>>22004
>For the critiques of the "Barbarossa was a preventive attack" idea one main card is the absence of direct evidence. Since the Soviet didn't attack the next best thing would be a plan.

We need to distinguish between "common" military plans, i.e. something like "in case of offensive on west border that division goes there and there" and large scale plans (like Barbarossa). Barbarossa was that plan, USSR had nothing (although it is debatable because there are much secrecy even today), but that type of plan made when decision is almost made too. USSR knew that war is very probable, but modernization of army planned to finish in 42, and there is no need to make serious plan until that happens. Or plan will be outdated in fast-changing world of 40s.

I guess Suvorov and his supporters say about global thing, like USSR would attack Germany, not about specific plan with numbers and arrows.

>but it's over 1.5 year. The Soviet could build and construct very efficiently, especially if it was about army and war.
>Due to the great cleansing the Red Army lacked in experienced officers. But that was 3 years before '41

I also have Zhukov's book (although it is memoirs, not historical work), he represents "official" post-Stalin position. He clearly says that officers were undereducated and unprepared, pre-war organization was flawed (like when communication in war situation must be done by local NKVD, but they couldn't do anything properly when war started). He wrote much about defenses and said that they weren't properly finished even according to 41's plan. Railroad modernization plan at "new" territories was completely failed in 40-41 etc.

Also purges didn't stop in 37, they continued to Stalin's death, although after Beria replaced Ezhov scale of repressions became smaller.