>>38286
>Goulart basically gave up the initiative to Kruel and the rebels.
On the grand scale, yes. The only reason he didn't put up a fight was he didn't want to. It would involve both radicalization and bloodshed and he wasn't willing to pursue either.
Not in this specific moment, though, because at the same time as this conversation he had dispatched an elite force to the Paraíba valley.
>He knew what's going on
Not so much, his apparatus was lacking in intelligence. If they had paid attention they'd have noticed in the preceding week huge troop movements by the Minas Gerais police and a suspicious meeting of high-ranking figures in the Juiz de Fora Airport.
>there were people who saw no threat.
The communists were among the "popular forces", which the military called the "Fifth Army". They boasted of their immense strength and, like the right, had a degree of paramilitary organization which could be formed into militias in wartime -this process briefly began in Brasília. This only helped convince the right they were a threat and had to be neutralized with a coup. Once the time came they were unable to use this force because of Goulart's indecisiveness, their own incompetence and simply because they were not as tough as they boasted. Prestes even told Kruschev he had two generals in the high command, which was pure nonsense.

So on to São Paulo. Through March political temperature rose including on the state. On the 16th a conference on land reform saw rowdy confrontations between left- and right-wing students and police. On the 19th, in a show of force the right made a 300 to 500 thousand-man demonstration, the March of the Family with God for Liberty.
It is Holy Friday, 28th of March. The sailors' mutiny has dragged the political crisis to it apex. At 03:00, two emissaries from the governor of Minas Gerais knock on Amauri Kruel’s home in Groenlândia street. They get him up to date on the conspiracy's buildup on their state, but he cannot confirm he’ll be on their side. He is in angst, divided between his loyalty to his friend and superior, the President, and his rage against the political situation.

At 19:30 42 of his subordinates come to his home. The conversation topic are rumors on the news that he's set to be replaced. He declares he'll refuse to hand over his post, and his officers declare their full support. A few of them suggest him to immediately rise up in revolt. He refuses: "the hour must be exact" and it's set for the next week. At about the same moment the conspiratorial staff in Minas Gerais was meeting to set the date, and chose an earlier day but did not inform anyone else. Like Castelo Branco, Kruel was expecting a rebellion on the 2nd of April or later.
Monday, 30th, 19:00. Through his brother in Rio de Janeiro, Riograndino, he gives Castelo Branco his “OK” for the operation.