Bernd 09/24/2020 (Thu) 13:27:31 No.40270 del
In Belo Horizonte the airbase's reaction was feared as the trustworthy commander had been replaced just prior to the outbreak. The police was ready to besiege it but the new one sided with the rebellion once it began.
Mourão Filho was greeted by an enthusiastic crowd at night. News of his proclamation rapidly spread through military units in the country, with many deciding to join.

By night at most the legalists were already on the road. It was imminent war. The terrain was rough with river lines and mountainous bottlenecks.

The Tiradentes Detachment had 2714 men and 193 vehicles per its internal bulletin (the true primary source which I can only indirectly access). Over half were young and barely trained, with the exception of Ferraro's 11th Infantry which had a longer service and hence was the best regiment at hand. The police battalions were only fit for urban combat and would melt away in the open. Ammunition would only last a few hours. The 10th Infantry came on civilian buses. The only reinforcements could be more police battalions and those were already tied down on Brasília and the home front.

The legalist force was numerically superior, one source gives 4 thousand rebels and 5 thousand legalists, other numbers are 300 in the 1st Caçadores and 2500 in the 2nd Infantry, not really reliable. Their training and armament were also superior, particularly the prestigious Sampaio, which came on proper trucks. There were many reserves, it was 4 thousand in Minas Gerais versus 30 thousand in Rio. They further had the Air Force which could trigger a rout in the enemy simply with a few sweeps overhead. The terrain was a difficulty but a skilled pilot could pull it off.

The legalist leadership was so certain of victory Cunha Melo told his staff they'd get to eat in Juiz de Fora. Yet the President never gave them offensive orders, so the task was just to block rebel movement. As the tip of the spear Kerensky would, without firing the first shot, delay at the border so the 1st Infantry could entrench at the Paraíba.
On his part, Muricy had discussed with the 4th Region's staff a middle ground between the defensive and offensive plans. He'd move the Detachment into Rio de Janeiro state for tactical and political gain and entrench at a defensible position, avoiding a wide open battle. With his previous revolutionary experience he knew the first 48 hours were an amorphous political environment, when sides were picked, and hence defections were open. This was the only way to offset his weakness.