ φήσομεν ἄπειρον ἐν τοῖς νοητοῖς εἶναι γραμμὴν; ποσὴ γὰρ ἂν εἴη ἢ ἐκεῖ γραμμὴ· ἀλλ’ εἰ μὴ ποσὴ τις ἐν ἀριθμῷ, ἄπειρος ἂν εἴη. ἢ τὸ ἄπειρον ἄλλον τρόπον, οὐχ ὡς ἀδιεξίτητον. ἀλλὰ πῶς 15 ἄπειρος; ἢ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ τῆς αὐτογραμμῆς οὐκ ἐν προσοοούμενον πέρας. τί οὖν ἐκεῖ γραμμὴ καὶ πού; ὕστερον μὲν γὰρ ἀριθμοῦ· ἐνοράται γὰρ ἐν αὐτῇ τὸ ἓν· καὶ γὰρ ἀφ’ ἐνὸς καὶ πρὸς μίαν διάστασιν· ποσὸν δὲ τὸ

¹ Here Plotinus returns to the question raised in ch. 2 and deferred at the beginning of ch. 3.

generate number in yourself and actualise the quantitative and the dyad. If however you say that virtue is form—and it is a kind of tetrad, as its parts come together into one—and a tetradic [or fourfold] unity like the underlying reality, then you are fitting to it the tetrad which is in you.

17. But what about the number called unlimited¹? For these arguments of ours give it limit. And this is correct, if it is going to be a number; for unlimitedness clashes with number. Why, then, do we say “The number is unlimited”? Is it with number as it is when we say a line is unlimited?—but we say a line is unlimited not because there is any line of this kind but because it is possible with the longest line, that of the universe for instance, to think of a longer.² For when it is known how much a number is it is possible to double it in thought without connecting it to that original number. For how could you attach a thought and mental image which is only in you to things which really exist? Or are we going to assert that there is an unlimited line among the intelligibles? For [otherwise] the line there will be of a certain length; but if it was not of a certain numbered length, it would be unlimited. But its unlimitedness may be of another kind, not like something which you cannot get to the end of. But how is it unlimited? Now in the definition of the absolute line limit is not thought as included. What then is the line there in the intelligible, and where? It is certainly posterior to number; for the one is observed in it: it proceeds from one point and over one

² This is Aristotle’s account of mathematical infinity: see *Physics* Γ 7. 207b28–34.

τῆς διαστάσεως μέτρον οὐκ ἔχει. ἀλλὰ ποῦ τοῦτο; ἀρα
 μόνον ἐν ἐννοήσει οἶον ὀριστικῆ; ἢ καὶ πρᾶγμα, νοερὸν
 20 μέντοι. πάντα γὰρ οὕτως, ὡς καὶ νοερά καὶ πως τὸ
 πρᾶγμα. καὶ δὴ καὶ περὶ ἐπιπέδου καὶ στερεοῦ καὶ
 πάντων τῶν σχημάτων, ποῦ καὶ ὅπως· οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἡμεῖς
 τὰ σχήματα ἐπινοοῦμεν. μαρτυρεῖ δὲ τό τε τοῦ παντός
 σχῆμα πρὸ ἡμῶν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα, ὅσα φυσικὰ σχήματα ἐν
 25 τοῖς φύσει οὖσαν, ἃ δὴ ἀνάγκη πρὸ τῶν σωμάτων εἶναι
 ἀσχημάτιστα ἐκεῖ καὶ πρῶτα σχήματα. οὐ γὰρ μορφαὶ
 ἐν ἄλλοις, ἀλλ' αὐτὰ αὐτῶν ὄντα οὐκ ἐδεῖτο ἐκταθῆναι.
 τὰ γὰρ ἐκταθέντα ἄλλων. πάντοτε οὖν σχῆμα ἐν ἐν τῷ
 ὄντι, διεκρίθη δὲ ἦτοι ἐν τῷ ζῶντι ἢ πρὸ τοῦ ζῶντος. λέγω
 30 δὲ "διεκρίθη" οὐχ ὅτι ἐμεγεθύνθη, ἀλλ' ὅτι ἕκαστον
 ἐμερίσθη πρὸς ἕκαστον, ὡς τὸ ζῶν, καὶ τοῖς σώμασιν
 ἐδόθη τοῖς ἐκεῖ, οἶον πυρί, εἰ βούλει, τῷ ἐκεῖ ἢ ἐκεῖ
 πυραμῖς. διὸ καὶ τοῦτο μιμεῖσθαι θέλει μὴ δυνάμενον
 ὕλης αἰτία καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἀνάλογον, ὡς λέγεται περὶ τῶν
 35 τῆδε. ἀλλ' οἶν ἐν τῷ ζῶντι καθ' ὃ ζῶν; ἢ ἐν τῷ νῶ
 πρότερον· ἔστι μὲν γὰρ ἐν τῷ ζῶντι· εἰ μὲν οὖν τὸ ζῶν

¹ The pyramid is the "unit and seed" (στοιχείον καὶ σπέρμα) of fire in the mathematical physics of the *Timaeus*: see 55B4-5. Plotinus' whole way of thinking about the

distance; but it does not have a quantitative measure of that distance. But where is this? Is it only in a kind of defining thought? No, it is a thing, but an intellectual thing. For all [beings there] are like this, so as to be intellectual and, in some way, the real thing. And indeed [we must also ask] where and how about plane and solid and all the figures: for it is certainly not we who merely think the figures. The figure of the universe, which was before us, is evidence of this, and the other natural figures in the things which exist by nature, which must exist before the bodies as unfigured figures there in the intelligible, and primary figures. For they are not shapes in something else, but since they are themselves belonging to themselves there was no need for them to be extended: the extended figures belong to other things. Figure, then, is always one in real being, but it has distinctions in it either in the living being or before the living being. But I mean "has distinctions" not in the sense that it has acquired size, but because it has been divided, each part of it in correspondence to each being, and given to the bodies there in the intelligible, as to fire there, if you like, to the pyramid there.¹ This is why this fire here below wants to imitate it, though it cannot by reason of matter, and the other elements in a similar way, as is said about the elements here below. But is figure, then, in the living being in that it is living being? No, it is in Intellect before. For it is certainly in the living being; if therefore the living being was inclusive of Intellect, it would be primarily in the living

intelligible world requires the presence of bodies there, though they cannot be extended in space.

περικτικὸν ἦν τοῦ νοῦ, ἐν τῷ ζώῳ πρώτως, εἰ δὲ νοῦς
κατὰ τὴν τάξιν πρότερος, ἐν νῷ. ἀλλ' εἰ ἐν τῷ ζώῳ τῷ
παντελεῖ καὶ ψυχαί, πρότερος νοῦς. ἀλλὰ νοῦς φησιν
ὅσα ὀρᾶ ἐν τῷ παντελεῖ ζώῳ· εἰ οὖν ὀρᾶ,
40 ὕστερος. ἢ δυνατὸν τὸ "ὀρᾶ" οὕτως εἰρησθαι, ὡς ἐν τῇ
ὀράσει τῆς ὑποστάσεως γινομένης· οὐ γὰρ ἄλλος, ἀλλὰ
πάντα ἓν, καὶ ἡ νόσις δὲ ψιλὸν ἔχει σφαῖραν, τὸ δὲ
ζῶον ζώου σφαῖραν.

18. Ἀλλὰ γὰρ ὁ ἀριθμὸς ἐκεῖ ὤριστα· ἡμεῖς δ'
ἐπινοήσομεν πλείονα τοῦ προτεθέντος, καὶ τὸ ἄπειρον
οὕτως ἀριθμούντων. ἐκεῖ δ' ἐπινοῆσαι πλέον οὐκ ἔστι
τοῦ ἐπινοηθέντος· ἤδη γὰρ ἔστιν· οὐδ' ἐλείφθη τις οὐδὲ
5 λειφθήσεται, ἵνα τις καὶ προστεθῇ αὐτῷ. εἴη δ' ἂν κακέι
ἄπειρος, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι μεμετρημένος· ὑπὸ τίνος γάρ;
ἀλλ' ὅς ἐστι, πᾶς ἐστιν ἐν ᾧ καὶ ὁμοῦ καὶ ὅλος δὴ καὶ
οὐ περιελημμένος πέρατι τινι, ἀλλ' ἑαυτῷ ᾧ ὅς ἐστι·
τῶν γὰρ ὄντων ὅλως οὐδὲν ἐν πέρατι, ἀλλ' ἔστι τὸ
10 πεπερασμένον καὶ μεμετρημένον τὸ εἰς ἀπειρίαν
κωλυθὲν δραμεῖν καὶ μέτρον δεόμενον· ἐκεῖνα δὲ πάντα
μέτρα, ὅθεν καὶ κατὰ πάντα. καὶ γάρ, ἢ ζῶον, καλόν,
ἀρίστην τὴν ζωὴν ἔχον, οὐδεμιᾶ ζωῇ ἐλλείπον, οὐδ' αὖ
πρὸς θάνατον συμμιγῆ ἔχον τὴν ζωὴν· οὐδὲν γὰρ θνητὸν
15 οὐδ' ἀποθνήσκον· οὐδ' αὖ ἀμενηνῆ ἢ ζωῇ τοῦ ζώου
αὐτοῦ, ἀλλ' ἡ πρώτη καὶ ἐναργεστάτη καὶ τὸ τρανὸν

being; but if Intellect has priority in rank, it is primarily in Intellect. But if in the complete living being there are also souls, Intellect is prior. But, Plato says, "as many as Intellect sees in the living being"¹; if then it sees, it is posterior. But it is possible that the "sees" is meant in this sense, that the real existence of the living being comes about in the seeing; for Intellect is not other, but all are one, and intellection has the bare sphere but the living being the sphere of the living being.

18. But certainly number there in the intelligible is limited; but we think of a number greater than that which is before us, and the unlimited belongs to us numbering in this way. But there it is not possible to think of more than what is thought of; it is already there; no number is deficient, nor will any be deficient, so that any number could be added to it. But number might be unlimited there also, because it is not measured: for what could it be measured by? But what it is it all is, being one and all together and, certainly, a whole, and not bounded by any limit but by its own agency being what it is; for in general none of the real beings is in a limit, but what is limited and measured is what is prevented from running on into indefiniteness and needs a measure; but those real beings are all measures, and therefore are all beautiful. For in that it is a living being it is beautiful, having the best of life, deficient in no life, nor again having life mixed with death; for nothing is mortal or dying; nor again is the life of the living being itself strengthless, but the first and clearest life, having the pure essence of living, like the first

¹ *Timaeus* 39E7-9.

ἔχουσα τοῦ ζῆν, ὡσπερ τὸ πρῶτον φῶς, ἀφ' οὗ καὶ αἱ
 ψυχαὶ ζωσί τε ἐκεῖ καὶ αἱ δεῦρο ἰοῦσαι κομίζονται. οἷδε
 δὲ καὶ ὄτου χάριν ζῆ καὶ πρὸς ὃ ζῆ, ἀφ' οὗ καὶ ζῆ· ἐξ οὗ
 20 γάρ, καὶ εἰς ὃ ζῆ. ἡ δὲ πάντων φρόνησις καὶ ὁ πᾶς νοῦς
 ἐπῶν καὶ συνῶν καὶ ὁμοῦ ὧν ἀγαθώτερον αὐτὸ
 ἐπιχρώσας καὶ συγκερασάμενος φρόνησιν σεμνότερον
 αὐτοῦ τὸ κάλλος παρέχεται. ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐνταῦθα φρόνιμος
 ζωὴ τὸ σεμνὸν καὶ τὸ καλὸν κατὰ ἀλήθειάν ἐστι, καίτοι
 25 ἀμυδρῶς ὁράται. ἐκεῖ δὲ καθαρῶς ὁράται· δίδωσι γὰρ
 τῷ ὁρῶντι ὄρασιν καὶ δύνάμιν εἰς τὸ μᾶλλον ζῆν καὶ
 μᾶλλον εὐτόνως ζῶντα ὁρᾶν καὶ γενέσθαι ὃ ὁρᾷ.
 ἐνταῦθα μὲν γὰρ ἡ προσβολὴ καὶ πρὸς ἄψυχον ἢ πολλή,
 καὶ ὅταν πρὸς ζῶα, τὸ μὴ ζῶν αὐτῶν προβέβληται, καὶ
 ἡ ἔνδον ζωὴ μέμικται. ἐκεῖ δὲ ζῶα πάντα καὶ ὅλα ζῶντα
 30 καὶ καθαρὰ· καὶ ὡς οὐ ζῶόν τι λάβης, ἐξέλαμψεν αὐτοῦ
 εὐθέως καὶ αὐτὸ τὴν ζωήν. τὴν δὲ οὐσίαν ἐν αὐτοῖς
 διαβάσαν, ἀκίνητον εἰς μεταβολὴν παρέχουσαν αὐτοῖς
 τὴν ζωήν, καὶ τὴν φρόνησιν καὶ τὴν ἐν αὐτοῖς σοφίαν
 καὶ ἐπιστήμην θεασάμενος τὴν κάτω φύσιν ἅπασαν
 35 γελάσει τῆς εἰς οὐσίαν προσποιήσεως. παρὰ γὰρ ταύτης
 μένει μὲν ζωὴ, μένει νοῦς, ἔστηκε δὲ ἐν αἰῶνι τὰ ὄντα·
 ἐξίστησι δὲ οὐδὲν οὐδέ τι τρέπει οὐδὲ παρακινεῖ αὐτό·
 οὐδὲ γὰρ ἔστι τι ὄν μετ' αὐτό, ὃ ἐφάπτεται αὐτοῦ· εἰ δέ τι
 ἦν, ὑπὸ τοῦτου ἂν ἦν. καὶ εἰ ἐναντίον τι ἦν, ἀπαθὲς ἂν ἦν
 40 τοῦτο ὑπ' αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἐναντίου· ὄν δὲ αὐτὸ οὐκ ἂν τοῦτο

light, from which the souls live there, and those
 which come down here bring it with them. But it
 knows for what reason it lives and towards what it
 lives, towards that from which also it lives; for that
 from which its life comes is also that to which it
 goes. But the thought of all [the beings in it] and
 universal Intellect is upon it and accompanies it and
 is closely together with it and by giving it a colour of
 greater goodness and mixing thought into it makes
 its beauty more majestic. For even here below a
 thoughtful life is majesty and beauty in truth,
 though it is dimly seen. But there it is seen clearly;
 for it gives to the seer sight and power to live more,
 and by living more intensely to see and become what
 he sees. For here below most of our attention is
 directed to lifeless things, and when it is directed to
 living beings what is lifeless in them stands in the
 way, and the life within them is mixed. But there all
 are living beings, living as wholes and pure; and if
 you take something not to be a living being it
 immediately itself flashes out its life. But when you
 contemplate the substance running through them,
 giving them a life which does not move by changing,
 and the thought and the wisdom and knowledge in
 them, you will laugh at the lower nature for its
 pretension to substantiality. For by this substance
 life abides and intellect abides, and the real beings
 stand still in eternity; nothing puts it out of itself or
 alters it or makes it deviate; for there is nothing
 beside it to get a grip on it; but if there was anything,
 it would exist because of it. And if there was any-
 thing opposed to it, it would be unaffected by this
 very opposed thing; but, existing itself, it would not
 have made this opposite exist, but some other com-

ἐποιήσεν ὄν, ἀλλ' ἕτερον πρὸ αὐτοῦ κοινόν, καὶ ἦν ἐκείνο
 τὸ ὄν ὥστε ταύτη Παρμενίδης ὀρθῶς ἐν εἰπὼν τὸ ὄν
 καὶ οὐ δι' ἐρημίαν ἄλλου ἀπαθές, ἀλλ' ὅτι ὄν· μόνῳ γὰρ
 τούτῳ παρ' αὐτοῦ ἐστὶν εἶναι. πῶς ἂν οὖν τις
 45 τὸ ὄν παρ' αὐτοῦ ἀφέλοιτο ἢ ὅτιοῦν ἄλλο, ὅσα ὄντος
 ἐνεργεία καὶ ὅσα ἀπ' αὐτοῦ; ἕως γὰρ ἂν ἦ, χορηγεῖ ἔστι
 δ' αἰεὶ ὥστε κάκεινα. οὕτω δ' ἐστὶν ἐν δυνάμει καὶ
 κάλλει μέγα, ὥστε θέλγειν καὶ τὰ πάντα ἀνηρτησθαι
 αὐτοῦ καὶ ἶχνος αὐτοῦ παρ' αὐτοῦ ἔχοντα ἀγαπᾶν καὶ
 50 μετὰ τοῦτο τὰγαθὸν¹ ζητεῖν· τὸ γὰρ εἶναι πρὸ ἐκείνου
 ὡς πρὸς ἡμᾶς. καὶ ὁ πᾶς δὲ κόσμος οὗτος καὶ ζῆν καὶ
 φρονεῖν, ἵνα ἦ, θέλει, καὶ πᾶσα ψυχὴ καὶ πᾶς νοῦς ὅ
 ἐστὶν εἶναι· τὸ δὲ εἶναι αὐτάρκες ἑαυτῷ.

¹ Kirchhoff: μετὰ τοῦτο ἀγαθὸν Enn.: μετ' αὐτοῦ τὸ ἀγαθὸν H-S'.

mon cause before it, and that would be the really
 existent; so that Parmenides¹ in this way was right
 in saying that being was one; and it is not unaffected
 because of the absence of anything else, but because
 it really exists; for real being alone can exist of and
 by itself. How then could anyone take being from it,
 or anything else of all the things which exist by
 being's activity and come from itself? For as long as
 it exists, it gives of its store of being; but it exists for
 ever, so that they do also. But in this way it is great
 in power and beauty, so that it is enchanting and all
 things depend on it and are happy when they have a
 trace of it and seek the Good with it; for being stands
 in front of the Good from our point of view. And this
 whole universe wants to live and think that it may
 be, and every soul and every intellect wants to be
 what it is; but being is sufficient to itself.

¹ The reference is a general one to the Second Hypothesis
 of Plato's *Parmenides*, beginning at 142B.

VI. 7. HOW THE MULTITUDE OF THE FORMS CAME INTO BEING, AND ON THE GOOD

Introductory Note

THIS treatise, perhaps the greatest of the single works of Plotinus, is number 33 in Porphyry's chronological order. It is separated in that order by only three short works on minor questions from its predecessor in the *Enneads*, VI. 6 *On Numbers*, and is immediately followed by its successor in the *Enneads*, VI. 8, the great treatise on divine freedom. The chronological order and the Ennead order coincide here more closely than anywhere else in Porphyry's edition. VI. 7 is the most intellectually and spiritually powerful of all Plotinus' "ascents of the mind to God". It begins in this world here below, and in the philosophical lecture-room, with a discussion of what for Plotinus (and other late Platonists) was the most important question raised by Plato's mythical account of the making of the world in the *Timaeus*: how far is Plato's description of that making in terms of the activity of a Demiurge or craftsman to be taken literally? Does God plan the world and then make it? Is divine wisdom to be understood in terms of the sort of intelligent, purposive, over-all planning characteristic of a good architect or civic designer? In showing that it is not, and in displaying the true nature of the creativity of the Divine Intellect, Plotinus builds up his fullest and most impressive account of the nature and contents of the intelligible world, showing us how everything here below is there too, and only here because it is there, and not there in the form of a system of abstractions but in a more vital reality than we apprehend it here: it is a world "boiling with life", an eternal world

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which somehow contains time and movement and change and process. In the end we are left with the very strong impression that for Plotinus there are not two worlds but one real world apprehended in different ways on different levels. It is from our highest and truest apprehension of this intelligible world of which we ourselves are parts that we ascend to the Good. For, as Plotinus shows here with particular care and clarity, ascend we must. The intelligible world which he has displayed in all its beauty is not our goal. Intellect and the intelligible cannot finally satisfy us. The demonstration of transcendence culminates in Plotinus' fullest and strongest account of the soul's union with the Good in the self-transcendence of Intellect, an account which shows more clearly than anything else in the *Enneads* the consonance of his mysticism and his metaphysics. The treatise concludes with a section which confirms the transcendence of the One or Good above Intellect by a full demonstration that the One does not think.

Synopsis

When God or the gods were making man, did they plan his senses with a view to self-preservation in the sense-world? No, there is no planning in the intelligible; but everything is there in such a way that when it is unfolded into time here below it looks as if it had been perfectly planned (ch. 1). In the intelligible the thing and the reason why it is are one (ch. 2). Man in the intelligible has senses so that the whole may be complete and everything may be there; but does not this mean that Intellect inclines to and plans for the sense-world (ch. 3)? The complexity of man, not just a soul but also the formative principle of body and the form in body (chs. 4 and 5). All his complexity exists in the intelligible, including senses and perhaps bodies, and the possibility of existing on different levels, from god to beast (ch. 6). There is nothing unnatural about the making of the lower animals; co-operation of universal and

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individual souls in making things here below; sense-perceptions here below imitate intellections in the intelligible (ch. 7). But how can there be irrational animals in the intelligible? Intellect is not the One and so must be multiple; and its multiplicity must be all-inclusive (ch. 8). All is living thought there; so what are irrational animals here below are living thought there (ch. 9). Horns and teeth and claws, which are to supply deficiencies here below, are there in the intelligible as part of the richly varied perfection of the whole (ch. 10). Plants and the four elements are in the intelligible world as well as animals: the elements are alive in their own way here below, and more intensely alive there (ch. 11). The glorious unity-in-diversity of the intelligible world, containing all that is in the universe of sense, in perfect unity and boiling with life (ch. 12). Only the last and lowest forms are single and simple. Intellect is vastly complex because it is all activities. How the Platonic categories of Otherness and Movement operate in Intellect to produce endless change, variety and movement all contained in its substance of living thought (ch. 13). Analogy from the complexity of lower forms, e.g. the form of a face. The unity in love without confusion of Intellect (ch. 14). Beginning of the ascent from Intellect to the Good Intellect receives everything in it from the Good, but in receiving it breaks up the primal unity into its own unity-in-diversity (ch. 15). The need to go higher than Intellect: how Intellect comes from the Good and the Good is cause both of its substance and its vision (ch. 16). The giver is greater than the gift: the Good gives Intellect what it does not have; it is the giver of form, itself beyond form and limit (ch. 17). What "being in the form of good" means when applied to Intellect and the Forms in Intellect; why the Good is supremely desirable so that we must go beyond Intellect to find it (chs. 18-21). Intellect and the Forms in Intellect need another light from the Good to be desirable besides the glory immanent in themselves (which they received from it); without this light and life they would be uninteresting and undesirable (chs.

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21-2). Necessity of the supreme Good, before all evils, which is before all things and makes all things (ch. 23). But what, after all, is this Good? What does it do for us and why do we desire it (ch. 24)? Exegesis of Plato's conclusion about pleasure in the *Philebus*: ascent through the scale of goods to the ultimate (ch. 25). The Good cannot be an illusion or a subjective feeling (ch. 26). The good for anything is not simply what is most akin to it (ch. 27). Could matter, which is evil, choose and desire the Good (ch. 28)? Difficulty of the unintellectual man with talk about Intellect as good; perhaps he has some dim awareness of a Good beyond Intellect (ch. 29). Return to and full explanation of Plato's mixture of pleasure and intelligence in the *Philebus* (ch. 30). The light and life which come to Intellect and Soul from the Good; the soul, moved by the Good to love, is carried by its love from bodies to the Forms in Intellect (ch. 31). The unbounded, formless source of the beauty of the Forms (ch. 32). Rejection of discursive reasoning about the Forms as a hindrance to the love which must go on beyond form to the formless (ch. 33). The experience of the final union or vision, in which the soul attains to the Good in the eternal self-transcendence of Intellect (chs. 34-6). The Good does not think: rejection of the Peripatetic idea that the First Principle thinks its own thinking, and full working out of the implications of saying that the Good is beyond being and intellect (chs. 37-42).

VI. 7. (38) ΠΩΣ ΤΟ ΠΛΗΘΟΣ ΤΩΝ ΙΔΕΩΝ
ΥΠΕΣΤΗ ΚΑΙ ΠΕΡΙ ΤΑΓΑΘΟΥ

1. Εἰς γένεσιν πέμπων ὁ θεὸς ἢ θεὸς τις τὰς ψυχὰς
φωσφόρα περὶ τὸ πρόσωπον ἔθηκεν ὀμματα καὶ
τὰ ἄλλα ὄργανα ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν ἐκάσταις ἔδωκε
προορώμενος, ὡς οὕτως ἂν σάζοιτο, εἰ προορώτο καὶ
5 προακούοι καὶ ἀψαμένῃ τὸ μὲν φεύγοι, τὸ δὲ διώκοι.
πόθεν δὴ προιδῶν ταῦτα; οὐ γὰρ δὴ πρότερον
γενομένων ἄλλων, εἶτα δι' ἀπουσίαν αἰσθήσεων
φθαρέντων, ἔδωκεν ὕστερον ἃ ἔχοντες ἐμελλον
ἄνθρωποι καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ζῶα τὸ παθεῖν φυλάξασθαι. ἢ
εἶποι ἂν τις, ἤδει, ὅτι ἐν θερμοῖς καὶ ψυχροῖς ἔσοιτο τὸ
10 ζῶον καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις σωμάτων πάθεσιν ταῦτα δὲ εἰδώς,
ὅπως μὴ φθείροιτο ῥαδίως τῶν ζῶων τὰ σώματα, τὸ

¹ Plotinus is here commenting on the whole account of the making of the material universe, the sending of souls into it, and the preparation of their bodies, in the *Timaeus*. He writes "God or one of the gods" because in the *Timaeus* (44E5 ff.) it is not the great Craftsman but his children, the younger gods, who make the human body and its organs (the "light-bearing eyes" 45B3). Plato's whole description of the activity both of Craftsman and of younger gods is in terms of reasoning (e.g. 34A8-B1) and planning. The exegetical problem for Plotinus is to show that this is not to be taken literally.

VI. 7. HOW THE MULTITUDE OF THE
FORMS CAME INTO BEING, AND
ON THE GOOD

1. When God or one of the gods was sending the souls to birth he put "light-bearing eyes" in the face and gave them the other organs for each of the senses, foreseeing that safety would be ensured in this way, if one saw and heard beforehand and by touching could avoid one thing and pursue another.¹ But really, where did this foreseeing come from? For it certainly was not because others had come into existence before and then perished because of the absence of senses that he afterwards gave what human beings and other living things were going to avoid suffering by having.² Now someone might say that he knew that the living being would be in heats and colds and other affections of bodies³; and because he knew this, so that the bodies of living things might not be easily destroyed he gave them

² Plotinus may have in mind here the curious "natural selection" of Empedocles as reported by Aristotle *Physics* B 8. 198b29-33, in a context (the discussion of the appearance of purposiveness in the processes of nature) very relevant to his argument here.

³ This is exactly what Plato does say in *Timaeus* 33A, though he is speaking here not of individual human bodies but of the necessity of including all of each of the four elements in the body of the universe.

αἰσθάνεσθαι ἔδωκε, καὶ δι' ὧν ἐνεργήσουσιν αἰ
 αἰσθήσεις ὀργάνων. ἀλλ' ἦτοι ἐχούσαις τὰς δυνάμεις
 ἔδωκε τὰ ὄργανα ἢ ἄμφω. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ἔδωκε καὶ τὰς
 15 αἰσθήσεις, οὐκ ἦσαν αἰσθητικαὶ πρότερον ψυχαὶ οὐσαι·
 εἰ δ' εἶχον, ὅτε ἐγένοντο ψυχαί, καὶ ἐγένοντο, ἢ' εἰς
 γένεσιν ἴωσι, σύμφυτον αὐταῖς τὸ εἰς γένεσιν ἰέναι.
 παρὰ φύσιν ἄρα τὸ ἀπὸ γενέσεως καὶ ἐν τῷ νοητῷ εἶναι,
 καὶ πεποίηται δὴ, ἵνα ἄλλου ὄσι καὶ ἵνα ἐν κακῷ εἶεν.
 20 καὶ ἡ πρόνοια, ἵνα σώζοντο ἐν τῷ κακῷ, καὶ ὁ
 λογισμὸς ὁ τοῦ θεοῦ οὗτος καὶ ὅλως λογισμὸς. ἀρχαὶ δὲ
 λογισμῶν τίνες; καὶ γάρ, εἰ ἐξ ἄλλων λογισμῶν, δεῖ ἐπί
 τι πρὸ λογισμοῦ ἢ τινὰ γε πάντως ἰέναι. τίνες οὖν
 ἀρχαί; ἢ γὰρ αἰσθησις ἢ νοῦς. ἀλλὰ αἰσθησις μὲν οὐπώ·
 νοῦς ἄρα. ἀλλ' εἰ νοῦς αἰ προτάσεις, τὸ συμπέρασμα
 25 ἐπιστήμη· περὶ αἰσθητοῦ οὐδενὸς ἄρα. οὐ γὰρ ἀρχὴ μὲν
 ἐκ τοῦ νοητοῦ, τελευτὴ δὲ εἰς νοητὸν ἀφικνείται, πῶς
 ἐν ταύτῃ τὴν ἕξιν πρὸς αἰσθητοῦ διανόησιν
 ἀφικνεῖσθαι; οὐτ' οὖν ζώου πρόνοια οὐθ' ὅλως τοῦδε τοῦ
 παντὸς ἐκ λογισμοῦ ἐγένετο· ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ ὅλως λογισμὸς
 30 ἐκεῖ, ἀλλὰ λέγεται λογισμὸς εἰς ἔνδειξιν τοῦ πάντα
 οὕτως, ὡς [ἄλλος σοφός]¹ ἐκ λογισμοῦ ἐν τοῖς ὑστερον,
 καὶ προόρασις, ὅτι οὕτως, ὡς ἂν τις σοφός [ἐν τοῖς
 ὑστερον]² προῖδοιτο. ἐν γὰρ τοῖς μὴ γενομένοις πρὸ

¹ del. Harder.² del. Theiler.

sense perception and organs for the senses to work through. But he either gave the organs to souls which already had the powers or gave both at once. But if he gave the senses also, then, although they were souls before, they did not have sense-perception; but if they had sense-perception when they came into being as souls, and came into being that they might go to birth, then going to birth was connatural to them. So it would be against nature for them to be away from birth and in the intelligible, and they would actually have been made in order to belong to something else and to be in evil; and the purpose of the forethought would be that they might be kept safe in the evil, and this would be God's planning, and it would be altogether planning. But what are the principles of plans? For even if they derive from other plans, they must be directed to an end or ends prior to planning. What then are the principles? They are either sense-perception or intellect. But there is no sense-perception yet, therefore intellect. But if the premises are intellect the conclusion is knowledge: not, then, about any sense-object. For how can that of which the beginning is from the intelligible and which comes in its end to the intelligible, being a disposition of this kind, come to the understanding of a sense-object? Therefore neither forethought for a living thing nor forethought for this universe in general derived from a plan; since there is no planning there at all, but it is called planning to show that all things there are as they would be as a result of planning at a later stage, and foresight because it is as a wise man would foresee it. For in things which did not come to be before planning, planning is useful because of the

λογισμοῦ ὁ λογισμὸς χρήσιμον ἀπορία δυνάμεως τῆς
 35 πρὸ λογισμοῦ, καὶ προόρασις, ὅτι μὴ ἦν δύναμις τῶ
 προορώντι, καθ' ἣν οὐκ ἐδεήθη προοράσεως. καὶ γὰρ ἡ
 προόρασις, ἵνα μὴ τοῦτο, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο, καὶ οἶον φοβεῖται
 τὸ μὴ τοιοῦτον. οὐδὲ τοῦτο μόνον, οὐ προόρασις. καὶ ὁ
 λογισμὸς τοῦτο ἀντὶ τούτου. μόνου δ' ὄντος θατέρου τί
 40 καὶ λογίζεται; πῶς οὖν τὸ μόνον καὶ ἓν καὶ ἀπλῶς ἔχει
 ἀναπτυσσόμενον τὸ "τοῦτο, ἵνα μὴ τοῦτο" καὶ "ἔμελλε
 γὰρ τοῦτο, εἰ μὴ τοῦτο" καὶ "χρήσιμον τοῦτο ἀνεφάνη
 καὶ σωτήριον τοῦτο γενόμενον"; προείδετο ἄρα καὶ
 προελογίσατο ἄρα καὶ δὴ καί—τὸ νῦν ἐξαρχῆς
 λεχθέν τὰς αἰσθήσεις διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ἔδωκε [τὰς
 45 δυνάμεις],¹ εἰ καὶ ὅτι μάλιστα ἀπορος ἢ δύσις [καὶ
 πῶς].² οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' εἰ δεῖ ἐκάστην ἐνέργειαν μὴ ἀτελῆ
 εἶναι, μηδὲ θεμιτὸν θεοῦ ὅτιοῦν ὄν ἄλλο τι νομίζειν ἢ
 ὅλον τε καὶ πᾶν, δεῖ ἐν ὄψεσιν τῶν αὐτοῦ πάντα
 ἐνυπάρχειν. δεῖ τοίνυν καὶ τοῦ αἰεῖ εἶναι.³ δεῖ τοίνυν καὶ
 τοῦ μέλλοντος ἤδη παρόντος εἶναι. οὐδὲ ὕστερόν τι ἐν
 50 ἐκείνῳ, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἤδη ἐκεῖ παρὸν ὕστερον ἐν ἄλλῳ
 γίνεται. εἰ οὖν ἤδη πάρεστι τὸ μέλλον, ἀνάγκη οὕτω

παρεῖναι, ὡς προνοηθέντος εἰς τὸ ὕστερον τοῦτο δεῖ

¹ delevimus, ut glossam e lin. 13 recessitam.

² delevimus.

³ δεῖ . . . εἶναι om. H-S².

lack of the power before planning, and foresight, because the one who foresees did not have the power by which there would be no need of foresight. For foresight is in order that there should not be this but that, and there is in it a kind of fear of what is not just so. But where there is only this, there is not foresight. And planning is "this instead of that". But when there is only one of them, why should there be a plan? How then can the alone and the one and the simple contain explicitly the "this that there should not be that", and "there had to be this if not that" and "this appeared useful and this preservative when it came to be"? So then it saw beforehand and planned beforehand, and indeed—as was said at the beginning of the present discussion—also gave the senses because of this, no matter how puzzling the giving. But all the same, if every divine activity must not be incomplete, and it is not permitted to suppose that anything which is of God is other than whole and all, then everything must exist in any thing which is his. So existing for ever must be there also.¹ So the future must also be already present there. For there is certainly nothing which comes later in that [divine world], but what is already present there comes to be later in another [world]. If then the future is already present, it must necessarily be present as if it had been thought out beforehand with a view to what comes later; but this means so

¹ δεῖ τοίνυν καὶ τοῦ αἰεῖ εἶναι is found only in the quotation in Philoponus *De Aeternitate Mundi* II 5 p. 39 8. H-S¹ print it in the text. H-S² omit it as being a comment of Philoponus, but there seems no sufficient reason for being certain that it is so.

ἔστιν, ὡς μηδὲν δεῖσθαι μηδενὸς τότε, τοῦτο δέ ἐστι
μηδὲν ἐλλείψοντος. πάντα ἄρα ἤδη ἦν καὶ αἰεὶ ἦν καὶ
55 οὕτως ἦν, ὡς εἰπεῖν ὕστερον τόδε μετὰ τόδε·
ἐκτενόμενον μὲν γὰρ καὶ οἶον ἀπλούμενον ἔχει
δεικνύναι τόδε μετὰ τόδε, ὁμοῦ δὲ ὄν πάν τόδε· τοῦτο δέ
ἔστιν ἔχον ἐν ἑαυτῷ καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν.

2. Διὸ καὶ ἐντεῦθεν ἂν τις οὐχ ἤττον καταμάθοι τὴν
νοῦ φύσιν, ἣν καὶ πλεόν των ἄλλων ὀρώμεν· οὐδ' ὡς
ὅσον ἐστὶ τὸ νοῦ χρῆμα ὀρώμεν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ "ὅτι"
δίδομεν αὐτὸν ἔχειν, τὸ δὲ "διότι" οὐκέτι, ἢ, εἰ δοίημεν,
5 χωρὶς. καὶ ὀρώμεν ἄνθρωπον ἢ ὀφθαλμόν, εἰ τύχοι,
ὥσπερ ἀγαλμα ἢ ἀγάλματος· τὸ δέ ἐστιν ἐκεῖ ἄνθρωπος
καὶ διὰ τί ἄνθρωπος, εἴπερ καὶ νοερόν αὐτὸν δεῖ τὸν ἐκεῖ
ἄνθρωπον εἶναι, καὶ ὀφθαλμὸς¹ καὶ διὰ τί· ἢ οὐκ ἂν
ὄλως εἴη, εἰ μὴ διὰ τί. ἐνταῦθα δὲ ὥσπερ ἕκαστον
10 τῶν μερῶν χωρὶς, οὕτω καὶ τὸ "διὰ τί". ἐκεῖ δ' ἐν ἐνὶ
πάντα, ὥστε ταῦτόν τὸ πρᾶγμα καὶ τὸ "διὰ τί" τοῦ
πράγματος. πολλαχοῦ δὲ καὶ ἐνταῦθα τὸ πρᾶγμα καὶ τὸ
"διὰ τί" ταῦτόν, οἶον τί ἐστὶν ἕκλευψις. τί οὖν κωλύει
καὶ ἕκαστον διὰ τί εἶναι καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, καὶ τοῦτο
εἶναι τὴν οὐσίαν ἐκάστου; μᾶλλον δὲ ἀνάγκη· καὶ

¹ Theiler: ὀφθαλμὸν Enn.

¹ This passage (line 49 to end), together with IV. 4. 16, anticipates the doctrine of Iamblichus and other later Neoplatonists of the pre-existence of time in the higher world. On this see S. Sambursky and S. Pines *The Concept of Time in Late Neoplatonism* (a selection of texts with

that there will be no need of anything then, and this means that there will be no deficiency. All things, then, existed already and existed for ever, and existed in such a way that one could say later "this after that"; for when it is extended and in a sense unfolded it is able to display this after that, but when it is all together it is entirely this; but this means having its cause also in itself.¹

2. And so even starting from here one could none the less come to know the nature of Intellect, which we see even more clearly than the others; but not even so do we see how great Intellect is. For we grant that it has the "that" but not the "why", or, if we do grant it the "why", it is as separate. And we see man, or, if it happens so, eye, as an image or belonging to an image. But in reality there in the intelligible there is man and the reason why there is man, if the man there must also himself be an intellectual reality, and eye and the reason why there is eye; or they would not be there at all, if the reason why was not. But here below, just as each of the parts is separate, so also is the reason why. But there all are in one, so that the thing and the reason why of the thing are the same. But often here below also the thing and the reason why are the same, as for instance "what is an eclipse".² What then prevents each and every thing being its reason why, in the case of the others too, and this being its substance? Rather, this is necessary; and when we try in translation and commentary), Jerusalem 1971.

² Plotinus in what follows is characteristically developing an Aristotelian distinction for his own purposes. Cp. Aristotle *Metaphysics* H 4. 1044b9-15 and *Posterior Analytics* B 2. 90a15.

- 15 *πειρωμένοις οὕτως τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι λαμβάνειν ὀρθῶς συμβαίνει. ὁ γὰρ ἐστὶν ἕκαστον, διὰ τοῦτό ἐστι. λέγω δὲ οὐχ ὅτι τὸ εἶδος ἐκάστῳ αἴτιον τοῦ εἶναι—τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ ἀληθές—ἀλλ' ὅτι, εἰ καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ εἶδος ἕκαστον πρὸς αὐτὸ ἀναπτύττοις, εὐρήσεις ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ "διὰ τί".*
- 20 *ἀργὸν μὲν γὰρ ὄν καὶ ζωὴν <μῆ>¹ ἔχον τὸ "διὰ τί" οὐ πάντως ἔχει, εἶδος δὲ ὄν καὶ νοῦ ὄν πόθεν ἂν λάβοι τὸ "διὰ τί"; εἰ δὲ παρὰ νοῦ τις λέγοι, οὐ χωρὶς ἐστίν, εἴ γε καὶ αὐτὸ ἐστίν· εἰ οὖν δεῖ ἔχειν ταῦτα μηδενὶ ἐλλείποντα, μηδὲ τῷ "διὰ τί" ἐλλείπειν. νοῦς δὲ ἔχει τὸ διὰ τί οὕτως ἕκαστον τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ· τὰ δὲ ἐν αὐτῷ*
- 25 *αὐτὸς ἕκαστον ἂν εἴη [τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ],² ὥστε μηδὲν προσδεῖσθαι τοῦ διὰ τί γέγονεν, ἀλλ' ὁμοῦ γέγονε καὶ ἔχει ἐν αὐτῷ τὴν τῆς ὑποστάσεως αἰτίαν. γεγονὸς δὲ οὐκ εἰκῆ οὐδὲν ἂν παραλειμμένον ἔχοι τοῦ "διὰ τί", ἀλλὰ πᾶν ἔχον ἔχει καὶ τὸ καλῶς ὁμοῦ τῆς αἰτίας. καὶ*
- 30 *τοῖς ἄρα μεταλαμβάνουσιν οὕτω δίδωσιν, ὡς τὸ "διὰ τί" ἔχειν. καὶ μὴν, ὥσπερ ἐν τῷδε τῷ παντὶ ἐκ πολλῶν συνεστηκότι συνείρεται πρὸς ἄλληλα τὰ πάντα, καὶ ἐν τῷ πάντα εἶναι ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ διότι ἕκαστον—ὥσπερ καὶ ἐφ' ἑκάστου τὸ μέρος πρὸς τὸ ὅλον ἔχον ὀράται—οὐ*
- 35 *τούτου γενομένου, εἴτα τούτου μετὰ τὸδε, ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἄλληλα ὁμοῦ τὴν αἰτίαν καὶ τὸ αἰτιατὸν συνιστάντων, οὕτω χρῆ πολὺ μᾶλλον ἐκεῖ τά τε πάντα πρὸς τὸ ὅλον ἕκαστα καὶ ἕκαστον πρὸς αὐτό. εἰ οὖν ἡ συνυπόστασις*

¹ Theiler.² delevinus.

this way to grasp the essential nature of a thing, it comes out right. For what a thing is is the reason why it is. But I do not mean that the form is cause of existence for each thing—this is of course true—but that, if also you open each individual form itself back upon itself, you will find the reason why in it. For a thing which is inert and does not have life does not at all have the reason why, but if it is a form and belongs to Intellect, where would it get its reason why from? But if someone were to say "from Intellect", it is not separate, supposing that it is also itself Intellect; if then Intellect must have these things in no way deficient, they must not be deficient in the reason why. But Intellect in this way has each and every reason why of the things in it; but it is itself individually all the things in it, so that none of them has come to be in need of a reason why, but it has come to be along with it and has in itself the cause of its existence. But since there is nothing casual in its coming to be it would not have any of its reason why left out but in having everything it has that of its cause which makes it exist beautifully. So it also gives to the things which participate in it in such a way that they possess their reason why. And truly, just as in this All here below, which is composed of many things, all of them are linked to each other, and each individual reason why is contained in their being all—just as in each individual the part is seen relating to the whole—it is not that this comes to be, and then this after that, but they jointly establish cause and caused together in relation to each other, so much more there in the intelligible must all things be each of them related to the whole and each to itself. If therefore there is a joint

ὁμοῦ πάντων καὶ οὐκ εἰκῆ πάντων καὶ δεῖ μὴ
 ἀπηρτηῆσθαι, ἐν αὐτοῖς ἂν ἔχοι τὰ αἰτιατὰ τὰς αἰτίας,
 40 καὶ τοιοῦτον ἕκαστον, οἷον ἀναιτίως τὴν αἰτίαν ἔχειν. εἰ
 οὖν μὴ ἔχει αἰτίαν τοῦ εἶναι, αὐτάρκη δέ ἐστι καὶ
 μεμονωμένα αἰτίας ἐστίν, εἴη ἂν ἐν αὐτοῖς ἔχοντα σὺν
 αὐτοῖς τὴν αἰτίαν. καὶ γὰρ αἰεὶ ἐμὴδέν ἐστι μάτην ἐκεῖ,
 πολλὰ δὲ ἐν ἑκάστῳ ἐστί, πάντα ὅσα ἔχει ἔχους ἂν εἰπεῖν
 45 διότι ἕκαστον. προῆν ἄρα καὶ συνῆν τὸ διότι ἐκεῖ οὐκ ὄν
 διότι, ἀλλ' ὅτι μᾶλλον δὲ ἄμφω ἔν. τί γὰρ ἂν καὶ
 περιττὸν εἶχε νοῦ, ὡς ἂν νοῦ νόημα μὴ τοιοῦτον ὄν, οἷον
 μὴ τέλεον γέννημα; εἰ οὖν τέλεον, οὐκ ἔστιν εἰπεῖν ὅτῳ
 ἐλλείπει, οὐδὲ διὰ τί τοῦτο οὐ παρέστι. παρὸν ἄρα ἔχους
 50 ἂν εἰπεῖν διότι παρέστιν· ἐν ἄρα τῇ ὑποστάσει τὸ διὰ τί
 ἐν ἑκάστῳ τοίνυν νοήματι καὶ ἐνεργήματι οἷον καὶ
 ἀνθρώπου πᾶς προεφάνη ὁ ἄνθρωπος συμφέρων ἑαυτὸν
 αὐτῷ, καὶ πάντα ὅσα ἔχει ἐξαρχῆς ὁμοῦ ἔχων ἔτοιμός
 ἐστιν ὅλος. εἴτα, εἰ μὴ πᾶς ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ δεῖ τι αὐτῷ
 55 προσθεῖναι, γεννήματός ἐστιν. ἔστι δ' ἀεί· ὥστε πᾶς
 ἐστιν. ἀλλ' ὁ γινόμενος ἄνθρωπος γενητός.

3. Τί οὖν κωλύει προβουλεύεσθαι περὶ αὐτοῦ; ἢ
 κατ' ἐκεῖνόν ἐστιν, ὥστε οὔτε τι ἀφελεῖν δεῖ οὔτε

existence of all things together, of all things with
 nothing random about it, and there must be no
 separation, then the things caused would have their
 causes in themselves, and each would be of such a
 kind as to possess its cause causelessly. If then the
 intelligibles have no cause of their being but are self-
 sufficient and independent of cause, they would be in
 possession of their cause in themselves and with
 themselves. For again, if nothing there is purpose-
 less, and there are many things in each, you could
 say that all the things which each individual has are
 each individual reason why. So there in the intelli-
 gible the reason why was before and with the things
 and was not a "why", but a "that"; but rather both
 are one. For what could an intelligible have over and
 above Intellect, so as not to be of such a kind being a
 thought of Intellect, as to be a perfect production? If
 then it is perfect, it is impossible to say in what it is
 deficient, nor why this is not present in it. If then
 something is present, you could tell the reason why
 it is present; so the reason why is contained in its
 existence; in each thought, then, and active
 actualisation of Intellect, man for instance, the
 whole man is manifest, bringing himself along with
 the thought of him, and, since all he has he has all
 together from the beginning, he is all ready as a
 whole. Then, if he is not whole there, but something
 has to be added to him, this belongs to something
 generated; but he exists for ever; and so he is all
 complete. But the man who has come to be is
 generated.

3. What, then, is there to prevent there being
 previous deliberation about him? Now he is accord-
 ing to that intelligible man, so that one must not

προσθεῖναι, ἀλλὰ τὸ βουλευσασθαι καὶ λελογίσθαι διὰ
τὴν ὑπόθεσιν· ὑπέθετο γὰρ γινόμενα. καὶ οὕτω μὲν ἡ
5 βούλευσις¹ καὶ ὁ λογισμὸς· τῷ δ' "ἀεὶ γινόμενα"
ἐνδείξασθαι καὶ ὅτι λογίζεται ἀνεῖλεν. οὐ γὰρ ἐν
λογίζεσθαι ἐν τῷ ἀεὶ· καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸ ἐπιλελησμένου ἦν,
ὅπως καὶ πρότερον. εἴτι, εἰ μὲν ἀμείνω ὕστερον, οὐκ ἂν
καλὰ πρότερον· εἰ δ' ἦν καλὰ, ἔχει τὸ ὡσαύτως. καλὰ δ'
10 ἐστὶ μετὰ τῆς αἰτίας· ἐπεὶ καὶ νῦν καλόν τι, ὅτι πάντα—
τοῦτο γὰρ καὶ εἶδος τὸ πάντα—καὶ ὅτι τὴν ὕλην
κατέχει· κατέχει δέ, εἰ μὴδὲν αὐτῆς ἀμόρφωτον
καταλείπει· καταλείπει δέ, εἴ τις μορφή ἠλείπει, οἶον
ὀφθαλμὸς ἢ ἄλλο τι ὥστε αἰτιολογῶν πάντα λέγεις. διὰ
15 τί οὖν ὀφθαλμοί; ἵνα πάντα. καὶ διὰ τί ὀφρύες; ἵνα
πάντα. καὶ γὰρ εἰ ἕνεκα σωτηρίας λέγοις, φυλακτικὸν
τῆς οὐσίας λέγεις ἐν αὐτῇ ὑπάρχον· τοῦτο δὲ εἶναι
συμβαλλόμενον. οὕτως ἄρα οὐσία ἦν πρὶν καὶ τοῦτο, καὶ
τὸ αἴτιον ἄρα μέρος τῆς οὐσίας· καὶ ἄλλο τοῖνυν τοῦτο,
20 ὃ δ' ἐστὶ, τῆς οὐσίας. πάντα τοῖνυν ἀλλήλοις καὶ ἡ ὅλη
καὶ τελεία καὶ πάσα καὶ τὸ καλῶς μετὰ τῆς αἰτίας καὶ
ἐν τῇ αἰτία, καὶ ἡ οὐσία καὶ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι καὶ τὸ διότι

¹ R^{2mg} (*deliberatio* Ficinus): βούλησις Ern.

¹The reference is to Plato's distinction between the realm of real being and the realm of becoming in *Timaeus*

take away or add anything, but deliberation and reasoning are due to [Plato's] assumption: for he assumed that things had come into being. And this is why there is deliberation and reasoning; but by saying "always coming into being" he also abolishes the idea that God reasons.¹ For it is not possible to reason in what is always; for to do so would belong to someone who had forgotten how it was before. And then if things were better afterwards, they would not have been beautiful before; but if they were beautiful, they keep the same. But they are beautiful because they are with their cause; since now also a thing is beautiful, because it is everything—for this is what form is, being everything—and because it controls matter; but it controls matter if it leaves no part of it unshaped; but it does so leave it if any shape is wanting, an eye, for instance, or something else; so that when you tell the cause, you tell all. Why then eyes? That there shall be everything. And why eyebrows? That there shall be everything. For even if you say "for preservation", you are speaking of a safeguard of the substance which exists in it; but this means you are saying that it contributes to its essential nature. Thus, then, the substance existed before this safeguard and the cause therefore was a part of the substance; and this safeguard, then, is something other, but what it is belongs to substance. All things therefore are for each other, and the whole is perfect and all-complete and its existing beautifully is with the cause and in the cause, and the substance and

27D5-28A4. It is Plotinus, not Plato, who draws the conclusion from it that God does not reason.

ἐν. εἰ τοίνυν ἔγκειται τὸ αἰσθητικὸν εἶναι καὶ οὕτως
αἰσθητικὸν ἐν τῷ εἶδει ὑπὸ αἰδίου ἀνάγκης καὶ
τελειότητος νοῦ ἐν αὐτῷ ἔχοντος, εἴπερ τέλειος, τὰς
25 αἰτίας, ὥστε ἡμᾶς ὕστερον ἰδεῖν, ὡς ἄρα ὀρθῶς οὕτως
ἔχει—ἐκεῖ γὰρ ἐν καὶ συμπληρωτικὸν τὸ αἴτιον καὶ
οὐχὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐκεῖ μόνον νοῦς ἦν, προσετέθη δὲ τὸ
αἰσθητικόν, ὅτε εἰς γένεσιν ἐστέλλετο—πῶς οὐκ ἂν
ἐκεῖνος ὁ νοῦς πρὸς τὰ τῆδε ῥέποι; τί γὰρ ἂν εἴη
30 αἰσθητικὸν ἢ ἀντιληπτικὸν αἰσθητῶν; πῶς δ' οὐκ
ἄτοπον, ἐκεῖ μὲν αἰσθητικὸν ἐξ αἰδίου, ἐνταῦθα δὲ
αἰσθάνεσθαι καὶ τῆς ἐκεῖ δυνάμεως τὴν ἐνέργειαν
πληροῦσθαι ἐνταῦθα, ὅτε χείρων ἢ ψυχῇ γίνεσθαι;

4. Πάλιν οὖν πρὸς ταύτην τὴν ἀπορίαν ἄνωθεν
ληπτίον τὸν ἄνθρωπον ὅστις ἐκεῖνός ἐστιν. ἴσως δὲ
πρότερον χρὴ τὸν τῆδε ἄνθρωπον ὅστις ποτέ ἐστιν
εἰπεῖν—μήποτε οὐδὲ τοῦτον ἀκριβῶς εἰδότες ὡς
5 ἔχοντες τοῦτον ἐκεῖνον ζητοῦμεν. φανείη δ' ἂν ἴσως
τισὶν ὁ αὐτὸς οὗτός τε καὶ ἐκεῖνος εἶναι. ἀρχὴ δὲ τῆς
σκέψεως ἐντεῦθεν. ἄρα ὁ ἄνθρωπος οὗτος λόγος ἐστὶ
ψυχῆς ἕτερος τῆς τὸν ἄνθρωπον τοῦτον ποιούσης καὶ
ζῆν αὐτὸν καὶ λογίζεσθαι παρεχομένης; ἢ ἡ ψυχὴ ἢ
10 τοιαύτη ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐστιν; ἢ ἡ τῷ σώματι τῷ τοιῷδε
ψυχῇ προσχωμένη; ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ζῶον λογικὸν ὁ

¹ The Platonic text with which Plotinus is concerned here is the conclusion drawn in *Alcibiades I* 129E–130A that man is a soul using a body, which acquired a rather disproportionate weight and importance in later Greek thought. It was an important source of sharp body-soul dualism not only for later Platonists but for Stoics and

the essential nature and the reason why are one. If, therefore, having senses, and senses of this kind, is contained in the form by eternal necessity and the perception of Intellect which, if it is perfect, possesses the causes in itself, so that we afterwards see that this then is the right way for things to be—for there in the intelligible the cause is one with and an essential completion of the substance—and if man is there not only an intellect, sense-perception being added when he was sent to birth, how could that Intellect not incline to the world here below? For what could sense-perception be except the apprehension of sense-objects? But how would it not be absurd for there to be sense-perception from eternity, but for it to do its perceiving here below, and for the power there in the intelligible to accomplish its activity here below, when the soul becomes worse?

4. To deal with this difficulty, therefore, we must go back and take up the question of who that man in the intelligible world is. But perhaps we should first say exactly who this man here below is—in case we go looking for that man on the supposition that we have got this one, though we do not even know this one accurately. But perhaps it might seem to some people that this man and that man are the same. This is the starting-point of our investigation: is this man a rational forming principle belonging to soul other than the soul which makes this man and provides him with life and reason? Or is the soul of this kind the man? Or the soul which uses a body of such a kind? But if man is a rational living being, but a Gnostics. On its history in Greek philosophy see J. Pépin *Idées Grecques sur l'Homme et sur Dieu* (Paris 1971), Part I *La Tradition du 1^{er} Alcibiade*.

ἄνθρωπος, ζῶον δὲ τὸ ἐκ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος, οὐκ ἂν
 εἶη ὁ λόγος οὗτος τῆ ψυχῆ ὁ αὐτός. ἀλλ' εἰ τὸ ἐκ ψυχῆς
 λογικῆς καὶ σώματος ὁ λόγος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, πῶς ἂν εἶη
 ὑπόστασις αἰδίου, τούτου τοῦ λόγου τοῦ τοιούτου
 15 ἀνθρώπου γινόμενου, ὅταν σῶμα καὶ ψυχὴ συνέλθῃ;
 ἔσται γὰρ ὁ λόγος οὗτος δηλωτικὸς τοῦ ἔσομένου, οὐχ
 οἶος ὃν φαμεν αὐτοάνθρωπος, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἑοικῶς ὄρω,
 καὶ τοιούτῳ οἶω μὴδὲ δηλωτικῶ τοῦ τί ἦν εἶναι. οὐδὲ
 γὰρ εἶδους ἐστὶ τοῦ ἐνύλου, ἀλλὰ τὸ συναμφοτέρον
 20 δηλῶν, ὃ ἐστὶν ἤδη. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, οὐπω εὕρηται ὁ
 ἄνθρωπος· ἦν γὰρ ὁ κατὰ τὸν λόγον. εἰ δέ τις λέγοι "τὸν
 λόγον δεῖ τὸν τῶν τοιούτων εἶναι συναμφοτέρον τι, τόδ'
 ἐν τῷδε", καθ' ὃ ἐστὶν ἕκαστον, οὐκ ἀξιοὶ λέγειν· χρῆ
 25 τοὺς λόγους χρῆ λέγειν, ἀλλὰ τὸν λόγον αὐτὸν τὸν
 πεποιηκότα, οἷον τὸν ἄνθρωπον, λαμβάνειν καὶ
 μάλιστα, ὅσοι τὸ¹ τί ἦν εἶναι ἀξιούσιν ἐφ' ἑκάστου
 ὀρίζεσθαι, ὅταν κυρίως ὀρίζωνται. τί οὖν ἐστὶ τὸ εἶναι
 ἀνθρώπου; τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ, τί ἐστὶ τὸ πεποιηκὸς τοῦτον
 30 τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἐνυπάρχον, οὐ χωριστόν; ἀρ' οὖν αὐτὸς ὁ
 λόγος ζῶόν ἐστι λογικόν, ἢ τὸ συναμφοτέρον, αὐτὸς δέ
 τις ποιητικὸς ζῶου λογικοῦ; τίς ὢν αὐτός; ἢ τὸ ζῶον

¹ Kirchhoff: τοῦ Enn.

living being is what is composed of soul and body, this rational form would not be the same as soul. But if what is composed of rational soul and body is the rational form of man, how could it be something eternally existent, since this rational form of this kind of man comes into existence when body and soul come together? For this rational form will be explanatory of what is going to be, not the sort we say is absolute man, but more like a definition, and the kind of definition which does not explain the essential nature. For it is not even a definition of the form in matter, but explains the composite, which already exists. But if this is so, the man is not yet found; for he was going to be the one according to the rational form. But if someone were to say "The rational form of such beings must be something composite, this in this", he does not think fit to say by what each exists; but one must, however much one must also speak of the rational forming principles of forms in matter as including matter, grasp the forming principle itself which makes, for instance, man; this applies especially to those who claim to define the essential nature in each case, when they define strictly and properly.¹ What is it, then, to be a man? That is, what is it which has made this man here below, which exists in him and is not separate? Is, then, the rational forming principle itself a rational living being, or is the living being the composite, but the principle itself one which makes the rational living being? What is it then

¹ Plotinus is here critically concerned with Aristotle's discussion of essence and definition in *Metaphysics* Z 4-5. 1029b1-1030a14.

ἀντὶ ζωῆς λογικῆς ἐν τῷ λόγῳ. ζωὴ τοίνυν λογικὴ ὁ
 ἄνθρωπος. ἀρ' οὖν ζωὴ ἄνευ ψυχῆς; ἢ γὰρ ἡ ψυχὴ
 35 παρῆχεται τὴν ζωὴν τὴν λογικὴν καὶ ἔσται ὁ ἄνθρωπος
 ἐνέργεια ψυχῆς καὶ οὐκ οὐσία, ἢ ἡ ψυχὴ ὁ ἄνθρωπος
 ἔσται. ἀλλ' εἰ ἡ ψυχὴ ἢ λογικὴ ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἔσται, ὅταν
 εἰς ἄλλο ζῶον ἴη¹ ἢ ψυχὴ, πῶς οὐκ ἄνθρωπος;

5. Λόγον τοίνυν δεῖ τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἄλλον παρὰ τὴν
 ψυχὴν εἶναι. τί κωλύει συναμφοτέρον τι τὸν ἄνθρωπον
 εἶναι, ψυχὴν ἐν τοιῷδε λόγῳ, ὅντος τοῦ λόγου οἷον
 ἐνεργείας τοιαύδε, τῆς δὲ ἐνεργείας μὴ δυναμένης ἄνευ
 5 τοῦ ἐνεργοῦντος εἶναι; οὕτω γὰρ καὶ οἱ ἐν τοῖς σπέρμασι
 λόγοι· οὔτε γὰρ ἄνευ ψυχῆς οὔτε ψυχῆ ἀπλῶς. οἱ γὰρ
 λόγοι οἱ ποιοῦντες οὐκ ἄψυχοι, καὶ θαυμαστὸν οὐδὲν
 τὰς τοιαύτας οὐσίας λόγους εἶναι. οἱ οὖν δὴ² ποιοῦντες
 ἄνθρωπον λόγοι ποίας ψυχῆς ἐνεργεῖαι; ἄρα τῆς
 10 φυτικῆς; ἢ τῆς ζῶον ποιούσης, ἐναργεστέρως τινὸς καὶ
 αὐτὸ τοῦτο ζωτικωτέρας. ἢ δὲ ψυχὴ ἢ τοιαύτη ἢ
 ἐγγενομένη τῇ τοιαύτῃ ὕλη, ἅτε οὐσα τοῦτο, οἷον οὕτω
 διακεκμημένη καὶ ἄνευ τοῦ σώματος, ἄνθρωπος, ἐν
 σώματι δὲ μορφώσασα κατ' αὐτὴν καὶ ἄλλο εἶδωλον
 15 ἀνθρώπου ὅσον ἐδέχεται τὸ σῶμα ποιήσασα, ὥσπερ καὶ
 τούτου ἀν ποιήσει ὁ ζωγράφος ἔτι ἐλάττω ἄνθρωπὸν
 τινα, τὴν μορφήν ἔχει καὶ τοὺς λόγους ἢ τὰ ἦθη, τὰς
 διαθέσεις, τὰς δυνάμεις, ἀμυδρὰ πάντα, ὅτι μὴ οὕτως
 πρῶτος· καὶ δὴ καὶ [εἶδη αἰσθήσεων ἄλλων]³ αἰσθήσεις
 20 ἄλλας ἐναργεῖς δοκούσας εἶναι, ἀμυδροτέρας δὲ ὡς πρὸς
 τὰς πρὸ αὐτῶν καὶ εἰκόνας. ὁ δὲ ἐπὶ τούτῳ ἄνθρωπος

¹ Creuzer (*transit* Ficinus, et testatur *Theologia*): ἢ Enn.

² Orth: μὴ Enn.

³ *delevimus, ut glossam: ad αἰσθήσεις ἄλλας.*

itself? Or does "living being" stand for "rational life" in the form? Then man is rational life. Is he then life without soul? For either soul will provide the rational life and the man will be an activity of soul and not a substance, or the soul will be the man. But if the rational soul is going to be the man, how is the soul not man when it goes into another living being?

5. Man, therefore, must be a rational forming principle other than soul. What is there to prevent man from being a composite, a soul in a particular kind of forming principle, the principle being a sort of particular activity, and the activity being unable to exist without that which acts? For this is how the forming principles in seeds are; for they are neither without soul nor simply souls. For the rational forming principles which make things are not soulless, and there is nothing surprising in substances of this kind being rational forming principles. Of what kind of soul, then, are the forming principles which make man activities? Of the growth-soul? Rather of that which makes a living being, a clearer one and just because of that more alive. And the soul of this kind which enters into matter of this kind, just because this is what it is, being in a way disposed like this even without the body, is man, it makes shapes in body according to itself, and makes another image of man as far as body allows, just as the painter in his turn makes yet another image of this, a kind of still lesser man; it has the shape and the forming principles or traits of character, the dispositions, the powers, all dim because (his man is not the first; and it also has other senses, which seem to be clear, but are dimmer in comparison with those before them and are images. But the man over this

ψυχῆς ἤδη θειοτέρας, ἐχούσης βελτίω ἄνθρωπον καὶ αἰσθήσεις ἐναργεύτερας. καὶ εἷη ἂν ὁ Πλάτων τοῦτον ὀρισάμενος, προσθεῖς δὲ τὸ χρωμένην σώματι, 25 ὅτι ἐποχεῖται τῇ ἤτις προσχρήται πρῶτως σώματι, ἢ δὲ δευτέρως ἢ θειοτέρα. ἤδη γὰρ αἰσθητικοῦ ὄντος τοῦ γενομένου ἐπηκολούθησεν αὕτη τρανοτέραν ζωὴν διδοῦσα· μᾶλλον δ' οὐδ' ἐπηκολούθησεν, ἀλλὰ οἶον προσέθηκεν αὐτήν· οὐ γὰρ ἐξίσταται τοῦ νοητοῦ, ἀλλὰ συναφαιμένη οἶον ἐκκρεμαμένην ἔχει τὴν κάτω 30 συμμίσασα ἑαυτὴν λόγῳ πρὸς λόγον. ὅθεν καὶ ἀμυδρὸς οὗτος ὢν ἐγένετο φανερὸς τῇ ἐλλάμψει.

6. Πῶς οὖν ἐν τῇ κρείττονι τὸ αἰσθητικόν; ἢ τὸ αἰσθητικὸν τῶν ἐκεῖ ἂν αἰσθητῶν,¹ καὶ ὡς ἐκεῖ τὰ αἰσθητά. διὸ καὶ οὕτως αἰσθάνεται τὴν αἰσθητὴν ἁρμονίαν, τῇ δὲ αἰσθήσει παραδεξαμένου τοῦ 5 αἰσθητικοῦ ἀνθρώπου καὶ συναρμόσαντος εἰς ἕσχατον πρὸς τὴν ἐκεῖ ἁρμονίαν, καὶ πυρὸς ἐναρμόσαντος πρὸς τὸ ἐκεῖ πῦρ, οὐδ' αἰσθησις ἦν ἐκείνη τῆ ψυχῇ ἀνάλογον <τῇ>² τοῦ πυρὸς τοῦ ἐκεῖ φύσει. εἰ γὰρ ἦν ἐκεῖ σώματα ταῦτα, ἦσαν αὐτῶν τῇ ψυχῇ αἰσθήσεις καὶ ἀντιλήψεις· 10 καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος ὁ ἐκεῖ, ἢ τοιαύτη ψυχῇ, ἀντιληπτικὴ τούτων, ὅθεν καὶ ὄσπερος ἄνθρωπος, τὸ μίμημα, εἶχε τοὺς λόγους ἐν μιμήσει· καὶ ὁ ἐν νῶ ἄνθρωπος τὸν πρὸ πάντων τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἄνθρωπον. ἐλλάμπει δ' οὗτος τῷ δευτέρῳ καὶ οὗτος τῷ τρίτῳ· ἔχει δὲ πῶς πάντας ὁ

¹ Schwyzer, testatur *Theologia*: τῶν ἐκεῖ ἀναισθητῶν A^{ac} (ἀν exp.) EBUCQ: τῶ ἐκεῖ ἀναισθητῶ x.

² Bentler.

one belongs to a soul already more divine which has a better man and clearer senses. And this would be the man Plato was defining, and by adding "using a body" he indicated that it rides upon the one which primarily uses a body, and the one which does so secondarily is diviner.¹ For when the man who came to be already had sense-perception, this soul followed on and gave a brighter life; or rather it did not follow, but in a way attached itself; for it does not go out of the intelligible, but united to it has the lower soul in a way hanging from it, mixing itself in, forming principle to forming principle. And so this man, who is dim, becomes clearly visible by the illumination.

6. How, then, is there a power of sense-perception in the better soul? It would be a power of perceiving the sense-objects there, and would correspond to the sense-objects there. This is the way, therefore, in which the better soul perceives the melody of sense, when the man of the sense-world receives it by sense-perception and comes into tune, to the last and lowest degree, with the melody there in the intelligible, and fire is tuned to the fire there, of which that better soul had a perception which corresponded to the nature of the fire there. For if there were bodies there, the soul had perceptions and apprehensions of them; and the man there, the soul of this kind, was able to apprehend these bodies; and that is why the later man, the imitation, had their forming principles in imitation; and the man in Intellect apprehends the man before all men. But this man shines on the second, and this second on the third; and the

¹ Again *Alcibiades* I 129E-130A.

15 ἔσχατος, οὐ γινόμενος ἐκείνοι,¹ ἀλλὰ παρακείμενος ἐκείνοις. ἐνεργεῖ δὲ ὁ μὲν ἡμῶν κατὰ τὸν ἔσχατον, τῷ δέ τι καὶ παρὰ τοῦ πρὸ αὐτοῦ, τῷ δὲ καὶ παρὰ τοῦ τρίτου ἢ ἐνέργεια, καὶ ἔστιν ἕκαστος καθ' ὃν ἐνεργεῖ, καίτοι πάντας ἕκαστος ἔχει καὶ αὐτὸς οὐκ ἔχει. τοῦ δὲ σώματος
 20 χωρισθείσης τῆς τρίτης ζωῆς καὶ τοῦ τρίτου ἀνθρώπου, εἰ συνέποιτο τῇ δευτέρᾳ,² συνέποιτο δὲ μὴ χωρισθείσα τῶν ἄνω, οὐ ἐκείνη καὶ αὕτη λέγεται εἶναι. μεταλαβούσης δὲ θήρειον σῶμα θαυμάζεται δέ, πῶς λόγος οὐσα ἀνθρώπου. ἢ πάντα ἦν, ἄλλοτε δὲ ἐνεργεῖ κατ' ἄλλον. καθαρὰ μὲν οὖν οὐσα καὶ πρὶν κακυνθῆναι
 25 ἀνθρώπων θέλει καὶ ἀνθρωπὸς ἐστὶ καὶ γὰρ κάλλιον τοῦτο, καὶ τὸ κάλλιον ποιεῖ. ποιεῖ δὲ καὶ δαίμονας προτέρους, ὁμοειδεῖς τῇ <ῆ>³ ἀνθρώπων καὶ ὁ πρὸ αὐτῆς δαιμονιώτερος, μᾶλλον δὲ θεός, καὶ ἔστι μίμημα θεοῦ δαίμων εἰς θεὸν ἀνηρημένος, ὡσπερ ἀνθρώπος εἰς
 30 δαίμονα.⁴ οὐ γὰρ λέγεται θεός, εἰς ὃν ὁ ἀνθρώπος ἔχει γὰρ διαφορὰν, ἢν ἔχουσι ψυχαὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλας, καὶ ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ὦσι στοίχου.⁵ λέγειν δὲ δεῖ δαίμονας εἶδος δαιμόνων, οὓς φησὶν ὁ Πλάτων δαίμονας. ὅταν δὲ συνέπηται τῇ⁶ θήρειον φύσιν ἐλομένη ψυχῇ⁷ ἢ
 35 συνηρημένη [τῇ]⁸ ὅτε ἀνθρώπος ἦν, τὸν ἐν αὐτῇ

¹ Geiger, testatur *Theologia*: ἐκείνοις Enn.

² coniectimus: ἢ δευτέρα Enn.

³ τῇ <ῆ> H-S¹: τῇ wBUCQ; τὸν x.

⁴ Volkman: ἀνθρώπων Enn.

⁵ Volkman: στοίχου Enn.

⁶ Theiler: τῇ Enn.

⁷ F^{3ms} (= Ficinus): ψυχῇ Enn. ⁸ del. Kirchhoff.

¹ Plotinus is probably thinking of two passages in Plato: *Symposium* 202D-E and *Timaeus* 90A. These give rather

last man somehow possesses all men, not becoming those other men, but set alongside them. And one of us is active according to the last and lowest man, but another has something also from the one before him, and another's active actuality comes even from the third, and each is the man according to whom he is active, though each of us has all of them — and again does not have them. And when the third life and the third man are separated from the body, if the third life follows the second, and follows it without being separated from the things above, then this life is said to be also where that life above is. But when the soul takes the body of a beast one wonders how it does it when it is the forming principle of man. Now it was all things, but is active at different times according to different ones. When it is pure, then, and before it is spoilt it wills man and is man; for this is finer, and it does what is finer. But soul makes the spirits which come before man, which are of the same kind as the soul which makes man; and he who is before the soul is more of a spirit, or rather is a god, and a spirit is an imitation of a god, dependent on the god as man is on the spirit; for the being on whom man is dependent is not called a god. He has the difference from a god which souls have from each other, even if they belong to the same order. But, one must call spirits that kind of spirits whom Plato calls spirits.¹ But when the soul which was joined to it when it was a man follows the soul which has chosen the nature of a beast, it gives the forming principle in it which different accounts of the nature of spirits: in the *Timaeus* the personal δαίμων or guardian spirit is demythologised and said to be the highest part of our soul, the immortal reason. Plotinus reconciles the two in III. 4. 5.

λόγον ἐκείνου τοῦ ζώου ἔδωκεν. ἔχει γάρ, καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια αὕτη χείρων.

7. Ἄλλ' εἰ κακυνθείσα καὶ χείρων γενομένη πλάττει θήρειον φύσιν, οὐκ ἦν ὁ ἐξαρχῆς βουὴν ἐποιεῖ ἢ ἵππον, καὶ ὁ λόγος δὲ ἵππου καὶ ἵππος παρὰ φύσιν. ἢ ἔλαττον, οὐ μὴν παρὰ φύσιν, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνό πως καὶ
5 ἐξαρχῆς ἵππος ἢ κύων. καὶ εἰ μὲν ἔξει, ποιεῖ τὸ κάλλιον, εἰ δὲ μή, ὁ δύναται, ἢ γε ποιεῖν προσταχθεῖσα· οἷα καὶ οἱ πολλὰ εἶδη ποιεῖν εἰδότες δημιουργοί, εἴτα τοῦτο ποιοῦντες, ἢ ὁ προσετάχθησαν, ἢ ὁ ἢ ὅλη ἐθέλει τῇ ἐπιτηδειότητι. τί γὰρ κωλύει τὴν μὲν δύναμιν τῆς τοῦ
10 παντὸς ψυχῆς προὔπογράφειν, ἅτε λόγον πάντα οὔσαν, πρὶν καὶ παρ' αὐτῆς ἦκειν τὰς ψυχικὰς δυνάμεις, καὶ τὴν προὔπογραφὴν οἶον προδρόμους ἐλλάμψεις εἰς τὴν ὅλην εἶναι, ἢδη δὲ τοῖς τοιούτοις ἴχνεσιν ἐπακολουθοῦσαν τὴν ἐξεργαζομένην ψυχὴν κατὰ μέρη
15 τὰ ἴχνη διαρροῦσαν ποιῆσαι καὶ γενέσθαι ἐκάστην τοῦτο, ᾧ προσῆλθε σχηματίσασα ἑαυτήν, ὡπερ τὸν ἐν ὀρχήσει πρὸς τὸ δοθὲν αὐτῷ δράμα; ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἐπιστόμενοι τῷ ἐφεξῆς εἰς τοῦτο ἦκομεν. ἦν δὲ ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος, τὸ αἰσθητικὸν ὅπως τοῦ ἀνθρώπου καὶ πῶς οὐκ ἐκεῖνα πρὸς γένεσιν βλέπει· καὶ ἡμῖν ἐφαίνετο καὶ ὁ
20 λόγος ἐδείκνυεν οὐκ ἐκεῖνα πρὸς τὰ τῆδε βλέπειν, ἀλλὰ ταῦτα εἰς ἐκεῖνα ἀνηρτῆσθαι καὶ μιμείσθαι ἐκεῖνα, καὶ

¹ Here and in what follows in ch. 7 Plotinus is explaining Plato's doctrine of animal reincarnation as stated in *Timaeus* 42B-C.

belongs to that living thing in the intelligible world. For it possesses it, and this is its worse form of activity.¹

7. But if it is when it is spoilt and has become worse that the soul makes a beast-nature, it was not from the beginning the principle which made horse or ox, and the forming principles of horse, and horse, were against nature. No, a lesser thing, certainly not an unnatural one, but that which made them was somehow from the beginning horse or dog. And if the soul has the opportunity, it makes what is finer, but if not, what it can; it is foreordained to make in any case: it is like the craftsmen who know how to make many forms and then make just this one, for which they had the order or which their material by its particular characteristics required. For what is there to prevent the power of the Soul of the All from drawing a preliminary outline, since it is the universal forming principle, even before the soul-powers come from it, and this preliminary outline being like illuminations running on before into matter, and the soul which carries out the work following traces of this kind and making by articulating the traces part by part, and each individual soul becoming this to which it came by figuring itself, as the dancer does to the dramatic part given him? Well, by following up one line of thought after another we have arrived at this point. But our discussion was about how the power of sense-perception belongs to man and how those intelligible realities do not look to coming to birth; and it appeared to us, and our argument showed, that those realities do not look to the things here below but these are dependent on those and imitate those, and that this man here below has his

τοῦτον τὸν ἀνθρώπου παρ' ἐκείνου ἔχοντα τὰς δυνάμεις
πρὸς ἐκείνα, καὶ συνεξεύχθαι ταῦτα τὰ αἰσθητὰ τούτῳ,
ἐκείνα δ' ἐκείνῳ· ἐκείνα γὰρ τὰ αἰσθητά, ἃ οὕτως
25 ὠνομάσαμεν, ὅτι σώματα,¹ ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον ἐν
ἀντιλήψει· καὶ τήνδε τὴν αἴσθησιν² ἀμυδροτέραν
εἶναι³ τῆς ἐκεῖ ἀντιλήψεως, ἣν ὠνομάζομεν αἴσθησιν
ὅτι σωμάτων ἦν⁴ ἐναργεστέραν οὖσαν.⁵ καὶ διὰ τοῦτο
30 καὶ τοῦτον αἰσθητικόν, ὅτι ἐλαττόνως καὶ ἐλαττόνων
ἀντιληπτικὸς εἰκόνων ἐκείνων· ὥστε εἶναι τὰς
αἰσθήσεις ταύτας ἀμυδράς νοήσεις, τὰς δὲ ἐκεῖ νοήσεις
ἐναργεῖς αἰσθήσεις.

8. Ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν αἰσθητικὸν οὕτως. τὸ δὲ "ἵππος"
ὁμῶς⁶ καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν ζώων ἐκεῖ πῶς οὐ πρὸς τὰ
ἐνταῦθα ἐθέλει βλέπειν; ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν, ἵνα ἐνταῦθα ἵππος
γένοιτο ἢ ἄλλο τι ζῶον, ἐξεύρε νόησιν ἵππου; καίτοι
5 πῶς οἶόν τε ἦν βουλόμενον ἵππον ποιῆσαι νοῆσαι ἵππου;
ἤδη γὰρ δῆλον ὅτι ὑπῆρχεν ἵππου νόησις, εἴπερ
ἠβουλήθη ἵππον ποιῆσαι· ὥστε οὐκ ἔστιν, ἵνα ποιῆση,
νοῆσαι, ἀλλὰ πρότερον εἶναι τὸν μὴ γενόμενον ἵππον
πρὸ τοῦ μετὰ ταῦτα ἐσομένου. εἰ οὖν πρὸ τῆς γενέσεως
10 ἦν καὶ οὐχ, ἵνα γένηται, ἐνοήθη, οὐ πρὸς τὰ τῆδε
βλέπων εἶχε παρ' ἐαυτῷ ὅς εἶχε τὸν ἐκεῖ ἵππον, οὐδ' ἵνα

¹ R^{2s} (*corpora* Ficinus): ἀσώματα AEBxUCQ, H-S².

² post αἴσθησιν transp. ὅτι σωμάτων ἦν Steinhart, H-S².

³ Theiler: οὖσαν Enn., H-S².

⁴ αἴσθησιν ὅτι σωμάτων ἦν del. H-S².

⁵ Theiler: εἶναι Enn., H-S².

⁶ Igal: ὁλως EBxUCQ: ὅλος A.

¹ In this difficult passage I remain closer to the MSS (and H-S¹) than to H-S². But in line 25 I read σώματα with Ficino (who translates *corpora*) and in lines 26 and 28 I

powers from that intelligible man and looks to those realities, and these sense-objects are linked to this man and those others to that; for those sense-objects, which we called so because they are bodies, are apprehended in a different way; and that this sense-perception here below is dimmer than the apprehension there in the intelligible, which we called sense-perception because it is of bodies and which is clearer.¹ And for this reason this man here has sense-perception, because he has a lesser apprehension of lesser things, images of those intelligible realities; so that these sense-perceptions here are dim intellections, but the intellections there are clear sense-perceptions.

8. But so much for the power of sense-perception. But all the same, how do "horse" and each and every one of the animals not intend to look to the things here below? But supposing God discovered the thought of horse in order that a horse (or some other animal) might come into being here below? Yet how would it be possible for him when he wanted to make a horse to think a horse? For it is already clear that the thought of horse existed if he wanted to make a horse; so that it is not possible for him to think it in order to make it, but the horse which did not come into being must exist before that which was to be afterwards. If then it existed before its generation and was not thought of that it might be generated, he who possessed the horse there in the intelligible did not possess it in himself in looking to the things here below, nor that he might make the things here transpose οὖσαν and εἶναι with Theiler. The presence of bodies in the intelligible world is suggested in the previous chapter, lines 7-9, and clearly affirmed in VI. 2. 21. 52-53.

τὰ τῆδε ποιήσῃ, εἶχε τοῦτόν τε καὶ τὰ ἄλλα, ἀλλὰ ἦν μὲν
 ἐκεῖνα, ταῦτα δὲ ἐπηκολούθει ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐκείνοις· οὐ
 γὰρ ἦν σῆμαι μέχρι τῶν ἐκεῖ. τίς γὰρ ἂν ἔστησε
 15 δύναμιν μένειν τε καὶ προΐεναι δυναμένην; ἀλλὰ διὰ τί
 ἐκεῖ ζῶα ταῦτα; τί γὰρ ἐν θεῷ ταῦτα; τὰ μὲν γὰρ λογικὰ
 ἔστω· ἀλόγων δὲ τοσοῦτον πλήθος τί τὸ σεμνὸν ἔχει; τί
 δὲ οὐ τοῦναντίον; ὅτι μὲν οὖν πολλὰ δεῖ τοῦτο τὸ εἶναι
 οὐ μετὰ τὸ πάντῃ εἶναι, δηλόν· ἢ οὐκ ἂν ἦν μετ' ἐκείνο,
 20 ἀλλ' ἐκείνο. μετ' ἐκείνο δὲ οὐκ ὑπὲρ μὲν ἐκείνο πρὸς τὸ
 μᾶλλον ἐν γενέσθαι οὐκ ἦν, ἐλλείπον ὃ ἐκείνου· τοῦ δ'
 ἀρίστου ὄντος ἐνός εἶδει πλέον ἢ ἐν εἶναι· τὸ γὰρ πλήθος
 ἐν ἐλλείψει. τί οὖν κωλύει δυνάδα εἶναι; ἢ ἐκάτερον τῶν
 ἐν τῇ δυνάδι οὐχ οἰόν τε ἦν ἐν παντελῶς εἶναι, ἀλλὰ πάλιν
 25 αὐτὸ δύο τοῦλάχιστον εἶναι, καὶ ἐκείνων αὐτῶσαύτως·
 εἶτα καὶ κίνησις ἦν ἐν τῇ δυνάδι τῇ πρώτῃ καὶ στάσις, ἦν
 δὲ καὶ νοῦς, καὶ ζωὴ ἦν ἐν αὐτῇ¹ καὶ τέλος νοῦς καὶ
 ζωὴ τελεία. ἦν τοίνυν οὐχ ὡς νοῦς εἷς, ἀλλὰ πᾶς καὶ
 πάντας τοὺς καθ' ἕκαστα νοῦς ἔχων καὶ τοσοῦτος ὅσοι
 πάντες, καὶ πλείων· καὶ ἕξῃ οὐχ ὡς ψυχὴ μία, ἀλλ' ὡς
 30 πᾶσαι, καὶ πλείων² δύναμιν εἰς τὸ ποιεῖν ψυχὰς ἐκάστας
 ἔχων, καὶ ζῶον παντελὲς ἦν, οὐκ ἄνθρωπον ἐν
 αὐτῷ μόνον ἔχων· μόνον γὰρ ἄνθρωπος ἐνταῦθα ἦν.

9. Ἄλλ' ἔστω, φησὶ τις, τὰ τίμια τῶν ζῴων· πῶς

¹ Harder, testatur *Theologia: aipō* Enn.

² AJP^c, H-S²: πλείων EBRUQ, H-S¹: om. C.

below, but those intelligibles existed and these things here necessarily followed upon them; for it was not possible to stop at the intelligibles there. For who could bring to a stop a power able both to abide and to go forward? But why these animals there in the intelligible? For why should they be in God? Rational animals, yes; but what majesty does so great a multitude of irrational ones have? Why does it not have just the opposite? Now it is clear that this one must be many, because it exists after the altogether One; or it would not have been after that One, but it would have been that One. But, being after it, it could not be above it in the direction of being more one, but had to fall short of it; but, as the best was one, it had to be more than one; for multiplicity is deficient. But what prevents it from being a dyad? Now each of the ones in the dyad could not be absolutely one, but must again be at least two, and again it is the same with each of those; and then there was in the first dyad movement as well as rest, and there was also intellect, and life was in it; and perfect intellect and perfect life.¹ Then it was not one as Intellect but all, and possessing all the particular intellects, and as many as all of them and more; and it lived not as one soul, but as all, and as possessing more power to make all the individual souls, and it was the "complete living being",² not having only man in it: for otherwise there would only be man here below.

9. "But yes," someone will say, "I grant the valuable living beings, but on the other hand, how could

¹ Cp. Plato *Sophist* 249A-C.

² Plato *Timaeus* 31B1.

αὐτὰ εὐτελῆ καὶ τὰ ἄλογα ἦν; τὸ εὐτελὲς δηλονότι τῷ
 ἀλόγῳ ἔχοντα, εἰ τῷ λογικῷ τὸ τίμιον· καὶ εἰ τῷ νοερῷ
 τὸ τίμιον, τῷ ἀνοήτῳ τὸ ἐναντίον. καίτοι πῶς ἀνόητον ἢ
 5 ἄλογον ἐκείνου ὄντος ἐν ᾧ ἕκαστα ἢ ἐξ οὗ; πρὸ δὲ τῶν
 περὶ ταῦτα καὶ πρὸς ταῦτα λεχθησομένων λάβωμεν, ὡς
 ὁ ἄνθρωπος ὁ ἐνταῦθα οὐ τοιοῦτός ἐστιν, οἷος ἐκείνος,
 ὥστε καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ζῶα οὐχ οἷα τὰ ἐνταῦθα κάκει, ἀλλὰ
 μειζόνως δεῖ ἐκείνα λαμβάνειν· εἴτα οὔτε τὸ λογικὸν
 10 ἐκεῖ· ὥδε γὰρ ἴσως λογικός, ἐκεῖ δὲ ὁ πρὸ τοῦ
 λογίζεσθαι. διὰ τί οὖν ἐνταῦθα λογίζεται οὗτος, τὰ δ'
 ἄλλα οὐ; ἢ διαφόρου ὄντος ἐκεῖ τοῦ νοεῖν ἐν τε ἀνθρώπῳ
 καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις, διάφορον καὶ τὸ λογίζεσθαι· ἐν
 γὰρ πῶς καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις πολλὰ διανοίας ἔργα. διὰ
 15 τί οὖν οὐκ ἐπίσης λογικά; διὰ τί δὲ ἄνθρωποι πρὸς
 ἀλλήλους οὐκ ἐπίσης; δεῖ δὲ ἐνθυμείσθαι, ὡς τὰς πολλὰς
 ζωὰς οἷον κινήσεις οὕσας καὶ τὰς πολλὰς νοήσεις οὐκ
 ἐχρῆν τὰς αὐτὰς εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ζωὰς διαφόρους καὶ
 νοήσεις ὡσαύτως· τὰς δὲ διαφορὰς πῶς φωτεινιτέρας
 20 καὶ ἐναργεστέρας, κατὰ¹ τὸ ἐγγὺς δὲ τῶν πρώτων
 πρώτας καὶ δευτέρας καὶ τρίτας. διόπερ τῶν νοήσεων αἱ
 μὲν θεοί, αἱ δὲ δευτερόν τι γένος, ἐν ᾧ τὸ λογικὸν
 ἐπικληθὲν ἐνταῦθα, ἐξῆς δ' ἀπὸ τούτων τὸ ἄλογον κληθέν.
 ἐκεῖ δὲ καὶ τὸ ἄλογον λεγόμενον λόγος ἦν, καὶ τὸ ἄνου

¹ H-S¹: καὶ Enn.

the cheap and irrational ones be there?" Their cheapness obviously comes by irrationality, if being valuable comes by rationality; and if they are valuable by their intellectual quality, they are the reverse by their unintellectuality. And yet how can anything be unintellectual or irrational when it is that Intellect in which each and every one exists or from which they come? Before, then, beginning the arguments about and against this position, let us grasp that man here is not like that intelligible man, so that the other living beings are not the same here and there, but one must have a greater and nobler apprehension of those there; and then too there is no rationality there: for here perhaps man is rational but in that world there is the man before reasoning. Why, then, does this man here reason, but the others do not? Now, there in the intelligible, intelligence is different in man and the other living beings, and reasoning is also different; for there are present somehow also in the other living beings many works of deliberate thought. Why then are they not equally rational? And why are men not equally so in comparison to each other? But one must consider that the many lives, which are like movements, and the many thoughts should not have been the same, but different lives and in the same way different thoughts; and the differences are, somehow, in brilliance and clarity, firsts and seconds and thirds according to their nearness to the first principles. And for this reason some of the thoughts are gods, and some of a second kind, in which is included what we call rational here below, and in sequence from these what is called irrational. But there what we say is irrational was also a rational principle, and

νοῦς ἦν, ἐπεὶ καὶ ὁ νοῶν ἵππον νοῦς ἔστι, καὶ ἡ νόησις
 25 ἵππου νοῦς ἦν. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν νόησις μόνον, ἄτοπον οὐδὲν
 τὴν νόησιν αὐτὴν νόησιν οὐσαν ἀνούητου εἶναι· νῦν δ' εἰ
 ταῦτόν ἢ νόησις τῷ πράγματι, πῶς ἢ μὲν νόησις,
 ἀνόητον δὲ τὸ πρᾶγμα; οὕτω γὰρ ἂν νοῦς ἀνόητον
 ἑαυτὸν ποιοί. ἢ οὐκ ἀνόητον, ἀλλὰ νοῦς τοιόσδε· ζωὴ
 30 γὰρ τοιάδε. ὡς γὰρ ἠτισοῦν ζωὴ οὐκ ἀπήλλακται τοῦ
 εἶναι ζωὴ, οὕτως οὐδὲ νοῦς τοιόσδε ἀπήλλακται τοῦ
 εἶναι νοῦς· ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ ὁ νοῦς ὁ κατὰ ὀτιοῦν ζῶον
 ἀπήλλακται αὐ τοῦ νοῦς εἶναι πάντων, οἶον καὶ
 ἀνθρώπου, εἴπερ ἕκαστον μέρος, ὃ τι ἂν λάβῃς, πάντα
 ἀλλ' ἴσως ἄλλως. ἐνεργεῖα μὲν γὰρ ἐκεῖνο, δύναται δὲ
 35 πάντα· λαμβάνομεν δὲ καθ' ἕκαστον τὸ ἐνεργεῖα· τὸ δ'
 ἐνεργεῖα ἔσχατον, ὥστε τοῦδε τοῦ νοῦ τὸ ἔσχατον ἵππον
 εἶναι, καὶ ἡ ἔληξε προῖων ἀεὶ εἰς ἐλάττω ζωὴν, ἵππον
 εἶναι, ἄλλον δὲ κατωτέρω λήξει. ἐξελιπτόμεναι γὰρ αἱ
 40 ἀφείσαι καὶ ἐν τῷ ἀφείναι δὲ ἄλλα ἄλλαι¹ διὰ τὸ ἐνδεῆς
 τοῦ ζώου τοῦ φανέντος ἐκ τοῦ ἐλλείποντος ἕτερον
 ἐξευρούσαι προσθεῖναι· οἶον ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἔτι τὸ ἰκανὸν
 εἰς ζωὴν, ἀνεφάνη ὄνυξ καὶ τὸ γαμφώνυχον ἢ τὸ

¹ H S¹: ἔλλα· ἄλλα Enn.

¹ Cp. Aristotle *Metaphysics* Λ 9. 1075a1-5. Both in Aristotle and Plotinus it is divine thought which is being considered, but the conclusions they draw from the

the mindless was mind, since the thinker of horse is mind and the thought of a horse was mind. But if it was only a thought, there would be nothing out of the way in the thought itself as a thought being of something thoughtless; but as things are, if the thought is the same as the thing,¹ how can the thought be thought and the thing thoughtless? For in this way thought would make itself thoughtless. But now it is not thoughtless but a particular kind of intellect: for it is a particular kind of life. For just as any particular life does not cease to be life, so neither does an intellect of a particular kind cease to be intellect: since the intellect appropriate to any particular living being does not on the other hand cease to be the intellect of all, of man also, for instance, granted that each part, whichever one you take, is all things, but perhaps in different ways. For it is actually one thing, but has the power to be all; but we apprehend in each what it actually is; and what it actually is, is the last and lowest, so that the last and lowest of this particular intellect is horse, and being horse is where it stopped in its continual outgoing to a lesser life, but another stops lower down. For as the powers unfold they always leave something behind on the higher level; and as they go out they lose something, and in losing different things different ones find and add on something else because of the need of the living being which appeared as a result of the deficiency; for instance, since there is not yet enough for life's purpose, nails appeared, and having claws and fangs, and the na-

principle of the identity of perfect immaterial thought with its object are startlingly different.

καρχαρόδον ἢ κέρατος φύσις· ὥστε, ἢ κατηῆλθεν ὁ νοῦς,
 45 ταύτη πάλιν αὐτῷ αὐτάρκει τῆς φύσεως ἀνακύψαι καὶ
 εὐρεῖν ἐν αὐτῷ τοῦ ἐλλείποντος κειμένην ἴασιν.

10. Ἀλλὰ πῶς ἐκεῖ ἐνέλειπε; τί γὰρ κέρατα ἐκεῖ
 πρὸς ἄμυναν; ἢ πρὸς τὸ αὐταρκες ὡς ζῶον καὶ τὸ
 τέλεον. ὡς γὰρ ζῶον ἔδει τέλεον εἶναι, καὶ ὡς νοῦν δὲ
 τέλεον, καὶ ὡς ζῶην δὲ τέλεον· ὥστε, εἰ μὴ τοῦτο, ἀλλὰ
 5 τοῦτο. καὶ ἡ διαφορὰ τῷ ἄλλο ἀντὶ ἄλλου, ἵνα ἐκ
 πάντων μὲν τὸ τελειότατον ζῶον καὶ ὁ τέλειος νοῦς καὶ
 ἡ τελειοτάτη ζωὴ, ἕκαστον δὲ ὡς ἕκαστον τέλειον. καὶ
 μὴν, εἰ ἐκ πολλῶν, δεῖ εἶναι αὐτῶν ἢ οὐχ οἷόν τε ἐκ
 πολλῶν μὲν εἶναι, τῶν αὐτῶν δὲ πάντων· ἢ αὐταρκες ἦν
 10 ἂν ἔν. δεῖ τοίνυν ἐξ ἐτέρων αἰεὶ κατ' εἶδος, ὡσπερ καὶ
 πᾶν σύνθετον, καὶ σωζομένων ἐκάστων, οἷαι καὶ αἰ
 μορφαὶ καὶ οἱ λόγοι. αἷ τε γὰρ μορφαί, οἷον ἀνθρώπου,
 ἐξ ὅσων διαφορῶν, καίτοι τὸ ἐπὶ πᾶσι ἐν. καὶ βελτίω
 καὶ χεῖρω ἀλλήλων, ὀφθαλμὸς καὶ δάκτυλος, ἀλλ' ἐνός·
 15 καὶ οὐ χεῖρον τὸ πᾶν, ἀλλ' ὅτι οὕτω, βέλτιον καὶ ὁ
 λόγος δὲ ζῶον καὶ ἄλλο τι, ὃ μὴ ταυτὸν τῷ "ζῶον". καὶ
 ἀρετῇ δὲ τὸ κοινὸν καὶ τὸ ἴδιον καὶ τὸ ὅλον καλὸν
 ἀδιαφόρου τοῦ κοινοῦ ὄντος.

11. Λέγεται δὲ οὐδ' ὁ οὐρανός—καὶ πολλὰ δὲ
 φαίνεται—οὐκ ἀτιμάσαι τὴν τῶν ζῴων πάντων φύσιν.

ture of horn; so that where the intellect came down to, at that very point it comes up again by the self-sufficiency of its nature and finds stored in itself the cure for the deficiency.

10. But how was it deficient there in the intelligible? For why should there be horns for defence there? They are for its self-sufficiency as a living being and its completeness. For it had to be complete as living being and complete as intellect and complete as life; so that if it did not have this, it must have that. And the difference is by having one thing instead of another, so that from all living beings [there may be composed] the most perfect living being and the perfect intellect and the perfect life, and each individual may be perfect as an individual. And certainly, if it is composed of many, it must on the other hand be one; now it is not possible for it to be composed of many and all of them the same: if it was, it would be a self-sufficient one. It must then be composed of things again and again differing in form, like every composite being, and each individual must be preserved, as their shapes and forming principles are. For the shapes also, of man for instance, are composed of so many different elements, though that over all is one. And they are better and worse than each other, eye and finger, but they belong to one; and the whole is not worse but, because it is so, is better; and the rationally defined forming principle is living being and something else, which is not the same as "living being". And it is a virtue to be both general and particular, and the whole beautiful—the general is not differentiated.

11. But it is said that even the heaven—and many living beings are manifest in it—does not think

ἐπεὶ καὶ τόδε τὸ πᾶν πάντα ἔχει. πόθεν οὖν ἔχει; πάντα
 οὖν ἔχει ὅσα ἐνταῦθα τὰ κεῖ; ἢ ὅσα λόγῳ πεποιήται καὶ
 5 κατ' εἶδος. ἀλλ' ὅταν πῦρ ἔχη, καὶ ὕδωρ ἔχει, ἔχει δὲ
 πάντως καὶ φυτὰ. πῶς οὖν τὰ φυτὰ ἐκεῖ; καὶ πῶς πῦρ
 ζῆ; καὶ πῶς γῆ; ἢ γὰρ ζῆ ἢ ὅσον νεκρὰ ἔσται ἐκεῖ, ὥστε
 μὴ πᾶν τὸ ἐκεῖ ζῆν. καὶ τί ὅλως ἐστὶν ἐκεῖ καὶ ταῦτα; τὰ
 10 τῆδε φυτὸν λόγος ἐστὶν ἐν ζωῇ κείμενος. εἰ δὴ ὁ
 ἔνυλος λόγος ὁ τοῦ φυτοῦ, καθ' ὃν τὸ φυτὸν ἐστὶ, ζωή
 τίς ἐστὶ τοιάδε καὶ ψυχὴ τις, καὶ ὁ λόγος ἐν τι, ἦτοι τὸ
 πρῶτον φυτὸν ἐστὶν οὗτος ἢ οὐ, ἀλλὰ πρὸ αὐτοῦ φυτὸν
 τὸ πρῶτον, ἀφ' οὗ καὶ τοῦτο. καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνο ἐν, ταῦτα
 15 δὲ πολλὰ καὶ ἀφ' ἐνὸς ἐξ ἀνάγκης. εἰ δὴ τοῦτο, δεῖ πολὺ
 πρότερον ἐκεῖνο ζῆν καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο φυτὸν εἶναι, ἀπ'
 ἐκείνου δὲ ταῦτα δευτέρως καὶ τρίτως καὶ κατ' ἔχοντος
 ἐκείνου ζῆν. γῆ δὲ πῶς; καὶ τί τὸ γῆ εἶναι; καὶ τίς ἢ ἐκεῖ
 γῆ τὸ ζῆν ἔχουσα; ἢ πρότερον τίς αὐτῆ; τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τί
 20 τὸ εἶναι αὐτῆ; δεῖ δὴ μορφὴν τινα εἶναι καὶ ἐνταῦθα καὶ
 λόγον. ἐκεῖ μὲν οὖν ἐπὶ τοῦ φυτοῦ ἔστι καὶ ὁ τῆδε αὐτοῦ
 λόγος. ἀρ' οὖν καὶ ἐν τῆδε τῆ γῆ; ἢ εἰ λάβοιμεν τὰ
 μάλιστα γήινα γεννώμενα καὶ πλαττόμενα ἐν αὐτῇ,
 εὔροιμεν ἂν καὶ ἐνταῦθα τὴν γῆς φύσιν. λίθων τοίνυν

worthless the nature of all living things, since also
 this All here has all of them. From where, then, does
 it have them? Does then the world there have every-
 thing that is here? Yes, everything that is made by
 forming principle and according to form. But when
 it has fire, it also has water, and it most certainly
 also has plants. How then are there plants there?
 And how does fire live? And how does earth? For it
 either lives or it will be a kind of dead body there, so
 that not everything there lives. And how in general
 can these things here be there in the intelligible?
 Well, the plants could fit into the argument; for the
 plant here is a rational forming principle resting in
 life. If then indeed the forming principle in matter,
 that of the plant, by which the plant exists, is a
 particular life and a soul, and the forming principle
 is some one thing, then this principle is either the
 first plant or it is not, but the first plant is before it,
 and this plant here derives from it. For that first
 plant is certainly one, and these plants here are
 many, and necessarily come from one. If this is really
 so, that plant must be much more primarily alive and
 be this very thing, plant, and these here must live
 from it in the second and third degree and from its
 traces. But how does earth live? And what is it to be
 earth? And what is the earth there which has life? Or
 rather, first, what is this earth here? That is, what
 being does it have? It must certainly even here below
 be a pattern and a forming principle. Well, in that
 case of the plant, its forming principle here too was
 alive. Does it then so live in the earth here? Now, if
 we were to take the most earthly things generated
 and shaped in it, we should find here below too the
 nature of earth. The growth, then, and shaping of

25 αὐξήσεις τε καὶ πλάσεις καὶ ὕμων ἀναφνομένων ἔνδον
μορφώσεις πάντως που λόγου ἐμφύχου δημιουργούντος
ἐνδοθεν καὶ εἰδοποιούντος χρῆ νομίζειν γίνεσθαι· καὶ
τοῦτο εἶναι τὸ εἶδος τῆς γῆς τὸ ποιοῦν, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς
δένδροις τὴν λεγομένην φύσιν, τῷ δὲ ξύλῳ τοῦ δένδρου
30 ἀνάλογον τὴν λεγομένην εἶναι γῆν, καὶ ἀποτμηθέντα τὸν
λίθον οὕτως ἔχειν, ὡς εἰ ἐκ τοῦ δένδρου τι κοπεῖται, μὴ
παθόντος δὲ τούτου, ἀλλ' ἔτι συνηρημένου, ὡς τὸ μὴ
κοπεῖν ἐκ τοῦ ζῶντος φυτοῦ. τὴν <δὴ>¹ δημιουργοῦσαν
ἐγκαθημένην τῇ γῇ φύσιν ζωὴν ἐν λόγῳ ἀνευρόντες
πιτυοίμεθα ἂν τὸ ἐντεῦθεν ῥαδίως τὴν ἐκεῖ γῆν πολλὴν
35 πρῶτον ζῶσαν εἶναι καὶ ζωὴν ἔλλογον γῆς, αὐτογῆν
καὶ πρῶτως γῆν, ἀφ' ἧς καὶ ἡ ἐνταῦθα γῆ. εἰ δὲ καὶ τὸ
πῦρ λόγος τις ἐν ὕλῃ ἐστὶ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ
οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ αὐτομάτου πῦρ—πόθεν γάρ; οὐ γάρ ἐκ
παρατρέψεως, ὡς ἂν τις οἰηθείη· ἤδη γὰρ ὄντος
40 ἐν τῷ παντὶ πυρὸς ἢ παρατρημῆς ἐχόντων τῶν
παρατρηβομένων σωμάτων· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἡ ὕλη οὕτως
δυνάμει, ὥστε παρ' αὐτῆς—εἰ δὴ κατὰ λόγον δεῖ τὸ
ποιοῦν εἶναι ὡς μορφοῦν, τί ἂν εἴη ἢ ψυχὴ ποιεῖν πῦρ
δυναμένη; τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ ζωὴ καὶ λόγος, ἐν καὶ ταῦτό
ἄμφω. διὸ καὶ Πλάτων ἐν ἐκάστῳ τούτων ψυχὴν φησιν
45 εἶναι οὐκ ἄλλως ἢ ὡς ποιοῦσαν τοῦτο δὴ τὸ αἰσθητὸν
πῦρ. ἔστιν οὖν καὶ τὸ ἐνταῦθα ποιοῦν πῦρ ζωὴ τις

¹ R^{2s} (*nimirum* Ficinus), Kirchhoff.

¹ In IV. 4. 27 (where Plotinus also speaks, as he does here, of the living rock growing) it is strongly asserted that earth here below not only has a soul, but a divine soul. She is, in accordance with all Greek tradition, a goddess.

stones and the inner patterning of mountains as they grow one must most certainly suppose take place because an ensouled forming principle is working within them and giving them form; and this is the active form of the earth, like what is called the growth-nature in trees, and what we call earth corresponds to the wood of the tree, and when the stone is cut out it is in the same state as if something is chopped from a tree, but if this does not happen to it and it is still joined on it is like what has not been chopped off from a living plant.¹ Now surely when we have discovered the working nature seated in earth as a life in a forming principle we shall easily be confident about what comes next, that the earth there in the intelligible is much more primarily alive and is the life of earth in its forming principle, absolute earth and primary earth, from which the earth here below derives. But if fire also is a forming principle in matter, and so are the other things of this kind, and fire is not spontaneously generated—for where could it come from? Not from friction, as one might think: for friction occurs when fire is already in the All and the bodies being rubbed together have it; also, matter is not able to be fire in such a way that fire can come from it—if then what makes fire must do so by forming principle, as structuring it, what could it be except a soul able to make fire? But that is a life and a forming principle, both one and the same. This is why Plato says that there is a soul in each of these elements,² in no other way than as making this perceptible fire. So then what

² Plotinus here appears to be thinking of *Epinomis* 981B-C and 984B-C.

πυρίνη, ἀληθέστερον πῦρ. τὸ ἄρα ἐπέκεινα πῦρ μᾶλλον
 ὄν πῦρ μᾶλλον ἂν εἶη ἐν ζωῇ· ζῆ ἄρα καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ πῦρ. ὁ
 δ' αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ὕδατός τε καὶ ἀέρος.
 50 ἀλλὰ διὰ τί οὐκ ἔμψυχα καὶ ταῦτα ὡσπερ ἡ γῆ; ὅτι μὲν
 οὖν καὶ ταῦτα ἐν ζώῳ τῷ παντί, δῆλόν που, καὶ ὅτι
 μέρη ζώου· οὐ φαίνεται δὲ ζωὴ ἐν αὐτοῖς, ὡσπερ οὐδ'
 ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς· συλλογίζεσθαι δὲ ἦν κακεῖ καὶ ἐκ τῶν
 γινομένων ἐν αὐτῇ· ἀλλὰ γίνεται καὶ ἐν πυρὶ ζῶα, καὶ ἐν
 55 ὕδατι δὲ φανερώτερον· καὶ ἀέρινοι δὲ ζώων συστάσεις.
 γινόμενον δὲ τὸ πῦρ ἕκαστον καὶ ταχὺ σβεννύμενον τὴν
 ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ ψυχὴν παρέρχεται εἰς τε ὄγκον οὐ γεγένηται
 μένον, ἢ ἔδειξε τὴν ἐν αὐτῷ ψυχὴν· ἀήρ τε καὶ ὕδωρ
 ὡσαύτως· ἐπεὶ, εἰ παγεῖ πῶς κατὰ φύσιν, δειξείεν ἂν.
 60 ἀλλ' ὅτι ἔδει εἶναι κεχυμένα, ἣν ἔχει οὐ δείκνυσι. καὶ
 κινδυνεύει ὅμοιον εἶναι οἶον τὸ ἐπὶ τῶν ὑγρῶν τῶν ἐν
 ἡμῖν, οἶον αἵματος· ἢ μὲν γὰρ σὰρξ ἔχειν δοκεῖ καὶ ὅτι
 ἂν σὰρξ γένηται ἐκ τοῦ αἵματος, τὸ δ' αἶμα αἰσθῆσιν οὐ
 παρεχόμενον ἔχειν οὐ δοκεῖ—καίτοι ἀνάγκη ἐνεῖναι καὶ
 65 ἐν αὐτῷ—ἐπεὶ καὶ οὐδέν ἐστι βίαιον γινόμενον περὶ
 αὐτό. ἀλλ' ἔτοιμόν ἐστι διεστάναι τῆς ἐνυπαρχούσης
 ψυχῆς, οἶον καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν στοιχείων τῶν τριῶν δεῖ
 νομίζεσθαι εἶναι· ἐπεὶ καὶ ὅσα ἐξ ἀέρος συστάντος μᾶλλον
 ζῶα ἔχει τὸ μὴ αἰσθάνεσθαι εἰς τὸ παθεῖν. ὡσπερ δὲ ὁ

makes the fire here below is also a fiery life, a truer
 fire. The transcendent fire, then, since it is more fire
 would be more in life; so then absolute fire also lives.
 And the same argument applies to the others, water
 and air. But why are these too not ensouled like the
 earth? Now it is clear, I suppose, that these are in the
 universal living being, and that they are parts of the
 living being; but life is not apparent in them, as it is
 not in the case of the earth; but one could deduce the
 presence of life there too from the things which came
 into being from it; but in fire also living things come
 to be, and more obviously in water; and there are
 living organisms in the air. But the individual fire
 which comes to be and is quickly quenched moves
 past the soul in the whole and has not come to be
 static in a bulk, when it would have shown the soul
 in it; and it is the same with air and fire; since, if they
 were naturally fixed, they would show their soul; but
 since they had to be flowing, they do not show the
 soul which they have. It is likely that their state
 resembles that of the liquids in us, blood for in-
 stance; for the flesh and whatever becomes flesh
 from the blood seems to have soul, but the blood
 because it does not give a sense-perception does not
 seem to have it—though it must exist in it also—
 since also nothing violent happens to it. But it is
 easily liable to separate from the soul which exists in
 it, as one must think is so with the three elements;
 since all the living beings which are composed of
 air¹ coming together do not have any sense-
 perception which affects them. For just as the air
¹ These are δαίμονες, who, Platonists generally believed,
 had bodies of air. Cp. III. 5. 6. 37 and the passages there
 referred to.

ἀήρ τὸ φῶς ἀτενές ὄν καὶ μένον, εἰς μένει, αὐτὸς
70 παρέρχεται, τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον πάρεισι¹ καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν
αὐτοῦ κύκλω καὶ οὐ πάρεισι· καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ὡσαύτως.

12. Ἄλλὰ πάλιν ὧδε λέγωμεν· ἐπεὶ γὰρ φαμεν πρὸς
οἶον παράδειγμα ἐκείνου τόδε τὸ πᾶν εἶναι, δεῖ κακεῖ
πρότερον τὸ πᾶν ζῶον εἶναι καί, εἰ π α ν τ ε λ ε σ τὸ εἶναι
αὐτῷ, πάντα εἶναι. καὶ οὐρανὸν δὴ ἐκεῖ ζῶον εἶναι, καὶ
5 οὐκ ἔρημον τοίνυν ἄστρον τῶν ἐνταῦθα τοῦτο
λεγομένων οὐρανόν, καὶ τὸ οὐρανῷ εἶναι τοῦτο. ἔστι δ'
ἐκεῖ δηλονότι καὶ γῆ οὐκ ἔρημος, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον
ἐζωωμένη, καὶ ἔστιν ἐν αὐτῇ ζῶα ξύμπαντα, ὅσα περὶ
καὶ χερσαία λέγεται ἐνταῦθα, καὶ φυτὰ δηλονότι ἐν τῷ
10 ζῆν ἰδρυμένα· καὶ θάλασσα δέ ἐστιν ἐκεῖ, καὶ πᾶν ὕδωρ
ἐν ῥοῇ καὶ ζωῇ μενούση, καὶ τὰ ἐν ὕδατι ζῶα πάντα,
ἀέρος τε φύσις τοῦ ἐκεῖ παντὸς μοῖρα, καὶ ζῶα ἀέρια ἐν
αὐτῷ ἀνάλογον αὐτῷ τῷ ἀέρι. τὰ γὰρ ἐν ζῶντι πῶς ἂν
οὐ ζῶντα, ὅπου δὴ καὶ ἐνταῦθα; πῶς οὖν οὐ πᾶν ζῶον ἐξ
15 ἀνάγκης ἐκεῖ; ὡς γὰρ ἕκαστον τῶν μεγάλων μερῶν
ἔστιν, ἐξ ἀνάγκης οὕτως ἔχει καὶ ἡ τῶν ζώων ἐν αὐτοῖς
φύσις. ὅπως οὖν ἔχει καὶ ἔστιν ἐκεῖ οὐρανός, οὕτω καὶ
ἔχει καὶ ἔστιν ἐκεῖ τὰ ἐν οὐρανῷ ζῶα πάντα, καὶ οὐκ
ἔστι μὴ εἶναι· ἢ οὐδ' ἐκεῖνα ἔσται. ὁ οὖν ζητῶν πόθεν
20 ζῶα, ζητεῖ πόθεν οὐρανός ἐκεῖ· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ ζητεῖν
πόθεν ζῶον, τοῦτο δὲ ταῦτόν πόθεν ζωὴ καὶ ζωὴ πᾶσα

¹ Kirshhoff: πάρεισι Enn.

itself moves past the light which does not give way and abides as long as it abides, in this way it passes round its soul and does not pass; and the same with the other elements.

12. But again, let us put it this way: since we maintain that this All exists after the pattern (so to call it) of that, the universal living being must exist there too first, and, if its existence is to be complete,¹ must be all living beings. And certainly the sky there must be a living being, and so a sky not bare of stars, as we call them here below, and this is what being sky is. But obviously there is earth there also, not barren, but much more full of life, and all animals are in it, all that walk on and belong to the land here below, and, obviously, plants rooted in life; and sea is there, and all water in abiding flow and life, and all the living beings in water, and the nature of air is part of the universe there, and aerial living things are there just as the air itself is. For how could the beings in what lives not be living, when they most certainly are so even here below? How then can every living being not be there of necessity? For as each of the great parts of the universe is there, so is of necessity the nature of the living beings in them. As, therefore, the sky is there, and in the way in which it is there, so and in that way all the living beings in the sky are there, and it is impossible for them not to be; or else those great parts would not be there. If one enquires, therefore, where the living beings come from, one is enquiring where the sky there comes from; and this is to enquire where the [universal] living being comes from, and this is the same as where life comes from, and universal life and

¹ An allusion to *Timaeus* 31B1.

καὶ ψυχὴ πάσα καὶ νοῦς ὁ ξύμπας, μηδεμιᾶς ἐκεῖ πενίας
 μηδ' ἀπορίας οὔσης, ἀλλὰ πάντων ζωῆς πεπληρωμένοι
 καὶ οἶον ζεόντων. ἔστι δ' αὐτῶν ἡ οἶον ῥοὴ ἐκ μιᾶς
 25 πηγῆς, οὐχ οἶον ἐνός τινος πνεύματος ἢ θερμότητος
 μιᾶς, ἀλλὰ οἶον εἴ τις ἦν ποιότης μία πάσας ἐν αὐτῇ
 ἔχουσα καὶ σώζουσα τὰς ποιότητας, γλυκύτητος μετὰ
 εὐωδίας, καὶ ὁμοῦ οἰνώδης ποιότης καὶ χυλῶν ἀπάντων
 δυνάμεις καὶ χρωμάτων ὄψεις καὶ ὅσα ἀφαί
 30 γινώσκουσιν. ἔστωσαν δὲ καὶ ὅσα ἀκοαὶ ἀκούουσι,
 πάντα μέλη καὶ ῥυθμὸς πᾶς.

13. "Ἔστι γὰρ οὔτε νοῦς ἀπλῶν, οὔτε ἡ ἐξ αὐτοῦ
 ψυχὴ, ἀλλὰ ποικίλα πάντα ὅσα ἀπλά, τοῦτο δὲ ὅσα μὴ
 σύνθετα καὶ ὅσα ἀρχαὶ καὶ ὅσα ἐνέργειαι. τοῦ μὲν γὰρ
 ἐσχάτου ἡ ἐνέργεια ὡς ἂν λήγουσα ἀπλή, τοῦ δὲ
 5 πρώτου πᾶσαι νοῦς τε κινούμενος κινεῖται μὲν
 ὡσαύτως καὶ κατὰ ταῦτά καὶ ὅμοια αἰεὶ, οὐ μέντοι
 ταῦτόν καὶ ἐν τι ἐν μέρει, ἀλλὰ πάντα. ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ ἐν
 μέρει αὐτὸ οὐχ ἓν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦτο ἀπειρον διαιρούμενον.
 ἀπὸ τίνος δὲ φάμεν ἂν καὶ πάντως ἐπὶ τί ὡς ἔσχατον; τὸ
 δὲ μεταξὺ πᾶν ἄρα ὡσπερ γραμμὴ, ἢ ὡσπερ ἕτερον
 10 σῶμα ὁμοιομερές τι καὶ ἀποίκιον; ἀλλὰ τί τὸ σεμνόν;

¹This remarkably powerful phrase is perhaps suggested to Plotinus by *De Anima* A 2. 405b26-29, where Aristotle says that Pre-Socratic ideas about soul and life followed their etymologies: some connected ζῆν (live) with ζεῖν (boil) and so thought of soul as something hot.

²Plotinus may be suggesting here that the life of the intelligible world in its complex unity is not to be thought of in terms of Stoic πνεῦμα.

universal Soul and universal Intellect, when there is no poverty or lack of resource there, but all things are filled full of life, and, we may say, boiling with life.¹ They all flow, in a way, from a single spring, not like one particular breath or one warmth,² but as if there was one quality which held and kept intact all the qualities in itself, of sweetness along with fragrance, and was at once the quality of wine and the characters of all tastes, the sights of colours and all the awarenesses of touch, and all that hearings hear, all tunes and every rhythm.

13. For neither is Intellect simple, nor the soul which derives from it, but all are varied in proportion to their simplicity, that is, in so far as they are not composites and in so far as they are principles and in so far as they are activities. For the activity of the last and lowest is simple as coming to a stop, but of the first is all activities; and Intellect in its movement moves along in the same way and on one same and identical course, but still is not the same one partial thing, but all things: since also the partial thing is in its turn not one, but this too is infinite when it is divided. But from what should we say that it began, and to what does it move as the ultimate point? And is all in between like a line or like another body, homogeneous and unvaried? But what majesty would there be in that?³ For if it has

³There may be an allusion here to Plato *Sophist* 249A1. Plotinus is certainly much concerned in this chapter with the discussion in the *Sophist* which begins there, and, as he often does, describes the living world of Intellect in terms of the "very important kinds" (*Sophist* 254D4) which appear in the course of that discussion, Being, Motion, Rest, Same and Other.

εἰ γὰρ μηδεμίαν ἔχει ἐξαλλαγὴν μηδὲ τις ἐξεγείρει αὐτὸ
 εἰς τὸ ζῆν ἑτερότης, οὐδ' ἂν ἐνέργεια εἴη· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἂν ἡ
 τοιαύτη κατάστασις μὴ ἐνεργείας διαφέρει. κἄν κίνησις
 δὲ ἢ τοιαύτη, οὐ πανταχῶς, μοναχῶς δ' ἂν εἴη ζωή· δεῖ
 15 δὲ πάντα ζῆν καὶ πανταχόθεν καὶ οὐδὲν μὴ ζῆν. ἐπὶ
 πάντα οὖν κινεῖσθαι δεῖ, μᾶλλον δὲ κεκινήσθαι. ἀπλοῦν
 δὴ εἰ κινεῖτο, ἐκείνο μόνον ἔχει· καὶ ἡ αὐτὸ καὶ οὐ
 προὔβη εἰς οὐδέν, ἢ εἰ προὔβη, ἄλλο μένον· ὥστε δύο·
 καὶ εἰ ταῦτόν τοῦτο ἐκείνω, μένει ἓν καὶ οὐ
 20 προελήλυθεν, εἰ δ' ἕτερον, προῆλθε μετὰ ἑτερότητος καὶ
 ἐποίησεν ἐκ ταύτου τινος καὶ ἐτέρου τρίτον ἓν.
 γενόμενον δὴ ἐκ ταύτου καὶ ἐτέρου τὸ γενόμενον φύσιν
 ἔχει ταῦτόν καὶ ἕτερον εἶναι· ἕτερον δὲ οὐ τί, ἀλλὰ πᾶν
 ἕτερον· καὶ γὰρ τὸ ταῦτόν αὐτοῦ πᾶν. πᾶν δὲ ταῦτόν ὄν
 25 καὶ πᾶν ἕτερον οὐκ ἔστιν ὃ τι ἀπολείπει τῶν ἐτέρων.
 φύσιν ἄρα ἔχει ἐπὶ πᾶν ἑτεροιοῦσθαι. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἔστι πρὸ
 αὐτοῦ τὰ ἕτερα πάντα, ἤδη πάσχοι ἂν ὑπ' αὐτῶν· εἰ δὲ
 μὴ ἔστιν, οὗτος τὰ πάντα ἐγέννα, μᾶλλον δὲ τὰ πάντα
 ἦν. οὐκ ἔστιν ἄρα τὰ ὄντα εἶναι μὴ νοῦ ἐνεργήσαντος,
 ἐνεργήσαντος δὲ ἀεὶ ἄλλο μετ' ἄλλο καὶ οἶον
 30 πλανηθέντος πᾶσαν πλάνην καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ πλανηθέντος,
 οἷα νοῦς ἐν αὐτῷ ὁ ἀληθινὸς πέφυκε πλανᾶσθαι· πέφυκε
 δ' ἐν οὐσίαις πλανᾶσθαι συνθεουσῶν τῶν οὐσιῶν ταῖς
 αὐτοῦ πλάναις. πανταχοῦ δ' αὐτός ἐστι· μένουσαν οὖν

no change in it, and no otherness wakes it to life, it
 would not even be an active actuality: for such a
 state would be undistinguishable from non-actual
 inactivity. And even if it were a movement of this
 [simple and straightforward] kind it would be life
 not in all ways, but in one way only; but it must live
 all things and from all directions and there must be
 nothing it does not live. It must therefore move to
 all, or rather have moved to all. Certainly if it moves
 a simple movement it has that one alone; and it is
 either itself and it has not gone forward to anything,
 or, if it has gone forward, it is another thing as
 staying behind; so there are two; and if this [one of
 the two] is the same as that, it remains one and has
 not gone forth; but if it is other, it has gone forth
 with otherness and from a same and another has
 made a third one. Now certainly if what has come to
 be has come to be from the same and the other, it is
 its nature to be the same and the other; and not just
 any other, but universal other: for its same also is
 universal. But since it is all that is the same and all
 that is other, there is no one of the others that it
 leaves out. Its nature therefore is to become other in
 every way. If then all the other things exist before it,
 it would already be affected by them; but if they do
 not, then this Intellect generated them all, or rather
 was them all. It is not then possible for the real
 beings to exist if Intellect is not actively at work, for
 ever working one thing after another and, we may
 say, wandering down every way and wandering in
 itself, as it is natural for the true Intellect to wander
 in itself; and it is natural for it to wander among
 substances while the substances run along with its
 wanderings. But it is everywhere itself; so its wan-

ἔχει τὴν πλάνην. ἡ δὲ πλάνη αὐτῷ ἐν τῷ τῆς
 35 ἀληθείας πεδίῳ, οὐδ' οὐκ ἐκβαίνει. ἔχει δὲ
 καταλαβῶν πᾶν καὶ αὐτῷ ποιήσας εἰς τὸ κινεῖσθαι οἶον
 τόπον, καὶ ὁ τόπος ὁ αὐτὸς τῷ οὐ τόπος. ποικίλον δὲ
 ἐστὶ τὸ πεδίον τοῦτο, ἵνα καὶ διεξιῶν· εἰ δὲ μὴ κατὰ πᾶν
 καὶ αἰεὶ ποικίλον, καθόσον μὴ ποικίλον, ἔστηκεν. εἰ δ'
 40 ἔστηκεν, οὐ νοεῖ· ὥστε καί, εἰ ἔσθη, οὐ νενόηκεν· εἰ δὲ
 τοῦτο, οὐδ' ἔστιν. ἔστιν οὖν νόησις· ἡ δὲ κίνησις πᾶσα
 πληροῦσα οὐσίαν πᾶσαν, καὶ ἡ πᾶσα οὐσία νόησις πᾶσα
 ζῶν περιλαβούσα πᾶσαν, καὶ μετ' ἄλλο αἰεὶ ἄλλο, καὶ ὅ
 τι αὐτοῦ ταῦτόν, καὶ ἄλλο, καὶ διαιροῦντι αἰεὶ τὸ ἄλλο
 ἀναφαίνεται. πᾶσα δὲ διὰ ζωῆς ἢ πορεία καὶ διὰ ζῶων
 45 πᾶσα, ὥσπερ καὶ τῷ διὰ γῆς ἰόντι πάντα, ἃ διεξιῶσι, γῆ,
 καὶ διαφορὰς ἔχη ἢ γῆ. καὶ ἐκεῖ ἢ μὲν ζωῆ, δι' ἧς, ἢ
 αὐτῆ, ὅτι δὲ αἰεὶ ἄλλη, οὐχ ἢ αὐτῆ. αἰεὶ δ' ἔχων τὴν αὐτὴν
 διὰ τῶν οὐκ αὐτῶν διεξοδόν, ὅτι μὴ ἀμείβει, ἀλλὰ
 σύνεστι τοῖς ἄλλοις τὸ ὡσούτως καὶ κατὰ ταῦτά· ἐὰν
 50 γὰρ μὴ περὶ τὰ ἄλλα τὸ ὡσαύτως καὶ κατὰ τὰ αὐτά,
 ἀργεῖ πάντη καὶ τὸ ἐνεργεία καὶ ἢ ἐνέργεια οὐδαμοῦ.
 ἔστι δὲ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα αὐτός, ὥστε πᾶς αὐτός. καὶ εἴπερ
 αὐτός, πᾶς, εἰ δὲ μὴ, οὐκ αὐτός. εἰ δὲ πᾶς αὐτὸς καὶ πᾶς,
 ὅτι τὰ πάντα, καὶ οὐδέν ἐστιν, ὃ τι μὴ συντελεῖ εἰς τὰ
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dering is an abiding one. And its wandering is in
 "the plain of truth",¹ which it does not leave. And it
 encompasses and possesses it all, and makes a kind
 of place for its movement, and the place is the same
 as that of which it is the place. But this plain is
 varied so that Intellect may travel through it; but if
 it was not in every way and for ever varied, in so far
 as it was not varied, Intellect would stand still. But
 if it stands still, it does not think; so that if it came to
 a standstill, it has not thought; but if this is so, it
 does not even exist. It is, then, thought; that is, all
 movement filling all substance, and all substance is
 all thought encompassing all life, and always one
 thing after another, and whatever of it is the same is
 also other, and as one is dividing it the other is
 always appearing. But all its journeying is through
 life, and all through living beings, as when someone
 travels through the earth, all he travels through is
 earth, even if the earth has its differences. And there
 in the intelligible, through which [the journey goes,]
 the life is the same, but because it is always other,
 not the same. But Intellect keeps always the same
 journeying through the things which are not the
 same, because it does not change, but unaltering
 sameness is present with the things which are other;
 for if unaltering sameness is not in the things which
 are other, Intellect is altogether inactive and its
 actuality and activity are nowhere. But it is also
 itself the other things, so that it is all itself. And if it
 is itself it is all, and if it is not, it is not itself. But if it
 is itself all, and all because it is all things, and there
 is no thing which does not make its contribution to

¹ Plato *Phaedrus* 248B6.

55 πάντα, οὐδέν ἐστιν αὐτοῦ, ὅ τι μὴ ἄλλο, ἵνα ἄλλο ὄν και
τοῦτο συντελή. εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἄλλο, ἀλλὰ ἄλλῳ ταυτόν,
ἐλαττώσει αὐτοῦ τὴν οὐσίαν ἰδίαν οὐ παρεχόμενον εἰς
συντέλειαν αὐτοῦ φύσιν.

14. Ἔστι δὲ και παραδείγμασι νοεροῖς χρώμενον
εἰδέναι οἶον ἐστι νοῦς, ὡς οὐκ ἀνέχεται οἶον κατὰ
μονάδα μὴ ἄλλος εἶναι. τίνα γὰρ και βούλει εἰς
παραδειγμα λαβεῖν λόγον εἴτε φυτοῦ εἴτε ζώου; εἰ γὰρ
5 ἐν τι και μὴ ἐν τοῦτο ποικίλον, οὐτ' ἂν λόγος εἴη, τό τε
γενόμενον ἴλη ἂν εἴη τοῦ λόγου μὴ πάντα γενομένου εἰς
τὸ πανταχοῦ τῆς ὕλης ἐμπεσόντα μηδὲν αὐτῆς ἐᾶσαι τὸ
αὐτὸ εἶναι. οἶον πρόσωπον οὐκ ὄγκος εἰς, ἀλλὰ και ῥίνες
και ὀφθαλμοί και ἡ ῥίς οὐχὶ οὐσα ἐν, ἀλλ' ἕτερον, τὸ δ'
10 ἕτερον αὐ πάλιν αὐτῆς, εἰ ἐμελλε ῥίς εἶναι. ἐν γὰρ τι
ἀπλῶς οὐσα ὄγκος ἂν ἦν μόνον. και τὸ ἄπειρον οὕτως ἐν
νώ, ὅτι ἐν¹ ὡς ἐν πολλά, οὐχ ὡς ὄγκος² εἰς, ἀλλ' ὡς
λόγος πολὺς ἐν αὐτῷ, ἐν ἐνὶ σχήματι νοῦ οἶον περιγραφῆ
ἔχων περιγραφὰς ἐντὸς και σχηματισμοὺς αὐ ἐντὸς και
15 δυνάμεις και νοήσεις και τὴν διαίρεσιν μὴ κατ' εὐθύ,
ἀλλ' εἰς τὸ ἐντὸς αἰεί, οἶον τοῦ παντός ζώου ἐμ-
περιεχομένας ζώων φύσεις, και πάλιν αὐ ἄλλας ἐπὶ τὰ
μικρότερα τῶν ζώων και εἰς τὰς ἐλάττους δυνάμεις,
ὅπου στήσεται εἰς εἶδος ἄτομον. ἡ δὲ διαίρεσις ἔγκειται
οὐ συγκεχυμένων, καιτοι εἰς ἐν ὄντων, ἀλλ' ἐστιν ἡ

¹ Porphyrius *Sent.*, testatur *Theologia*: ἂν Enn.

² Porphyrius *Sent.*, testatur *Theologia*: οἶκος Enn.

the totality of things, then there is nothing of it which is not other, that by being other it may make this contribution. For if it is not other, but the same as something else, it will diminish the substance of Intellect by not bringing to its completeness its own particular nature.

14. But it is also possible by using examples taken from the intellectual realm to understand what Intellect is like, that it does not endure to be not other like a unit. For what forming principle of plant or animal would you like to take as an example? For if it was one thing and not this one varied thing, it would not be a forming principle, and what came to be would be matter, if the principle did not become all things so that by penetrating every point of the matter it allowed nothing of it to be the same. A face, for instance, is not one lump, but has both nostrils and eyes; and the nose is not one thing, but there is one part and again another of it, if it is going to be a nose; for if it was simply and solely one thing it would be a lump. And the unbounded is in Intellect in this way, that it is one as one-many, not like one lump but like a rational forming principle multiple in itself, in the one figure of Intellect holding as within an outline outlines inside itself and again figurations inside and powers and thoughts; and its division does not go on in a straight line, but moves always to the interior, as the natures of living beings are included in and belong to the universal living being, and again other natures going on to the smaller living things and the weaker powers, where it will come to a stop at the indivisible form. But the division which is in Intellect is not of things confused, though of things existing in unity, but this is

20 λεγομένη ἐν τῷ παντί φιλία τοῦτο, οὐχ ἢ ἐν τῷδε τῷ παντί μιμείται γὰρ αὕτη ἐκ διεστηκότων οὐσα φίλη· ἢ δὲ ἀληθῆς πάντα ἐν εἶναι καὶ μήποτε διακριθῆναι. διακρίνεσθαι δὲ φησι τὸ ἐν τῷδε τῷ οὐρανῷ.

15. Ταύτην οὖν τὴν ζωὴν τὴν πολλὴν καὶ πᾶσαν καὶ πρώτην καὶ μίαν τίς ἰδὼν οὐκ ἐν ταύτῃ εἶναι ἀσπάζεται τὴν ἄλλην πᾶσαν ἀτιμάσας; σκότος γὰρ αἱ ἄλλαι αἱ κάτω καὶ σμικραὶ καὶ ἀμυδραὶ καὶ εὐτελεῖς¹ καὶ οὐ
 5 καθαραὶ καὶ τὰς καθαρὰς μολύνουσαι. κἂν εἰς αὐτὰς ἴδῃς, οὐκέτι τὰς καθαρὰς οὔτε ὄρας οὔτε ζῆς ἐκείνας τὰς πάσας ὁμοῦ, ἐν αἷς οὐδὲν ἐστὶν ὅτι μὴ ζῆ καὶ καθαρῶς ζῆ κακὸν οὐδὲν ἔχον. τὰ γὰρ κακὰ ἐνταῦθα, ὅτι ἴχνος ζωῆς καὶ νοῦ ἴχνος· ἐκεῖ δὲ τὸ ἀρχέτυπον τὸ
 10 ἀγαθοειδές φησιν, ὅτι ἐν τοῖς εἶδει τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἔχει. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐστὶν ἀγαθόν, ὃ δὲ ἀγαθὸς ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ θεωρεῖν τὸ ζῆν ἔχων· θεωρεῖ δὲ ἀγαθοειδῆ ὄντα τὰ θεωρούμενα καὶ αὐτά, ἃ ἐκτίσασατο, ὅτε ἐθεώρει τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φύσιν. ἦλθε δὲ εἰς αὐτὸν οὐχ ὡς ἐκεῖ ἦν, ἀλλ' ὡς
 15 αὐτὸς ἔσχεν. ἀρχὴ γὰρ ἐκείνος καὶ ἐξ ἐκείνου ἐν τούτῳ καὶ οὗτος ὁ ποιήσας ταῦτα ἐξ ἐκείνου. οὐ γὰρ ἦν θέμις βλέποντα εἰς ἐκείνον μηδὲν νοεῖν οὐδ' αὖ τὰ ἐν ἐκείνῳ· οὐ γὰρ ἂν αὐτὸς ἐγέννα. δύναμιν οὖν εἰς τὸ γεννᾶν εἶχε

¹ w: ἀτελεῖς BxUCQ, H-S¹.

what is called¹ the love in the All, not the love in this All; for this is an imitation, since it is a loving of things which are separate; but the true love is all things being one and never separated. But Empedocles says that what is within this our sky is separated.

15. This life then, multiple and universal and primary and one—who is there who when he sees it does not delight to be in it, despising every other life? For the other lives, the lives below, are darkness and little and dim and cheap; they are not pure and pollute the pure lives. And if you look at them you no longer either see or live the pure lives, those lives all together in which there is nothing which does not live, and live purely, having no evil. For the evils are here below, because there is [only] a trace of life and a trace of Intellect; but there, Plato says, is the archetype, which “has the form of good”² because it possesses the Good in the Forms. That then is the Good, but Intellect is good by having its life in that contemplation; and it contemplates the objects of its contemplation as having the form of good and as the ones which it came to possess when it contemplated the nature of the Good. But they came to it, not as they were there, but as Intellect itself possessed them. For that Good is the principle, and it is from that that they are in this Intellect, and it is this which has made them from that Good. For it was not lawful in looking to him to think nothing, nor again to think what was in him; for then Intellect itself would not have generated them. In

¹ By Empedocles; cp. e.g. frs. B 17. 7 and 26. 5 DK.

² Plato *Republic* 509A3.

παρ' ἐκείνου καὶ τῶν αὐτοῦ πληροῦσθαι γεννημάτων
 20 διδόντος ἐκείνου ἂ μὴ εἶχεν αὐτός. ἀλλ' ἐξ ἑνὸς αὐτοῦ
 πολλὰ τούτῳ ἦν γὰρ ἐκομίζετο δύναμιν ἀδυνατῶν ἔχειν
 συνέθρανε καὶ πολλὰ ἐποίησε τὴν μίαν, ἵν' οὕτω δύναιτο
 κατὰ μέρος φέρειν. ὅτι οὖν ἐγέννα, ἀγαθοῦ ἐκ δυνάμεως
 ἦν καὶ ἀγαθοειδὲς ἦν, καὶ αὐτὸς ἀγαθὸς ἐξ ἀγαθοειδῶν,
 25 ἀγαθὸν ποικίλον. διὸ καὶ εἴ τις αὐτὸν ἀπεικάζει σφαίρα
 ζώση ποικίλη, εἴτε παμπρόσωπόν τι χρῆμα λάμπον
 ζῶσι προούποις εἴτε ψυχὰς τὰς καθαρὰς πάσας εἰς τὸ
 αὐτὸ συνδραμούσας φαντάζοιτο οὐκ ἐνδεεῖς, ἀλλὰ
 πάντα τὰ αὐτῶν ἐχοῦσας, καὶ νοῦν τὸν πάντα ἐπ' ἄκραις
 30 αὐταῖς ἰδρυμένον, ὡς φέγγει νοερῶ καταλάμπεσθαι τὸν
 τόπον—φανταζόμενος μὲν οὕτως ἕξω πως ἄλλος ὢν
 ὁρήνη ἄλλον· δεῖ δὲ αὐτὸν¹ ἐκείνο γενόμενον τὴν θέαν
 ἑαυτὸν ποιήσασθαι.

16. Χρῆ δὲ μηδ' αἰεὶ ἐν τῷ πολλῷ τούτῳ καλῶ
 μένειν, μεταβαίνειν δ' ἔτι πρὸς τὸ ἄνω αἰζαντα, ἀφέντα
 καὶ τοῦτο, οὐκ ἐκ τούτου τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἐκείνου,
 θαυμάσαντα τίς ὁ γεννήσας καὶ ὅπως. ἕκαστον μὲν οὖν
 5 εἶδος, ἕκαστον καὶ ἴδιος οἶον τύπος· ἀγαθοειδὲς δὲ ὃν

¹ Igal: ἑαυτὸν Enn.

¹ Cp. V. 3. 11. In the next chapter (16, lines 10–24) Plotinus carefully criticises and refines this account of the pluralising contemplation of Intellect.

² There is a reminiscence here of Plato's description of

tellec therefore had the power from him to generate and to be filled full of its own offspring, since the Good gave what he did not himself have. But from the Good himself who is one there were many for this Intellect; for it was unable to hold the power which it received and broke it up and made the one power many, that it might be able so to bear it part by part.¹ Whatever it generated, then, was the power of the Good and had the form of good, and Intellect itself is good from [the many] which have the form of good, a good richly varied. And so, if one likens it to a living richly varied sphere,² or imagines it as a thing all faces, shining with living faces, or as all the pure souls running together into the same place, with no deficiencies but having all that is their own, and universal Intellect seated on their summits so that the region is illuminated by intellectual light—if one imagined it like this one would be seeing it somehow as one sees another from outside; but one must become that, and make oneself the contemplation.

16. But we must not remain always in that manifold beauty but go on still darting upwards, leaving even this behind, not out of this sky here below, but out of that, in our wondering about who generated it and how. Now each thing there is a form, and each has a kind of distinctive character of its own; but, being in the form of good, all of them have in

the true surface of the earth in the myth of the *Phaedo* (110B7). What follows is strangely reminiscent of Indian many-faced representations of the gods (it is possible, though of course by no means certain, that Plotinus might have seen some small Indian image of this kind in Alexandria or elsewhere).

κοινὸν τὸ ἐπιθέον ἐπὶ πᾶσι πάντα ἔχει. ἔχει μὲν οὖν καὶ τὸ ὄν ἐπὶ πᾶσιν, ἔχει δὲ καὶ τὸ ζῶον ἕκαστον ζωῆς κοινῆς ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ὑπαρχούσης, τάχα δ' ἂν καὶ ἄλλα. ἀλλὰ καθ' ὅσον ἀγαθὰ καὶ δι' ὅτι ἀγαθὰ, τί ἂν εἴη; πρὸς 10 δὴ τὴν τοιαύτην σκέψιν τάχ' ἂν εἴη προὔργου ἄρξασθαι ἐντεῦθεν. Ἄρα, ὅτε ἑώρα πρὸς τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἐνόει ὡς πολλὰ τὸ ἐν ἐκείνῳ καὶ ἐν ὄνι αὐτὸς ἐνόει αἰτὸν πολλὰ, μερίζων αὐτὸν παρ' αὐτῷ τῷ νοεῖν μὴ ὅλον ἑμοῦ δύνασθαι; ἀλλ' οὐπω νοῦς ἦν ἐκείνο βλέπων, ἀλλ' ἐβλεπεν ἀνοήτως. ἢ 15 φατέον ὡς οὐδὲ ἑώρα πώποτε, ἀλλ' ἔζη μὲν πρὸς αὐτὸ καὶ ἀνήρητο αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐπέστραπτο πρὸς αὐτό, ἢ δὴ κίνησις αὕτη πληρωθεῖσα τῷ ἐκεῖ κινεῖσθαι καὶ περὶ ἐκείνο ἐπλήρωσεν αὐτὸ καὶ οὐκέτι κίνησις ἦν μόνον, ἀλλὰ κίνησις διακορῆς καὶ πλήρης· ἐξῆς δὲ πάντα 20 ἐγένετο καὶ ἔγνω τούτο ἐν συναίσθησει αὐτοῦ καὶ νοῦς ἤδη ἦν, πληρωθεὶς μὲν, ἢ ἔχη, ὃ ὄψεται, βλέπων δὲ αὐτὰ μετὰ φωτὸς παρὰ τοῦ δόντος ἐκείνα καὶ τούτο κομιζόμενος. διὰ τούτο οὐ μόνον λέγεται τῆς οὐσίας, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦ ὁρᾶσθαι αὐτὴν αἴτιος ἐκείνος εἶναι. ὡςπερ 25 δὲ ὁ ἥλιος τοῦ ὁρᾶσθαι τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς καὶ τοῦ γίνεσθαι αἴτιος ὢν αἰτιός πως καὶ τῆς ὄψεώς ἐστιν—οὐκ οὐτε ὄψις οὐτε τὰ γινόμενα—οὕτως καὶ ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φύσις αἰτία οὐσίας καὶ νοῦ οὐσα καὶ φῶς κατὰ¹ τὸ ἀνάλογον τοῖς ἐκεῖ ὁρατοῖς καὶ τῷ ὁρῶντι οὐτε τὰ ὄντα

¹ A^{3mg} (= Ficinus): καὶ Enn.

¹ Here Plotinus begins to develop from Plato's analogy of the Sun (*Republic* 509B2-8) the idea of the light which

common what runs over them all. They of course have also being over them all, and each has the living being as there is a common life over all, and perhaps they have other things [in common]. But what is it according to which and by which they are good? For this kind of enquiry perhaps it would be profitable to begin from here. Did Intellect, when it looked towards the Good, think that One as many, and because it was itself one being think him as many, dividing him in itself by not being able to think the whole at once? But it was not yet Intellect when it looked at him, but looked unintellectually. Or rather we should say that it did not ever see the Good, but lived towards it and depended on it and turned to it, and its movement was fulfilled because it moved there and round that Good and filled Intellect, and was not just movement but movement satiated and full; and thereupon it became all things, and knew this in its own intimate self-consciousness and was now at this point Intellect, filled full that it might have what it was going to see, but looking at them in a light, receiving this light too from the giver of them.¹ This is why that Good is said to be the cause not only of substance but of its being seen. And just as the sun, which is cause for sense objects both of their being seen and their coming into being, is also in some way cause of sight—and therefore is neither sight nor the things which have come to be—in this way also the nature of the Good, which is cause of substance and intellect and light, according to our analogy, to the things seen there and the seer,

shines upon Intellect from the Good, which becomes important later (chs. 21 and 22).

30 οὔτε νοῦς ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ αἴτιος τούτων καὶ <νοεῖν καὶ>¹
 νοεῖσθαι φωτὶ τῷ ἑαυτοῦ εἰς τὰ ὄντα καὶ εἰς τὸν νοῦν
 παρέχων. πληρούμενος μὲν οὖν ἐγένετο, πληρωθεὶς δὲ
 ἦν, καὶ ὁμοῦ ἀπετελέσθη καὶ ἑώρα. ἀρχὴ δὲ αὐτοῦ
 ἐκεῖνό τε ὁ² πρὶν πληρωθῆναι ἦν, ἑτέρα δὲ ἀρχὴ οἷον εἰ
 35 ἔξωθεν ἢ πληροῦσα ἦν, ἀφ' ἧς οἷον ἐτυποῦτο
 πληρούμενος.

17. Ἀλλὰ πῶς ταῦτα ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ αὐτός, οὐκ ὄντων
 ἐκεῖ ἐν τῷ πληρώσαντι οὐδ' αὖ ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ
 πληρουμένῳ; ὅτε γὰρ μήπω ἐπληροῦτο, οὐκ εἶχεν. ἢ
 οὐκ ἀνάγκη, ὃ τις δίδωσι, τοῦτο ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ δεῖ ἐν τοῖς
 5 τοιούτοις τὸ μὲν δίδόν μείζον νομίζειν, τὸ δὲ διδόμενον
 ἕλαττον τοῦ δίδοντος· τοιαύτη γὰρ ἡ γένεσις ἐν τοῖς
 οὔσι. πρῶτον γὰρ δεῖ τὸ ἐνεργεῖα εἶναι, τὰ δ' ὕστερα
 εἶναι δυνάμει τὰ πρὸ αὐτῶν· καὶ τὸ πρῶτον δὲ ἐπέκεινα
 τῶν δευτέρων καὶ τοῦ διδομένου τὸ δίδόν ἐπέκεινα ἦν·
 10 κρεῖττον γάρ. εἴ τι τοίνυν ἐνεργείας πρότερον, ἐπέκεινα
 ἐνεργείας, ὥστε καὶ ἐπέκεινα ζωῆς. εἰ οὖν ζωὴ ἐν
 τούτῳ, ὃ διδούς ἔδωκε μὲν ζωὴν, καλλίων δὲ καὶ
 τιμιώτερος ζωῆς. εἶχεν οὖν ζωὴν καὶ οὐκ ἔδειτο
 ποικίλου τοῦ δίδοντος, καὶ ἦν ἡ ζωὴ ἴχνος τι ἐκεῖνου,
 οὐκ ἐκεῖνου ζωῆ. πρὸς ἐκεῖνο μὲν οὖν βλέπουσα
 15 ἀόριστος ἦν, βλέψασα δ' ἐκεῖ ὀρίζετο ἐκεῖνου ὄρον οὐκ
 ἔχοντος. εὐθύς γὰρ πρὸς ἓν τι ἰδοῦσα ὀρίζεται τούτῳ
 καὶ ἴσχει ἐν αὐτῇ ὄρον καὶ πέρασ καὶ εἶδος· καὶ τὸ εἶδος
 ἐν τῷ μορφωθέντι, τὸ δὲ μορφώσαν ἀμορφον ἦν. ὃ δὲ

¹ Igal.

² τε ὁ Igal: τὸ Enn.

is neither the real beings nor intellect but cause of these, giving by its own light thinking and being thought to the real beings and to intellect. So then Intellect came to be by being filled, and when it was filled it was, and simultaneously it was perfected and saw. Its principle was that which it was before being filled, but another principle, in a way external to it, was the one that filled it, from which it received its character in being filled.

17. But how can these be in Intellect, and be Intellect, when they are not there in what fills it, nor, again, in it itself which is filled? For when it was not yet filled, it did not have them. Now, there is no necessity for anyone to have what he gives, but in this kind of situation one must consider that the giver is greater, and that what is given is less than the giver; for that is how coming to be is among the real beings. For that which is actual must be first, and those that come after must be potentially those before them; and the first transcended the seconds and the giver transcended the gift: for it was stronger. So if there is anything prior to actuality, it transcends actuality, so that it also transcends life. If then there is life in this Intellect the giver gave life, but is nobler and worth more than life. Intellect therefore had life and had no need of a giver full of variety, and its life was a trace of that Good and not his life. So when its life was looking towards that it was unlimited, but after it had looked there it was limited, though that Good has no limit. For immediately by looking to something which is one the life is limited by it, and has in itself limit and bound and form; and the form was in that which was shaped, but the shaper was shapeless. But the boundary is

ὄρος οὐκ ἔξωθεν, οἷον μεγέθει περιτεθείς, ἀλλ' ἦν πάσης
 20 ἐκείνης τῆς ζωῆς ὄρος πολλῆς καὶ ἀπείρου οὕσης, ὡς ἂν
 παρὰ τῆς φύσεως ἐκλαμφάσῃ. Ζωὴ τε ἦν οὐ
 τοῦδε ὄριστο γὰρ ἂν ὡς ἀτόμου ἤδη· ἀλλ' ὄριστο
 μέντοι ἦν ἄρα ὄρισθείσα ὡς ἐνός τινος πολλοῦ—ὄριστο
 δὴ καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν πολλῶν—διὰ μὲν τὸ πολὺ τῆς ζωῆς
 25 πολλὰ ὄρισθείσα, διὰ δὲ αὐτὸν ὄρον ἔν. τί οὖν τὸ "ἐν
 ὠρίσθη"; νοῦς· ὄρισθείσα γὰρ ζωὴ νοῦς. τί δὲ τὸ
 "πολλά"; νόες πολλοί. πάντα οὖν νόες, καὶ ὁ μὲν πᾶς
 νοῦς, οἱ δὲ ἕκαστοι νοῖ. ὁ δὲ πᾶς νοῦς ἕκαστον περιέχων
 ἄρα ταῦτόν ἕκαστον περιέχει; ἀλλ' ἕνα ἂν περιείχεν. εἰ
 30 οὖν πολλοί, διαφορὰν δεῖ εἶναι. πάλιν οὖν πῶς ἕκαστος
 διαφορὰν ἔσχεν; ἢ ἐν τῷ καὶ εἰς ὅλως γενέσθαι εἶχε τὴν
 διαφορὰν· οὐ γὰρ ταῦτόν ὅπου οὖν νοῖ τὸ πᾶν. ἦν οὖν ἡ
 μὲν ζωὴ δύναμις πᾶσα, ἡ δὲ ὄρασις ἡ ἐκείθεν δύναμις
 πάντων, ὁ δὲ γενόμενος νοῦς αὐτὰ ἀνεφάνη τὰ πάντα. ὁ
 35 δὲ ἐπικάθηται αὐτοῖς, οὐχ ἵνα ἰδρυθῇ, ἀλλ' ἵνα ἰδρύσῃ
 εἰδῶς εἰδῶν τῶν πρώτων ἀνείδεν αὐτό. καὶ νοῦς δὲ
 γίνεται πρὸς ψυχὴν οὕτως φῶς εἰς αὐτήν, ὡς ἐκεῖνος εἰς

not from outside, as if it was surrounded by a largeness, but it was a bounding limit of all that life which is manifold and unbounded, as a life would be which shines out from a nature of this kind. And it was not the life of this or that; or it would be limited to being the life of an indivisible minimum; but all the same it was limited and defined; it was therefore defined as the life of one manifold thing—and each individual of the many things in the manifold was certainly also defined—and it was defined as many because of the multiplicity of its life, but on the other hand as one because of the defining limit. What then does "it was defined as one" mean? Intellect: for life defined and limited is intellect. And what "as many"? Many intellects. All then are intellects, and all as a whole Intellect, and the individuals intellects. But does the whole Intellect in comprehending each individual comprehend each as the same? But if it did, it would comprehend only one. If then the intellects are many, there must be difference. Again, then, how did each one have difference? It had its difference in altogether becoming one: for what is the same in any intellect is not the all. The life of Intellect, then, is all power, and the seeing which came from the Good is the power to become all things, and the Intellect which came to be is manifest as the very totality of things. But the Good sits enthroned upon them, not that it may have a base but that it may base the "Form" of the first "Forms";¹ being formless itself. And in this way Intellect is to soul a light upon it, as that Good is a

¹ Νοῦς is said to be εἶδος εἰδῶν by Aristotle, *De Anima* Γ 8. 432a2.

νοῦν· καὶ ὅταν καὶ οὗτος ὀρίση τὴν ψυχὴν, λογικὴν ποιεῖ
 δοῦς αὐτῇ ὧν ἔσχεν ἔχνος. ἔχνος οὖν καὶ νοῦς ἐκείνου·
 40 ἐπεὶ δὲ ὁ νοῦς εἶδος καὶ ἐν ἐκτάσει¹ καὶ πλήθει, ἐκείνος
 ἄμορφος καὶ ἀνείδεις· οὕτω γὰρ εἰδοποιεῖ. εἰ δ' ἦν
 ἐκείνος εἶδος, ὁ νοῦς ἦν ἂν λόγος. ἔδει δὲ τὸ πρῶτον μὴ
 πολὺ μηδαμῶς εἶναι· ἀνήρητο γὰρ ἂν τὸ πολὺ αὐτοῦ
 εἰς ἕτερον αὐτὸ πρὸ αὐτοῦ.

18. Ἄλλ' ἀγαθοειδῆ κατὰ τί τὰ ἐν τῷ νῷ; ἄρα ἡ
 εἶδος ἕκαστον ἢ ἡ καλὰ ἢ τί; εἰ δὴ τὸ παρὰ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ
 ἦκον πᾶν ἔχνος καὶ τύπον ἔχει ἐκείνου ἢ ἀπ' ἐκείνου,
 ὡς περ τὸ ἀπὸ πυρὸς ἔχνος πυρὸς καὶ τὸ ἀπὸ γλυκέος
 5 γλυκέος ἔχνος, ἦκει δὲ εἰς νοῦν καὶ ζωὴ ἀπ' ἐκείνου—ἐκ
 γὰρ τῆς παρ' ἐκείνου ἐνεργείας ὑπέστη—καὶ νοῦς δὲ δι'
 ἐκείνου καὶ τὸ τῶν εἰδῶν κάλλος ἐκείθεν, πάντα ἂν
 ἀγαθοειδῆ εἶη καὶ ζωὴ καὶ νοῦς καὶ ἰδέα. ἀλλὰ τί τὸ
 κοινόν; οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἀρκεῖ τὸ ἀπ' ἐκείνου πρὸς τὸ ταῦτόν·
 10 ἐν αὐτοῖς γὰρ δεῖ τὸ κοινὸν εἶναι· καὶ γὰρ ἂν γένοιτο
 ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ μὴ ταῦτόν ἢ καὶ δοθὲν ὡς αὐτῶς ἐν τοῖς
 δεξομένοις ἄλλο γίνεσθαι· ἐπεὶ καὶ ἄλλο τὸ εἰς πρώτην
 ἐνεργεῖαν, ἄλλο δὲ τὸ τῇ πρώτῃ ἐνεργείᾳ δοθὲν, τὸ δ'
 ἐπὶ τούτοις ἄλλο ἤδη· ἢ οὐδὲν κωλύει καθ' ἕκαστον μὲν
 15 ἀγαθοειδὲς εἶναι, μᾶλλον μὴν κατ' ἄλλο. τί οὖν καθὸ
 μάλιστα; ἀλλὰ πρότερον ἐκείνο ἀναγκαῖον ἰδεῖν· ἄρα γε

¹ Theiler: ἐκτάσει Enn.

light upon Intellect; and when Intellect also defines and limits the soul it makes it rational by giving it a trace of what it has. Therefore Intellect too is a trace of that Good; but since Intellect is a Form and exists in extension and multiplicity, that Good is shapeless and formless; for this is how he makes forms. But if that was a form, Intellect would have been [only a derived] rational principle. But the first must be not in any way multiple: for its multiplicity then would depend on another again before it.

18. But in what way do the things in Intellect have the form of good? Is it in that each of them is a Form, or in that they are beautiful, or what is it? Certainly, if everything which comes from the Good has a trace and an imprint which is his or derives from him, as what comes from fire is a trace of fire and what comes from a sweet thing a trace of sweet, and if also life comes from that Good to Intellect—for it came to exist from the activity derived from him—and Intellect exists through him and the beauty of the Forms comes from there, all would have the form of good, life and intellect and idea. But what is it that is common to all? For coming from that Good does not suffice for sameness; for what is common should be in them themselves; for what is not the same could come to be from the same, or, also, what is given in sameness might become different in the things which are going to receive it; since, too, what pertains to the first activity is one thing and what is given by the first activity another, and what depends on these another again. Now, nothing prevents it having the form of good in each way, but more in one of them. What then is it by which most of all it is this? But first of all it is necessary to look at

ἀγαθὸν ἢ ζωὴ ἢ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ζωὴ [ἢ]¹ ψιλὴ θεωρουμένη
καὶ ἀπογεγυμνωμένη; ἢ ἢ² ζωὴ ἢ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ. τὸ δ' "ἀπ'
αὐτοῦ" ἄλλο τι ἢ³ τοιαύτη; πάλιν οὖν τί ἢ τοιαύτη ζωὴ;
20 ἢ ἀγαθοῦ. ἀλλ' οὐκ αὐτοῦ ἦν, ἀλλὰ ἐξ αὐτοῦ. ἀλλ' εἰ ἐν
τῇ ζωῇ ἐκείνη ἐνίοιτο ἐξ ἐκείνου καὶ ἔστιν ἡ ὄντως ζωὴ,
καὶ οὐδὲν ἄτμον παρ' ἐκείνου [λεκτέον εἶναι],³ καὶ
καθὸ ζωῆς, ἀγαθὸν (λεκτέον)³ εἶναι, καὶ ἐπὶ νοῦ δὴ τοῦ
ἀληθινοῦ ἀνάγκη λέγειν τοῦ πρώτου ἐκείνου, ὅτι
25 ἀγαθόν. καὶ δῆλον ὅτι καὶ εἶδος ἕκαστον ἀγαθὸν καὶ
ἀγαθοειδές, ἢ οὖν τι ἔχει ἀγαθόν, εἴτε κοινόν, εἴτε
μᾶλλον ἄλλο, εἴτε τὸ μὲν πρώτως, τὸ δὲ τῷ ἐφεξῆς καὶ
δευτέρως. ἐπεὶ γὰρ εἰλήφμεν ἕκαστον ὡς ἔχον ἡδὴ ἐν
τῇ οὐσίᾳ αὐτοῦ ἀγαθόν τι καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἦν ἀγαθόν—καὶ
30 γὰρ ἢ ζωὴ ἦν ἀγαθόν οὐχ ἀπλῶς, ἀλλ' ὅτι ἐλέγετο
ἀληθινὴ καὶ ὅτι παρ' ἐκείνου, καὶ νοῦς ὁ ὄντως—δεῖ τι
τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἐν αὐτοῖς ὁρᾶσθαι. διαφόρων γὰρ ὄντων, ὅταν
τὸ αὐτὸ αὐτῶν κατηγορηται, κωλύει μὲν οὐδὲν ἐν τῇ
οὐσίᾳ αὐτῶν τοῦτο ἐνυπάρχειν, ὅμως δ' ἔστι λαβεῖν
αὐτὸ χωρὶς τῷ λόγῳ, οἷον καὶ τὸ ζῶον ἐπ' ἀνθρώπου
35 καὶ ἵππου, καὶ τὸ θερμὸν ἐπὶ ὕδατος καὶ πυρός, τὸ μὲν
ὡς γένος, τὸ δ' ὡς τὸ μὲν πρώτως, τὸ δὲ δευτέρως· ἢ
ὁμωνύμως ἂν ἐκότερον ἢ ἕκαστον λέγοιτο ἀγαθόν. ἀρ'
οὖν ἐνυπάρχει τῇ οὐσίᾳ αὐτῶν τὸ ἀγαθόν; ἢ ὅλον
ἕκαστον ἀγαθόν ἔστιν, οὐ καθ' ἐν τὸ ἀγαθόν. πῶς οὖν; ἢ

¹ del. Theiler: ἢ H-S¹.² Harder: ἢ Enn³ Igal.

the following: is life a good in that it is this very thing, life considered bare and stripped of all else? Rather, in that it is the life which comes from the Good. But does this "from the Good" mean anything else but that it is of a particular kind? Again, then, what is "life of a particular kind"? It is life of the Good. But it was not life of the Good, but deriving from the Good. But if in that life the authentic life from that Good has entered and is, and nothing from that is valueless, it must be said to be good also in that it is life, and it is necessary to say also of that true and first Intellect that it is good; and it is clear also that each individual Form is good and has the form of good, in that, therefore, it has some good, either common, or more particularly one rather than another, or one primarily and another by succession and secondarily. For, since we took each Form as having something good in its substance, and it was good for this reason—for its life was not good simply as life, but because it was called true life and because it came from that Good, and Intellect because it was real Intellect—something of the same must be visible in them. For, as they are different, when the same thing is predicated of them there is nothing to prevent this being immanent in their substance, but all the same it is possible to take it separately in thought, as, for instance, "living thing" in man and horse, and "hot" in water and fire, in the one case as the genus, and in the other as one primarily and the other secondarily; otherwise each of them or each particular one of them would be called good equivocally. Is then the good immanent in their substance? Now, each of them is good as a whole; its good does not depend on just one constitu-

40 ὡς μέρη; ἀλλὰ ἄμερές τὸ ἀγαθόν. ἢ ἔν μὲν αὐτό, οὕτως
 δὲ τόδε, οὕτως δὲ τόδε. καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἐνέργεια ἡ πρώτη
 ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ ἐπ' αὐτῇ ὀρισθὲν ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ συνάμφω.
 καὶ τὸ μὲν ὅτι γενόμενον ὑπ' αὐτοῦ, τὸ δ' ὅτι κόσμος ἀπ'
 αὐτοῦ, τὸ δ' ὅτι συνάμφω. ἀπ' αὐτοῦ οὖν, καὶ οὐδὲν
 45 ταυτόν, οἷον εἰ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ φωνὴ καὶ βᾶδις καὶ
 ἄλλο τι, πάντα κατορθούμενα. ἢ ἐνταῦθα, ὅτι τάξις καὶ
 ῥυθμός· ἐκεῖ δὲ τί; ἀλλ' εἴποι τις ἄν, ὡς ἐνταῦθα ὄλον εἰς
 τὸ καλῶς ἕξωθεν διαφόρων ὄντων τῶν περὶ ἃ ἡ τάξις,
 ἐκεῖ δὲ καὶ αὐτά. ἀλλὰ διὰ τί καὶ αὐτά; οὐ γὰρ ὅτι ἀπ'
 50 ἐκείνου δεῖ πιστεύοντας ἀφεῖναι· δεῖ μὲν γὰρ συγχωρεῖν
 ἀπ' ἐκείνου ὄντα εἶναι τίμια, ἀλλὰ ποθεῖ ὁ λόγος λαβεῖν,
 κατὰ τί τὸ ἀγαθὸν αὐτῶν.

19. Ἄρ' οὖν τῇ ἐφέσει καὶ τῇ ψυχῇ ἐπιτρέψομεν τὴν
 κρίσιν καὶ τῷ ταύτης πάθει πιστεύσαντες τὸ ταύτη
 ἐφετὸν ἀγαθὸν φήσομεν, διότι δὲ ἐφίεται οὐ ζητήσομεν;
 καὶ τί μὲν ἕκαστον, περὶ τούτου ἀποδείξεις κοιμούμεν,
 5 τὸ δ' ἀγαθὸν τῇ ἐφέσει δώσομεν; ἀλλὰ πολλὰ ἄτοπα
 ἡμῖν φαίνεται. πρῶτον μὲν, ὅτι καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐν τι τῶν
 περὶ. ἔπειτα, ὅτι πολλὰ τὰ ἐφιέμενα καὶ ἄλλα ἄλλων

ent. Well then, are they good as parts? But the good is partless. Now, it is one itself, but is in this way, this particular good, and in that way, that. For the first activity is good and what is defined following upon it is good, and the pair of them together; and the one is good because it is brought into being by the Good, and the other because it is an ordered world which comes from it, and the last because it is both of them together. They come from the Good then, and not one of them is the same, as from the same [Form of man] talking and walking and a variety of other things come, all correct [according to the Form]. Now here below this is because there is order and rhythm: but why there in the intelligible? But one might say that here below always what brings about the excellence comes from outside, and the things with which the order is concerned are different [from the order], but there the things themselves also are good. But why are they also good? For we should not just trust that it is because they come from that Good and give up; for we must agree that it is because they are from that Good that they are valuable, but the discussion is anxious to grasp the reason for their goodness.

19. Shall we then hand over the decision to desire and to the soul and, trusting in this soul's experience, maintain that what is desired by this is good, and not enquire why it desires? And shall we produce demonstrations of what each and every thing is, but commit the good to desire? But we see many absurdities in this. First, because the good also will become one of the accompaniments. Then, because there are many that desire, and different ones desire different things; how then shall we decide by the

πῶς οὖν κρινοῦμεν τῷ ἐφιεμένῳ, εἰ βέλτιον; ἀλλ' ἴσως οὐδὲ τὸ βέλτιον γνωσόμεθα τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἀγνοοῦντες. ἀλλὰ
 10 ἄρα τὸ ἀγαθὸν ὀριοῦμεθα κατὰ τὴν ἐκάστου ἀρετὴν; ἀλλ' οὕτως εἰς εἶδος καὶ λόγον ἀνάξομεν, ὁρθῶς μὲν πορευόμενοι. ἀλλὰ ἐλθόντες ἐκεῖ τί ἐροῦμεν αὐτὰ ταῦτα ζητοῦντες πῶς ἀγαθὰ; ἐν μὲν γὰρ τοῖς χείροσιν, ὡς ἔοικε, γινώσκοιμεν ἂν τὴν φύσιν τὴν τοιαύτην καίτοι
 15 οὐκ ἔχουσαν εἰλικρινῶς, ἐπειδὴ¹ οὐ πρῶτως, τῇ πρὸς τὰ χείρω παραθέσει, ὅπου δὲ μηδὲν ἔστι κακόν, αὐτὰ δ' ἐφ' ἑαυτῶν ἔστι τὰ ἀμείνω, ἀπορήσομεν. ἄρ' οὖν, ἐπειδὴ ὁ² λόγος τὸ διότι ζητεῖ, ταῦτα δὲ ἀγαθὰ παρ' αὐτῶν, διὰ τοῦτο ἀπορεῖ τοῦ "διότι" τὸ "ὅτι" ὄντος; ἐπεὶ κἂν ἄλλο φῶμεν αἴτιον, τὸν θεόν, λόγου μὴ
 20 φθάνοντος ἐκεῖ ὁμοίως ἢ ἀπορία. οὐ μὴν ἀποστατέον, εἴ πη κατ' ἄλλην ὁδὸν πορευομένοις τι φανείη.

20. Ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν ἀπιστοῦμεν ἐν τῷ παρόντι ταῖς ὀρέξεσι πρὸς τὰς τοῦ τί ἔστιν ἢ ποῖόν ἔστι θέσεις,³ ἄρα χρὴ πρὸς τὰς κρίσεις ἵνα καὶ τὰς τῶν πραγμάτων ἐναντιώσεις, οὐκ ἄξιον ἀταξίαν, σύμμετρον
 5 ἀσύμμετρον, ὑγίαν νόσον, εἶδος ἀμορφίαν, οὐσίαν φθοράν, ὅλως συστασίαν ἀφάνισιν; τούτων γὰρ τὰ πρῶτα καθ' ἐκάστην συζυγίαν τίς ἂν ἀμφισβητήσῃ μὴ οὐκ ἐν ἀγαθοῦ εἶδει εἶναι; εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, καὶ τὰ ποιητικὰ

¹ Gollwitzer: ἐκεῖ δὲ Enn.

² Kirchhoff.

³ R^{pc} (ad asseverandum Ficinus), Creuzer: θέσει Enn.

desirer whether the desired is better [than other objects of desire]? But perhaps we shall not even know the better if we are ignorant of the good. But shall we then define the good according to each thing's excellence? But in this way we shall refer to Form and reason-principle, certainly a correct manner of proceeding. But when we have got there, what are we going to say when we enquire how these very Forms are good? For in the things which are inferior, it seems likely, we might recognise the nature of this kind, though it is not in a pure state, since it does not exist primarily, by comparison with things which are [still] worse. But where there is nothing evil, but the Forms themselves by themselves are the better things, we shall be in difficulties. Is the difficulty, then, there for this reason, that, since our rational discourse seeks the reason why but these are good in themselves, the "why" is the "that"? Since even if we also assert another cause, God, the difficulty remains all the same while our discourse has not arrived there. We must certainly not give up while there is any chance of something appearing if we proceed by another way.

20. Since, then, we do not at present rely on our impulses for establishing what a thing is or what it is like, should we then turn to judgements and the oppositions of things, for instance order, disorder, symmetrical, unsymmetrical, health, sickness, form, shapelessness, substance, destruction, and in general coherence and dissolution? For who is there who would argue that the first of these in each pair is not in the form of good? But if this is so, it is

¹This is how Aristotle defines human good in *Nicomachean Ethics* A 7. 1098a16-17.

αὐτῶν ἀνάγκη ἐν ἀγαθοῦ μοίρα τίθεσθαι. καὶ ἀρετὴ δὴ
 10 καὶ νοῦς καὶ ζωὴ καὶ ψυχὴ, ἣ γε ἔμφρων, ἐν ἀγαθοῦ
 εἶδει καὶ ὧν ἐφίεται τοίνυν ἔμφρων ζωὴ. τί οὖν οὐ
 στησόμεθα, φήσει τις, εἰς νοῦν καὶ τοῦτο τὸ ἀγαθὸν
 θησόμεθα; καὶ γὰρ ψυχὴ καὶ ζωὴ νοῦ ἵχνη, καὶ τούτου
 ἐφίεται ψυχὴ. καὶ κρίνει τοίνυν καὶ ἐφίεται νοῦ,
 κρίνουσα μὲν δικαιοσύνην ἀντ' ἀδικίας ἄμεινον καὶ
 15 ἕκαστον εἶδος ἀρετῆς πρὸ κακίας εἶδους, καὶ τῶν αὐτῶν
 ἢ προτίμησις, ὧν καὶ ἡ αἴρεσις. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν νοῦ μόνον
 ἐφίεται, τάχα ἂν πλείονος ἐδέησε λόγου δεικνύντων, ὡς
 οὐ τὸ ἔσχατον ὁ νοῦς καὶ νοῦ μὲν οὐ πάντα, ἀγαθοῦ δὲ
 πάντα. καὶ τῶν μὲν μὴ ἐχόντων νοῦν οὐ πάντα νοῦν
 20 κτήσασθαι ζητεῖ, τὰ δ' ἔχοντα νοῦν οὐχ ἴσταται ἤδη,
 ἀλλὰ πάλιν τὸ ἀγαθὸν ζητεῖ, καὶ νοῦν μὲν ἐκ λογισμοῦ,
 τὸ δ' ἀγαθὸν καὶ πρὸ τοῦ λόγου. εἰ δὲ καὶ ζωῆς ἐφίεται
 καὶ τοῦ αἰεὶ εἶναι καὶ ἐνεργεῖν, οὐχ ἣ νοῦς ἂν εἴη τὸ
 ἐφετόν, ἀλλ' ἢ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἀπὸ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ εἰς ἀγαθόν
 ἐπεὶ καὶ ἡ ζωὴ οὕτως.

21. Τί οὖν ἐν ὧν ἐν πᾶσι τοῖτοις ποιεῖ ἀγαθὸν
 ἕκαστον; ὧδε τοίνυν τετολμήσθω εἶναι μὲν τὸν νοῦν καὶ
 τὴν ζωὴν ἐκείνην ἀγαθοειδῆ, ἔφεσω δὲ εἶναι καὶ
 τούτων, καθύσιν ἀγαθοειδῆ· ἀγαθοειδῆ δὲ λέγω τῷ τὴν
 5 μὲν τὰγαθοῦ εἶναι ἐνέργειαν, μᾶλλον δὲ ἐκ τὰγαθοῦ
 ἐνέργειαν, τὸν δὲ ἤδη ὀρισθεῖσαν ἐνέργειαν. εἶναι δ'

necessary to put their makers also on the good side. And surely virtue and intelligence and life and soul, thinking soul at least, are in the form of good; and so, then, are what thinking life desires. Why then, someone will say, do we not stop at Intellect and posit this as the Good? For soul and life are traces of Intellect, and it is this Intellect that soul desires. And so in its judgements also it desires Intellect, judging righteousness better than unrighteousness, and preferring each form of virtue to the [corresponding] form of vice, and judging more valuable the same things which it chooses. But if it only desires Intellect, perhaps it might be in need of further reasoning to show that Intellect is not the ultimate and that not all things desire Intellect but all things desire the Good. And not all of the things which do not have intellect seek to gain possession of it, and the things that have intellect do not stop there, but again seek the Good, and they seek Intellect from their reasoning, but the Good even before reason. And if they also seek life, and everlasting existence and activity, what they desire is not Intellect in so far as it is Intellect, but in so far as it is good and from the Good and directed to the Good: since this is so also with life.

21. What therefore is it which is one in all these and makes each and every one of them good? Let us, then, make bold to say this: Intellect and that life of its are in the form of good and there is desire of these also in so far as they are in the form of good: I mean "in the form of good" in the sense that life is the activity of the Good, or rather an activity from the Good, and Intellect is the activity already bounded and defined. But they are both filled full of glory and

αὐτὰ μεστὰ μὲν ἀγλαΐας καὶ διώκεσθαι ὑπὸ ψυχῆς, ὡς
 ἐκείθεν καὶ πρὸς ἐκεῖνα αὐ· ὡς τοῖνυν οἰκεία, ἀλλ' οὐχὶ
 ἀγαθά· ἀγαθοειδῆ δὲ ὄντα οὐδὲ ταύτῃ ἀπόβλητα εἶναι.
 10 τὸ γὰρ οἰκείον, εἰ μὴ ἀγαθὸν εἶη, οἰκείον μὲν ἔστι,
 φεύγει δὲ τις αὐτό· ἐπεὶ καὶ ἄλλα πόρρω ὄντα καὶ κάτω
 κινήσειεν ἄν. γίνεται δὲ πρὸς αὐτὰ ἔρως ὁ σύντονος οὐχ
 ὅταν ἢ ὑπερ ἐντὶν, ἀλλ' ὅταν ἐκείθεν ἤδη ὄντα¹ ἄπερ
 ἔστιν ἄλλο προσλάβῃ. οἷον γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν σωματίων
 φωτὸς ἐμμεμιγμένου ὅμως δεῖ φωτὸς ἄλλον, ἵνα καὶ
 15 φανείη τὸ ἐν αὐτοῖς χρῶμα τὸ φῶς, οὕτω τοι δεῖ καὶ ἐπὶ
 τῶν ἐκεῖ καίπερ πολὺ φῶς ἐχόντων φωτὸς κρείττονος
 ἄλλου, ἵνα κακείνα καὶ ὑπ' αὐτῶν καὶ ὑπ' ἄλλου ὀφθῆ.

22. Ὅταν οὖν τὸ φῶς τοῦτό τις ἴδῃ, τότε δὴ καὶ
 κινεῖται ἐπ' αὐτὰ καὶ τοῦ φωτὸς τοῦ ἐπιθέοντος ἐπ'
 αὐτοῖς γλιχόμενος εὐφραίνεται, ὥσπερ κάπι² τῶν
 ἐνταῦθα σωματίων οὐ τῶν ὑποκειμένων ἐντὶν ὁ ἔρως,
 5 ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἐμφανταζομένου κάλλους ἐπ' αὐτοῖς. ἔστι γὰρ
 ἕκαστον ὃ ἔστιν ἐφ' αὐτοῦ· ἐφετὸν δὲ γίνεται
 ἐπιχρῶσαντος αὐτὸ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ὥσπερ χάριτας δόντος
 αὐτοῖς καὶ εἰς τὰ ἐφιδόμενα ἔρωτας. καὶ τοῖνυν ψυχὴ
 λαβοῦσα εἰς αὐτὴν τὴν ἐκείθεν ἀπορροῆν κινεῖται
 καὶ ἀναβακχεύεται καὶ οἴστρων πίμπλαται καὶ ἔρως

¹ F³⁸ (= Ficinus): ὄν Enn.

² Beutler: καὶ Enn.

are pursued by the soul because it comes from them
 and again is directed to them; as akin then, but not
 as good; but since they are in the form of good, not to
 be rejected for this reason. For what is akin to one, if
 it is not good, is indeed akin, but one avoids it; since
 [if it was otherwise] other things also which are far
 off and deep below might move one to desire. But
 there comes to be the intense kind of love for them
 not when they are what they are but when, being
 already what they are, they receive something else
 from there beyond. For just as with bodies, though
 light is mixed into them, all the same there is need of
 another light for the light, the colour, in them to
 appear, so with the things there in the intelligible,
 though they possess much light, there is need of
 another greater light that they may be seen both by
 themselves and by another.

22. When anyone, therefore, sees this light, then
 truly he is also moved to the Forms, and longs for the
 light which plays upon them and delights in it, just
 as with the bodies here below our desire is not for
 the underlying material things but for the beauty
 imaged upon them. For each is what it is by itself;
 but it becomes desirable when the Good colours it,
 giving a kind of grace to them and passionate love to
 the desirers. Then the soul, receiving into itself an
 outflow from thence, is moved and dances wildly and

10 γίνεταί. πρὸ τοῦδε οὐδὲ πρὸς τὸν νοῦν κινεῖται, καίπερ
καλὸν ὄντα· ἀργόν τε γὰρ τὸ κάλλος αὐτοῦ, πρὶν τοῦ
ἀγαθοῦ φῶς λάβῃ, ὑπτία τε ἀναπέπτωκεν ἢ
ψυχὴ παρ' αὐτῆς καὶ πρὸς πᾶν ἀργῶς ἔχει καὶ παρόντος
νοῦ ἔστι πρὸς αὐτὸν νωθῆς. ἐπειδὴν δὲ ἦκη εἰς αὐτὴν
15 ὥσπερ θερμασία ἐκείθεν, ῥώννυταί τε καὶ ἐγείρεται καὶ
ὄντως πετροῦται καὶ πρὸς τὸ παρακείμενον καὶ πλησίον
καίπερ ἐπτοημένη ὁμως πρὸς ἄλλο οἶον τῇ μνήμῃ
μείζον κουφίζεται. καὶ ἕως τί ἐστιν ἀνωτέρω τοῦ
παρόντος, αἴρεται φύσει ἀνω αἰρομένη ὑπὸ τοῦ δόντος
20 τὸν ἔρωτα. καὶ νοῦ μὲν ὑπεραίρει, οὐ δύναται δὲ ὑπὲρ τὸ
ἀγαθὸν δραμεῖν, ὅτι μηδὲν ἐστὶ τὸ ὑπερκείμενον. εἰάν δὲ
μένῃ ἐν νῶ, καλὰ μὲν καὶ σεμνὰ θεᾶται, οὐπω μὲν ὁ
ζητεῖ πάντῃ ἔχει. οἶον γὰρ προσώπῳ πελάζει καλῶ μὲν,
οὐπω δὲ ὄψιν κινεῖν δυναμένῳ, ᾧ μὴ ἐμπρέπει χάρις
25 ἐπιθέουσα τῷ κάλλει. διὸ καὶ ἐνταῦθα φατέον μᾶλλον τὸ
κάλλος τὸ ἐπὶ τῇ συμμετρίᾳ ἐπιλαμπόμενον ἢ τὴν
συμμετρίαν εἶναι καὶ τοῦτο εἶναι τὸ ἐράσμιον. διὰ τί
γὰρ ἐπὶ μὲν ζῶντος προσώπου μᾶλλον τὸ φέγγος τοῦ
καλοῦ, ἔχνος δ' ἐπὶ τεθνηκότος καὶ μήπω τοῦ προσώπου

¹ Plotinus in this chapter is, as so often, inspired by the myth in Plato's *Phaedrus* 246A ff. He refers here particularly to the description of the soul in love in 251B. The phrase "falls flat on its back" in line 12 also comes from the myth (254B8), but the context is startlingly different. In Plato the character of the soul falls back in reverence when he is reminded by the beauty of the beloved of the Form of beauty which he once saw, and drags his horses back with him. In Plotinus the soul lies back in boredom and indifference if it does not see over the Forms

is all stung with longing and becomes love.¹ Before this it is not moved even towards Intellect, for all its beauty; the beauty of Intellect is inactive till it catches a light from the Good, and the soul by itself "falls flat on its back" and is completely inactive and, though Intellect is present, is unenthusiastic about it. But when a kind of warmth from thence comes upon it, it gains strength and wakes and is truly winged; and though it is moved with passion for that which lies close by it, yet all the same it rises higher, to something greater which it seems to remember. And as long as there is anything higher than that which is present to it, it naturally goes on upwards, lifted by the giver of its love.² It rises above Intellect, but cannot run on above the Good, for there is nothing above. But if it remains in Intellect it sees fair and noble things, but has not yet quite grasped what it is seeking. It is as if it was in the presence of a face which is certainly beautiful, but cannot catch the eye because it has no grace playing upon its beauty. So here below also beauty is what illuminates good proportions rather than the good proportions themselves, and this is what is lovable. For why is there more light of beauty on a living face, but only a trace of it on a dead one, even if its

the light which comes from beyond them, from the Good. On the significance of this chapter and its relationship to some equally startling remarks on the beauty of the World of Forms in V. 5. 12 see my "Beauty and the Discovery of Divinity in the Thought of Plotinus" (*Plotinian and Christian Studies* XIX).

² This is the clearest statement by Plotinus of something implicit in his whole system, that our desire to return to the Good is given by the Good.

ταῖς σαρκὶ καὶ ταῖς συμμετρίαις μεμαρασμένον; καὶ
 30 τῶν ἀγαλμάτων δὲ τὰ ζωτικώτερα καλλίω, κἄν
 συμμετρότερα τὰ ἕτερα ἤ; καὶ αἰσχιῶν ζῶν καλλίων τοῦ
 ἐν ἀγάλματι καλοῦ; ἢ ὅτι τοδὶ ἐφετὸν μᾶλλον τοῦτο δ'
 ὅτι ψυχὴν ἔχει· τοῦτο δ' ὅτι ἀγαθοειδέστερον· τοῦτο δ'
 ὅτι ἀγαθοῦ ἀμηγέπη φωτὶ κέχρωσται καὶ χρωσθεῖσα
 35 ἐγήγερται καὶ ἀνακεκούφισται καὶ ἀνακουφίζει ὃ ἔχει,
 καὶ ὡς οἶόν τε αὐτῷ ἀγαθοποιεῖ αὐτὸ καὶ ἐγείρει.

23. Ἐκεῖ δὴ, ὃ ψυχὴ διώκει, καὶ ὃ νῶ φῶς παρέχει
 καὶ ἐμπεσὸν αὐτοῦ ἕχρος κινεῖ, οὗτοι δεῖ θαυμάζειν,
 εἰ τοιαύτην δύναμιν ἔχει ἔλκον πρὸς αὐτὸ καὶ
 ἀνακαλούμενον ἐκ πάσης πλάνης, ἵνα πρὸς αὐτὸν
 5 ἀναπαύσαιο. εἰ γὰρ ἔκ του τὰ πάντα, οὐδὲν ἐστι
 κρείττον αὐτοῦ, ἐλάττω δὲ πάντα. τὸ δὴ ἄριστον τῶν
 ὄντων πῶς οὐ τὸ ἀγαθόν ἐστι; καὶ μὴν εἰ δεῖ τὴν τοῦ
 ἀγαθοῦ φύσιν ἀνταρκεστάτην τε εἶναι αὐτῇ καὶ ἀενδεᾶ
 ἄλλου ὄτουσὸν παντός, τίνα ἂν ἄλλην ἢ ταύτην οὔσαν
 10 εὔροι τις, ἢ πρὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἦν ὅπερ ἦν, ὅτε μὴδὲ κακία
 πω ἦν; εἰ δὲ τὰ κακὰ ἕστερον ἐν τοῖς μὴδὲ καθ' ἐν
 τούτου μετεληφόσι καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐσχάτοις καὶ οὐδὲν
 ἐπέκεινα τῶν κακῶν πρὸς τὸ χεῖρον, ἐναντίως ἂν ἔχοι
 τὰ κακὰ πρὸς αὐτὸ οὐδὲν ἔχοντα μέσον πρὸς
 ἐναντίωσιν. τὸ ἄρα ἀγαθὸν τοῦτο ἂν εἴη· ἢ γὰρ οὐκ
 15 ἔστιν ὅλως ἀγαθόν, ἢ, εἰ ἀνάγκη εἶναι, τοῦτο ἂν καὶ οὐκ
 ἄλλο εἴη. εἰ δὲ τις λέγοι μὴ εἶναι, οὐδὲ κακὸν ἂν εἴη·

flesh and its proportions are not yet wasted away?
 And are not the more lifelike statues the more
 beautiful ones, even if the others are better propor-
 tioned? And is not an uglier living man more beauti-
 ful than the beautiful man in a statue? Yes, because
 the living is more desirable; and this is because it
 has soul; and this is because it has more the form of
 good; and this means that it is somehow coloured by
 the light of the Good, and being so coloured wakes
 and rises up and lifts up that which belongs to it, and
 as far as it can makes it good and wakes it.

23. There, surely, one need not wonder if that
 which the soul pursues and which gives light to
 Intellect and in falling upon it stirs a trace of itself
 has so great a power, and draws to itself and calls
 back from all wandering to rest beside it. For if there
 is something from which all things come, there is
 nothing stronger than it, but all things are less than
 it. How can the best of realities possibly not be the
 Good? And furthermore, if the nature of the Good
 must be completely sufficient to itself and without
 need of anything else at all, what other nature than
 this could anyone find, which was what it was before
 the others, when there was not yet any badness? But
 if the evils come later, in things which do not
 participate in this Good in any way at all, and on the
 very last and lowest level, and there is nothing
 beyond the evils on the worse side, the evils would be
 opposed to it without any middle term for the oppo-
 sition. This then would be the Good; for either there
 is no Good at all, or, if it is necessary that there is,
 it would be this and not something else. But if someone
 says that there is not, then there would be no evil
 either; so things would be by nature indifferent for

ἀδιάφορα ἄρα πρὸς αἴρεσιν τῇ φύσει· τοῦτο δ' ἀδύνατον.
 ἂ δ' ἄλλα λέγουσιν ἀγαθὰ, εἰς τοῦτο, αὐτὸ δὲ εἰς οὐδέν.
 τί οὖν ποιεῖ τοιοῦτον ὄν; ἢ ἐποίησε νοῦν, ἐποίησε ζωὴν,
 20 ψυχὰς ἐκ τούτου καὶ τὰ ἄλλα, ὅσα λόγου ἢ νοῦ ἢ ζωῆς
 μετέχει. ὃ δὴ τούτων πηγὴ καὶ ἀρχή, τίς ἂν
 εἴποι, ὅπως ἀγαθὸν καὶ ὄσον; ἀλλὰ τί νῦν ποιεῖ; ἢ καὶ
 νῦν σφίξει ἐκεῖνα καὶ νοεῖν ποιεῖ τὰ νοοῦντα καὶ ζῆν τὰ
 ζῶντα, ἐμπνέον νοῦν, ἐμπνέον ζωὴν, εἰ δέ τι μὴ δύναται
 ζῆν, εἶναι.

24. Ἡμᾶς δὲ τί ποιεῖ; ἢ πάλιν περὶ τοῦ φωτός
 λέγωμεν τί τὸ φῶς, ᾧ καταλάμπεται μὲν νοῦς,
 μεταλαμβάνει δὲ αὐτοῦ ψυχὴ. ἢ τοῦτο νῦν εἰς ὕστερον
 ἀφέντες εἰκότως ἐκεῖνα πρότερον ἀπορήσωμεν. ἄρα γε
 5 τὸ ἀγαθόν, ὅτι ἐστὶν ἄλλω ἐφετόν, ἔστι καὶ λέγεται
 ἀγαθόν, καὶ τι μὲν ὄν ἐφετόν τι ἀγαθόν, πᾶσι δὲ ὄν
 τοῦτο λέγομεν εἶναι τὸ ἀγαθόν; ἢ μαρτύριον μὲν ἂν τις
 τοῦτο ποιήσαιτο τοῦ εἶναι ἀγαθόν, δεῖ δέ γε φύσιν αὐτὸ
 τὸ ἐφετόν ἔχειν τοιαύτην, ὡς δικαίως ἂν τυχεῖν τῆς
 10 τοιαύτης προσηγορίας. καὶ πότερα τῷ τι δέχεσθαι τὰ
 ἐφίεμενα ἐφίεται ἢ τῷ χαίρειν αὐτῷ; καὶ εἰ μὲν τι
 δέχεται, τί τοῦτο; εἰ δὲ τῷ χαίρειν, διὰ τί τούτῳ, ἀλλὰ
 μὴ ἄλλω τινί; ἐν ᾧ δὴ καὶ πότερα τῷ οἰκείῳ τὸ ἀγαθόν ἢ
 ἄλλω τινί. καὶ δὴ καὶ πότερα τὸ ἀγαθὸν ὅλως ἄλλου

¹ The phrase is taken from *Phaedrus* 245C9. But Plato uses it there of soul as "source and principle" of movement to all else.

our choice; but this is impossible. But what others call goods are referred to this, but it itself is referred to nothing. What then does it make, if it is like this? It made Intellect, it made life, and from Intellect the souls and all else that has a share in reason or intellect or life. Then, surely, what is "source and principle"¹ of these, how could one say in what way and how greatly it is good? But what is it making now? Now as well it is keeping those things in being and making the thinking things think and the living things live, inspiring thought, inspiring life and, if something cannot live, existence.

24. But what does it make us? Either let us speak again of the light and say what that light is by which Intellect is illuminated and in which Soul has a part. Or else let us leave this till afterwards² and, as is reasonable, deal first with the following difficulties. Is the Good good, and does it have that name, because it is desirable for another, and is it good for one because it is desirable for one, but because it is this for all we say that it is the Good? Now one might offer this as evidence that the Good exists, but surely the object of desire itself must have such a nature that it is right to call it this. And do its desirers desire it because they receive something, or because they delight in it? And if they receive something, what is it? But if it is because of delight, why do they delight in this and not in something else? And in this the question is certainly involved whether the good is so by kinship or by something else. And, indeed, the further question whether the good is altogether the good of another, or whether the good is good for

² Ch. 31 onwards.

15 ἐστίν, ἢ καὶ αὐτῷ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἀγαθὸν ἐστίν· ἢ ὃ ἂν ἢ
 ἀγαθόν, αὐτῷ μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν, ἄλλου δὲ ἐξ ἀνάγκης; καὶ
 τίς φύσει ἀγαθὸν ἐστίν; ἔστι δέ τις φύσις, ἢ μηδὲν
 ἀγαθὸν ἐστίν; κακείνο δὲ οὐκ ἀφείκτον, ὃ τάχ' ἂν τις
 δυσχερατικὸς ἀνὴρ εἴποι, ὡς "ὑμεῖς, ὦ οὔτοι, τί δὴ
 ἀπουεμύνετε τοῖς ὀνόμασιν¹ ἄνω καὶ κάτω ζωὴν
 20 ἀγαθὸν λέγοντες καὶ νοῦν ἀγαθὸν λέγοντες καὶ τι
 ἐπέκεινα τούτων; τί γὰρ ἂν καὶ ὁ νοῦς ἀγαθὸν εἴη; ἢ τί ὁ
 νοῦν τὰ εἶδη αὐτὰ ἀγαθὸν ἔχει αὐτὸ ἕκαστον θεωρῶν;
 ἠπατημένος μὲν γὰρ ἂν καὶ ἠδόμενος ἐπὶ τούτοις τάχα
 ἂν ἀγαθὸν λέγοι καὶ τὴν ζωὴν ἠδεῖαν οὔσαν· στὰς δ' ἐν
 25 τῷ ἀνήδονος εἶναι διὰ τί ἂν φήσειεν ἀγαθά; ἢ τὸ αὐτὸν
 εἶναι; τί γὰρ ἂν ἐκ τοῦ εἶναι καρπώσασαίτο; ἢ τί ἂν
 διαφέρου ἐν τῷ εἶναι ἢ ὄλως μὴ εἶναι, εἰ μὴ τις τὴν πρὸς
 αὐτὸν φιλίαν αἰτίαν τούτων θεῖτο; ὥστε διὰ ταύτην τὴν
 ἀπάτην φυσικὴν οὔσαν καὶ τὸν φόβον τῆς φθορᾶς τὴν
 30 τῶν ἀγαθῶν νομισθῆναι θέσιν."

25. Ὁ μὲν οὖν Πλάτων ἠδονὴν τῷ τέλει μιγνύς καὶ
 τὸ ἀγαθὸν οὐχ ἀπλοῦν οὐδὲ ἐν νῷ μόνον τιθέμενος, ὡς ἐν
 τῷ Φιλήβῳ γέγραπται, τάχα ἂν αἰσθόμενος ταύτης τῆς
 ἀπορίας οὔτε παντάπασιν ἐπὶ τὸ ἡδὺ τίθεσθαι τὸ ἀγαθὸν

¹ R^{2mg}: ὀνομασιν Enn.

¹ Plotinus is rather more sympathetic than might be expected to this down-to-earth and anti-metaphysical person. He gives him here a good, forcible statement of his case, and answers him seriously and carefully in ch. 29, where he indicates (lines 21-22) that he and this awkward

itself; or is whatever may be good not good for itself, but necessarily the good of another? And for what nature is it good? And is there any nature for which nothing is good? And we must not leave out the following remarks which some cantankerous person might make,¹ "Really, you people, why do you use this pompous language up and down and all around, saying life is good, and intellect is good, and something transcending these? For why should intellect be good? Or what good could the thinker of the Forms have as he contemplates each of them? If he takes a deceptive pleasure in them he might perhaps say intellect was good, and life, because it was pleasant; but if he is stuck in a pleasureless state, why should he say they are good? Is it because he exists? What then would he gain from existence? What difference would there be in existing or altogether not existing, unless one makes affection for oneself the reason for all this? In that case it would be this natural deception and the fear of dissolution which would account for the acceptance of the supposition of goods."

25. Plato, then, who mixes pleasure into the end-object and does not posit the good as simple or in intellect alone, as it is written in the *Philebus*,² perhaps because he was aware of this difficulty was not inclined to place the good altogether in the pleasant—and in this he was right—nor did he think character have at least this in common, that the good of Intellect is not enough for them by itself.

² The passages in Plato's *Philebus* which Plotinus is discussing in this chapter (21D-22A and 61B-D) are important, in his understanding of them, for his thought about Intellect and the Good.

5 ἐτράπετο, ὀρθῶς ποιῶν, οὔτε τὸν νοῦν ἀνήδονον ὄντα
 ᾧ ἦθη δεῖν θέσθαι ἀγαθὸν τὸ κινεῖν ἐν αὐτῷ οὐχ ὀρών.
 τάχῃ δὲ οὐ ταύτη, ἀλλ' ὅτι ἡξίου τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἔχον φύσιν
 ἐν αὐτῷ τοιαύτην δεῖν ἐξ ἀνάγκης χαρτὸν εἶναι, τό τε
 ἐφετὸν τῷ τυγχάνοντι καὶ τυχόντι πάντως ἔχειν τὸ
 10 χαίρειν, ὥστε, ᾧ μὴ τὸ χαίρειν, ἀγαθὸν μηδὲ εἶναι, καὶ
 ὥστε, εἰ τὸ χαίρειν τῷ ἐφιεμένῳ, τῷ πρῶτῳ μὴ εἶναι
 ὥστε μηδὲ τὸ ἀγαθόν. καὶ οὐκ ἄτοπον τοῦτο· αὐτὸς γὰρ
 οὐ τὸ πρῶτον ἀγαθὸν ἐζήτει, τὸ δὲ ἡμῶν, καὶ ὅλως
 ἐτέρου ὄντος ἔστιν αὐτῷ ἕτερον ὄν αὐτοῦ, ἔλλειπούς
 15 ὄντος αἰτοῦ καὶ ἴσως συνθέτου· ὅθεν καὶ τὸ ἔρημον
 καὶ ἰσόνονον μηδὲν ἔχειν ἀγαθόν, ἀλλ' εἶναι ἐτέρως καὶ
 μειζόνως. ἐφετὸν μὲν οὖν δεῖ τὸ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι, οὐ μέντοι
 τῷ ἐφετὸν εἶναι ἀγαθὸν γίνεσθαι, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀγαθὸν
 εἶναι ἐφετὸν γίνεσθαι. ἀρ' οὖν τῷ μὲν ἐσχάτῳ ἐν τοῖς
 οὔσι τὸ πρὸ αὐτοῦ, καὶ αἰεὶ ἢ ἀνάβασις τὸ ὑπὲρ ἕκαστον
 20 διδοῦσα ἀγαθὸν εἶναι τῷ ὑπ' αὐτὸ, εἰ ἢ ἀνάβασις οὐκ
 ἐξίσταται τοῦ ἀνάλογον, ἀλλὰ ἐπὶ μείζον αἰεὶ προχωροῖ;
 τότε δὲ στήσεται ἐπ' ἐσχάτῳ, μεθ' ὃ οὐδὲν ἔστιν εἰς τὸ
 ἄνω λαβεῖν, καὶ τοῦτο τὸ πρῶτον καὶ τὸ ὄντως καὶ τὸ
 μάλιστα κυρίως ἔσται, καὶ αἴτιον δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις.
 25 τῇ μὲν γὰρ ὕλη τὸ εἶδος—εἰ γὰρ αἴσθησιν λάβοι,
 ἀσπάσαιτ' ἄν—τῷ δὲ σώματι ψυχῇ—καὶ γὰρ οὐδ' ἄν

¹ The phrase is again taken from the *Philebus* (33B7-8) but can only be applied to the Good by a very strained exegesis.

² Plotinus speaks, in the treatises in which he deals with matter, of matter desiring form or soul or good (I. 8. 14. 35-36; III. 6. 11. 32, 14. 9-10). But in I. 8 and III. 6 he goes to considerable trouble to show that matter can never really

that he ought to posit intellect which was without pleasure as the good, since he did not see what there was in it to move [us to desire it]. But perhaps it was not for this reason, but because he thought it right that the good, since it had such a nature in itself, should of necessity be delightful, and that the desired object must altogether hold delight for the one who is attaining or has attained it, so that who does not have delight does not have good, and so that, if delight belongs to the desirer, it does not belong to the First; so that neither does the good. And this is not unreasonable; for Plato himself [here] was not looking for the First Good, but for our good, and since this is altogether different, there is for him a Good other than it; for it is deficient, and perhaps composite; this is why he says that the "solitary and alone"¹ has nothing good in it, but is [the Good] in another, greater way. The Good, therefore, must be desirable, but must not become good by being desirable, but become desirable by being good. Is it then so that the good for the last and lowest among beings is what lies before it, and there is a continuous ascent which gives that above a thing to be good for what is below it, on the assumption that the ascent never gets beyond relative proportion, but goes on for ever to greater good? But it will come to a stop at the ultimate, at that after which one cannot grasp anything higher, and this is the First and the really good and the Good in the strictest sense, and the cause also of the other goods. For form is the good for matter—for if it were conscious, it would welcome it²—and soul for body—for without it it could receive form or be changed by it from its own evil nature. Cp. ch. 28 lines 1-12 and n. 1, p. 173.

εἴη οὐδ' ἂν σώζοιτο—ψυχῇ δὲ ἀρετῇ. ἤδη δὲ καὶ ἀνωτέρω νοῦς καὶ ἐπὶ τούτῳ ἦν δὴ φαμεν πρώτην φύσιν. καὶ δὴ καὶ τούτων ἕκαστον ποιεῖν τι εἰς τὰ ὦν ἀγαθὰ ἐστι, τὰ μὲν τάξιν καὶ κόσμον, τὰ δ' ἤδη ζωὴν, 30 τὰ δὲ φρονεῖν καὶ ζῆν ἐδ', τῷ δὲ νῶ τὸ ἀγαθόν, ὃ φαμεν καὶ εἰς τοῦτο ἤκειν, καὶ ὅτι ἐνέργεια ἐξ αὐτοῦ, καὶ ὅτι καὶ νῦν δίδωσι <τι>¹ φῶς λεγόμενον· ὃ δὴ τί ποτ' ἐστίν, ὕστερον.

26. Καὶ δὴ τὸ πεφυκὸς αἰσθάνεσθαι παρ' αὐτόν, εἰ ἤκει αὐτῷ τὸ ἀγαθόν, γνώσκων καὶ λέγειν ἔχειν. τί οὖν, εἰ ἠπάτηται; δεῖ ἄρα τινὰ εἶναι ὁμοίωσιν, καθ' ἣν ἠπάτηται. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, ἐκεῖνο ἀγαθὸν ἂν αὐτῷ εἴη [ἀφ' 5 οὐ ἠπάτηται].² ἐπεὶ καί, ὅταν ἐκεῖνο ἤκη, ἀφίσταται ἀφ' οὐ ἠπάτηται. καὶ ἡ ἔφεσις δ' αὐτοῦ ἐκάστου καὶ ἡ ὠδὶς μαρτυρεῖ, ὅτι ἔστι τι ἀγαθὸν ἐκάστου. τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ἀμύχοις παρ' ἄλλου τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ αὐτοῖς ἡ δόσις, τῷ δὲ ψυχὴν ἔχοντι ἡ ἔφεσις τὴν δίωξιν ἐργάζεται, ὡσπερ καὶ 10 τοῖς νεκροῖς γεγενημένοις σώμασι παρὰ τῶν ζώντων ἡ ἐπιμέλεια καὶ ἡ κήδευσις, τοῖς δὲ ζῶσι παρ' αὐτῶν ἡ πρόνοια. ὅτι δ' εἴτιχε, πιστοῦται, ὅταν βέλτιόν τι γίνηται καὶ ἀμετανόητον ἢ καὶ πεπληρώσθαι αὐτῷ γίγνηται καὶ ἐπ' ἐκεῖνον μένη καὶ μὴ ἄλλο ζητῇ. διὸ καὶ 15 ἡ ἡδονὴ οὐκ αὐτάρκες· οὐ γὰρ ἀγαπᾷ ταυτόν· οὐ γάρ, ὃ

¹ Igal.² del. Harder.

not exist or be preserved—and virtue for soul. And now, still higher, there is intellect, and above this what we call the first nature. And certainly each of these effects something for those of which they are the good, some arrangement and ordered beauty, some already life, and some thought and living well, but for Intellect the Good effects something, the Good which we maintain comes also to this, both because its active actuality comes from it and because now also it gives something called light: what this is, we shall see later.¹

26. And surely what has by itself the natural power to perceive, if the Good comes to it, has the power to know and to say that it has it. Well then, what if it is deceived? There must then be some likeness [to the Good] which accounts for the deception. But if there is this, that would be the good for it; since also, when that [Good] comes, it leaves that which was the origin of its deception. And each and every thing's desire and birth-pangs of longing bear witness that there is some good for each. For to things without soul the gift of the good comes from another, but for that which has soul it is the desire which brings about the pursuit, just as when bodies have become corpses they are tended and prepared for burial by the living, but the living take thought for themselves. But the attainment is confirmed when a thing becomes better and has no regrets, and fulfilment comes to it and it remains with the Good and does not seek something else. This is why pleasure is not self-sufficient; for one is not satisfied with the same thing; for what pleasure is satisfied with

¹ Ch. 32 ff.

τι ἡδονή¹ πάλιν, ταύτων ἄλλο γὰρ αἰεὶ τὸ ἐφ' ᾧ ἡδεται.
 δεῖ δὴ τὸ ἀγαθόν, ὃ αἰρείται τις, εἶναι οὐ τὸ πάθος τὸ ἐπὶ
 τῷ τυχόντι· ὅθεν καὶ κενὸς μένει ὁ τοῦτο ἀγαθὸν
 νομίζων, τὸ πάθος μόνον ἔχων, ὃ ἔσχεν ἂν τις ἀπὸ τοῦ
 20 ἀγαθοῦ. διὸ οὐκ ἂν ἀνάσχοιτό τις τοῦ πάθους, ἐφ' ᾧ οὐκ
 ἔχων, οἷον ἐπὶ τῷ παιδί, ὅτι πάρεστιν, ἡδεσθαι οὐ
 παρόντος· οὐδέ γε οἶμαι οἷς ἐν τῷ πληροῦσθαι
 σωματικῶς τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἡδεσθαι ὡς ἐσθίοντα μὴ
 ἐσθίοντα, ὡς ἀφροδισίοις χρώμενον μὴ συνόντα ἢ
 ἐβούλετο, ἢ ὅλως μὴ δρώντα.

27. Ἄλλὰ τίνος γενομένου ἐκάστω τὸ αὐτῷ
 προσήκον ἔχει; ἢ εἶδους τινὸς φήσομεν καὶ γὰρ τῇ ὕλη
 εἶδος, καὶ ψυχῇ ἢ ἀρετῇ εἶδος. ἀλλὰ τὸ εἶδος τοῦτο ἄρα
 γε τῷ οἰκείον εἶναι ἀγαθὸν ἐστὶν ἐκείνῳ, καὶ ἢ ἔφεσις
 5 πρὸς τὸ οἰκείον; ἢ οὐ· καὶ γὰρ τὸ ὅμοιον οἰκείον, κἂν
 ἐθέλῃ αὐτὸ καὶ χαίρῃ τῷ ὁμοίῳ, οὐπω τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἔχει.
 ἀλλ' οὐκ οἰκείον φήσομεν ἀγαθὸν εἰπόντες εἶναι; ἢ
 φατέον τοῦ οἰκείου τῷ κρείττονι κρίνειν δεῖ καὶ τῷ
 βελτίονι αὐτοῦ, πρὸς ὃ δυνάμει ἐστίν. ὃν γὰρ δυνάμει
 10 πρὸς ὃ ἐστίν, ἐνδεές ἐστὶν αὐτοῦ, οὐ δὲ ἐνδεές ἐστὶ

¹ Beutler: ἡδονήν Enn.

¹ This is the doctrine of οἰκειώσις, fundamental in Stoic ethics. See *SVF* I 197 and III 178 ff. Plotinus' criticism of it develops Diotima's rejection of Aristophanes' account of

again is not the same; for that which gives one pleasure is always something else. Certainly the good which one chooses must be something which is not the feeling one has when one attains it; that is why the one who takes this for good remains empty, because he only has the feeling which one might get from the good. This is the reason why one would not find acceptable the feeling produced by something one has not got; for instance, one would not delight in a boy because he was present when he was not present; nor do I think that those who find the good in bodily satisfaction would feel pleasure as if they were eating when they were not eating or as if they were enjoying sex when they were not with the one they wanted to be with, or in general when they were not active.

27. But what is it by the coming of which to each one it has what is appropriate to it? We shall maintain that it is a form; for form is the appropriate good for matter, and virtue is form for soul. But is this form good for that which has it by being akin to it, and is its desire directed to what is akin¹? No: for what is like it is akin, and if it wishes the like and delights in it, it does not yet have the good. But when we say that something is good, are we not going to maintain that it is akin? Rather we must maintain that one must judge the good by what is higher than what is akin and by what is better than the thing itself, to which it is potentially directed. For, since it is potentially directed to what it is, it is in need of it, and what it is in need of as something

the origin of love (the story of the bisected spherical protohumans) in Plato *Symposium* 205D10–206A1.

κρείττονος ὄντος, ἀγαθὸν ἔστιν αὐτῷ ἐκείνο. ἡ δὲ ὕλη πάντων ἐνδεέστατον καὶ τὸ ἔσχατον εἶδος προσεχὲς αὐτῇ· μὲν γὰρ αὐτὴν πρὸς τὸ ἄνω. εἰ δὲ δὴ καὶ αὐτὸ αὐτῷ ἀγαθὸν ἔστι, πολὺ μᾶλλον ἂν εἴη ἀγαθὸν αὐτῷ ἢ
 15 τελειότης αὐτοῦ καὶ τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὸ κρείττον αὐτοῦ, καὶ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ φύσει ὃν τοιοῦτον καὶ αὐτῷ, ὅτι καὶ αὐτὸ ἀγαθὸν ποιεῖ. ἀλλὰ διὰ τί αὐτῷ ἀγαθὸν ἔσται; ἅρ ὅτι οἰκειότατον αὐτῷ; ἢ οὐ· ἀλλ' ὅτι ἐστὶ τις ἀγαθοῦ μοῖρα. διὸ καὶ μᾶλλον οἰκειώσεις πρὸς αὐτοὺς τοῖς εἰλικρινέσι
 20 καὶ τοῖς μᾶλλον ἀγαθοῖς. ἄτοπον δὴ τὸ ζητεῖν, διὰ τί ἀγαθὸν ὃν αὐτῷ ἀγαθὸν ἔστιν, ὥσπερ δέον πρὸς αὐτὸ ἐξίστασθαι τῆς αὐτοῦ φύσεως καὶ μὴ ἀγαπᾶν ἑαυτὸ ὡς ἀγαθόν. ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀπλοῦ τοῦτο σκεπτέον, εἰ, ὅπου μηδαμῶς ἐν ἄλλο, τὸ δὲ ἄλλο, ἔστιν ἡ οἰκειώσεις πρὸς αὐτό, <καὶ εἰ αὐτό>¹ ἀγαθὸν ἔστιν ἑαυτῷ. νῦν δέ, εἰ
 25 ταῦτα ὀρθῶς λέγεται, καὶ ἡ ἐπανάβασις ἔχει τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐν φύσει τινὶ κείμενον, καὶ οὐχ ἡ ἔφεσις ποιεῖ τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἀλλ' ἡ ἔφεσις, ὅτι ἀγαθόν, καὶ γίνεται τι τοῖς κτωμένοις καὶ τὸ ἐπὶ τῇ κτήσει ἡδύ. ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν "εἰ μὴ ἔποιτο ἡδονή,² αἰρετέον τὸ ἀγαθόν" καὶ αὐτὸ ζητητέον.

28. Τὸ δ' ἐκ τοῦ λόγου συμβαῖνον νῦν ὀπτέον. εἰ γὰρ πανταχοῦ τὸ παραγινόμενον ὡς ἀγαθὸν εἶδος, καὶ τῇ ὕλη δὲ εἶδος ἐν τὸ ἀγαθόν, πότερον ἠθέλησεν ἂν ἡ ὕλη, εἴπερ ἦν αὐτῇ τὸ θέλειν, εἶδος μόνον γενέσθαι; ἀλλ' εἰ
 5 τοῦτο, ἀπολέσθαι θελήσει τὸ δ' ἀγαθὸν αὐτῷ πᾶν

¹ H. S¹.

² Steinhart: ἐποιεῖτο ἡδονῆ Enn.

higher than it, that is its good. And matter is the neediest of all, and the last and lowest form is next to it; for it comes after it in the upward direction. But even if a thing is a good for itself, its perfection and its form and what is higher than it would much more be a good, both because it is such by its own nature and again because it makes the thing good. But why will anything be a good for itself? Is it because it is the most akin to itself? No, but because it is a part of good. This is why those who are pure and more good have a closer kinship with themselves. It is therefore absurd to enquire why a thing which is good is good for itself, as if it would have as regards itself to get out of its own nature and not be content with itself as good. But when something is simple we must consider this question, whether, where in no way there is in it one part and another, there is kinship to itself, and if it is a good for itself. But now, if these conclusions are correct, the movement upwards grasps the good present in a particular nature, and it is not the desire which makes the good but there is desire because there is a good, and something comes to those who possess it, and also pleasure in the possession. But we must also enquire into the saying "even if pleasure did not follow, the good should be chosen."¹

28. Now we must look at what follows from the discussion. For if everywhere what comes as a good is form, and one single form is the good for matter, would matter wish, if it had the power of wishing, to become only form? But if so, it will wish to perish;

¹ A paraphrase of Aristotle *Nicomachean Ethics* K 3. 1174a6-8. Plotinus discusses this in ch. 29.

ζητεῖ. ἀλλ' ἴσως οὐχ ὕλη εἶναι ζητήσῃ, ἀλλὰ εἶναι, τοῦτο δ' ἔχουσα ἀφείναι αὐτῆς θελήσει τὴν κάκην. ἀλλὰ τὸ κακὸν πῶς ἔφεσιν ἔξει τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ; ἢ οὐδὲ τὴν ὕλην ἐν ἐφέσει ἐτιθέμεθα, ἀλλ' ὑπόθεσιν ἐποιεῖτο ὁ λόγος
 10 αἰσθησιν δούς, εἴπερ οἶόν τε ἦν δοῦναι ὕλην τηροῦσιν ἀλλὰ τοῦ εἶδους ἐπελθόντος, ὡσπερ ὄνειρατος ἀγαθοῦ, ἐν καλλίονι τάξει γεγονέναι. εἰ μὲν οὖν τὸ κακὸν ἢ ὕλη, εἴρηται· εἰ δ' ἄλλο τι, οἶον κακία, εἰ αἰσθησιν λάβοι τὸ εἶναι αὐτῆς, ἄρ' οὖν ἔτι τὸ οἰκείον πρὸς τὸ κρεῖττον τὸ
 15 ἀγαθὸν ἔσται; ἢ οὐχ ἢ κακία ἦν ἢ αἴρουμένη, ἀλλὰ τὸ κακούμενον. εἰ δὲ ταῦτόν τὸ εἶναι καὶ τὸ κακόν, πῶς τοῦτο τὸ ἀγαθὸν αἰρήσεται; ἀλλ' ἄρά γε, εἰ αἰσθησιν αὐτοῦ λάβοι τὸ κακόν, ἀγαπήσει αὐτό; καὶ πῶς ἀγαπητὸν τὸ μὴ ἀγαθόν¹ ἔσται; οὐ γὰρ δὴ τῷ οἰκείῳ
 20 ἐθέμεθα τὸ ἀγαθόν. καὶ ταῦτα μὲν ταῦτη. ἀλλ' εἰ εἶδος τὸ ἀγαθὸν πανταχοῦ καὶ μᾶλλον ἐπαναβαίνουσιν μᾶλλον εἶδος—μᾶλλον γὰρ ψυχῆ εἶδος ἢ σώματος εἶδος, καὶ ψυχῆς τὸ μὲν μᾶλλον, τὸ δ' ἐπιμᾶλλον, καὶ νοῦς ψυχῆς τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἂν προσχωροῖ τῷ τῆς ὕλης² ἐναντίῳ
 25 καὶ οἶον καθαιρομένῳ καὶ ἀποτιθεμένῳ κατὰ δύναμιν μὲν ἐκάστω, τὸ δὲ μάλιστα πᾶν ὅτι ὕλης ἀποτιθεμένῳ. καὶ δὴ καὶ ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φύσις πᾶσαν ὕλην φυγοῦσα,

¹ Igal: ἀγαπητὸν Enn.

² A^{3mg} (= Ficinus): ψυχῆς Enn.

but everything seeks what will be good for itself. But perhaps it will not seek to be matter, but to be, and in possessing this to let its evil go. But how can evil have a desire of the good? But we did not assume that matter was desirous, but our argument framed a hypothesis by giving it perception—if it was possible to give it and still keep it as matter; but we assumed that when form came upon it, like a good dream, it came to be in a fairer order. If then matter is [absolute] evil, enough has been said¹; but if it is something else, badness for instance, if its essential being acquired perception, will what is akin to it on the higher side still be the good? Now it was not [on this supposition] badness which chose, but what had become bad. But if its being and evil were one and the same, how can this choose the good? Well then, if evil acquired a perception of itself, would it be satisfied with itself? And how could what is not good be satisfactory? For we certainly did not identify the good with the kindred. And so much for that. But if form is everywhere the good, and the higher the ascent goes the more there is form—for soul is more form than the form of body, and one part of soul more form, and another very much more, and Intellect more than soul—the Good would come to that which was opposed to matter, and, we may say, which was purified from it and had put it away, according to the capacity of each, and most to that which put away everything belonging to matter. And certainly the nature of the Good, which has escaped from all matter, or rather never in any way

¹ This is Plotinus' own view: this passage is his amplification and correction of a possibly misleading general remark in ch. 25, lines 24–5: see n. 2 there, p. 165.

μᾶλλον δὲ οὐδαμῆ οὐδαμῶς πλησίον γενομένη, ἀνα-
πεφευγία ἂν εἴη εἰς τὴν ἀνείδεον φύσιν, ἀφ' ἧς τὸ
πρῶτον εἶδος. ἀλλὰ περὶ τούτου ὕστερον.

29. Ἄλλ' εἰ μὴ ἔποιτο ἡδονὴ τῷ ἀγαθῷ, γίνοιτο δὲ
πρὸ τῆς ἡδονῆς τι, δι' ὃ καὶ ἡ ἡδονή, διὰ τί οὐκ
ἀσπαστόν; ἢ εἰπόντες ἀσπαστόν ἡδονὴν ἡδὴ εἶπομεν.
ἀλλ' εἰ ὑπάρξει μὲν, ὑπάρξαντος δὲ δυνατὸν μὴ
5 ἀσπαστόν εἶναι; ἀλλ' εἰ τοῦτο, παρόντος τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ
αἰσθησιν ἔχον τὸ ἔχον οὐ γνώσεται, ὅτι. ἢ τί κωλύει καὶ
γινώσκειν καὶ μὴ κινεῖσθαι ἄλλως μετὰ τὸ αὐτὸ ἔχειν;
ὃ μᾶλλον ἂν τῷ σωφρονεστέρῳ ὑπάρχοι καὶ μᾶλλον
τῷ μὴ ἐνδεεῖ. διὸ οὐδὲ τῷ πρώτῳ, οὐ μόνον ὅτι
10 ἀπλοῦν, ἀλλ' ὅτι ἡ κτήσις δεηθέντος ἡδεῖα. ἀλλὰ
καὶ τουτὶ καταφανὲς ἔσται τὰ ἄλλα ὅσα λοιπὰ
προανακαθηραμένοις¹ καὶ ἐκείνον τὸν ἀντίτυπον λόγον
ἀπωσαμένοις. ἔστι δὲ οὗτος <τοῦ>² ὃς ἀπορεῖ, τί ἂν
καρπώσαιο ὁ νυῦν ἔχων εἰς ἀγαθοῦ μοῖραν, οὐδὲν
πληττόμενος, ὅταν ταῦτα ἀκούῃ, τῷ μὴ σύνεσις αὐτῶν
15 ἴσχειν, ἢ ὄνομα ἀκούων ἢ ἄλλο τι ἕκαστον αὐτῶν
ὑπολαμβάνων ἢ αἰσθητόν τι ζητῶν καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐν
χρήμασι ἢ τισι τοιούτοις τιθέμενος. πρὸς ὃν λεκτέον,

¹ Harder: *προσ-* Enn.

² Theiler.

at all come near it, will have escaped up into the
formless nature from which the first form comes. But
we shall speak of this later.¹

29. But if pleasure does not follow upon the Good,
but there comes to be something before pleasure
through which there is also pleasure, why is it not to
be welcomed? Now in saying "to be welcomed" we
have already said "pleasure". But suppose that it
exists but, though it exists, there is a possibility of
its not being welcome. But if this is so, when the
Good is present, what has it, though it has a percep-
tion of it, will not know it is there. Or what is to
prevent it from knowing and not being moved in any
other way going beyond the actual possession? This
would be more likely to happen to a more self-
controlled person, and more likely if he was without
needs. This is why the First has no pleasure, not only
because it is simple but because it is the acquisition
of something needed which is pleasant. But this will
be luminously clear when we have first cleared up all
the remaining difficulties and repelled that opposing
argument. This argument is that of someone² who
has a difficulty about what a man with intelligence
would get out of it in the way of good, being in no
way disconcerted when he hears these arguments of
ours because he does not know what they mean; he
either hears only the words or understands each
thing [spoken of] differently or is looking for some-
thing perceptible [by the senses] and locating the
Good in property or something of the sort. One must

¹ In chs. 32 and 33.

² This is the objector who states his position forcibly in
ch. 24: see n. 1, p. 162.

ὡς, ὅταν ταῦτα ἀτιμάζῃ, ὁμολογῆί τίθεσθαί τι παρ' αὐτῷ ἀγαθόν, ἀπορῶν δ' ὄπη, τῇ ἐννοίᾳ τῇ παρ' αὐτῷ
 20 ταῦτα ἐφαρμόττει. οὐ γὰρ ἔστι λέγειν "μὴ τοῦτο"
 πάντη ἄπειρον καὶ ἀνενόητον ὄντα τούτου. τάχα δὲ καὶ
 τὸ ὑπὲρ νοῦν ἀπομαντεύεται. ἔπειτα δέ, εἰ τῷ ἀγαθῷ ἢ
 τῷ ἐγγύς τούτου προσβάλλων ἀγνοεῖ, ἐκ τῶν
 ἀντικειμένων εἰς ἐννοιαν ἴτω. ἢ οὐδὲ κακὸν τὴν ἀνοιαν
 25 θήσεται; καίτοι πᾶς αἰρεῖται νοεῖν καὶ νοῶν σεμνύνεται.
 μαρτυροῦσι δὲ καὶ αἱ αἰσθήσεις εἰδήσεις εἶναι θέλουσαι.
 εἰ δὴ νοῦς τίμιον καὶ καλὸν καὶ νοῦς ὁ πρῶτος μάλιστα,
 τί ἂν φαντασθεῖη τις, εἴ τις δύναιτο, τὸν τούτου
 γεννητὴν καὶ πατέρα; τὸ δὲ εἶναι καὶ τὸ ζῆν ἀτιμάζων
 30 ἀντιμαρτυρεῖ ἑαυτῷ καὶ τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ πάθεσι πᾶσιν. εἰ δέ
 τις δυσχεραίνει τὸ ζῆν, ᾧ θάνατος μέμικται, τὸ τοιοῦτο
 δυσχεραίνει, οὐ τὸ ἀληθῶς ζῆν.

30. Ἄλλὰ εἰ δεῖ τῷ ἀγαθῷ τὴν ἡδονὴν μεμίχθαι καὶ
 μὴ τέλειον ἔστι τὸ ζῆν, εἴ τις τὰ θεῖα θεῶτο καὶ μάλιστα
 τὴν τούτων ἀρχὴν, νῦν ἰδεῖν ἐφαπτομένους τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ
 πάντως προσήκει. τὸ μὲν οὖν οἶεσθαι τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐκ τε
 5 τοῦ νοῦ ὡς ὑποκειμένου ἐκ τε τοῦ πάθους τῆς ψυχῆς ὃ
 γίνεται ἐκ τοῦ φρονεῖν, οὐ τὸ τέλος οὐδ' αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθὸν
 τὸ συναμφότερόν ἐστι τιθέντος, ἀλλὰ νοῦς ἂν εἴη τὸ
 ἀγαθόν, ἡμεῖς δὲ χαίροντες τῷ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἔχειν. καὶ εἴη
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say to him that when he despises these things he admits that he does posit some good for himself, but, since he finds it difficult to see how [the Good is good], he fits these things to his own idea of it. For it is not possible to say "not this" if one has no experience or conception of "this". But perhaps also he has a prophetic intuition of what is above Intellect. But then, if when he applies his mind to the Good or that which is near it he does not recognise them, let him come to some idea of them from the things opposed to them. Or will he not even regard unintelligence as evil? Yet everyone prefers to be intelligent and is proud of himself when he uses his intelligence. And our sense-perceptions bear witness to this when they want to be knowings. But if intellect is honourable and beautiful, and above all the first Intellect, as what would one image, if one could, this Intellect's generator and father? But if [our opponent] despises existence and life, he brings evidence against himself and all his own experiences. But if anyone is dissatisfied with life with which death is mixed, it is this kind of life he is dissatisfied with, not true life.

30. But whether pleasure must be mixed with the good and life is not perfect, if someone contemplates the divine things and above all their principle, is a question which it is in every way appropriate to keep in sight now that we are getting into touch with the Good. Well then, to think that the good consists of Intellect as underlying reality and of the experience of the soul which comes from thinking does not belong to one who posits the composite of both as the goal or the Good itself, but Intellect would be the Good, and ourselves in the enjoyment of possessing

ἂν αὐτὴ τις δόξα περὶ ἀγαθοῦ. ἑτέρα δὲ εἴη ἂν παρὰ
 10 ταύτην, ἣ μίξασα τῷ νῷ τὴν ἡδονὴν ὡς ἔν τι ἐξ ἀμφοῖν
 ὑποκείμενον τοῦτο τίθεται εἶναι, ἵν' ἡμεῖς τὸν τοιοῦτον
 νοῦν κτησάμενοι ἢ καὶ ἰδόντες τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἔχωμεν· τὸ γὰρ
 ἔρημον καὶ μόνον οὔτε γενέσθαι οὔτε αἰρετὸν
 εἶναι δυνατὸν ὡς ἀγαθόν. πῶς ἂν οὖν μιχθείη νοῦς ἡδονῇ
 15 εἰς μίαν συντέλειαν φύσεως; ὅτι μὲν οὖν τὴν σώματος
 ἡδονὴν οὐκ ἂν τις οἰηθείη νῷ δυνατὴν εἶναι μίγνυσθαι,
 παντὶ δῆλον· ἀλλ' οὐδ' ὅσαι χαραὶ ψυχῆς ἂν
 ἄλογοι γένοιντο. ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ πάσῃ ἐνεργείᾳ καὶ
 διαθέσει δὲ καὶ ζωῇ ἔπεσθαι δεῖ καὶ συνέιναι οἷόν τι¹
 20 ἐπιθέον, καθὸ τῇ μὲν ἐστὶ κατὰ φύσιν ἰούση τὸ
 ἐμποδίζον καὶ τι τοῦ ἐναντίου παραμεμιγμένον, ὃ οὐκ
 ἐὰ τὴν ζωὴν ἑαυτῆς εἶναι, τῇ δὲ καθαρὸν καὶ
 εἰλικρινές τὸ ἐνέργημα καὶ ἡ ζωὴ ἐν διαθέσει
 φαιδρᾷ, τὴν τοιαύτην τοῦ νοῦ κατάστασιν ἀσμενιστῆν
 25 καὶ αἰρετωτάτην εἶναι τιθέμενοι ἡδονῇ μεμίχθαι
 λέγουσιν ἀπορία οἰκείας προσηγορίας, οἷα ποιοῦσι καὶ
 τὰ ἄλλα ὀνόματα παρ' ἡμῖν ἀγαπώμενα μεταφέροντες,
 τὸ "μεθυσοθεῖς ἐπὶ τοῦ νέκταρος" καὶ "ἐπὶ δαίτα καὶ
 ἐστίασιν" καὶ τὸ "μείδησε δὲ πατήρ" οἱ ποιηταὶ καὶ

¹ Sleeman: τὸ Enn.

¹ Again *Philebus* 63B7–8, but here in a more appropriate context (see ch. 25, n. 1, p. 164). In this chapter Plotinus is concerned to explain and justify Plato's doctrine in the *Philebus* that the good life must be a mixture of pleasure and intelligence, taking account also of Aristotle's discussion of pleasure in *Nicomachean Ethics* K 1–5. 1172a–1176a.

the Good. And this would be one opinion about good. But there would be another contrary to this, which mixes pleasure with intellect as one thing made from both and posits this as the underlying reality, so that we, by possessing, or even seeing, this kind of intellect may possess the Good; for what is "isolated and single"¹ could not come to be or to be chosen as the Good. How then could intellect be mixed with pleasure into one composite perfection of nature? Well, it is, I suppose, clear to everyone that nobody would think that bodily pleasure could possibly be mixed with intellect; but neither could all the irrational joys of the soul which may occur. But, since a sort of something extra and external must follow upon and accompany every activity and disposition and life, in so far as to one of them going its natural way there will be a hindrance and something of its opposite mixed into it, which does not allow the life to be independent, but another will have its activity "pure and unmixed"² and its life will be a state of luminous clarity, the philosophers,³ assuming that such a state of intellect is most pleasing and acceptable, say that it is mixed with pleasure because they cannot find an appropriate way of speaking about it; this is what the other words which we are fond of do metaphorically, like "drunk with the nectar"⁴ and "to feast and entertainment",⁵ and what the poets say, "the father smiled",⁶ and thousands and

² *Philebus* 52D6–7.

³ Plato is meant: see previous note.

⁴ Plato *Symposium* 203B5 (Poros in the garden of Zeus).

⁵ Plato *Phaedrus* 247A8 (with *ἐστίασιν* for *θούνην*).

⁶ A formula-phrase from Homer (not very appropriate in this context): *Iliad* 5. 426; 15. 47.

30 ἄλλα τοιαῦτα μυρία. ἔστι γὰρ καὶ τὸ ἄμμενον ὄντως
 ἐκεῖ καὶ τὸ ἀγαπητότατον καὶ τὸ ποθεινότατον, οὐ
 γινόμενον οὐδ' ἐν κινήσει, αἴτιον δὲ τὸ ἐπιχρῶσαν αὐτὰ
 καὶ ἐπιλάμψαν καὶ φαιδρύναν. διὸ καὶ ἀλήθειαν τῷ
 μίγματι προστίθῃσι καὶ τὸ μετρήσον πρὸ αὐτοῦ ποιεῖ
 καὶ ἡ συμμετρία καὶ τὸ κάλλος ἐπὶ τῷ μίγματι ἐκείθεν
 35 φῆσιν εἰς τὸ καλὸν ἐλήλυθεν. ὥστε κατὰ τοῦτο ἂν ἡμεῖς
 καὶ ἐν τούτῳ μοίρας· τὸ δὲ ὄντως ὀρεκτὸν ἡμῖν ἄλλως
 μὲν ἡμεῖς αὐτοῖς εἰς τὸ βέλτιστον ἑαυτῶν ἀνάγοντες
 ἑαυτούς, τοῦτο δὲ τὸ σύμμετρον καὶ καλὸν καὶ εἶδος
 ἀσύνθετον· καὶ ζωὴν ἐναργῆ καὶ νοερὰν καὶ καλὴν.

31. Ἄλλ' ἐπεὶ ἐκαλλύνθη τὰ πάντα ἐκείνῳ τῷ πρὸ
 τούτων καὶ φῶς ἔσχε, νοῦς μὲν τὸ τῆς ἐνεργείας τῆς
 νοερᾶς φέγγος, ᾧ τὴν φύσιν ἐξέλαμψε, ψυχὴ δὲ δύναμιν
 ἔσχεν εἰς τὸ ζῆν ζωῆς πλείονος εἰς αὐτὴν ἐλθοῦσης.
 5 ἦρθη μὲν οὖν ἐκεῖ καὶ ἔμεινεν ἀγαπήσας τὸ περὶ ἐκείνον
 εἶναι· ἐπιστραφεῖσα δὲ καὶ ψυχὴ ἡ δυνηθεῖσα, ὡς ἔγνω
 καὶ εἶδεν, ἦσθη τε τῇ θεᾷ καὶ ὅσον οἶα τε ἦν ἰδεῖν
 ἐξεπλάγη. εἶδε δὲ οἶον πληγείσα καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ ἔχουσα τι
 αὐτῷ συνήσθητο καὶ διατεθείσα ἐγένετο ἐν πόθῳ,
 10 ὥσπερ ἂν ἐν τῷ εἰδώλῳ τοῦ ἐρασμίου κινούμενοι εἰς τὸ
 αὐτὸ ἰδεῖν ἐθέλειν τὸ ἐρώμενον. ὥσπερ δὲ ἐνταῦθα
 σχηματίζονται εἰς ὁμοιότητα τῷ ἐραστῷ οἱ ἂν ἐρώσι,
 καὶ τὰ σώματα εὐπρεπέστερα καὶ τὰς ψυχὰς ἄγοντες εἰς
 ὁμοιότητα, ὡς μὴ λείπεσθαι κατὰ δύναμιν θέλειν τῇ

¹ H-S¹: σύνθετον Enn.

¹ In *Philebus* 64B-65A.

thousands of others. For there in the realm of Intellect is true delight and the greatest satisfaction, the most loved and longed for, which is not in process of becoming nor in movement, but its cause is what colours and shines upon and glorifies the intelligibles. This is why Plato adds truth to the mixture, and puts what measures it before it, and says that from there the good proportion and beauty in the mixture come to the beautiful.¹ So we should be according to this and have our parts in it; but in another way what is really worth aspiring to for us is our selves, bringing themselves back for themselves to the best of themselves; this is the well-proportioned and beautiful and the form which is not part of the composite and the clear, intelligent, beautiful life.

31. But since all things were made beautiful by that which was before them and held its light, Intellect held the resplendence of its intelligent activity, with which it illuminated its nature, and soul held power to live, since a greater life came to it. So Intellect was raised to that height and stayed there, happy in being around that Good; but the soul also which was able turned to it and, when it knew and saw, rejoiced in the vision and, in so far as it was able to see, was utterly amazed. It saw, as if in utter amazement, and, since it held something of it in itself, it had an intimate awareness of it and came into a state of longing, like those who are moved by an image of the loved one to wish to see that same beloved. And just as here below those who are in love shape themselves to the likeness of the beloved, and make their bodies handsomer and bring their souls into likeness, since as far as they can they do

15 τοῦ ἐρωμένου σωφροσύνη τε καὶ ἀρετῇ τῇ ἄλλῃ—ἢ ἀπόβλητοι ἂν εἶεν τοῖς ἐρωμένοις τοῖς τοιούτοις—καὶ οὗτοι εἰσιν οἱ συνεῖναι δυνάμενοι, τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον καὶ ψυχῇ ἐρᾶ μὲν ἐκείνου ὑπ' αὐτοῦ ἐξ ἀρχῆς εἰς τὸ ἐρᾶν κωηθεῖσα. καὶ ἡ πρόχειρον ἔχουσα τὸν ἔρωτα ὑπό-
 20 μνησιν οὐ περιμένει ἐκ τῶν καλῶν τῶν τῆδε, ἔχουσα δὲ τὸν ἔρωτα, καὶ ἂν ἀγνοῇ ὅτι ἔχει, ζητεῖ αἰεὶ καὶ πρὸς ἐκείνο φέρεσθαι θέλουσα ὑπεροψίαν τῶν τῆδε ἔχει, καὶ ἰδοῦσα τὰ ἐν τῷδε τῷ παντὶ καλὰ ὑποψίαν ἔχει πρὸς αὐτά, ὅτι ἐν σαρκὶ καὶ σώμασιν ὄρα αὐτὰ ὄντα καὶ μαινώμενα τῇ παρούσῃ οἰκῆσει καὶ τοῖς μεγέθεσι
 25 διειλημμένα καὶ οὐκ αὐτὰ τὰ καλὰ ὄντα. μὴ γὰρ ἂν τολμήσαι ἐκείνα οἷά ἐστιν εἰς βόρβορον σωματῶν ἐμβῆναι καὶ ῥυπᾶναι ἑαυτὰ καὶ ἀφανίσει. ὅταν δὲ καὶ παραρρέοντα ἴδῃ, ἥδη παντελῶς γιγνώσκει, ὅτι ἄλλοθεν ἔχει, ὃ ἦν αὐτοῖς ἐπιθέον. εἴτ' ἐκεῖ φέρεται δεινῇ
 30 ἀνευρεῖν οὐπερ ἐρᾶ οἶσα, καὶ οὐκ ἂν πρὶν ἐλεῖν ἀποστᾶσα, εἰ μὴ πού τις αὐτῆς καὶ τὸν ἔρωτα ἐξέλοι. ἔνθα δὲ εἶδε μὲν καλὰ πάντα καὶ ἀληθῆ ὄντα, καὶ ἐπερρώσθη πλέον τῆς τοῦ ὄντος ζωῆς πληρωθεῖσα, καὶ ὄντως ὄν καὶ αὐτῇ γενομένη καὶ σύνεσιν ὄντως λαβοῦσα ἐγγυὲς οὐσα αἰσθάνεται οὐδὲ πάλαι ζητεῖ.

¹ Plotinus is thinking of the philosophic lovers in *Phaedrus* 250–257. But here, as in I. 6. 9, it is himself, not as in Plato the beloved, whom the lover shapes to the divine likeness: this of course suits the present context considerably better.

not want to fall short of the integrity and all the other excellence of the loved one—if they did they would be rejected by loved ones like these—and these are the lovers who are able to have intercourse¹; in this way the soul also loves that Good, moved by it to love from the beginning. And the soul which has its love ready to hand does not wait for a reminder from the beauties here, but because it has its love, even if it does not know that it has it,² it is always searching and in its wish to be borne away to that Good has a contempt for the things here, and when it sees the beauties of this world it distrusts them, because it sees that they are in bodies of flesh and polluted by their present dwelling and disintegrated by magnitudes and are not the true beautiful things themselves; for those, being as they are, would never bring themselves to enter the mud of bodies and dirty themselves and disappear. But when it sees the beauties here flowing past it, it already knows completely that they have the light which plays on them from elsewhere. And then it is borne away there, skilled in finding what it loves, and not leaving off till it catches it, unless someone were to take even its love away. There certainly it sees that all things are beautiful and true and gains greater strength, since it is filled with the life of real being, and has become truly real itself also, and has true awareness, and it perceives that it is near to what it has long been seeking.

² Here, as in V. 5. 12, the unperceived presence and unconscious love of the Good are prior to the conscious recollection of the beauty of the World of Forms aroused by the beauties here.

32. Ποῦ οὖν ὁ ποιήσας τὸ τοσοῦτον κάλλος καὶ τὴν
 τοσαύτην ζωὴν καὶ γεννήσας οὐσίαν; ὁρᾷς τὸ ἐπ' αὐτοῖς
 ἅπασι ποικίλοις οὖσιν εἶδεισι κάλλος. κυλὸν μὲν ὡδὶ
 μένειν· ἀλλ' ἐν καλῷ ὄντα δεῖ βλέπειν, ὅθεν ταῦτα καὶ
 5 ὅθεν καλά. δεῖ δ' αὐτὸ εἶναι τούτων μηδὲ ἐν· τί γὰρ
 αὐτῶν ἔσται μέρος τε ἔσται. οὐ τοίνυν οὐδὲ τοιαύτη
 μορφή οὐδέ τις δύναμις οὐδ' αὖ πάσαι αἱ γεγενημένοι
 καὶ οὐσαι ἐνταῦθα, ἀλλὰ δεῖ ὑπὲρ πάσας εἶναι δυνάμεις
 καὶ ὑπὲρ πάσας μορφάς. ἀρχὴ δὲ τὸ ἀνείδεον, οὐ τὸ
 10 μορφῆς δεόμενον, ἀλλ' ἀφ' οὗ πάσα μορφή νοερά. τὸ
 γὰρ γενόμενον, εἴπερ ἐγένετο, ἔδει γενέσθαι τι καὶ
 μορφήν ἰδίαν ἔσχειν· ὃ δὲ μηδεὶς ἐποίησε, <τί>¹ τις ἂν
 ποιήσειεν; οὐδὲν οὖν τοῦτο τῶν ὄντων καὶ πάντα· οὐδὲν
 μὲν, ὅτι ὕστερα τὰ ὄντα, πάντα δέ, ὅτι ἐξ αὐτοῦ. πάντα
 15 δὲ ποιεῖν δυνάμενον τί ἂν μέγεθος ἔχοι; ἢ ἄπειρος ἂν
 εἴη, ἀλλ' εἰ ἄπειρος, μέγεθος ἂν ἔχοι οὐδέν. καὶ γὰρ
 μέγεθος ἐν τοῖς ὑστάτοις· καὶ δεῖ, εἰ καὶ τοῦτο ποιήσει,
 αὐτὸν μὴ ἔχειν. τό τε τῆς οὐσίας μέγεθος οὐ ποσόν· ἔχοι δ'
 ἂν καὶ ἄλλο τι μετ' αὐτὸν τὸ μέγεθος. τὸ δὲ μέγα αὐτοῦ
 20 τὸ μηδὲν αὐτοῦ εἶναι δυνατώτερον παρισυῶσθαι τε
 μηδὲν δίνασθαι· τίτι γὰρ τῶν αὐτοῦ εἰς ἴσον ἂν τι ἔλθοι
 μηδὲν ταῦτὸν ἔχον; τό τε εἰς αἰεὶ καὶ εἰς πάντα οὐ μέτρον

¹ <τί> τις coniectimus: τις Enn.

¹ Plotinus normally uses ἐκεῖ (there) for the World of Forms and ἐνταῦθα (here) for the material world. But in this

32. Where then is he who made the beauty which is so great and the life which is so great, he who is the generator of substance? You see the beauty which rests upon the very Forms, all of them richly varied. It is beautiful to abide here; but when one is in beauty one must look to see whence these Forms come and whence they derive their beauty. But this itself must not be any one of them; for then it will be one of them and will be a part. Nor, then, can it be a shape of any kind or an individual power, nor again all those which have come to be and exist here above,¹ but it must be above all powers and above all shapes. The principle is the formless, not that which needs form, but that from which every intelligent form comes. For what came to be, if it did come to be, came to be something and had its own particular shape; but who could have made what no one made anything? Therefore it is none of these things and all of them: none of them because the real beings are later, but all of them because they come from it. But what size could that have which has the power to make all? Now he would be unbounded, but if unbounded he would have no size. For there is size in the last and lowest things; and, even if he makes size, he himself must not have it. And the greatness of substance is not quantitative; but something else posterior to him might also have size. But his greatness is that nothing can be more powerful than him and nothing can be compared with him; for to what that belongs to him could anything come to equality which has nothing the same? And being for ever and

passage he is speaking as one who is already in the World of Forms and seeking to go beyond it.

αὐτῷ δίδωσιν οὐδ' αὖ ἄμετρίαν· πῶς γὰρ ἂν τὰ ἄλλα
μετρήσειεν; οὐ τοίνυν αὖ οὐδὲ οὐχῆμα. καὶ μὴν, ὅτου ἂν
25 ποθεινοῦ ὄντος μήτε σχῆμα μήτε μορφήν ἔχουσ λαβεῖν,
ποθεινότατον καὶ ἐρασμιώτατον ἂν εἴη, καὶ ὁ ἔρωσ ἂν
ἄμετρος εἴη. οὐ γὰρ ὤρισται ἐνταῦθα ὁ ἔρωσ, ὅτι μηδὲ
τὸ ἐρώμενον, ἀλλ' ἄπειρος ἂν εἴη ὁ τούτου ἔρωσ, ὥστε
καὶ τὸ κάλλος αὐτοῦ ἄλλον τρόπον καὶ κάλλος ὑπὲρ
30 κάλλος. οὐδὲν γὰρ ὄν τί κάλλος; ἐράσμιον δὲ ὄν τὸ
γενῶν ἂν εἴη τὸ κάλλος. δύναμις οὖν παντὸς καλοῦ
ἄνθος ἐστί, κάλλος καλλοποιόν. καὶ γὰρ γενῶ αὐτὸ καὶ
κάλλιον ποιεῖ τῇ παρ' αὐτοῦ περιουσίᾳ τοῦ κάλλους,
ὥστε ἀρχὴ κάλλους καὶ πέρασ κάλλους. οὐσα δὲ
35 κάλλους ἀρχὴ ἐκεῖνο μὲν καλὸν ποιεῖ οὐδ' ἀρχή, καὶ
καλὸν ποιεῖ οὐκ ἐν μορφῇ· ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ γενόμενον
ἄμορφεῖν, ἄλλον δὲ τρύπον ἐν μορφῇ. ἢ γὰρ λεγομένη
αὐτὸ τοῦτο μόνον μορφή ἐν ἄλλω, ἐφ' ἑαυτῆς δὲ οὐσα
ἄμορφον. τὸ οὖν μετέχον κάλλους μεμόρφωται, οὐ τὸ
κάλλος.

33. Διὸ καὶ ὅταν κάλλος λέγεται, φευκτέον μᾶλλον
ἀπὸ μορφῆς τοιαύτης, ἀλλ' οὐ πρὸ ὀμμάτων ποιητέον,
ἵνα μὴ ἐκπέσης τοῦ καλοῦ εἰς τὸ ἀμυδρᾶ μετοχῇ καλὸν
λεγόμενον. τὸ δὲ ἄμορφον εἶδος καλόν, εἴπερ εἰδύς ἐστί,
5 καὶ ὅσω ἂν ἀποσυλήσας εἴης πᾶσαν μορφήν, οἷον καὶ
τῆν ἐν λόγῳ, ἢ διαφέρειν ἄλλο ἄλλου λέγομεν, ὡς
δικαιοσύνην καὶ σωφροσύνην ἀλλήλων ἕτερα, καίτοι

for all things gives him no measure—nor on the
other hand measurelessness: for [if he was measure-
less] how could he measure the others? Nor again
has he form either. Truly, when you cannot grasp the
form or shape of what is longed for, it would be most
longed for and most lovable, and love for it would be
immeasurable. For love is not limited here, because
neither is the beloved, but the love of this would be
unbounded; so his beauty is of another kind and
beauty above beauty. For if it is nothing, what
beauty can it be? But if it is lovable, it would be the
generator of beauty. Therefore the productive power
of all is the flower of beauty, a beauty which makes
beauty. For it generates beauty and makes it more
beautiful by the excess of beauty which comes from
it, so that it is the principle of beauty and the term of
beauty. But since it is the principle of beauty it
makes that beautiful of which it is the principle, and
makes it beautiful not in shape; but it makes the
very beauty which comes to be from it to be shape-
less, but in shape in another way; for what is called
this very thing [, shape,] is shape in another, but by
itself shapeless. Therefore that which participates in
beauty is shaped, not the beauty.

33. Therefore, even when it is called beauty, one
must even more avoid shape of this kind; but it must
not be set before the eyes, that you may not fall out
of beauty into what is called beauty by obscure
participation. But the shapeless form is beautiful,
since it is form, and is so in proportion to the length
you go in stripping all shape from it, the shape in
reasoning, for instance, by which we say that one
form differs from another, as we say that righteous-
ness and integrity are different from each other,

καλὰ ὄντα. ἐπειδὴ ὁ νοῦς ἰδιόν τι νοεῖ, ἡλάττωται, κἄν
ὁμοῦ πάντα λάβῃ, ὅσα ἐν τῷ νοητῷ· κἄν ἕκαστον, μίαν
10 μορφὴν νοητὴν ἔχει· ὁμοῦ δὲ πάντα οἶον ποικίλην τινά,
ἔτι ἐν δεήσει, οἶον δεῖ θεάσασθαι ὃν ὑπὲρ ἐκείνο τὸ
πάγκαλον καὶ ποικίλον καὶ οὐ ποικίλον, οὐ ὁρέγεται μὲν
ψυχῇ οὐ λέγουσα διὰ τί τοιοῦτον ποθεῖ, ὁ δὲ λόγος
λέγει, ὅτι τοῦτο τὸ ὄντως, εἴπερ ἐν τῷ πάντῃ ἀνειδέω ἢ
τοῦ ἀρίστου φύσις καὶ ἢ τοῦ ἐρασμιωτάτου. διὸ ὅ τι ἂν
15 εἰς εἶδος ἀνάγων τῇ ψυχῇ δευκνήης, ἐπὶ τούτῳ ἄλλο τὸ
μορφῶσαν ζητεῖ. λέγει δὴ ὁ λόγος, ὅτι τὸ μορφὴν ἔχον
καὶ ἢ μορφὴ καὶ τὸ εἶδος μεμετρημένον πᾶν, τοῦτο δὲ
οὐ πᾶν οὐδὲ αὐταρκες οὐδὲ παρ' αὐτοῦ καλόν, ἀλλὰ καὶ
τοῦτο μέμικται. δεῖ τοίνυν ταῦτα μὲν καλὰ, τὸ δὲ ὄντως
20 ἢ τὸ ὑπέρκαλον μὴ μεμετρηθῆσαι· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, μὴ
μεμορφῶσθαι μηδὲ εἶδος εἶναι. ἀνειδέον ἄρα τὸ πρῶτως
καὶ πρῶτον καὶ ἢ καλλονὴ ἐκείνο ἢ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φύσις.
μαρτυρεῖ δὲ καὶ τὸ τῶν ἐραστῶν πάθος, ὡς, ἕως ἐστὶν ἐν
ἐκείνῳ τῷ τύπον¹ αἰσθητὸν ἔχοντι, οἷπιεν ἐρᾷ· ὅταν δ'
25 ἀπ' ἐκείνου αὐτὸς ἐν αὐτῷ οὐκ αἰσθητὸν γεννήσῃ τύπον
ἐν ἄμερεί ψυχῇ, τότε ἔρωσ φύεται. βλέπειν δὲ ζητεῖ τὸ
ἐρίμενον, ἔν' ἐκείνο ἐπάρδοι μαραινόμενον. εἰ δὲ

¹ Sleeman: τὸν wBxUC: τὸ Q.

although they are beautiful. When the intellect thinks one particular thing, it is diminished, as it is also even if it takes together all things that are in the intelligible realm; if it thinks an individual, it has one intelligible shape; if it thinks all together it has a kind of variegated shape, still in need [and trying to discover] how it should contemplate that which is above that which is all-beautiful and variegated and not variegated; that which the soul desires without saying why it longs for something like this, but our reasoning says that this is the real thing, since the nature of the best and the nature of the most lovable is in the altogether formless. Therefore, whatever you bring into form and show to the soul, it seeks something else over it which gave it shape. Our reasoning insists that what has shape, and shape, and form, all this, is measured and limited, that is, it is not all or self-sufficient or beautiful of itself, but this too is mixed. These beautiful things, then, must be measured and limited, but not the really beautiful or rather the super-beautiful; but if this is so, it must not be shaped or be a form. The primarily beautiful, then, and the first is without form, and beauty is that, the nature of the Good. The experience of lovers bears witness to this, that, as long as it is in that which has the impression perceived by the senses, the lover is not yet in love; but when from that he himself generates in himself an impression not perceptible by the senses in his partless soul, then love springs up. But he seeks to see the beloved that he may water him when he is withering.¹ But if he should

¹ An allusion to *Phaedrus* 251B1-4.

σύνεσιν λάβοι, ὡς δεῖ μεταβαίνειν ἐπὶ τὸ ἀμορφότερον,
 ἐκείνου ἂν ὀρέγοιτο· καὶ γὰρ ὁ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἔπαθεν, ἐκ
 30 σέλαος ἀμυδροῦ ἔρωσ φωτὸς μεγάλου. τὸ γὰρ ἴχνος τοῦ
 ἀμόρφου μορφῆ· τοῦτο γοῦν γεννᾷ τὴν μορφὴν, οὐχ ἡ
 μορφὴ τοῦτο, καὶ γεννᾷ, ὅταν ὕλη προὔλθῃ. ἡ δὲ ὕλη
 πορρωτάτω ἐξ ἀνάγκης, ὅτι μηδὲ τῶν ὑστάτων μορφῶν
 παρ' αὐτῆς τινα ἔχει. εἰ οὖν ἐράσμιον μὲν οὐχ ἡ ὕλη,
 35 ἀλλὰ τὸ εἰδοποιηθὲν διὰ τὸ εἶδος, τὸ δ' ἐπὶ τῇ ὕλῃ
 εἶδος παρὰ ψυχῆς, ψυχὴ δὲ μᾶλλον εἶδος καὶ μᾶλλον
 ἐράσμιον καὶ νοῦς μᾶλλον ταύτης εἶδος καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον
 ἐρασιμώτερον, ἀνείδεον δεῖ τὴν καλοῦ τίθεσθαι φύσιν
 τὴν πρώτην.

34. Καὶ οὐκέτι θαυμάσομεν τὸ τοὺς δεινοὺς πόθους
 παρέχον εἰ πάντῃ ἀπήλλακται καὶ μορφῆς νοητῆς· ἐπεὶ
 καὶ ψυχὴ, ὅταν αὐτοῦ ἔρωτα σύντονον λάβῃ, ἀποτίθεται
 πᾶσαν ἣν ἔχει μορφὴν, καὶ ἥτις ἂν καὶ νοητοῦ ἢ ἐν αὐτῇ.
 5 οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἔχοντά τι ἄλλο καὶ ἐνεργοῦντα περὶ αὐτὸ
 οὔτε ἰδεῖν οὔτε ἐναρμοσθῆναι. ἀλλὰ δεῖ μήτε κακὸν μήτ'
 αὐτὸ ἀγαθὸν μηδὲν ἄλλο πρόχειρον ἔχειν, ἵνα δέξῃται
 μόνῃ μόνον. ὅταν δὲ τούτου εὐτυχῆσῃ ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ ἦκῃ
 πρὸς αὐτὴν, μᾶλλον δὲ παρὸν φανῇ, ὅταν ἐκείνη ἐκνεύσῃ
 10 τῶν παρόντων καὶ παρασκευάσασα αὐτὴν ὡς ὅτι
 μάλιστα καλὴν καὶ εἰς ὁμοίωσιν ἐλλοῦσα (ἡ δὲ
 παρασκευὴ καὶ ἡ κόσμησις δῆλη πού τοις
 παρασκευαζομένοις), ἰδοῦσα δὲ ἐν αὐτῇ ἐξαίφνης
 φανέντα (μεταξὺ γὰρ οὐδὲν οὐδ' ἔτι δύο, ἀλλ' ἐν ἄμφω·

come to understand that one must change to that
 which is more formless, he would desire that; for his
 experience from the beginning was love of a great
 light from a dim glimmer. For the trace of the
 shapeless is shape; it is this which generates shape,
 not shape this, and it generates it when matter
 comes to it. But matter is necessarily furthest from
 it, because it does not have of itself any one even of
 the last and lowest shapes. If then what is lovable is
 not the matter, but what is formed by the form, and
 the form upon the matter comes from soul, and soul
 is more form and more lovable, and intellect is more
 form than soul and still more lovable, one must
 assume that the first nature of beauty is formless.

34. And we shall no longer be surprised if that
 which produces these strangely powerful longings is
 altogether free from even intelligible shape; since
 the soul also, when it gets an intense love of it, puts
 away all the shape which it has, even whatever
 shape of the intelligible there may be in it. For it is
 not possible for one who has anything else and is
 actively occupied about it to see or to be fitted in.
 But one must not have evil, or any other good either,
 ready to hand, that the soul alone may receive it
 alone. But when the soul has good fortune with it,
 and it comes to it, or rather, being there already,
 appears, when that soul turns away from the things
 that are there, and has prepared by making itself as
 beautiful as possible and has come to likeness (the
 preparation and the adornment are clearly under-
 stood, I think, by those who are preparing them-
 selves) and it sees it in itself suddenly appearing (for
 there is nothing between, nor are there still two but

οὐ γὰρ ἂν διακρίναις ἔτι, ἕως πάρεστι μίμησις δὲ
 15 τούτου καὶ οἱ ἐνταῦθα ἐρασταὶ καὶ ἐρώμενοι συγκρίναι
 θέλοντες), καὶ οὔτε σώματος ἔτι αἰσθάνεται, ὅτι ἐστὶν
 ἐν αὐτῷ, οὔτε ἑαυτὴν ἄλλο τι λέγει, οὐκ ἄνθρωπον, οὐ
 ζῶον, οὐκ ὄν, οὐδὲ πᾶν (ἀνώματος γὰρ ἢ τούτων πως
 θέα), καὶ οὐδὲ σχολὴν ἄγει πρὸς αὐτὰ οὔτε θέλει, ἀλλὰ
 20 καὶ αὐτὸ ζήτησασα ἐκείνῳ παρόντι ἀπαντᾶ κακείνο
 ἀντ' αὐτῆς βλέπει· τίς δὲ οὐσα βλέπει, οὐδὲ τούτο
 σχολάζει ὁρᾶν. ἐνθα δὴ οὐδὲν πάντων ἀντὶ τούτου
 ἀλλάξαιτο, οὐδ' εἴ τις αὐτῇ πάντα τὸν οὐρανὸν
 ἐπιτρέποι, ὡς οὐκ ὄντος ἄλλου ἔτι ἀμείνωνος οὐδὲ
 μᾶλλον ἀγαθοῦ· οὔτε γὰρ ἀνωτέρω τρέχει τά τε ἄλλα
 25 πάντα κατιούσης, κἂν ἢ ἄνω. ὥστε τότε ἔχει καὶ τὸ
 κρίνειν καλῶς καὶ γινώσκειν, ὅτι τοῦτό ἐστιν οὐ
 ἐφίετο, καὶ τίθεσθαι, ὅτι μηδὲν ἐστι κρείττον αὐτοῦ. οὐ
 γὰρ ἐστὶν ἀπάτη ἐκεῖ· ἢ ποῦ ἂν τοῦ ἀληθοῦς
 ἀληθέστερον τύχοι; ὁ οὖν λέγει, ἐκεῖνό ἐστι, καὶ ὕστερον
 30 λέγει, καὶ σιωπῶσα δὲ λέγει καὶ εὐπαθοῦσα οὐ
 ψεύδεται, ὅτι εὐπαθεῖ· οὐδὲ γαργαλιζομένου λέγει τοῦ
 σώματος, ἀλλὰ τούτο γενομένη, ὁ πάλαι, ὅτε εὐτύχει.
 ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα πάντα, οἷς πρὶν ἦδετο, ἀρχαῖς ἢ
 δυνάμεσιν ἢ πλοῦτοις ἢ κάλλεσιν ἢ ἐπιστήμασι, ταῦτα
 ὑπεριδοῦσα λέγει οὐκ ἂν εἰπούσα μὴ κρείττοσι

¹ "There is nothing between" is said of Intellect and Soul in IV. 4. 2. 27-28, and, more unexpectedly, of Intellect and the material universe at V. 8. 7. 13. ἐν ἄμφω is always used by Plotinus of a perfect union in which the two united

both are one¹; nor could you still make a distinction while it is present; lovers and their beloveds here below imitate this in their will to be united), it does not still perceive its body, that it is in it, and does not speak of itself as anything else, not man, or living thing, or being, or all (for the contemplation of these would be somehow disturbing), and it has no time for them nor wants them, but it has been seeking it, and meets that when it is present, and looks at that instead of itself; but it has not even time to see who the soul is that looks. There, truly, it would not exchange this for anything in the world, not even if someone handed over the whole universe to it, because there is nothing still better, and nothing that is more a good; for it does not run up higher, and all the other things are on its way down, even if they are in the realm above. So then it has the ability to judge rightly and to know that this is what it desired, and to establish that there is nothing better than it. For there is no deceit there; or where could it find any thing truer than the truth? What it speaks, then, is that, and it speaks it afterwards, and speaks it in silence, and in its happiness is not cheated in thinking that it is happy; and it does not say it is happy when the body tickles it, but when it has become that which it was before, when it is fortunate. But it says it in contempt of all the other things in which it delighted before, offices or powers or riches or beauties or sciences, and it would not have spoken if it had not met better things than

retain their distinct natures. See *Lexicon Plotinianum* s. v. ἄμφω (b). Its use in IV. 4. 2. 29. ἐν ἑστὶν ἄμφω καὶ δύο, of Soul and Intellect, brings out its meaning clearly.

35 σωντυχοῦσα τούτων οὐδὲ φοβείται, μή τι πάθῃ, μετ' ἐκείνου οὔσα οὐδ' ὅλως ἰδοῦσα· εἰ δὲ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα τὰ περὶ αὐτὴν φθείροιτο, εὖ μάλα καὶ βούλεται, ἵνα πρὸς τούτῳ ἢ μόνον· εἰς τόσον ἤκει εὐπαθείας.

35. Οὕτω δὲ διάκειται τότε, ὡς καὶ τοῦ νοεῖν καταφρονεῖν, ὃ τὸν ἄλλον χρόνον ἠσπάζετο, ὅτι τὸ νοεῖν κίνησις τις ἦν, αὕτη δὲ οὐ κινεῖσθαι θέλει. καὶ γὰρ οὐδ' ἐκείνῳ φησιν, ὃν ὄρᾳ, καίτοι νοῦς γενόμενος αὕτη
5 θεωρεῖ οἷον νοωθείσα καὶ ἐν τῷ τόπῳ τῷ νοητῷ γενομένη; ἀλλὰ γενομένη μὲν ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ περι αὐτὸν ἔχουσα τὸ νοητὸν νοεῖ, ἐπὴν δ' ἐκείνον ἴδῃ τὸν θεόν, πάντα ἤδη ἀφίησιν, οἷον εἴ τις εἰσελθὼν εἰς οἶκον ποικίλον καὶ οὕτω καλὸν θεωροῖ ἔνδον ἕκαστα τῶν ποικιλμάτων καὶ θαυμάζει, πρὶν ἰδεῖν τὸν τοῦ οἴκου
10 δεσπότην, ἰδὼν δ' ἐκείνον καὶ ἀγασθεὶς οὐ κατὰ τὴν τῶν ἀγαλμάτων φύσιν ὄντα, ἀλλ' ἄξιον τῆς ὄντως θέας, ἀφείς ἐκεῖνα τούτων μόνον τοῦ λοιποῦ βλέπει, εἴτα βλέπων καὶ μὴ ἀφαιρῶν τὸ ὄμμα μηκέτι ὄραμα βλέπει τῷ συνεχεῖ τῆς θέας, ἀλλὰ τὴν ὄψιν αὐτοῦ
15 συγκεράσαιτο τῷ θεάματι, ὥστε ἐν αὐτῷ ἤδη τὸ ὄρατὸν πρότερον ὄψιν γεγονέναι. τῶν δ' ἄλλων πάντων ἐπιλάθεται θεαμάτων. καὶ τάχα ἂν σφίσι τὸ ἀνάλογον ἢ εἰκῶν, εἰ μὴ ἄνθρωπος εἴη ὁ ἐπιστάς τῷ τὰ τοῦ οἴκου θεωμένῳ, ἀλλὰ τις θεός, καὶ οὗτος οὐ κατ' ὄψιν φανείς,

¹ The phrase "the intelligible place" here and in line 41 is taken from Plato's *Republic* (508C1 and 517B5).

these; it is not afraid, either, that anything may happen to it, since it does not even see it while it is with that; but if all the other things about it perished, it would even be pleased, that it might be alone with this: so great a degree of happiness has it reached.

35. And the soul is so disposed then as even to despise intelligence, which at other times it welcomed, because intelligence is a kind of movement, and the soul does not want to move. For it says that he whom it sees does not move either; yet when this soul has become intellect it contemplates, when it has been, so to speak, made intellect and has come to be in the intelligible place¹; but when it has come to be in it and moves about it, it possesses the intelligible and thinks, but when it sees that god it at once lets everything go; it is as if someone went into a house richly decorated and so beautiful, and within it contemplated each and every one of the decorations and admired them before seeing the master of the house, but when he sees that master with delight, who is not of the nature of the images [in the house], but worthy of genuine contemplation, he dismisses those other things and thereafter looks at him alone, and then, as he looks and does not take his eyes away, by the continuity of his contemplation he no longer sees a sight, but mingles his seeing with what he contemplates, so that what was seen before has now become sight in him, and he forgets all other objects of contemplation. And perhaps the likeness would keep in conformity with the reality if it was not a mortal who encountered the one who was seeing the sights of the house but one of the gods, and one who did not appear visibly but

20 ἀλλὰ τὴν ψυχὴν ἐμπλήσας τοῦ θεωμένου. καὶ τὸν νοῦν
 τοῖνον τὴν μὲν ἔχειν δύναμιν εἰς τὸ νοεῖν, ἣ τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ
 βλέπει, τὴν δέ, ἣ τὰ ἐπέκεινα αὐτοῦ ἐπιβολὴ τιμὴ καὶ
 πυρριδοχῆ, καθ' ἣν καὶ πρότερον ἐώρα μόνον καὶ ὄρων
 ὕστερον καὶ νοῦν ἔσχε καὶ ἐν ἔστι. καὶ ἔστιν ἐκείνη μὲν ἣ
 θέα νοῦ ἔμφρονος, αὕτη δὲ νοῦς ἐρών, ὅταν ἀφρων
 25 γένηται μεθυσθεὶς τοῦ νέκταρος· τότε ἐρών
 γίνεται ἀπλωθεὶς εἰς εὐπάθειαν τῷ κόρῳ· καὶ ἔστιν
 αὐτῷ μεθύειν βέλτιον ἢ σευνοτέρῳ εἶναι τοιαύτης
 μέθης. παρὰ μέρος δὲ ὁ νοῦς ἐκείνος ἄλλα, τὰ δὲ ἄλλοτε
 ἄλλα ὄρᾳ; ἢ οὐ· ὁ δὲ λόγος διδάσκων γινόμενα ποιεῖ, τὸ
 30 δὲ ἔχει τὸ νοεῖν ἡεῖ, ἔχει δὲ καὶ τὸ μὴ νοεῖν, ἀλλὰ ἄλλως
 ἐκείνον βλέπειν. καὶ γὰρ ὄρων ἐκείνον ἔσχε γεννήματα
 καὶ συνησθετο καὶ τούτων γενομένων καὶ ἐνόοντων· καὶ
 ταῦτα μὲν ὄρων λέγεται νοεῖν, ἐκείνο δὲ ἣ δυνάμει
 ἔμελλε νοεῖν. ἣ δὲ ψυχὴ οἶον συγχέασα καὶ ἀφανίσουσα
 35 μένοντα τὸν ἐν αὐτῇ νοῦν, μᾶλλον δὲ ὁ νοῦς αὐτῆς ὄρᾳ
 πρῶτος, ἔρχεται δὲ ἣ θέα καὶ εἰς αὐτὴν καὶ τὰ δύο ἐν
 γίνεται. ἐκταθὲν δὲ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐπ' αὐτοῖς καὶ
 συναρμοσθὲν τῇ ἀμφοτέρων συστάσει ἐπιδραμὸν καὶ
 ἐνώσαν τὰ δύο ἔπεστιν αὐτοῖς μακαρίαν διδοῦς αἴσθησιν

¹ Plotinus may be thinking here particularly of possession by Apollo or Dionysus.

² For this "pre-intellectual" vision of Intellect see III. 8. 9. 29-32; V. 4. 2. 4-7; V. 3. 11. 4 12; it is the first moment in Intellect's eternal generation, its properly "intellectual" vision being the second.

filled the soul of the beholder.¹ Intellect also, then, has one power for thinking, by which it looks at the things in itself, and one by which it looks at what transcends it by a direct awareness and reception, by which also before it saw only, and by seeing acquired intellect and is one.² And that first one is the contemplation of Intellect in its right mind, and the other is Intellect in love, when it goes out of its mind "drunk with the nectar"³; then it falls in love, simplified into happiness by having its fill; and it is better for it to be drunk with a drunkenness like this than to be more respectably sober. But does that Intellect see in part, at one time some things and at another others? No, but our rational discourse instructing us makes them come to be, but Intellect always has its thinking and always its not thinking, but looking at that god in another way. For when it saw him it had offspring and was intimately aware of their generation and existence within it; and when it sees these it is said to think, but it sees that by the power by which [later] it was going to think. But the soul sees by a kind of confusing and annulling the intellect which abides within it—but rather its intellect sees first and the vision comes also to it and the two become one. But the Good is spread out over them and fitted in to the union of both; playing upon them and uniting the two it rests upon them and

³ Again the drunkenness of Poros from Plato *Symposium* 203B5; see ch. 30, n. 4, p. 179. The application of it to Intellect's eternal self-transcendence in vision of and union with the One is strikingly powerful and paradoxical. Intellect must be eternally out of its mind with drink or love to be the Divine Mind.

καὶ θεῶν, τοσοῦτον ἄρας, ὥστε μήτε ἐν τόπῳ εἶναι,
 40 μήτε ἐν τῷ ἄλλῳ, ἐν οἷς πέφυκεν ἄλλο ἐν ἄλλῳ εἶναι·
 οὐδὲ γὰρ αὐτός που· ὁ δὲ νοητὸς τόπος ἐν αὐτῷ,
 αὐτὸς δὲ οὐκ ἐν ἄλλῳ. διὸ οὐδὲ κινεῖται ἡ ψυχὴ τότε, ὅτι
 μηδὲ ἐκεῖνο. οὐδὲ ψυχὴ τοίνυν, ὅτι μηδὲ ζῆ ἐκεῖνο, ἀλλὰ
 ὑπὲρ τὸ ζῆν. οὐδὲ νοῦς, ὅτι μηδὲ νοεῖ· ὁμοιοῦσθαι γὰρ
 45 δεῖ. νοεῖ δὲ οὐδ' ἐκεῖνο, ὅτι οὐδὲ νοεῖ.

36. Τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἄλλα δῆλα, εἴρηται δέ τι καὶ περὶ
 τούτου. ἀλλ' ὅμως καὶ νῦν ἐπ' ὀλίγον λεκτέον
 ἀρχομένους μὲν ἐκείθεν, διὰ λογισμῶν δὲ προϊούσων.
 ἔστι μὲν γὰρ ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ εἴτε γνώσις εἴτε ἐπαφή
 5 μέγιστον, καὶ μέγιστόν φησι τοῦτ εἶναι μάθημα,
 οὐ τὸ πρὸς αὐτὸ ἰδεῖν μάθημα λέγων, ἀλλὰ περὶ αὐτοῦ
 μαθεῖν τι πρότερον. διδάσκουσι μὲν οὖν ἀναλογίαι τε
 καὶ ἀφαιρέσεις καὶ γνώσεις τῶν ἐξ αὐτοῦ καὶ
 ἀναβασμοί τινες, πορεύουσι δὲ καθάρσεις πρὸς αὐτὸ καὶ
 ἀρεταὶ καὶ κοσμήσεις καὶ τοῦ νοητοῦ ἐπιβάσεις καὶ ἐπ'
 10 αὐτοῦ ἰδρύσεις καὶ τῶν ἐκεῖ ἐστιάσεις. ὅστις <δὲ
 γέγεννηται¹ ὁμοῦ θεατῆς τε καὶ θέαμα αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ καὶ
 τῶν ἄλλων καὶ γενόμενος οὐσία καὶ νοῦς καὶ ζῶον
 παντελὲς μηκέτι ἔξωθεν αὐτὸ βλέπει—τοῦτο δὲ
 γινόμενος ἐγγύς ἐστι, καὶ τὸ ἐφεξῆς ἐκεῖνο, καὶ πλησίον

¹ coniectimus.

gives them a blessed perception and vision, lifting them so high that they are not in place nor in anything other, among things where it is natural for one thing to be in another; for he is not anywhere either; but the intelligible place is in him, but he is not in another. Therefore the soul does not move then either, because that does not move. Nor, then, is it soul, because that does not live, but is above life. Nor is it intellect, because that does not think either; for one must be made like. It does not even think that it does not think.

36. The rest, then, is clear, and something has been said also about this. But all the same, even now we must speak of it for a little, starting from that [experience] but proceeding by rational discourse. The knowledge or touching of the Good is the greatest thing, and Plato says it is the "greatest study",¹ not calling the looking at it a "study", but learning about it beforehand. We are taught about it by comparisons and negations and knowledge of the things which come from it and certain methods of ascent by degrees, but we are put on the way to it by purifications and virtues and adornings and by gaining footholds in the intelligible and settling ourselves firmly there and feasting on its contents. But whoever has become at once contemplator of himself and all the rest and object of his contemplation, and, since he has become substance and intellect and "the complete living being",² no longer looks at it from outside—when he has become this he is near, and that Good is next above him, and already close

¹ Plato *Republic* 505A2 (of the Idea of the Good).

² Plato *Timaeus* 31B1.

15 αὐτὸ ἤδη ἐπὶ παντὶ τῷ νοητῷ ἐπιστίλβον. ἔνθα δὲ ἕσασται
 τις πᾶν μάθημα, καὶ μέχρι τοῦ παιδαγωγηθεὶς καὶ ἐν
 καλῷ ἰδρυθεὶς, ἐν ᾧ μὲν ἐστὶ, μέχρι τούτου νοεῖ,
 ἐξενεχθεὶς δὲ τῷ αὐτοῦ¹ τοῦ νοῦ οἶον κύματι καὶ ὑψοῦ
 ὑπ' αὐτοῦ οἶον οἰδήσαντος ἄρθοις εἰσείδεν ἐξαίφνης οὐκ
 20 ἰδὼν ὅπως, ἀλλ' ἢ θέα πλήσασα φωτὸς τὰ ὄμματα οὐ δι'
 αὐτοῦ πεποιήκεν ἄλλο ὄραν, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ τὸ φῶς τὸ ὄραμα
 ἦν. οὐ γὰρ ἦν ἐν ἐκείνῳ τὸ μὲν ὀρώμενον, τὸ δὲ φῶς
 αὐτοῦ, οὐδὲ νοῦς καὶ νοούμενον, ἀλλ' αὐγὴ γεννώσα
 ταῦτα εἰς ὕστερον καὶ ἀφείσα εἶναι παρ' αὐτῷ· αὐτὸς δὲ
 αὐγὴ μόνον γεννώσα νοῦν, οὔτι σβέσασα αὐτῆς ἐν τῷ
 25 γεννήσαι, ἀλλὰ μείναςα μὲν αὐτῇ, γενομένου δ' ἐκείνου
 τῷ ταῦτο εἶναι. εἰ γὰρ μὴ τοῦτο τοιοῦτον ἦν, οὐκ ἂν
 ὑπέστη ἐκείνο.

37. Οἱ μὲν οὖν νόησιν αὐτῷ δόντες τῷ λόγῳ τῶν μὲν
 ἐλαττόνων καὶ τῶν ἐξ αὐτοῦ οὐκ ἔδοσαν· καίτοι καὶ
 τοῦτο ἄτοπον τὰ ἄλλα, φασί τινες, μὴ εἰδέναι· ἀλλ' οὖν
 ἐκείνοι ἄλλο τιμιώτερον αὐτοῦ οὐχ εὐρόντες τὴν νόησιν
 5 αὐτῷ αὐτοῦ εἶναι ἔδοσαν, ὥσπερ τῇ νοήσει σεμνοτέρου
 αὐτοῦ ἐσομένου καὶ τοῦ νοεῖν κρείττονος ἢ κατ' αὐτὸν ὃ
 ἐστὶν ὄντος, ἀλλ' οὐκ αὐτοῦ σεμνύνοντος τὴν νόησιν. τίμιον
 γὰρ τὸ τίμιον ἔξει, τῇ νοήσει ἢ αὐτῷ; εἰ μὲν τῇ νοήσει,
 αὐτῷ οὐ τίμιον ἢ ἦττον, εἰ δὲ αὐτῷ, πρὸ τῆς νοήσεως
 10 ἐστὶ τέλειος καὶ οὐ τῇ νοήσει τελειούμενος. εἰ δ' ὅτι

¹ Harder: αὐτῷ wBUCQ: αὐτὸ J: αὐτῷ vel αὐτὸ R.

by, shining upon all the intelligible world. It is there that one lets all study go; up to a point one has been led along and settled firmly in beauty and as far as this one thinks that in which one is, but is carried out of it by the surge of the wave of Intellect itself and lifted on high by a kind of swell and sees suddenly, not seeing how, but the vision fills his eyes with light and does not make him see something else by it, but the light itself is what he sees. For there is not in that Good something seen and its light, nor intellect and object of intellect, but a ray which generates these afterwards and lets them be beside it; but he himself is the ray which only generates Intellect and does not extinguish itself in the generation, but it itself abides, and that Intellect comes to be because this Good exists. For if this was not of the kind it is, that would not have come into existence.

37. Those who in their reasoned account attribute thinking to the Good do not attribute to him thinking of the lesser things which derive from him¹; yet some people do say that this is absurd, that he should not know the other things; but, however that may be, those [Peripatetics], since they did not find anything of more worth than himself, attributed to him thought of himself, on the supposition that he would become more majestic by thinking and that thinking was better than what he is in himself, but that it was not he himself who conferred majesty on thinking. For by what does he have his worth, by thinking or by himself? If it is by thinking, he is in himself of no worth or lesser worth, but if by himself he is perfect before thinking and not perfected by

¹ See Aristotle *Metaphysics* A 1074b17-35.

ἐνέργειά ἐστιν, ἀλλ' οὐ δύναμις, δεῖ νοεῖν, εἰ μὲν οὐσία
 ἐστὶν αἰεὶ νοοῦσα καὶ τούτῳ ἐνέργειαν λέγουσι, δύο
 ὅμως λέγουσι, τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τὴν νόησιν, καὶ οὐχ
 ἀπλοῖν λέγουσιν, ἀλλὰ τι ἕτερον προστιθέασιν αὐτῷ,
 ὡς περ ὀφθαλμοῖς τὸ ὄραν κατ' ἐνέργειαν, καὶ αἰεὶ
 15 βλέπωσιν. εἰ δ' ἐνέργειά λέγουσιν, ὅτι ἐνέργειά ἐστὶ καὶ
 νόησις, οὐκ ἂν οὐσα νόησις νοεῖ, ὡς περ οὐδὲ κίνησις
 κινεῖτο ἂν. τί οἶν; οὐ καὶ αὐτοὶ λέγετε οὐσίαν καὶ
 ἐνέργειαν εἶναι ἐκεῖνα; ἀλλὰ πολλὰ ταῦτα ὁμολογοῦμεν
 εἶναι καὶ ταῦτα ἕτερα, τὸ δὲ πρῶτον ἀπλοῦν, καὶ τὸ ἐξ
 20 ἄλλου δίδομεν νοεῖν καὶ οἶον ζητεῖν αὐτοῦ τὴν οὐσίαν
 καὶ αὐτὸ καὶ τὸ ποιῆσαν αὐτό, καὶ ἐπιστραφέν ἐν τῇ θέᾳ
 καὶ γνωρίσαν νοῦν ἡδὴ δικαίως εἶναι. τὸ δὲ μήτε
 γεγόμενον μήτ' ἔχον πρὸ αὐτοῦ, ἀλλ' αἰεὶ <ὄν>¹ ὅ ἐστι—
 τίς αἰτία τοῦ νοεῖν ἔξει; ² διὸ ὑπὲρ νοῦν φησιν ὁ
 25 Πλάτων εἶναι ὀρθῶς. νοῦς μὲν γὰρ μὴ νοῶν ἀνόητος· ᾧ
 γὰρ ἡ φύσις ἔχει τὸ νοεῖν, εἰ μὴ τοῦτο πράττει, ἀνόητος·
 ᾧ δὲ μηδὲν ἔργον ἐστὶ, τί ἂν τούτῳ τις ἔργον προσάγων
 κατὰ στέρησιν αὐτοῦ κατηγοροῖ τοῦτο, ὅτι μὴ πράττει;
 οἶον εἰ ἀνίατρον αὐτόν τις λέγοι. μηδὲν δὲ ἔργον εἶναι
 αὐτῷ, ὅτι μηδὲν ἐπιβάλλει αὐτῷ ποιεῖν· ἄρκει γὰρ

¹ Kirchhoff.

² Igal: ἔξε. Enn.

thinking. But if he has to think because he is active actuality, but not potency, if he is a substance always thinking and it is because of this that they say he is active actuality, they are all the same speaking of two things, substance and thinking, and are not saying that he is simple, but adding something else to him, as actually seeing is an addition to the eyes, even if they are always looking. But if they say that he is actual because he is active actuality, that is, thought, if he was thought he would not think, just as movement is not in motion. "Well then, do you not yourselves say that those higher things are substance and active actuality?" Yes, but we agree that these are many, and being many are different, but the first is single and simple, and we attribute thinking to what comes from another, and a kind of seeking its substance and its self and what made it, and say that in turning back in its contemplation and recognising itself it is at that point rightly and properly Intellect¹; but that what has not come to be and has nothing before it, but is always what it is—what reason will it have to think? This is why Plato rightly says that it is above Intellect. Now Intellect, if it did not think, would be unintelligent; for if that whose nature includes thought did not think, it would be unintelligent; but when something has no work to do, why should one put a work to it and then predicate the absence of this work of it because it does not do it? It would be as if one were to call him unmedical. But he has no work to do because there is no obligation on him to do anything; for he is sufficient and does not have to

¹ See ch. 35, n. 1, p. 194.

30 αὐτὸς καὶ οὐδὲν δεῖ ζητεῖν παρ' αὐτὸν ὑπὲρ τὰ πάντα
ὄντα· ἀρκεῖ γὰρ αὐτῷ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὧν αὐτὸς ὁ ἔστιν.

38. Ἔστι δὲ οὐδὲ τὸ "ἔστιν"· οὐδὲν γὰρ οὐδὲ τούτου
δείχεται· ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ τὸ "ἀγαθὸς ἔστι" κατὰ τούτου, ἀλλὰ
καθ' οὗ τὸ "ἔστι"· τὸ δὲ "ἔστιν" οὐχ ὡς κατ' ἄλλου
ἄλλο, ἀλλ' ὡς σημαῖνον ὁ ἔστι. λέγομεν δὲ τὰγαθὸν περὶ
5 αὐτοῦ λέγοντες οὐκ αὐτὸ οὐδὲ κατηγοροῦντες, ὅτι αὐτῷ
ὑπάρχει, ἀλλ' ὅτι αὐτό· εἴτα οὐδ' "ἔστιν ἀγαθόν" λέγειν
ἀξιοῦντες οὐδὲ τὸ "τὸ" προτιθέναι αὐτοῦ, δηλοῦν δὲ οὐ
δυνάμενοι, εἴ τις αὐτὸ παντάπασιν ἀφέλοι, ἵνα μὴ ἄλλο,
τὸ δὲ ἄλλο ποιῶμεν, ὡς μὴ δεῖσθαι τοῦ "ἔστιν" ἔτι,
10 οὕτω λέγομεν "τὰγαθόν". ἀλλὰ τίς παραδέξεται φύσιν
οὐκ οἶσαν <ἐν>¹ αἰσθήσει καὶ γνώσει αὐτῆς; τί οὖν
γνώσεται; "ἐγὼ εἰμι"; ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔστι. διὰ τί οὖν οὐκ ἔρει
τὸ "ἀγαθόν εἰμι"; ἢ πάλιν τὸ "ἔστι" κατηγορήσει
αὐτοῦ. ἀλλὰ τὸ "ἀγαθόν" μόνον ἔρει τι προσθεῖς·
"ἀγαθόν" μὲν γὰρ νοήσειεν ἂν τις ἄνευ τοῦ "ἔστιν", εἰ
15 μὴ κατ' ἄλλου κατηγοροῖ· ὁ δὲ αὐτὸν² νοῶν ὅτι ἀγαθόν
πάντως νοήσει τὸ "ἐγὼ εἰμι τὸ ἀγαθόν": εἰ δὲ μὴ,
ἀγαθόν μὲν νοήσει, οὐ παρέσται δὲ αὐτῷ τὸ ὅτι αὐτός
ἔστι τούτου νοεῖν. δεῖ οὖν τὴν νόησιν εἶναι, ὅτι "ἀγαθόν
εἰμι". καὶ εἰ μὲν νόησις αὐτῆ τὸ ἀγαθόν, οὐκ αὐτοῦ
20 ἔσται νόησις, ἀλλ' ἀγαθοῦ, αὐτός τε οὐκ ἔσται τὸ
ἀγαθόν, ἀλλ' ἡ νόησις. εἰ δὲ ἑτέρα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἡ νόησις
τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ἔστιν ἤδη τὸ ἀγαθόν πρὸ τῆς νοήσεως

¹ A³⁸ (= Ficinus).

² Kirchhoff: αὐτὸ Enn.

seek anything but himself who is above all things;
for he suffices for himself and all else by being what
he is.

38. But he is not even the "is"; for he has no need
whatever even of this; for "he is good" is not applic-
able to him either, but to that to which the "is"
applies; but the "is" [when said of him,] is not said
as one thing of another, but as indicating what he is.
But we say "the Good" about him, not speaking of
him himself nor predicating of him that good belongs
to him, but saying it is himself; so then, since we do
not think it proper to say "is good" nor to put the
article before it, but are unable to make ourselves
clear, if one takes it away altogether, we say "the
good" so as not to still need the "is", that we may not
make one thing and then another. But who is going
to accept a nature which is not in a state of percep-
tion and knowledge of itself? What then will he
know? "I am"? But he is not. Why then will he not
say "I am the Good"? Again he will predicate the
"is" of himself. But [perhaps] he will only say
"good", with some addition; for one could think
"good" without "is", if one did not predicate it of
something else. But he who thinks that he is good
will in every case think "I am the Good"; if not, he
will think good but the thought will not be present
to his mind that he is this good. The thought, then,
must be "I am good".¹ And if the thought itself is the
Good, it will not be a thought of himself but of good,
and he himself will not be the Good, but the thought
will. But if the thought of the Good is different from
the Good, the Good is there already before the

¹ Cp. the closely parallel discussion in V. 3. 10.

αὐτοῦ. εἰ δ' ἔστι πρὸ τῆς νοήσεως τὸ ἀγαθὸν αὐταρκες,
αὐταρκες ὃν αὐτῷ εἰς ἀγαθὸν οὐδὲν ἂν δέοιτο τῆς
25 νοήσεως τῆς περὶ αὐτοῦ ὥστε ἢ ἀγαθὸν οὐ νοεῖ ἑαυτό.

39. Ἀλλὰ ἢ τί; ἢ οὐδὲν ἄλλο πάρεστιν αὐτῷ, ἀλλ'
ἀπλή τις ἐπιβολὴ αὐτῷ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἔσται. ἀλλὰ οὐκ
ὄντος οἶον διαστήματός τινος οὐδὲ διαφορᾶς πρὸς αὐτὸ
τὸ ἐπιβάλλειν ἑαυτῷ τί ἂν εἴη ἢ αὐτό; διὸ καὶ ὀρθῶς
5 ἑτερότητα λαμβάνει, ὅπου νοῦς καὶ οὐσία. δεῖ γὰρ τὸν
νοῦν αἰεὶ ἑτερότητα καὶ ταυτότητα λαμβάνειν, εἴπερ
νοήσει. ἑαυτὸν τε γὰρ οὐ διακρινεῖ ἀπὸ τοῦ νοητοῦ τῆ
πρὸς αὐτὸ ἑτέρου σχέσει τὰ τε πάντα οὐ θεωρήσει,
μηδεμιᾶς ἑτερότητος γενομένης εἰς τὸ πάντα εἶναι. οὐδὲ
10 γὰρ ἂν οὐδὲ δύο. ἔπειτα, εἰ νοήσει, οὐ δήπου ἑαυτὸν
μόνον νοήσει, εἴπερ ὅλως νοήσει διὰ τί γὰρ οὐχ
ἅπαντα; ἢ ἀδυνατήσει; ὅλως δὲ οὐχ ἀπλοῦς γίνεται
νοῶν ἑαυτόν, ἀλλὰ δεῖ τὴν νόησιν τὴν περὶ αὐτοῦ ἑτέρου
εἶναι, εἴ τι ὅλως δύναίτο νοεῖν αὐτό. ἐλέγομεν δέ, ὅτι οὐ
νόησις τούτου,¹ οὐδ' εἰ ἄλλον αὐτὸν ἐθέλοι ἰδεῖν. νοήσας
15 δὲ αὐτὸς πολὺς γίνεται, νοητός, νοῶν, κινούμενος καὶ
ὅσα ἄλλα προσήκει νῶ. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις κάκεινο ὄρᾶν
προσῆκει, ὅπερ εἴρηται ἤδη ἐν ἄλλοις, ὡς ἐκάστη

¹ Igal: τούτο Enn.

thought of it. But if the Good is sufficient to itself before the thought, since it is sufficient to itself for good it will have no need of the thought about it; so, as good, it does not think itself.

39. But as what, then? Now nothing else is present to it, but it will have a simple concentration of attention on itself. But since there is no distance or difference in regard to itself, what could its attention be other than itself? Therefore Plato rightly understands that there is otherness and sameness where there is intellect and substance.¹ For one must always understand intellect as otherness and sameness if it is going to think. For [otherwise] it will not distinguish itself from the intelligible by its relation of otherness to itself, and will not contemplate all things if no otherness has occurred to make all things exist: for [without otherness] there would not even be two. Then, if it is going to think, it will not presumably think itself alone, if it is going to think at all; for why will it not think all things? Will it not be able to? But in general intellect is not simple when it thinks itself, but its thought about itself must be thought of another if it is to be able to think itself as anything at all. But we said that there is no thinking of this Good, not even if he wanted to see himself as another. But if he himself thinks he becomes many, intelligible, intelligent, in motion and everything else appropriate to Intellect. But besides this it is appropriate to observe that point which has been discussed elsewhere,² that each

¹ Plotinus' usual application of the "very important kinds" of Plato *Sophist* 254-5 to Intellect.

² Cp. e.g. VI. 9. 2.

νόησις, εἴπερ νόησις ἔσται, ποικίλον τι δεῖ εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ἀπλοῦν καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ πᾶν οὖν κίνημα, εἰ τοιοῦτον εἴη
 20 οἶον ἐπαφή, οὐδὲν νοερὸν ἔχει. τί οὖν; οὔτε τὰ ἄλλα οὔτε αὐτὸν εἰδήσει; [ἀλλὰ σεμνὸν ἐστήξεται]¹ τὰ μὲν οὖν ἄλλα ὕστερα αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἦν πρὸ αὐτῶν ὃ ἦν, καὶ ἐπίκτητος αὐτῶν ἢ νόησις καὶ οὐχ ἢ αὐτῆ ἀεὶ καὶ οὐχ ἐστηκότων· κἂν τὰ ἐστῶτα δὲ νοῆ, πολὺς ἐστιν. οὐ γὰρ
 25 δὴ τὰ μὲν ὕστερα μετὰ τῆς νοήσεως καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ἔξει, αἱ δὲ τοῦτου νοήσεις θεωρίαι κεναὶ μόνον ἔσονται. ἢ δὲ πρόνοια ἀρκεῖ ἐν τῷ αὐτῶν εἶναι, παρ' οὗ τὰ πάντα. τὸ δὲ πρὸς αὐτὸν πῶς, εἰ μὴ αὐτόν; ἀλλὰ σεμνὸν ἐστήξεται.
 30 ἔλεγε μὲν οὖν ὁ Πλάτων περὶ τῆς οὐσίας λέγων, ὅτι νοήσει, ἀλλ' οὐ σεμνὸν ἐστήξοιτο ὡς τῆς οὐσίας μὲν νοούσης, τοῦ δὲ μὴ νοούντος σεμοῦ ἐστηξομένου, τὸ μὲν "ἐστήξοιτο" τῷ μὴ ἄλλως ἂν δεδυνῆσθαι ἐρμηνεύσαι, σεμνότερον δὲ καὶ ὄντως σεμνὸν νομίζων εἶναι τὸ ὑπερβεβηκὸς τὸ νοεῖν.

40. Καὶ ὅτι μὲν δεῖ νόησιν περὶ αὐτὸν εἶναι, εἰδείεν ἂν οἱ προσαψάμενοι τοῦ τοιοῦτου· δεῖ γὰρ μὴ παραμύθια ἅττα πρὸς τοῖς εἰρημένοις κοιμίζειν, εἴ πῃ οἶόν τε τῷ λόγῳ σημῆναι. δεῖ δὲ τὴν πειθῶ μεμιγμένην
 5 ἔχειν τὴν ἀνάγκην. δεῖ τοίνυν γινώσκειν ἐπιστήριοντα, ὡς νόησις πᾶσα ἔκ τινός ἐστι καὶ τινός. καὶ ἢ μὲν
¹ delevimus, ut e lin. 28-9 iteratum.

¹ Plotinus is here interpreting Plato *Sophist* 208

thought, if it is going to be a thought, must be something multiply various, but that kind of movement, simple and all the same, if it is to be something like a touch, has nothing intelligent about it. Well then, will he not know the other things or himself? The other things come after him, and he was what he was before them, and the thought of them would be acquired from outside himself, and not always the same, and of things that do not stand still; and even if he thinks the things that stand still, he is many. For it is certainly not true that the things which come after will possess the substance with their thought, but the thoughts of this Good will be only visions empty [of real content]. But it is enough for providence that he exists from whom all things come. But what is his relation to himself, if he does not think himself? But he will stand still in majesty. Plato did say, speaking of substance, that it will think, but would not stand still in majesty, meaning that substance thinks, but that which does not think will stand still in majesty; he used "will stand still" because he could not explain what he meant in any other way, and he considered more majestic and truly majestic that which transcends thought.¹

40. And those who have had a contact of this kind would know that thinking cannot pertain to him; but we do need to add some words of encouragement to what has been said, if discourse can indicate it in any way at all. But necessity must have persuasion mixed with it. One must, then, know and understand that all thinking comes from something and is of

248D6-249A2; he seems conscious that his interpretation will seem rather odd.

ουνοῖσα τῷ ἐξ οὗ ἐστιν ὑποκείμενον μὲν ἔχει τὸ οὐ ἐστι νόησις, οἷον δὲ ἐπικείμενον αὐτῇ γίνεται ἐνέργειαι αὐτοῦ οὐσα καὶ πληροῦσα τὸ δυνάμει ἐκείνο οὐδὲν αὐτῇ
 10 γεννώσα· ἐκείνου γὰρ ἐστιν, οὐ ἐστι, μόνον, οἷον τελείωσις. ἡ δὲ οὐσα νόησις μετ' οὐσίας καὶ ὑποστήσασα τὴν οὐσίαν οὐκ ἂν δύναιτο ἐν ἐκείνῳ εἶναι, ἀφ' οὗ ἐγένετο· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐγέννησέ τι ἐν ἐκείνῳ οὐσα. ἀλλ' οὐσα δύναμις τοῦ γεννᾶν ἐφ' ἑαυτῆς ἐγέννα, καὶ ἡ
 15 ἐνέργεια αὐτῆς ἐστιν οὐσία, καὶ σύνεστι καὶ ἐν τῇ οὐσίᾳ, καὶ ἔστιν οὐχ ἕτερον ἢ νόησις καὶ ἡ οὐσία αὕτη καὶ αὐτῇ¹ ἑαυτὴν νοεῖ ἢ φύσις, οὐχ ἕτερον, ἀλλ' ἡ λόγῳ, τὸ νοούμενον καὶ τὸ νοοῦν, πλῆθος ὄν, ὡς δέδεικται πολλαχῆ. καὶ ἔστιν αὕτη πρώτη ἐνέργεια ὑπόστασιν
 20 γενήσασα εἰς οὐσίαν, καὶ ἰνδαλμα ὄν ἄλλου οὕτως ἐστὶ μεγάλου τινός, ὥστε ἐγένετο οὐσία. εἰ δ' ἦν ἐκείνου καὶ μὴ ἀπ' ἐκείνου, οὐδ' ἂν ἄλλο τι ἢ ἐκείνου ἦν, καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἐφ' ἑαυτῆς ὑπόστασις ἦν. πρώτη δὲ οὐσα αὕτη ἐνέργεια καὶ πρώτη νόησις οὐκ ἂν ἔχοι οὔτε ἐνέργειαν πρὸ αὐτῆς
 25 οὔτε νόησιν. μεταβαίνων τούτων τις ἀπὸ ταύτης τῆς οὐσίας καὶ νοήσεως οὕτως ἐπὶ οὐσίαν ἤξει οὐτ' ἐπὶ νόησιν, ἀλλ' ἐπέκεινα ἤξει οὐσίας καὶ νοήσεως ἐπὶ τι θαυμαστόν, ὃ μῆτε ἔχει ἐν αὐτῷ οὐσίαν μῆτε νόησιν, ἀλλ' ἔστιν ἔρημον αὐτὸ ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ τῶν ἐξ αὐτοῦ

¹ οὐ ἢ Theiler: αὐτῇ Enn.

something. And one kind of thinking, which keeps close to that from which it comes, has as its ground that of which it is the thought and itself becomes a kind of superstructure, being its ground's actuality and fulfilling that ground's potentiality without generating anything itself; for it is only a kind of completion of that of which it is. But the thinking which accompanies substance and has brought substance into existence could not be in that from which it came to be; for it would not have generated anything if it was in that. But since it was a power of generation by itself, it generated, and its active actuality is substance, and also in substance it is there with it, and the thought and this substance are not different things, and, again, in that the nature thinks itself, they are not different except in definition, what is thought and what thinks, that is, a plurality, as has often been demonstrated. And this is the first active actuality, which has generated an existent which came to be substance, and, being the image of another, is the image of one so great that substance came to be. But if it was intrinsic to that and did not derive from it, it would be nothing else but intrinsic to that and would not be an existent on its own. Certainly, as this is the first active actuality and the first thought, it would have neither actuality or thought before it. So then when one goes on from this substance and thought one will not arrive at substance or thought, but will come, beyond substance¹ and thought, to something wonderful, which does not have in it substance or thought, but is alone by itself, with no need of the things which come from

¹ Plato *Republic* VI 509B9.

30 οὐδὲν δεόμενον. οὐ γὰρ ἐνεργήσας πρότερον ἐγέννησεν
ἐνέργειαν· ἦδη γὰρ ἂν ἦν, πρὶν γενέσθαι· οὐδὲ νόησας
ἐγέννησε νόησιν· ἦδη γὰρ ἂν νανοήκει, πρὶν γενέσθαι
νόησιν. ὅλως γὰρ ἡ νόησις, εἰ μὲν ἀγαθοῦ, χεῖρον αὐτοῦ·
ὥστε οὐ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἂν εἶη· λέγω δὲ οὐ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, οὐχ
35 ὅτι μὴ ἔστι νοῆσαι τὸ ἀγαθόν—τοῦτο γὰρ ἔστω—ἀλλ'
ὅτι ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ ἀγαθῷ οὐκ ἂν εἶη νόησις· ἡ ἐν ἔσται
ὁμοῦ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ ἔλαττον αὐτοῦ, ἡ νόησις αὐτοῦ.
εἰ δὲ χεῖρον ἔσται, ὁμοῦ ἡ νόησις ἔσται καὶ ἡ οὐσία. εἰ δὲ
κρείττον ἡ νόησις, τὸ νοητὸν χεῖρον ἔσται. οὐ δὴ¹ ἐν τῷ
ἀγαθῷ ἡ νόησις, ἀλλὰ χεῖρον οὐσα καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὸ
40 ἀγαθὸν ἀξιωθεῖσα ἐτέρωθι ἂν εἶη αὐτοῦ, καθαρὸν ἐκεῖνο
ὥσπερ τῶν ἄλλων καὶ αὐτῆς ἀφεῖσα. καθαρὸν δὲ ὄν
νοήσεως εἰλικρινῶς ἔστιν ὃ ἔστιν, οὐ παραποδιζόμενον
τῇ νοήσει παρούση, ὡς μὴ εἰλικρινὲς καὶ ἐν εἶναι. εἰ δὲ
τις καὶ τοῦτο ἅμα νοοῦν καὶ νοούμενον ποιεῖ καὶ οὐσίαν
45 καὶ νόησιν συνούσαν τῇ οὐσίᾳ καὶ οὕτως αὐτὸ νοοῦν
θέλει ποιεῖν, ἄλλου δεήσεται καὶ τούτου πρὸ αὐτοῦ,
ἐπεὶπερ ἡ ἐνέργεια καὶ ἡ νόησις ἡ ἄλλου ὑποκειμένου
τελείωσις ἡ συνυπόστασις οὐσα πρὸ αὐτῆς καὶ αὐτῇ
ἄλλην ἔχει φύσιν, ἢ καὶ τὸ νοεῖν εἰκότως. καὶ γὰρ ἔχει ὃ
50 νοῆσει, ὅτι ἄλλο πρὸ αὐτῆς· καὶ ὅταν αὐτῇ αὐτὴν, οἶον
καταμανθάνει ἃ ἔσχεν ἐκ τῆς ἄλλου θέας ἐν αὐτῇ. ᾧ δὲ
μήτε τι ἄλλο πρὸ αὐτοῦ μήτε τι σύνεστιν αὐτῷ ἔξ

¹ Kirchhoff: οὐδὲ Enn.

it. For it did not act before it generated activity; for then activity would have been there before it came to be; nor did it think before it generated thought; for then it would have thought before thought came to be. For in general thought, if it is of the Good, is worse than it; so that it would not be thought of the Good; but I mean "not of the Good" not in the sense that it is impossible to think the Good—this may well be so—but that there would be no thought in the Good itself; otherwise the Good and what is less than it, the thought of it, would be a unity together. But if [thought] is going to be worse [than the Good], thought and substance will be together. But if thought is better, the object of thought will be worse. Certainly then thought is not in the Good but, being worse and given its value by this Good, would be somewhere else than it, leaving that Good clear of thought itself as well as everything else. But being clear of thought it is purely what it is, not hindered by the presence of thought from being pure and one. But if someone makes this also at once thinker and thought and substance and thought in company with substance, and in this way wants to make it self-thinking, he will need another, and this other prior to itself, since active actuality and thought is either the bringing to completion of something else underlying it or a co-existent and so has itself also another nature prior to it by which thinking comes naturally. For it has something to think about because there is something else before it; and when it thinks itself it is in a way comprehending what it had from the vision of another in itself. But that which has nothing else before it nor anything accompanying it from something else—

ἄλλου, τί καὶ νοήσει ἢ πῶς ἐαυτόν; τί γὰρ ἐζήτει ἢ τί
ἐπόθει; ἢ τὴν δύναμιν αὐτοῦ ὄση, ὡς ἐκτὸς οὔσης αὐτοῦ,
55 καθὸ ἐνόει; λέγω δέ, εἰ ἄλλη μὲν ἢ δύναμις αὐτοῦ, ἢν
ἐμάνθανεν, ἄλλη δέ, ἢ ἐμάνθανεν· εἰ δὲ μία, τί ζητεῖ;

41. Κινδυνεύει γὰρ βοήθεια τὸ νοεῖν δεδόσθαι ταῖς
φύσεσι ταῖς θειοτέραις μὲν, ἐλάττωσι δὲ οὔσαις, καὶ οἶον
αὐταῖς τυφλαῖς οὔσαις ὄμμα. ὁ δ' ὀφθαλμὸς τί ἂν δέοιτο
τὸ ὄν ὁρᾶν φῶς αὐτὸς ὦν; ὁ δ' ἂν δέχεται, δι' ὀφθαλμοῦ
5 σκότον ἔχων παρ' αὐτῷ φῶς ζητεῖ. εἰ οὖν φῶς τὸ νοεῖν,
τὸ δὲ φῶς φῶς οὐ ζητεῖ, οὐκ ἂν ἐκείνη ἢ αὐγὴ¹ φῶς μὴ
ζητούσα ζητήσκει νοεῖν, οὐδὲ προσθήσει αὐτῇ τὸ νοεῖν·
τί γὰρ καὶ ποιήσει; ἢ τί προσθήσει δεόμενος καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ
νοῦς, ἵνα νοῆ; οὐκ αἰσθάνεται οὖν ἑαυτοῦ—οὐ γὰρ
10 δεῖται—οἷδ' ἔστι δῖο, μᾶλλον δὲ <οὐδὲ>² πλείω, αὐτός,
ἢ νόησις—οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἢ νόησις αὐτός—δεῖ δὲ τρίτον καὶ
τὸ νοούμενον εἶναι. εἰ δὲ ταῦτόν νοῦς, νόησις, νοητόν,
πάντη ἐν γενόμενα ἀφανίζει αὐτὰ ἐν αὐτοῖς· διακριθέντα
δὲ τῷ "ἄλλο" πάλιν αὐτὸ οὐκ ἐκείνο ἔσται. ἐατέον οὖν τὰ
15 ἄλλα πάντα ἐπὶ φύσεως ἀρίστης οὐδεμιᾶς ἐπικουρίας
δεομένης· ὁ γὰρ ἂν προσβῆς, ἡλάττωσας τῇ προσθήκῃ
τὴν οὐδενὸς δεομένην. ἡμῖν μὲν γὰρ ἢ νόησις καλόν, ὅτι
ψυχῇ δεῖται νοῦν ἔχειν, καὶ νῶ, ὅτι τὸ εἶναι αὐτῶ

¹ Kirchhoff: αὐτῇ Enn.

² coniecimus.

whatever will it think and how will it think itself? For what did it seek and what did it long for? Was it to know how great its power was, as if it was outside it in so far as it thought it? What I mean by this is, if the power which it learnt about was one thing and the power by which it learnt another; but if they were one, what was it seeking?

41. For it seems likely that thinking has been given as a help to the natures which are of the more divine kind, but lesser, and as something like an eye for their blindness. But why should the eye which is itself light¹ need to see real being? But what does need to seek light through the eye because it has darkness in itself. If then thinking is light, and light does not seek light, that ray which does not seek light would not seek to think, and will not add thinking to itself; for what will it do with it? Or what will even Intellect itself add in its need in order to think? So he has no perception of himself—he does not need it—and he is not two, or rather not several, himself, his thinking—for his thinking is certainly not himself—and what is being thought must be the third. But if intellect, thinking, and object of thought are the same, if they become altogether one they will make themselves disappear in themselves; but if they are distinguished by being other they will, again, not be that Good. With the best nature, then, which needs no assistance, we must leave aside everything; for whatever you add, you have lessened by the addition the nature which needs nothing. For thinking is a fine thing for us, because the soul needs to possess intellect, and for Intellect, because its

¹ Cp. IV. 5. 4 and 7; V. 5. 7.

ταυτόν, καὶ ἡ νόησις πεποιήκεν αὐτόν· συνεῖναι οὖν δεῖ
 20 τῇ νοήσει τοῦτον καὶ σύνεσιν αὐτοῦ λαμβάνειν αἰεὶ, ὅτι
 τοῦτο τοῦτο, ὅτι τὰ δύο ἓν· εἰ δ' ἓν ἦν μόνον, ἤρκεσεν ἂν
 αὐτῷ καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἐδεήθη λαβεῖν. ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ "γνώθι
 σαυτὸν" λέγεται τούτοις, οἱ διὰ τὸ πλήθος ἑαυτῶν
 ἔργον ἔχουσι διαριθμεῖν ἑαυτοὺς καὶ μαθεῖν, ὅσα καὶ
 25 ποῖα ὄντες οὐ πάντα ἴσασι ἢ οὐδέν, οὐδ' ὅτι ἄρχει οὐδὲ
 κατὰ τί αὐτοί. εἰ δέ τί ἐστιν αὐτό, μειζόνως ἐστὶν ἡ
 κατὰ γνώσει καὶ νόησει καὶ συναίσθησει αὐτοῦ· ἐπεὶ
 οὐδὲ ἑαυτῷ οὐδέν ἐστιν· οὐδὲν γὰρ εἰσάγει εἰς αὐτόν,
 ἀλλὰ ἄρκει αὐτό. οὐ τοίνυν οὐδ' ἀγαθὸν αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ τοῖς
 30 ἄλλοις· ταῦτα γὰρ καὶ δεῖται αὐτοῦ, αὐτὸ δὲ οὐκ ἂν
 δέοιτο ἑαυτοῦ· γελοῖον γάρ· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν καὶ ἐνδεὲς ἦν
 αὐτοῦ. οὐδὲ βλέπει δὴ ἑαυτό· δεῖ γὰρ τι εἶναι καὶ
 γίνεσθαι αὐτῷ ἐκ τοῦ βλέπειν. τούτων γὰρ ὑπάντων
 παρακεχώρηκε τοῖς μετ' αὐτό, καὶ κινδυνεύει μηδὲν
 τῶν προσόντων τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐκείνῳ παρεῖναι, ὥσπερ
 35 οὐδὲ οὐσία· οὐ τοίνυν οὐδὲ τὸ νοεῖν, εἴπερ ἐνταῦθα ἡ
 οὐσία καὶ ὁμοῦ ἄμφω ἡ νόησις ἡ πρώτη καὶ κυρίως καὶ
 τὸ εἶναι. διὸ οὕτε λόγος οὕτε αἴσθησις
 οὕτε ἐπισημῆ, ὅτι μηδὲν ἔστι κατηγορεῖν αὐτοῦ
 ὡς παρόν.

42. Ἄλλ' ὅταν ἀπορηῆς ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ καὶ ζητῆς,

¹ A reference to Parmenides fr. B 8 DK.

being is the same as thinking,¹ and thinking made it; therefore this Intellect needs to keep company with thinking and to be always getting an intimate understanding of itself, that this is this, because the two are one; but if it was only one, it would have sufficed to itself and would not have needed to get understanding. Since also "Know yourself" is said to those who because of their selves' multiplicity have the business of counting themselves up and learning that they do not know all of the number and kind of things they are, or do not know any one of them, not what their ruling principle is or by what they are themselves. But if the Good is anything, it is so in a greater way than by knowledge and thought and self-perception; since it is not anything for itself; for it does not bring anything into itself, but itself suffices. It is not, then, even good for itself, but for the others; for they need it, but it could not need itself; that would be ridiculous; for if it did it would be in need of itself. Nor, certainly, does it look at itself; for it must have and get something from the looking. For it has left all these things to the beings which come after it, and, so it seems, none of the additions to the others are with it, just as even substance is not; so not thinking either, since that is where substance is and the primary and authentic thinking and being are both together. Therefore "There is neither discourse nor perception nor knowledge"² because it is impossible to predicate anything of it as present with it.

42. But when in this kind of enquiry you adopt a rational approach to these things and get into dif-

² Plato *Parmenides* 142A3-4.

ὅπου δεῖ ταῦτα θέσθαι, λογισμῶ ἐπ' αὐτὰ στελλόμενος, ἀπόθου ταῦτα, ἃ νομίζεις σεμνὰ εἶναι, ἐν τοῖς δευτέροις, καὶ μήτε τὰ δεύτερα προστίθει τῷ πρώτῳ μήτε τὰ
 5 τρίτα τοῖς δευτέροις, ἀλλὰ τὰ δεύτερα περὶ τὸ πρῶτον τίθει καὶ τὰ τρίτα περὶ τὸ δεύτερον. οὕτω γὰρ αὐτὰ ἕκαστα ἐάσεις, ὡς ἔχει, καὶ τὰ ὕστερα ἐξαρτήσεις ἐκείνων ὡς ἐκεῖνα περιθέντα ἐφ' ἑαυτῶν ὄντα. διὸ καὶ ὀρθῶς καὶ ταύτη λέγεται περὶ τὸν πάντων
 10 βασιλέα πάντα εὐτὶ κἀκείνου ἕνεκα πάντα, τὰ πάντα ὄντα λέγοντος αὐτοῦ καὶ τὸ ἐκείνου ἕνεκα, ἐπειδὴ καὶ τοῦ εἶναι αἰτίως αὐτοῖς καὶ οἶον ὀρέγεται ἐκείνου ἑτέρου ὄντος τῶν πάντων καὶ οὐδὲν ἔχοντος, ὃ ἐκείνους πάρεστω ἢ οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἔτι τὰ πάντα, εἴ τι ἐκείνῳ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν μετ' αὐτὸν παρείη. εἰ οὖν
 15 καὶ νοῦς τῶν πάντων, οὐδὲ νοῦς ἐκείνῳ. αἴτιον δὲ λέγων πάντων καλῶν τὸ καλὸν ἐν τοῖς εἶδεσι φαίνεται τιθέμενος, αὐτὸ δὲ ὑπὲρ τὸ καλὸν πᾶν τοῦτο. ταῦτα δὲ δεύτερα τιθεῖς εἰς <αὐτὰ>¹ τὰ τρίτα φησὶν ἀνηρτησθαι τὰ μετὰ ταῦτα γενόμενα, καὶ περὶ τὰ τρίτα
 20 δὲ τιθεῖς εἶναι, δῆλον ὅτι τὰ γενόμενα ἐκ τῶν τρίτων, κόσμον τόνδε, εἰς ψυχὴν. ἀνηρτημένης δὲ ψυχῆς εἰς νοῦν καὶ νοῦ εἰς τὰγαθόν, οὕτω πάντα εἰς ἐκείνον διὰ μέσων, τῶν μὲν πλησίον, τῶν δὲ τοῖς πλησίον γειτονοῦντων, ἐσχάτην δ' ἀπόστασιν τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἐχόντων εἰς ψυχὴν ἀνηρτημένων.

¹ H-S¹.¹ The reference is to *Platonic Letter* II 312E1-2. This

ficulties and enquire where you should put them, put away these things which you regard as majestic on the second level, and do not add the seconds to the first or the thirds to the seconds, but set the seconds around the first and the thirds around the second. For thus you will leave each of them as they are and will make the things which come after depend upon those higher realities which exist in independence as the later things circle round them. This is why it is rightly said in this regard also "All things are around the King of all and all are for the sake of that King"¹; Plato is speaking of all the real beings and says "for the sake of that King", since he is the cause of their being and they, we may say, strive after him, who is other than all of them and has nothing which belongs to them; otherwise they would not still be "all things" if any of the other things which come after him belonged to him. If then Intellect is one of "all things" it does not belong to him. But when Plato calls him "Cause of all beauties" he is clearly putting beauty in the world of Forms, but the Good itself above all this beauty. Now when he puts these second, he says that the thirds depend on them, that is the things which come to be after them, and what he posits around the thirds, clearly the things that came to be from the thirds, this universe here, he makes depend on Soul. But since Soul depends on Intellect and Intellect on the Good, so all things depend on him through intermediaries, some close to him, some neighbours of those close to him, and the things of sense dependent on Soul at the ultimate distance from him.

cryptic passage, very unlikely to be authentic Plato, had great authority for the Neoplatonists.

VI. 8. ON FREE WILL AND THE WILL OF THE ONE

Introductory Note

THIS treatise, number 39, immediately follows in Porphyry's chronological order its predecessor in the *Enneads*, VI. 7 (38). The two together contain the profoundest and most powerful expression of the thought of Plotinus about the One or Good. This First Principle is spoken of here in more strongly positive terms than anywhere else in the *Enneads*: the language of will and love and thought is used about him, and he appears as something more like a "personal God" than he does elsewhere in the *Enneads*. But, as Plotinus makes clear in the treatise, this positive emphasis is in no way intended to be inconsistent with the negative way of approach to the One on which he so strongly insists. It is rather a powerful contribution to that negating of negations which the later Neoplatonists showed clearly was the final stage on the negative way and was necessary to attain that fruitful and illuminating silence in which alone the One can be contemplated.

Plotinus starts the treatise with an analysis of our concept of human freedom and it is from this that he ascends, with considerable trepidation but admitting that he has no better starting-point, to consider the freedom of the One which is the main subject of the work. At chapter 7 he introduces a "rash statement starting from a different way of thinking" which says that since the Good "happens to be as it is, and does not have the mastery of what it is, and is what it is not from itself, it would not have freedom,

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and its doing or not doing what it is necessitated to do or not to do is not in its power." It is not clear whether Plotinus regards this as a positive statement of a doctrine other than his own or as an objection to his own doctrine; and if the latter, whether it is a possible objection which he has himself thought of or an objection which he has actually heard from others; a view of my own that it comes from a Christian source much concerned to assert the absolute freedom of God's will has not been generally accepted (A. H. Armstrong, "Two Views of Freedom" in *Studia Patristica* XVIII, Pergamon Press, Oxford 1982, 397-406). But however that may be, he takes it very seriously, and concentrates in the rest of the treatise on establishing his own doctrine of the One against it. It is in doing this that he uses language more likely than anything else in the *Enneads* to commend his version of Platonism to theists (Platonist, Jewish or Christian) accustomed to think of God as a Supreme Being possessed of intelligence and will; though, as has already been said, he is careful to show that this positive language is in no way inconsistent with his negative theology.

Synopsis

Statement of scope of the enquiry: it is to extend as high as the One; but we must begin with our own experience of "having something in our power" (ch. 1). Problems about the freedom of human beings in our present state, as embodied souls (chs. 2-3). Freedom is power to go to the Good: Intellect possesses this in the fullest degree (ch. 4). Our souls in their highest, contemplative, activity can share in this freedom of Intellect (chs. 5-6). How can we drag the lord and master of all things, the Good, into our discussion of freedom? A rash and absurd statement about

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it (ch. 7). Total inadequacy of all our language to the Good (ch. 8). And especial inadequacy of "it happened to be" (ch. 9). Chance is later than and inferior to Intellect; and though the Good necessarily is what he is he is not bound by necessity but is the necessity and law of the others (ch. 10). Questions which cannot properly be asked about the Good; necessity to overcome our persistent tendency to imagine it as in a place (ch. 11). That which gives freedom to substance itself must be still freer; though "master of himself" is inadequate (ch. 12). Yet perhaps we must use this sort of inadequate language, understanding "as if" with every word; then we shall say that the Good is master of himself and is as he willed himself to be (ch. 13). Cause and substance are one in the world of real being; still more in the cause of that world. He is cause of himself, self primarily and beyond being (ch. 14). He is supremely lovable and love of himself; when we attain to him we are far above chance, more than free and more than independent (ch. 15). He is everywhere and nowhere, giving himself existence in being awake to himself (ch. 16). Intellect is beyond providence, choice and chance, and its cause still more so, by himself what he is, related and directed to himself (ch. 17). Intellect and the One: image of the circle with the One as centre, being as he wished to be and ought to be (ch. 18). Experience of the Good transcends language: he who made being has no need of being and is so beyond it (ch. 19). He is eternally his own self-making, totally self-determined and at his own disposal (ch. 20). He is his will, truly free and truly himself (ch. 21).

VI. 8. (39) ΠΕΡΙ ΤΟΥ ΕΚΟΥΣΙΟΥ ΚΑΙ
ΘΕΛΗΜΑΤΟΣ ΤΟΥ ΕΝΟΣ

1. Ἄρ' ἔστι καὶ ἐπὶ θεῶν εἴ τί ἐστιν ἐπ' αὐτοῖς
ζητεῖν, ἢ ἐν ἀνθρώπων ἀδυναμίαις τε καὶ
ἀμφισβητησίμοις δυνάμεσι τὸ τοιοῦτον ἂν πρέποι
ζητεῖν, θεοῖς δὲ τὸ¹ πάντα δύνασθαι ἐπιτρεπτόν καὶ
5 ἐπ' αὐτοῖς οὐ μόνον τι, ἀλλὰ καὶ πάντα εἶναι; ἢ τὴν
δύναμιν δὴ πάσαν καὶ τὸ ἐπ' αὐτῷ δὴ πάντα ἐνὶ
ἐπιτρεπτόν, τοῖς δ' ἄλλοις τὰ μὲν οὕτως, τὰ δ' ἐκείνως
ἔχειν, καὶ τίσιν² ἐκατέρως; ἢ καὶ ταῦτα μὲν ζητητέον,
τολμητέον δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν πρώτων καὶ τοῦ ἄνω ὑπὲρ
10 πάντα ζητεῖν τὸ τοιοῦτον, πῶς τὸ ἐπ' αὐτῷ, κἂν πάντα
συγχωρῶμεν δύνασθαι. καίτοι καὶ τὸ δύνασθαι τοῦτο
σκεπτόν πῶς ποτε λέγεται, μήποτε οὕτως τὸ μὲν
δύναμιν, τὸ δ' ἐνέργειαν φήσομεν, καὶ ἐνέργειαν
μέλλουσαν. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ἐν τῷ παρόντι ἀναβλητέον,
15 πρότερον δὲ ἐφ' ἡμῶν αὐτῶν, ἐφ' ὧν καὶ ζητεῖν ἔθος, εἴ

¹ H-S¹: τε Enn.

² Harder, Theiler, recte: τίσιν H-S².

VI. 8. ON FREE WILL AND THE WILL OF
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1. Is it possible to enquire even about the gods whether there is anything which is in their power, or is it true that this kind of enquiry is proper in dealing with human impotences and dubious powers, but we must attribute to the gods omnipotence and say that not just something but everything is in their power? Or is it true that omnipotence and having everything in his power is indeed to be attributed to the One, but with the other gods we should say that some things are this way and some the other way, and of which gods each is true? Now we must certainly enquire about this as well [as human freedom] and we must dare to push our enquiry on to the first beings and to him who is on high above all things, and enquire in this way what "being in his power" means, even if we agree that he is omnipotent. And we must investigate as well what this "potent" means, in case by using this term we intend to say that it sometimes means potency and sometimes actual activity, and an activity which belongs to the future.¹ But we must postpone these questions for the present, and first enquire about ourselves, as we usually do, whether

¹ Plotinus shows himself here very well aware of the ambiguity inherent in the Greek philosophical usage of *δύνασθαι*, *δύναμις*, which it is often necessary to take into account in reading him.

τι ἐφ' ἡμῖν ὄν τυγχάνει. πρῶτον ζητητέον τί ποτε δεῖ τὸ
 ἐφ' ἡμῖν εἶναι τι λέγειν· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τίς ἔννοια τοῦ
 τοιούτου· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν πως γνωσθεῖη, εἰ καὶ ἐπὶ θεοῦς
 καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον ἐπὶ θεὸν ἀρμόζει μεταφέρειν ἢ οὐ
 20 μετενεκτέον· ἢ μετενεκτέον μὲν, ζητητέον δέ, πῶς τὸ
 ἐπ' αὐτοῖς τοῖς τε ἄλλοις καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν πρώτων. τί τοῖνυν
 νοοῦντες τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν λέγομεν καὶ διὰ τί ζητοῦντες; ἐγὼ
 μὲν οἶμαι, ἐν ταῖς ἐναντίαις κινούμενοι τύχαις τε καὶ
 ἀνάγκαις καὶ παθῶν ἰσχυραῖς προσβολαῖς τὴν ψυχὴν
 25 κατεχούσαις, ἅπαντα ταῦτα κύρια νομίσαντες εἶναι καὶ
 δουλεύοντες αὐτοῖς καὶ φερόμενοι ἢ ἐκεῖνα ἄγοι, μὴ
 ποτε οὐδέν ἐσμεν οὐδέ τί ἐστιν ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἠπορήσαμεν, ὡς
 τούτου ἐσομένου ἂν ἐφ' ἡμῖν, ὃ μὴ τύχαις δουλεύοντες
 μηδὲ ἀνάγκαις μηδὲ πάθεσιν ἰσχυροῖς πράξαμεν ἂν
 30 βουληθέντες οὐδενὸς ἐναντιουμένου ταῖς βουλήσεσιν. εἰ
 δὲ τοῦτο, εἴη ἂν ἡ ἔννοια τοῦ ἐφ' ἡμῖν, ὃ τῇ βουλήσει
 δουλεῖ καὶ παρὰ τοσοῦτον¹ ἂν γένοιτο ἢ μὴ, παρ'
 ὅσον βουληθῆίμεν ἂν. ἐκούσιον μὲν γὰρ πᾶν, ὃ μὴ βίᾳ
 μετὰ τοῦ εἰδέναι, ἐφ' ἡμῖν δέ, ὃ καὶ κύριοι πράξαι. καὶ

¹ Kirchhoff: τοῦτον wBRQ: τοῦτο JU: τούτων C.

¹ In this discussion of human freedom, which continues to ch. 6, Plotinus takes account of earlier, mostly Peripatetic, discussions, especially Aristotle's treatment of the voluntary and involuntary in *Nicomachean Ethics* I 1-5. 1109b30-1114b25. But he is not concerned with

anything does happen to be in our power.¹ First we must ask what something "being in our power" ought to mean; that is, what is the idea of this kind of thing in our minds; for in this way it might come to be known whether it is suitable to transfer it to the gods and, still more, to God, or whether it should not be transferred; or whether it should be transferred, but we should enquire how "being in their power" is to be applied to the other gods and to the first beings. What then do we have in our minds when we speak of "being in our power"; and why are we trying to find out? I myself think that, when we are pushed around among opposing chances and compulsions and strong assaults of passions possessing our soul, we acknowledge all these things as our masters and are enslaved to them and carried wherever they take us, and so are in doubt whether we are not nothing and nothing is in our power, on the assumption that whatever we might do when not enslaved to chances or compulsions or strong passions, because we wished it and with nothing opposing our wishes, this would be in our power. But if this is so, our idea of what is in our power would be something enslaved to our will and would come to pass (or not) to the extent to which we wished it. For everything is a voluntary act which we do without being forced to and with knowledge [of what we are doing], and in our power which we are also competent to do. And refuting or criticising his predecessors but with building up his own distinctive Platonic view of human freedom, that we are only truly free when we live on our highest level in the realm of Intellect.

35 συνθέοι μὲν¹ ἂν πολλαχοῦ ἄμφω καὶ τοῦ λόγου αὐτῶν
 ἐτέρου ὄντος, ἔστι δ' οὐ καὶ διαφωνήσειεν ἄν. οἷον εἰ
 κύριος ἦν τοῦ ἀποκτείνειν, ἦν ἂν οὐχ ἑκούσιον αὐτῷ
 πεπραχότι, εἰ τὸν πατέρα ἠγνόει τοῦτον εἶναι. τάχῃ δ'
 ἂν κάκείνῳ διαφωνοῖ ἔχοντι τὸ ἐφ' ἑαυτῷ· δεῖ δὲ καὶ
 40 τὴν εἶδησιν ἐν τῷ ἑκούσιῳ οὐκ ἐν τοῖς καθέκαστα μόνον
 εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅλως. διὰ τί γάρ, εἰ μὲν ἀγνοεῖ, ὅτι
 φίλιος, ἀκούσιον, εἰ δὲ ἀγνοεῖ, ὅτι μὴ δεῖ, οὐκ ἀκούσιον;
 εἰ δ' ὅτι ἔδει μανθάνειν; οὐχ ἑκούσιον τὸ μὴ εἶδέναι, ὅτι
 ἔδει μανθάνειν, ἢ τὸ ἀπάγον ἀπὸ τοῦ μανθάνειν.

2. Ἄλλ' ἐκεῖνο ζητητέον· τοῖτο δὲ τὸ ἀναφερόμενον
 εἰς ἡμᾶς ὡς ἐφ' ἡμῖν ὑπάρχον τίτι δεῖ διδόναι; ἢ γὰρ τῇ
 ὀρμῇ καὶ ἠτινιοῦν ὀρέξει, οἷον ὁ θυμῷ πράττεται (<ἢ μὴ
 πράττεται>),² ἢ ἐπιθυμίᾳ ἢ λογισμῷ τοῦ συμφέροντος
 5 μετ' ὀρέξεως [ἢ μὴ πράττεται].² ἄλλ' εἰ μὲν θυμῷ καὶ
 ἐπιθυμίᾳ, καὶ παισὶ καὶ θηρίοις τὸ ἐπ' αὐτοῖς τι εἶναι
 δώσομεν καὶ μαινομένοις καὶ ἐξεστηκόσι καὶ
 φαρμάκοις ἀλοῦσι καὶ ταῖς προσπιπτούσαις
 φαντασίαις, ὧν οὐ κύριοι· εἰ δὲ λογισμῷ μετ' ὀρέξεως,
 10 ἄρ' εἰ καὶ πεπλανημένῳ τῷ λογισμῷ; ἢ τῷ ὀρθῷ
 λογισμῷ καὶ τῇ ὀρθῇ ὀρέξει. καίτοι καὶ ἐνταῦθα
 ζητήσεσιν ἂν τις, πότῃ ὁ λογισμὸς τὴν ὀρεξιν
 ἐκίνησεν, ἢ τοῦτον ἢ ὀρεξίς. καὶ γὰρ εἰ κατὰ φύσιν αἱ
 ὀρέξεις, εἰ μὲν ὡς ζώου καὶ τοῦ συνθέτου, ἢ κολούθησεν

¹ Kirchhoff: συνθεοὶ μὲν UC^p: συνθεῖ μὲν wBxC: συνθεῖμεν Q, H-S¹.

² transpos. Igal.

both may often coincide, even if their definition is different; but sometimes they might be discordant; for instance, if one was competent to kill, it would not be a voluntary act when one did so if one did not know that this man was one's father. But perhaps that ignorance would be incompatible with having something in one's power; and certainly the knowledge involved in a voluntary act must not only apply in the particular circumstances but generally. For why is the action involuntary if one does not know that it is a relation, but not involuntary if one does not know that one ought not to do it? Possibly because one ought to have learnt that? Not knowing that one ought to have learnt it is not voluntary, nor is what leads one away from learning.

2. But we must enquire into the following: to what ought we to attribute this which is referred to us as being in our power? One possibility is to attribute it to impulse and any kind of desire, for instance what is done or not done by passion or lust or calculation of the beneficial accompanied by desire. But if by passion or lust, we shall grant that something is in the power of children and wild animals and madmen and those who are beside themselves and caught by drugs or casually occurring imaginations of which they are not master; but if by calculation accompanied by desire, is this so if the calculation has gone wrong? Should we perhaps attribute it to correct calculation accompanied by correct desire? Yet even here one might enquire whether the calculation set the desire in motion or the desire the calculation. Then also, if the desires are according to nature, if they are of the kind that belong to the living being, that is, the composite, the soul followed

15 ἡ ψυχὴ τῇ τῆς φύσεως ἀνάγκῃ· εἰ δὲ ὡς ψυχῆς μόνῃς,
πολλὰ τῶν νῦν ἐφ' ἡμῖν λεγομένων ἔξω ἂν τούτου
γίνοιτο. εἶτα καὶ τίς λογισμὸς ψιλὸς πρόεισι τῶν
παθημάτων; ἢ τε φαντασία ἀναγκάζουσα ἢ τε ὄρεξις
ἐφ' ὅτι ἂν ἄγῃ ἔλκουσι πῶς ἐν τούτοις κυρίους ποιεῖ;
πῶς δ' ὅλως κύριοι, οὐ ἀγόμεθα; τὸ γὰρ ἐνδεὲς ἐξ
20 ἀνάγκης πληρώσεως ὀρεγόμενον οὐκ ἔστι κύριον τοῦ
ἐφ' ὃ παντελῶς ἄγεται. πῶς δ' ὅλως αὐτό τι παρ' αὐτοῦ,
ὃ παρ' ἄλλου καὶ ἀρχὴν εἰς ἄλλο ἔχει κἀκείθεν
γεγένηται οἶόν ἐστι; κατ' ἐκεῖνο γὰρ ζῆ καὶ ὡς
πέπλασται ἢ οὕτω γε καὶ τὰ ἄψυχα ἔξει τὸ ἐπ' αὐτοῖς
25 τι εἰληφέναι· ποιεῖ γὰρ ὡς γεγένηται καὶ τὸ πῦρ. εἰ δ'
ὅτι γιγνώσκει τὸ ζῶον καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ ὃ ποιεῖ, εἰ μὲν
αἰσθήσει, τίς ἢ προσθήκη πρὸς τὸ ἐπ' αὐτοῖς εἶναι; οὐ
γὰρ ἡ αἰσθησις πεποιήκει τοῦ ἔργου κύριον ἰδοῦσα
μόνον. εἰ δὲ γνώσει, εἰ μὲν γνώσει τοῦ ποιουμένου, καὶ
30 ἐνταῦθα οἶδε μόνον, ἄλλο δὲ ἐπὶ τὴν πράξιν ἄγει· εἰ δὲ
καὶ παρὰ τὴν ὄρεξιν ὁ λόγος ποιεῖ ἢ ἡ γνώσις καὶ
κρατεῖ, εἰς τί ἀναφέρει ζητητέον, καὶ ὅλως πού τοῦτο
συμβαίνει. καὶ εἰ μὲν αὐτὸς ἄλλῃν ὄρεξιν ποιεῖ, πῶς
ληπτέον· εἰ δὲ τὴν ὄρεξιν παύσας ἔσται καὶ ἐνταῦθα τὸ
35 ἐφ' ἡμῖν, οὐκ ἐν πράξει τοῦτο ἔσται, ἀλλ' ἐν νῶ
στήσεται τοῦτο· ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ ἐν πράξει πάν, κἂν κρατῆ ὁ
λόγος, μικτὸν καὶ οὐ καθαρὸν δύναται τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἔχειν.

the necessity of nature; but if they are of the kind that belongs to the soul alone, many of the things which are now said to be in our power will be outside it. Then also, what bare calculation precedes our passions? Or when imagination compels and desire pulls us in whatever direction it leads, how are we given the mastery in these circumstances? And how in general can we have the mastery where we are led? For that which is in need and necessarily desires to be filled does not have the mastery over that to which it is simply being led. But how in general can something be self-originated which comes from something else and whose origin is referred to something else and has come to be as it is from thence? For it lives according to that and as it is formed by it; or in this way soulless things will be able to have something in their power; for fire also acts as it has come to be. But if it is because the living being and the soul knows what it does, if it knows by sense-perception, what help is that to things being in their power? For sense-perception does not give mastery of the work since it only sees. But if by knowledge, if it is by knowledge of what is being done, here too it only knows, but something else leads to action; but if reason or knowledge acts against the desire and gets the better of it, we must enquire to what this is to be referred, and in general where it takes place. And if reason itself makes another desire, we must understand how; but if it puts a stop to the desire and stands still and this is where what is in our power is, this will not be in action, but will stand still in Intellect; since everything in the sphere of action, even if reason is dominant, is mixed and cannot have being in our power in a pure state.

3. Διὸ σκεπτέον περὶ τούτων· ἤδη γὰρ αὐ¹ καὶ ἐγγύς
 γινόμεθα τοῦ λόγου τοῦ περὶ θεῶν. ἀναγαγόντες τοίνυν
 τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν εἰς βούλησιν, εἶτα ταύτην ἐν λόγῳ θέμενοι,
 εἶτα ἐν λόγῳ ὀρθῶ—ἴσως δὲ δεῖ προσθεῖναι τῷ ὀρθῶ τὸ
 5 τῆς ἐπιστήμης· οὐ γάρ, εἴ τις ἐδόξασεν ὀρθῶς καὶ
 ἔπραξεν, ἔχει ἂν ἴσως ἀναμφισβήτητον τὸ αὐτεξούσιον,
 εἰ μὴ εἰδῶς διότι ὀρθῶς, ἀλλὰ τύχη ἢ φαντασία τινὶ
 πρὸς τὸ δεόν ἀχθείς· ἐπεὶ καὶ τὴν φαντασίαν οὐκ ἐφ'
 ἡμῖν εἶναι λέγοντες τοὺς κατ' αὐτὴν δρῶντας πῶς ἂν εἰς
 10 τὸ αὐτεξούσιον τάξαιμεν; ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἡμεῖς τὴν μὲν
 φαντασίαν, ἣν ἂν τις καὶ φαντασίαν κυρίως εἴποι, τὴν
 ἐκ τοῦ σώματος τῶν παθημάτων ἐγειρομένην (καὶ γὰρ
 κενώσεις σίτων καὶ ποτῶν φαντασίας οἷον
 ἀναπλάττουσι καὶ πληρώσεις αὐ καὶ μεστός τις
 15 σπέρματος ἄλλα φαντάζεται καὶ καθ' ἐκάστας
 ποιότητος ὑγρῶν τῶν ἐν σώματι) τοὺς κατὰ τὰς
 τοιαύτας φαντασίας ἐνεργοῦντας εἰς ἀρχὴν αὐτεξούσιον
 οὐ τάξομεν· διὸ καὶ τοῖς φαύλοις κατὰ ταύτας
 πράττουσι τὰ πολλὰ οὔτε τὸ ἐπ' αὐτοῖς οὔτε τὸ
 20 ἐκούσιον δώσομεν, τῷ δὲ διὰ νοῦ τῶν ἐνεργειῶν
 ἐλευθέρῳ τῶν παθημάτων τοῦ σώματος τὸ αὐτεξούσιον
 δώσομεν—εἰς ἀρχὴν τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν καλλίστην ἀνάγοντες

¹ H-S¹: ἂν Enn.

¹ In his earlier discussion of imagination and memory in his great work on the soul, IV. 3-5 (27-29), Plotinus comes to the conclusion that there are two *φαντασίαι*, one

3. We must therefore enquire about these matters; for [in doing so] we are already also coming near to our subject of discourse, the gods. Well then, we traced back what is in our power to will, and then placed this in the context of discourse, and then of correct discourse—but perhaps we ought to add to “correct” that it belongs to rational knowledge; for if someone had a right opinion and acted on it he would not indisputably have the power of self-determination if he acted, without knowing why his opinion was right, but led to his duty by chance or some imagination; since when we say that imagination is not in our power, how can we put those who act by it in the class of the self-determined? But we do say this about the imagination which one can properly call imagination,¹ that which is roused by the experiences of the body, for being empty, or again full, of food and drink in a way gives the imaginations shape, and one who is full of semen has different imaginations, and so it is according to all the qualities of the bodily fluids, and we shall not class those who are active according to imaginations of this kind among those whose principle of action is self-determined; therefore we shall not grant to bad men, who do most things according to these, either having something in their power or voluntary action, but we shall grant voluntary action to one whose doings depend on the activities of Intellect and who is free from bodily affections. We trace back what is in our power to the noblest

belonging to the higher and one to the lower soul (IV. 3. 31). But here he seems to exclude the higher *φαντασία* from consideration.

τὴν τοῦ νοῦ ἐνέργειαν καὶ τὰς ἐντεῦθεν προτάσεις ἐλευθέρως ὄντως <εἶναι>¹ δώσομεν, καὶ τὰς ὀρέξεις τὰς ἐκ τοῦ νοεῖν ἐγειρομένας οὐκ ἀκουσίους [εἶναι
25 δώσομεν],¹ καὶ τοῖς θεοῖς τοῦτον ζῶσι τὸν τρόπον [ὅσοι νῶ καὶ ὀρέξει τῇ κατὰ νοῦν ζῶσι]² φήσομεν παρεῖναι.

4. Καίτοι ζητήσκειν ἂν τις, πῶς ποτε τὸ κατ' ὄρεξιν γιγνόμενον αὐτεξούσιον ἔσται τῆς ὀρέξεως ἐπὶ τὸ ἔξω ἀγούσης καὶ τὸ ἐνδὲς ἐχούσης· ἀγεται γὰρ τὸ ὀρεγόμενον, κἂν εἰ πρὸς τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἄγοιτο. καὶ δὴ καὶ
5 περὶ τοῦ νοῦ αὐτοῦ ἀπορητέον, εἰ ὅπερ πέφυκε καὶ ὡς πέφυκεν ἐνεργῶν λέγοιτο ἂν τὸ ἐλεύθερον ἔχειν καὶ τὸ ἐπ' αὐτῷ, οὐκ ἔχων ἐπ' αὐτῷ τὸ μὴ ποιεῖν. ἔπειτα, εἰ ὅλως κυρίως λέγοιτο ἐπ' ἐκείνων τὸ ἐπ' αὐτοῖς, οἷς πράξις οὐ πάρεστιν. ἀλλὰ καὶ οἷς πράξις, ἢ ἀνάγκη
10 ἔξωθεν· οὐ γὰρ μάτην πράξουσιν. ἀλλ' οὖν πῶς τὸ ἐλεύθερον δουλευόντων καὶ τούτων τῇ αὐτῶν φύσει; ἢ, εἰ μὴ ἐτέρῳ ἔπεισθαι ἠνάγκασται, πῶς ἂν τὸ δουλεύειν λέγοιτο; πῶς δὲ πρὸς τὸ ἀγαθὸν τι φερόμενον ἠναγκασμένον ἂν εἶη ἐκούσιου τῆς ἐφέσεως οὔσης, εἰ
15 εἰδὼς ὅτι ἀγαθὸν ὡς ἐπ' ἀγαθὸν ἴοι; τὸ γὰρ ἀκούσιον ἀπαγωγὴ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἠναγκασμένον, εἰ πρὸς τοῦτο φέροιτο, ὃ μὴ ἀγαθὸν αὐτῷ· καὶ δουλεύει τοῦτο, ὃ μὴ κύριόν ἐστιν ἐπὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐλθεῖν, ἀλλ' ἐτέρου κρείττονος ἐφεστηκότος ἀπάγεται τῶν αὐτοῦ
20 ἀγαθῶν δουλεύον ἐκείνῳ. διὰ τοῦτο γὰρ καὶ δουλεία ψέγεται οὐχ οἷς τις οὐκ ἔχει ἐξουσίαν ἐπὶ τὸ κακὸν

¹ transposuimus.

² del. H-S¹, ut glossam.

principle, the activity of Intellect, and shall grant that the premises of action derived from this are truly free, and that the desires roused by thinking are not involuntary, and we shall say that the gods who live in this way have self-determination.

4. But all the same one might enquire how what happens under the impulse of desire can be self-determined when desire leads one to what is outside [oneself] and has deficiency in it; for that which desires is led, even if it is led to the good. And a difficulty must be raised about Intellect itself, whether, when its activity is what it is by nature and as it is by nature, it could be said to have freedom and anything in its power, when it does not have it in its power not to act. And then whether "in their power" can properly be said of those beings which have no practical action. But the necessity comes from outside also to those beings which are engaged in practical action; for their action will not be purposeless. But then how is there freedom when even these higher beings are slaves to their own nature? Now, where there is no compulsion to follow another, how can one speak of slavery? How could something borne towards the Good be under compulsion since its desire for the Good will be voluntary if it knows that it is good and goes to it as good? For the involuntary is a leading away from the good and towards the compulsory, if something is carried to that which is not good for it; and that is enslaved which is not master of its going to the Good, but, since something stronger than it stands over it, it is enslaved to that and led away from its own goods. For it is for this reason that slavery is ill spoken of, not where one has no power to go to the bad, but

ἐλθεῖν, ἀλλ' οὐ ἐπὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἀγόμενος πρὸς
τὸ ἀγαθὸν τὸ ἄλλου. τὸ δὲ καὶ δουλεύειν λέγειν τῇ αὐτοῦ
φύσει δύο ποιούντός ἐστι τὸ τε δουλεύειν καὶ τὸ φ. φύσις
25 δὲ ἀπλή καὶ ἐνέργεια μία καὶ οὐδὲ τὸ δυνάμει ἔχουσα
ἄλλο, ἄλλο δὲ τὸ ἐνεργεία, πῶς οὐκ ἐλευθέρα; οὐδὲ γὰρ
ὡς πέφυκε λέγοιτο ἂν ἐνεργεῖν ἄλλης οὔσης τῆς οὐσίας,
τῆς δὲ ἐνεργείας ἄλλης, εἴπερ τὸ αὐτὸ τὸ εἶναι ἐκεῖ καὶ
τὸ ἐνεργεῖν. εἰ οἶν οὔτε δι' ἕτερον οὔτε ἐφ' ἑτέρω, πῶς
30 οὐκ ἐλευθέρα; καὶ εἰ μὴ τὸ ἐπ' αὐτῷ ἀρμόσει, ἀλλὰ
μείζον ἐνταῦθα τοῦ ἐπ' αὐτῷ, καὶ οὕτως ἐπ' αὐτῷ, ὅτι
μὴ ἐφ' ἑτέρω μῆδ' ἄλλο τῆς ἐνεργείας κύριον· οὐδὲ γὰρ
τῆς οὐσίας, εἴπερ ἀρχή. καὶ εἰ ἄλλην δὲ ὁ νοῦς ἀρχὴν
ἔχει, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔξω αὐτοῦ, ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ ἀγαθῷ. καὶ εἰ κατ'
35 ἐκείνο τὸ ἀγαθόν, πολὺ μᾶλλον <τὸ>¹ ἐπ' αὐτῷ καὶ τὸ
ἐλεύθερον· ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ ἐλεύθερον καὶ τὸ ἐπ' αὐτῷ τις
ζητεῖ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ χάριν. εἰ οἶν κατὰ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐνεργεῖ,
μᾶλλον ἂν τὸ ἐπ' αὐτῷ· ἤδη γὰρ ἔχει τὸ πρὸς αὐτὸ ἐξ
αὐτοῦ ὀρμώμενον² καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ [εἴπερ πρὸς αὐτό],³ ὃ
40 ἄμεινον ἂν εἴη αὐτῷ ἐν αὐτῷ ἂν εἶναι, εἴπερ πρὸς αὐτό.

5. Ἄρ' οἶν ἐν νῷ μόνῳ νοοῦντι τὸ αὐτεξούσιον καὶ
τὸ ἐπ' αὐτῷ καὶ ἐν νῷ τῷ καθαρῷ ἢ καὶ ἐν ψυχῇ κατὰ
νοῦν ἐνεργούσῃ καὶ κατὰ ἀρετὴν πραττούσῃ; τὸ μὲν οἶν
πραττούσῃ εἴπερ δώσομεν, πρῶτον μὲν οὐ πρὸς τὴν

¹ Kirchhoff.

² Kirchhoff: ὀρμώμενον Enn.

³ delevimus.

where one has no power to go to one's own good but
is led away to the good of another. But to speak of
being enslaved to one's own nature is making two
things, one which is enslaved and one to which it is
enslaved. But how is a simple nature and single
active actuality not free, when it does not have one
part potential and one actual? For it could not be
said to be active according to its nature as if its
substance was one thing and its activity another if
being and acting there are the same. If then the
activity is neither because of another or in the power
of another, how is it not free? And even if "being in
its own power" is unsuitable language, but there is
something higher than being in its power here, even
so it is in its own power because it is not in the power
of another nor is another master of its activity; nor
indeed of its substance, if it is principle of its sub-
stance. And even if Intellect does have another
principle, it is not outside it, but it is in the Good.
And if it is active according to the Good, it is much
more in its own power and free; since one seeks
freedom and being in one's own power for the sake of
the Good. If then it is active according to the Good,
it would be still more in its own power; for it has
already what goes from itself to it, and in itself what
would be better for it, being in it, if it is directed
towards it.

5. Is self-determination and being in one's own
power, then, only in Intellect when it thinks, that is,
pure intellect, or is it also in soul when it is active
according to intellect and engaged in practical ac-
tion according to virtue? Now if we are going to
grant it to the soul engaged in practical action, first
of all it should not perhaps be granted in reference to

5 τεύξιν ἴσως χρηθὶ διδόναι· οὐ γὰρ ἡμεῖς τοῦ τυχεῖν κύριοι.
 εἰ δὲ πρὸς τὸ καλῶς καὶ τὸ πάντα ποιῆσαι τὰ παρ'
 αὐτοῦ, τάχα μὲν ἂν τοῦτο ὀρθῶς λέγοιτο. ἐκεῖνο δὲ πῶς
 ἐφ' ἡμῖν; οἶον εἰ, διότι πόλεμος, ἀνδριζοίμεθα· λέγω δὲ
 τὴν τότε ἐνέργειαν πῶς ἐφ' ἡμῖν, ὅποτε πολέμου μὴ
 10 καταλαβόντος οὐκ ἦν τὴν ἐνέργειαν ταύτην ποιήσασθαι;
 ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων πράξεων τῶν κατὰ ἀρετὴν
 ἀπασῶν πρὸς τὸ προσπίπτον αἰεὶ ἀναγκαζομένης τῆς
 ἀρετῆς τοδὶ ἢ τοδὶ ἐργάζεσθαι. καὶ γὰρ εἴ τις αἴρῃσιν
 αὐτῆς δοῖη τῆ ἀρετῆς, πότῃ βούλεται, ἢ ἔχοι ἐνεργεῖν,
 15 εἶναι πολέμους, ἵνα ἀνδρίζοιτο, καὶ εἶναι ἀδικίαν, ἵνα τὰ
 δίκαια ὀρίξῃ καὶ κατακοσμήῃ, καὶ πενίαν, ἵνα τὸ
 ἐλευθέριον ἐνδεικνύοιτο, ἢ πάντων εἰ ἐχόντων ἡσυχίαν
 ἄγειν, εἴλοιο ἂν τὴν ἡσυχίαν τῶν πράξεων οὐδενὸς
 20 ἰατροῦ, οἶον Ἰπποκράτης, μηδένα δεῖσθαι τῆς παρ'
 αὐτοῦ τέχνης. εἰ οὖν ἐνεργοῦσα ἐν ταῖς πράξεσιν ἡ
 ἀρετὴ ἠνάγκασται βοηθεῖν, πῶς ἂν καθαρῶς ἔχοι τὸ ἐπ'
 αὐτῆς; ἄρ' οὖν τὰς πράξεις μὲν ἀναγκαίαις, τὴν δὲ
 βούλησιν τὴν πρὸ τῶν πράξεων καὶ τὸν λόγον οὐκ
 25 ἠνάγκασμένον φήσομεν; ἀλλ' εἰ τοῦτο, ἐν ψιλῶ
 τιθέμενοι τῷ πρὸ τοῦ πραττομένου, ἔξω τῆς πράξεως
 τὸ αὐτεξούσιον καὶ τὸ ἐπ' αὐτῆς τῆ ἀρετῆς θήσομεν. τί δὲ
 ἐπ' αὐτῆς τῆς ἀρετῆς τῆς κατὰ τὴν ἔξω καὶ τὴν
 διάθεσιν; ἄρ' οὐ κακῶς ψυχῆς ἐχούσης φήσομεν αὐτὴν
 30 εἰς κατακόσμησιν ἐλθεῖν συμμετρομένην τὰ πάθη καὶ
 τὰς ὀρέξεις; τίνα οὖν τρόπον λέγομεν ἐφ' ἡμῖν τὸ

the accomplishment; for it is not we who are in charge of the accomplishment. But if it is granted in reference to acting finely and doing everything which comes from oneself, perhaps this might be correctly said. But how is that in our power? For instance if we are brave because there is a war; what I mean is, how is the activity then in our power when if war did not break out it would not be possible to carry out this activity? But it is also the same with the other actions done according to virtue, since virtue is always being compelled to do this or that to cope with what turns up. For certainly if someone gave virtue itself the choice whether it would like in order to be active that there should be wars, that it might be brave, and that there should be injustice that it might define what is just and set things in order, and poverty, that it might display its liberality, or to stay quiet because everything was well, it would choose to rest from its practical activities because nothing needed its curative action, as if a physician, for instance Hippocrates, were to wish that nobody needed his skill. If then when it is active in practical affairs virtue is compelled to be helpful, how can things be purely and simply in its power? Are we then to assert that the actions are compelled but the will and the reason which are before the action are not compelled? But if this is so, by placing them only in what comes before the action we shall be placing self-determination, and being in the power of virtue itself, outside the action. And what about virtue itself which is according to state and disposition? Are we to say that when the soul is in a bad way it comes to set it to rights by bringing the passions and desires within proper limits? In what

ἀγαθοῖς εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἀδέσποτον τὴν ἀρετὴν; ἢ τοῖς γε βουλευθεῖσι καὶ ἐλομένοις· ἢ ὅτι ἐγγενομένη αὕτη κατασκευάζει τὸ ἐλεύθερον καὶ τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν καὶ οὐκ ἐὰν εἴη δούλους εἶναι, ἢν πρότερον ἦμεν. εἰ οὖν οἶον
35 νοῦς τις ἄλλος ἐστὶν ἢ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἕξις οἶον νοωθῆναι τὴν ψυχὴν ποιούσα, πάλιν αὐτῆκεὶ οὐκ ἐν πράξει τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν, ἀλλ' ἐν νῷ ἡσύχω τῶν πράξεων.

6. Πῶς οὖν εἰς βούλησιν πρότερον ἀνήγομεν τούτο λέγοντες “ὁ παρὰ τὸ βουλευθῆναι γένοιτο ἄν”; ἢ κάκει ἐλέγετο “ἢ μὴ γένοιτο”. εἰ οὖν τά τε νῦν ὀρθῶς λέγεται, ἐκεῖνά τε τούτοις συμφώνως ἕξει, φήσομεν τὴν μὲν
5 ἀρετὴν καὶ τὸν νοῦν κύρια εἶναι καὶ εἰς ταῦτα χρῆναι ἀνάγειν τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν καὶ τὸ ἐλεύθερον· ἀδέσποτον δὲ ὄντα ταῦτα τὸν μὲν ἐφ' αὐτοῦ εἶναι, τὴν δὲ ἀρετὴν βούλεσθαι μὲν ἐφ' αὐτῆς εἶναι ἐφεστῶσαν τῇ ψυχῇ, ὥστε εἶναι ἀγαθὴν, καὶ μέχρι τούτου αὐτὴν τε ἐλευθέραν καὶ τὴν
10 ψυχὴν ἐλευθέραν παρασχέσθαι προσπιπτόντων δὲ τῶν ἀναγκαίων παθημάτων τε καὶ πράξεων ἐφεστῶσαν ταῦτα μὲν μὴ βεβουλήσθαι γενέσθαι, ὅμως γε μὴν καὶ ἐν τούτοις διασώσειν τὸ ἐφ' αὐτῇ εἰς αὐτὴν καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἀναφέρουσαν· οὐ γὰρ τοῖς πράγμασιν ἐφέψεσθαι, οἶον
15 σφύζουσα τὸν κινδυνεύοντα, ἀλλ' εἰ δοκοῖ αὐτῇ, καὶ προϋεμένην τούτων καὶ τὸ ζῆν κελεύουσαν προΐεσθαι καὶ χρήματα καὶ τέκνα καὶ αὐτὴν πατρίδα, σκοπὸν τὸ καλὸν αὐτῆς ἔχουσαν, ἀλλ' οὐ τὸ εἶναι τῶν ὑπ' αὐτῆν· ὥστε καὶ τὸ ἐν ταῖς πράξεσιν αὐτεξούσιον καὶ τὸ ἐφ'
20 ἡμῖν οὐκ εἰς τὸ πράττειν ἀνάγεσθαι οὐδ' εἰς τὴν ἕξιν,

¹ A favourite text from the proclamation which introduces the choice of lives in the Myth of Er. Plato *Republic* X 617E3.

² Ch. 1, lines 32–3.

way then are we saying that being good is in our power and “virtue has no master”¹? Yes, it is if we wish and choose it; or because when virtue comes to be in us it constructs freedom and being in our own power and does not allow us to be any more slaves of what we were enslaved to before. If then virtue is a kind of other intellect, a state which in a way intellectualises the soul, again, being in our power does not belong to the realm of action but in intellect at rest from actions.

6. How then did we refer this before² to will when we said “which would come to pass to the extent that we wished it”? Now it was said there also “or would not come to pass”. If then what we are saying now is correctly said and what we said before will be in tune with it, we shall assert that virtue and intellect have the mastery and that we should refer being in our own power and freedom to them; and since these have no master, intellect is independent and virtue wishes to be independent by supervising the soul to make it good, and up to this point is free itself and makes the soul free; but when compulsory passions and actions come in the way it has not in its supervision wished that they should occur, but all the same even among these it will keep its independence by referring back to itself even here; for it will not follow the lead of the facts, for instance by saving the man who is in danger, but, if it thinks fit, it will sacrifice him and command him to sacrifice his life and property and children and even his fatherland, having in view its own excellence and not the existence of what is subject to it; so that also in practical actions self-determination and being in our own power is not referred to practice and outward

ἀλλ' εἰς τὴν ἐντὸς ἐνέργειαν καὶ νότιον καὶ θεωρίαν
 αὐτῆς τῆς ἀρετῆς. δεῖ δὲ τὴν ἀρετὴν ταύτην νοῦν τινα
 λέγειν εἶναι οὐ συναριθμοῦντα τὰ πάθη τὰ δουλωθέντα ἢ
 μετρηθέντα τῷ λόγῳ· ταῦτα γὰρ ἔθηκε, φησὶν, ἐγγύς
 25 τι τείνειν τοῦ σώματος ἕθει καὶ ἀσκήσεσι
 κατορθωθέντα. ὥστε εἶναι σαφέστερον, ὡς τὸ αὐλόν
 ἐστὶ τὸ ἐλεύθερον καὶ εἰς τοῦτο ἡ ἀναγωγὴ τοῦ ἐφ' ἡμῖν
 καὶ αὐτῆ ἢ βούλησις ἢ κυρία καὶ ἐφ' ἑαυτῆς οὐδα, καὶ εἴ
 τι ἐπιτάξειε πρὸς τὰ ἔξω ἐξ ἀνάγκης. ὅσα οὖν ἐκ ταύτης
 30 καὶ διὰ ταύτην, ἐφ' ἡμῖν, ἔξω τε καὶ ἐφ' αὐτῆς· ὁ αὐτῆ
 βούλεται καὶ ἐνεργεῖ ἀνεμποδίστως, τοῦτο καὶ πρῶτον
 ἐφ' ἡμῖν. ὁ δὲ θεωρητικὸς νοῦς καὶ πρῶτος οὗτος τὸ ἐφ'
 αὐτῷ, ὅτι τὸ ἔργον αὐτοῦ μηδαμῶς ἐπ' ἄλλω, ἀλλὰ πᾶς
 ἐπέστραπται πρὸς αὐτὸν καὶ τὸ ἔργον αὐτοῦ αὐτὸς καὶ
 35 ἐν τῷ ἀγαθῷ κείμενος ἀνευδεῆς καὶ πλήρης ὑπάρχων
 καὶ οἶον κατὰ βούλησιν ζῶν· ἡ δὲ βούλησις ἢ νόσις,
 βούλησις δ' ἐλέχθη, ὅτι κατὰ νοῦν· ἡ¹ γὰρ λεγομένη
 βούλησις τὸ κατὰ νοῦν μιμεῖται. ἡ γὰρ βούλησις θέλει
 τὸ ἀγαθόν· τὸ δὲ νοεῖν ἀληθῶς ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ ἀγαθῷ. ἔχει
 40 οὖν ἐκεῖνος, ὅπερ ἡ βούλησις θέλει καὶ οὐ τυχούσα ἂν
 ταύτῃ νόσις γίνεται. εἰ οὖν βουλήσει τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ
 τίθεμεν² τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν, τὸ ἦδη ἐν ᾧ θέλει ἡ βούλησις εἶναι
 ἰδρυμένον πῶς οὐ τὸ ἐφ' αὐτῷ ἔχει; ἢ μείζον εἶναι

¹ Igal: καὶ Enn.

² Theiler: ἐτίθεμεν Enn.

¹ Republic 518D10-E2.

² Plotinus is playing here on the common meaning of κατὰ νοῦν, "according to one's mind", "as one likes it", and the sense required by context here, "according to

activity but to the inner activity of virtue itself, that is, its thought and contemplation. But one must say that this virtue is a kind of intellect and not count in with it the passions which are enslaved and limited by the reason; for these, Plato says, "come close to the body, since it is by habits and exercises"¹ that they are set in order. So it is still clearer that the immaterial is the free, and it is to this that being in our power is to be referred and the will which has the mastery and is independent, even if something directs it by necessity to what is outside. All therefore that comes from this will and is done according to it is in our power, when it is acting externally and when it is by itself; what it wishes and makes actual without hindrance, this is primarily what is in our power. But the contemplative, that is the primary, Intellect is what is in its own power in this way, that its work in no way depends on another, but it is all turned to itself and its work is itself and it rests in the Good, being without need and fulfilled, and, one might say, living according to its will; but its will is its thought, but was called will, because it was to its mind; for what is called will imitates what is to its mind.² For will wants the Good; but thinking is truly in the Good. That Intellect therefore has what its will wants, that by which it becomes thought when it attains it. If then we allot being in our power to willing the Good, surely that which is already firmly settled in what its will wants must possess it. Or else

Intellect". The Divine Intellect lives, of course, according to itself and so as it likes. The whole passage shows clearly how Plotinus, like other Greek philosophers, makes no sharp distinction between thinking and willing.

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 8.

θετέον, εἰ μή τις ἐθέλει εἰς τοῦτο ἀναβαίνειν τὸ ἐφ'
45 αὐτῷ.

7. Γίνεται οὖν ψυχὴ μὲν ἐλευθέρᾳ διὰ νοῦ πρὸς τὸ
ἀγαθὸν σπεύδουσα ἀνεμποδίστως, καὶ ὁ διὰ τοῦτο
ποιεῖ, ἐφ' αὐτῇ· νοῦς δὲ δι' αὐτόν· ἢ δὲ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φύσις
αὐτὰ τὸ ἐφετὸν καὶ δι' ὃ τὰ ἄλλα ἔχει τὸ ἐφ' αὐτοῖς,
5 ὅταν τὸ μὲν τυγχάνειν ἀνεμποδίστως δύνηται, τὸ δὲ
ἔχειν, πῶς δὴ αὐτὸ τὸ κύριον ἀπάντων τῶν μετ' αὐτὸ
τιμίον καὶ ἐν πρώτῃ ἔδρᾳ ὄν, πρὸς ὃ τὰ ἄλλα ἀναβαίνειν
θέλει καὶ ἐξήρηται αὐτοῦ καὶ τὰς δυνάμεις ἔχει παρ'
αὐτοῦ, ὥστε δύνασθαι τὸ ἐπ' αὐτοῖς ἔχειν, πῶς ἂν τις
10 εἰς τὸ ἐπ' ἐμοὶ ἢ ἐπὶ σοὶ ἄγοι; ὅπου καὶ νοῦς μύλις, ὅμως
δὲ βία εἴλκετο. εἰ μή τις τολμηρὸς λόγος ἐτέρωθεν
σταλεῖς λέγοι, ὡς τυχεύουσα οὕτως ἔχειν, ὡς ἔχει, καὶ
οὐκ οὔσα κυρία τοῦ ὅ ἐστιν, οὔσα τοῦτο ὅ ἐστιν οὐ παρ'
αὐτῆς οὔτε τὸ ἐλεύθερον ἂν ἔχοι οὔτε τὸ ἐπ' αὐτῇ
15 ποιούσα ἢ μὴ ποιούσα, ὃ ἠνάγκασται ποιεῖν ἢ μὴ
ποιεῖν. ὅς δὲ λόγος ἀντίτυπός τε καὶ ἄπορος καὶ
παντάπασι τὴν τοῦ ἐκουσίου τε καὶ αὐτεξουσίου φύσιν
καὶ τὴν ἔννοιαν τοῦ ἐφ' ἡμῖν εἴη ἂν ἀναιρῶν, ὡς μάτην
εἶναι ταῦτα λέγεσθαι καὶ φωνὰς πραγμάτων
20 ἀνυποστάτων. οὐ γὰρ μόνον μηδὲν ἐπὶ μηδενὶ εἶναι
λέγειν, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ νοεῖν οὐδὲ συνιέναι ἀναγκαῖον αὐτῷ
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it must be assumed to be something greater, if one does not want being in one's own power to go up so high.

7. The soul, then, becomes free when it presses on without hindrance to the Good by means of Intellect, and what it does through this is in its power; but Intellect is free through itself, but the nature of the Good is the very goal of the striving and that through which the others have what is in their power, when one is able to attain it without hindrance and the other to have it. Now how can one bring the very lord and master of all things of value after it, that which sits in the first seat, to which all things else want to ascend, and depend on it and have their powers from it so as to be able to have something in their power—how can one bring it [down to the level of] what is in your and my power to which Intellect also was only dragged with difficulty, though it was all the same violently dragged? Unless some rash statement starting from a different way of thinking says that since [the nature of the Good] happens to be as it is, and does not have the mastery of what it is, and is what it is not from itself, it would not have freedom, and its doing or not doing what it is necessitated to do or not to do is not in its power.¹ This statement is indeed contrary and absurd and would altogether do away with the nature of free will and self-determination and our idea of what is in our power, as if this was empty talk and names for non-existent things. For not only must the one who makes it say that nothing is in anyone's power, but he must say that he does not think or

¹ On this statement see *Introductory Note* p. 224.

λέγειν ταύτην τὴν φωνήν. εἰ δὲ ὁμολογοὶ συνιέναι, ἤδη
 ἂν ῥαδίως ἐλέγχοιτο τῆς ἐννοίας τοῦ ἐφ' ἡμῖν
 ἐφαρμοζομένης οἷς ἐφαρμόττειν οὐκ ἔφη. ἡ γὰρ ἐννοια
 25 τὴν οὐσίαν οὐ πολυπραγμονεῖ οὐδὲ ἐκείνην προσ-
 παραλαμβάνει—ἀδύνατον γὰρ ἑαυτὸ τι ποιεῖν καὶ εἰς
 ὑπόστασιν ἄγειν—ἀλλὰ ἐθέλει θεωρεῖν ἢ ἐπίνοια, τί
 τῶν ὄντων δοῦλον ἐτέρων, καὶ τί ἔχει τὸ αὐτεξούσιον
 καὶ τί μὴ ὑπ' ἄλλω, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ τῆς ἐνεργείας κύριον, ὃ
 καθαρῶς <καὶ>¹ τοῖς αἰδίοις ὑπάρχει [καὶ τοῖς]¹ καθό
 30 εἰσιν αἰδίοι καὶ τοῖς ἀκωλύτως τὸ ἀγαθὸν διώκουσιν ἢ
 ἔχουσιν. ὑπὲρ δὲ ταῦτα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ αὐτοῦ ὄντος οἶον
 ἄλλο παρ' αὐτὸ ἀγαθὸν ζητεῖν ἄτοπον. ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ κατὰ
 τύχην λέγειν αὐτὸ εἶναι οὐκ ὀρθόν· ἐν γὰρ τοῖς ὕστερον
 καὶ ἐν πολλοῖς ἡ τύχη· τὸ δὲ πρῶτον οὔτε κατὰ τύχην ἂν
 35 λέγοιμεν, οὔτε οὐ κύριον τῆς αὐτοῦ γενέσεως, ὅτι μὴδὲ
 γέγονε. τὸ δὲ ὅτι ὡς ἔχει ποιεῖ ἄτοπον, εἰ τις ἀξιοὶ τότε
 εἶναι τὸ ἐλεύθερον, ὅταν παρὰ φύσιν ποιῇ ἢ ἐνεργῇ. οὐδὲ
 δὴ τὸ τὸ² μοναχὸν ἔχον ἀφήρηται τῆς ἐξουσίας, εἰ τὸ
 μοναχὸν μὴ τῷ κωλύεσθαι παρ' ἄλλου ἔχει, ἀλλὰ τῷ
 40 τοῦτο αὐτὸ εἶναι καὶ οἶον ἀρέσκειν ἑαυτῷ, καὶ μὴ ἔχειν
 ὃ τι κρείττον αὐτοῦ ἢ οὕτω γε τὸ μάλιστα τυγχάνον
 τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἀφαιρήσεται τις τὸ αὐτεξούσιον. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο
 ἄτοπον, ἀτοπώτερον ἂν γίνοιτο αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθὸν
 ἀποστερεῖν τοῦ αὐτεξουσίου, ὅτι ἀγαθὸν καὶ ὅτι ἐφ'
 45 αὐτοῦ μένει οὐ δρόμενον κινεῖσθαι πρὸς ἄλλο τῶν ἄλλων

¹ transposuimus.² Creuzer: τὸν Enn.

understand this term. But if he did admit that he understood it, he could be easily refuted, because our idea of what is in our power fits what he said it did not fit. For the idea is not concerned with the substance of a thing and does not take it as well into consideration—for it is impossible for a thing to make itself and bring itself into existence—but our idea wants to observe what among beings is a slave of others and what has self-determination and what is not subject to another but itself master of its activity, which is purely and simply the case with eternal beings in that they are eternal, and with those which pursue or possess the good without hindrance. But certainly since the Good is above these it is absurd to seek as if for another good beside it. Then also it is not correct to say that it exists by chance; for chance occurs among things that are later and among many things; but we could not say that the First is by chance and is not master of its own coming to be, because it has not come to be. And the remark that it does as it is absurd if it involves a claim that there is freedom when it does things or is active against its own nature. Nor indeed does its possession of uniqueness take away its independence, if it possesses uniqueness not because it is obstructed by something else but because it is this very thing and is, we may say, satisfied with itself and has nothing better than itself; otherwise one will take self-determination away from what attains the Good in the highest degree. But if this is absurd it would be more absurd to deprive the Good itself of self-determination because it is good and because it remains on its own and does not need to move to something else, since

κινουμένων πρὸς αὐτὸ καὶ οὐδὲν δεόμενον οὐδενός. ὅταν δὲ δῆ ἢ οἶον ὑπόστασις αὐτοῦ ἢ οἶον ἐνέργεια ἦ—οὐ γὰρ ἢ μὲν ἕτερον, ἢ δ' ἕτερόν ἐστιν, εἴ γε μηδὲ ἐπὶ τοῦ νοῦ τοῦτο, ὅτι μᾶλλον κατὰ τὸ εἶναι ἢ ἐνέργεια ἢ κατὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν τὸ εἶναι—ὥστε οὐκ ἔχει τὸ αἰς πέφυκεν ἐνεργεῖν, οὐδὲ ἢ ἐνέργεια καὶ ἢ οἶον ζωὴ ἀνενεχθήσεται εἰς τὴν οἶον οὐσίαν, ἀλλ' ἢ οἶον οὐσία συνοῦσα καὶ οἶον συγγενομένη ἐξ αἰδίου τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν αὐτὸ αὐτὸ ποιεῖ, καὶ ἑαυτῷ καὶ οὐδενός.

8. Ἡμεῖς δὲ θεωροῦμεν οὐ συμβεβηκὸς τὸ αὐτεξούσιον ἐκείνῳ, ἀλλὰ ἀπὸ τῶν περὶ τὰ ἄλλα αὐτεξουσίῳ ἀφαιρέσει τῶν ἐναντίων αὐτὸ ἐφ' ἑαυτό· πρὸς αὐτὸ τὰ ἐλάττω ἀπὸ ἐλαττόνων μεταφέροντες 5 ἀδυναμία τοῦ τυχεῖν τῶν ἂ προσήκει λέγειν περὶ αὐτοῦ, ταῦτα ἂν περὶ αὐτοῦ εἴπομεν. καίτοι οὐδὲν ἂν εὔροιμεν εἰπεῖν οὐχ ὅτι κατ' αὐτοῦ, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ περὶ αὐτοῦ κυρίως· πάντα γὰρ ἐκείνου καὶ τὰ καλὰ καὶ τὰ σεμνὰ ὕστερα. τούτων γὰρ αὐτὸς ἀρχή· καίτοι ἄλλον τρόπον οὐκ ἀρχή· 10 ἀποτιθεμένοις δὲ πάντα καὶ τὸ ἐπ' αὐτῷ ὡς ὕστερον καὶ τὸ αὐτεξούσιον—ἤδη γὰρ εἰς ἄλλο ἐνέργειαν λέγει— καὶ ὅτι ἀνεμποδίστως καὶ ὄντων ἄλλων τὸ εἰς αὐτὰ ἀκωλύτως. δεῖ δὲ ὅλως πρὸς οὐδὲν αὐτὸν λέγειν· ἔστι γὰρ ὅπερ ἐστὶ καὶ πρὸ αὐτῶν· ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ “ἔστιν” 15 ἀφαιρούμεν, ὥστε καὶ τὸ πρὸς τὰ ὄντα ὁπωσοῦν· οὐδὲ

the other things move to it and it has no need of anything. But when his, so to speak, existence is his, as it were, activity—for one is not one thing and the other another if this is not even so with Intellect, because¹ its activity is more according to its being than its being according to its activity—so that it cannot be active according to what it naturally is, nor will its activity and its life, as we may call it, be referred to its, in a manner of speaking, substance, but its something like substance is with and, so to put it, originates with its activity and it itself makes itself from both, for itself and from nothing.

8. But we see self-determination not as that Good's incidental attribute but itself by itself, by taking away the opposing factors from the self-determinations in other things; we might say this about it by transferring what is less from lesser things because of incapacity to find what we ought to say about it. All the same, we could find nothing to say which is applicable to it, or even really about it; for all noble and majestic things come after it. For he himself is the origin of these; yet, all the same, in another way not their origin. For those who put away everything, “being in his power” [is to be put away] as later, and “self-determination”—for it already speaks of activity towards another—and “that he is unimpededly active” and “that when others exist his activity directed to them is unhindered”. But we must say that he is altogether unrelated to anything; for he is what he is before them; for we take away the “is”, and so also any kind of relations

¹ I retain *ὅτι* here with H-S. But *οὔτι* (Kirchhoff: *non* Ficino) would fit the context better.

δὴ τὸ "ὡς πέφυκεν". ὕστερον γὰρ καὶ τοῦτο, καὶ εἰ
λέγοιτο καὶ ἐπ' ἐκείνων, ἐπὶ τῶν ἐξ ἄλλου ἂν λέγοιτο,
ὥστε πρῶτως ἐπὶ τῆς οὐσίας, ὅτι ἐξ ἐκείνου ἔφυ· εἰ δ' ἐν
τοῖς ἐν χρόνῳ ἢ φύσις, οὐδ' ἐπὶ τῆς οὐσίας. οὐδὲ δὴ τὸ
20 "οὐ παρ' αὐτῆς εἶναι" λεκτέον· τὸ τε γὰρ "εἶναι"
ἀφηρηθῆμεν, τὸ τε "οὐ παρ' αὐτῆς" λέγοιτο ἂν, ὅταν ὑπ'
ἄλλου. οὕτως οὖν συνέβη; ἢ οὐδὲ τὸ "συνέβη" ἀκτέον·
οὔτε γὰρ αὐτῷ οὔτε πρὸς ἄλλο· ἐν γὰρ πολλοῖς τὸ
"συνέβη", ὅταν τὰ μὲν ἦ, τὸ δὲ ἐπὶ τούτοις συμβῆ. πῶς
25 οὖν τὸ πρῶτον συνέβη; οὐδὲ γὰρ ἦλθεν, ἵνα ζητῆς "πῶς
οὖν ἦλθε; τύχη τίς ἤγαγεν ἢ ὑπέστησεν αὐτό;" ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ
τύχη πω ἦν οὐδὲ τὸ αὐτόματον δέ· καὶ γὰρ τὸ
αὐτόματον καὶ παρ' ἄλλου καὶ ἐν γινομένοις.

9. Ἀλλὰ πρὸς αὐτὸ εἴ τις λαμβάνοι τὸ "συνέβη",
οὔτοι δεῖ πρὸς τὸ ὄνομα ἵστασθαι, ἀλλὰ ὅπως νοεῖ ὁ
λέγων συνιέναι. τί οὖν νοεῖ; τοῦτο, ὅτι ταύτην ἔχον τὴν
φύσιν καὶ τὴν δύναμιν ἀρχή¹ καὶ γὰρ εἰ ἄλλην εἶχεν, ἦν
5 ἂν [ἀρχή]² τοῦτο, ὅπερ ἦν, καὶ εἰ χεῖρον, ἐνήργησεν ἂν
κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ οὐσίαν. πρὸς δὴ τὸ τοιοῦτον λεκτέον,
ὅτι μὴ οἶόν τε ἦν ἀρχὴν οὐδὲ πάντων τὸ τυχεῖν εἶναι,
μὴ ὅτι χεῖρον, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ἀγαθὸν μὲν, ἀγαθὸν δὲ ἄλλως,
οἶον ἐνδεέστερον. ἀλλὰ δεῖ κρείττονα εἶναι τὴν ἀρχὴν

¹ Kirchhoff: ἀρχήν Enn.

² del. Kirchhoff.

to the real beings; nor, certainly, [do we accept] the
"as he naturally is"; for this also is later, and even if
it may be said about those real beings, it would be
said about those which come from another, and so
first about substance, because it grew naturally from
him; but if nature is in the things in time, it cannot
be applied to substance. Nor indeed must we say this
nature "is not from itself"; for we took away the
"is", and the "not from itself" would be said when it
[was brought into being] by something else. Did it
then just happen to be like this? No, we must not
bring in "happened to be"; nothing happened to him
or in relation to something else; for "happened to
be" applies among many things, when some are
there and something happens to be besides them.
How then could the First happen to be? For it did not
come, so that you might enquire "How then did it
come? What chance brought it or established it in
being?" For chance did not yet exist, nor accident
either; for accident comes from something else, and
among things which have come to be.

9. But if someone takes "happened to be" as
applying to the Good, one must not stop at the word,
but understand what the man who says it has in
mind. What, then, does he have in mind? This, that it
is because it has this nature and power that it is
principle; for if it had another, it would have been
what it was, and if it was worse, it would have been
active according to its own substance. To this we
must reply that it was not possible for it, since it is
the principle of all, to be what chanced, and certainly
not to be worse, not even to be good but good in
another way, a kind of lesser way. But the principle
must be better than all the things which come after

10 ἀπάντων τῶν μετ' αὐτήν ὥστε ὠρισμένον τι. λέγω δὲ
 ὠρισμένον, ὅτι μοναχῶς καὶ οὐκ ἐξ ἀνάγκης· οὐδὲ γὰρ
 ἦν ἀνάγκη· ἐν γὰρ τοῖς ἐπομένοις τῇ ἀρχῇ ἡ ἀνάγκη καὶ
 οὐδὲ αὕτη ἔχουσα ἐν αὐτοῖς τὴν βίαν· τὸ δὲ μοναχὸν
 15 τοῦτο παρ' αὐτοῦ. τοῦτο οὖν καὶ οὐκ ἄλλο, ἀλλ' ὅπερ
 ἐχρήν εἶναι· οὐ τοίνυν οὕτω συνέβη, ἀλλ' ἔδει οὕτως· τὸ
 δὲ "ἔδει" τοῦτο ἀρχὴ τῶν ὅσα ἔδει. τοῦτο τοίνυν οὐκ ἂν
 οὕτως εἶη, ὡς συνέβη· οὐ γὰρ ὅπερ ἔτυχεν ἔστω, ἀλλ'
 ὅπερ ἐχρήν εἶναι· μᾶλλον δὲ οὐδὲ ὅπερ ἐχρήν, ἀλλὰ
 ἀναμένειν δεῖ τὰ ἄλλα, τί ποτε αὐτοῖς ὁ βασιλεὺς
 φανείη, καὶ τοῦτο <αὐτὸν θέσθαι>,¹ ὅπερ ἐστὶν αἰτιός
 20 [τοῦτο αὐτὸν θέσθαι],¹ οὐχ ὡς συνέβη φανέντα, ἀλλὰ
 ὄντως βασιλέα καὶ ὄντως ἀρχὴν καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ὄντως,
 οὐκ ἐνεργοῦντα κατὰ τὸ ἀγαθόν—οὕτω γὰρ ἂν δόξειεν
 ἔπεσθαι ἄλλω—ἀλλ' ὄντα ἔν, ὅπερ ἐστίν, ὥστε οὐ κατ'
 ἐκεῖνο, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο. εἰ τοίνυν οὐδ' ἐπὶ τοῦ ὄντος τὸ
 25 "συνέβη"—τῷ γὰρ ὄντι, εἴ τι συμβήσεται, τὸ
 "συνέβη", ἀλλ' οὐκ αὐτὸ τὸ ὄν συνέβη, οὐδὲ συνέκυρσε
 τὸ ὄν οὕτως εἶναι, οὐδὲ παρ' ἄλλου τὸ οὕτως εἶναι, ὄν
 ὡς ἔστιν, ἀλλ' αὕτη ὄντως φύσις ὄν εἶναι—πῶς ἂν τις
 ἐπὶ τοῦ ἐπέκειναι ὄντος τοῦτο ἐνθυμοίτο τὸ "οὕτω
 συνέβη", ὃ ὑπάρχει γεγεννηκέναι τὸ ὄν, ὃ οὐχ οὕτω
 30 συνέβη, ἀλλ' ἔστιν ὡς ἔστιν ἡ οὐσία, οὕσα ὅπερ ἐστὶν
 οὐσία καὶ ὅπερ ἐστὶ νοῦς; ἐπεὶ οὕτω τις κἂν² τὸν νοῦν

¹ Igal.² Theiler: καὶ Enn.

it; so it must be something defined. But I mean defined by its uniqueness, and not of necessity; for there was no necessity; for necessity is in the things which follow the principle, and even this [subsequent] necessity does not have power to force them; but this uniqueness comes from the principle itself. It is this, then, and not something else, but what it ought to be; it did not then happen to be like this, but had to be like this; but this "had to be" is principle of all things that had to be. It could not then be this in the sense that it happened to be; for it is not what it chanced to be but what it ought to be; or rather, not what it ought to be, but the other things have to wait and see how their king will appear to them and affirm that he is what he himself is, not appearing as he happened to be, but as really king and really principle and really the Good, not active according to the Good—for in this way he would seem to be following another—but being one, what he is, so that he is not active according to that, but is that. If then "happened to be" does not even apply to real being—for, if anything is going to happen, it happens to being, but being itself does not happen, nor is it a casual occurrence that being is like this, nor does it derive being like this from something else, being as it is, but this is really its nature, to be real being—how could one imagine about what transcends being¹ that it happened to be like this, that to which it belongs to have generated being, which did not happen to be like this but is as its substance is, being what substance is and what Intellect is; for in this way one could even say of Intellect "it just

¹ Plato *Republic* VI 509B9.

εἴπαι "οὕτω συνέβη νοῦν εἶναι", ὡσπερ ἄλλο τι ἂν τὸν νοῦν ἐκόμενον ἢ τοῦτο, ὃ δὴ φύσις ἐστὶ νοῦ. τὸ δὴ οὐ παρεκβεβηκὸς ἐαυτοῦ, ἀλλ' ἀκλινὲς ὄν ἐαυτοῦ, αὐτὸ ἂν
 35 τις κυριώτατα λέγοι εἶναι ὅ ἐστι. τί ἂν οὖν τις λέγοι ἐκεῖ εἰς τὸ ὑπὲρ τοῦτο ἀναβάς καὶ εἰσιδὼν; ἀρὰ γε τὸ "οὕτως <συνέβη>"¹ ὡς εἶδεν αὐτὸν ἔχοντα; [τὸ οὕτως συνέβη]¹ ἢ οὔτε τὸ "οὕτω" οὔτε τὸ "ὁπωσοῦν συνέβη", ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ὅλως τὸ "συνέβη". ἀλλὰ τὸ "οὕτω μόνον καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἄλλως, ἀλλ' οὕτως"; ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τὸ
 40 "οὕτως": οὕτω γὰρ ἂν ὀρίσας εἴης καὶ τόδε τι· ἀλλ' ἐστὶ τῷ ἰδόντι οὐδὲ τὸ "οὕτως" εἰπεῖν δύνασθαι οὐδ' αὖ τὸ "μὴ οὕτως". τί γὰρ ἂν εἴποις αὐτὸ τῶν ὄντων, ἐφ' ὧν τὸ "οὕτως". ἄλλο τοῦνυν παρ' ἅπαντα τὰ οὕτως. ἀλλ' ἀόριστον ἰδὼν πάντα μὲν ἕξεις εἰπεῖν τὰ μετ' αὐτό,
 45 φήσεις δὲ οὐδὲν ἐκείνων εἶναι, ἀλλά, εἴπερ, δύναμιν πάσαν αὐτῆς ὄντως κυρίαν, τοῦτο οὖσαν ὃ θέλει, μᾶλλον δὲ ὃ θέλει ἀπορρίψασαν εἰς τὰ ὄντα, αὐτὴν δὲ μείζονα παντὸς τοῦ θέλει οὖσαν τὸ θέλει μετ' αὐτὴν θεμένην. οὕτ' οὖν αὐτὴ ἠθέλησε τὸ "οὕτως", ἵνα ἂν εἴπετο, οὔτε ἄλλος πεποιήκεν οὕτως.

10. Καὶ τοῦνυν καὶ ἐρωτῆσαι χρὴ τὸν λέγοντα τὸ "οὕτω συνέβη": πῶς ἂν ἀξιώσει ψεῦδος εἶναι τὸ "συνέβη", εἰ τί² εἴη; καὶ πῶς ἂν τις ἀφέλοι τὸ

¹ Theiler.

² Igal: εἴ τι Enn.

¹ A clear statement of the necessity of negating one's negations as the final step in the negative way, very

happened in this way to be Intellect", as if Intellect was going to be anything else but this which the nature of Intellect is. That, surely, which does not depart from itself, but is its own without declination, one would most properly say is what it is. What, then, is one to say at the point where one goes up to and looks upon what is above this? Is it what it happens to be as one sees that it is? No, it did not happen to be in this way or in that way, but it did not happen to be at all. But [could one say] "in this way", and "not otherwise, but in this way"? But [you must] not [say] "in this way"; for in this way you would be defining it, and it would be a particular thing; but the one who sees it cannot say "in this way" or again "not in this way"¹; for you would be saying that it was one of the beings to which "in this way" applies. It is then something else besides all the things which are in this way. But, since you see it as without definition, you will be able to speak of all the things which come after it, but you will affirm that it is none of these, but, if anything at all, that it is all power, really master of itself, being what it wills to be, or rather throwing "what it wills to be" away to the beings, and being itself greater than all willing, setting willing after itself. It did not then will the "in this way" so that it might conform to it, nor did another make it like this.

10. And then one must also put these questions to the one who said "happened to be": on what conditions would he affirm that "happened to be" was false, if there was any [happening to be]? And how

strongly stressed by the Athenian Neoplatonists Proclus and Damascius and by Pseudo-Dionysius.

"συνέβη"; καὶ εἰ τίς¹ εἴη φύσις, τότε φήσκει οὐκ
 5 ἐφαρμόζειν τὸ "συνέβη"; εἰ γὰρ τὴν τῶν ἄλλων
 ἀφαιροῦσαν τὸ "οὕτω συνέβη" ἀνατίθῃσι τύχῃ, ποῦ
 ποτε τὸ μὴ ἐκ τύχης εἶναι γένοιτο; ἀφαιρεῖ δὲ τὸ "ὡς
 ἔτυχεν" αὕτη ἢ ἀρχὴ τῶν ἄλλων εἶδος καὶ πέρασ καὶ
 μορφήν διδοῦσα, καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν τοῖς οὕτω κατὰ λόγον
 γινομένοις τύχῃ ἀναθεῖναι, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο λόγῳ τὴν
 10 αἰτίαν, ἐν δὲ τοῖς μὴ προηγουμένως καὶ μὴ ἀκολούθως,
 ἀλλὰ συμπτώμασιν, ἢ τύχῃ. τὴν δὲ ἀρχὴν παντὸς λόγου
 τε καὶ τάξεως καὶ ὄρου πῶς ἂν τις τὴν τούτου
 ὑπόστασιν ἀναθεῖη τύχῃ; καὶ μὴν πολλῶν μὲν ἢ τύχῃ
 κυρία, νοῦ δὲ καὶ λόγου καὶ τάξεως εἰς τὸ γεννᾶν ταῦτα
 15 οὐ κυρία· ὅπου καὶ ἐναντίον γε δοκεῖ λόγῳ εἶναι τύχῃ,
 πῶς ἂν γεννήτῃρα αὐτοῦ γένοιτο; εἰ οὖν μὴ γεννᾶ νοῦν
 τύχῃ, οὐδὲ τὸ πρὸ νοῦ οὐδὲ τὸ κρείττον νοῦ· οὔτε γὰρ
 εἶχεν ὄθεν γεννήσει, οὔτε ἦν τὸ παράπαν αὕτη οὐδ' ὄλως
 ἐν τοῖς αἰδίοις. εἰ οὖν μηδὲν πρὸ ἐκείνου, αὐτὸς δὲ
 πρῶτος, στήναι ἐνταῦθα δεῖ καὶ μηδὲν ἔτι περὶ αὐτοῦ
 20 λέγειν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μετ' αὐτὸ ζητεῖν πῶς ἐγένετο, αὐτὸ δὲ
 μηκέτι ὅπως, ὅτι ὄντως τοῦτο μὴ ἐγένετο. τί οὖν, εἰ μὴ
 ἐγένετο, ἔστι δὲ οἶός ἐστιν, οὐκ ὦν τῆς αὐτοῦ οὐσίας
 κύριος; καὶ εἰ μὴ οὐσίας δέ, ἀλλ' ὦν ὅς ἐστιν, οὐχ
 ὑποστήσας ἑαυτόν, χρώμενος δὲ ἑαυτῷ οἶός ἐστιν,

¹ Igal: εἴ τις Enn.

would one remove the "happened to be"? And if
 there is a nature, will he then say that the "hap-
 pened to be" does not fit? For if he attributes to
 chance the nature which takes away the "happened
 to be" from the others, wherever will existence
 which is not by chance come to be? But this principle
 takes away the "as it chanced" from the others by
 giving them form and limit and shape, and one
 cannot attribute anything to chance in things which
 come to be rationally in this way, but [must main-
 tain] this very thing, that their cause is rational; but
 chance is in what does not come to be as a result of
 what goes before and consistently, but is mere co-
 incidence. But as for the principle of all reason and
 order and limit, how could one attribute the
 existence of this to chance? Chance is certainly
 mistress of many things, but is not mistress of in-
 tellect and reason and order so as to generate them;
 when chance even seems to be in direct opposition to
 reason, how could it be reason's generator? If then
 chance does not generate Intellect, then certainly
 not that which is before Intellect and better than
 Intellect; for it would not have any resources to
 generate it from, nor did it exist at all in any way
 among the eternal beings. If then there is nothing
 before him, but he is the first, one must stop here and
 say nothing more about him, but enquire how the
 things after him came to be, but not how this did,
 because it really did not come to be. Well then,
 suppose he did not come to be, but is as he is and is
 not of his own substance. And if he is not master of
 his substance, but is who he is, as he did not bring
 himself into existence but manages with himself as
 he is, then he is what he is of necessity, and could

25 ἐξανάγκης τοῦτο ἂν εἶη, ὃ ἐστι, καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἄλλως. ἢ οὐχ
 ὅτι οὐκ ἄλλως, οὕτως, ἀλλ' ὅτι τὸ ἄριστον οὕτως. πρὸς
 μὲν γὰρ τὸ βέλτιον ἐλθεῖν οὐ πᾶν αὐτεξούσιον, πρὸς δὲ
 τὸ χεῖρον ἐλθεῖν οὐδὲν ὑπ' ἄλλου κεκώλυται. ἀλλ' ὅτι μὴ
 ἦλθε, παρ' αὐτοῦ οὐκ ἐλήλυθεν, οὐ τῷ κεκωλύσθαι,
 30 ἀλλὰ τῷ αὐτὸ εἶναι, ὃ μὴ ἐλήλυθε· καὶ τὸ ἀδύνατον
 ἐλθεῖν πρὸς τὸ χεῖρον οὐκ ἀδυναμίαν σημαίνει τοῦ μὴ
 ἦκοντος, ἀλλὰ παρ' αὐτοῦ καὶ δι' αὐτὸν τὸ μὴ ἦκειν. καὶ
 τὸ μὴ ἦκειν πρὸς μηδὲν ἄλλο τὴν ὑπερβολὴν τῆς
 δυνάμεως ἐν αὐτῷ ἔχει, οὐκ ἀνάγκη κατελιγμένου,
 35 ἀλλ' αὐτοῦ ἀνάγκης τῶν ἄλλων οὔσης καὶ νόμου. αὐτὴν
 οὖν ἢ ἀνάγκη ὑπέστησεν; ἢ οὐδὲ ὑπέστη τῶν ἄλλων
 ὑποστάντων τῶν μετ' αὐτὸ δι' αὐτό. τὸ οὖν πρὸ
 ὑποστάσεως πῶς ἂν ἢ ὑπ' ἄλλου ἢ ὑφ' αὐτοῦ ὑπέστη;

11. Ἄλλὰ τὸ μὴ ὑποστᾶν τοῦτο τί; ἢ σιωπήσαντας
 δεῖ ἀπελθεῖν, καὶ ἐν ἀπόρῳ τῇ γνώμῃ θεμένους μηδὲν
 ἔτι ζητεῖν. τί γὰρ ἂν τις καὶ ζητήσκειν εἰς οὐδὲν ἔτι
 ἔχων προελθεῖν πάσης ζητήσεως εἰς ἀρχὴν ἰούσης καὶ
 5 ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ ἰσταμένης; πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ζήτησιν
 ἅπασαν χρὴ νομίζειν ἢ τοῦ τί ἐστὶν εἶναι ἢ τοῦ οἶον ἢ
 τοῦ διὰ τί ἢ τοῦ εἶναι. τὸ μὲν οὖν εἶναι, ὡς λέγομεν
 ἐκεῖνο εἶναι, ἐκ τῶν μετ' αὐτό. τὸ δὲ διὰ τί ἀρχὴν ἄλλην
 ζητεῖ· ἀρχῆς δὲ τῆς πάσης οὐκ ἔστιν ἀρχή. τὸ δὲ οἶον
 10 ἐστὶ ζητεῖν τί συμβέβηκεν αὐτῷ, ἢ συμβέβηκε μηδέν.
 τὸ δὲ τί ἐστὶ δηλοῖ μάλλον τὸ μηδέν δεῖν περὶ αὐτοῦ
 ζητεῖν, αὐτὸ μόνον εἰ δυνατόν αὐτοῖς λαβόντας ἐν νῷ¹

¹ Kirchoff: τῷ Enn., H-S¹.

not be otherwise. Now he is not as he is because he cannot be otherwise, but because being what he is is the best. For not everything has the power over itself to go to the better, but nothing is hindered by another to go to the worse. But that it did not go was due to itself; it was not because it was hindered but because it was itself what did not go; and inability to go to the worse does not indicate the powerlessness of what does not go, but its not going comes from itself and is because of itself. And not going to anything else has in it the extreme of power; [that which does not go] is not held fast by necessity, but is itself the necessity and law of the others. Did necessity, then, bring itself into existence? No, that did not come into existence; the other things after it came to existence through it. How then could that which is before existence have come to existence either by another's agency or by its own?

11. But what is this which did not come to existence? We must go away in silence and enquire no longer, aware in our minds that there is no way out. For why should one even enquire when one has nothing to go on to, since every enquiry goes to a principle and stands still in it? And besides, one must consider that every enquiry is about either what something is, or of what kind it is, or why it is or if it is. Now being, in the sense in which we say that that is, [is known] from what comes after it. And the question "why?" seeks another principle; but there is no principle of the universal principle. And to enquire into what kind of thing it is is to enquire what attributes it has, which has no attributes. And the question "what is it?" rather makes clear that we must make no enquiry about it, grasping it, if

μηδὲν αὐτῷ θεμιτὸν εἶναι προσάπτειν μαθόντας. ὄλως δὲ
 εὐοίκαμεν ταύτην τὴν ἀπορίαν ἐνθυμηθῆναι, περὶ ταύτης
 15 τῆς φύσεως οἷπερ ἐνεθυμηθῆμεν, ἐκ τοῦ πρώτου μὲν
 τίθεσθαι χώραν καὶ τόπον, ὥσπερ τι χάος, εἶτα χώρας
 ἤδη οὔσης ἐπαγαγεῖν ταύτην τὴν φύσιν εἰς τὸν ἐν τῇ
 φαντασίᾳ ἡμῶν γεγονότα ἢ οἷτα τόπον, εἰσάγοντες δὲ
 αὐτὸν εἰς τὸν τοιοῦτον τόπον οὕτω τοι ζητεῖν, οἷον
 πόθεν καὶ πῶς ἐλήλυθεν ἐνταῦθα, καὶ ὥσπερ ἔπηλυν
 20 ὄντα ἐζητηκέναι αὐτοῦ τὴν παρουσίαν καὶ οἷον τὴν
 οὐσίαν, καὶ δὴ καὶ ὥσπερ ἐκ τινος βάθους ἢ ἐξ ὕψους
 τινὸς ἐνθάδε ἐρρίφθαι. διόπερ δεῖ τὸ αἴτιον τῆς ἀπορίας
 ἀνελόντα ἔξω ποιήσασθαι τῆς ἐπιβολῆς τῆς πρὸς αὐτὸ
 πάντα τόπον καὶ μηδὲ ἐν ὅτῳ οὖν τίθεσθαι αὐτό, μήτε
 25 αἰεὶ κείμενον ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ ἰδρυμένον μήτε ἐληλυθότα,
 ἀλλ' ὄντα μόνον, ὡς ἔστι, λεγόμενον ὑπ' ἀνάγκης τῶν
 λόγων εἶναι, τὸν δὲ τόπον, ὥσπερ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα, ὕστερον
 καὶ ὕστερον ἀπάντων. τὸ οὖν ἄτοπον τοῦτο νοοῦντες, ὡς
 νοοῦμεν, οὐδὲν περὶ αὐτὸ ἔτι τιθέντες οἷον κύκλῳ οὐδὲ
 30 περιλαβεῖν ἔχοντες ὅσον, οὐδὲ τὸ ὅσον αὐτῷ
 συμβεβηκέναι φήσομεν· οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ τὸ ποιόν· οὐδὲ γὰρ
 μορφὴ τις περὶ αὐτὸν οὐδὲ νοητὴ ἂν εἴη· οὐδὲ τὸ πρὸς
 ἄλλο· ἐφ' αὐτοῦ γὰρ καὶ ὑφέστηκε, πρὶν ἄλλο. τί ἂν οὖν
 ἔτι εἴη τὸ "οὕτω συνέβη"; ἢ πῶς φθελγόμεθα τοῦτο, ὅτι
 35 καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἐν ἀφαιρέσει πάντα τὰ περὶ τούτου

¹ Plotinus is thinking of the Chaos with which Hesiod

possible, in our minds by learning that it is not right to add anything to it. But in general we probably think of this difficulty, those of us who think about this nature at all, because we first assume a space and place, a kind of vast emptiness,¹ and then, when the space is already there, we bring this nature into the place which has come to be or is in our imagination, and bringing it into this kind of place we enquire in this way as if into whence and how it came here, and as if it was a stranger we have asked about its presence and, in a way, its substance, really just as if we thought that it had been thrown up from some depth or down from some height. Therefore one must remove the cause of the difficulty by excluding from our concentrated gaze upon it all place, and not put it in any place either as resting and settled in it or as having come to it, but [think of it] as being what it is (this is said by the necessity of speech), but that place, like everything else, is afterwards, and last of all afterwards. When therefore we think, as we do think, of this being out of place, and put nothing round it in a kind of circle, and are unable to encompass its extent, we shall not attribute extension to it; and certainly not quality either; for there could not be any shape about it, even intelligible; and not relation to something else; for it existed by itself before there was anything else. What then could the "it happened to be like this" still mean? And how shall we be able to say this, because everything else about it is said negatively?

begins his account of the generation of the gods (*Theogony* 116), which he understands as Aristotle does (*Physics* Δ 1208b31-3) as the empty space or place which things occupy.

λεγόμενα; ὥστε ἀληθές μᾶλλον οὐ τὸ "οὕτω συνέβη", ἀλλὰ τὸ "οὐδὲ οὕτω συνέβη", ὅπου καὶ τὸ "οὐδὲ συνέβη ὅλως".

12. Τί οὖν; οὐκ ἔστιν ὃ ἔστι; τοῦ δὲ εἶναι ὃ ἔστιν ἢ τοῦ ἐπέκεινα εἶναι ἄρα γε κύριος αὐτός; πάλιν γὰρ ἢ ψυχῇ οὐδέν τι πεισθείσα τοῖς εἰρημένους ἄπορός ἐστι. λικτέον τοίνυν πρὸς ταῦτα ἴδδε, ὡς ἕκαστος μὲν ἡμῶν
 5 κατὰ μὲν τὸ σῶμα πόρρω ἂν εἴη οὐσίας, κατὰ δὲ τὴν ψυχῇν καὶ ὃ μάλιστα ἔσμεν μετέχομεν οὐσίας καὶ ἔσμεν τις οὐσία, τοῦτο δὲ ἔστιν οἷον σύνθετόν τι ἐκ διαφορᾶς καὶ οὐσίας. οὐκ οὐκ κυρίως οὐσία οὐδ' αὐτοουσία: διὸ οὐδὲ κύριοι τῆς αὐτῶν οὐσίας. ἄλλο γάρ πως ἢ οὐσία
 10 καὶ ἡμεῖς ἄλλο, καὶ κύριοι οὐκ ἡμεῖς τῆς αὐτῶν οὐσίας, ἀλλ' ἢ οὐσία αὐτὸ ἡμῶν, εἴπερ αὕτη καὶ τὴν διαφορὰν προστίθησιν. ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ ὅπερ κύριον ἡμῶν ἡμεῖς πῶς ἔσμεν, οὕτω τοι οὐδὲν ἦττον καὶ ἐνταῦθα λεγοίμεθα ἂν αὐτῶν κύριοι. οὐ¹ δὲ γε παντελῶς ἔστιν ὃ ἔστιν
 15 αὐτοουσία, καὶ οὐκ ἄλλο μὲν αὐτό, ἄλλο δὲ ἢ οὐσία αὐτοῦ, ἐνταῦθα ὅπερ ἐστὶ, τούτου ἐστὶ² καὶ κύριον καὶ οὐκέτι εἰς ἄλλο, ἢ ἔστι καὶ ἢ ἔστιν οὐσία. καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸ ἀφείθη κύριον εἶναι αὐτοῦ, ἢ ὃ πρῶτον εἰς οὐσίαν. τὸ δὲ πεποιηκὸς ἐλεύθερον τὴν οὐσίαν, πεφυκὸς δηλονότι ποιεῖν ἐλεύθερον καὶ ἐλευθεροποιὸν ἂν λεχθέν, τίνι ἂν
 20 δοῦλον εἴη, εἴπερ ὅλως καὶ θεμιτὸν φθέγγεσθαι τόδε; τῇ

¹ Theiler: ὃ Enn.

² Harder: τοῦτό ἐστ. wBUCQ: om. x.

So that not "it happened to be like this" but "not even like this did it happen to be" is truer, where it is true that it did not happen to be at all.

12. Well then, is he not what he is? And is he himself really master of his being what he is or transcending being? For again the soul is not in the least persuaded by what has been said and sees no way out of its difficulty. So we must say this as well, that each one of us may be far from substance in respect of his body but in respect of the soul and what we most are we participate in substance and are a particular kind of substance, that is a particular kind of composite of substance and difference. We are not then substance in the strict and proper sense or absolute substance; and for this reason we are not masters of our own substance. For in some way substance is one thing and we are another and we are not masters of our own substance, but substance, the very thing itself, is master of us, given that this also adds the difference. But since in some way we are that which is master of us, in this way, all the same, even here below we could be called masters of ourselves.¹ But where absolute substance is completely what it is, and it is not one thing and its substance another, what it is it is also master of, and is no longer to be referred to another in that it is and in that it is substance. For, again, it has been let go into self-mastery in that it is what is primarily related to substance. That, then, which has made substance free, which is clearly of a nature to liberate and can be called liberator—to what could it be a slave, if it is even in any way permitted to utter this

¹ The sense in which this is true is explained in V. 3. 4.

αὐτοῦ οὐσία; ἀλλὰ καὶ αὕτη παρ' αὐτοῦ ἐλευθέρα καὶ
 ὑστέρα, καὶ αὐτὸ οὐκ ἔχον οὐσίαν. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐστί τις
 ἐνέργεια ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ ἐν τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ αὐτὸν θησόμεθα,
 οὐδ' ἂν διὰ τοῦτο εἴη ἂν ἕτερον αὐτοῦ καὶ οὐκ αὐτὸς
 25 αὐτοῦ κύριος, ἀφ' οὗ ἡ ἐνέργεια, ὅτι μὴ ἕτερον ἐνέργεια
 καὶ αὐτός. εἰ δ' ὅλως ἐνεργεῖαν οὐ δώσομεν ἐν αὐτῷ
 εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τὰλλα περὶ αὐτὸν ἐνεργοῦντα τὴν
 ὑπόστασιν ἴσχειν, ἔτι μᾶλλον οὔτε τὸ κύριον οὔτε τὸ
 κυριεύμενον ἐκεῖ εἶναι δώσομεν. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τὸ "αὐτοῦ
 κύριος", οὐχ ὅτι ἄλλο αὐτοῦ κύριον, ἀλλ' ὅτι τὸ "αὐτοῦ
 30 κύριον" τῇ οὐσίᾳ ἀπέδομεν, τὸ δὲ ἐν τιμωτέρῳ ἢ κατὰ
 τοῦτο ἐθέμεθα. τί οὖν τὸ ἐν τιμωτέρῳ τοῦ ὅ ἐστιν
 αὐτοῦ κύριον; ἢ ὅτι, ἐπειδὴ οὐσία καὶ ἐνέργεια ἐκεῖ δύο
 πως ὄντα ἐκ τῆς ἐνεργείας τὴν ἔννοιαν ἐδίδου τοῦ
 κυρίου, τοῦτο δὲ ἦν τῇ οὐσίᾳ ταυτόν, διὰ τοῦτο καὶ
 35 χωρὶς ἐγένετο τὸ κύριον εἶναι καὶ αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ ἐλέγετο
 κύριον. ὅπου δὲ οὐ δύο ὡς εἶναι, ἀλλὰ εἷν—ἢ γὰρ ἐνέργεια
 μόνον ἢ οὐδ' ὅλως ἐνέργεια—οὐδὲ τὸ "κύριον αὐτοῦ"
 ὀρθῶς.

13. Ἄλλ' εἰ καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα ταῦτα ἐπάγειν δεῖ [οὐκ
 ὀρθῶς]¹ τοῦ ζητουμένου, πάλιν αὐτὸ λεγέσθω, ὡς τὰ μὲν
 <οὐκ>² ὀρθῶς εἴρηται, ὅτι οὐ ποιητέον οὐδ' ὡς εἰς
 ἐπίνοιαν δύο, τὰ δὲ νῦν τῆς πειθοῦς χάριν καὶ τι
 5 παρανοητέον ἐν τοῖς λόγοις. εἰ γὰρ δοίημεν ἐνεργείας

¹ del. Theiler.

² ἴgal.

word? To its own substance? But this substance gets
 its freedom from it and comes after it, and it is not in
 possession of substance. If then there is an active
 actuality in him, and we are going to locate him
 himself in the active actuality, he would not because
 of this be something else than himself and not
 himself master of himself, he from whom the active
 actuality comes, because active actuality and he
 himself are not different. But if we are not in any
 way going to grant that there is active actuality in
 him, but say that the other things have their
 existence by being active round him, then still more
 shall we refuse to grant that there is mastery or
 being mastered at that level. But we shall not even
 admit the "master of himself", not because some-
 thing else is master of him, but because we have
 allotted the "master of himself" to substance, and
 put him in a more honourable place than this applies
 to. What then is that which is in a more honourable
 position than being its own master? It is because,
 since substance and activity there are in a way two
 and gave, from the point of view of activity, the idea
 of mastery, but this was the same thing as substance,
 for this reason mastery came to be separated, and it
 was said to be master of itself. But where there are
 not two as one, but there is one—either only active
 actuality or not active actuality at all—"master of
 himself" is not correct.

13. But if one must bring in these names of what
 we are looking for, let it be said again that it was not
 correct to use them, because one must not make it
 two even for the sake of forming an idea of it; but
 now we must depart a little from correct thinking in
 our discourse for the sake of persuasion. For if we

αὐτῷ, τὰς δ' ἐνεργείας αὐτοῦ οἶον βουλήσει αὐτοῦ—οὐ γὰρ ἀβουλῶν ἐνεργεῖ—αἱ δὲ ἐνέργειαι ἢ οἶον οὐσία αὐτοῦ, ἢ βούλησις αὐτοῦ καὶ ἢ οὐσία ταυτὸν ἔσται. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, ὡς ἄρα ἐβούλετο, οὕτω καὶ ἔστιν. οὐ μᾶλλον ἄρα
 10 ὡς πέφυκε βούλεται τε καὶ ἐνεργεῖ, ἢ ὡς βούλεται τε καὶ ἐνεργεῖ ἢ οὐσία ἔστιν αὐτοῦ. κύριος ἄρα πάντη ἑαυτοῦ ἐφ' ἑαυτῷ ἔχων καὶ τὸ εἶναι. ἴδε δὴ καὶ τότε τῶν ὄντων ἕκαστον ἐφιέμενον τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ βούλεται ἐκεῖνο μᾶλλον ἢ ὃ ἔστιν εἶναι, καὶ τότε μάλιστα οἴεται εἶναι, ὅταν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ μεταλάβῃ, καὶ ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ
 15 αἰρεῖται ἑαυτῷ ἕκαστον τὸ εἶναι καθόσον¹ ἂν παρὰ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἴσχη, ὡς τῆς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φύσεως ἑαυτῷ² δηλονότι πολὺ πρότερον αἰρετῆς οὔσης, εἴπερ τὸ ὅση μοῖρα ἀγαθοῦ παρ' ἄλλῳ αἰρετωτάτη, καὶ οὐσία ἐκούσιος καὶ παραγενομένη θελήσει καὶ ἐν καὶ ταυτὸν
 20 οὐδα θελήσει καὶ διὰ θελήσεως ὑποστᾶσα. καὶ ἔως μὲν τὸ ἀγαθὸν μὴ εἶχεν ἕκαστον, ἠθέλησεν ἄλλο, ἢ δὲ ἔσχεν, ἑαυτὸ τε θέλει ἤδη καὶ ἔστιν οὔτε κατὰ τύχην ἢ τοιαύτη παρουσία οὔτε ἔξω τῆς βουλήσεως αὐτοῦ ἢ οὐσία, καὶ τούτῳ καὶ ὀρίζεται καὶ ἑαυτῆς ἐστι τούτῳ. εἰ οὖν τούτῳ
 25 αὐτό τι ἕκαστον ἑαυτὸ ποιεῖ, δῆλον δῆπου γίνεται ἤδη, ὡς ἐκεῖνο ἂν εἴη ἑαυτῷ τοιοῦτον πρῶτως, ᾧ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἑαυτοῖς ἔστιν εἶναι, καὶ σύνεστιν αὐτοῦ τῇ οἶον οὐσία ἢ θέλησις τοῦ οἶον τοιοῦτον εἶναι, καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν

¹ Kirchhoff: καὶ ὅσον Enn.

² Theiler: ἑαυτῇ Enn.

were to grant activities to him, and ascribe his activities to what we might call his will—for he does not act without willing—and his activities are what we might call his substance, his will and his substance will be the same thing. But if this is so, then as he willed, so also he is. He does not then will and act as it is his nature to, any more than his substance is as he wills and acts. So he is altogether master of himself since he has even his being in his own power. Observe this also: every being in its desire for the Good wants to be that Good rather than what it is, and thinks that it is in the highest degree when it participates in the Good, and in such a state each being will choose for itself to be in so far as it has being from the Good; so the nature of the Good is obviously far more worthy of choice for himself, if it is true that whatever share of the Good there may be in something else is most worthy of choice, and is its freely willed substance which comes to it in accordance with its will and is one and the same thing as its will and is established in existence through its will. And as long as each individual did not have the Good it wished something else, but in that it possesses the Good it wills itself, and neither is this kind of presence by chance nor is its substance outside its will, and it is by this Good that its substance is defined and by this that it belongs to itself. If then it is by this that each thing itself makes itself, it becomes, I suppose, obvious that that Good is primarily the kind of thing it is by its own agency, by which the other things also are able to be by their own agency, and that the will, as it were, to be the kind of thing it is goes with its, as we please to call it, substance, and it is not possible to apprehend him

αὐτὸν λαβεῖν ἄνευ τοῦ θέλειν ἑαυτῷ ὅπερ ἔστί, καὶ
 30 σύνδρομος αὐτὸς ἑαυτῷ θέλων αὐτὸς εἶναι καὶ τοῦτο
 ὦν, ὅπερ θέλει, καὶ ἡ θέλησις καὶ αὐτὸς ἓν, καὶ τούτῳ
 οὐχ ἦττον ἓν, ὅτι μὴ ἄλλο αὐτός, ὅπερ ἔτυχεν, ἄλλο δὲ
 τὸ ὡς ἐβουλήθη ἄν. τί γὰρ ἂν καὶ ἠθέλησεν ἢ τοῦτο, ὃ
 ἔστι; καὶ γὰρ εἰ ὑποποιμεθα ἐλεσθαι αὐτῷ ὃ τι θέλοι
 γενέσθαι, καὶ ἐξεῖναι αὐτῷ ἀλλάξασθαι τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν
 35 εἰς ἄλλο, μήτ' ἂν ἄλλο τι γενέσθαι βουλευθῆναι, μήτ' ἂν
 ἑαυτῷ τι μέμψασθαι ὡς ὑπὸ ἀνάγκης τοῦτο ὄν, ὃ ἔστι,
 τοῦτο τὸ "αὐτὸς εἶναι" ὅπερ αὐτὸς ἀεὶ ἠθέλησε καὶ
 θέλει. ἔστι γὰρ ὄντως ἡ ἀγαθοῦ φύσις θέλησις αὐτοῦ οὐ
 δεδεκασμένου οὐδὲ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ φύσει ἐπισπομένου, ἀλλ'
 40 ἑαυτὸν ἐλομένου, ὅτι μηδὲ ἦν ἄλλο, ἵνα πρὸς ἐκεῖνο
 ἐλθῆ. καὶ μὴν κάκεινο ἂν τις λέγοι, ὡς ἐν τῇ αὐτῶν
 ἕκαστον τὰ ἄλλα οὐσία οὐ περιείληφε τὸν λόγον τὸν τοῦ
 ἀρέσκεσθαι αὐτῷ· καὶ γὰρ ἂν καὶ δυσχεραῖνοι τι αὐτό.
 ἐν δὲ τῇ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ὑποστάσει ἀνάγκη τὴν αἴρεσιν καὶ
 45 τὴν αὐτοῦ θέλησιν ἐμπεριελιμμένην εἶναι ἢ σχολῇ γ'
 ἂν ἄλλῳ ὑπάρχοι· ἑαυτῷ ἀρεστῷ εἶναι, ἃ μετουσία ἢ
 ἀγαθοῦ φαντασίᾳ ἀρέσκειται αὐτοῖς. δεῖ δὲ συγχωρεῖν
 τοῖς ὀνόμασιν, εἴ τις περὶ ἐκείνου λέγων ἐξανάγκης
 ἐνδείξεως ἕνεκα αὐτοῖς χρῆται, ἃ ἀκριβεῖα οὐκ ἔωμεν
 50 λῆγασθαι· λαμβανέτω δὲ καὶ τὸ "οἶον" ἕφ' ἐκάστου. εἰ
 οὖν ὑφέστηκε τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ συνψίστησιν αὐτὸ ἢ
 αἴρεσις καὶ ἡ βούλησις—ἄνευ γὰρ τούτων οὐκ ἔσται—
 δεῖ δὲ τοῦτο μὴ πολλὰ εἶναι, συνακτέον εἰς¹ ἓν τὴν

¹ Kirchhoff: ὡς Enn.

without the will to be by his own agency what he is, and that his willing to be himself by his own agency is concurrent with his being what he wills, and his will and he himself are one, and not less one by this, that he himself is not one thing as he happened to be and what he would have liked to be another. For what could he have wished to be except this which he is? For even if we assumed that he could choose to become what he wished, and it was possible for him to change his own nature into something else, he would not wish to become something else, or have any fault to find with himself, as if he is this thing which he is by necessity, this being himself which he always willed and wills. For the nature of the Good is in reality the will of himself, a self not corrupted nor following his own nature, but choosing himself, because there was nothing else at all that he might be drawn to. And one might also make the following point, that the other things do not each of them include in their substance the character of being satisfied with themselves: for a thing could even dislike itself. But it is necessary for the choice and willing of itself to be included in the existence of the Good, or it would hardly be possible for anything else to find itself satisfactory; they are satisfied with themselves by their participation in or imagination of the Good. But one must go along with the words, if one in speaking of that Good uses of necessity to indicate its expressions which we do not strictly speaking allow to be used; but one should understand "as if" with each of them. If then the Good is established in existence, and choice and will join in establishing it—for without these it will not be—but this Good must not be many, its will and substance

βούλησιν καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν [καὶ τὸ θέλειν].¹ τὸ δὲ θέλειν
 (εἶ)² παρ' αὐτοῦ, ἀνάγκη παρ' αὐτοῦ καὶ τὸ εἶναι αὐτῷ
 55 εἶναι, ὥστε αὐτὸν πεποιηκέναι αὐτὸν ὁ λόγος ἀνεῦρεν. εἰ
 γὰρ ἢ βούλησις παρ' αὐτοῦ καὶ ὅσον ἔργον αὐτοῦ, αὕτη
 δὲ ταῦτόν τῇ ὑποστάσει αὐτοῦ, αὐτὸς ἂν οὕτως
 ὑποστήσας ἂν εἴη αὐτόν· ὥστε οὐχ ὅπερ ἔτυχεν ἔστιν,
 ἀλλ' ὅπερ ἐβουλήθη αὐτός.

14. Ἔτι δὲ ὁρᾶν δεῖ καὶ ταύτη· ἕκαστον τῶν
 λεγομένων εἶναι ἢ ταῦτόν ἐστι τῷ εἶναι αὐτοῦ, ἢ ἕτερον·
 ὅσον ἄνθρωπος ὅδε ἕτερος, καὶ τὸ ἀνθρώπων εἶναι ἄλλο·
 μετέχει γὰρ μὴν ὁ ἄνθρωπος τοῦ ὅ ἐστιν ἀνθρώπων εἶναι.
 5 ψυχῇ δὲ καὶ τὸ ψυχῇ εἶναι ταῦτόν, εἰ
 ἀπλοῦν ψυχῇ καὶ μὴ κατ' ἄλλον, καὶ ἄνθρωπος αὐτὸ καὶ
 τὸ ἀνθρώπων εἶναι. καὶ τὸ μὲν ἂν κατὰ τύχην γένοιτο
 ἄνθρωπος, ὅσω³ ἕτερον τοῦ ἀνθρώπων εἶναι, τὸ δὲ
 ἀνθρώπων εἶναι οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο κατὰ τύχην· τοῦτο δ'
 ἐστὶ "παρ' αὐτοῦ ἄνθρωπος αὐτό". εἰ δὴ τὸ ἀνθρώπων
 10 εἶναι παρ' αὐτοῦ καὶ οὐ κατὰ τύχην τοῦτο οὐδὲ
 συμβέβηκε, πῶς ἂν τὸ ὑπὲρ τὸ ἀνθρώπων αὐτό, τὸ
 γεννητικὸν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου αὐτό, καὶ οὐ τὰ ὄντα πάντα,
 κατὰ τύχην ἂν λέγοιτο, φύσις ἀπλουστέρα τοῦ
 ἄνθρωπον εἶναι καὶ τοῦ ὅλως τὸ ὂν εἶναι; ἔτι⁴ πρὸς τὸ
 15 ἀπλοῦν ἰόντι οὐκ ἔστι συναφέρειν τὴν τύχην, ὥστε καὶ

¹ del. Vitranga.

² A^{3mg} (= Ficinus).

³ H-S¹: ὅτω Enn.

⁴ Harder: εἰ Enn.

must be brought into one; but if its willing comes from itself, it is necessary that it also gets its being from itself, so that our discourse has discovered that he has made himself. For if his will comes from himself and is something like his own work, and this will is the same thing as his existence, then in this way he will have brought himself into existence; so that he is not what he happened to be but what he himself willed.

14. And, further, one must look at it also in this way: each of the things which is said to be is either the same as its being or different; for instance, this particular human being is one thing and essential humanity another; the human being, of course, participates in essential humanity. But soul and essential soulness are the same thing if soul is simple and not predicated of something else, and the human being as such is the same as essential humanity.¹ And the one might become a human being by chance, in so far as it is different from essential humanity, but essential humanity could not come to be by chance: this means "the human being as such comes to be from himself". If then essential humanity comes to be from itself and not by chance or as it happens, how could that which is above humanity as such and which generates humanity as such, and to which all the real beings belong, be said to be by chance, a nature simpler than essential humanity and universal essential being? Further, as one goes towards the simple it is not possible to take chance

¹ There is a reference here (with a Platonic correction to bring in the Form of man) to Aristotle *Metaphysics* H 3. 1043b2-4.

εἰς τὸ ἀπλοῦστατον ἀδύνατον ἀναβαίνειν τὴν τύχην. ἔτι
 δὲ κἀκεῖνο ἀναμνησθῆναι προσήκει ἤδη που εἰρημένον,
 ὡς ἕκαστον τῶν κατὰ ἀλήθειαν ὄντων καὶ ὑπ' ἐκείνης
 τῆς φύσεως ἐλθόντων εἰς ὑπόστασιν, καὶ εἴ τι δὲ ἐν τοῖς
 20 αἰσθητοῖς τοιοῦτον,¹ τῷ ἀπ' ἐκείνων τοιοῦτον· λέγω δὲ
 τὸ τοιοῦτον τὸ σὺν αὐτῶν τῇ οὐσίᾳ ἔχειν καὶ τῆς
 ὑποστάσεως τὴν αἰτίαν, ὥστε τὸν ὕστερον θεατὴν
 ἐκάστου ἔχειν εἰπεῖν, διὸ ἕκαστον τῶν ἐνυπαρχόντων,
 οὖν διὰ τί ὀφθαλμὸς καὶ διὰ τί πόδες τοιοῦδε τοιοῦδε,
 καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν συναπογεινῶσαν ἕκαστον μέρος ἐκάστου
 25 εἶναι καὶ δι' ἄλληλα τὰ μέρη εἶναι. διὰ τί πόδες εἰς
 μῆκος; ὅτι καὶ τόδε τοιοῦδε καὶ ὅτι πρόσωπον τοιοῦδε,
 καὶ πόδες τοιοῦδε. καὶ ὅλως ἢ πρὸς ἄλληλα πάντων
 συμφωνία ἀλλήλοις αἰτία· καὶ τὸ διὰ τί τόδε, ὅτι τοῦτ'
 ἔστι τὸ ἀνθρώπων εἶναι· ὥστε ἐν καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ τὸ εἶναι καὶ
 30 τὸ αἶτιον. ταῦτα δὲ ἐκ μιᾶς πηγῆς οὕτως ἦλθεν οὐ
 λελογισμένης, ἀλλὰ παρεχούσης ὅλον ἀθρόον τὸ διὰ τί
 καὶ τὸ εἶναι. πηγὴ οὖν τοῦ εἶναι καὶ τοῦ διὰ τί εἶναι ὁμοῦ
 ἄμφω διδοῦσα· ἀλλὰ οἶα τὰ γινόμενα, πολὺ
 ἀρχετυπώτερον καὶ ἀληθέστερον καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ κατ'
 35 ἐκεῖνα πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον τὸ ἀφ' οὗ ταῦτα. εἰ οὖν μηδὲν
 εἰκῆ μηδὲ κατὰ τύχην μηδὲ τὸ "συνέβη γὰρ οὕτως" τῶν

¹ τοιοῦτον del. Igal, H-S².

up with one, so that it is impossible for chance to ascend to the simplest of all. And, further, it is appropriate to remember that statement which has already been made somewhere¹ that each and every one of the things which in truth are and have been brought to existence by that nature, and anything among the things of sense which is of this kind, is of this kind by what comes from those higher beings: I mean by "of this kind" having together with their substance also the cause of their existence, so that the observer afterwards can say why each of its inherent parts is there, for instance why there is an eye and why the feet of these particular beings are as they are and the cause which brings into existence together each part of each thing and brings them into existence on account of each other. Why are the legs and feet as long as they are? Because this is as it is, and because the face is as it is the feet and legs are as they are. And in general the harmony of all the parts with each other is their reciprocal cause; and the reason why this part is, is that this is essential humanity; so that the being and the cause are one and the same. But these came in this way from a single source which did not reason but gave the reason why and the being together as a whole. It is the source therefore of being and the why of being, giving both at once; but that from which these come is like the things which have come to be much more originally and more truly and more than as it is on their level in that it is better. If then there is nothing random or by chance and no "it happened to be like

¹ The reference is a general one to the first two chapters of the preceding treatise VI. 7.

ὅσα τὰς αἰτίας ἐν αὐτοῖς ἔχει, ἔχει δὲ τὰ ἐξ αὐτοῦ
 ἅπαντα, λόγου ὧν καὶ αἰτίας καὶ οὐσίας αἰτιώδους
 πατήρ, ἀ δὴ πάντα πόρρω ὑπάρχει τύχης, εἴη ἂν ἀρχὴ
 καὶ οἶον παράδειγμα τῶν ὅσα μὴ κεκωνώνηκε τύχη, τὸ
 40 ὄντως καὶ τὸ πρῶτον, ἀμυγῆς τύχαις καὶ αὐτομάτῳ καὶ
 συμβάσει, αἴτιον ἑαυτοῦ καὶ παρ' αὐτοῦ καὶ δι' αὐτὸν
 αὐτός· καὶ γὰρ πρῶτως αὐτὸς καὶ ὑπερόντως αὐτός.

15. Καὶ ἐράσιμον καὶ ἔρωσ ὁ αὐτὸς καὶ αὐτοῦ ἔρωσ,
 ἅτε οὐκ ἄλλως καλὸς ἢ παρ' αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ. καὶ γὰρ
 καὶ τὸ συνεῖναι ἑαυτῷ οὐκ ἂν ἄλλως ἔχοι, εἰ μὴ τὸ συνὸν
 5 καὶ τὸ ᾧ σύνεστιν ἐν καὶ ταῦτόν εἴη. εἰ δὲ τὸ συνὸν τῷ ᾧ
 σύνεστιν ἐν καὶ τὸ οἶον ἐφιέμενον τῷ ἐφετῷ ἐν, τὸ δὲ
 ἐφετὸν κατὰ τὴν ὑπόστασιν καὶ οἶον ὑποκείμενον, πάλιν
 αὐτῷ ἡμῖν ἀνεφάνη ταῦτόν ἢ ἔφεσις καὶ ἡ οὐσία. εἰ δὲ
 τοῦτο, πάλιν αὐτὸς ἐστὶν οὗτος ὁ ποιῶν ἑαυτὸν καὶ
 10 κύριος ἑαυτοῦ καὶ οὐχ ὡς τι ἕτερον ἠθέλησε γενόμενος,
 ἀλλ' ὡς θέλει αὐτός. καὶ μὴν καὶ λέγοντες αὐτὸν οὔτε τι
 εἰς αὐτὸν δέχεσθαι οὔτε ἄλλο αὐτὸν καὶ ταύτῃ ἂν εἴημεν
 ἕξω ποιῶντες τοῦ τύχης εἶναι τοιοῦτον οὐ μόνον τῷ
 μονοῦν αὐτὸν καὶ τῷ καθαρὸν ποιεῖν ἅπαντων, ἀλλ' ὅτι,
 εἴ ποτε καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐνίδοιμέν τινα φύσιν

¹There is a reference here to the *Platonic Letter* VI 323D4, one of the esoteric passages (with *Letter* II 312E) from dubiously genuine letters which were foundation-texts for

this" with the things which have their cause in themselves, and all things which come from him do have it, for he is the father of reason and cause and causative substance,¹ which are certainly all far from chance, he would be the principle and in a way the exemplar of all things which have no part in chance, truly and primarily, uncontaminated by chances and coincidence and happening, cause of himself and himself from himself and through himself; for he is primarily self and self beyond being.

15. And he, that same self, is lovable and love and love of himself, in that he is beautiful only from himself and in himself. For surely his keeping company with himself could not be in any other way than if what keeps company and what it keeps company with were the one and the same. But if what keeps company is one with what it keeps company with and what is, in a way, desiring is one with the object of desire, and the object of desire is on the side of existence and a kind of substrate, again it has become apparent to us that the desire and the substance are the same. But if this is so, again it is he himself who makes himself and is master of himself and has not come to be as something else willed, but as he himself wills. And further, when we say that he does not receive anything into himself nor does anything else receive him, in this way too we shall be placing something of this kind outside chance existence not only by making him one alone and clear of all things but for this reason: if we ever see in ourselves a nature of this

the Neoplatonists, giving Platonic authority for the doctrine of the Three Hypostases.

15 τοιαύτην οὐδὲν ἔχουσαν τῶν ἄλλων, ὅσα συνήρηται
 ἡμῖν, καθὰ πάσχειν ὅ τί περ ἂν συμβῆ [καί]¹ κατὰ
 τύχην ὑπάρχει—πάντα γὰρ τὰ ἄλλα, ὅσα ἡμῶν, δοῦλα
 κάκκειμένα² τύχαις καὶ οἶον κατὰ τύχην προσελθόντα,
 τούτῳ δὲ μόνῳ τὸ κύριον αὐτοῦ καὶ τὸ αὐτεξούσιον
 20 φωτὸς ἀγαθοειδοῦς καὶ ἀγαθοῦ ἐνεργεία καὶ μείζονος ἢ
 κατὰ νοῦν, οὐκ ἐπακτὸν τὸ ὑπὲρ τὸ νοεῖν ἐχούσης· εἰς ὃ
 δὴ ἀναβάντες καὶ γενόμενοι τοῦτο μόνον, τὰ δ' ἄλλα
 ἀφέντες, τί ἂν εἴπομεν αὐτὸ ἢ ὅτι πλέον ἢ ἐλεύθεροι,
 καὶ πλέον ἢ αὐτεξούσιοι; τίς δ' ἂν ἡμᾶς προσάψειε τότε
 25 τύχαις ἢ τῷ εἰκῆ ἢ τῷ “συμβέβηκεν” αὐτὸ τὸ ἀληθινὸν
 ζῆν γενομένους ἢ ἐν τούτῳ γενομένους, ὃ μηδὲν ἔχει
 ἄλλο, ἀλλ' ἔστιν αὐτὸ μόνον; τὰ μὲν οὖν ἄλλα μονούμενα
 οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτοῖς ἀντάρκη εἶναι εἰς τὸ εἶναι τοῦτο δέ
 ἔστιν ὃ ἔστι καὶ μονούμενον. ὑπόστασις δὲ πρώτη οὐκ ἐν
 ἀιδήχῳ οὐδ' ἐν ζωῇ ἀλόγῳ· ἀσθενὴς γὰρ εἰς τὸ εἶναι καὶ
 30 αὕτη σκέδασις οὐσα λόγου καὶ ἀοριστία· ἀλλ' ὅσα
 πρόεισιν εἰς λόγον, ἀπολείπει τύχην· τὸ γὰρ κατὰ λόγον
 οὐ τύχη· ἀναβαίνουσι δὲ ἡμῖν ἐκείνο μὲν οὐ λόγος,
 κάλλιον δὲ ἢ λόγος· τοσοῦτον ἀπέχει τοῦ τύχην
 συμβῆναι. ῥίζα γὰρ λόγου παρ' αὐτῆς καὶ εἰς τοῦτο
 35 λήγει τὰ πάντα, ὡσπερ φυτοῦ μεγίστου κατὰ λόγον
 ζῶντος ἀρχὴ καὶ βάσις, μένουσα γὰρ αὐτῇ ἐφ' ἑαυτῆς,
 διδοῦσα δὲ κατὰ λόγον τῷ φυτῷ, ὃν ἔλαβεν, εἶναι.

¹ del. H-S¹.² conicicimus: καὶ κείμενη Enn.

kind which has nothing of the other things which are attached to us by which we have to experience whatever happens by chance—for all the other things which belong to us are enslaved to and exposed to chances, and come to us in a way by chance, but this alone has self-mastery and self-disposal by the active presence of a light in the form of good, and good, and greater than that which belongs to Intellect, having its transcendence of Intellect not as something brought in from outside; surely, when we ascend to this and become this alone and let the rest go, what can we say of it except that we are more than free and more than independent? Who could then make us depend on chances or randomness or just happening when we have become the true life itself or come to be in it, which has nothing else but is itself alone? For the other things when they are isolated cannot be self-sufficient enough to exist; but this is what it is also when it is isolated. But as first existence it is not in the soulless and not in irrational life; for this also is too weak to exist and is a dispersal of rational principle and an indefiniteness; but in so far as it advances towards rational principle, it leaves chance behind; for that which is in accordance with rational principle is not by chance. But for us as we ascend that is not rational principle but more beautiful than rational principle; so far is it from happening by chance. For it is the root of rational principle from itself, and all things come to a stop in it; it is like the principle and fundament of a mighty tree living according to rational principle which remains itself by itself but gives to the tree existence according to the rational principle which it receives.

16. Ἐπεὶ δὲ φαμεν καὶ δοκεῖ πανταχοῦ τε εἶναι
 τοῦτο καὶ αὐτὸ εἶναι οὐδαμοῦ, τοῦτό τοι χρὴ ἐνθυμηθῆναι
 καὶ νοῆσαι, οἷον δεῖ καὶ ἐντεῦθεν σκοποῦμένοις θέσθαι
 περὶ ὧν ζητοῦμεν. εἰ γὰρ μηδαμοῦ, οὐδαμοῦ συμβέβηκε,
 5 καὶ εἰ πανταχοῦ, ὅσος ἐστὶν αὐτός, τοσοῦτος πανταχοῦ·
 ὥστε τὸ πανταχοῦ καὶ τὸ πάντη αὐτός, οὐκ ἐν ἐκείνῳ
 ὧν τῷ πανταχοῦ, ἀλλ' αὐτὸς ὧν τοῦτο καὶ δούς εἶναι
 τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐν τῷ πανταχοῦ παρακείσθαι. ὁ δ'
 ὑπερτάτην ἔχων τάξιν, μᾶλλον δὲ οὐκ ἔχων, ἀλλ' ὧν
 10 ὑπέρτατος αὐτός, δοῦλα πάντα ἔχει, οὐ συμβὰς αὐτοῖς,
 αὐτῷ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων, μᾶλλον δὲ περὶ αὐτὸν τῶν ἄλλων,
 οὐ πρὸς αὐτὰ βλέποντος αὐτοῦ, ἀλλ' ἐκείνων πρὸς
 αὐτόν· ὁ δ' εἰς τὸ εἶσω οἷον φέρεται αὐτοῦ οἷον ἑαυτὸν
 ἀγαπήσας, ἀ γ γ ἦ ν κ α θ α ρ ά ν, αὐτὸς ὧν τοῦτο, ὅπερ
 15 ἠγάπησε· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ὑποστήσας αὐτόν, εἴπερ
 ἐνέργεια μένουσα καὶ τὸ ἀγαπητότατον οἷον νοῦς. νοῦς
 δὲ ἐνέργημα ὥστε ἐνέργημα αὐτός. ἀλλὰ ἄλλου μὲν
 οὐδενός· ἑαυτοῦ ἄρα ἐνέργημα αὐτός. οὐκ ἄρα ὡς
 συμβέβηκέν ἐστιν, ἀλλ' ὡς ἐνεργεῖ αὐτός. ἔτι τοίνυν, εἰ
 ἔστι μάλιστα, ὅτι πρὸς αὐτόν οἷον στηρίζει καὶ οἷον
 20 πρὸς αὐτόν βλέπει καὶ τὸ οἷον εἶναι τοῦτο αὐτῷ τὸ πρὸς
 αὐτόν βλέπειν, οἷον ποιοῖ ἂν αὐτόν, οἷον ὡς ἔτυχεν ἄρα
 ἐστίν, ἀλλ' ὡς αὐτὸς θέλει, καὶ οὐδ' ἢ θέλησις εἰκὴ οὐδ'
 οὕτω συνέβη· τοῦ γὰρ ἀρίστου ἢ θέλησις οὐσα οὐκ ἐστὶν
 εἰκὴ. ὅτι δ' ἢ τοιαύτη νεύσις αὐτοῦ πρὸς αὐτόν οἷον
 25 ἐνέργεια οὐσα αὐτοῦ καὶ μονή ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ εἶναι ὅ ἐστι

¹ The light in which the souls see the Forms in *Phaedrus* 250C4; for Plotinus this light is the Good (or comes from the Good: VI. 7. 21–22).

16. But since we maintain, and it appears to be so, that this is everywhere and again is nowhere, we must ponder this and think out what we ought to posit about the subject of our enquiry when we look at it from this point of view. For if he is nowhere, he has not happened to be anywhere, and if he is everywhere, he is as much as he is everywhere; so that the "everywhere" and "in every way" are himself; he is not in that everywhere, but is this himself and gives the others their being there with him in the everywhere. But he, since he has the highest place, or rather does not have it, but is himself the highest, has all things as slaves; he does not happen to them, but they to him, or rather they happen around him; he does not look to them, but they to him; but he is, if we may say so, borne to his own interior, as it were well pleased with himself, the "pure radiance",¹ being himself this with which he is well pleased; but this means that he gives himself existence, supposing him to be an abiding active actuality and the most pleasing of things in a way rather like Intellect. But Intellect is an actualisation; so that he is an actualisation. But not of anything else; he is then an actualisation of himself. He is not therefore as he happens to be, but as he acts. And then, further, if he is supremely because he so to speak holds to himself and so to speak looks to himself, and this so-called being of his is his looking to himself, he as it were makes himself and is not as he chanced to be but as he wills, and his willing is not random nor as it happened; for since it is willing of the best it is not random. But that an inclination of this kind to himself, being in a kind of way his activity and abiding in himself, makes him be what

ποιεί, μαρτυρεῖ ὑποθετὲν τοῖναντίον· ὅτι, εἰ πρὸς τὸ
 ἕξω κρύσειεν αὐτοῦ, ἀπολεῖ τὸ εἶναι ὅπερ ἐστί· τὸ ἄρα
 εἶναι ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἢ ἐνέργεια ἢ πρὸς αὐτόν· τοῦτο δὲ ἐν
 καὶ αὐτός. αὐτὸς ἄρα ὑπέστησεν αὐτὸν συνεξενεχθείσης
 30 τῆς ἐνεργείας μετ' αὐτοῦ. εἰ οὖν μὴ γέγονεν, ἀλλ' ἦν ἀεὶ
 ἢ ἐνέργεια αὐτοῦ καὶ οἷον ἐγρηγόρησις οὐκ ἄλλου ὄντος
 τοῦ ἐγρηγορότος, ἐγρηγόρησις καὶ ὑπερνήσις ἀεὶ οὐσα,
 ἔστιν οὕτως, ὡς ἐγρηγόρησεν. ἢ δὲ ἐγρηγόρησις ἐστὶν
 ἐπέκεινα οὐσίας καὶ νοῦ καὶ ζωῆς ἐμφρονος· ταῦτα δὲ
 35 αὐτός ἐστιν. αὐτὸς ἄρα ἐστὶν ἐνέργεια ὑπὲρ νοῦν καὶ
 φρόνησιν καὶ ζωὴν· ἐξ αὐτοῦ δὲ ταῦτα καὶ οὐ παρ'
 ἄλλου. παρ' αὐτοῦ ἄρα αὐτῷ καὶ ἐξ αὐτοῦ τὸ εἶναι. οὐκ
 ἄρα, ὡς συνέβη, οὕτως ἐστὶν, ἀλλ' ὡς ἠθέλησεν αὐτός
 ἐστίν.

17. Ἐπι δὲ καὶ ὧδε· ἕκαστά φαμεν τὰ ἐν τῷ παντὶ
 καὶ τόδε τὸ πᾶν οὕτως ἔχειν, ὡς ἂν ἔσχεν, ὡς ἢ τοῦ
 ποιούντος προαίρεσις ἠθέλησε, καὶ οὕτως ἔχειν, ὡς ἂν
 προϊέμενος καὶ προῖδων ἐν λογισμοῖς κατὰ πρόνοιαν
 5 οὗτος¹ εἰργάσατο. ἀεὶ δὲ οὕτως ἐχόντων καὶ ἀεὶ οὕτως
 γιγνομένων, οὕτω τοι καὶ ἀεὶ ἐν τοῖς συνοῦσι κείσθαι
 τοὺς λόγους ἐν μείζονι εὐθημοσύνη ἐυτάτας· ὥστε
 ἐπέκεινα προνοίας τάκει εἶναι καὶ ἐπέκεινα προ-
 αιρέσεως καὶ πάντα ἀεὶ νοερώς ἐστηκότα εἶναι, ὅσα
 10 ἐν τῷ ὄντι. ὥστε τὴν οὕτω διάθεσιν εἴ τις ὀνομάζει

¹ Theiler: οὕτως Enn.

he is, is evident if one posits the opposite; because, if he inclined to what is outside him, he would put an end to his being what he is; so then his being what he is is his self-directed activity; but these are one thing and himself. He therefore brought himself into existence, since his activity was brought out into existence along with himself. If then he did not come into being, but his activity was always and a something like being awake, when the waker was not someone else, a wakefulness and a thought transcending thought which exists always, then he is as he woke himself to be. But his waking transcends substance and intellect and intelligent life; but these are himself. He then is an active actuality above intellect and thought and life¹; but these are from him and not from another. His being then comes by and from himself. He is not therefore as he happened to be, but he is himself as he willed.

17. And further, [consider it] also like this: we affirm that each and every thing in the All, and this All here itself, is as it would have been if the free choice of its maker had willed it, and its state is as if this maker proceeding regularly in his calculations with foresight had made it according to his providence. But since things here are always like this and always come to be like this, so their rational principles also always rest among the things which exist all together, standing still in a better order; so that the things there transcend providence and transcend free choice, and all the things which are in real being stand in intellectual stillness. So that if someone calls this disposition of things providence,

¹ Again *Republic* VI 509B9.

πρόνοιαν, οὕτω νοεῖτω, ὅτι ἐστὶ πρὸ τοῦδε νοῦς τοῦ
 παντός ἐστώς, ἀφ' οὗ καὶ καθ' ὃν τὸ πᾶν τόδε. εἰ μὲν οὖν
 νοῦς πρὸ πάντων καὶ ἀρχὴ ὁ τοιοῦτος νοῦς, οὐκ ἂν εἴη
 ὡς ἔτυχε, πολλὸς μὲν ὢν, συνωδὸς δὲ αὐτῷ καὶ οἶον εἰς
 15 ἓν συντεταγμένος. οὐδὲν γὰρ πολὺ καὶ πλήθος
 συντεταγμένον καὶ λόγοι πάντες καὶ περιληφθέντες ἐνὶ
 δια παντός ὡς ἔτυχε καὶ ὡς συνέβη, ἀλλὰ πόρρω
 φύσεως τῆς τωαύτης καὶ ἐναντίον, ὅσον τύχη ἐν ἀλογίᾳ
 κειμένη λόγῳ. εἰ δὲ τὸ πρὸ τοῦ τοιοῦτου ἀρχή, δηλονότι
 20 προσεχῆς τούτῳ τῷ οὕτω λελογωμένῳ, καὶ τὸ οὕτω
 λεγόμενον τοῦτο κατ' ἐκείνο καὶ μετέχον ἐκείνου καὶ
 οἶον θέλει ἐκείνο καὶ δύναμις ἐκείνου. ἀδιάστατος τοίνυν
 ἐκείνους, εἰς <εἰς>¹ πάντα λόγος, εἰς ἀριθμὸς καὶ εἰς
 μείζων τοῦ γενομένου καὶ δυνατώτερος, καὶ οὐδὲν
 μείζων αὐτοῦ οὐδὲ κρείττον. οὐδὲ ἄρα ἐξ ἄλλου ἔχει οὔτε
 25 τὸ εἶναι οὔτε τὸ ὁποῖός ἐστιν εἶναι. αὐτὸς ἄρα αὐτῷ ὅ
 ἐστι πρὸς αὐτόν καὶ εἰς αὐτόν, ἵνα μηδὲ ταύτη πρὸς τὸ
 ἔξω ἢ πρὸς ἄλλον, ἀλλὰ πρὸς αὐτὸν πάς.

18. Καὶ σὺ ζητῶν μηδὲν ἔξω ζήτει αὐτοῦ, ἀλλ' εἴσω
 πάντα τὰ μετ' αὐτόν· αὐτὸν δὲ ἔα. τὸ γὰρ ἔξω αὐτός
 ἐστι, περίληψις πάντων καὶ μέτρον. ἢ εἴσω ἐν βάθει, τὸ
 δ' ἔξω αὐτοῦ, οἶον κύκλῳ ἐφαπτόμενον αὐτοῦ καὶ
 5 ἐξηρητημένον πᾶν ὁ λόγος καὶ νοῦς· μᾶλλον δ' ἂν εἴη

¹ Cilento.

he must understand it in this way, that Intellect is
 there standing still before this All, and this All here
 is from and according to Intellect. If then Intellect
 was before all things and an intellect of this kind
 was the principle, it would not be just as it chanced
 to be, being many but in tune with itself and as it
 were brought together into a single order. For what
 is many and an ordered multiplicity, and all rational
 forms included in one which goes through all, none
 of this is as it chanced and as it happened to be, but it
 is far from a nature of this kind and opposed to it, as
 much as chance whose place is in unreason is to
 rational principle. But if that before the Intellect of
 this kind is the principle, it is obviously close to this
 which is rationalised in this way, and what we speak
 of in this way is according to that and participates in
 that and is as that wills and is the power of that. He
 is then without dimensions, one rational principle
 for all things, one number and one which is greater
 and more powerful than what has come into being,
 and there is nothing greater or better than him. He
 does not then have from another either his being or
 his being what he is. He himself therefore is by
 himself what he is, related and directed to himself,
 that he may not in this way either be related to the
 outside or to something else, but altogether self-
 related.

18. And you when you seek, seek nothing outside
 him, but seek within all things which come after
 him; but leave him himself alone. For he himself is
 the outside, the encompassment and measure of all
 things. Or within in depth, but what is outside him,
 touching him in a kind of circle and depending on
 him, is all which is rational principle and intellect;

νοῦς, καθὸ ἐφάπτεται καὶ ἡ ἐξήρηται¹ αὐτοῦ [καὶ ἡ ἐξήρηται],² ἄτε παρ' ἐκείνου ἔχων τὸ νοῦς εἶναι. ὡςπερ ἂν οὖν κύκλος, (ὄς)³ ἐφάπτοιτο κέντρου κύκλω, ὁμολογοῖτο ἂν τὴν δύναμιν παρὰ τοῦ κέντρου
 10 ἔχειν καὶ οἶον κεντροειδῆς, ἡ⁴ γραμμαὶ ἐν κύκλω πρὸς κέντρον ἐν συνιοῦσαι τὸ πέρασ αὐτῶν τὸ πρὸς τὸ κέντρον ποιοῦσι τοιοῦτον εἶναι οἶον τὸ πρὸς ὃ ἠνέχθησαν καὶ ἀφ' οὗ οἶον ζέξφυσαν, μείζονος ἔντος ἡ κατὰ ταύτας τὰς γραμμὰς καὶ τὰ πέρατα αὐτῶν τὰ
 15 αὐτῶν σημεῖα τῶν γραμμῶν—καὶ ἔστι μὲν οἶον ἐκείνο, ἀμυδρὰ δὲ καὶ ἴχνη ἐκείνου τοῦ ὃ δύναται αὐτὰ καὶ τὰς γραμμὰς δυνάμενον, αἱ πανταχοῦ ἔχουσι αὐτό· καὶ ἐμφαίνεται διὰ τῶν γραμμῶν, οἶον ἔστιν ἐκείνο, οἶον ἐξελιχθὲν οὐκ ἐξεληλιγμένον—οὕτω τοι καὶ τὸν νοῦν καὶ τὸ ὄν χρή λαμβάνειν, γενόμενον ἐξ ἐκείνου καὶ οἶον
 20 ἐκχυθὲν καὶ ἐξελιχθὲν καὶ ἐξηρητημένον, ἐκ τῆς αὐτοῦ νοεράς φύσεως μαρτυρεῖν τὸν οἶον ἐν ἐνὶ νοῦν οὐ νοῦν ἄντα· ἐν γάρ. ὡςπερ οὐδ' ἐκεῖ γραμμὰς οὐδὲ κύκλον τὸ κέντρον, κύκλου δὲ καὶ γραμμῶν πατέρα, ἴχνη αὐτοῦ δόντα καὶ δυνάμει μενούση γραμμὰς καὶ κύκλον οὐ
 25 πάντη ἀπηρητημένα αὐτοῦ ῥώμη τινὶ γεγεννηκότα· οὕτω τοι καὶ ἐκείνο, τῆς νοεράς περιθεούσης δυνάμεως, τὸ οἶον ἰνδάλματος αὐτοῦ ἀρχέτυπον, ἐν ἐνὶ νοῦν, πολλοῖς καὶ εἰς πολλὰ οἶον νενικημένου καὶ νοῦ διὰ ταῦτα γενομένου, ἐκείνου πρὸ νοῦ μείναντος (ἐκ)⁵ τῆς
 30 δυνάμεως αὐτοῦ νοῦς γενήσαντος—τίς ἂν συντυχία (ἡ τὸ αὐτόματον ἡ τὸ ὡς συνέβη εἶναι') τῆς τοιαύτης

¹ coniecimus: ἐφάπτεται Enn.

² delevimus.

³ Theiler.

⁴ P^{3mg} (= Ficinus): ἡ Enn.

⁵ A^{3mg} (= Ficinus), H-S¹: om. H-S².

but, rather, it would be Intellect, in so far as it touches him and in the way that it depends on him, in that it has from him its being Intellect. Just as a circle, therefore, which touches the centre all round in a circle, would be agreed to have its power from the centre and to have in a way the centre's form, in that the radii in the circle coming together to one centre make their terminal point at the centre like that to which they are carried and from which they, so to speak, grow out, though the centre is greater than is proportionate to these lines and their terminal points, the points of the lines themselves—and the terminal points are like that centre, but only a dim image of that which has power to produce them in having power also to produce the lines; and what that centre is like is revealed through the lines; it is as if it was spread out without having been spread out—it is like this that we must apprehend that Intellect-Being, coming to be from that Good and as if poured out and spread out and hanging out from it, is, by its own intelligent nature, evidence of something like Intellect in the One which is not Intellect; for it is one. Just as in our example also the radii and the circle were not the centre, but it is the father of circle and radii giving traces of itself and with an abiding power generating radii and circle, not at all cut off from it, by a kind of strength; so also is that too, as the intellectual power runs round it, a kind of archetype of the image of itself, Intellect in one, an image, as it were, overcome by many and into many and so becoming Intellect, while that remains before Intellect and generates intellects from its power—what chance happening (or accident or "as it happened to be") could come near a power like this

δυνάμειος τῆς νοοποιού καὶ ὄντως ποιητικῆς πλησίον
 ἦκοι; οἷον γὰρ τὸ ἐν νῶ, πολλαχῆ μείζον ἢ τοιοῦτον τὸ
 ἐν ἐνὶ ἐκείνῳ, ὡσπερ φωτὸς ἐπὶ πολὺ σκεδασθέντος ἐξ
 35 ἐνός τινος ἐν αὐτῷ ὄντος διαφανούς· εἰδωλον μὲν τὸ
 σκεδασθέν, τὸ δ' ἀφ' οὗ τὸ ἀληθές· οὐ μὴν ἄλλοειδές τὸ
 σκεδασθέν εἰδωλον ὁ νοῦς, ὃς οὐ τύχη, ἀλλὰ καθέκαστον
 αὐτοῦ λόγος καὶ αἰτία, αἴτιον δὲ ἐκείνο τοῦ αἰτίου.
 μείζονως ἄρα οἷον αἰτιώτατον καὶ ἀληθέστερον αἰτία,
 40 ὁμοῦ πάσας ἔχον τὰς μελλούσας ἀπ' αὐτοῦ ἔσεσθαι
 νοεράς αἰτίας καὶ γεννητικὸν τοῦ οὐχ ὡς ἔτυχε, ἀλλ'
 ὡς ἠθέλησεν αὐτός. ἢ δὲ θέλησις οὐκ ἄλογος ἦν οὐδὲ τοῦ
 εἰκῆ οὐδ' ὡς ἐπήλθεν αὐτῷ, ἀλλ' ὡς ἔδει, ὡς οὐδενὸς
 ὄντος ἐκεῖ εἰκῆ. ὅθεν καὶ δέον καὶ καιρὸν
 45 ὁ Πλάτων ὡς οἷον τε ἦν σημήναι ἐφιέμενος, ὅτι πόρρω
 τοῦ ὡς ἔτυχε, ἀλλ' ὅπερ ἐστὶ, τοῦτο δέον. εἰ δὲ τὸ δέον
 τοῦτο, οὐκ ἀλόγως τοῦτο, καὶ εἰ καιρός, τὸ μάλιστα
 κυριώτατον ἐν τοῖς μετ' αὐτὸ καὶ πρότερον αὐτῷ καὶ
 οὐχ οἷον ἔτυχε τοῦτό ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ τοῦτό ἐστιν, ὅπερ οἷον
 50 ἐβουλήθη αὐτός, εἴπερ τὰ δέοντα βούλεται καὶ ἐν τῷ
 δέον καὶ ἢ τοῦ δέοντος ἐνέργεια· καὶ ἐστὶ δέον οὐχ ὡς
 ὑποκείμενον, ἀλλ' ὡς ἐνέργεια πρώτη τοῦτο ἑαυτὴν
 ἐκφήρασα, ὅπερ ἔδει. οὕτω γὰρ δεῖ αὐτὸν λέγειν
 ἀδυνατοῦντα λέγειν ὡς τις ἐθέλει.

¹ Taken from an entirely different context, Plato's discussion of the two kinds of measurement, *Statesman* 288

which makes Intellect and is maker of reality? For something like what is in Intellect, in many ways greater, is in that One; it is like a light dispersed far and wide from some one thing translucent in itself; what is dispersed is image, but that from which it comes is truth; though certainly the dispersed image, Intellect, is not of alien form; it is not chance, but each and every part of it is rational principle and cause, but that One is cause of the cause. He is then in a greater degree something like the most causative and truest of causes, possessing all together the intellectual causes which are going to be from him and generative of what is not as it chanced but as he himself willed. And his willing is not irrational, or of the random, or just as it happened to occur to him, but as it ought to be, since nothing there is random. For this reason Plato speaks of "due" and "right moment",¹ desiring to indicate as far as possible that it is far from "as it chanced", but what it is is what it ought to be. But if this is what ought to be, it is not so irrationally, and if it is the right moment it has the most authentic mastery among the things which come after it, and has priority in its own right and is not what it in a way chanced to be, but what he in a way wished to be, since he wishes what ought to be and what ought to be and the active actuality of what ought to be are one; and it is not what ought to be as a substrate, but as the first active actuality revealing itself as what it ought to be. For this is how one has to speak of him since one is unable to speak as one should.

284D-E, from which Aristotle develops his doctrine of the Mean.

19. Λαμβανέτω τις οὖν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων
 ἀνακινήθεις πρὸς ἐκείνο ἐκείνο αὐτό, καὶ θεάσεται καὶ
 αὐτὸς οὐχ ὅσον θέλει εἰπεῖν δυνάμενος. ἰδὼν δὲ ἐκείνο ἐν
 αὐτῷ πάντα λόγον ἀφείς θήσεται παρ' αὐτοῦ ἐκείνο
 5 τοῦτο οὖν, ὡς, εἴπερ εἶχεν οὐσίαν, δούλην ἂν αὐτοῦ τὴν
 οὐσίαν εἶναι καὶ οἶον παρ' αὐτοῦ εἶναι. οὐδ' ἂν
 τολμήσειέ τις ἰδὼν ἔτι τὸ "ὡς συνέβη" λέγειν, οὐδ' ἂν
 ὁλως φθέγγασθαι δύναται· ἐκπλαγείη γὰρ ἂν τολμῶν,
 καὶ οὐδ' ἂν ἔχοι αἰξίας "ποῦ" εἰπεῖν περὶ αὐτοῦ πάντη
 10 αὐτῷ ἐκείνου οἶον πρὸ ὀμμάτων τῆς ψυχῆς προ-
 φαινομένου καί, ὅποι ἂν ἀτενίσῃ, ἐκείνον βλέποντος, εἰ
 μή ποι ἄλλη ἀφείς τὸν θεὸν ἀτενίσῃ μηδὲν ἔτι¹ περὶ
 αὐτοῦ διανοοῦμενος. χρηὴ δὲ ἴσως καὶ τὸ ἐπέκεινα
 οὐσίης καὶ ταύτη νοεῖσθαι τοῖς παλαιοῖς λεγόμενον
 15 δι' αἰνίξεως, οὐ μόνον ὅτι γεννᾷ οὐσίαν, ἀλλ' ὅτι οὐ
 δουλεύει οὐδὲ οὐσίᾳ οὐδὲ ἑαυτῷ, οὐδέ ἐστιν αὐτῷ ἀρχὴ
 ἢ οὐσία αὐτοῦ, ἀλλ' αὐτὸς ἀρχὴ τῆς οὐσίας ὣν οὐχ αὐτῷ
 ἐποίησε τὴν οὐσίαν, ἀλλὰ ποιήσας ταύτην ἕξω εἴασεν
 ἑαυτοῦ, ἅτε οὐδὲν τοῦ εἶναι δεόμενος, ὃς ἐποίησεν αὐτό.
 20 οὐ τοίνυν οὐδὲ καθό ἐστι ποιεῖ τὸ ἔστι.

20. Τί οὖν; οὐ συμβαίνει, εἴποι τις ἂν, πρὶν ἢ
 γενέσθαι γεγονέναι; εἰ γὰρ ποιεῖ ἑαυτόν, τῷ μὲν
 "ἑαυτόν" οὐπω ἐστί, τῷ δ' οὐ ποιεῖν ἔστιν ἤδη πρὸ
 ἑαυτοῦ τοῦ ποιουμένου ὄντος αὐτοῦ. πρὸς δ' ὀδη λεκτέον,

¹ A^{3mg} (= Ficinus): εἴ τ. wBUCQ: ἦτοι x.

19. Raised up, then, towards that by what has
 been said one should take hold of that itself, and he
 will see also himself and will not be able to say all
 that he wishes. But when he sees that in itself he will
 put away all reasoning and will set that by itself as
 being such that, if it had substance, its substance
 would be its slave and as if derived from it. Nor
 would one who sees it still be rash enough to say "as
 it happened to be"; nor is he able to utter a word
 about it; if he did he would be struck dumb in his
 rashness, and would not in his swift flight be able to
 say "where" about it; it appears everywhere to him
 as if before the eyes of his soul and, wherever he fixes
 his gaze, he is looking at him, unless he leaves the
 God and fixes his gaze elsewhere and thinks no more
 about him. And one ought perhaps to understand
 that it was in this sense that the ancients spoke of
 "beyond being" with a hidden meaning,¹ not only
 that he generates substance but that he is not a slave
 to substance or to himself, nor is his substance his
 principle, but he, being principle of substance, did
 not make substance for himself but when he had
 made it left it outside himself, because he has no
 need of being, he who made it. He does not then even
 make being in accordance with his being.

20. "Well then," someone might say, "does he not
 happen to be already before he comes into being? For
 if he makes himself, as regards himself he does not
 yet exist, but on the other hand as regards the
 making he exists already before himself, as he him-
 self is what is made." To this we must reply that he is

¹ The reference is of course again to Plato *Republic* VI
 509B9.

5 ὡς ὅλως οὐ τακτέον κατὰ τὸν ποιούμενον, ἀλλὰ κατὰ
τὸν ποιῶντα, ἀπόλυτον τὴν ποιήσιν αὐτοῦ τιθεμένοις,
καὶ οὐχ ἵνα ἄλλο ἀποτελεσθῆ ἔξ αὐτοῦ τῆς ποιήσεως,
ἄλλου τῆς¹ ἐνεργείας αὐτοῦ οὐκ ἀποτελεστικῆς, ἀλλ'
ὅλου τούτου ὄντος· οὐ γὰρ δύο, ἀλλ' ἓν. οὐδὲ γὰρ
10 φοβητέον ἐνεργεῖαν τὴν πρώτην τίθεσθαι ἄνευ οὐσίας,
ἀλλ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο τὴν οἶον ὑπόστασιν θετέον. εἰ δὲ
ὑπόστασιν ἄνευ ἐνεργείας τις θεῖτο, ἐλλιπῆς ἢ ἀρχὴ καὶ
ἀτελής ἢ τελειοτάτη πασῶν ἔσται. καὶ εἰ προσθείη
ἐνεργεῖαν, οὐχ ἓν τηρεῖ. εἰ οὖν τελειότερον ἢ ἐνεργεῖα
15 τῆς οὐσίας, τελειότατον δὲ τὸ πρῶτον, πρῶτον ἂν
ἐνεργεῖα εἴη. ἐνεργήσας οὖν ἤδη ἔστι τούτο, καὶ οὐκ
ἔστιν ὡς πρὶν γενέσθαι ἦν· τότε² γὰρ οὐκ ἦν πρὶν
γενέσθαι, ἀλλ' ἤδη πᾶς ἦν. ἐνεργεῖα δὲ οὐ δουλεύουσα
οὐσία καθαρῶς ἐστὶν ἐλευθέρα, καὶ οὕτως³ αὐτὸς παρ'
20 αὐτοῦ αὐτός. καὶ γὰρ εἰ μὲν ἐσώζετο εἰς τὸ εἶναι ὑπ'
ἄλλου, οὐ πρῶτος αὐτὸς ἔξ αὐτοῦ· εἰ δ' αὐτὸς αὐτὸν
ὀρθῶς λέγεται συνέχειν, αὐτὸς ἐστὶ καὶ ὁ παράγων
ἑαυτόν, εἴπερ, ὅπερ συνέχει κατὰ φύσιν, τοῦτο καὶ ἔξ
ἀρχῆς πεποίηκεν εἶναι. εἰ μὲν οὖν χρόνος ἦν, ὅθεν
ἤρξατο εἶναι, τὸ πεποιηκέναι κυριώτατον ἂν ἐλέχθη·
25 νῦν δέ, εἰ καὶ πρὶν αἰῶνα εἶναι ὅπερ ἔστιν ἦν, τὸ
πεποιηκέναι ἑαυτὸν τοῦτο νοεῖται τὸ σύνδρομον εἶναι τὸ
πεποιηκέναι καὶ αὐτό· ἓν γὰρ τῆ ποιήσει καὶ οἶον
γεννήσει αἰδίῳ τὸ εἶναι. ὅθεν καὶ τὸ "ἄρχων ἑαυτοῦ".

¹ H-S¹: ἀλλ' οὐσίας Enn.

² Theiler: ὅτε Enn.

³ Nicephorus Gregorius: οἴτος Enn.

not at all to be classed as made, but as maker; we must posit that his making is absolute, and not in order that something else should be brought to perfection by his making, since his activity is not directed to the perfection of something else, but is altogether this God; for there are not two, but one. Nor should we be afraid to assume that the first activity is without substance, but posit this very fact as his, so to speak, existence. But if one posited an existence without activity, the principle would be defective and the most perfect of all imperfect. And if one adds activity one does not keep the One. If then the activity is more perfect than the substance, and the first is most perfect, the first will be activity. In his activity, therefore, he is already this first, and it cannot be that he was before he came to be; for then he was not before coming to be, but already altogether was. Now certainly an activity not enslaved to substance is purely and simply free, and in this way he himself is himself from himself. For indeed, if he was kept in being by another, he would not be first self from himself; but if he is rightly said to hold himself together, he is both himself and the bringer of himself into being, granted that what he by his nature holds together is what from the beginning he has made to be. Now if there was a time from which he began to be, "he has made" would be used in the strict and proper sense; but now, if he was what he is before eternity existed, this "he has made" must be understood to mean that making and self are concurrent; for the being is one with the making and what we may call the eternal generation. From this too [it comes that we say] "ruling himself"; and if there were two, this is properly said, but if there is

καὶ εἰ μὲν δύο, κυρίως, εἰ δὲ ἓν, τὸ "ἄρχων" μόνον· οὐ
 30 γὰρ ἔχει τὸ ἀρχόμενον. πῶς οὖν ἄρχον οὐκ ὄντος πρὸς ὃ;
 ἢ τὸ ἄρχον ἐνταῦθα πρὸς τὸ πρὸ αὐτοῦ, ὅτι μηδὲν ἦν. εἰ
 δὲ μηδὲν ἦν, πρῶτον· τοῦτο δὲ οὐ τάξει, ἀλλὰ κυριότητι
 καὶ δυνάμει αὐτεξουσίῳ καθαρῶς. εἰ δὲ καθαρῶς, οὐκ
 ἔστιν ἐκεῖ λαβεῖν τὸ μὴ αὐτεξουσίως. ὅλον οὖν
 35 αὐτεξουσίως ἐν αὐτῷ. τί οὖν αὐτοῦ, ὃ μὴ αὐτός; τί οὖν,
 ὃ μὴ ἐνεργεῖ; καὶ τί, ὃ μὴ ἔργον αὐτοῦ; εἰ γὰρ τι εἴη μὴ
 ἔργον αὐτοῦ ἐν αὐτῷ, οὐ καθαρῶς ἂν εἴη οὔτε
 αὐτεξουσίως οὔτε πάντα δυνάμενος· ἐκείνου τε γὰρ οὐ
 κύριος πάντα τε οὐ δυνάμενος. ἐκείνου γοῦν οὐ δύναται,
 οὐ μὴ αὐτὸς κύριος εἰς τὸ ποιεῖν.

21. Ἐδύνατο οὖν ἄλλο τι ποιεῖν ἑαυτὸν ἢ ὃ ἐποίησεν;
 ἢ οὐπω¹ καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ποιεῖν ἀναιρήσομεν, ὅτι μὴ ἂν
 κακὸν ποιοί. οὐ γὰρ οὕτω τὸ δύνασθαι ἐκεῖ, ὡς καὶ τὰ
 ἀντικείμενα, ἀλλ' ὡς ἀστεμφεῖ καὶ ἀμετακινήτω
 5 δυνάμει, ἢ μάλιστα δυνάμεις ἐστιν, ὅταν μὴ ἐξίστηται
 τοῦ ἓν· καὶ γὰρ τὸ τὰ ἀντικείμενα δύνασθαι ἀδυναμίας
 ἐστὶ τοῦ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀρίστου μένειν. δεῖ δὲ καὶ τὴν ποίησιν
 αὐτοῦ, ἣν λέγομεν, καὶ ταύτην ἅπαξ εἶναι· καλὴ γάρ.
 καὶ τίς ἂν παρατρέψει βουλήσει γενομένην θεοῦ καὶ
 10 βούλησιν οὐσαν; βουλήσει οὖν μήπω ὄντος; τί δὲ
 βούλησιν ἐκείνου ἀβουλοῦντος τῆ ὑποστάσει; πόθεν οὖν
 αὐτῷ ἔσται ἡ βούλησις ἀπὸ οὐσίας ἀνεργήτου; ἢ ἦν

¹ Theiler: οὔτω Enn.

one, the "ruling" only; for he does not have what is ruled. How then can we say "ruling" when there is nothing to rule? Now "ruling" here refers to what was before him, because there was nothing before him. But if there was nothing, he is the first; but this means not in rank, but in authentic mastery and purely self-determined power. But if it is purely self-determined, it is not possible to accept absence of self-determination there. He is therefore altogether at his own disposal in himself. What then is there of his which is not himself? What which is not his activity? And what which is not his work? For if there was anything in him which was not his work, he would not then be purely and simply at his own disposal and capable of all things; for he would not be master of that and would not be capable of all things; at any rate he would not be capable of that of whose making he was not himself master.

21. Could he then make himself anything else than he did? Now we shall not yet do away with his making himself good because he could not make himself evil. For power to make there is not to be understood as power to make the opposites, but as making with power unshaken and not to be deflected, which is power in the highest degree when it does not go out of the One; for to be capable of the opposites belongs to incapacity to remain with the best. But his making which we speak of must be once for all; for it is beautiful. And who would alter it when it has come to be by the will of God and is his will? By the will, then, of a God who did not yet exist? And what could his will be when he is without will in his very existence? How will he come to have a will from his inactive substance? Now his will is in

βούλησις ἐν τῇ οὐσίᾳ· οὐχ ἕτερον ἄρα τῆς οὐσίας οὐδέν.
 ἢ τί ἦν, ὃ μὴ ἦν, οἷον ἢ βούλησις; πᾶν ἄρα βούλησις ἦν
 15 καὶ οὐκ ἔνι τὸ μὴ βουλόμενον· οὐδὲ τὸ πρὸ βουλήσεως
 ἄρα. πρῶτον ἄρα ἢ βούλησις αὐτός. καὶ τὸ ὡς ἐβούλετο
 ἄρα καὶ οἷον ἐβούλετο, καὶ τὸ τῇ βουλήσει ἐπόμεινον, ὃ ἢ
 τῆς βούλησις ἐγέννα—ἐγέννα δὲ οὐδὲν ἔτι ἐν
 αὐτῷ—τούτο γὰρ ἤδη ἦν. τὸ δὲ συνέχειν ἑαυτὸν οὕτω
 20 ληπτέον νοεῖν, εἴ τις ὀρθῶς αὐτὸ φθέγγοιτο, ὡς τὰ μὲν
 ἄλλα πάντα ὅσα ἐστὶ παρὰ τούτου συνεχεται μετουσίᾳ
 γὰρ τινι αὐτοῦ ἐστί, καὶ εἰς τούτο ἢ ἀναγωγὴ πάντων.
 αὐτός¹ δὲ ἤδη παρ' αὐτοῦ οὔτε συνοχῆς οὔτε μετουσίας
 δεόμενος, ἀλλὰ πάντα ἐαυτῷ, μᾶλλον δὲ οὐδὲν οὐδὲ
 25 τῶν πάντων δεόμενος εἰς αὐτόν· ἀλλ' ὅταν αὐτὸν εἴπησ
 ἢ ἐννοηθῆς, τὰ ἄλλα πάντα ἄφες. ἀφελὼν πάντα,
 καταλιπὼν δὲ μόνον αὐτόν, μὴ τί προσθῆς ζήτει, ἀλλὰ
 μὴ τί πω οὐκ ἀφήρηκας ἀπ' αὐτοῦ ἐν γνώμῃ τῇ σῆ'. ἔστι
 γὰρ τινος ἐφάμασθαι καὶ σέ, περὶ οὗ οὐκέτι ἄλλο
 30 ἐνδέχεται οὔτε λέγειν οὔτε λαβεῖν· ἀλλ' ὑπεράνω
 κείμενον μόνον τούτο ἀληθείᾳ ἐλεύθερον, ὅτι μηδὲ
 δουλεύον ἐστὶν ἐαυτῷ, ἀλλὰ μόνον αὐτὸ καὶ ὄντως αὐτό,
 εἴ γε τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον αὐτὸ καὶ ἄλλο.

¹ A^{2mg} (= Ficinus): αὐτοῖς Enn., H-S².

his substance; so there is nothing different from his
 substance. Or what was there that he was not, will
 for instance? So he was all will, and there is nothing
 in him which is not that which wills—nothing, then,
 before willing. So he himself is primarily his will. So
 then he is also as he willed and of the kind he willed,
 and what follows upon his will, what this kind of will
 generated—but it generated nothing further in him-
 self, for he was this already. But his holding himself
 together must be understood, if one is to say it
 correctly, as meaning that all the other things that
 exist are held together by this; for they exist by some
 kind of participation in him, and it is to this that
 their origin is to be traced. But he himself has no
 longer any need from himself of holding together or
 participation, but is all things by and in himself—
 but rather none of them, and he does not need all
 things to be himself; but when you speak or think of
 him, put away all the other things. When you have
 put away all things and left only himself, do not try
 to find what you can add, but if there is something
 you have not yet taken away from him in your mind.
 For even you can grasp something about which it is
 not possible any more to say or apprehend anything
 else; but it is something which has its place high
 above everything, this which alone is free in truth,
 because it is not enslaved to itself, but is only itself
 and really itself, while every other thing is itself and
 something else.

VI. 9. ON THE GOOD OR THE ONE

Introductory Note

THIS early treatise, number 9 in Porphyry's chronological order, is the first clear presentation by Plotinus of the One as the ultimate principle and of union with it as the goal of the philosophic or spiritual life. It is the first and one of the clearest and most powerful of his great ascents of the mind, in which he both uses philosophic reason as far as it will go to show the way and urges his readers to go on beyond any thinkable reality to the union which he does not presume to describe. Though the treatise was probably meant for a rather wider circle of readers than the more technical works like VI 1-3, the discussion of the Categories, or VI 6, on numbers, it would still be intended to be read only by a chosen few, those among his friends and hearers who were capable of making the tremendous moral and spiritual effort required to travel by this way and reach the goal, and who already fully accepted the fundamentals of Platonic philosophical religion and were trying to live the philosophical life. Beginning from some fairly commonplace observations on the scale of unity and the necessity of unity for the existence of anything, it leads the reader rapidly through the Platonic World of Forms which is also Divine Intellect (where many Platonists and later theists wished to stop) to its source, and concludes with a passage about (not a description of) the mystical union which has rightly become a classic, though it should not be read and thought about in isolation from the rest of the *Enneads*; the two great works which precede it in the

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Ennead order, though they were written some years later, VI 7 [38] and VI 8 [39], need particularly to be taken into consideration.

Synopsis

All beings are beings by the one; unity is the condition of their existence. Soul unifies all beings in this world, but is not itself the One, but one by something else (ch. 1). Nor is real being, either individual or universal, the One; the world of Forms, which is Being, and is alive, and is Intellect, is manifold, and neither as the totality of real beings nor as living and thinking can it be the One which gives it unity (ch. 2). Difficulty of thinking or speaking about the One because it is formless; we must first reach the level of Intellect and then go beyond it; the One is not one of things it generates, and all which is said of them must be denied of it (ch. 3). We are aware of the One by a presence above knowledge; teaching and reasoning can only help on the way to it (ch. 4). We must first come to an understanding of the soul and its derivation from Intellect, and go on from there; inadequacy of all names, including "One", for the source of Intellect (ch. 5). What we mean by using this inadequate term for it; the absolute self-sufficiency of the One; it is beyond the need for thinking (ch. 6). Need to turn inwards, away from all other things, and even oneself, to find the One (ch. 7). The image of the circles; how we must turn to the One, the centre, by putting away otherness (ch. 8). The One is always present, always giving its gifts, but we must put away all other things to possess him truly (ch. 9). The vision which is perfect union, with no consciousness of duality (ch. 10). The final mystery of that union; how we fall from it and rise to it again (ch. 11).

VI. 9. (9) ΠΕΡΙ ΤΑΓΑΘΟΥ Η ΤΟΥ ΕΝΟΣ

1. Πάντα τὰ ὄντα τῷ ἐνὶ ἑστίν ὄντα, ὅσα τε πρώτως
 ἐστίν ὄντα, καὶ ὅσα ὅπως οὖν λέγεται ἐν τοῖς οὖσι εἶναι.
 τί γὰρ ἂν καὶ εἶη, εἰ μὴ ἐν εἶη; ἐπεὶ περ ἀφαιρεθέντα τοῦ
 ἐν ὃ λέγεται οὐκ ἔστιν ἐκεῖνα. οὔτε γὰρ στρατὸς ἔστιν,
 5 εἰ μὴ ἐν ἔσται, οὔτε χορὸς οὔτε ἀγέλη μὴ ἐν ὄντα. ἀλλ'
 οὐδὲ οἰκία ἢ ναῦς τὸ ἐν οὐκ ἔχοντα, ἐπεὶ περ ἢ οἰκία ἐν
 καὶ ἢ ναῦς, ὃ εἰ ἀποβάλοι, οὔτ' ἂν ἢ οἰκία ἔτι οἰκία οὔτε
 ἢ ναῦς. τὰ τοίνυν συνεχῆ μεγέθη, εἰ μὴ τὸ ἐν αὐτοῖς
 παρεῖη, οὐκ ἂν εἶη τμηθέντα γοῖν, καθόσον τὸ ἐν
 10 ἀπόλλυσιν, ἀλλάσσει τὸ εἶναι. καὶ δὴ καὶ τὰ τῶν φυτῶν
 καὶ ζώων σώματα ἐν ὄντα ἕκαστα εἰ φεύγοι τὸ ἐν εἰς
 πλήθος θρυπτόμενα, τὴν οὐσίαν αὐτῶν, ἣν εἶχεν,
 ἀπώλεσεν οὐκέτι ὄντα ἂ ἦν, ἄλλα δὲ γενόμενα καὶ
 ἐκεῖνα, ὅσα ἐν ἔστι. καὶ ἢ ὑγίεια δέ, ὅταν εἰς ἐν
 15 συνταχθῆ τὸ σῶμα, καὶ κάλλος, ὅταν ἢ τοῦ ἐνὸς τὰ
 μέρη κατὰ σῆ φύσιν· καὶ ἀρετὴ δὲ ψυχῆς, ὅταν εἰς ἐν
 καὶ εἰς μίαν ὁμολογίαν ἐνωθῆ. ἄρ' οὖν, ἐπειδὴ ψυχὴ τὰ
 πάντα εἰς ἐν ἄγει δημιουργοῦσα καὶ πλάττουσα καὶ
 μορφοῦσα καὶ συντάττουσα, ἐπὶ ταύτην ἐλθόντας δεῖ

¹ The scale of different degrees of unity which Plotinus uses in this chapter and elsewhere is Stoic. Cp. *SVF* II 366-8 and 1013.

² On beauty and unity cp. I. 6. 2. 18-28.

VI. 9. ON THE GOOD OR THE ONE

1. It is by the one that all beings are beings, both those which are primarily beings and those which are in any sense said to be among beings. For what could anything be if it was not one? For if things are deprived of the one which is predicated of them they are not those things. For an army does not exist if it is not one, nor a chorus or a flock if they are not one. But neither can a house or a ship exist if they do not have their one, since the house is one and so is the ship, and if they lose it the house is no longer a house nor the ship a ship. So then continuous magnitudes, if the one was not with them, would not exist; at any rate, if they are cut up they change their being in proportion as they lose their one. And again the bodies of plants and animals, each of which is one, if they escape their one by being broken up into a multiplicity, lose the substance which they had and are no longer what they were but have become other things, and are those other things in so far as each of them is one.¹ And there is health when the body is brought together into one order, and beauty when the nature of the one holds the parts together²; and the soul has virtue when it is unified into one thing and one agreement. Is it true then that, since the soul brings all things to their one by making and moulding and shaping and composing them, we should, when we have arrived at it, say that it is this

20 λέγειν, ὡς αὕτη τὸ ἓν χορηγεῖ καὶ αὕτη ἐστὶ τὸ ἓν; ἢ
 ὡσπερ τὰ ἄλλα χορηγοῦσα τοῖς σώμασιν οὐκ ἔστιν αὕτη
 ὃ δίδωσιν, οἷον μορφὴ καὶ εἶδος, ἀλλ' ἕτερα αὐτῆς, οὕτω
 χρῆ, εἰ καὶ ἓν δίδωσιν, ἕτερον ὃν αὐτῆς νομίζειν αὐτῆν
 διδόναι καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἓν βλέπουσαν ἓν ἕκαστον ποιεῖν,
 25 ὡσπερ καὶ πρὸς ἄνθρωπον ἄνθρωπον, συλλαμβάνουσαι
 μετὰ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τὸ ἓν αὐτῷ ἓν. τῶν γὰρ ἐν
 λεγομένων οὕτως ἕκαστόν ἐστιν ἓν, ὡς ἔχει καὶ ὃ ἔστιν,
 ὥστε τὰ μὲν ἦττον ὄντα ἦττον ἔχειν τὸ ἓν, τὰ δὲ μᾶλλον
 μᾶλλον. καὶ δὴ καὶ ψυχὴ ἕτερον οὐσα τοῦ ἓνός <τὸ>
 μᾶλλον <ἓν>¹ ἔχει κατὰ λόγον τοῦ μᾶλλον καὶ ὄντως
 30 εἶναι. [τὸ μᾶλλον ἓν]¹ οὐ μὴν αὐτὸ τὸ ἓν· ψυχὴ γὰρ μία
 καὶ συμβεβηκός πως τὸ ἓν, καὶ δύο ταῦτα ψυχὴ καὶ ἓν,
 ὡσπερ σῶμα καὶ ἓν. καὶ τὸ μὲν διεστηκός, ὡσπερ
 χορός, πορρωτάτω τοῦ ἓν, τὸ δὲ συνεχές ἐγγυτέρω·
 ψυχὴ δὲ ἔτι μᾶλλον κοινωνοῦσα καὶ αὐτῇ. εἰ δ' ὅτι ἄνευ
 35 τοῦ ἓν εἶναι οὐδ' ἂν ψυχὴ εἶη, ταύτη εἰς ταῦτόν τις ἄγει
 ψυχὴν καὶ τὸ ἓν, πρῶτον μὲν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα <ᾶ>² ἐστὶν
 ἕκαστα μετὰ τοῦ ἓν εἶναι ἐστίν· ἀλλ' ὁμως ἕτερον αὐτῶν
 τὸ ἓν—οὐ γὰρ ταῦτόν σῶμα καὶ ἓν, ἀλλὰ τὸ σῶμα
 μετέχει τοῦ ἓν—ἔπειτα δὲ πολλὴ ἢ ψυχὴ καὶ ἢ μία καὶ
 40 εἰ μὴ ἐκ μερῶν· πλείσται γὰρ δυνάμεις ἐν αὐτῇ,
 λογίζεσθαι, ὀρέγεσθαι, ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι, ἃ τῷ ἓν
 ὡσπερ δεσμῷ συνέχεται. ἐπάγει μὲν δὴ ψυχὴ τὸ ἓν ἐν

¹ transposuimus, ut correctionem.² H-S¹.

which provides the one and this which is the one? Rather we should consider that, just as with the other things it provides for bodies, it is not itself what it gives, shape and form for instance, but they are other than it, so, even if it gives the one, it gives it as something other than itself, and that it is by looking to the one that it makes each and every thing one, just as it is by looking to [the Form of] man that it makes something man, taking the one in it along with the man. For of the things which are said to be one each is one in the way in which it also has what it is, so that the things which are less beings have the one less, and those which are more beings, more. And the soul too, which is other than the one, has its being more one in proportion to its greater and real being. It is certainly not the one itself; for the soul is one and the one is somehow incidental to it, and these things, soul and one, are two, just like body and one. And what has separate parts, like a chorus, is furthest from the one, and what is a continuous body is nearer; and the soul is nearer still, but still participates in it. But if because without being one it would not be soul, for this reason someone makes soul and the one the same, first of all, all the other things are what they are along with their being one; but all the same the one is different from them—for body and one are not the same thing, but the body participates in the one—and then the soul is many, even the soul which is one, even if it is not composed from parts; for there are very many powers in it, reasoning, desiring, apprehending, which are held together by the one as by a bond. So the soul brings the one to other things

οὔσα¹ καὶ αὐτὴ ἄλλω· πάσχει δὲ τοῦτο καὶ αὐτὴ ὑπ' ἄλλου.

2. Ἄρ' οὖν ἐκάστῳ μὲν τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἐν οὐ ταῦτὸν ἢ οὐσία αὐτοῦ καὶ τὸ ἐν, ὅλω δὲ τῷ ὄντι καὶ τῇ οὐσίᾳ ταῦτὸν ἢ οὐσία καὶ τὸ ὄν καὶ τὸ ἐν; ὥστε τὸν ἐξευρόντα
5 τὸ ὄν ἐξευρηκέναι καὶ τὸ ἐν, καὶ αὐτὴν τὴν οὐσίαν αὐτὸ εἶναι τὸ ἐν· οἷον, εἰ νοῦς ἢ οὐσία, νοῦν καὶ τὸ ἐν εἶναι πρῶτως ὄντα ὄν καὶ πρῶτως ἐν, μεταδιδόντα δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις τοῦ εἶναι οὕτως καὶ κατὰ τοσοῦτον καὶ τοῦ ἐνός. τί γὰρ ἂν τις καὶ παρ' αὐτὰ εἶναι αὐτὸ φήσῃ; ἢ² γὰρ ταῦτὸν τῷ ὄντι—ἀνθρώπος γὰρ καὶ εἰς
10 ἀνθρώπος ταῦτόν—ἢ οἷον ἀριθμὸς τις ἐκάστου, ὥσπερ εἰ δύο τινὰ ἔλεγες, οὕτως ἐπὶ μόνου τινὸς τὸ ἐν. εἰ μὲν οὖν ὁ ἀριθμὸς τῶν ὄντων, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τὸ ἐν· καὶ ζητητέον τί ἐστίν. εἰ δὲ ψυχῆς ἐνέργημα τὸ ἀριθμεῖν ἐπεξιούσης, οὐδὲν ἂν εἴη ἐν τοῖς πράγμασι τὸ ἐν. ἀλλ'
15 ἔλεγεν ὁ λόγος, εἰ ἀπολεῖ ἕκαστον τὸ ἐν, μηδ' ἔσσεσθαι τὸ παράπαν. ὁρᾶν οὖν δεῖ, εἰ ταῦτὸν τὸ ἐν ἕκαστον καὶ τὸ ὄν, καὶ τὸ ὅλω ὄν καὶ τὸ ἐν. ἀλλ' εἰ τὸ ὄν τὸ ἐκάστου πλήθος ἐστίν, τὸ δὲ ἐν ἀδύνατον πλήθος εἶναι, ἕτερον ἂν

¹ ἐν οὔσα A³ (= Ficinus): ἐνοῦσα BxUCQ; ἐνοῦσα w.

² A³ (= Ficinus): εἰ Enn.

¹ That Intellect-Real Being is the first principle was the view of most Platonists before Plotinus, including his fellow-pupil of Ammonius, Origen the Platonist (to be distinguished from Origen the Christian). See Origen fr. 7 Weber (= Proclus *Platonic Theology* II 4, p. 31, 5-11 Saffrey-

being also itself one by something else: it too experiences this unity by the act of another.

2. Is it, then, true that for each of the things which are one as parts its substance and its one are not the same thing, but for being and substance as a whole substance and being and one are the same thing? So that anyone who has discovered being has discovered the one, and substance itself is the one itself: for example, if intellect is substance, intellect is also the one since it is primarily being and primarily one, and as it gives the other things a share in being, so in the same measure it also gives them a share in the one.¹ For what can anyone say that it is besides being and intellect? For it is either the same as being—for "man" and "one man" are the same thing—or it is like a kind of number of the individual; you say "one" of a thing alone just as you say "two things". Now if number belongs to the real beings, it is clear that so does the one; and we must investigate what it is. But if numbering is an activity of soul going through things one after another, the one would not be anything factual. But our argument said that if an individual thing loses its one it will not exist at all. We must therefore see if the individual one and individual being are the same thing, and universal being and the universal one. But if the being of the individual is a multiplicity, but it is impossible for the one to be a multiplicity, they will be different from each other. At any rate

Westcrink). H. R. Schwyzer has suggested that Ammonius himself may have held a view closer to that of Plotinus (*Ammonios Sakkas, der Lehrer Plotins*, Opladen 1983, 72-78).

εἴη ἐκάτερον. ἄνθρωπος γοῦν καὶ ζῶον καὶ λογικὸν καὶ
 20 πολλὰ μέρη καὶ συνδέεται ἐνὶ τὰ πολλὰ ταῦτα· ἄλλο ἄρα
 ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἓν, εἰ τὸ μὲν μεριστόν, τὸ δὲ ἀμερές. καὶ
 δὴ καὶ τὸ ὄλον ὄν πάντα ἐν αὐτῷ ἔχον τὰ ὄντα πολλὰ
 μᾶλλον ἢ εἴη καὶ ἕτερον τοῦ ἐνός, μεταλήψει δὲ ἔχον
 καὶ μεθέξει τὸ ἓν. ἔχει δὲ καὶ ζωὴν [καὶ νοῦν]¹ τὸ ὄν· οὐ
 25 γὰρ δὴ νεκρόν· πολλὰ ἄρα τὸ ὄν. εἰ δὲ νοῦς τοῦτο εἴη,
 καὶ οὕτω πολλὰ ἀνάγκη εἶναι. καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον, εἰ τὰ εἶδη
 περιέχον· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἡ ἰδέα ἓν, ἀλλ' ἀριθμὸς μᾶλλον καὶ
 ἐκάστη καὶ ἡ σύμπασα, καὶ οὕτως ἓν, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴη² ὁ
 κόσμος ἓν. ὅλως δὲ τὸ μὲν ἓν τὸ πρῶτον, ὁ δὲ νοῦς καὶ
 30 τὰ εἶδη καὶ τὸ ὄν οὐ πρῶτα. εἰδός τε γὰρ ἕκαστον ἐκ
 πολλῶν καὶ σύνθετον καὶ ὕστερον· ἐξ ὧν γὰρ ἕκαστον
 ἐστι, πρότερα ἐκείνα. ὅτι δὲ οὐχ οἶόν τε τὸν νοῦν τὸ
 πρῶτον εἶναι καὶ ἐκ τῶνδε δῆλον ἔσται· τὸν νοῦν ἀνάγκη
 ἐν τῷ νοεῖν εἶναι καὶ τόν γε ἄριστον καὶ τὸν οὐ
 35 πρὸς τὸ ἔξω βλέποντα νοεῖν τὸ πρὸ αὐτοῦ· εἰς αὐτὸν γὰρ
 ἐπιστρέφω· εἰς ἀρχὴν ἐπιστρέφει. καὶ εἰ μὲν αὐτὸς τὸ
 νοοῦν καὶ τὸ νοούμενον, διπλοῦς ἔσται καὶ οὐχ ἀπλοῦς
 οὐδὲ τὸ ἓν· εἰ δὲ πρὸς ἕτερον βλέπει, πάντως πρὸς τὸ
 κρείττον καὶ πρὸ αὐτοῦ. εἰ δὲ καὶ πρὸς αὐτὸν καὶ πρὸς
 40 τὸ κρείττον, καὶ οὕτως δεύτερον. καὶ χρὴ τὸν νοῦν
 τοιοῦτον τίθεσθαι, οἷον παρεῖναι μὲν τῷ ἀγαθῷ καὶ τῷ

¹ del. Harder.

² Harder: εἰ ἢ WBCQ: εἰ ἦν U: εἰ καὶ x.

“man” and “living being” and “rational” are many parts and these many are bound together by the one. “Man” and “one” are therefore different, and one has parts and the other is partless. And, further, universal being, which has all the beings in it, will be still more many and different from the one, and will have the one by sharing and participation. But being also has life; for it is certainly not a corpse; being therefore is many things. But if it is intellect, in this way too it must be many; and still more if it includes the Forms. For the Idea is not one, but rather a number, both each individual one and the total Idea, and is one in the way in which the universe is one. But altogether the one is primary and the Forms and being are not primary. For each Form is of many parts and composite and posterior; for those elements from which an individual thing is composed are prior to it. And it is clear also from the following that intellect cannot be the first: it is necessary that intellect exists in its thinking, and that the best intellect, the one which does not look outside itself, thinks what is before it¹; for in turning to itself it turns to its principle. And if intellect itself is what thinks and what is thought, it will be double and not single and so not the one; but if it looks to another, it must certainly be to that which is better than it and before it. But if it looks both to itself and to what is better than it, in this way also it is second. And one must suppose that intellect is of such a kind that it is present to the good and the first

¹ Here Plotinus is developing and correcting Aristotle's account of the self-thinking divine mind in *Metaphysics* Λ 9. 1074b15–1075a12.

πρώτῳ καὶ βλέπειν εἰς ἐκεῖνον, συνεῖναι δὲ καὶ ἑαυτῷ
 νοεῖν τε καὶ ἑαυτὸν καὶ νοεῖν ἑαυτὸν ὄντα τὰ πάντα.
 πολλοῦ ἄρα δεῖ τὸ ἓν εἶναι ποικίλον ὄντα. οὐ τοῖνυν οὐδέ
 45 τὸ ἓν τὰ πάντα ἔσται, οὕτω γὰρ οὐκέτι ἓν εἶη· οὐδὲ νοῦς,
 καὶ γὰρ ἂν οὕτως εἶη τὰ πάντα τοῦ νοῦ τὰ πάντα ὄντος·
 οὐδὲ τὸ ὄν· τὸ γὰρ ὄν τὰ πάντα.

3. Τί ἂν οὖν εἶη τὸ ἓν καὶ τίνα φύσιν ἔχον; ἢ οὐδὲν
 θαυμαστὸν μὴ ῥάδιον εἰπεῖν εἶναι, ὅπου μὴδὲ τὸ ὄν
 ῥάδιον μὴδὲ τὸ εἶδος· ἀλλ' ἔστιν ἡμῖν γνώσις εἶδεσιν
 ἐπεριδομένη. ὅσω δ' ἂν εἰς ἀνείδεον ἢ ψυχὴ ἔη,
 5 ἐξαδυνατοῦσα περιλαβεῖν τῷ μὴ ὀρίζεσθαι καὶ οἶον
 τυποῦσθαι ὑπὸ ποικίλου τοῦ τυποῦντος ἐξολισθάνει καὶ
 φοβεῖται, μὴ οὐδὲν ἔχη. διὸ κάμνει ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις
 καὶ ἀσμένη καταβαίνει πολλάκις ἀποπίπτουσα ἀπὸ
 πάντων, μέχρις ἂν εἰς αἰσθητὸν ἦκη ἐν στερεῷ ὥσπερ
 10 ἀναπαυομένη· οἶον καὶ ἡ ὄψις κάμνουσα ἐν τοῖς μικροῖς
 τοῖς μεγάλοις ἀσμένως περιπίπτει. καθ' ἑαυτὴν δὲ ἡ
 ψυχὴ ὅταν ἰδεῖν ἐθέλῃ, μόνον ὁρῶσα τῷ συνεῖναι καὶ ἐν
 οὐδα τῷ ἓν εἶναι αὐτῷ οὐκ οἶεται πῶ ἔχειν ὃ ζητεῖ, ὅτι
 τοῦ νοουμένου μὴ ἕτερόν ἐστιν. ὅμως δὴ χρὴ οὕτως
 ποιεῖν τὸν μέλλοντα περὶ τὸ ἓν φιλοσοφήσειν. ἐπεὶ
 15 τοῖνυν ἓν ἐστὶν ὃ ζητούμεν, καὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν τῶν πάντων
 ἐπισκοποῦμεν, πάγαθόν καὶ τὸ πρῶτον, οὔτε πόρρω δεῖ

¹ Plotinus may be thinking here of Numenius' comparison of the attempt to see the Good to someone

and looks to him, but is also present with itself and thinks itself, and thinks itself as being all things. It is far, then, from being the one since it is richly various. The one then cannot be all things, for so it would be no longer one; and it cannot be intellect, for in this way it would be all things since intellect is all things; and it cannot be being; for being is all things.

3. What then could the One be, and what nature could it have? There is nothing surprising in its being difficult to say, when it is not even easy to say what Being or Form is; but we do have a knowledge based upon the Forms. But in proportion as the soul goes towards the formless, since it is utterly unable to comprehend it because it is not delimited and, so to speak, stamped by a richly varied stamp, it slides away and is afraid that it may have nothing at all. Therefore it gets tired of this sort of thing, and often gladly comes down and falls away from all this, till it comes to the perceptible and rests there as if on solid ground; just as sight when it gets tired of small objects is glad to come upon big ones.¹ But when the soul wants to see by itself, seeing only by being with it and being one by being one with it, it does not think it yet has what it seeks, because it is not different from what is being thought. But all the same this is what one must do if one is going to philosophise about the One. Since, then, that which we seek is one and we are considering the principle of all things, the Good and the First, one must not go far away from the things around the primary by

straining his eyes to catch sight of a little boat far away among the waves (fr. 2 des Places, 11 Leemans).

γενέσθαι τῶν περὶ τὰ πρῶτα εἰς τὰ ἔσχατα τῶν πάντων
 πεισύντα, ἀλλ' ἰέμενον εἰς τὰ πρῶτα ἐπαναγαγεῖν ἑαυτὸν
 ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἐσχάτων ὄντων, κακίας τε πάσης
 20 ἀπηλλαγμένον εἶναι ἅτε πρὸς τὸ ἀγαθὸν σπεύδοντα
 γενέσθαι, ἐπὶ τε τὴν ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἀρχὴν ἀναβεβηκέναι καὶ
 ἐν ἑκ πολλῶν γενέσθαι ἀρχῆς καὶ ἐνὸς θεατὴν ἐσόμενον.
 νοῦν τοίνυν χρὴ γενόμενον καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν τὴν αὐτοῦ νῶ
 πιστεύσαντα καὶ ὑφιδρύσαντα, ἕν' ἅ¹ ὁρᾷ ἐκεῖνος
 ἐγγυροῦν δέχοντα, τούτῳ θεᾶσθαι τὸ ἐν οὐ
 25 προστιθέντα αἰσθησὶν οὐδεμίαν οὐδέ τι παρ' αὐτῆς εἰς
 ἐκεῖνον δεχόμενον, ἀλλὰ καθαρῶ τῷ νῶ τὸ καθαρῶτατον
 θεᾶσθαι καὶ τοῦ νοῦ τῷ πρῶτῳ. ὅταν τοίνυν ὁ ἐπὶ τὴν
 θέαν τοῦ τοιοῦτου ἐσταλμένος ἢ μέγεθος ἢ σχῆμα ἢ
 ὄγκον περὶ ταύτην τὴν φύσιν φαντασθῇ, οὐ νοῦς τούτῳ
 30 ἡγεμῶν γίνεται τῆς θέας, ὅτι μὴ νοῦς τὰ τοιαῦτα
 πέφυκεν ὁρᾶν, ἀλλ' ἔστιν αἰσθήσεως καὶ δόξης ἐπομένης
 αἰσθήσει ἢ ἐνέργεια. ἀλλὰ δεῖ λαβεῖν παρὰ τοῦ νοῦ τὴν
 ἐπαγγελίαν ὡς δύναται. δύναται δὲ ὁρᾶν ὁ νοῦς [ἢ τὰ
 πρὸ αὐτοῦ]² ἢ τὰ αὐτοῦ ἢ τὰ πρὸ³ αὐτοῦ. καθαρὰ
 35 δὲ καὶ τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ, ἔτι δὲ καθαρῶτερα καὶ ἀπλούστερα
 τὰ πρὸ αὐτοῦ, μᾶλλον δὲ τὰ πρὸ αὐτοῦ. οὐδὲ νοῦς
 τούτων, ἀλλὰ πρὸ νοῦ· τί γὰρ τῶν ὄντων ἐστὶν ὁ νοῦς·
 ἐκεῖνο δὲ οὐ τι, ἀλλὰ πρὸ ἐκάστου, οὐδὲ ὄν· καὶ γὰρ τὸ
 ὄν οἷον μορφήν τὴν τοῦ ὄντος ἔχει, ἄμορφον δὲ ἐκεῖνο
 40 καὶ μορφῆς νοητῆς. γεννητικὴ γὰρ ἢ τοῦ ἐνὸς φύσις
 οὐσα τῶν πάντων οὐδὲν ἐστὶν αὐτῶν. οὔτε οὖν τι οὔτε
 ποιὸν οὔτε ποσὸν οὔτε νῦν οὔτε ψυχὴν· οὐδὲ

¹ A⁵ (= Ficinus): ἕνα Enn.

² del. Igal.

³ Igal: παρ' Enn.

falling down to the last things of all, but as one goes to the primary one must lift oneself up from the things of sense which are the last and lowest, and become freed from all evil since one is hastening to the Good, and ascend to the principle in oneself and become one from many, when one is going to behold the Principle and the One. Therefore one must become Intellect and entrust one's soul to and set it firmly under Intellect, that it may be awake to receive what that sees, and may by this Intellect behold the One, without adding any sense-perception or receiving anything from sense-perception into that Intellect, but beholding the most pure with the pure Intellect, and the primary part of Intellect. When therefore he who is embarked on the contemplation of this kind imagines size or shape or bulk about this nature, it is not Intellect which guides his contemplation because Intellect is not of a nature to see things of this kind, but the activity is one of sense-perception and opinion following sense-perception. But one must take one's information from Intellect where it is competent. And Intellect is competent to see its own things and the things before it. The things in it also are pure, but those before it are purer and simpler—or rather that which is before it. It is not therefore Intellect, but before Intellect. For Intellect is one of the beings, but that is not anything, but before each and every thing, and is not being; for being has a kind of shape of being, but that has no shape, not even intelligible shape. For since the nature of the One is generative of all things it is not any one of them. It is not therefore something or qualified or quantitative or intellect or soul; it is not in movement or at rest,

κινούμενον οὐδ' αὖ ἐστάως, οὐκ ἐν τόπῳ, οὐκ ἐν χρόνῳ,
 ἀλλ' αὐτὸ¹ καθ' αὐτὸ μονοειδές, μᾶλλον δὲ
 ἀνείδεον πρὸ εἶδους ὄν παντός, πρὸ κινήσεως, πρὸ
 45 στάσεως· ταῦτα γὰρ περὶ τὸ ὄν, ἃ πολλὰ αὐτὸ ποιεῖ. διὰ
 τί οὖν, εἰ μὴ κινούμενον, οὐχ ἐστάως; ὅτι περὶ μὲν τὸ ὄν
 τούτων θάτερον ἢ ἀμφοτέρα ἀνάγκη, τό τε ἐστάως
 στάσει ἐστάως καὶ οὐ ταύτων τῇ στάσει· ὥστε συμ-
 βήσεται αὐτῷ καὶ οὐκέτι ἀπλοῦν μενεῖ.² ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ
 50 αἴτιον λέγειν οὐ κατηγορεῖν ἐστι συμβεβηκός τι αὐτῷ,
 ἀλλ' ἡμῖν, ὅτι ἔχομέν τι παρ' αὐτοῦ ἐκείνου ὄντος ἐν
 αὐτῷ· δεῖ δὲ μηδὲ τὸ "ἐκείνου" μηδὲ "ὄντος"³ λέγειν
 ἀκριβῶς λέγοντα, ἀλλ' ἡμᾶς οἷον ἔξωθεν περιθέοντα
 τὰ αὐτῶν ἔρμηνεύειν ἐθέλειν πάθη ὅτε μὲν ἐγγύς, ὅτε δὲ
 ἀποπίπτοντας ταῖς περὶ αὐτὸ ἀπορίαις.

4. Γίνεται δὲ ἡ ἀπορία μάλιστα, ὅτι μηδὲ κατ'
 ἐπιστήμην ἢ σύνεσιν ἐκείνου μηδὲ κατὰ νόησιν, ὥσπερ
 τὰ ἄλλα νοητά, ἀλλὰ κατὰ παρουσίαν ἐπιστήμης
 κρείττονα· πάσχει δὲ ἡ ψυχὴ τοῦ ἐν εἶναι τὴν ἀπόστασιν
 5 καὶ οὐ πάντῃ ἐστὶν ἐν, ὅταν ἐπιστήμην του λαμβάνη·
 λόγος γὰρ ἡ ἐπιστήμη, πολλὰ δὲ ὁ λόγος· παρέρχεται
 οὖν τὸ ἐν εἰς ἀριθμὸν καὶ πλήθος πεσοῦσα· ὑπὲρ
 ἐπιστήμην τοίνυν δεῖ δραμεῖν καὶ μηδαμῇ ἐκβαίνειν τοῦ
 ἐν εἶναι, ἀλλ' ἀποστῆναι δεῖ καὶ ἐπιστήμης καὶ
 10 ἐπιστητῶν καὶ παντός ἄλλον καὶ καλοῦ θεάματος· πᾶν

¹ Heintz: ἀλλὰ τὸ Enn.

² Dodds: μένει Enn.

³ Page: ὄντως Enn.

not in place, not in time,¹ but "itself by itself of single form",² or rather formless, being before all form, before movement and before rest; for these pertain to being and are what make it many. Why, then, if it is not in movement is it not at rest? Because each or both of these must necessarily pertain to being, and what is at rest is so by rest and is not the same as rest; so rest will be incidental to it and it will not be the same as rest. For to say that it is the cause is not to predicate something incidental of it but of us, because we have something from it while that One is in itself; but one who speaks precisely should not say "that" or "is"; but we run round it outside, in a way, and want to explain our own experiences of it, sometimes near it and sometimes falling away in our perplexities about it.

4. The perplexity arises especially because our awareness of that One is not by way of reasoned knowledge or of intellectual perception, as with other intelligible things, but by way of a presence superior to knowledge. The soul experiences its falling away from being one and is not altogether one when it has reasoned knowledge of anything; for reasoned knowledge is a rational process, and a rational process is many. The soul therefore goes past the One and falls into number and multiplicity. One must therefore run up above knowledge and in no way depart from being one, but one must depart from knowledge and things known, and from every other, even beautiful, object of vision. For every

¹ This comes from an established Platonic-Pythagorean exegesis of the First Hypothesis of Plato's *Parmenides*.

² Plato *Symposium* 211B1.

γὰρ καλὸν ὑστερον ἐκείνου καὶ παρ' ἐκείνου, ὥσπερ πᾶν
 φῶς μεθήμερινὸν παρ' ἡλίου. διὸ οὐδ' ἐρήτ' οὐδὲ
 γραπτόν, φησὶν, ἀλλὰ λέγομεν καὶ γράφομεν πέμποντες
 εἰς αὐτὸ καὶ ἀνεγείροντες ἐκ τῶν λόγων ἐπὶ τὴν θεάν
 ὥσπερ ὁδὸν δευκνύντες τῷ τι θεάσασθαι βουλομένῳ.
 15 μέχρι γὰρ τῆς ὁδοῦ καὶ τῆς πορείας ἡ διδασίς, ἡ δὲ θέα
 αὐτοῦ ἔργον ἤδη τοῦ ἰδεῖν βεβουλημένου. εἰ δὲ μὴ ἦλθέ
 τις ἐπὶ τὸ θέαμα, μηδὲ σύνεσιν ἔσχεν ἢ ψυχὴ τῆς ἐκεῖ
 ἀγλαΐας μηδὲ ἔπαθε μηδὲ ἔσχεν ἐν ἑαυτῷ οἷον ἐρωτικὸν
 πάθημα ἐκ τοῦ ἰδεῖν ἐραστοῦ ἐν ᾧ ἔρᾳ ἀναπαυσαμένου,
 20 δεξάμενος¹ φῶς ἀληθινὸν καὶ πάσαν τὴν ψυχὴν
 περιφωτίσαν² διὰ τὸ ἐγγυτέρω γεγονέναι,
 ἀναβεβηκέναι δὲ ἔτι ὀπισθοβαρῆς ὑπάρχων, ἃ ἐμπόδια
 ἦν τῇ θεᾷ, καὶ οὐ μόνος ἀναβιβηκώς, ἀλλ' ἔχων τὸ
 διείργον ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, ἢ μήπω εἰς ἐν συναχθείς—οὐ γὰρ
 25 δὴ ἀπεστιν οὐδενὸς ἐκείνου καὶ πάντων δέ, ὥστε παρῶν
 μὴ παρεῖναι ἀλλ' ἢ τοῖς δέχεσθαι δυναμένοις καὶ
 παρεσκευασμένοις, ὥστε ἐναρμόσαι καὶ οἷον ἐφάψασθαι
 καὶ θιγεῖν ὁμοίῳ τῇ καὶ τῇ ἐν αὐτῷ δυνάμει συγγενεῖ
 τῷ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ ὅταν οὕτως ἔχη, ὡς εἶχεν, ὅτε ἦλθεν ἀπ'
 30 αὐτοῦ, ἢ δὴ δύναται ἰδεῖν ὡς πέφυκεν ἐκείνος θεατὸς
 εἶναι—εἰ οὖν μήπω ἐστὶν ἐκεῖ, ἀλλὰ διὰ ταῦτά ἐστιν
 ἔξω, ἢ δι' ἐνδειαν τοῦ παιδαγωγούντος λόγου καὶ πίστιν
 περὶ αὐτοῦ παρεχομένου, δι' ἐκείνα μὲν αὐτὸν ἐν αἰτία

¹ Kirchoff: δεξάμενον Enn.

² suspic. Harder: περιφωτίσας Enn.

beautiful thing is posterior to that One, and comes from it, as all the light of day comes from the sun. Therefore, Plato says, "it cannot be spoken or written",¹ but we speak and write impelling towards it and wakening from reasonings to the vision of it, as if showing the way to someone who wants to have a view of something. For teaching goes as far as the road and the travelling, but the vision is the task of someone who has already resolved to see. But if someone has not come to the vision, and his soul has no awareness of the glory there, and he has not experienced and does not have in himself in seeing a kind of passionate experience like that of a lover resting in the beloved, then, having received the true light and illumined his whole soul through drawing nearer, but being still held back in the ascent by a burden which hinders the vision, and having ascended not alone but taking something with him which keeps him from the One, or being not yet brought together into unity—for that One is not absent from any, and absent from all, so that in its presence it is not present except to those who are able and prepared to receive it, so as to be in accord with it and as if grasp it and touch it in their likeness; and, by the power in oneself akin to that which comes from the One, when someone is as he was when he came from him, he is already able to see as it is the nature of that God to be seen—if then someone is not yet there but is outside because of these impediments, or through lack of a reasoning to guide him and give him assurance about the One, let him blame himself for those hindrances and try to

¹ Plato *Letter* VII 341C5.

τιθέσθω, καὶ πειράσθω ἀποστὰς πάντων μόνος εἶναι, ἃ
35 δὲ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἀπιστεῖ ἐλλείπων, ὧδε διανοεῖσθω.

5. Ὅστις οἶεται τὰ ὄντα τύχη καὶ τῷ αὐτομάτῳ
διοικεῖσθαι καὶ σωματικαῖς συνέχεσθαι αἰτίαις, οὗτος
πόρρω ἀπελήλαται καὶ θεοῦ καὶ ἐννοίας ἐνός, καὶ ὁ
λόγος οὐ πρὸς τούτους, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλην φύσιν
5 παρὰ τὰ σώματα τιθεμένους καὶ ἀνιόντας ἐπὶ ψυχῆν.
καὶ δὴ δεῖ τούτους φύσιν ψυχῆς κατανεοηκέναι τὰ τε
ἄλλα καὶ ὡς παρὰ νοῦ ἐστι καὶ λόγου παρὰ τούτου
κοινωνήσασα ἀρετὴν ἴσχει· μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα νοῦν λαβεῖν
ἕτερον τοῦ λογιζομένου καὶ λογιστικοῦ καλουμένου, καὶ
10 τοὺς λογισμοὺς ἤδη οἶον ἐν διαστάσει καὶ κινήσει, καὶ
τὰς ἐπιστήμας λόγους ἐν ψυχῇ τὰς τοιαύτας ἐν φανερωῖ
ἤδη γεγонуίας τῷ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γεγόνεναι τὸν νοῦν τῶν
ἐπιστημῶν αἴτιον. καὶ νοῦν ἰδόντα οἶον αἰσθητὸν τῷ
ἀντιληπτὸν εἶναι ἐπαναβεβηκότα τῇ ψυχῇ καὶ πατέρα
αὐτῆς ὄντα κόσμον νοητόν, νοῦν ἡσυχον καὶ ἀτρεμῆ
15 κίνησιν φατέον πάντα ἔχοντα ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ πάντῃ ὄντα,
πλήθος ἀδιάκριτον καὶ αὐτὸ διακεκριμένον. οὔτε γὰρ
διακέκριται ὡς οἱ λόγοι οἱ ἤδη καθ' ἐν νοούμενοι, οὔτε
συγκέχυται τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ· πρόεισι γὰρ ἕκαστον χωρὶς·
οἶον καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἐπιστήμασι πάντων ἐν ἀμρεῖ ὄντων
20 ὅμως ἐστὶν ἕκαστον χωρὶς αὐτῶν. τοῦτο οὖν τὸ ὁμοῦ
πλήθος, ὁ κόσμος ὁ νοητός, ἔστι μὲν ὁ πρὸς τῷ πρώτῳ,
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depart from all things and be alone, but as for what
he disbelieves because he is deficient in his reason-
ings, let him consider the following.

5. Whoever thinks that reality is governed by
chance and accident and held together by bodily
causes is far removed from God and from the idea of
the One, and our discourse is not directed to these
people but to those who posit another nature besides
bodies and have gone up as far as soul. Now these
must come to an understanding of the soul, in other
ways and especially that it derives from Intellect,
and that it is by sharing in the rational principle
which comes from it that it possesses virtue; after
this they must grasp that there is an Intellect other
than that which is called reasoning and reckoning,
and that reasonings are already in a kind of separa-
tion and motion, and that our bodies of knowledge
are rational principles in the soul and of a kind
which have already become manifest there because
Intellect the cause of knowledges has become pre-
sent in the soul. And when one has seen Intellect as
something like an object of sense because it is
apprehended as transcending the soul and being its
father, an intelligible universe, one must say that
Intellect is a quiet and undisturbed movement, hav-
ing all things in itself and being all things, a multi-
plicity which is undivided and yet again divided. For
it is not divided as are the rational principles which
are already thought one by one, nor are its contents
confused; for each one proceeds separately; it is as it
is in our bodies of knowledge, where all the items are
in a partless whole and yet each of them is separate.
This multiplicity all together, then, the intelligible
universe, is what is near to the First, and our

καί φησιν αὐτὸ ὁ λόγος ἐξανάγκης εἶναι, εἴπερ τις καὶ
 ψυχὴν εἶναι, τοῦτο δὲ κυριώτερον ψυχῆς· οὐ μέντοι
 πρῶτον, ὅτι μὴ ἔν μὴδὲ ἀπλοῦν· ἀπλοῦν δὲ τὸ ἔν καὶ ἡ
 25 πάντων ἀρχή. τὸ δὴ πρὸ τοῦ ἔν τοῖς οὐσι τιμιωτάτου,
 εἴπερ δεῖ τι πρὸ νοῦ εἶναι ἔν μὲν εἶναι βουλομένου, οὐκ
 ὄντος δὲ ἔν, ἐνοειδούς δέ, ὅτι αὐτῷ μὴδὲ ἐσκέδασται ὁ
 νοῦς, ἀλλὰ σύνεστιν ἑαυτῷ ὄντως οὐ διαρτήσας ἑαυτὸν
 τῷ πλησίον μετὰ τὸ ἔν εἶναι, ἀποστήναι δέ πως τοῦ ἐνός
 30 τολήσας—τὸ δὴ πρὸ τούτου θαῦμα τοῦ ἔν, ὃ μὴ ὄν
 ἔστιν, ἵνα μὴ καὶ ἐνταῦθα κατ' ἄλλου τὸ ἔν, ὧ ὄνομα μὲν
 κατὰ ἀλήθειαν οὐδὲν προσήκον, εἴπερ δεῖ δεῖ ὀνομάσαι,
 κοινῶς ἂν λεχθὲν προσηκόντως ἔν, οὐχ ὡς ἄλλο, εἴτα ἔν,
 χαλεπὸν μὲν γνωσθῆναι διὰ τοῦτο, γιγνωσκόμενον δὲ
 35 μᾶλλον τῷ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ γεννήματι, τῇ οὐσίᾳ—καὶ ἄγει εἰς
 οὐσίαν νοῦς—καὶ αὐτοῦ ἡ φύσις τοιαύτη, ὡς πηγὴ τῶν
 ἀρίστων εἶναι καὶ δύναμιν γενῶσαν τὰ ὄντα μένουσαν
 ἐν ἑαυτῇ καὶ οὐκ ἐλαττωμένην οὐδὲ ἐν τοῖς γινομένοις
 ὑπ' αὐτῆς οὔσαν. ὅ τι καὶ πρὸ τούτων, ὀνομάζομεν ἔν
 40 ἐξανάγκης τῷ σημαίνειν ἀλλήλοις αὐτῆν· τῷ ὀνόματι εἰς
 ἔννοιαν ἀμέριστον ἄγοντες καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἐνοῦν
 θέλοντες, οὐχ οὔτως ἐν λέγοντες καὶ ἀμερές, ὡς σημείον

¹ Normally, in this treatise as elsewhere in the *Enneads*, intellect does not "lead to" substance: the two are identical. Perhaps Plotinus means that it is intellect *in us* that leads us to substance, and inserts this parenthesis to

argument says that it must necessarily exist, if one says that the soul exists, and that it must be of higher authority than soul; it is not, however, the First, because it is not one nor simple; but the One is simple and the principle of all things. Now that which is prior to what is most honourable among real beings, given that there must be something before Intellect which wants to be one but is not one, but in unitary form, because Intellect is not dispersed in itself but is in reality all together with itself and its nearness after the One has kept it from dividing itself, though it did somehow dare to stand away from the One—that which is before this Intellect, this marvel of the One, which is not existent, so that "one" may not here also have to be predicated of something else, which in truth has no fitting name, but if we must give it a name, "one" would be an appropriate ordinary way of speaking of it, not in the sense of something else and then one; this is difficult to know for this reason, but can be better known from its product, substance—and it is intellect which leads to substance¹—and its nature is of such a kind that it is the source of the best and the power which generates the real beings, abiding in itself and not being diminished and not being one of the things which it brought into being. Whatever is even before these, we give the name of "One" to by necessity, to indicate its nature to one another, bringing ourselves by the name to an indivisible idea and wanting to unify our souls; we do not when we

remind his readers, in the middle of his account of the supra-intellectual way to the One, that this can only begin when the intellectual way has reached its goal.

ἢ μονάδα λέγομεν.¹ τὸ γὰρ οὕτως ἐν ποσοῦ ἀρχαί, ὃ οὐκ
 ἂν ὑπέστη μὴ προούσης οὐσίας καὶ τοῦ πρὸ οὐσίας·
 οὐκ οὖν δεῖ ἐνταῦθα βάλλειν τὴν διάνοιαν· ἀλλὰ ταῦτα
 45 ὁμοίως αἰεὶ ἐκείνοις ἐν ἀναλογίαις τῷ ἀπλῶ καὶ τῇ
 φυγῇ τοῦ πλήθους καὶ τοῦ μερισμοῦ.

6. Πῶς οὖν λέγομεν ἓν, καὶ πῶς τῇ νοήσει
 ἐφαρμοστέον; ἢ πλεόνως τιθέμενον ἐν ἡ ὡς μονὰς καὶ
 σημεῖον ἐνίσταται. ἐνταῦθα μὲν γὰρ μέγεθος ἡ ψυχή
 ἀφελούσα καὶ ἀριθμοῦ πλήθος καταλήγει εἰς τὸ
 5 σμικρότατον καὶ ἐπερίδεται τινι ἀμερεῖ μὲν, ἀλλὰ ὃ ἦν
 ἐν μεριστῶ καὶ ὃ ἔστιν ἐν ἄλλῳ· τὸ δὲ οὔτε ἐν ἄλλῳ οὔτε
 ἐν μεριστῶ οὔτε οὕτως ἀμερές, ὡς τὸ μικρότατον·
 μέγιστον γὰρ ἀπάντων οὐ μεγέθει, ἀλλὰ δυνάμει, ὥστε
 καὶ τὸ ἀμέγεθες δυνάμει· ἐπεὶ καὶ τὰ μετ' αὐτὸ ὄντα
 10 ταῖς δυνάμεσιν ἀμερίστα καὶ ἀμερῆ, οὐ τοῖς ὄγκοις.
 ληπτέον δὲ καὶ ἄπειρον αὐτὸν οὐ τῷ ἀδιεξιτήτῳ ἢ τοῦ
 μεγέθους ἢ τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀπεριλήπτῳ τῆς
 δυνάμεως. ὅταν γὰρ ἂν αὐτὸν νοήσης οἶον ἢ νοῦν ἢ θεόν,
 πλεόν ἐστί· καὶ αὖ ὅταν αὐτὸν ἐνίσῃς τῇ διανοίᾳ, καὶ
 ἐνταῦθα πλεόν ἐστὶν ἢ ὅσον² ἂν αὐτὸν ἐφαντάσθῃς εἰς
 15 τὸ ἐνικώτερον τῆς σῆς νοήσεως εἶναι· ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ γὰρ
 ἐστὶν οὐδενὸς αὐτῷ συμβεβηκότος. τῷ αὐτάρκει δ' ἂν

¹ Harder: λέγοντες Enn.

² Gollwitzer: θεὸν Enn.

¹This is, perhaps, the clearest explanation in the *Enneads* of the way in which Plotinus intends his use of the terms "one" and "infinite" as applied to the First Principle
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call it one and indivisible mean it in the sense of a point or a unit; for what are one in this way are principles of quantity, which could not have come to exist unless substance and that before substance had preceded it; so that is not where one should direct one's thought; but all the same these correspond to those higher things in their simplicity and avoidance of multiplicity and partition.

6. In what sense, then, do we call it one, and how are we to fit it into our thought? "One" must be understood in a larger sense than that in which a unity and a point are unified. For there the soul takes away size and multiplicity of number and comes to a stop at the smallest and rests its thought on something which is partless but was in something divisible and is in something else; but what is not in something else or in the divisible is not partless either in the same way as the smallest; for it is the greatest of all things, not in size but in power, so that its sizelessness also is a matter of power; since the things after it also are indivisible and undivided in their powers, not in their bulks. And it must be understood as infinite not because its size and number cannot be measured or counted but because its power cannot be comprehended.¹ For when you think of him as Intellect or God, he is more; and when you unify him in your thought, here also the degree of unity by which he transcends your thought is more than you imagined it to be; for he is by himself without any incidental attributes. But someone could also think of his oneness in terms of self-

to be taken: they are to point beyond any comprehensible unit or unboundedness.

τις καὶ τὸ ἓν αὐτοῦ ἐνθυμηθείη.¹ δεῖ μὲν γὰρ
 ἰκανώτατον <ὄν>² ἀπάντων καὶ αὐταρκέστατον, καὶ
 ἀνευδέεστατον εἶναι· πᾶν δὲ πολὺ καὶ [μὴ ἓν]³ ἐνδεές μὴ
 20 ἓν ἐκ πολλῶν γενόμενον. δεῖται οὖν αὐτοῦ ἢ οὐσία ἓν
 εἶναι. τὸ δὲ οὐ δεῖται ἑαυτοῦ· αὐτὸ γὰρ ἐστὶ. καὶ μὴν
 πολλὰ ὄν τοσοῦτων δεῖται, ὅσα ἔστι, καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν ἐν
 αὐτῷ μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων ὄν καὶ οὐκ ἔφ' ἑαυτοῦ, ἐνδεές τῶν
 ἄλλων ὑπάρχον, καὶ καθ' ἓν καὶ κατὰ τὸ ὅλον τὸ
 τοιοῦτον ἐνδεές παρέχεται. εἴπερ οὖν δεῖ τι
 25 αὐταρκέστατον εἶναι, τὸ ἓν εἶναι δεῖ τοιοῦτον ὄν μόνον,
 οἷον μήτε πρὸς αὐτὸ μήτε πρὸς ἄλλο ἐνδεές εἶναι. οὐ γάρ
 τι ζητεῖ, ἵνα ᾗ, οὐδ' ἵνα εὑρῆ, οὐδὲ ἵνα ἐκεῖ ἰδρυθῆ. τοῖς
 μὲν γὰρ ἄλλοις αἴτιον ὄν οὐ παρ' ἄλλων ἔχει ὃ ἐστὶ, τό
 τε εὑ τί ἂν εἴη αὐτῷ ἔξω αὐτοῦ; ὥστε οὐ κατὰ
 30 συμβεβηκὸς αὐτῷ τὸ εὑ· αὐτὸ γὰρ ἐστὶ. τόπος τε οὐδεὶς
 αὐτῷ· οὐ γὰρ δεῖται ἰδρύσεως ὥσπερ αὐτὸ φέρειν οὐ
 δυνάμενον, τό τε ἰδρυθησόμενον ἄψυχον καὶ ὄγκος
 πίπτων, ἐὰν μήπω ἰδρυθῆ. ἰδρυταὶ δὲ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα διὰ
 τοῦτον, δι' ὄν ὑπέστη ἅμα καὶ ἔσχεν εἰς ὄν ἐτάχθη
 τόπον· ἐνδεές δὲ καὶ τὸ τόπον ζητοῦν. ἀρχὴ δὲ οὐκ
 35 ἐνδεές τῶν μετ' αὐτό· ἢ δ' ἀπάντων ἀρχὴ ἀνευδέες
 ἀπάντων. ὅτι γὰρ ἐνδεές, ἐφιέμενον ἀρχῆς ἐνδεές· εἰ δὲ
 τὸ ἓν ἐνδεές του, ζητεῖ δηλονότι τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἓν· ὥστε
 ἐνδεές ἔσται τοῦ φθεροῦντος· πᾶν δὲ ὃ ἂν λέγηται
 ἐνδεές, τοῦ εὑ καὶ τοῦ σφύζοντός ἐστιν ἐνδεές. ὥστε τῷ

¹ Gollwitzer: ἐν οὐ μὴ θεῖη Enn.

² Harder.

³ del. Puelma.

sufficiency. For since he is the most sufficient and
 independent of all things, he must also be the most
 without need; but everything which is many is also
 in need unless it becomes one from many. Therefore
 its substance needs to be one. But the One does not
 need itself: for it is itself. Certainly anything which
 is many needs all the things which it is, and each of
 the things in it, since it is with the others and not by
 itself, and exists in need of the others, makes a thing
 like this needy both in each single part and as a
 whole. Given, then, that there must be something
 supremely self-sufficient, it must be the One, which
 is the only thing of such a kind as not to be in need
 either in relation to itself or to anything else. For it
 does not seek anything for its being or for its well-
 being, or its establishment in its place. For since it is
 the cause of the others it does not have from the
 others what it is, and what could its well-being be
 outside itself? So its well-being is not incidental to
 it: for it is itself. And it has no place: for it needs no
 establishment as if unable to support itself; and that
 which has to be established is sculless and a mass
 which falls if it is not yet established. And the other
 things are established through him, through whom
 they at once exist and have the place to which they
 are assigned; but that which is looking for its place
 is in need. But a principle is not in need of the things
 which come after it, and the principle of all things
 needs none of them. For whatever is in need is in
 need as striving towards its principle; but if the One
 is in need of anything, it is obviously seeking not to
 be one; so it will be in need of its destroyer; but
 everything which is said to be in need is in need of its
 well-being and its preserver. So that there is nothing

40 ἐνὶ οὐδὲν ἀγαθὸν ἔστιν· οὐδὲ βούλησις τοίνυν οὐδενός·
 ἀλλ' ἔστιν ὑπεράγαθον καὶ αὐτὸ οὐχ ἑαυτῷ, τοῖς δὲ
 ἄλλοις ἀγαθόν, εἴ τι αὐτοῦ δύναται μεταλαμβάνειν. οὐδὲ
 νόησις, ἵνα μὴ ἑτερότης· οὐδὲ κίνησις· πρὸ γὰρ
 κινήσεως καὶ πρὸ νοήσεως. τί γὰρ καὶ νοήσει; ἑαυτόν;
 45 πρὸ νοήσεως τοίνυν ἀγνοῶν ἔσται, καὶ νοήσεως
 δεήσεται, ἵνα γνῶ ἑαυτὸν ὁ αὐτάρκης ἑαυτῷ. οὐ τοίνυν,
 ὅτι μὴ γινώσκει μηδὲ νοεῖ ἑαυτόν, ἀγνοία περὶ αὐτὸν
 ἔσται· ἢ γὰρ ἀγνοία ἑτέρου ὄντος γίγνεται, ὅταν
 θάτερον ἀγνοῇ θάτερον· τὸ δὲ μόνον οὔτε γινώσκει,
 οὔτε τι ἔχει ὃ ἀγνοεῖ, ἐν δὲ ὄν συνὸν αὐτῷ οὐ δέχεται
 50 νοήσεως ἑαυτοῦ. ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ τὸ συνεῖναι δεῖ προσάπτειν,
 ἵνα τηρῆς τὸ ἐν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ νοεῖν καὶ τὸ συνεῖναι¹
 ἀφαιρεῖν καὶ ἑαυτοῦ νόησιν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων· οὐ γὰρ κατὰ
 τὸν νοῦντα δεῖ τάπτειν αὐτόν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον κατὰ τὴν
 νόησιν. νόησις δὲ οὐ νοεῖ, ἀλλ' αἰτία τοῦ νοεῖν ἄλλω· τὸ
 55 δὲ αἴτιον οὐ ταῦτόν τῷ αἰτιατῷ. τὸ δὲ πάντων αἴτιον
 οὐδὲν ἔστιν ἐκείνων. οὐ τοίνυν οὐδὲ ἀγαθὸν λεκτέον
 τοῦτο, ὃ παρέχει, ἀλλὰ ἄλλως τὰγαθὸν ὑπὲρ τὰ ἄλλα
 ἀγαθά.

7. Εἰ δ' ὅτι μηδὲν τούτων ἔστιν, ἀοριστεῖς τῇ
 γνώμῃ, στήσων σαυτὸν εἰς ταῦτα, καὶ ἀπὸ τούτων θεῶ
 θεῶ δὲ μὴ ἔξω ρίπτων τὴν διάνοιαν. οὐ γὰρ κείταί που
 ἐρημώσαν αὐτοῦ τὰ ἄλλα, ἀλλ' ἔστι τῷ δυναμένῳ θιγεῖν
 5 ἀεὶ² παρόν, τῷ δ' ἀδυνατοῦντι οὐ πάρεστιν. ὡς περ δὲ
 ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων οὐκ ἔστι τι νοεῖν ἄλλο νοῦντα καὶ πρὸς

¹ Preller: συνιέναι Enn.

² suspic. Harder, approb. Puelma: ἐκεῖ Enn.

good for the One; so then it does not wish for anything; but it transcends good, and is good not for itself but for the others, if anything is able to participate in it. And it does not think, because there is no otherness; and it does not move: for it is before movement and before thought. For what will he be able to think? Himself? Then before his thinking he will be ignorant, and will need thinking in order to know himself, he who suffices for himself. There is, then, no ignorance about him because he does not know or think himself; for ignorance is of what is other, when one thing is ignorant of another; but the One alone does not know and has nothing of which it is ignorant, but being one and in union with itself does not need thought of itself. For in order to keep to the one you should not add the "in union", but take away thinking and being in union and thought of itself and of the others; for we must not put him on the level of the thinker, but rather on that of the thought. But thought does not think, but is a cause of thought to another; and the cause is not the same as what is caused. But the cause of all things is none of them. So we must not even call this One good, the good which he gives, but the Good in another way beyond all goods.

7. But if because it is none of these things you become indefinite in your thought of it, stand fast on these and contemplate it from these. But contemplate it without casting your thought outwards. For it does not lie somewhere leaving the other things empty of it, but is always present to anyone who is able to touch it, but is not present to the one who is unable. But, just as with other things it is not possible to think anything when one is thinking

ἄλλω ὄντα, ἀλλὰ δεῖ μηδὲν προσάπτειν τῷ νοουμένῳ,
 ἢ ἢ αὐτὸ τὸ νοούμενον, οὕτω δεῖ καὶ ἐνταῦθα εἶδέναι,
 ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλλου ἔχοντα ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τύπον ἐκείνου
 10 νοῆσαι ἐνεργούντος τοῦ τύπου, οὐδ' αὖ ἄλλοις
 κατειλημμένην τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ κατεχομένην τυπωθῆναι
 τῷ τοῦ ἐναντίου τύπῳ, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ περὶ τῆς ὕλης
 λέγεται, ὡς ἄρα ἄποιοι εἶναι δεῖ πάντων, εἰ μέλλει
 δέχεσθαι τοὺς πάντων τύπους, οὕτω καὶ πολὺ μᾶλλον
 15 ἀνείδεον τὴν ψυχὴν γίνεσθαι, εἰ μέλλει μηδὲν ἐμπόδιον
 ἐγκαθήμενον ἔσεσθαι πρὸς πλήρωσιν καὶ ἔλλαμψιν αὐτῇ
 τῆς φύσεως τῆς πρώτης. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, πάντων τῶν ἔξω
 ἀφεμένην δεῖ ἐπιστραφῆναι πρὸς τὸ εἶσω πάντα, μὴ
 πρὸς τι τῶν ἔξω κεκλίσθαι, ἀλλὰ ἀγνοήσαντα τὰ πάντα
 20 καὶ πρὸ τοῦ μὲν τῇ αἰσθήσει,¹ τότε δὲ καὶ τοῖς εἶδεσιν,
 ἀγνοήσαντα δὲ καὶ αὐτὸν ἐν τῇ θεᾷ ἐκείνου γενέσθαι,
 κάκεινῳ συγγενόμενον καὶ ἰκανῶς ὅλον ὀμιλήσαντα
 ἦκειν ἀγγέλλοντα, εἰ δύναίτο, καὶ ἄλλῳ τὴν ἐκεῖ
 συνουσίαν· οἷαν ἴσως καὶ Μίνως ποιοῦμενος
 ὁ ἀριστῆς τοῦ Διὸς ἐφημίσθη εἶναι, ἧς
 25 μεμνημένος εἶδωλα αὐτῆς τοὺς νόμους ἐτίθει τῇ τοῦ
 θεοῦ ἐπαφῇ εἰς νόμων πληρούμενος θέσων. ἢ καὶ τὰ
 πολιτικά οὐκ ἄξια αὐτοῦ νομίσας ἀεὶ² ἐθέλει μένειν
 ἄνω, ὅπερ καὶ τῷ πολὺ ἰδόντι γένοιτο ἂν πάθημα.

¹ Page: διαθέσει: Enn.

² van Winden: νομίσασα εἰ Enn.

¹ A summary paraphrase of Plato *Timaeus* 50D–E.

² The quotation is from *Odyssey* 19. 178–9. But Plotinus may have taken it from the account of Minos in the pseudo-Platonic dialogue of that title (*Minos* 318E–320D) which he is using here.

something else and has one's mind on something else, but one must add nothing to what is being thought about, that it may really be it which is being thought about, so here one must know that it is not possible when one has the impression of something else in one's soul to think that One while the impression is acting, and that the soul when it is taken up with and possessed by other things cannot take the impression of the opposite; but just as it is said of matter that it must be free from all qualities if it is going to receive the impressions of all things,¹ so much more must the soul be without form if there is going to be no obstacle settled in it to its fulfilment and illumination by the first nature. But if this is so, the soul must let go of all outward things and turn altogether to what is within, and not be inclined to any outward thing, but ignoring all things (as it did formerly in sense-perception, but then in the realm of Forms), and even ignoring itself, come to be in contemplation of that One, and having been in its company and had, so to put it, sufficient converse with it, come and announce, if it could, to another that transcendent union. Perhaps also it was because Minos attained this kind of union that he was said in the story to be "the familiar friend of Zeus",² and it was in remembering this that he laid down laws in its image, being filled full of lawgiving by the divine touch. Or, also, he may think civic matters unworthy of him and want to remain always above; this is liable to happen to one who has seen much. Plato says the One is not outside anything,³

³ Plato *Parmenides* 138E4.

οὐδενός φησὶν ἐστὶν ἔξω, ἀλλὰ πᾶσι σύνεστιν
 30 οὐκ εἰδόσι. φεύγουσι γὰρ αὐτοὶ αὐτοῦ ἔξω, μᾶλλον δὲ
 αὐτῶν ἔξω. οὐ δύναται οὖν ἐλεῖν ὃν πεφεύγασιν, οὐδ'
 αὐτοὺς ἀπολωλεκότες ἄλλον ζητεῖν, οὐδέ γε παῖς αὐτοῦ
 ἔξω ἐν μανίᾳ γεγεννημένος εἰδήσει τὸν πατέρα· ὁ δὲ
 μαθὼν ἑαυτὸν εἰδήσει καὶ ὀπόθεν.

8. Εἴ τις οὖν ψυχὴ οἶδεν ἑαυτὴν τὸν ἄλλον χρόνον,
 καὶ οἶδεν ὅτι ἢ κίνησις αὐτῆς οὐκ εὐθεία, ἀλλ' ἢ ὅταν
 κλάσιν λάβῃ, ἢ δὲ κατὰ φύσιν κίνησις οἷα ἢ ἐν κύκλῳ
 περὶ τι οὐκ ἔξω, ἀλλὰ περὶ κέντρον, τὸ δὲ κέντρον ἀφ'
 5 οὐ ὁ κύκλος, κινήσεται περὶ τοῦτο, ἀφ' οὗ ἐστὶ, καὶ
 τοῦτου¹ ἀναρτήσεται συμφέρουσα ἑαυτὴν πρὸς τὸ
 αἰτό, πρὸς ὃ ἐχρήν μὲν πάσας, φέρονται δὲ αἱ θεῶν αἰεὶ
 πρὸς ὃ φερόμεναι θεοὶ εἰσι. θεὸς γὰρ τὸ ἐκείνῳ
 συνημμένον, τὸ δὲ πύρρῳ ἀφιστάμενον ἄνθρωπος ὁ
 10 πολὺς καὶ θηρίον. τὸ οὖν τῆς ψυχῆς οἶον κέντρον τοῦτο
 ἐστὶ τὸ ζητούμενον; ἢ ἄλλο τι δεῖ νομίσει, εἰς ὃ πάντα
 οἶον κέντρα συμπίπτει; καὶ ὅτι ἀναλογίᾳ τὸ κέντρον
 τοῦδε τοῦ κύκλου; οὐδὲ γὰρ οὕτω κύκλος ἢ ψυχὴ ὡς τὸ
 σχῆμα, ἀλλ' ὅτι ἐν αὐτῇ καὶ περὶ αὐτὴν ἡ ἀρχαία

¹ Kirchhoff: τοῦτο Enn.

¹ The phrase "the ancient nature" of the soul occurs in Plato at *Symposium* 192E9 (Aristophanes' story), *Republic* X 611D2 (the simile of the sea-god Glaucus) and *Timaeus* 90D5 (in the context of the education of the soul). In all these places it means the true original nature of soul.

but is in company with all without their knowing. For they run away outside it, or rather outside themselves. They cannot then catch the one they have run away from, nor seek for another when they have lost themselves. A child, certainly, who is outside himself in madness will not know his father; but he who has learnt to know himself will know from whence he comes.

8. If then a soul knows itself for the rest of the time, and knows that its movement is not in a straight line, except when there is a kind of break in it, but its natural movement is, as it were, in a circle around something, something not outside but a centre, and the centre is that from which the circle derives, then it will move around this from which it is and will depend on this, bringing itself into accord with that which all souls ought to, and the souls of the gods always do; and it is by bringing themselves into accord with it that they are gods. For a god is what is linked to that centre, but that which stands far from it is a multiple human being or a beast. Is then this, as it were, centre of the soul what we are looking for? Or should we think it is something else in which all such centres coincide? And that the centre of the circle here below is only like it analogically? For the soul is not a circle in the same way as a geometrical figure, but because there is in it and around it the ancient nature,¹ and because it comes

Plotinus uses it again in this sense at VI. 5. 1. 16 and this must be its meaning here. Harder gives a different explanation of the passage based on the interpretation of "the ancient nature" as matter in I. 8. 7. 6. See his note *ad loc.*

15 φύσις, καὶ ὅτι ἀπὸ τοιούτου, καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον καὶ ὅτι
χωρισθεῖσαι ὄλαι. νῦν δέ, ἐπεὶ μέρος ἡμῶν κατέχεται
ὑπὸ τοῦ σώματος, οἷον εἴ τις τοὺς πόδας ἔχει ἐν ὕδατι,
τῷ δ' ἄλλω σώματι ὑπερέχει, τῷ δὴ μὴ βαπτισθέντι τῷ
σώματι ὑπεράραντες, τούτῳ συνάπτομεν κατὰ τὸ
20 ἑαυτῶν κέντρον τῷ οἷον πάντων κέντρῳ, καθάπερ τῶν
μεγίστων κύκλων τὰ κέντρα τῷ τῆς σφαίρας τῆς
περιχοῦστος κέντρῳ, ἀναπαυόμενοι. εἰ μὲν οὖν
σωματικοὶ ἦσαν, οὐ ψυχικοὶ κύκλοι, τοπικῶς ἂν τῷ
κέντρῳ συνῆπτον καὶ πῶς κειμένου τοῦ κέντρον περὶ
25 αὐτὸ ἂν ἦσαν· ἐπεὶ δὲ αὐταὶ τε αἱ ψυχαὶ νοηταί, ὑπὲρ
νοῦν τε ἐκείνο, δυνάμεσιν ἄλλαις, ἣ πέφυκε τὸ νοῦν
πρὸς τὸ κατανοούμενον συνάπτειν, οἷητέον τὴν συναφὴν
γίνεσθαι καὶ πλεόνως τὸ νοῦν παρεῖναι ὁμοιότητι καὶ
ταυτότητι καὶ συνάπτειν τῷ συγγενεῖ οὐδενὸς
30 διείργοντος. σώμασι μὲν γὰρ σώματα κωλύεται
κοινωνεῖν ἀλλήλοις, τὰ δὲ ἀσώματα σώμασιν οὐ
διείργεται· οὐδ' ἀφέστηκε τοίνυν ἀλλήλων τόπῳ,
ἑτερότητι δὲ καὶ διαφορᾷ· ὅταν οὖν ἡ ἑτερότης μὴ παρῆ,
ἀλλήλοις τὰ μὴ ἕτερα πάρεστιν. ἐκεῖνο μὲν οὖν μὴ ἔχον
35 ἑτερότητα αἰεὶ πάρεστιν, ἡμεῖς δ' ὅταν μὴ ἔχωμεν
καὶ ἐκεῖνο μὲν ἡμῶν οὐκ ἐφίεται, ὥστε περὶ ἡμᾶς εἶναι,
ἡμεῖς δὲ ἐκείνου, ὥστε ἡμεῖς περὶ ἐκεῖνο. καὶ αἰεὶ μὲν
περὶ αὐτό, οὐκ αἰεὶ δὲ εἰς αὐτὸ βλέπομεν, ἀλλ' οἷον χορὸς
ἐξῆς ᾄδων¹ καίπερ ἔχων περὶ τὸν κορυφαῖον τραπέζην ἂν
40 εἰς τὸ ἔξω τῆς θέας, ὅταν δὲ ἐπιστρέψῃ, ᾄδει τε καλῶς

¹ ἐξῆς ᾄδων Puelma: ἐξάδων Enr.

from an origin of this kind, and because souls are wholly separated. But now, since a part of us is held by the body, as if someone had his feet in water, but the rest of his body was above it, we lift ourselves up by the part which is not submerged in the body and by this join ourselves at our own centres to something like the centre of all things, just as the centres of the greatest circles join the centre of the encompassing sphere, and we are at rest. If then our circles were bodily, not soul-circles, they would be in touch with the centre at a place; the centre would be in some place and they would be around it; but since the souls themselves belong to the realm of Intellect and that One transcends Intellect, we must suppose that the contact takes place by other powers, in the way in which the thinker is naturally united to the thought, and that the thinker is present more completely by sameness and otherness and joined to what is akin to it with nothing to keep them apart. For bodies are hindered from communion with each other by bodies, but incorporeal things are not kept apart by bodies; nor are they separated in place, but by otherness and difference; when therefore there is no otherness, the things which are not other are present to each other. That One, therefore, since it has no otherness is always present, and we are present to it when we have no otherness; and the One does not desire us, so as to be around us, but we desire it, so that we are around it. And we are always around it but do not always look to it; it is like a choral dance: in the order of its singing the choir keeps round its conductor but may sometimes turn away, so that he is out of their sight, but when it turns back to him it sings beautifully and is truly

καὶ ὄντως περὶ αὐτὸν ἔχει, οὕτω καὶ ἡμεῖς αἰεὶ μὲν περὶ αὐτόν—καὶ ὅταν μὴ,¹ λύσις ἡμῖν παντελὴς ἔσται καὶ οὐκέτι ἐσόμεθα—οὐκ αἰεὶ δὲ εἰς αὐτόν· ἀλλ' ὅταν εἰς αὐτὸν ἴδωμεν, τότε ἡμῖν τέλος καὶ ἀνάπαυλα καὶ τὸ μὴ
45 ἀπάδειν χορεύουσιν ὄντως περὶ αὐτὸν χορείαν ἔνθεον.

9. Ἐν δὲ ταύτῃ τῇ χορείᾳ καθορᾷ πηγὴν μὲν ζωῆς, πηγὴν δὲ νοῦ, ἀρχὴν ὄντος, ἀγαθοῦ αἰτίαν, ρίζαν ψυχῆς· οὐκ ἐκχεομένων ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, εἴτ' ἐκείνον ἐλαττούντων· οὐ γὰρ ἄγκος· ἢ φθαρτὰ ἂν ἦν τὰ γεννώμενα. νῦν δ'
5 ἐστὶν αἰδία, ὅτι ἢ ἀρχὴ αὐτῶν ὡσαύτως μένει οὐ μεμερισμένη εἰς αὐτά, ἀλλ' ὅλη μένουσα. διὸ κακείνα μένει· οἷον εἰ μένοντος ἡλίου καὶ τὸ φῶς μένει. οὐ γὰρ ἀποτετμήμεθα οὐδὲ χωρὶς ἐσμεν, εἰ καὶ παρεμπεσοῦσα ἢ σώματος φύσις πρὸς αὐτὴν ἡμᾶς εἴλκυσε, ἀλλ'
10 ἐμπνέομεν² καὶ σωζόμεθα οὐ δόντος, εἴτ' ἀποστάντος ἐκείνου, ἀλλ' αἰεὶ χορηγοῦντος ἕως ἂν ἢ ὅπερ ἐστί. μᾶλλον μέντοι ἐσμέν νεύσαντες πρὸς αὐτὸ καὶ τὸ εὖ ἐνταῦθα, τὸ <δὲ>³ πόρρω εἶναι μόνον καὶ ἦττον εἶναι. ἐνταῦθα καὶ ἀναπαύεται ψυχὴ καὶ κακῶν ἔξω εἰς τὸν τῶν κακῶν καθαρὸν τόπον ἀναδραμοῦσα· καὶ νοεῖ
15 ἐνταῦθα, καὶ ἀπαθῆς ἐνταῦθα. καὶ τὸ ἀληθῶς ζῆν ἐνταῦθα· τὸ γὰρ νῦν καὶ τὸ ἄνευ θεοῦ ἔχνος ζωῆς ἐκείνην μιμούμενον,⁴ τὸ δὲ ἐκεῖ ζῆν ἐνέργεια μὲν νοῦ· ἐνέργεια δὲ καὶ γεννᾶ θεοῦς ἐν ἡσυχῇ τῇ πρὸς ἐκείνο ἐπαφῇ, γεννᾶ δὲ κάλλος, γεννᾶ δικαιοσύνην, ἀρετὴν γεννᾶ.
20 ταῦτα γὰρ κύει ψυχὴ πληρωθεῖσα θεοῦ, καὶ τοῦτο αὐτῇ ἀρχὴ καὶ τέλος· ἀρχὴ μὲν, ὅτι ἐκείθεν, τέλος δέ, ὅτι τὸ

¹ Kirchhoff: ἢ Enn.

² Kirchhoff: ἐν πνέομεν Enn.

³ Müller.

⁴ A³ (= Ficinus): μιμουμένον Enn.

with him; so we too are always around him—and if we were not, we should be totally dissolved and no longer exist—but not always turned to him; but when we do look to him, then we are at our goal and at rest and do not sing out of tune as we truly dance our god-inspired dance around him.

9. And in this dance the soul sees the spring of life, the spring of intellect, the principle of being, the cause of good, the root of the soul; these are not poured out from him with the result that they diminish him; for there is no bulk; otherwise the things generated from him would be perishable. But as it is they are eternal, because their principle remains the same, not divided up into them but abiding as a whole. So they also abide; just as the light abides if the sun abides. For we are not cut off from him or separate, even if the nature of body has intruded and drawn us to itself, but we breathe and are preserved because that Good has not given its gifts and then gone away but is always bestowing them as long as it is what it is. But we exist more when we turn to him and our well-being is there, but being far from him is nothing else but existing less. There the soul takes its rest and is outside evils because it has run up into the place which is clear of evils; and it thinks there, and is not passive, and its true life is there; for our present life, the life without God, is a trace of life imitating that life. But life in that realm is the active actuality of Intellect; and the active actuality generates gods in quiet contact with that Good, and generates beauty, and generates righteousness, and generates virtue. It is these the soul conceives when filled with God, and this is its beginning and end; its beginning because it comes from thence, and its end

ἀγαθὸν ἐκεῖ. καὶ ἐκεῖ γενομένη γίγνεται αὐτὴ καὶ ὅπερ
 ἦν· τὸ γὰρ ἐνταῦθα καὶ ἐν τούτοις ἔκπτωσις καὶ φυγὴ
 καὶ πτερορρύσεις. δηλοῖ δὲ ὅτι τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐκεῖ καὶ ὁ
 25 ἔρωσις ὁ τῆς ψυχῆς ὁ σύμφυτος, καθὸ καὶ συνέζευκται
 Ἔρωσι ταῖς Ψυχαῖς καὶ ἐν γραφαῖς καὶ ἐν μύθοις. ἐπεὶ
 γὰρ ἕτερον θεοῦ ἐκείνη, ἐξ ἐκείνου δέ, ἐρᾷ αὐτοῦ
 ἐξανάγκης. καὶ οὐσα ἐκεῖ τὸν οὐράνιον Ἔρωτα ἔχει,
 ἐνταῦθα δὲ πάνδημος γίγνεται· καὶ γὰρ ἔστιν ἐκεῖ
 30 Ἀφροδίτη οὐρανία, ἐνταῦθα δὲ γίγνεται πάνδημος οἷον
 ἑταιρισθείσα. καὶ ἔστι πάσα ψυχὴ Ἀφροδίτη· καὶ
 τοῦτο αἰνίττεται καὶ τὰ τῆς Ἀφροδίτης γενέθλια καὶ ὁ
 Ἔρωσις ὁ μετ' αὐτῆς γενόμενος. ἐρᾷ οὖν κατὰ φύσιν
 35 ἔχουσα ψυχὴ θεοῦ ἐνωθῆναι θέλουσα, ὡσπερ παρθένος
 καλοῦ πατρὸς¹ καλὸν ἔρωτα. ὅταν δὲ εἰς γένεσιν
 ἔλθοῦσα οἷον μνηστείας ἀπατηθῆ, ἄλλον ἀλλαξαμένη
 θνητὸν ἔρωτα ἐρημία πατρὸς ὑβρίζεται· μισήσασα δὲ
 πάλιν τὰς ἐνταῦθα ὑβρεῖς ἀγνεύσασα τῶν τῆδε πρὸς τὸν
 πατέρα αὐτῆς στελλομένη εὐπαθεῖ. καὶ οἷς μὲν
 40 ἀγνωστόν ἐστι τὸ πάθημα τοῦτο, ἐντεῦθεν ἐνθυμείσθω
 ἀπὸ τῶν ἐνταῦθα ἐρώτων, οἷον ἔστι τυχεῖν ὧν τις
 μάλιστα ἐρᾷ, καὶ ὅτι ταῦτα μὲν τὰ ἐρώμενα θνητὰ καὶ
 βλαβερὰ καὶ εἰδώλων ἔρωτες καὶ μεταπίπτει, ὅτι οὐκ
 ἦν τὸ ὄντως ἐρώμενον οὐδὲ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἡμῶν οὐδ' ὁ

¹ Kirchhoff: πρὸς WBRCQ: om. JU.

² From the *Phaedrus* myth, 248C8.

³ For the distinction of the two Aphrodites (which seems to have been a sort of Athenian homosexual in-joke, without foundation in cult or popular belief) see Plato *Symposium* 180D–E. It had, of course, a much more serious history from Plotinus onwards.

⁴ *Symposium* 203E. Plotinus' fullest interpretation of the myth is III. 5. 7–9.

because its good is there. And when it comes to be there it becomes itself and what it was; for what it is here and among the things of this world is a falling away and an exile and a "shedding of wings".¹ And the soul's innate love makes clear that the Good is there, and this is why Eros is coupled with the Psyche in pictures and stories. For since the soul is other than God but comes from him it is necessarily in love with him, and when it is there it has the heavenly love, but here love becomes vulgar; for the soul there is the heavenly Aphrodite, but here becomes the vulgar Aphrodite, a kind of whore.² And every soul is Aphrodite; and this is symbolised in the story of the birthday of Aphrodite and Eros who is born with her.³ The soul then in her natural state is in love with God and wants to be united with him; it is like the noble love of a girl for her noble father. But when the soul has come into the world of becoming and is deceived, so to say, by the blandishments of her suitors, she changes, bereft of her father, to a mortal love and is shamed; but again she comes to hate her shames here below, and purifies herself of the things of this world and sets herself on the way to her father and fares well.⁴ And if anyone does not know this experience, let him think of it in terms of our loves here below, and what it is like to attain what one is most in love with, and that these earthly loves are mortal and harmful and loves only of images, and that they change because it was not what is really and truly loved nor our good nor what

⁴ Plotinus uses this comparison again at V. 5. 12. 37. But there it is not the beauty of the world of sense which draws the daughter away from the father, but the beauty of the intelligible: on this see my note *ad loc.*

ζητούμεν. ἐκεῖ δὲ τὸ ἀληθινὸν ἐρώμενον, ᾧ ἔστι καὶ
 45 συνεῖναι μεταλαμβάνοντα αὐτοῦ καὶ ὄντως ἔχοντα, οὐ
 περιπτυσσόμενον σαρκὶν ἔξωθεν. ὅστις δὲ εἶδεν,
 οἶδεν ὁ λέγω, ὡς ἡ ψυχὴ ζωὴν ἄλλην ἴσχει τότε
 καὶ προσιούσα¹ καὶ ἤδη προσελθοῦσα καὶ μετασχούσα
 αὐτοῦ, ὥστε γινῶναι διατεθείσαν, ὅτι πάρεστιν ὁ
 50 χορηγὸς ἀληθινῆς ζωῆς, καὶ δεῖ οὐδενὸς ἔτι. τούναντίον
 δὲ ἀποθέσθαι τὰ ἄλλα δεῖ, καὶ ἐν μόνῳ στήναι τούτῳ,
 καὶ τοῦτο γενέσθαι μόνον περικόψαντα τὰ λοιπὰ ὅσα
 περικείμεθα: ὥστε ἐξελεῖν σπεύδειν ἐντεῦθεν καὶ
 ἀγανακτεῖν ἐπὶ θάτερα δεδεμένους, ἵνα τῷ ὅλῳ αὐτῶν
 55 περιπτυξώμεθα καὶ μηδὲν μέρος ἔχομεν, ᾧ μὴ
 ἐφαπτόμεθα θεοῦ. ὁρᾶν δὴ ἔστιν ἐνταῦθα κἀκείνον καὶ
 ἑαυτὸν ὡς ὁρᾶν θέμις: ἑαυτὸν μὲν ἠγλαϊσμένον, φωτὸς
 πλήρη νοητοῦ, μᾶλλον δὲ φῶς αὐτὸ καθαρὸν, ἀβαρῆ,
 κούφον, θεὸν γενόμενον, μᾶλλον δὲ ὄντα, ἀναφθέντα μὲν
 60 τότε, εἰ δὲ πάλιν βαρύνοντο, ὥσπερ μαραινόμενον.

10. Πῶς οὖν οὐ μένει ἐκεῖ; ἢ ὅτι μήπω ἐξελήλυθεν
 ὁλος. ἔσται δὲ ὅτε καὶ τὸ συνεχὲς ἔσται τῆς θείας οὐκ ἐτι
 ἐνοχλουμένῳ οὐδεμίαν ἐνόχλησιν τοῦ σώματος. ἔστι δὲ
 τὸ ἐωρακὸς οὐ τὸ ἐνοχλούμενον, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἄλλο, ὅτε
 5 τὸ ἐωρακὸς ἀργεῖ τὴν θείαν οὐκ ἀργοῦν τὴν ἐπιστήμην
 τὴν ἐν ἀποδείξεσι καὶ πίστεσι καὶ τῷ τῆς ψυχῆς
 διαλογισμῷ: τὸ δὲ ἰδεῖν καὶ τὸ ἐωρακὸς ἔστιν οὐκ ἐτι
 λόγος, ἀλλὰ μείζον λόγου καὶ πρὸ λόγου καὶ ἐπὶ τῷ

¹ Kirchhoff: προῖούσα Enn.

¹ The phrase seems to have been a fairly commonplace one, used by a mystery-initiate when addressing others to avoid divulging secrets. See Pausanias I 37. 4-5 (where it is

we seek. But there is our true love, with whom also we can be united, having a part in him and truly possessing him, not embracing him in the flesh from outside. But "whoever has seen, knows what I am saying",¹ that the soul then has another life and draws near, and has already come near and has a part in him, and so is in a state to know that the giver of true life is present and we need nothing more. But quite otherwise, we must put away other things and take our stand only in this, and become this alone, cutting away all the other things in which we are encased; so we must be eager to go out from here and be impatient at being bound to the other things, that we may embrace him with the whole of ourselves and have no part with which we do not touch God. There one can see both him and oneself as it is right to see: the self glorified, full of intelligible light—but rather itself pure light—weightless, floating free, having become—but rather, being a god; set on fire then, but the fire seems to go out if one is weighed down again.

10. How is it, then, that one does not remain there? It is because one has not yet totally come out of this world. But there will be a time when the vision will be continuous, since there will no longer be any hindrance by the body. But it is not that which has seen which is hindered, but the other part which, when that which has seen rests from vision, does not rest from the knowledge which lies in demonstrations and evidence and the discourse of the soul; but seeing and that which has seen are not reason, but greater than reason and before reason used in the very down-to-earth and unspiritual context of beans). Plotinus also uses it at I. 6. 7. 2.

λόγω, ὡσπερ καὶ τὸ ὁρώμενον. ἐαυτὸν μὲν οὖν ἰδὼν
 10 τότε, ὅτε ὁρᾷ, τοιοῦτον ὄψεται, μᾶλλον δὲ αὐτῷ
 τοιοῦτῳ συνέσται καὶ τοιοῦτον αἰσθήσεται ἀπλοῦν
 γενόμενον. τάχα δὲ οὐδὲ "ὄψεται" λεκτέον, τὸ δὲ
 "ὄφθέν", εἴπερ δεῖ δύο ταῦτα λέγειν, τό τε ὁρῶν καὶ
 ὁρώμενον, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἐν ἄμφω· τολμηρὸς μὲν ὁ λόγος.
 τότε μὲν οὖν οὔτε ὁρᾷ οὐδὲ διακρίνει ὁ ὁρῶν οὐδὲ
 15 φαντάζεται δύο, ἀλλ' οἷον ἄλλος γενόμενος καὶ οὐκ
 αὐτὸς οὐδ' αὐτοῦ συντελεῖ ἐκεῖ, κάκεινου γενόμενος ἐν
 ἔστιν ὡσπερ κέντρῳ κέντρον συνάψας. καὶ γὰρ ἐνταῦθα
 συνελθόντα ἐν ἔστι, τό τε δύο, ὅταν χωρίς. οὕτω καὶ
 ἡμεῖς νῦν λέγομεν ἕτερον· διὸ καὶ δίσφραστον τὸ θέαμα·
 20 πῶς γὰρ ἂν ἀπαγγείλειε τις ὡς ἕτερον οὐκ ἰδὼν ἐκεῖ ὅτε
 ἐθεᾶτο ἕτερον, ἀλλὰ ἐν πρὸς ἑαυτόν;

11. Τοῦτο δὴ ἐθέλον δηλοῦν τὸ τῶν μυστηρίων
 τῶνδε ἐπίταγμα, τὸ μὴ ἐκφέρειν εἰς μὴ μεμνημένους,
 ὡς οὐκ ἐκφορον ἐκεῖνο ὄν, ἀπέιπε δηλοῦν πρὸς ἄλλον τὸ
 θεῖον, ὅτι μὴ καὶ αὐτῷ ἰδεῖν εὐτύχηται. ἐπεὶ τοῖνυν δύο
 5 οὐκ ἦν, ἀλλ' ἐν ἦν αὐτὸς ὁ ἰδὼν πρὸς τὸ ἐωραμένον, αἷς
 ἂν μὴ ἐωραμένον, ἀλλ' ἠνωμένον, ὃς ἐγένετο ὅτε ἐκείνῳ
 ἐμίγνυτο εἰ μεμνώτο, ἔχοι ἂν παρ' ἑαυτῷ ἐκείνου
 εἰκόνα. ἦν δὲ ἐν καὶ αὐτὸς διαφορὰν ἐν αὐτῷ οὐδεμίᾳ
 πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἔχων οὔτε κατὰ ἄλλα—οὐ γάρ τι ἐκινεῖτο
 10 παρ' αὐτῷ, οὐ θυμός, οὐκ ἐπιθυμία ἄλλου παρῆν αὐτῷ
 ἀναβεβηκότι—ἀλλ' οὐδὲ λόγος οὐδέ τις νόησις οὐδ'

and above reason, as is that which is seen. When therefore the seer sees himself, then when he sees, he will see himself as like this, or rather he will be in union with himself as like this and will be aware of himself as like this since he has become single and simple. But perhaps one should not say "will see", but "was seen", if one must speak of these as two, the seer and the seen, and not both as one—a bold statement. So then the seer does not see and does not distinguish and does not imagine two, but it is as if he had become someone else and he is not himself and does not count as his own there, but has come to belong to that and so is one, having joined, as it were, centre to centre. For here too when the centres have come together they are one, but there is duality when they are separate. This also is how we now speak of "another". For this reason the vision is hard to put into words. For how could one announce that as another when he did not see, there when he had the vision, another, but one with himself?

11. This is the intention of the command given in the mysteries here below not to disclose to the uninitiated; since that Good is not disclosable, it prohibits the declaration of the divine to another who has not also himself had the good fortune to see. Since, then, there were not two, but the seer himself was one with the seen (for it was not really seen, but united to him), if he remembers who he became when he was united with that, he will have an image of that in himself. He was one himself, with no distinction in himself either in relation to himself or to other things for there was no movement in him and he had no emotion, no desire for anything else when he had made the ascent—but there was not even any

ὄλως αὐτός, εἰ δεῖ καὶ τοῦτο λέγειν. ἀλλ' ὥσπερ
 ἀρπασθεῖς ἢ ἐνθουσιάσας ἡσυχῇ ἐν ἐρήμῳ καὶ
 καταστάσει γεγένηται ἀτρεμεῖ, τῇ αὐτοῦ οὐσία οὐδαμῇ
 15 ἀποκλίνων οὐδὲ περὶ αὐτὸν στρεφόμενος, ἐστὼς πάντῃ
 καὶ ὄν στάσις γενόμενος. οὐδὲ τῶν καλῶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ
 καλὸν ἤδη ὑπερθέων, ὑπερβάς ἤδη καὶ τὸν τῶν ἀρετῶν
 χορόν, ὥσπερ τις εἰς τὸ εἶσω τοῦ ἀδύτου εἰσδύς εἰς
 τοῦπίσω καταλιπὼν τὰ ἐν τῷ νεῷ ἀγάλματα, ἃ
 20 ἐξελθόντι τοῦ ἀδύτου πάλιν γίνεται πρῶτα μετὰ τὸ
 ἔνδον θέαμα καὶ τὴν ἐκεῖ συνουσίαν πρὸς οὐκ ἄγαλμα
 οὐδὲ εἰκόνα, ἀλλὰ αὐτό· ἃ δὴ γίνονται δεύτερα θεάματα.
 τὸ δὲ ἴσως ἦν οὐ θέαμα, ἀλλὰ ἄλλος τρόπος τοῦ ἰδεῖν,
 ἔκστασις καὶ ἄπλωσις καὶ ἐπίδοσις αὐτοῦ καὶ ἔφσεις
 πρὸς ἀφήν καὶ στάσις καὶ περινόησις πρὸς
 25 ἐφαρμογήν, εἴπερ τις τὸ ἐν τῷ ἀδύτῳ θεάσεται. εἰ δ'
 ἄλλως βλέποι, οὐδὲν αὐτῷ πάρεστι. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν
 μιμήματα· καὶ τοῖς οὖν σοφοῖς τῶν προφητῶν
 αἰνίττεται, ὅπως θεὸς ἐκεῖνος ὀράται· σοφὸς δὲ ἱερεὺς
 τὸ αἶνγμα συνιείς ἀληθινῇ ἂν ποιοῖτο ἐκεῖ γενόμενος
 30 τοῦ ἀδύτου τὴν θέαν. καὶ μὴ γενόμενος δὲ τὸ ἀδύτον
 τοῦτο ἀόρατόν τι χρῆμα νομίσας καὶ πηγῆν καὶ ἀρχήν,
 εἰδήσει ὡς ἀρχῇ ἀρχὴν ὀρᾷ καὶ συγγίνεται [καὶ]¹ τῷ
 ὁμοίῳ τὸ ὅμοιον. <καὶ>¹ οὐδὲν παραλιπὼν τῶν θείων

¹ transposuimus.

¹ This is the only passage in the *Enneads* where ἔκστασις (usually rather inadequately and misleadingly translated "ecstasy") is used in any context relevant to the mystical union, if with Theiler and H-S we read ἐκτάσει in VI. 7. 17. 40. Theiler would prefer, for this and other reasons, to read [ἐκ]στάσις here and delete καὶ στάσις in the next line: see *Plotinus Schriften VI (Indices)* p. 174. But even if the reading of the MSS is kept here, there is no good reason for

reason or thought, and he himself was not there, if we must even say this; but he was as if carried away or possessed by a god, in a quiet solitude and a state of calm, not turning away anywhere in his being and not busy about himself, altogether at rest and having become a kind of rest. He had no thought of beauties, but had already run up beyond beauty and gone beyond the choir of virtues, like a man who enters into the sanctuary and leaves behind the statues in the outer shrine; these become again the first things he looks at when he comes out of the sanctuary, after his contemplation within and intercourse there, not with a statue or image but with the Divine itself; they are secondary objects of contemplation. But that other, perhaps, was not a contemplation but another kind of seeing, a being out of oneself¹ and simplifying and giving oneself over and pressing towards contact and rest and a sustained thought leading to adaptation, if one is going to contemplate what is in the sanctuary. But if one looks in another way, one finds nothing. These are images; and this, therefore, is how the wise among the expositors of holy things express in riddles how that god is seen; and a wise priest who understands the riddle may make the contemplation real by entering the sanctuary; and even if he has not been there, and thinks that this sanctuary is something invisible, and the source and the principle, he will know that he sees principle by principle and that like is united with like. And he will neglect none of the divine properties which the soul can have even describing the mystical union according to Plotinus as an "ecstasy". It gives a very misleading impression of this austere and quiet mysticism.

ὅσα δύναται ψυχὴ ἔχειν καὶ πρὸ τῆς θεάς, τὸ λοιπὸν ἐκ
 35 τῆς θεάς ἀπαιτεῖ. τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν τῷ ὑπερβάντι πάντα τὸ ὄ
 ἔστι πρὸ πάντων. οὐ γὰρ δὴ εἰς τὸ πάντη μὴ ὄν ἦξει ἢ
 ψυχῆς φύσις, ἀλλὰ κάτω μὲν βᾶσα εἰς κακὸν ἦξει, καὶ
 οὕτως εἰς μὴ ὄν, οὐκ εἰς τὸ παντελὲς μὴ ὄν. τὴν ἐναντίαν
 δὲ δραμοῦσα ἦξει οὐκ εἰς ἄλλο, ἀλλ' εἰς αὐτήν, καὶ
 40 οὕτως οὐκ ἐν ἄλλῳ ὅσα <οὐκ>¹ ἐν οὐδενί ἐστιν, ἀλλ' ἐν
 αὐτῇ· τὸ δὲ ἐν αὐτῇ μόνῃ καὶ οὐκ ἐν τῷ ὄντι ἐν ἐκείνῳ·
 γίνεται γὰρ καὶ αὐτὸς τις οὐκ οὐσία, ἀλλ' ἐπέκεινα
 οὐσίας ταύτης, ἢ προσομιλεῖ. εἴ τις οὖν τοῦτο αὐτὸν
 γενόμενον ἴδοι, ἔχει ὁμοίωμα ἐκείνου αὐτόν, καὶ εἰ ἀφ'
 45 αὐτοῦ μεταβαίνοι ὡς εἰκῶν πρὸς ἀρχέτυπον, τέλος ἂν
 ἔχοι τῆς πορείας. ἐκπίπτων δὲ τῆς θεάς πάλιν
 ἐγείρας ἀρετὴν τὴν ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ κατανοήσας ἑαυτὸν
 ταύταις κεκοσμημένον πάλιν κουφισθήσεται δι' ἀρετῆς
 ἐπὶ νοῦν ἰῶν καὶ σοφίαν καὶ διὰ σοφίας ἐπ' αὐτό. καὶ
 οὗτος θεῶν καὶ ἀνθρώπων θείων καὶ εὐδαιμόνων βίος,
 50 ἀπαλλαγὴ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τῆδε, βίος ἀνήδονος τῶν
 τῆδε, φυγὴ μόνου πρὸς μόνον.

¹ Thedinga.

¹ "Beyond substance" is the often quoted foundation-text from Plato *Republic* VI 509B9; "the end of the journey" from *Republic* VII 532E3, again in the context of the ascent to the Good.

² These last words, in the common translation "flight of the alone to the Alone", are the only words of Plotinus at all generally known and remembered. He uses the "alone to the alone" formula elsewhere in the *Enneads* when speaking of our encounter with the Good (I. 6. 7. 8; VI. 7. 34. 7). It is in fact a fairly commonplace Greek phrase, generally, but not always, in a religious context. The closest parallel to Plotinus' use of it is in Numenius fr. 2 des

before the vision, and will seek the rest from the vision; and the rest, for him who has gone beyond all, is that which is before all. For the nature of the soul will certainly not arrive at absolute non-existence, but when it goes down it will arrive at evil and in this way at non-existence, not at absolute non-existence. But if it runs the opposite way, it will arrive, not at something else but at itself, and in this way since it is not in something else it will not be in nothing, but in itself; but when it is in itself alone and not in being, it is in that; for one becomes, not substance, but "beyond substance" by this converse. If then one sees that oneself has become this, one has oneself as a likeness of that, and if one goes on from oneself, as image to original, one has reached "the end of the journey".¹ And when one falls from the vision, he wakes again the virtue in himself, and considering himself set in order and beautiful by these virtues he will again be lightened and come through virtue to Intellect and wisdom and through wisdom to that Good. This is the life of gods and of godlike and blessed men, deliverance from the things of this world, a life which takes no delight in the things of this world, escape in solitude to the solitary.²

Places (11 Leemans) 11-12 ὁμιλῆσαι τῷ ἀγαθῷ μόνῳ μόνον. See E. R. Dodds "Numenius and Ammonius" in *Les Sources de Plotin (Entretiens Hardt V)*, Vandoœuvres-Genève 1957, 16-17. It does tell us something important about the mysticism of Plotinus, but can be misleading if considered in isolation from the rest of his writing about the spiritual life and Porphyry's account of Plotinus as he knew him. See my "The Apprehension of Divinity in the Self and Cosmos in Plotinus" (*Plotinian & Christian Studies XVIII*).