09/18/2020 (Fri) 17:00:52
In this time period when they investigated the subject in 1963 they found several conspiracies already underway. Later they helped organized the dispatch of fuel tankers.
From the other side the Czechoslovak secret service had some activity in the same period.>>40136>if the units all over were kept low on crew and war material partially as an anti-coup measure (beside economical considerations)
Up to the 60s the logic was to concentrate firepower in the south and in Rio. The former as it bordered the Argentine Army. The latter because it was the capital, and reining in the military must've been a component of that. Goulart's apparatus concentrated reliable officers in Rio, too, and it's not unsafe to assume previous governments had a similar policy.
But Minas Gerais was unreliable because it was weak, not weak because it was unreliable. Mourão Filho was the least trustworthy general and hence given the weakest Division.>with the exception of the School-Unit Group, which might have kept as a unit to counter the others if necessary
The "anti-coup unit" would probably be the 1st Infantry Division itself. Once it was committed and a second front appeared the School-Unit Group was dispatched. In Sergeants' Revolt in 63 paratroopers were employed when an immediate iron-fisted reaction was needed. And within Rio itself marines were the regime's muscle.>This big independence the states enjoy in Brazil? They can negotiate deals with foreign actors? Especially arm deals?
It's one author that mentions it. Might be vestigial state independence from the pre-1930 time, when São Paulo could even train its state army with French advisors.>>40129>And your topic is a very successful putsch, and now I'm thinking those Brazilian officers really did know what they were doing (in a theoretical sense; they might had very incomplete information what is going on out in the field about them and as a consequence they might were very unsure what their next step should be)
What was really decisive wasn't a meticulously planned conspiracy but that the political climate developed to a point where the uninvolved would all either defect or retreat with no resistance. In Minas Gerais the plot was tightly woven allowing a swift takeover but it was just an island in an "archipelago" of regional conspiracies which were only connected near the very end. In some garrisons, notably the 5th Infantry Division, the rebels weren't just off on the date by a few days (as in Rio de Janeiro) but very aloof and caught by surprise. A rebellion was already what they wanted so they switched sides as soon as conditions were favorable (it was a weak garrison). This was in part from many efforts to legitimize an action against the government, and from the government itself ruining its image with the officer class. In this field the action of organizations such as IPES, which besides influencing public opinion opened covert channels of contact between oppositionist elites and officers, played the years-long game of preparing the ground. >and avoiding bloodshed was a top priority.
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